2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 11 - Civil Practice Act
Article 6 - Trials
§ 9-11-52. Findings by the Court

- Amendment of judgment to conform to verdict, § 9-12-14.

Provision that judgment may not be set aside for any defect that is amendable as matter of form, § 9-12-15.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52, see 28 U.S.C.

- For annual survey of recent developments, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1986). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 305 (2012).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Findings, Generally
• When Findings Necessary
• Review of Findings on Appeal
• Motions for Amendment and New Trial

General Consideration

Default judgments.

- When the judgment entered against the defendant is by default, compliance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 is not required. Smith v. Mack, 161 Ga. App. 95, 289 S.E.2d 299 (1982).

Motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 does not come within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Jones v. Christian, 165 Ga. App. 165, 300 S.E.2d 1 (1983).

- Award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 had to be vacated and remanded for reconsideration when the trial court had not made findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the award as such findings and conclusions were mandatory and did not have to be requested under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a); furthermore, the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in the trial court's order overcame the presumption of regularity of all proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 287 Ga. App. 133, 650 S.E.2d 795 (2007).

- Only after making the finding of deprivation may the court consider hearsay. In re D.S., 212 Ga. App. 203, 441 S.E.2d 412 (1994).

- Court could not consider commercial tenant's argument that tenant's motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law was refused; even assuming that the tenant filed a motion that complied with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, the motion was untimely because the motion was filed on the same day as the notice of appeal, filing of which deprived the trial court of the power to affect the judgment appealed. Keita v. K & S Trading, 292 Ga. App. 116, 663 S.E.2d 362 (2008).

Failure of plaintiff to make a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was a waiver of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court should have made such findings and conclusions, and nothing was presented for appellate review. Cage v. Chase Home Mtg. Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861, 443 S.E.2d 504 (1994).

When the appellants failed to request that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) prior to the entry of the court's order, it was unnecessary for the trial court to make any such findings. Youngblood v. Youngblood, 263 Ga. App. 820, 589 S.E.2d 602 (2003).

- Appellant who intends to argue that a trial court's findings are inadequate or incomplete waives that argument by failing to make the postjudgment motion referenced in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(c). In such cases, an appellate court does not remand for additional findings but simply affirms. Brannon v. Perryman Cemetery, Ltd., 308 Ga. App. 832, 709 S.E.2d 33 (2011).

- Trial court, following the grant of an injunction requiring the manager of an adult day care center to hand over control of the center to the owner, was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law because the manager's request was not made until after the injunction had issued. Kim v. First One Group, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 861, 700 S.E.2d 729 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by issuing an order that did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law and in failing to amend the court's order to include such findings and conclusions after a debtor filed a request pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 because the issues presented in the trial court were clearly reflected in the record, the only witness to testify at trial was the debtor, and the resolution of the issues depended on the law as applied to the undisputed facts; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(c) applied because the debtor did not file a motion asking the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law until after the trial court entered the court's judgment on the debtor's counterclaim. Sevostiyanova v. Tempest Recovery Servs., 307 Ga. App. 868, 705 S.E.2d 878 (2011).

- In divorce proceedings, because a former spouse moved for findings of fact after entry of the judgment, the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for findings of fact but was not required to do so under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(c). Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 709 S.E.2d 263 (2011).

- Trial court did not err in declining to amend a judgment prohibiting a limited liability company (LLC) from making any permanent changes to the surface of the property owners' land in replacing a sewer pipe by including the additional finding that the owners could not make any permanent changes to the surface of the easement until installation of the new sewer pipe because the issue of the owners' planned construction and any potential claims related thereto were not included in the pre-trial order as matters for determination, and the LLC had not previously requested any declaratory or injunctive relief pertaining to that issue prior to the entry of judgment. Parris Props., LLC v. Nichols, 305 Ga. App. 734, 700 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

Defendants' motion for new trial on timber proceeds issue was properly denied because whether a sibling received consideration for transferring interest in timber proceeds was a question of fact resolved by the superior court at a bench trial based on the testimony presented. Braswell v. Benton, 351 Ga. App. 372, 830 S.E.2d 758 (2019).

