2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 11 - Civil Practice Act
Article 6 - Trials
§ 9-11-50. Motions for Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

1. Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A motion for a directed verdict may be made at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent or at the close of the case. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that a motion is not granted without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. If there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed.
2. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict - When made; new trial motion. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than 30 days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or, if a verdict was not returned, such party, within 30 days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned, the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned, the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
3. Same - Conditional rulings on grant of motion; motion for new trial by losing party.
   1. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict provided for in subsection (b) of this Code section is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for the new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the appellee on appeal may assert error in that denial; and, if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
   2. The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial not later than 30 days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
4. Same - Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this Code section precludes it from determining that the appellee is entitled to a new trial or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
5. Erroneous denial of directed verdict. Where error is enumerated upon an order denying a motion for directed verdict and the appellate court determines that the motion was erroneously denied, it may direct that judgment be entered below in accordance with the motion or may order that a new trial be had, as the court may determine necessary to meet the ends of justice under the facts of the case.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 50; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, §§ 22, 43, 48.)

- Requirements pertaining to filing of motion for new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where appeal taken from judgment, ruling, or other procedure, § 5-6-36.

Question of necessity for setting out portions of record or transcript of evidence in motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, § 5-6-49.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50, see 28 U.S.C.

- For article discussing motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this state prior to adoption of this section, see 7 Mercer L. Rev. 352 (1956). For article, "The 1967 Amendments to the Georgia Civil Practice Act and the Appellate Procedure Act," see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 383 (1967). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2007). For case comment, "Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort to Solve an Old Problem," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Directed Verdict
• Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
• New Trials

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, §§ 5926 and 6545 and former Code 1933, § 110-104 and Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 440, and Ga. L. 1959, p. 234 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

This section is patterned after the federal Civil Practice Act, and a court may turn to it for guidance. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

- Purpose of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 was to obviate the necessity of a new trial whenever the trial judge finds that the judge has erroneously refused to direct a verdict. Hart v. Columbus, 125 Ga. App. 625, 188 S.E.2d 422 (1972).

- Except for giving presiding judge 30 days for a change of mind, as contrasted with the 10-day period under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 is the same as Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P. Hart v. Columbus, 125 Ga. App. 625, 188 S.E.2d 422 (1972).

Standard for granting a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same. Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30, 302 S.E.2d 554 (1983); United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Connell, 166 Ga. App. 329, 304 S.E.2d 131 (1983); Custom Coating, Inc. v. Parsons, 188 Ga. App. 506, 373 S.E.2d 291 (1988); Morris v. Futch, 193 Ga. App. 132, 386 S.E.2d 905, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 910, 386 S.E.2d 905 (1989).

- Because a father waived any objections concerning the form of the verdict, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court denied a motion for new trial on the father's claims for tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets asserted against the father's son; moreover, given the jury's decision not to award damages on those claims, the appeals court declined to consider the son's claim that the trial court erred in failing to grant motions for a directed verdict and j.n.o.v. concerning them. Lou Robustelli Mktg. Servs. v. Robustelli, 286 Ga. App. 816, 650 S.E.2d 326 (2007).

Grant of either a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is authorized only when the evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom demand a verdict in favor of the movant. Mercer v. Woodard, 166 Ga. App. 119, 303 S.E.2d 475 (1983).

- Act of directing a verdict or granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict declares that there is no conflict in the evidence, and that all deductions and inferences from the evidence introduced demand a particular verdict. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972).

Verdict shall be directed when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. Joiner v. Lane, 235 Ga. App. 121, 508 S.E.2d 203 (1998), recons. denied, overruled by Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 834 S.E.2d 77 (2019).

Motion for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. erroneously denied on a breach of fiduciary duty claim as to a son's wife, who was not a corporate officer, director, or agent, and lacked the power to deal with third parties, including the creation of company obligations, without the son's approval, and the son was a corporate officer. Lou Robustelli Mktg. Servs. v. Robustelli, 286 Ga. App. 816, 650 S.E.2d 326 (2007).

In a personal injury action, the trial court erred by denying a manufacturer's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the undisputed evidence demanded a finding that the injured party assumed the risk of injuries from driving a doorless off-road vehicle; the injured party testified that the injured party read the operator's manual and warnings posted on the vehicle. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. McTaggart, 313 Ga. App. 103, 720 S.E.2d 217 (2011).

Record as record exists at close of trial controls whether the verdict should be directed. DeLoach v. Myers, 215 Ga. 255, 109 S.E.2d 777 (1959).

- Directing of verdict or granting of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a very, very grave matter, as by such act, the case is taken away from the jury, and the court's own judgment is substituted therefor. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972).

Municipal court may be authorized to direct a verdict. Lynch v. Southern Express Co., 146 Ga. 68, 90 S.E. 527 (1916).

To refuse to direct a verdict is within the discretion of the trial court, and absent abuse of such discretion, the appellate court will not reverse a case for such refusal. Claude S. Bennett, Inc. v. Vanneman, 95 Ga. App. 140, 97 S.E.2d 375 (1957).

- When the plaintiff and the defendant each separately request a directed verdict, the party unsuccessful in the party's request does not waive the party's right or have issues submitted to the jury or to except to direction of verdict for the other party. Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 38 S.E.2d 534 (1946).

Fact that each party moves for direction of a verdict in that party's favor does not, without more, amount to consent by both parties that case should be disposed of by direction of a verdict for one side or the other. Roberts v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 428, 31 S.E.2d 707 (1944).

- Trial court correctly found that a homebuilder's argument that the buyers were not entitled to recover attorney's fees on claims for which the jury did not award money damages was precluded since the issue was not raised in the homebuilder's motion for directed verdict; thus, the homebuilder was precluded from raising this argument in the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. Morrison Homes of Fla., Inc. v. Wade, 266 Ga. App. 598, 598 S.E.2d 358 (2004).

In a breach of contract action between a city and the city's general contractor arising out of a renovation project on property above and within an inert landfill, because the jury could find that the city acted in bad faith in the city's dealings with the general contractor on the issue of overhead costs, was stubbornly litigious, and caused the contractor unnecessary trouble and expense after the contractor encountered landfill materials within the depth of the contractor's excavation which caused the contractor to have to halt work, the contractor properly awarded attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11; thus, the city was properly denied a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to this issue. City of Lilburn v. Astra Group, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 568, 649 S.E.2d 813 (2007).