Cited in Brown v. White, 122 Ga. App. 771, 178 S.E.2d 757 (1970); Butterworth v. Butterworth, 227 Ga. 301, 180 S.E.2d 549 (1971); Faucette v. Faucette, 228 Ga. 201, 184 S.E.2d 586 (1971); Henderson v. County Bd. of Registration & Elections, 126 Ga. App. 280, 190 S.E.2d 633 (1972); American Appraisal Co. v. Whitley Constr. Co., 126 Ga. App. 398, 190 S.E.2d 838 (1972); Atlanta Country Club, Inc. v. Sanders, 230 Ga. 146, 195 S.E.2d 893 (1973); Bell v. Stocks, 128 Ga. App. 799, 198 S.E.2d 209 (1973); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. City of Dalton, 128 Ga. App. 853, 198 S.E.2d 401 (1973); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. AVCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 Ga. App. 605, 200 S.E.2d 309 (1973); Stafford v. Mincy, 129 Ga. App. 646, 200 S.E.2d 502 (1973); Searcy v. Godwin, 129 Ga. App. 827, 201 S.E.2d 670 (1973); Collins v. Collins, 231 Ga. 683, 203 S.E.2d 524 (1974); Brook Forest Enters., Inc. v. Paulding County, 231 Ga. 695, 203 S.E.2d 860 (1974); Bennett Iron Works, Inc. v. Underground Atlanta, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 653, 204 S.E.2d 331 (1974); Brown v. Hames, 131 Ga. App. 148, 205 S.E.2d 716 (1974); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Evans Implement Co., 131 Ga. App. 502, 206 S.E.2d 107 (1974); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 131 Ga. App. 761, 206 S.E.2d 672 (1974); Stinson v. Gray, 232 Ga. 542, 207 S.E.2d 506 (1974); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J.B. Forrest & Sons, 132 Ga. 714, 209 S.E.2d 6 (1974); Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. Georgia State Bank, 132 Ga. App. 762, 209 S.E.2d 82 (1974); Carter v. Kinman, 132 Ga. App. 845, 209 S.E.2d 230 (1974); Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616, 211 S.E.2d 635 (1974); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 233 Ga. 799, 213 S.E.2d 841 (1975); Dixie-Land Iron & Metal Co. v. Piedmont Iron & Metal Co., 233 Ga. 970, 213 S.E.2d 897 (1975); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, Inc., 234 Ga. 30, 214 S.E.2d 495 (1975); Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Hagin v. Powers, 134 Ga. App. 609, 215 S.E.2d 346 (1975); Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co. v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 135 Ga. App. 12, 217 S.E.2d 372 (1975); Classic Enters., Inc. v. Continental Mtg. Investors, 135 Ga. App. 105, 217 S.E.2d 411 (1975); Wiggins v. Darrah, 135 Ga. App. 509, 218 S.E.2d 106 (1975); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Williams, 135 Ga. App. 562, 218 S.E.2d 282 (1975); Sweat v. Georgia Power Co., 235 Ga. 281, 219 S.E.2d 384 (1975); Dixie-Land Iron & Metal Co. v. Piedmont Iron & Metal Co., 235 Ga. 503, 220 S.E.2d 130 (1975); Brown v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 308, 220 S.E.2d 790 (1975); American San. Servs. v. EDM of Tex., Inc., 136 Ga. App. 200, 221 S.E.2d 66 (1975); Nodvin v. Nodvin, 235 Ga. 708, 221 S.E.2d 404 (1975); Beneficial Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Usalavage, 136 Ga. App. 328, 221 S.E.2d 457 (1975); Leasing Int'l, Inc. v. Plemons, 136 Ga. App. 455, 221 S.E.2d 663 (1975); Wiles v. Brothers, 136 Ga. App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 148 (1975); Lawson v. Alvers, 136 Ga. App. 801, 222 S.E.2d 203 (1975); Tele-Spot v. Garden Cities Corp., 137 Ga. App. 238, 223 S.E.2d 273 (1976); Jardine v. Jardine, 236 Ga. 323, 223 S.E.2d 668 (1976); Doyal Dev. Co. v. Blair, 137 Ga. App. 434, 224 S.E.2d 55 (1976); Graham v. Tallent, 137 Ga. App. 444, 224 S.E.2d 98 (1976); Shannondoah, Inc. v. Smith, 137 Ga. App. 378, 224 S.E.2d 465 (1976); Hopkins v. Donaldson, 137 Ga. App. 786, 224 S.E.2d 788 (1976); Reid v. Minter, 137 Ga. App. 799, 224 S.E.2d 849 (1976); Sanders v. Darnell, 236 Ga. 604, 225 S.E.2d 23 (1976); Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976); Stouffer v. Stouffer, 236 Ga. 908, 225 S.E.2d 892 (1976); Reading Assocs., Ltd. v. Reading Assocs. of Ga., Inc., 236 Ga. 906, 225 S.E.2d 899 (1976); Alston v. Georgia Credit Counsel, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 545, 227 S.E.2d 87 (1976); Brown v. Brown, 237 Ga. 201, 227 S.E.2d 360 (1976); Williams v. Mathis, 237 Ga. 305, 227 S.E.2d 378 (1976); Shelor v. Shelor, 139 Ga. App. 11, 228 S.E.2d 18 (1976); White v. Atlanta Parking Serv. Co., 139 Ga. App. 243, 228 S.E.2d 156 (1976); Nelson v. Mexicana de Jugo y Sabores, 139 Ga. App. 612, 229 S.E.2d 102 (1976); Hill v. Cockrell, 139 Ga. App. 616, 229 S.E.2d 105 (1976); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alsco Constr. Co., 139 Ga. App. 786, 229 S.E.2d 559 (1976); Marler v. Citizens & S. Bank, 139 Ga. App. 851, 229 S.E.2d 786 (1976); Davis v. Embry, 140 Ga. App. 181, 230 S.E.2d 314 (1976); Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976); Evans v. Marbut, 140 Ga. App. 329, 231 S.E.2d 94 (1976); Gooden v. Blanton, 140 Ga. App. 612, 231 S.E.2d 541 (1976); General Fin. Corp. v. Hester, 141 Ga. App. 28, 232 S.E.2d 375 (1977); Moore v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 164, 233 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Henry v. Adair Realty Co., 141 Ga. App. 182, 233 S.E.2d 39 (1977); Yalanzon v. Sharon Constr. Co., 141 Ga. App. 294, 233 S.E.2d 220 (1977); Heller v. Board of Comm'rs, 238 Ga. 501, 233 S.E.2d 761 (1977); Johnson Ventures, Inc. v. Barkin, 141 Ga. App. 810, 234 S.E.2d 340 (1977); Saade v. Saade, 238 Ga. 620, 234 S.E.2d 530 (1977); Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 238 Ga. 660, 234 S.E.2d 915 (1977); W.R.G. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 81, 235 S.E.2d 43 (1977); In re C.A.M., 142 Ga. App. 159, 235 S.E.2d 395 (1977); Mallett v. Fulford, 142 Ga. App. 200, 235 S.E.2d 650 (1977); McKnight v. Mitchell, 142 Ga. App. 344, 235 S.E.2d 763 (1977); Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga. 160, 236 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 236 S.E.2d 599 (1977); Anthony v. Anthony, 239 Ga. 273, 236 S.E.2d 621 (1977); Minter v. Reid, 143 Ga. App. 92, 237 S.E.2d 632 (1977); Lee v. White Truck Lines, 143 Ga. App. 94, 238 S.E.2d 120 (1977); Evans v. Smithdeal, 143 Ga. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 278 (1977); Black v. American Vending Co., 239 Ga. 632, 238 S.E.2d 420 (1977); Hulsey v. Hendon, 239 Ga. 474, 238 S.E.2d 691 (1977); Milam v. Milam, 240 Ga. 33, 239 S.E.2d 361 (1977); Charamond v. Charamond, 240 Ga. 34, 239 S.E.2d 362 (1977); Michael v. McAdams, 240 Ga. 65, 239 S.E.2d 518 (1977); Wall v. Federal Land Bank, 240 Ga. 236, 240 S.E.2d 76 (1977); City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407, 240 S.E.2d 881 (1977); Saul v. Vaughn & Co., 240 Ga. 301, 241 S.E.2d 180 (1977); Beatty v. Wilkerson, 144 Ga. App. 280, 241 S.E.2d 654 (1977); Cook v. Cook, 240 Ga. 517, 241 S.E.2d 249 (1978); Mercury Rising, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 502, 241 S.E.2d 620 (1978); McCann v. Duggan, 144 Ga. App. 547, 241 S.E.2d 647 (1978); Bank of Clearwater v. Kimbrel, 240 Ga. 570, 242 S.E.2d 16 (1978); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 242 S.E.2d 101 (1978); Quilfo v. Creel, 144 Ga. App. 653, 242 S.E.2d 319 (1978); Galanti v. Emerald City Records, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 773, 242 S.E.2d 368 (1978); Greene v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 645, 242 S.E.2d 489 (1978); Jackson v. Jackson, 145 Ga. App. 564, 244 S.E.2d 91 (1978); Aikens v. Turner, 241 Ga. 401, 245 S.E.2d 660 (1978); Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prod. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. 266, 246 S.E.2d 354 (1978); Stanley v. Department of Human Resources, 146 Ga. App. 450, 246 S.E.2d 459 (1978); Guest v. Guest, 146 Ga. App. 512, 246 S.E.2d 503 (1978); Farmer v. Farmer, 147 Ga. App. 387, 249 S.E.2d 106 (1978); Fountain v. Marta, 147 Ga. App. 465, 249 S.E.2d 296 (1978); Tingle v. Georgia Power Co., 147 Ga. App. 775, 250 S.E.2d 497 (1978); Wolfe v. GMC, 148 Ga. App. 716, 252 S.E.2d 215 (1979); Mallett v. Fulford, 149 Ga. App. 773, 256 S.E.2d 49 (1979); Bradfield v. Gardner, 150 Ga. App. 49, 256 S.E.2d 655 (1979); Friedman v. Harbold, 150 Ga. App. 482, 258 S.E.2d 154 (1979); McCary v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 181, 259 S.E.2d 181 (1979); Redi-Cut Co. v. Bonanza Int'l, Inc., 244 Ga. 794, 262 S.E.2d 76 (1979); Hasty v. Randall, 152 Ga. App. 365, 262 S.E.2d 626 (1979); Taylor v. Thompson, 152 Ga. App. 547, 263 S.E.2d 487 (1979); Davis v. Davis, 245 Ga. 233, 264 S.E.2d 177 (1980); Rich v. Piland, 153 Ga. App. 253, 265 S.E.2d 290 (1980); Allison v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 245 Ga. 445, 265 S.E.2d 575 (1980); Atlas Aviation, Inc. v. Hungate, 153 Ga. App. 517, 265 S.E.2d 851 (1980)

James v. James, 245 Ga. 624, 266 S.E.2d 224 (1980); Sea Island Bank v. First Bulloch Bank & Trust Co., 245 Ga. 715, 267 S.E.2d 12 (1980); Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank, 245 Ga. 834, 268 S.E.2d 154 (1980); Harper v. State, 154 Ga. App. 550, 269 S.E.2d 56 (1980); Mathis v. Citizens DeKalb Bank, 157 Ga. App. 693, 278 S.E.2d 500 (1981); Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981); Krofft Dev. Corp. v. Quo Modo, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 403, 280 S.E.2d 368 (1981); Housing Auth. v. Davis, 158 Ga. App. 600, 281 S.E.2d 345 (1981); Black v. Lowry, 159 Ga. App. 57, 282 S.E.2d 700 (1981); Goss v. Thornton, 159 Ga. App. 166, 283 S.E.2d 63 (1981); Peoples Bank v. Austin, 159 Ga. App. 223, 283 S.E.2d 81 (1981); Phillips v. Phillips, 159 Ga. App. 676, 285 S.E.2d 52 (1981); PSI Pneumatic Structures, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Newnan Bank, 159 Ga. App. 766, 285 S.E.2d 576 (1981); High Point Sprinkler Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 160 Ga. App. 192, 286 S.E.2d 763 (1981); Nodvin v. Krabe, 160 Ga. App. 310, 287 S.E.2d 236 (1981); Johnson v. Freeman, 160 Ga. App. 431, 287 S.E.2d 314 (1981); King v. Chrisler, 160 Ga. App. 784, 287 S.E.2d 124 (1982); Schube v. Parts Distribs., Inc., 160 Ga. App. 882, 288 S.E.2d 598 (1982); Smith v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 26, 289 S.E.2d 520 (1982); Scott v. W.S. Badcock Corp., 161 Ga. App. 826, 289 S.E.2d 769 (1982); Trax, Inc. v. Pentagon Aero-Marine Corp., 162 Ga. App. 276, 290 S.E.2d 196 (1982); Freeman v. Freeman, 162 Ga. App. 433, 291 S.E.2d 770 (1982); Landmark Fin. Corp. v. Stewart, 163 Ga. App. 176, 293 S.E.2d 364 (1982); Smith v. Public Storage, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 455, 294 S.E.2d 685 (1982); Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 295 S.E.2d 830 (1982); In re A.J.A., 164 Ga. App. 210, 296 S.E.2d 103 (1982); Forrest v. Garner, 164 Ga. App. 396, 298 S.E.2d 259 (1982); Broussard v. Williams, 164 Ga. App. 545, 298 S.E.2d 269 (1982); Wilson v. Ashland Petro. Co., 164 Ga. App. 770, 298 S.E.2d 316 (1982); Wiggins v. City of Millen, 165 Ga. App. 18, 299 S.E.2d 191 (1983); Porter v. Eastern Air Lines, 165 Ga. App. 152, 300 S.E.2d 525 (1983); Brady v. Housing Auth., 165 Ga. App. 335, 300 S.E.2d 547 (1983); Texaco, Inc. v. DOT, 165 Ga. App. 338, 301 S.E.2d 59 (1983); Goolsby v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 165 Ga. App. 496, 302 S.E.2d 140 (1983); Johns v. Leaseway of Ga., Inc., 166 Ga. App. 472, 304 S.E.2d 555 (1983); Marathon Oil Co. v. Hollis, 167 Ga. App. 48, 305 S.E.2d 864 (1983); Hall v. VNB Mtg. Corp., 167 Ga. App. 219, 306 S.E.2d 359 (1983); Stein v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 1, 311 S.E.2d 220 (1983); Coley v. Coley, 169 Ga. App. 426, 313 S.E.2d 129 (1984); Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 314 S.E.2d 245 (1984); Chambless Ford Tractor, Inc. v. McGlaun Farms, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 672, 314 S.E.2d 689 (1984); Wood v. Dan P. Holl & Co., 169 Ga. App. 839, 315 S.E.2d 51 (1984); Walker v. Hill, 253 Ga. 126, 317 S.E.2d 825 (1984); Stinson v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources Credit Union, 171 Ga. App. 303, 319 S.E.2d 508 (1984); Fairburn Banking Co. v. Upton, 172 Ga. App. 81, 321 S.E.2d 814 (1984); Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga. App. 368, 323 S.E.2d 259 (1984); Exxon Corp. v. Butler, 173 Ga. App. 146, 325 S.E.2d 806 (1984); O'Quin v. Emergency Physicians, 173 Ga. App. 325, 326 S.E.2d 530 (1985); Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga. 239, 327 S.E.2d 723 (1985); Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 327 S.E.2d 796 (1985); Boatman v. Chapman, 174 Ga. App. 77, 329 S.E.2d 185 (1985); Pettus v. Smith, 174 Ga. App. 587, 330 S.E.2d 735 (1985); Simpkins v. Minks, 175 Ga. App. 729, 334 S.E.2d 340 (1985); Mims v. Wardlaw, 176 Ga. App. 891, 338 S.E.2d 866 (1985); In re C.R.M., 179 Ga. App. 38, 345 S.E.2d 141 (1986); Carter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 179 Ga. App. 532, 347 S.E.2d 264 (1986); DOT v. Arapaho Constr., Inc., 180 Ga. App. 341, 349 S.E.2d 196 (1986); Decker v. Decker, 256 Ga. 513, 350 S.E.2d 434 (1986); Holy Cross Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Clayton County, 257 Ga. 21, 354 S.E.2d 151 (1987); Gemini Constr. Co. v. Childs, 182 Ga. App. 207, 355 S.E.2d 81 (1987); State v. Mozley, 182 Ga. App. 871, 357 S.E.2d 313 (1987); Garmon v. Health Group of Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 587, 359 S.E.2d 450 (1987); Marsh v. White, 185 Ga. App. 642, 365 S.E.2d 464 (1988); Panfel v. Boyd, 186 Ga. App. 214, 367 S.E.2d 54 (1988); Fadum v. Liakos, 186 Ga. App. 556, 367 S.E.2d 843 (1988); Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 455, 369 S.E.2d 736 (1988); Banta v. Quik-Thrift Food Stores, Inc., 187 Ga. App. 250, 370 S.E.2d 3 (1988); Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 371 S.E.2d 222 (1988); Doe v. Chambers, 188 Ga. App. 879, 374 S.E.2d 758 (1988); Gully v. Glover, 190 Ga. App. 238, 378 S.E.2d 411 (1989); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 385 S.E.2d 734 (1989); Carole Lyden Smith Enters., Inc. v. Mathew, 193 Ga. App. 320, 387 S.E.2d 577 (1989); Manderson & Assocs. v. Gore, 193 Ga. App. 723, 389 S.E.2d 251 (1989); Lamb v. Tretiak, 194 Ga. App. 764, 391 S.E.2d 722 (1990); Sego v. City of Peachtree City, 260 Ga. 388, 392 S.E.2d 877 (1990); Westwind Corp. v. Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 195 Ga. App. 411, 393 S.E.2d 479 (1990); Parking Co. of Am. v. Sucan, 195 Ga. App. 616, 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Central of Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Mills, 196 Ga. App. 882, 397 S.E.2d 137 (1990); Wood v. Turner, 196 Ga. App. 815, 397 S.E.2d 161 (1990); Venture Design, Ltd. v. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 432, 398 S.E.2d 781 (1990); Greene v. Keener, 198 Ga. App. 565, 402 S.E.2d 284 (1991); Intertrust Corp. v. Fischer Imaging Corp., 198 Ga. App. 812, 403 S.E.2d 94 (1991); Smith Dev., Inc. v. Flood, 198 Ga. App. 817, 403 S.E.2d 249 (1991); Jewell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 203, 407 S.E.2d 763 (1991); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 254, 419 S.E.2d 43 (1992); Ardex, Ltd. v. Brighton Homes, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 606, 426 S.E.2d 200 (1992); Hanson v. Kent, 263 Ga. 124, 428 S.E.2d 785 (1993); Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 431 S.E.2d 110 (1993); Burks v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 209 Ga. App. 41, 432 S.E.2d 822 (1993); National Chemco, Inc. v. Union Camp Corp., 209 Ga. App. 317, 433 S.E.2d 691 (1993); Hughes v. Cobb County, 264 Ga. 128, 441 S.E.2d 406 (1994); Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 454 S.E.2d 478 (1995); McMillan v. Motor Warehouse, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 550, 472 S.E.2d 120 (1996); Safadi v. Thompson, 226 Ga. App. 685, 487 S.E.2d 457 (1997); Municipal Elec. Auth. v. City of Calhoun, 227 Ga. App. 571, 489 S.E.2d 599 (1997); J.C. Penney Co. v. Richmond County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 233 Ga. App. 399, 504 S.E.2d 201 (1998); Stephens v. Conyers Apostolic Church, 243 Ga. App. 170, 532 S.E.2d 728 (2000); Fontaine v. Sidelines IV, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 681, 538 S.E.2d 137 (2000); Lanier v. Burnette, 245 Ga. App. 566, 538 S.E.2d 476 (2000); BMH Real Estate Pshp. v. Montgomery, 246 Ga. App. 301, 540 S.E.2d 256 (2000); Lighting Galleries, Inc. v. Drummond, 247 Ga. App. 124, 543 S.E.2d 419 (2000); Magnus Homes, L.L.C. v. DeRosa, 248 Ga. App. 31, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001); Walker v. Walker, 248 Ga. App. 177, 546 S.E.2d 315 (2001); In the Interest of A.D.L., 253 Ga. App. 64, 557 S.E.2d 489 (2001); In re Estate of Garmon, 254 Ga. App. 84, 561 S.E.2d 216 (2002); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mar. Trade Ctr. Builders, 257 Ga. App. 779, 572 S.E.2d 319 (2002); McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008); Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Advantage Fire Sprinkler Co., 290 Ga. App. 374, 659 S.E.2d 778 (2008); Gooch v. Tudor, 296 Ga. App. 414, 674 S.E.2d 331 (2009); Asgharneya v. Hadavi, 298 Ga. App. 693, 680 S.E.2d 866 (2009); Washington v. Harrison, 299 Ga. App. 335, 682 S.E.2d 679 (2009); Johnson v. Randolph County, 301 Ga. App. 265, 687 S.E.2d 223 (2009); Katz v. Crowell, 302 Ga. App. 763, 691 S.E.2d 657 (2010); SN Int'l, Inc. v. Smart Props., 311 Ga. App. 434, 715 S.E.2d 826 (2011); In re Estate of Tapley, 312 Ga. App. 234, 718 S.E.2d 92 (2011); Shotwell v. Filip, 314 Ga. App. 93, 722 S.E.2d 906 (2012); God's Hope Builders, Inc. v. Mount Zion Baptist Church of Oxford, Georgia, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 435, 741 S.E.2d 185 (2013)

Wallace v. Wallace, 301 Ga. 195, 800 S.E.2d 303 (2017).

Findings, Generally

Subsection (a) mandatory.

- Requirement in subsection (a) of Ga. L. 1969, p. 645, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52) that the trial court find the facts specially and state separately the court's conclusions of law thereon and enter judgment pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 58 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58) is mandatory and not discretionary. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971); Booker v. J.T. Bickers Realty Co., 127 Ga. App. 614, 194 S.E.2d 490 (1972); Reese v. Ideal Realty Co., 128 Ga. App. 684, 197 S.E.2d 829 (1973); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 129 Ga. App. 632, 200 S.E.2d 483 (1973); Philips Broadcast Equip. Corp. v. Production 70's, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 765, 213 S.E.2d 35 (1975); Doyal Dev. Co. v. Blair, 234 Ga. 261, 215 S.E.2d 471 (1975); Githens v. Githens, 234 Ga. 715, 217 S.E.2d 291 (1975); Avery v. Avery, 234 Ga. 729, 218 S.E.2d 19 (1975); Reid v. Minter, 135 Ga. App. 763, 219 S.E.2d 15 (1975); Hagin v. Powers, 136 Ga. App. 395, 221 S.E.2d 245 (1975); Barkwell v. Helms, 137 Ga. App. 290, 223 S.E.2d 485 (1976); Crook v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 137 Ga. App. 817, 224 S.E.2d 806 (1976); Miller v. Self, 137 Ga. App. 717, 224 S.E.2d 823 (1976); Finlay v. Oxford Constr. Co., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 495 (1976); Oster v. Rich's, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 373, 231 S.E.2d 140 (1976); Pruitt v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Ga. App. 100, 235 S.E.2d 617 (1977); Gray v. Finance Am. Corp., 145 Ga. App. 253, 243 S.E.2d 671 (1978); Fred R. Surface & Assocs. v. Worozbyt, 148 Ga. App. 639, 252 S.E.2d 67 (1979); Beasley v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 317, 254 S.E.2d 472 (1979); Hickok v. Starka Indus., Inc., 151 Ga. App. 668, 261 S.E.2d 418 (1979); Smith v. Randolph, 153 Ga. App. 78, 264 S.E.2d 557 (1980); Wojcik Constr. Co. v. Schell's Concrete Co., 153 Ga. App. 793, 266 S.E.2d 569 (1980); Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197, 267 S.E.2d 757 (1980); Cochran v. Cochran, 154 Ga. App. 326, 268 S.E.2d 728 (1980).