Evidence sufficient to withstand motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See McFarland v. Hodge Homebuilders, Inc., 168 Ga. App. 733, 309 S.E.2d 853 (1983).

Trial court did not err in denying property owners' motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the owners' suit to prevent a limited liability company from replacing an existing sewer pipe with a larger one because a sewer-line easement authorized the removal and replacement of a malfunctioning or worn-out sewer pipeline, and there was some evidence that the existing pipe was not functioning properly and was worn out; moreover, there was evidence that the removal of the existing sewer pipe and replacement with either a six-inch or eight-inch pipe would not expand the physical boundaries of the easement. Parris Props., LLC v. Nichols, 305 Ga. App. 734, 700 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying property owners' motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on a limited liability company's (LLC) counterclaim for conversion, which was predicated on the owners' disposal of pipe fixtures the LLC owned, because the evidence was sufficient to support the LLC's counterclaim for conversion; the owners exercised dominion and control over the pipe fixtures by having the fixtures removed from the owners' property and disposed of at a landfill, and even if the LLC acted wrongfully by depositing and storing the pipe fixtures on the owners' property, there was evidence that the owners failed to exercise due care in removing the expensive fixtures by having the fixtures dumped at a landfill with no consideration given as to the fixtures ultimate fate. Parris Props., LLC v. Nichols, 305 Ga. App. 734, 700 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying a driver's motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the amount of damages the jury awarded a decedent's estate for pain and suffering because the testimony of two eyewitnesses that the decedent was unconscious when the eyewitnesses saw the decedent immediately after the automobile accident was not necessarily inconsistent with the testimony of the officer who arrived at the scene and observed the decedent while a doctor was ministering to the decedent and talking to the decedent; because the trial court approved the verdict in denying the driver's post-trial motion, a presumption of correctness arose that would not be disturbed absent compelling evidence. Park v. Nichols, 307 Ga. App. 841, 706 S.E.2d 698 (2011).

- On appeal from order directing a verdict, the question before the court is whether the evidence is without conflict as the evidence pertains to the material issues in the case, and thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party, whether the evidence demands the verdict ordered. Aldridge v. Dixie Fire & Cas. Co., 223 Ga. 130, 153 S.E.2d 723 (1967).

Direction of verdict for the defendant will be affirmed on review when it appears from all the evidence, both for the plaintiff and the defendant, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, that such verdict was demanded. Riggins v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 64 Ga. App. 834, 14 S.E.2d 182 (1941).

- Commercial vehicle liability insurer's notice of appeal of an order denying the insurer's motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict was timely under O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-38 and9-11-50(b) because the notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the trial court's order on the insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the insurer filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Litton, 308 Ga. App. 497, 707 S.E.2d 885 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1110, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 580 (Ga. 2011).

- Because the county did not properly move the special master for a partial directed verdict as to the scope of damages recoverable in the condemnation proceeding, the issue was not properly raised in the trial court and there is nothing for the appellate court to review. Morgan County v. Gay, 352 Ga. App. 555, 834 S.E.2d 576 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0331, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 380 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0495, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 390 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0332, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. 2020).

When there is no evidence in the record to show whether a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict was warranted, the appellate court must assume that the trial court was correct in the court's denial of the appellant's motions and affirm. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. White, 168 Ga. App. 516, 309 S.E.2d 858 (1983).

- Although a trial court denied a property owner's motion for partial directed verdict on the issue of environmental contamination and damages in a condemnation proceeding by the Georgia Department of Transportation, as the jury was instructed not to consider that issue when determining the fair market value of the property there was no harm shown by the trial court's directed verdict ruling for purposes of the owner's appeal thereof. H.D. McCondichie Props. v. Ga. DOT, 280 Ga. App. 197, 633 S.E.2d 558 (2006).

- Although in motions both under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-50 and9-11-56 the moving party has the burden of showing that the opposite party has not presented sufficient evidence to authorize a jury to find in the party's favor, a ruling in favor of a movant for summary judgment is a more far-reaching determination. Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 301 (1981).