Findings of fact and conclusions of law required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 are mandatory. Frasier v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 1, 282 S.E.2d 667 (1981).

- City of Atlanta's argument that the trial court's order granting a permanent injunction was deficient because the order did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) failed as § 9-11-52(a) only applied to interlocutory injunctions. City of Atlanta v. S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 446, 623 S.E.2d 557 (2005).

- Subsection (a) of this section is applicable to the State Court of Cobb County. General Fin. Corp. v. Hester, 137 Ga. App. 367, 223 S.E.2d 763 (1976).

Requirement that judge make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, unless waived, applies to the various state courts as well as the superior courts of this state. Risk v. Turner Coal & Brick Co., 139 Ga. App. 232, 228 S.E.2d 210 (1976); Dyna-Comp Corp. v. Selig Enters., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 462, 238 S.E.2d 571 (1977).

In absence of waiver, subsection (a) of this section is mandatory and failure to comply with the subsection requires reversal. Motes v. Stanton, 237 Ga. 440, 228 S.E.2d 831 (1976).

Purpose of findings of fact is threefold: as an aid in the trial judge's process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971); General Teamsters Local 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc., 228 Ga. 479, 186 S.E.2d 527 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041, 92 S. Ct. 1313, 31 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1972).

Reason for requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law is to assist appellate court in the court's review of the merits of an appeal. Coleman v. Coleman, 238 Ga. 183, 232 S.E.2d 57 (1977).

- When the court order concerning the adoption issue stated only: "The petition for final adoption coming on to be heard and the court having proceeded to a full hearing on the petition and the examination of the parties at interest in open court, under oath, and having given consideration to the investigative report of the Department of Human Resources and the recommendation therein contained, the court is satisfied that it is not in the best interest of (the child) that this adoption be approved," such order constituted a mere legal conclusion not supported by the mandatory findings of fact required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Brant v. Bazemore, 173 Ga. App. 294, 325 S.E.2d 905 (1985).

- When a question of substantive fact (as distinguished from a decision of law) is submitted to the judge for trial without the intervention of a jury, the judge's decision as to the facts is as binding upon the parties as a verdict and may be set aside under the same rules as apply to the vacating of the finding of a jury. Sunn v. Mercury Marine, 166 Ga. App. 567, 305 S.E.2d 6 (1983).

- Order complies with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, notwithstanding the fact that the order does not specify the evidence actually relied upon in making the findings and reaching the conclusions. Siegel v. General Parts Corp., 165 Ga. App. 339, 301 S.E.2d 292 (1983).

- Juvenile court's deprivation order was proper as the order was explicitly based on a mother's physical abuse of a child, although the fact was not included as a formal finding of fact; the trial court's reasoning leading to the conclusion of deprivation was clearly laid out. In the Interest of K.J., 268 Ga. App. 843, 602 S.E.2d 861 (2004).

Following a bench trial, the trial court properly awarded a lessee a monetary judgment and the lessor possession of the premises as the clear language of the underlying contract between the parties provided that the parties intended the contract to be a purchase and sale agreement, and the lessor's failure to perform barred the court from enforcing a liquidated damages provision. Thus, the appeals court refused to disturb the trial court's factual findings as such were not clearly erroneous. Lifestyle Home Rentals, LLC v. Rahman, 290 Ga. App. 585, 660 S.E.2d 409 (2008).

Findings of fact are not intended to amount to brief of evidence, and need be made only on issues necessary to disposition of case and upon which judgment was entered. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971); American Century Mtg. Investors v. Strickland, 138 Ga. App. 657, 227 S.E.2d 460 (1976); Siegel v. General Parts Corp., 165 Ga. App. 339, 301 S.E.2d 292 (1983).

Findings of fact should be brief, concise, pertinent, and adjusted to the evidence as reflected by the record; over elaboration and particularization is neither required nor desired. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971).

Findings of fact should not be redundant or argumentative, but should be inclusive enough to afford an intelligent review. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971).

- One purpose of findings is as an aid in the appellate courts' review; hence, findings should be inclusive enough to afford intelligent review. Donaldson v. Hopkins, 132 Ga. App. 713, 209 S.E.2d 131 (1974), overruled in part by Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

- Trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which the result was reached. Beasley v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 317, 254 S.E.2d 472 (1979); Wojcik Constr. Co. v. Schell's Concrete Co., 153 Ga. App. 793, 266 S.E.2d 569 (1980); Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197, 267 S.E.2d 757 (1980).

Mere recitation of events that took place at trial does not satisfy requirements of subsection (a) of this section as to findings and conclusions, nor does recitation in the order denying the motion for new trial. Fred R. Surface & Assocs. v. Worozbyt, 148 Ga. App. 639, 252 S.E.2d 67 (1979).

Mere recitation of events that took place at trial does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) of this section. Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197, 267 S.E.2d 757 (1980); In re D.L.G., 212 Ga. App. 353, 442 S.E.2d 11 (1994).

Dry recitation that certain legal requirements have been met is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) of this section. Beasley v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 317, 254 S.E.2d 472 (1979).

- Paraphrase of statutory requirements for confirmation of a sale under power and an ultimate conclusion will not suffice as findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pruitt v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Ga. App. 100, 235 S.E.2d 617 (1977).

- When there is a discrepancy between the amount of judgment asserted by the parties and that shown in the trial court's record, and findings of fact and conclusions of law were not made according to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, the case must be remanded with any aggrieved party free to enter another appeal. Bourdon v. Plank, 170 Ga. App. 711, 318 S.E.2d 312 (1984).

"Findings of fact" which merely state court's answers to material issues are insufficient, especially when they contain no facts based on the evidence supporting those answers. C & H Couriers, Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Ga. App. 853, 305 S.E.2d 500 (1983).

Court may request counsel to prepare findings and conclusions, which the judge is at liberty to amend or change in any respect deemed proper; the judge may also prepare the findings and conclusions without assistance of counsel. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971).

- Legislative intent was that findings of fact and conclusions of law required by subsection (a) of this section be made prior to the rendition of the judgment, not after expiration of the time for appeal. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Richard & Assocs., 229 Ga. 156, 189 S.E.2d 853 (1972).

In a case of great magnitude and complexity, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's postjudgment motion for the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though a formal request was not made prior to judgment. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Wilson, 220 Ga. App. 426, 469 S.E.2d 504 (1996).

- When findings and conclusions required by subsection (a) of this section were not entered at time judgment was entered, but were subsequently made and transmitted to the reviewing court, the judgment complained of will not be invalidated. Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973).

Final order signed on behalf of both parties "approved as to form" constitutes valid waiver of requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law be stated. Rude v. Rude, 241 Ga. 454, 246 S.E.2d 311 (1978).

- While findings of fact should be included in the record in all contested civil cases tried by a judge without a jury, if the judgment rendered is approved in writing "as to form" by counsel for the parties, neither party can thereafter complain of a failure to comply with this section, because this section also provides that the requirement for making and including findings of fact in the record may be waived in writing. Stephens v. Stephens, 232 Ga. 69, 205 S.E.2d 295 (1974).

- When a purchaser of land did not make a postjudgment motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(c) for amended or additional findings, the purchaser waived the argument that a special master's findings of fact did not set forth sufficient findings to justify the conclusions of law. Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693, 660 S.E.2d 392 (2008).

Mere signature, without any recital to indicate intention, does not constitute a valid waiver of the requirement that the court enter findings of facts and conclusions of law. Motes v. Stanton, 237 Ga. 440, 228 S.E.2d 831 (1976); Rude v. Rude, 241 Ga. 454, 246 S.E.2d 311 (1978).

- If findings of facts and conclusions of law by the court are to be insisted upon, time to do it is when proposed order is presented to counsel for approval; after approving the form of the order, a party cannot complain of the court's failure to include findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rude v. Rude, 241 Ga. 454, 246 S.E.2d 311 (1978).

- Although findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory, their absence is not fatal. Kennedy v. Brown, 239 Ga. 286, 236 S.E.2d 632 (1977).

- Failure of trial court to incorporate findings of fact and conclusions of law in order modifying the divorce decree was an amendable defect which appeared on the face of the record, not a defect which would warrant setting aside the judgment. Kennedy v. Brown, 239 Ga. 286, 236 S.E.2d 632 (1977).

Since the failure to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in the order in a proceeding under the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act", O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19, was an amendable defect appearing on the face of the record, it was not subject to a motion to set aside and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to set aside judgment. Powell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 780, 305 S.E.2d 646 (1983).

Bare statement of what the court considered in reaching the court's conclusions is not a recitation of how those facts give support to or what constitutes the separate conclusions. Moore v. Farmers Bank, 182 Ga. App. 94, 354 S.E.2d 692 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Underwood v. Underwood, 282 Ga. 643, 651 S.E.2d 736 (2007); In re D.L.G., 212 Ga. App. 353, 442 S.E.2d 11 (1994).

- Evidentiary hearing on issue of damages following the defendant's default is subject to requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law be in writing. Marsh v. Way, 170 Ga. App. 300, 316 S.E.2d 599 (1984).

Oral findings stated into the record as supplemented by arguments of counsel will not satisfy the requirement for written findings and conclusions. Aycock v. Morris Indus., Inc., 171 Ga. App. 50, 318 S.E.2d 780 (1984); Beeks v. Consultech, Inc., 222 Ga. App. 473, 474 S.E.2d 675 (1996).

- Oral recitations of the court's conclusions presented during the hearing are not a substantial compliance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Chamlee v. DOT, 182 Ga. App. 120, 354 S.E.2d 701 (1987).

- When the trial court adopts the verbatim proposed findings and conclusions of the prevailing party, the adequacy of the findings is more apt to be questioned, the losing party may forfeit the party's undeniable right to be assured that the party's position has been thoroughly considered, and the independence of the trial court's thought process may be cast in doubt, but the practice cannot be condemned when there is no evidence that the trial court did not give serious consideration to and review the proposed findings and conclusions eventually adopted. Outdoor Adv. Ass'n v. DOT, 186 Ga. App. 550, 367 S.E.2d 827, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 367 S.E.2d 827 (1988).

- When the trial court fails to make findings or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is taken, the appellate court will normally vacate the judgment and remand the action for appropriate findings to be made. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971); Hickok v. Starka Indus., Inc., 151 Ga. App. 668, 261 S.E.2d 418 (1979).

Absence of findings required by subsection (a) of this section does not require reversal of the judgment, but only a remand of the case for the making of such findings. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Richard & Assocs., 229 Ga. 156, 189 S.E.2d 853 (1972).

When findings of fact and conclusions of law required by subsection (a) of this section were neither made nor waived, the case must be remanded with direction that the judge vacate the judgment, prepare or cause to be prepared appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter a new judgment thereon, after which the losing party shall be free to enter a new appeal. Medical Personnel Pool v. Middlebrooks, 133 Ga. App. 148, 210 S.E.2d 372 (1974); Gardner v. Goss, 138 Ga. App. 637, 227 S.E.2d 92 (1976); Jones v. Childs, 139 Ga. App. 337, 228 S.E.2d 363 (1976); Smith v. Randolph, 153 Ga. App. 78, 264 S.E.2d 557 (1980).

Judgment rendered without findings of fact and conclusions of law may be vacated on appeal, and conclusions of law and facts supplied at the direction of the appellate court. Kennedy v. Brown, 239 Ga. 286, 236 S.E.2d 632 (1977).

When the trial court's order contains no recitation of the facts the court found to support the court's conclusions, the appeal is remanded with direction that the trial judge vacate the judgment, prepare, or cause to be prepared, appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter a new judgment thereon, after which the losing party shall be free to enter another appeal if the losing party should wish to do so. C & H Couriers, Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Ga. App. 853, 305 S.E.2d 500 (1983).

Case must be remanded when the trial court fails to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the court's dismissal order, and when neither party waives these findings and conclusions. L & L Elec. Serv., Inc. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 168 Ga. App. 780, 310 S.E.2d 557 (1983); Avery Mechanical Contractors v. Quality Mechanical Contractors, 182 Ga. App. 168, 355 S.E.2d 102 (1987).

Judgment granting the state's petition to validate revenue bonds under the Revenue Bond Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-82-60 et seq., was remanded to the trial court because the trial court failed to mention in the judgment the citizen who intervened in the proceedings and to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various grounds pursued by the citizen as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a); prior to the judgment, the citizen requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 314 Ga. App. 237, 723 S.E.2d 528 (2012).

Trial court erred by validating taxable revenue bonds for a county development authority as the order validating the bonds failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the court's holdings and, thus, failed to satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a). Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 320 Ga. App. 689, 740 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

When no enumeration of error is directed to court's failure to include findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment of trial court will not be reversed upon such ground. Cunnane v. Cunnane, 237 Ga. 650, 229 S.E.2d 431 (1976); Lavender v. Myers, 150 Ga. App. 547, 258 S.E.2d 257 (1979).

- In a stockholder's suit against a corporation and the corporation's other owners, the trial court's finding that the stockholder paid in full for the stock issued to the stockholder was not clearly erroneous, based on the uncontradicted testimony from the vice-president of the corporation's bookkeeper, corporate record corroborated by financial and tax findings by the corporation, and no inference based on circumstantial evidence was rebutted by direct testimony. Monterrey Mexican Rest. of Wise, Inc. v. Leon, 282 Ga. App. 439, 638 S.E.2d 879 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Temple v. Hillegass, 344 Ga. App. 454, 810 S.E.2d 625 (2018).

- In a divorce appeal, a trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in not making the specific total-marital-estate-value finding that the husband belatedly requested, given the other findings the court made in the decree and the evidence in the record. Driver v. Driver, 292 Ga. 800, 741 S.E.2d 631 (2013).

When Findings Necessary

Findings and conclusions generally unnecessary to motions.

- Provisions of this section which require findings of fact and conclusions of law are not applicable to motions. Lupo v. Long, 145 Ga. App. 876, 245 S.E.2d 73 (1978).

- Since the plaintiff did not perfect service, the trial court correctly dismissed that suit; dismissal of the action rendered a hearing on the merits and compliance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 moot. Nally v. Bartow County Grand Jurors, 280 Ga. 790, 633 S.E.2d 337 (2006).

- Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Ga. L. 1972, p. 689, §§ 4 and 5 or Ga. L. 1975, p. 757, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12 or O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) or any other motion, except as provided in Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b)). Walker v. Walker, 238 Ga. 273, 232 S.E.2d 554 (1977).

Requirement of subsection (a) of Ga. L. 1970, p. 170, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52) that in all actions in superior court tried upon the facts without a jury, with certain exceptions, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately the court's conclusions of law thereon upon entry of judgment applies when the court enters an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b)). Salvador v. Wals, 139 Ga. App. 362, 228 S.E.2d 384 (1976).

- Court was not required to give legal or factual reasons for dismissing the appellant's counterclaim. Garrett v. Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 217 Ga. App. 415, 457 S.E.2d 677 (1995).

§ 9-11-12(b)(6) motion. - Client's claim of a procedural defect in the trial court's handling of the client's complaint seeking to vacate an arbitration award was rejected as the trial court did not have to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) when ruling on an O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) claim; even if O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) applied, the client did not request such findings of fact and conclusions of law. Durden v. Suggs, 271 Ga. App. 688, 610 S.E.2d 640 (2005).

- Under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, as it was amended in 1987, entry of findings and conclusions is mandatory only upon request by a party, as opposed to the earlier law, when such entry was required unless waived by the parties. Poor v. Leader Fed. Bank for Savs., 221 Ga. App. 889, 473 S.E.2d 563 (1996).

Alleged requests for findings that were framed as "issues for determination by the jury" were legally insufficient under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 to mandate that the trial court issue such findings. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Aguilera, 243 Ga. App. 442, 533 S.E.2d 448 (2000).

Because conflicting evidence was presented concerning the values of the parties' assets as well as the premarital and marital contributions of each spouse, the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was required to determine whether and to what extent a particular asset was marital or non-marital, exercise the court's discretion, and then divide the marital property equitably; hence, inasmuch as the issues on appeal depended upon the factual determinations made by the trial court as fact finder, and neither party asked the trial court to make factual findings, the equitable distribution of marital property was not improper as a matter of law or fact. Mathis v. Mathis, 281 Ga. 865, 642 S.E.2d 832 (2007).

Trial court did not err by failing to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench trial hearing in the trial court's denial of an estate administrator's petition for leave to recover and sell the estate's property as the administrator never requested such findings and conclusions of law within the time period required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Huggins v. Powell, 293 Ga. App. 436, 667 S.E.2d 219 (2008).

In a dispossessory proceeding, as the mortgagors did not request the state court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law until after a ruling had been entered, the state court was not required to include that information pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) as to each of the mortgagors' defenses and counterclaims; O.C.G.A. § 44-7-56, which provided a mechanism for trial courts to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in dispossessory cases being appealed, was permissive, not mandatory. Mackey v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg., 294 Ga. App. 495, 669 S.E.2d 397 (2008).

Because the parties agreed that a verdict would be rendered without findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, the trial court did not err in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Swainsboro Cabinet Co. v. Ed Johns Constr. Co., 299 Ga. App. 462, 682 S.E.2d 599 (2009).

Appellant who did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) failed to demonstrate error in the trial court's failure to specify the court's reasons for issuing an interlocutory injunction. Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 562, 690 S.E.2d 415 (2010).

Because a chairperson of the board of education failed to allege any error in the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law or request that the trial court amend the court's judgment to separately make such findings or conclusions, the chairperson waived the right to challenge the sufficiency of the findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Cook v. Smith, 288 Ga. 409, 705 S.E.2d 847 (2010).

When disposition of motion in nonjury case requires weighing of evidence and constitutes an adjudication on the merits, findings of fact and conclusions of law are required. Bob Bennett Enters., Inc. v. Trust Co. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 344, 265 S.E.2d 311 (1980).

Order making settlement agreement judgment of the court is something more than decision of a motion such as is contemplated by exemption in this section, but rather is subject to the requirement of findings of fact and separate conclusions of law. Greene v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 35, 232 S.E.2d 381 (1977).

In an uncontested divorce action, the trial court was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Russ v. Russ, 272 Ga. 438, 530 S.E.2d 469 (2000).

- Subsection (a) of this section requires findings of facts and conclusions of law in contested divorce, contested alimony, and contested custody of children actions. Githens v. Githens, 234 Ga. 715, 217 S.E.2d 291 (1975).

- Requirement of written findings of fact and conclusions of law applies to contested child custody cases under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Jordan v. Jordan, 179 Ga. App. 155, 345 S.E.2d 675 (1986).

Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 is mandatory in contested custody of children actions. Couch v. Couch, 177 Ga. App. 773, 341 S.E.2d 303 (1986).