Cited in Turk v. Jackson Elec. Membership Corp., 117 Ga. App. 631, 161 S.E.2d 430 (1968); Warren v. Mann, 117 Ga. App. 787, 161 S.E.2d 894 (1968); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808 (1968); Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969); Todd v. Waddell, 120 Ga. App. 20, 169 S.E.2d 351 (1969); Gandy v. Griffin, 120 Ga. App. 100, 169 S.E.2d 651 (1969); Peara v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 163, 169 S.E.2d 670 (1969); Wilson v. Matthews, 120 Ga. App. 284, 170 S.E.2d 346 (1969); Hemphill v. Simmons, 120 Ga. App. 823, 172 S.E.2d 178 (1969); Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Blanchard, 121 Ga. App. 82, 173 S.E.2d 103 (1970); Worley v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Ga. App. 179, 173 S.E.2d 248 (1970); Blackwell v. American S. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 671, 175 S.E.2d 160 (1970); Floyd v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 852, 176 S.E.2d 111 (1970); Mallin v. Mallin, 226 Ga. 628, 176 S.E.2d 709 (1970); Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970); Stevens v. Stevens, 227 Ga. 410, 181 S.E.2d 34 (1971); Harrison v. Harrison, 228 Ga. 126, 184 S.E.2d 147 (1971); Tomlinson v. Patrick, 228 Ga. 373, 185 S.E.2d 407 (1971); Hammock v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 854, 186 S.E.2d 353 (1971); Smith v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 587, 188 S.E.2d 439 (1972); Thurmond v. Spoon, 125 Ga. App. 811, 189 S.E.2d 92 (1972); Wages v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 125 Ga. App. 798, 189 S.E.2d 110 (1972); Young v. Bozeman, 229 Ga. 195, 190 S.E.2d 523 (1972); Gordon v. Carter, 126 Ga. App. 343, 190 S.E.2d 570 (1972); Owens v. Georgia Power Co., 229 Ga. 281, 190 S.E.2d 897 (1972); Young v. Wiggins, 229 Ga. 392, 191 S.E.2d 863 (1972); Savannah Ice Delivery Co. v. Ayers, 127 Ga. App. 560, 194 S.E.2d 330 (1972); Sprewell v. Farmer, 230 Ga. 297, 196 S.E.2d 866 (1973); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mitchell, 230 Ga. 323, 197 S.E.2d 126 (1973); Barge & Co. v. Oakwood Steel Co., 128 Ga. App. 597, 197 S.E.2d 405 (1973); Merino v. State, 230 Ga. 604, 198 S.E.2d 311 (1973); Roberts v. Allied Fin. Co., 129 Ga. App. 10, 198 S.E.2d 416 (1973); Andrews v. Commercial Credit Corp., 129 Ga. App. 294, 199 S.E.2d 383 (1973); New Era Publishing Co. v. Guess, 231 Ga. 250, 201 S.E.2d 142 (1973); Central of Ga. R.R. v. Sellers, 129 Ga. App. 811, 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973); Adams v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 850, 201 S.E.2d 639 (1973); Guardian of Ga., Inc. v. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp., 130 Ga. App. 514, 203 S.E.2d 733 (1974); Belk-Hudson Co v. Davis, 132 Ga. App. 237, 207 S.E.2d 528 (1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Reid, 132 Ga. App. 136, 207 S.E.2d 532 (1974); Glover v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 132 Ga. App. 74, 207 S.E.2d 584 (1974); Johnson v. Mann, 132 Ga. App. 169, 207 S.E.2d 663 (1974); Baitcher v. Louis R. Clerico Assocs., 132 Ga. App. 219, 207 S.E.2d 698 (1974); Scott v. Blackmon, 132 Ga. App. 578, 208 S.E.2d 589 (1974); Wright v. Lovett, 132 Ga. App. 729, 209 S.E.2d 15 (1974); Martin v. Moore, 232 Ga. 842, 209 S.E.2d 182 (1974); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 132 Ga. App. 816, 209 S.E.2d 223 (1974); Kanellos & Co. v. Kavadas, 132 Ga. App. 787, 209 S.E.2d 232 (1974); McConnell v. Brenau College, 134 Ga. App. 470, 215 S.E.2d 25 (1975); Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. Sasser & Co., 133 Ga. App. 772, 212 S.E.2d 857 (1975); Hagin v. Powers, 134 Ga. App. 609, 215 S.E.2d 346 (1975); Glo-Ann Plastic Indus., Inc. v. Peak Textiles, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 924, 216 S.E.2d 715 (1975); Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 135 Ga. App. 12, 217 S.E.2d 372 (1975); Carreker v. National Diversified, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 511, 218 S.E.2d 117 (1975); Sunset Villa, Inc. v. Mothner-Simowitz Ins. Agency, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 706, 218 S.E.2d 463 (1975); McConnell v. Brenau College, 135 Ga. App. 711, 218 S.E.2d 464 (1975); Interstate Transp., Inc. v. Hogan, 135 Ga. App. 919, 219 S.E.2d 631 (1975); Kenney v. Piedmont Hosp., 136 Ga. App. 660, 222 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Lamb v. Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 136 Ga. App. 863, 222 S.E.2d 679 (1975); Mills v. Smith, 236 Ga. 260, 223 S.E.2d 658 (1976); Rasmussen v. Martin, 236 Ga. 267, 223 S.E.2d 663 (1976); Hill v. Hospital Auth., 137 Ga. App. 633, 224 S.E.2d 739 (1976); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976); Lyon v. Patterson, 138 Ga. App. 816, 227 S.E.2d 423 (1976); Hayes v. Flaum, 138 Ga. App. 787, 227 S.E.2d 512 (1976); Kitchens v. Lowe, 139 Ga. App. 526, 228 S.E.2d 923 (1976); Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976); Stuckey v. Kahn, 140 Ga. App. 602, 231 S.E.2d 565 (1976); Smith v. Bank of S., 141 Ga. App. 114, 232 S.E.2d 629 (1977); Elkins v. Willett Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 458, 233 S.E.2d 851 (1977); Venable v. Block, 141 Ga. App. 523, 233 S.E.2d 878 (1977); Smith v. Telecable of Columbus, Inc., 238 Ga. 559, 234 S.E.2d 24 (1977); Creative Underwriters, Inc. v. Heilman, 141 Ga. App. 740, 234 S.E.2d 371 (1977); Helton v. Zellmer, 238 Ga. 735, 235 S.E.2d 35 (1977); Pascoe Steel Corp. v. Turner County Bd. of Educ., 142 Ga. App. 88, 235 S.E.2d 554 (1977); Hughes v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 110, 235 S.E.2d 619 (1977); Reece v. Town of Lyerly, 239 Ga. 227, 236 S.E.2d 347 (1977); Stembridge v. Simmons, 143 Ga. App. 90, 237 S.E.2d 514 (1977); Grossman v. Glass, 143 Ga. App. 464, 238 S.E.2d 569 (1977); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 143 Ga. App. 404, 238 S.E.2d 753 (1977); Goforth v. Fogarty Van Lines, 143 Ga. App. 432, 238 S.E.2d 768 (1977); National Bank v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 143 Ga. App. 661, 239 S.E.2d 551 (1977); Atlanta Army & Navy Store, Inc. v. Stuckman, 143 Ga. App 850, 240 S.E.2d 220 (1977); Deroller v. Powell, 144 Ga. App. 585, 241 S.E.2d 469 (1978); Adderholt v. Adderholt, 240 Ga. 626, 242 S.E.2d 11 (1978); Johnson v. Castleberry, 144 Ga. App. 697, 242 S.E.2d 350 (1978); Cheney v. Barber, 144 Ga. App. 720, 242 S.E.2d 358 (1978); Rogers v. Joyner, 145 Ga. App. 179, 243 S.E.2d 249 (1978); Roger Budd Chevrolet Co. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 145 Ga. App. 167, 243 S.E.2d 332 (1978); Maddox v. Maddox, 241 Ga. 118, 244 S.E.2d 3 (1978); Rockdale Awning & Iron Co. v. Sheppard, 145 Ga. App. 524, 244 S.E.2d 60 (1978); Gilbert v. Meason, 145 Ga. App. 662, 244 S.E.2d 601 (1978); Outlaw v. Transit Homes, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 695, 244 S.E.2d 633 (1978); Dalton Am. Truck Stop, Inc. v. ADBE Distrib. Co., 146 Ga. App. 8, 245 S.E.2d 346 (1978); Gordon v. Athens Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 146 Ga. App. 134, 245 S.E.2d 484 (1978); Decker v. Housing Auth., 146 Ga. App. 405, 246 S.E.2d 423 (1978); DOT v. Glenn, 146 Ga. App. 819, 247 S.E.2d 520 (1978); National Bank v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 147 Ga. App. 240, 248 S.E.2d 496 (1978); Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 147 Ga. App. 221, 248 S.E.2d 524 (1978); Kirk v. Barnes, 147 Ga. App. 423, 249 S.E.2d 140 (1978); DeKalb County v. Scruggs, 147 Ga. App. 711, 250 S.E.2d 159 (1978); Corrosion Control, Inc. v. William Armstrong Smith Co., 148 Ga. App. 75, 251 S.E.2d 49 (1978); Mayo v. State, 148 Ga. App. 213, 251 S.E.2d 80 (1978); Achour v. Belk & Co., 148 Ga. App. 306, 251 S.E.2d 157 (1978); Arrow Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. Clarklift of Dalton, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 693, 252 S.E.2d 197 (1979); Pippin v. Bryan, 149 Ga. App. 193, 253 S.E.2d 855 (1979); Horton v. Wayne County, 243 Ga. 789, 256 S.E.2d 775 (1979); Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979); Straynar v. Jack W. Harris Co., 150 Ga. App. 509, 258 S.E.2d 248 (1979); Rucker v. Frye, 151 Ga. App. 415, 260 S.E.2d 373 (1979); Johnson v. McAfee, 151 Ga. App. 774, 261 S.E.2d 708 (1979); Arrington v. Andrews, 152 Ga. App. 572, 263 S.E.2d 491 (1979); Hughes v. Newell, 152 Ga. App. 618, 263 S.E.2d 505 (1979); Fuller v. Smith, 245 Ga. 751, 261 S.E.2d 23 (1980); Wall v. Citizens & S. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 29, 264 S.E.2d 523 (1980); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Blankenship Plumbing Co., 153 Ga. App. 335, 265 S.E.2d 66 (1980); Etheridge v. Kay, 153 Ga. App. 399, 265 S.E.2d 332 (1980)