Divorce, alimony, or child custody case in which separation agreement is modified by the trial judge pursuant to the judge's authority is "contested" within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section. Mullis v. Mullis, 238 Ga. 185, 232 S.E.2d 60 (1977).

- Requirements of subsection (a) of this section are applicable to contested child custody cases. Avery v. Avery, 234 Ga. 729, 218 S.E.2d 19 (1975); Motes v. Stanton, 237 Ga. 440, 228 S.E.2d 831 (1976); Coleman v. Coleman, 238 Ga. 183, 232 S.E.2d 57 (1977).

Trial court, in the court's order, failed to make any findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the father's request for modification of custody, despite the father's request. Warren v. Smith, 336 Ga. App. 342, 785 S.E.2d 25 (2016).

Remand was necessary on the issue of modification of child support because the appellate court had previously directed the trial court to issue findings of fact related to the trial court's ruling on custody and child support and the trial court subsequently failed to do so. Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 808 S.E.2d 11 (2017).

Order of the trial court granting a couple joint legal custody was vacated because there was nothing in the trial court's order that assisted the reviewing court in its evaluation of whether the trial court properly exercised the court's discretion in modifying the former custody arrangement as the order merely set forth in detail the new custody and child support arrangement, and nothing more. Longino v. Longino, 352 Ga. App. 263, 834 S.E.2d 355 (2019).

- Because the father requested that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law prior to the hearing on the petition for modification of custody, child support, and visitation, the father was entitled to the findings particularly given that the trial court denied the father any visitation or contact with the child and, therefore, the portion of the order denying the father's request for a modification of visitation was vacated. Selvage v. Franklin, 350 Ga. App. 353, 829 S.E.2d 402 (2019).

- After the now-15-year-old child was removed from an aunt and uncle's custody and adjudicated dependent based on allegations that the aunt had physically abused the child, the juvenile court erred in entering an order granting a motion for nonreunification filed by the County Department of Family and Children Services because the nonreunification order did not set forth the juvenile court's findings of facts, separate from the conclusions of law, in a manner that would permit the appellate court to make an intelligent review of the merits of the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. In the Interest of B. G., 345 Ga. App. 167, 812 S.E.2d 552 (2018).

- In a dependency case, the juvenile court's order denying the mother's motion for immediate reunification and return of the mother's six children to the mother's custody on the court's belief that the mother would not protect the children from the biological father of five of the children once the father was released from prison was vacated as the order did not include findings of fact, separate from the court's apparent conclusions of law, in a manner that would permit the appellate court to make an intelligent or meaningful review of the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. In the Interest of T. Y., 350 Ga. App. 553, 829 S.E.2d 808 (2019).

- Adoption case necessarily involves custody of the adopted person, and "custody of minors" is among the matters excepted from the requirement that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Grady v. Hill, 128 Ga. App. 153, 195 S.E.2d 794 (1973).

Subsection (a) of this section applies to an adoption proceeding as it is not among any of the exceptions noted therein. Perry v. Thomas, 129 Ga. App. 325, 199 S.E.2d 634 (1973).

- In ruling on deprivation petitions, findings of fact should be made in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. In re A.A.G., 143 Ga. App. 648, 239 S.E.2d 697 (1977).

Since the trial court treated a deprivation determination as part of a custody determination, which does not require specific findings of fact, the case was remanded with direction that the court prepare findings of fact employing statutory standards for determination of deprivation. In re J.B., 241 Ga. App. 679, 527 S.E.2d 275 (1999).

- Judge hearing confirmation of a nonjudicial sale of property is required to render a judgment with findings of fact. Weems v. McCloud, 619 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980).

Application for contempt is a motion before the court not coming within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 and, as such, the trial judge does not err in failing to make special findings of fact and conclusions of law. Baldwin v. National Bank, 165 Ga. App. 381, 300 S.E.2d 209 (1983).

- Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 does not apply when an application for writ of certiorari is denied. Flacker v. Berr-Nash Corp., 157 Ga. App. 638, 278 S.E.2d 180 (1981), overruled as being incompatible with O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12(b), relating to the standard to be applied in appeals to superior court by application for certiorari. Smith v. Elder, 174 Ga. App. 316, 329 S.E.2d 511 (1985), overruled on other grounds, 228 Ga. App. 864, 493 S.E.2d 51 (1997), overruled on other grounds as stated in, Norris v. Henry County, 255 Ga. App. 718, 566 S.E.2d 428 (2002).

In an equity case, the court's duty to apply facts to law makes findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary, even when the court calls upon a jury for special verdicts. Hanson v. First State Bank & Trust, 254 Ga. 235, 327 S.E.2d 730 (1985).

- When the order granting injunctive relief fails to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52, the requirements of which were not waived by the parties, that order is deficient as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order granting injunctive relief will be remanded for the preparation of written findings of fact and conclusion of law, after which the losing party may appeal to the court of appropriate jurisdiction. Henderson v. Glen Oak, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 380, 346 S.E.2d 842 (1986), aff'd, 256 Ga. 619, 351 S.E.2d 640 (1987).

Consent order voluntarily entered into by both parties which was presented to the trial judge in order to dispose of all matters pending before the court was covered by the exceptions in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 and did not require written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Elliott v. Flewellyn, 174 Ga. App. 486, 330 S.E.2d 185 (1985).

- Trial court is not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law with order granting summary judgment. Healthdyne, Inc. v. Henry, 144 Ga. App. 52, 240 S.E.2d 259 (1977).

Trial court need not make findings of fact in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Edwards v. McTyre, 246 Ga. 302, 271 S.E.2d 205 (1980); Brown v. Reeves, 164 Ga. App. 89, 296 S.E.2d 393 (1982).

Grant of motion for summary judgment was excluded from the operation of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 by the clear language of the section. Karsman v. Portman, 173 Ga. App. 108, 325 S.E.2d 608 (1984).

It is not necessary to include findings of fact and conclusions of law on decisions on motions for summary judgment. Fudge v. Colonial Baking Co., 186 Ga. App. 582, 367 S.E.2d 814 (1988).

Mere entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on a motion for summary judgment does not constitute error per se. In certain cases when the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment, it can be helpful to the appellate courts and instructive to the parties. Harrell v. Louis Smith Mem. Hosp., 197 Ga. App. 189, 397 S.E.2d 746 (1990).

It is not grounds for reversal that the trial court elected not to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the court's grant of summary judgment. Hopkins v. Hudgins & Co., 218 Ga. App. 508, 462 S.E.2d 393 (1995).

Motion to set aside default judgment pursuant to Ga. L. 1974, p. 1138, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)) does not come within the ambit of Ga. L. 1970, p. 170, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52). Emery Enters., Inc. v. Automatic Fastners Div., 155 Ga. App. 24, 270 S.E.2d 261 (1980).

- Since application for contempt does not come within definition of a pleading, it is necessarily a motion as defined in Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 7 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7(b)), and provisions of Ga. L. 1970, p. 170, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52) which require findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court are not applicable to motions. Hines v. Hines, 237 Ga. 755, 229 S.E.2d 744 (1976); Fields v. Fields, 240 Ga. 173, 240 S.E.2d 58 (1977).

Hearing on fitness of applicant to take bar examination is not such an action as is contemplated under subsection (a) of this section, requiring finding of facts and conclusions of law in actions tried upon the facts without a jury. Gardner v. Gwinnett Circuit Bar Ass'n, 241 Ga. 614, 247 S.E.2d 64 (1978).

- Judgment in an action to confirm a foreclosure sale is inadequate if the judgment contains no specific finding concerning the sufficiency of the price brought at sale. Lanier v. Citizens State Bank, 186 Ga. App. 395, 367 S.E.2d 585 (1988).

- Because a revenue bond validation order contained merely a dry recitation that certain legal requirements had been met, adequate appellate review of the trial court's decision making process was effectively prevented; the validation order did not specifically address a resident's objection that the transaction did not comply with the Development Authorities Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-62-8(b), or the process by which the court came to the court's conclusion that the proposed transaction followed all proper and necessary steps. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 317 Ga. App. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2012).

Subsection (a) of this section contains so-called "any evidence rule," which has long been binding upon appellate courts in this state on appeals taken from nonjury single-judge judgments. Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga. App. 662, 197 S.E.2d 749 (1973).

- "Any evidence rule" provides that when a nonjury single-judge judgment is reviewed, neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals will interfere with a finding by the trial tribunal when there is any evidence to support the finding. Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974).

- In a bench trial the court sits as the trier of fact and the court's findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. The "clearly erroneous" test is the same as the "any evidence rule"; thus, an appellate court will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain those findings. Allen v. Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 158 Ga. App. 209, 279 S.E.2d 505 (1981); Smith v. Carlton Farms, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 743, 353 S.E.2d 624 (1987); Kimbrell v. Effingham Bd. of Tax Assessors, 191 Ga. App. 544, 382 S.E.2d 388 (1989); CFUS Props., Inc. v. Thornton, 246 Ga. App. 75, 539 S.E.2d 571 (2000); Ins. Indus. Consultants, Inc. v. Essex Invs., Inc., 249 Ga. App. 837, 549 S.E.2d 788 (2001).

When a nonjury judgment by a trial court is reviewed by an appellate court in Georgia, it will not interfere with the findings of fact by the trial tribunal if there is "any evidence" to support the findings. This "any evidence" test is the same as the "clearly erroneous" test for findings of fact by the trial judge required by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52. Wolfe v. Rhodes, 166 Ga. App. 845, 305 S.E.2d 606 (1983).

- When a case is submitted to a judge for trial and decision, without a jury, the judge's finding is given the same weight as a verdict, and if there is any evidence to support the finding, the finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Evans v. Marbut, 140 Ga. App. 329, 231 S.E.2d 94 (1976), cert. dismissed, 238 Ga. 583, 234 S.E.2d 506 (1977); Mullins v. Oden & Sims Used Cars, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 250, 251 S.E.2d 65 (1978).

Appellate courts of this state will not interfere with the findings of a judge sitting without a jury if there is any evidence to support the findings. Associated Distribs., Inc. v. McBee, 140 Ga. App. 433, 231 S.E.2d 449 (1976).

Trial court did not err in entering judgment against the venture capital firm on the firm's fraudulent misrepresentation counterclaim asserting that the three stockholders misrepresented or fraudulently concealed the existence of a consulting agreement that when revealed resulted in the termination of their company's most valuable contract; evidence in the record supported the trial court's finding that the consulting agreement was not material in regard to the venture capital firm's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Tampa Bay Fin., Inc. v. Nordeen, 272 Ga. App. 529, 612 S.E.2d 856 (2005).

- Even though findings of fact contended for by appellants would have been authorized by evidence presented at trial, when the facts found by the trial court were also authorized by the evidence such findings would not be set aside. Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597, 207 S.E.2d 513 (1974).

- Like the findings of a jury or of the Workers' Compensation Board, the judge's findings of fact are binding on appeal, and unless wholly unsupported or clearly erroneous will not afford a basis for reversal. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971).

Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility. Bell v. Cronic, 248 Ga. 457, 283 S.E.2d 476 (1981); Mutual Ins. Co. v. Dublin Pub, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 94, 378 S.E.2d 497 (1989); Claxton Enter. v. Evans County Bd. of Comm'rs, 249 Ga. App. 870, 549 S.E.2d 830 (2001).

Findings of fact by a trial judge will not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous." Smith v. Smith, 248 Ga. 268, 282 S.E.2d 324 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Abushmais v. Erby, 282 Ga. 619, 652 S.E.2d 549 (2007).

Finding of facts by the trial court in nonjury cases will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or are clearly erroneous. Davis v. Hospital Auth., 167 Ga. App. 304, 306 S.E.2d 306 (1983).

Findings of the trial judge were to be set aside as clearly erroneous when the award of back pay to a former president of a corporation was speculative and not supported by the evidence. The former president would not have drawn that salary for that period because the business would not have continued. Davis v. Davis, 262 Ga. 420, 419 S.E.2d 913 (1992).

On a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, the appellate court construes the evidence to uphold the trial court's judgment and will not disturb the trial court's findings thereon unless the findings are clearly erroneous; thus, when the trial court conducted a hearing and considered the evidence before concluding that appellants, the children of a decedent, did not carry the appellants' burden of proving that an enforceable settlement agreement was reached with appellee, the decedent's widow, the trial court acted as a finder of fact, and the clearly erroneous standard of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) thus applied in reviewing the trial court's decision. Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857, 581 S.E.2d 375 (2003), aff'd, Ga. , 615 S.E.2d 542 (2005).

If a trial court in a civil case hears live testimony and is called upon to act as the ultimate finder of fact on a duress issue, a clearly erroneous, rather than a de novo standard of review applies. Peacock v. Spivey, 278 Ga. App. 338, 629 S.E.2d 48 (2006).

- In light of the plaintiff's own admission that the plaintiff offered to the plaintiff's new employer, a competitor of the plaintiff's former employer, sales catalogues of two of the plaintiff's former employer's customers, to whom the plaintiff attempted to sell products from the plaintiff's new employer, the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff solicited sales in violation of the noncompetition provisions of the contract. Fisher v. Marvin Reese Cos., 231 Ga. App. 487, 499 S.E.2d 411 (1998).

There being no showing of a manifest abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling denying the defendant's request to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the court's judgment was proper. Greene County v. North Shore Resort at Lake Oconee, L.L.C., 238 Ga. App. 236, 517 S.E.2d 553 (1999); Vernon Library Supplies, Inc. v. Ard, 249 Ga. App. 853, 550 S.E.2d 108 (2001).

Probate court properly revoked letters testamentary, ordered reimbursement to a decedent's estate of excessive expenses, and ordered a settling of the estate's accounts after the decedent's executor committed 17 breaches of fiduciary duty, including failing to wind up the estate and failing to provide the decedent's other child with an accounting. Fowler v. Cox, 264 Ga. App. 880, 592 S.E.2d 510 (2003).

In a case in which the trial court denied a petition by the appellants, the children of a decedent, to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between themselves and the appellee, the decedent's widow, which supposedly was reached in a probate case following mediation of a dispute between the parties regarding the validity of the decedent's will, the trial court's finding that the children failed to prove that the widow's settlement offer was still open when the children tried to accept the offer was not clearly erroneous given that the widow testified that the widow did not re-extend the widow's settlement offer after the children rejected the offer and after the widow rejected the children's counteroffer, and given that a letter from the widow's counsel to opposing counsel after the counteroffer was rejected expressed the possibility of considering further settlement offers, but did not refer to any outstanding settlement offer. Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857, 581 S.E.2d 375 (2003), aff'd, Ga. , 615 S.E.2d 542 (2005).

Because there was evidence to support a trial court's factual conclusions that a tenant's breach of contract terms by failing to remove storage tanks from the landlord's premises upon termination of the lease did not amount to a default, the determination that the landlord was not entitled to exercise cross-default provisions in order to terminate other leases between the parties was affirmed; in order to have committed a default, pursuant to the language of the lease, the tenant was entitled to notice and an attempt to timely cure the default. Dude, Inc. v. Foamex, L.P., 269 Ga. App. 909, 605 S.E.2d 459 (2004).

Trial court properly entered an order compelling a health plan to cover a stem cell transplant to treat an insured's kidney cancer; the health plan failed to meet the plan's burden under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) in challenging the judgment as the plan never provided the plan's enrollees with notice of plan limitations, which included stem cell procedure limitations, and therefore, the limitation was not enforceable. Hosp. Auth. v. Bohannon, 272 Ga. App. 96, 611 S.E.2d 663 (2005).

In a case in which the trial court found that the appellant altered its lot, for the purpose of operating a used car business, creating an artificial increase in the water flowing onto the appellee's property, the trial court did not clearly err under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) in determining that an adequate cure for the runoff problem required both implementation of a second engineering plan and removal of motor vehicles from the rear portion of the lot as the record supported the finding that the placement of gravel on the lot, together with the metal roof created by the number of vehicles parked there, rendered a substantial portion of the lot virtually impermeable. Menzies v. Hall, 281 Ga. 223, 637 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Trial court's factual finding that a car dealer had not breached a verbal agreement to its customer regarding the wiring to an uninstalled radio unit that the customer sought was not clearly erroneous, given the appellate court's deference, as the wiring was not an essential accessory that should have come with the radio as part of the radio's purchase. Rise v. GAPVT Motors, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 246, 653 S.E.2d 320 (2007).

Trial court's findings in favor of a customer on the customer's counterclaim for malicious prosecution in a contractor's breach of contract and trover claim were upheld as the evidence established that the contractor had signed a sworn affidavit stating that the customer committed criminal fraud by not paying for an installed fence on the customer's property and refused to pay when the amount due was merely in dispute and the customer had, in fact, tendered a check for a portion of the amount due indicating that the remaining balance was in dispute. The fact that the contractor's execution of those false statements had consequences not intended, namely that the customer spent two nights in jail, was insufficient to absolve the contractor's liability for making those statements. Gooch v. Tudor, 296 Ga. App. 414, 674 S.E.2d 331 (2009).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by awarding property owners interlocutory injunctive relief against a county to keep the owners from further harm pending the resolution of the case because the county was found to have exceeded the bounds of an easement and it was for the trial court to determine how the county was required to cure the problem. Gwinnett County v. McManus, 294 Ga. 702, 755 S.E.2d 720 (2014).

- In considering arguments concerning fact finding, the appellate courts cannot disturb the judge's findings and judgment absent some error of law. Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974); Nabors v. Blanche Reeves Interiors, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 638, 229 S.E.2d 117 (1976); Browning v. Federal Home Loan Mtg. Corp., 210 Ga. App. 115, 435 S.E.2d 450 (1993).

Finding based upon erroneous legal theory is cause for reversal or recommittal. DOT v. Livaditis, 129 Ga. App. 358, 199 S.E.2d 573 (1973).

While ordinarily a judgment right for any reason must be affirmed, when it is apparent that the court rests judgment on reasons which are erroneous or upon an erroneous legal theory, the court commits reversible error. Ayers v. Yancey Bros. Co., 141 Ga. App. 358, 233 S.E.2d 471 (1977).

Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 provides that findings of trial courts in nonjury trials "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." This principle does not apply, however, when it appears that the trial court's findings and judgment are based on an error of law. Scott v. Purser Truck Sales, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 611, 402 S.E.2d 354 (1991).

If court's judgment is based upon stated fact for which there is no evidence, the judgment should be reversed. Lamas v. Baldwin, 140 Ga. App. 37, 230 S.E.2d 13 (1976); Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 161 Ga. App. 257, 287 S.E.2d 696 (1982).

When there is evidence to support finding that settlement had been made, the Court of Appeals is without authority to disturb the settlement on appeal. General Communications Serv., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 149 Ga. App. 466, 254 S.E.2d 710, aff'd, 244 Ga. 855, 262 S.E.2d 96 (1979).