Pirkle v. Triplett, 153 Ga. App. 524, 265 S.E.2d 854 (1980); Whitmire v. Watkins, 245 Ga. 713, 267 S.E.2d 6 (1980); B.G. Sanders & Assocs. v. Castellow, 154 Ga. App. 433, 268 S.E.2d 695 (1980); Bennett v. Caton, 154 Ga. App. 515, 268 S.E.2d 786 (1980); Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980); Berry v. Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 155 Ga. App. 15, 270 S.E.2d 257 (1980); Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 277 S.E.2d 312 (1981); Hospital Auth. v. Bryant, 157 Ga. App. 330, 277 S.E.2d 322 (1981); Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981); Basic Four Corp. v. Parker, 158 Ga. App. 117, 279 S.E.2d 241 (1981); Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981); Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 282 S.E.2d 393 (1981); Charter Medical Mgt. Co. v. Ware Manor, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 378, 283 S.E.2d 330 (1981); Henry v. Hemingway, 159 Ga. App. 375, 283 S.E.2d 341 (1981); Siefferman v. Peppers, 159 Ga. App. 688, 285 S.E.2d 61 (1981); Collins v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 898, 285 S.E.2d 562 (1981); Connell v. Long, 248 Ga. 716, 286 S.E.2d 287 (1982); Lake George-Limerick Property Owners Ass'n v. Taylor, 160 Ga. App. 347, 287 S.E.2d 71 (1981); Loyless v. Hazim, 161 Ga. App. 254, 287 S.E.2d 711 (1981); Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 161 Ga. App. 631, 295 S.E.2d 843 (1982); Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888, 288 S.E.2d 601 (1982); Campbell v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Ga. App. 589, 288 S.E.2d 919 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 249 Ga. 216, 290 S.E.2d 55 (1982); Ross v. Lowery, 249 Ga. 307, 290 S.E.2d 61 (1982); Brown v. Barnes, 162 Ga. App. 383, 290 S.E.2d 483 (1982); Thompson v. Walker, 162 Ga. App. 292, 290 S.E.2d 490 (1982); Westberg v. Stamm, 162 Ga. App. 369, 291 S.E.2d 439 (1982); Cramer v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 519, 292 S.E.2d 112 (1982); Washington v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 163 Ga. App. 15, 293 S.E.2d 485 (1982); Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982); Roland v. Byrd, 163 Ga. App. 408, 294 S.E.2d 626 (1982); Perloe v. Getz Servs., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 397, 294 S.E.2d 640 (1982); Ray v. Marietta Marine, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 690, 294 S.E.2d 698 (1982); Leiphart Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ewing, 163 Ga. App. 416, 295 S.E.2d 128 (1982); Holbrook v. Burrell, 163 Ga. App. 529, 295 S.E.2d 201 (1982); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 250 Ga. 83, 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982); Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 161 Ga. App. 631, 295 S.E.2d 843 (1982); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Rosenthal, 163 Ga. App. 905, 296 S.E.2d 67 (1982); Glen Restaurant, Inc. v. West, 163 Ga. App. 835, 296 S.E.2d 153 (1982); American Spacers, Ltd. v. Ross, 164 Ga. App. 342, 296 S.E.2d 176 (1982); Slaughter v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 164 Ga. App. 428, 296 S.E.2d 428 (1982); Green v. Housing Auth., 164 Ga. App. 205, 296 S.E.2d 758 (1982); U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. v. Hutsell, 164 Ga. App. 443, 296 S.E.2d 760 (1982); Collins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 482, 297 S.E.2d 503 (1982); Ingle v. Swish Mfg. S.E., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 469, 297 S.E.2d 506 (1982); Saxon v. Sylvania Mobile Homes, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 47, 299 S.E.2d 52 (1983); State v. Belcher, 165 Ga. App. 139, 299 S.E.2d 57 (1983); Simon v. McGee Plumbing & Elec. Co., 164 Ga. App. 667, 299 S.E.2d 388 (1982); Oden & Sims Used Cars, Inc. v. Thurman, 165 Ga. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 673 (1983); Hughes v. Hospital Auth., 165 Ga. App. 530, 301 S.E.2d 695 (1983); Townsend v. Moore, 165 Ga. App. 606, 302 S.E.2d 398 (1983); Wilbanks v. State, 165 Ga. App. 876, 303 S.E.2d 144 (1983); Hester v. Associated Indem. Corp., 166 Ga. App. 63, 303 S.E.2d 321 (1983); Twin Tower Joint Venture v. American Mktg. & Communications Corp., 166 Ga. App. 364, 304 S.E.2d 493 (1983); American Spacers, Ltd. v. Ross, 166 Ga. App. 829, 305 S.E.2d 659 (1983); Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70, 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983); LaPan v. State, 167 Ga. App. 250, 305 S.E.2d 858 (1983); Heard v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 44, 306 S.E.2d 49 (1983); Giddens v. Bo Lovein Ford, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 699, 307 S.E.2d 271 (1983); Muscogee Realty Dev. Corp. v. Jefferson Co., 168 Ga. App. 673, 310 S.E.2d 245 (1983); Lindsey v. State, 252 Ga. 493, 314 S.E.2d 881 (1984); Stone Mt. Pool Supply Co. v. Imperial Pool Co., 170 Ga. App. 283, 316 S.E.2d 769 (1984); Chester v. Bouchillon, 253 Ga. 175, 317 S.E.2d 525 (1984); Beatty v. Morgan, 170 Ga. App. 661, 317 S.E.2d 662 (1984); Housing Auth. v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509, 317 S.E.2d 853 (1984); Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 170 Ga. App. 791, 318 S.E.2d 144 (1984); Greene v. Johnson, 170 Ga. App. 760, 318 S.E.2d 205 (1984); Batson v. First Nat'l Bank, 170 Ga. App. 803, 318 S.E.2d 227 (1984); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 253 Ga. 233, 319 S.E.2d 440 (1984); Lipe v. Coomler, 171 Ga. App. 389, 319 S.E.2d 539 (1984); Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 253 Ga. 337, 320 S.E.2d 174 (1984); Merr Enters., Inc. v. Abbott Foods of Ga., Inc., 171 Ga. App. 464, 320 S.E.2d 214 (1984); Williamson v. Lucas, 171 Ga. App. 695, 320 S.E.2d 800 (1984); Anderson v. Housing Auth., 171 Ga. App. 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984); Casper v. Harrison Hatchery, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 35, 321 S.E.2d 785 (1984); McCoy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 Ga. App. 26, 322 S.E.2d 76 (1984); Mansour v. McWilliams, 172 Ga. App. 377, 323 S.E.2d 262 (1984); Brown v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 172 Ga. App. 568, 323 S.E.2d 822 (1984); Allmond v. Walker, 172 Ga. App. 870, 324 S.E.2d 812 (1984); Groover v. Dickey, 173 Ga. App. 73, 325 S.E.2d 617 (1984); Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assocs., 254 Ga. 734, 334 S.E.2d 308 (1985); City of Roswell v. Davis, 255 Ga. 158, 335 S.E.2d 582 (1985); Federal Ins. Co. v. Paulk, 173 Ga. App. 266, 325 S.E.2d 886 (1985); Craft v. Hospital Auth., 173 Ga. App. 444, 326 S.E.2d 590 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Baugh, 173 Ga. App. 615, 327 S.E.2d 576 (1985); Whitaker v. Ranow, 173 Ga. App. 746, 327 S.E.2d 855 (1985); Roberts v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 173 Ga. App. 757, 328 S.E.2d 391 (1985); Minnick v. Lee, 174 Ga. App. 182, 329 S.E.2d 548 (1985); Walker v. Housing Auth., 174 Ga. App. 585, 330 S.E.2d 729 (1985); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 174 Ga. App. 645, 331 S.E.2d 12 (1985); Dauer v. Flight Int'l, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 879, 332 S.E.2d 28 (1985); D. Jack Davis Corp. v. Karp, 175 Ga. App. 482, 333 S.E.2d 685 (1985); Wheeler v. McDonald, 175 Ga. App. 785, 334 S.E.2d 367 (1985); Stubbs v. Tri-State Culvert Corp., 177 Ga. App. 113, 338 S.E.2d 449 (1985); European Bakers, Ltd. v. Holman, 177 Ga. App. 172, 338 S.E.2d 702 (1985); Moore v. Allen, 255 Ga. 430, 339 S.E.2d 243 (1986); Pye Datsun, Inc. v. Gas, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 538, 339 S.E.2d 791 (1986); Echols v. Quality Mechanical, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 870, 341 S.E.2d 328 (1986); Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 342 S.E.2d 1 (1986); Parsells v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 178 Ga. App. 51, 342 S.E.2d 13 (1986); Tri-Eastern Petro. Corp. v. Glenn's Super Gas, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 144, 342 S.E.2d 346 (1986); Nichols v. Purvis, 178 Ga. App. 826, 344 S.E.2d 692 (1986); Sun v. Bush, 179 Ga. App. 80, 345 S.E.2d 85 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057, 107 S. Ct. 936, 93 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1987); Alexie, Inc. v. Old S. Bottle Shop Corp., 179 Ga. App. 190, 345 S.E.2d 875 (1986); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 179 Ga. App. 318, 346 S.E.2d 363 (1986); Hodges Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. ITT Grinnell Co., 179 Ga. App. 521, 347 S.E.2d 257 (1986); Melton v. Elbert Sales Co., 181 Ga. App. 61, 351 S.E.2d 261 (1986); Bank S. v. Harrell, 181 Ga. App. 64, 351 S.E.2d 263 (1986); Grabowski v. Radiology Assocs., 181 Ga. App. 298, 352 S.E.2d 185 (1986); Layfield v. Turner Adv. Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 354 S.E.2d 14 (1987); Joseph v. Bray, 182 Ga. App. 131, 354 S.E.2d 878 (1987); Terrell v. Hester, 182 Ga. App. 160, 355 S.E.2d 97 (1987); Chrysler Corp. v. Marinari, 182 Ga. App. 399, 355 S.E.2d 719 (1987); Atlanta Dairies Coop. v. Grindle, 182 Ga. App. 409, 356 S.E.2d 42 (1987)