- In a personal injury action hearing under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a), it was error for the trial court to grant a motorist's motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between the injured party and the motorist's insurer because the evidence did not show the insurer's unqualified acceptance of the injured party's settlement proposal, nor did the evidence show the injured party's acceptance of the insurer's counteroffer. Jones v. Frickey, 274 Ga. App. 398, 618 S.E.2d 29 (2005), aff'd, 280 Ga. 573, 630 S.E.2d 374 (2006).

- Trial court erred in the court's division of marital property in allowing the wife to delay the ultimate payment of funds to the husband for an indefinite period of time as the final judgment simply awarded the home to the wife without making any finding that the husband was entitled to any equitable division of that asset. While the degree of detail required was not significant, as the issue was not complex, some findings were required. Arthur v. Arthur, 293 Ga. 63, 743 S.E.2d 420 (2013).

Every presumption and inference favors judgment, and the evidence must be construed to uphold rather than to destroy the judgment. Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974).

Concomitant with principle that findings of fact by trial judge who sits without a jury may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous is directive that after judgment every presumption and inference favors such judgment and evidence must be construed to uphold rather than destroy the judgment. Nabors v. Blanche Reeves Interiors, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 638, 229 S.E.2d 117 (1976).

- In the absence of a transcript of the evidence, the court must assume evidence presented was sufficient to support judgment. Craigmiles v. Craigmiles, 237 Ga. 498, 228 S.E.2d 882 (1976).

Judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed if the record does not show error, and in the absence of a transcript of the evidence, the appellate courts must assume evidence was sufficient to support the judgment. National Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 145 Ga. App. 198, 243 S.E.2d 563 (1978).

State's highest court accepted a probate court's findings that a daughter's evidence that the mother's will had been revoked lacked credibility, that the presumption of revocation had been rebutted, and that the proffered copy was a true copy as the daughter did not provide the state's highest court with a transcript of the probate court hearing. Tanksley v. Parker, 278 Ga. 877, 608 S.E.2d 596 (2005).

When there is no transcript of evidence, judgment must be affirmed as it cannot be said that the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous." White v. Johnson, 151 Ga. App. 345, 259 S.E.2d 731 (1979).

When there is no transcript of the evidence, the appellate court cannot say a trial court's finding is clearly erroneous and the court must, therefore, be bound by the finding. Hammond v. State, 168 Ga. App. 508, 308 S.E.2d 701 (1983).

- Findings of the trier of fact as to residence and domicile will not be disturbed if there is "any evidence" to support the findings. Smith v. Smith, 248 Ga. 268, 282 S.E.2d 324 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Abushmais v. Erby, 282 Ga. 619, 652 S.E.2d 549 (2007).

- Since the trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to offer any competent evidence to support the purported debt underlying an attorneys' fee lien, the court's factual finding was upheld on appeal. Ellis, Funk, Goldberg, Labovitz & Dockson v. Kleinberger, 235 Ga. App. 360, 509 S.E.2d 660 (1998).

- After the plaintiff admitted to agreeing to pay a certain sum for the services of one employed by the defendant, the trial court's ruling that the defendant was entitled to recover a different amount for such services was clearly erroneous. Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. Air Door, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 804, 278 S.E.2d 708 (1981).

- Trial court had the authority to reverse or remand decision of the State Personnel Board on ground that the board abused the board's discretion by departing from the board's progressive discipline policy. Georgia Dep't of Labor v. Sims, 164 Ga. App. 856, 298 S.E.2d 562 (1982).

- When the record did not show that the plaintiff, the subject of bank's dispossessory action, requested that the trial court include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the court's order to vacate premises prior to the order's issuance, the trial court did not err in failing to include these findings in the court's final judgment. Burks v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 209 Ga. App. 41, 432 S.E.2d 822 (1993); Middlebrooks v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 217 Ga. App. 263, 456 S.E.2d 627 (1995).

Mother failed to preserve for appeal the mother's claims that the trial court erred in failing to set forth the basis for the court's written legitimation order and in the court's written order granting a father's motion to change a child's name as the mother never requested the findings of fact. Carden v. Warren, 269 Ga. App. 275, 603 S.E.2d 769 (2004).

On appeal from an order equitably distributing the parties' marital property, inasmuch as the issues on appeal depended upon the factual determinations made by the trial court as fact-finder, and neither party asked the trial court to make factual findings, the Supreme Court of Georgia was unable to conclude that the trial court's equitable distribution of marital property was improper as a matter of law or as a matter of fact. Crowder v. Crowder, 281 Ga. 656, 642 S.E.2d 97 (2007).

In an action to collect on past-due amounts owed by a homebuilder to two contractors, because the homebuilder failed to move the trial court to make or amend the court's findings, or make additional findings and amend the judgment to the extent necessary for review, the homebuilder waived any claim on appeal that the trial court's findings were inadequate or incomplete. Hampshire Homes, Inc. v. Espinosa Constr. Servs., 288 Ga. App. 718, 655 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

City waived the right to challenge the sufficiency of the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the trial court's judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 because the city filed motions to set aside the judgment and to open default within 20 days after the judgment was entered, but such post-judgment motions did not allege any error in the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law or request that the trial court amend the court's judgment to separately make such findings or conclusions. City of East Point v. Jordan, 300 Ga. App. 891, 686 S.E.2d 471 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0494, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 337 (Ga. 2010).

Court finding clearly erroneous. See Big Canoe Corp. v. Williamson, 168 Ga. App. 179, 308 S.E.2d 440 (1983).

Finding of trial court not clearly erroneous. See Ridgley v. Helms, 168 Ga. App. 435, 309 S.E.2d 375 (1983).

- In a commercial landlord's suit for damages to the extent that the rent the landlord would have been paid exceeded fair market value, the trial court properly denied the landlord's motions to amend the judgment or for a new trial; the landlord, via O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(c), had improperly attempted to inject into the case a new methodology for calculating damages to replace the one it had used at trial. Trustreet Props. v. Burdick, 287 Ga. App. 565, 652 S.E.2d 197 (2007).

When findings in child custody case were so deficient the findings precluded review, the case was remanded to the trial court with direction that the trial judge vacate the judgment and make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter a new judgment thereon. Milner v. Milner, 177 Ga. App. 164, 338 S.E.2d 757 (1985).

Motions for Amendment and New Trial

Subsection (b) not designed as second opportunity to prove case.

- Subsection (b) of this section is not a procedural device by which a party may be granted a second opportunity to prove the party's case after the party fails to do so in the first instance. Buckley v. Thornwell, 143 Ga. App. 764, 240 S.E.2d 258 (1977).

- Final judgment which requires but does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law may be amended by the lower court at any time to meet objections when the judgment is consequently entered of record. Peachtree Mtg. Corp. v. Northside Realty Assocs., 140 Ga. App. 541, 231 S.E.2d 350 (1976), aff'd, 239 Ga. 62, 235 S.E.2d 491 (1977).

- Although amendment to a judgment of the court sitting without a jury, adding thereto certain statements, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, is authorized by subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1970, p. 170, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52), amendment is not an authorized means of bringing evidence to the appellate court on appeal under Ga. L. 1965, p. 18, § 10 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41). Chapman v. Connor, 138 Ga. App. 518, 226 S.E.2d 625 (1976).

Reason for rule that new trial motion must go to findings of fact is that a new trial is necessarily authorized only when errors occurred which might have affected the finding of the trier of fact; if it is only the judgment thereon which is alleged to be erroneous or illegal, this alludes to a matter of law only and there is no need for a new trial, but the party must merely take direct exception at the proper time. Sunn v. Mercury Marine, 166 Ga. App. 567, 305 S.E.2d 6 (1983).

- In cases tried before the court without a jury, whether or not written findings are required, motion for reconsideration by the trial judge is proper if filed within the ten-day period, irrespective of expiration of the term of court. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 232 Ga. 719, 208 S.E.2d 819 (1974).

Motion for new trial is available remedy to review contested custody case between parents. Adair v. Adair, 236 Ga. 443, 224 S.E.2d 21 (1976).

- Entry of supplemental order making findings of fact and conclusions of law does not change effect of final order dismissing complaint, but merely sets out the basis for a judgment of dismissal; it is not a new judgment. Northside Realty Assocs. v. Peachtree Mtg. Corp., 239 Ga. 62, 235 S.E.2d 491 (1977); Grizzle v. Federal Land Bank, 145 Ga. App. 385, 244 S.E.2d 362 (1978).

- Trial judge has inherent power during same term of court in which judgment is rendered to revise, correct, revoke, modify, or vacate such judgment, even upon the judge's own motion, for the purpose of promoting justice and in the exercise of sound legal discretion. LeCraw v. Atlanta Arts Alliance, Inc., 126 Ga. App. 656, 191 S.E.2d 572 (1972).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 75B Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §§ 1183, 1662 et seq.

- 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 1044 et seq. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 361 et seq. 89 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 1236, 1237.

- Advantage which the original trier of facts enjoyed over reviewing court from opportunity of seeing and hearing witnesses, 111 A.L.R. 742.

Power of trial court, on remand for further proceedings, to change prior fact findings as to matter not passed upon by appellate court, without receiving further evidence, 19 A.L.R.3d 502.

Propriety and effect of trial court's adoption of findings prepared by prevailing party, 54 A.L.R.3d 868.

Construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and state constitutional provisions proscribing state bills of attainder, 63 A.L.R. 6th 1.