Life Ins. Co. v. Helmuth, 182 Ga. App. 750, 357 S.E.2d 107 (1987); Coastal Supply Co. v. White, 183 Ga. App. 54, 357 S.E.2d 875 (1987); Leavell v. Bentley, 183 Ga. App. 366, 358 S.E.2d 907 (1987); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 359 S.E.2d 376 (1987); Canal Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 183 Ga. App. 880, 360 S.E.2d 435 (1987); GECC v. Smith, 183 Ga. App. 897, 360 S.E.2d 443 (1987); Rivers v. Lynch, 257 Ga. 555, 361 S.E.2d 162 (1987); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Strickland, 185 Ga. App. 306, 363 S.E.2d 834 (1987); Turner Outdoor Adv., Ltd. v. Fidelity E. Fin., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 815, 366 S.E.2d 201 (1988); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Partridge, 187 Ga. App. 637, 371 S.E.2d 185 (1988); Howard v. Jones, 187 Ga. App. 756, 371 S.E.2d 196 (1988); Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 478, 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988); Union Camp Corp. v. Daley, 188 Ga. App. 756, 374 S.E.2d 329 (1988); Bramblett v. Bass, 375 Ga. App. 106, 375 S.E.2d 106 (1988); Feinberg v. Durga, 189 Ga. App. 733, 377 S.E.2d 33 (1988); Clayton v. Larisey, 190 Ga. App. 512, 379 S.E.2d 789 (1989); Daniels v. Johnson, 191 Ga. App. 70, 381 S.E.2d 87 (1989); Stolz v. Shulman, 191 Ga. App. 864, 383 S.E.2d 559 (1989); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 192 Ga. App. 504, 385 S.E.2d 87 (1989); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 385 S.E.2d 118 (1989); Quinones v. Maier & Berkele, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 585, 385 S.E.2d 719 (1989); Georgia Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 193 Ga. App. 288, 387 S.E.2d 898 (1989); Estfan v. Poole, 193 Ga. App. 507, 388 S.E.2d 373 (1989); Reeb v. Daniels Lincoln-Mercury Co., 193 Ga. App. 817, 389 S.E.2d 367 (1989); Lipsey Motors v. Karp Motors, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 15, 389 S.E.2d 537 (1989); Williams v. Lemon, 194 Ga. App. 249, 390 S.E.2d 89 (1990); Luke v. Spicer, 194 Ga. App. 183, 390 S.E.2d 267 (1990); City of Lawrenceville v. Heard, 194 Ga. App. 580, 391 S.E.2d 441 (1990); Doctors Hosp. v. Bonner, 195 Ga. App. 152, 392 S.E.2d 897 (1990); Dixie Roof Decks v. Borggren/Dickson Constr., 195 Ga. App. 881, 395 S.E.2d 19 (1990); Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Miller, 195 Ga. App. 830, 395 S.E.2d 243 (1990); Joe N. Guy Co. v. Valiant Steel & Equip., Inc., 196 Ga. App. 20, 395 S.E.2d 310 (1990); Bryan v. Williamson, 196 Ga. App. 32, 395 S.E.2d 355 (1990); John D. Robinson Corp. v. Southern Marine & Indus. Supply Co., 196 Ga. App. 402, 395 S.E.2d 837 (1990); Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Hall, 196 Ga. App. 349, 395 S.E.2d 851 (1990); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mathis, 197 Ga. App. 324, 398 S.E.2d 387 (1990); Lehman v. Zuckerman, 198 Ga. App. 202, 400 S.E.2d 704 (1990); Darnell v. Holtzclaw, 260 Ga. 891, 401 S.E.2d 521 (1991); Hester Enters., Inc. v. Narvais, 198 Ga. App. 580, 402 S.E.2d 333 (1991); England v. Georgia-Florida Co., 198 Ga. App. 704, 402 S.E.2d 783 (1991); Deloitte, Haskins & Sells v. Green, 198 Ga. App. 849, 403 S.E.2d 818 (1991); Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Carter, 199 Ga. App. 110, 403 S.E.2d 855 (1991); Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. O'Pry, 199 Ga. App. 125, 404 S.E.2d 299 (1991); Pier 1 Imports v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 199 Ga. App. 294, 404 S.E.2d 637 (1991); Powell v. Thomas, 199 Ga. App. 553, 405 S.E.2d 553 (1991); Bowdish v. Johns Creek Assocs., 200 Ga. App. 93, 406 S.E.2d 502 (1991); Williams v. Dienes Apparatus, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 205, 407 S.E.2d 408 (1991); Lester v. Bird, 200 Ga. App. 335, 408 S.E.2d 147 (1991); Burton v. John Thurmond Constr. Co., 201 Ga. App. 10, 410 S.E.2d 137 (1991); Garrett v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 201 Ga. App. 251, 410 S.E.2d 806 (1991); Wade v. Polytech. Indus., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 18, 413 S.E.2d 468 (1991); Speir v. Nicholson, 202 Ga. App. 405, 414 S.E.2d 533 (1992); Miller v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 737, 415 S.E.2d 700 (1992); Moore v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 203 Ga. App. 189, 416 S.E.2d 807 (1992); Three Notch Elec. Membership Corp. v. Simpson, 208 Ga. App. 227, 430 S.E.2d 52 (1993); Shepherd v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 139, 430 S.E.2d 67 (1993); Goggin v. Goldman, 209 Ga. App. 251, 433 S.E.2d 85 (1993); Stanfield v. Kime Plus, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 316, 436 S.E.2d 54 (1993); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Gottschalk, 212 Ga. App. 88, 441 S.E.2d 281 (1994); Wilson v. Muhanna, 213 Ga. App. 704, 445 S.E.2d 540 (1994); Department of Human Resources v. Thomas, 217 Ga. App. 174, 456 S.E.2d 724 (1995); Roseberry v. Brooks, 218 Ga. App. 202, 461 S.E.2d 262 (1995); Hitchcock v. McPhail, 221 Ga. App. 299, 471 S.E.2d 256 (1996); Lofty v. Fuller, 223 Ga. App. 95, 477 S.E.2d 30 (1996); Southern Water Techs., Inc. v. Kile, 224 Ga. App. 717, 481 S.E.2d 826 (1997); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 499 S.E.2d 722 (1998); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 499 S.E.2d 374 (1998); Rubio v. Davis, 231 Ga. App. 425, 500 S.E.2d 367 (1998); Bowman v. Stephens, 232 Ga. App. 326, 501 S.E.2d 245 (1998); Grier v. Brogdon, 234 Ga. App. 79, 505 S.E.2d 512 (1998); Thomas v. Baxter, 234 Ga. App. 663, 507 S.E.2d 766 (1998); Griffin v. Associated Payphone, 244 Ga. App. 183, 534 S.E.2d 540 (2000); Nunley v. Nunley, 248 Ga. App. 208, 546 S.E.2d 330 (2001); Bennett St. Props., L.P. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 248 Ga. App. 686, 548 S.E.2d 619 (2001); Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Floyd Beasley & Sons, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 673, 551 S.E.2d 388 (2001); Patton v. Turnage, 260 Ga. App. 744, 580 S.E.2d 604 (2003); Hornsby v. Hunter, 262 Ga. App. 598, 585 S.E.2d 900 (2003); Looney v. M-Squared, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 499, 586 S.E.2d 44 (2003); Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (2008); DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 291 Ga. App. 444, 662 S.E.2d 141 (2008); PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP v. Bassett, 293 Ga. App. 274, 666 S.E.2d 721 (2008); Caswell v. Caswell, 285 Ga. 277, 675 S.E.2d 19 (2009); Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 687 S.E.2d 233 (2009); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 848, 708 S.E.2d 697 (2011); Toole v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Jan. 19, 2011); Gospel Tabernacle Deliverance Church, Inc. v. From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 355, 718 S.E.2d 575 (2011); Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 832, 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012); Canton Plaza, Inc. v. Regions Bank, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 303, 732 S.E.2d 449 (2012); Mosley v. Lancaster, 296 Ga. 862, 770 S.E.2d 873 (2015); Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Estate of Forrister, 332 Ga. App. 693, 774 S.E.2d 755 (2015); Georgia Casualty & Surety Company v. Valley Wood, Inc., 336 Ga. App. 290, 785 S.E.2d 1 (2016); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. RM Kids, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 638, 788 S.E.2d 542 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1843, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 117 (Ga. 2017); Wilson v. Wernowsky, Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 101 (2020).

Directed Verdict

1. In General

Essence of motion for directed verdict is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to established facts. McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962).

Granting a directed verdict on a single issue is entirely consistent with the general purpose of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 377 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 15 (1988).

- No signed verdict is required. Sirmans v. Jones, 142 Ga. App. 144, 235 S.E.2d 543 (1977).

Judgment entered upon directed verdict not signed by the jury is not void or illegal. Morgan v. Mize, 118 Ga. App. 534, 164 S.E.2d 565 (1968).

Motion for directed verdict is not essential when evidence demanded the verdict. Kelly v. Chrysler Corp., 129 Ga. App. 447, 199 S.E.2d 856 (1973) (on motion for rehearing).

- When motion for directed verdict is granted and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, such judgment should not be reversed merely because the moving party failed to properly specify grounds on which the motion was based. Green v. Knight, 153 Ga. App. 183, 264 S.E.2d 657 (1980); Boykin v. North, 218 Ga. App. 435, 461 S.E.2d 598 (1995).

Fact that both parties move for directed verdict does not constitute waiver by each party of the right to have fact issues decided by the jury, if fact issues remain. Walker v. Bush, 234 Ga. 366, 216 S.E.2d 285 (1975).

- Trial court's function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is analogous to the function the court performs when ruling on a motion for directed verdict. McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962).

Trial court's function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is analogous to the function the court performs when ruling on a motion for directed verdict; the essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the applicable law. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 109 Ga. App. 574, 136 S.E.2d 505 (1964).

Trial court's function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is analogous to that in ruling on a motion for directed verdict; the essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts. Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969).

Motion for summary judgment is analogous to motion for directed verdict; however, although operation of the motions is essentially the same in reference to those issues upon which the movant for summary judgment would have the burden of proof at trial, the operation is somewhat different made by the opponent of the party with the trial burden. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969).

- Grant of summary judgment may be improper in a case in which, at trial, a grant of a directed verdict may be proper. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969).

Party who moves for summary judgment in a case premised on negligence has a considerable burden, and if the moving party is the defendant, the moving party may not be able to obtain summary judgment even though a directed verdict might be obtained at trial. Turner v. Noe, 127 Ga. App. 870, 195 S.E.2d 463 (1973).

Court's conclusion that summary judgment is inappropriate does not preclude subsequent directed verdict since the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing except that under the evidence considered at that time there can be no judgment rendered as a matter of law. Timber Equip., Inc. v. McKinney, 166 Ga. App. 757, 305 S.E.2d 468 (1983).

- Motion for directed verdict is procedurally incorrect in a nonjury case, but the court may nonetheless treat the motion as one for involuntary dismissal. Pichulik v. Air Conditioning & Heating Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 195, 180 S.E.2d 286 (1971).

In a nonjury case, it is procedurally incorrect to move for directed verdict; such a motion, as well as the grant thereof, will be construed as one for involuntary dismissal under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b)). Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 212 S.E.2d 447 (1975).

- Trial judge is never authorized to direct a verdict against a party litigant until the party has introduced or had an opportunity to introduce all evidence on the issues involved and rested the case. Mallard v. Mallard, 221 Ga. 480, 145 S.E.2d 533 (1965).

Court is required to grant the verdict based on the evidence, not the statement of counsel. Glenridge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Felton, 183 Ga. App. 858, 360 S.E.2d 418 (1987).

Directed verdict cannot be granted if there is "any evidence" to support a contrary verdict, but there cannot be "some evidence" that all the evidence demands a particular verdict. Carden v. Burckhalter, 214 Ga. App. 487, 448 S.E.2d 251 (1994).

Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for directed verdict under the "any evidence" standard, which requires the appellate court to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who obtained a verdict, and if there is any evidence to support the verdict, the appellate court will not disturb the verdict. Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 580 S.E.2d 342 (2003).

Trial court's denial of the motel sellers' motion for a directed verdict as to a claim for damages under a tortious interference with business relationship claim, as well as for property damages, was proper as the evidence produced at trial satisfied the "any evidence" test; there was evidence that the sellers had turned off electricity to an advertising sign, failed to disclose that the sale terminated the motel franchise, and that there were frequent diesel spills on the property as well as evidence as to the cost of repairs to the property. Chhina Family P'ship, L.P. v. S-K Group of Motels, Inc., 275 Ga. App. 811, 622 S.E.2d 40 (2005).

In a tenant's action against the leasing agent of the tenant's apartment complex alleging that the tenant was injured by soot emitted from the apartment's heating system, the agent's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the tenant did not show that the agent caused the soot to appear in the apartment was properly denied although there was evidence that the tenant smoked, burned candles, and painted the apartment; construed to favor the tenant, the theory that the agent's negligent maintenance caused the problem was substantiated by the opinion of the tenant's expert and by the facts that the problem began before the tenant painted the apartment, and that no residue problems occurred in a subsequent apartment where the tenant also smoked and burned candles. Ambling Mgmt. Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 640 S.E.2d 620 (2006).

Trial court did not err in entering a directed verdict against a husband and wife, in the couples' suit seeking uninsured motorist benefits, as the couples failed to prove negligence, and inferences of such provided by the wife's testimony amounted to mere conjecture, which was insufficient for a liability claim to attach. Morton v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 282 Ga. App. 734, 639 S.E.2d 352 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0570, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court properly denied the motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed by the executors of a will and trust because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the documents were invalid as a product of undue influence based on the executors taking complete control of the elderly testator and isolating the testator from the testator's sons, as well as substituting the executors' desires and having the testator sign a new will and trust, which benefitted the executors and excluded the testator's wife and sons. Davison v. Hines, 291 Ga. 434, 729 S.E.2d 330 (2012).

Evidence did not demand verdict. See Thompson Enters., Inc. v. Coskrey, 168 Ga. App. 181, 308 S.E.2d 399 (1983); Cardin v. Telfair Acres of Lowndes County, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 449, 393 S.E.2d 731 (1990).

Insurer failed to show that the insurer was entitled to a verdict as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) after: (1) the jury heard the evidence and decided against the insurer as to the driver's duty to mitigate damages; (2) the driver reported the accident to the insurer; (3) the insured was led to believe that the insurer would defend both the driver and the insured; (4) upon service of the negligence suit, the driver contacted the insured, telling the insured of the suit; and (5) the insurer failed to show that there was not a factual issue that the driver exercised ordinary care to mitigate the driver's damages. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Macleod, 259 Ga. App. 761, 577 S.E.2d 799 (2003).

In a suit over a nursing home manager's non-compliance with a nursing home operator's document requests, the manager was properly denied a directed verdict on a breach of contract claim because the manager failed to provide documents to the operator as required under a management agreement and termination was therefore permitted under the agreement. Additionally, the manager was properly denied a directed verdict on a conversion claim because the manager had held documentation belonging to the operator and had made unauthorized loans and employee payments. Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., 264 Ga. App. 265, 590 S.E.2d 235 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying a truck modifying company's motion for a directed verdict in a truck owner's products liability action arising from a fire in the truck cab due to an allegedly defective switch that had been installed by the company as the parties presented conflicting evidence to explain the origin and cause of the fire that burned the owner's body; accordingly, a particular verdict was not demanded and a directed verdict was not mandated. Cottrell, Inc. v. Williams, 266 Ga. App. 357, 596 S.E.2d 789 (2004).

Trial court properly denied an insurance management company and the company's president's motion for directed verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, in an action by a contractor who was forced to pay for a subcontractor's employee's injuries due to the failure of the subcontractor to have workers' compensation insurance as there was sufficient evidence of misrepresentations by the company and the company's president, and justifiable reliance by the contractor, to support the contractor's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; the company and the company's president had assured the contractor repeatedly that the subcontractor had adequate workers' compensation insurance for building purposes, although the subcontractor did not, and based on the fraud by them, punitive damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) were properly presented to the jury for consideration. FitzSimons v. W. M. Collins Enters., Inc., 271 Ga. App. 854, 610 S.E.2d 654 (2005).

Trial court properly denied the motel sellers' motion for directed verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, on the issue of fraud in the parties' agreement as the existence of a valid merger clause in the sale agreement for the motel did not bar the purchasers' claim that there was fraud based on misrepresentations in the agreement; further, there was evidence of such misrepresentations by the sellers as to the boundaries, which properties were covered by the agreement, and whether a restaurant was covered in the agreement. Chhina Family P'ship, L.P. v. S-K Group of Motels, Inc., 275 Ga. App. 811, 622 S.E.2d 40 (2005).

Evidence that a fire rescue emergency vehicle's lights were working properly at the time of an accident and testimony that the lights "were in compliance with Georgia law," was sufficient for a jury to have found that the lights were visible from a distance of 500 feet, in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 for purposes of allowing the vehicle to proceed through a red light; accordingly, a trial court properly denied a driver's motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) arising from a collision that occurred at the intersection involving the driver's vehicle and the emergency vehicle. Wynn v. City of Warner Robins, 279 Ga. App. 42, 630 S.E.2d 574 (2006).

In a medical malpractice action, the trial court did not err in denying an original doctor a directed verdict on grounds that the negligence of either the patient or the patient's subsequent doctor cut off the original doctor's liability as: (1) the patient was never put on notice of the need for any ongoing evaluation or treatment, and hence, any failure to seek routine medical care after the original doctor's misdiagnosis for over two years could not serve as the proximate cause of injury; (2) the acts or omissions of the subsequent doctor could not serve to cut off the liability of the original doctor; and (3) the jury was entitled to hear and resolve whether the subsequent doctor supplied an intervening cause of injury. Amu v. Barnes, 286 Ga. App. 725, 650 S.E.2d 288 (2007), aff'd, 283 Ga. 549, 662 S.E.2d 113 (2008).

Trial court did not err by denying a property owner's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether a power company had a duty to warn before opening dam flood gates in the property owner's negligence suit for flood damage as whether the power company had a duty to warn under Georgia tort law, as opposed to the power company's emergency action plan, was a matter for the jury. The property owner failed to cite a single appellate case in Georgia that required a dam owner or operator, as a matter of law, to notify downstream residents when opening flood gates and the evidence on the issue was in conflict, thus, the matter did not demand a verdict in the property owner's favor. Lee v. Ga. Power Co., 296 Ga. App. 719, 675 S.E.2d 465 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying lessees' motions for directed verdict after a jury found in favor of a lessor in the lessor's action to recover the unpaid rent due on a commercial lease because there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury's verdict that the lease was not terminated and that the lessees owed the lessor for past due rent; the language used in the warranty deed transferring title to the property from the original landlord to a purchaser and the quitclaim deed transferring title to the property from the purchaser to the lessor could be read as an assignment of the lease, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the lessor did not force the lessees to vacate the premises when the purchaser hired a locksmith to change the locks on the premises since the lessees sent the lessor a letter stating that the lessees would be leaving the facility. Level One Contact, Inc. v. BJL Enters., LLC, 305 Ga. App. 78, 699 S.E.2d 89 (2010).

Will propounder was not entitled to a directed verdict in a will caveat as the evidence established a question for the jury on the issue of the testator's capacity due to testimony that the testator was regularly confused and did not appear to understand her medical conditions, including dementia. Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 748 S.E.2d 839 (2013).

Will propounder was not entitled to a directed verdict in a will caveat as the evidence established a question for the jury on the issue of whether the testator suffered from delusions based on monomania, and whether the propounder had misrepresented to the testator the nature of a real property transfer for purposes of fraud. Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 748 S.E.2d 839 (2013).

Will propounder was not entitled to a directed verdict in a will caveat as the evidence established a question for the jury on the issue of undue influence because there was more than merely an opportunity for the propounder to influence the testator; there was also evidence of the testator's diminished mental faculties and an established confidential relationship between the propounder and the testator. Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 748 S.E.2d 839 (2013).

Grounds not mentioned in a motion for directed verdict cannot thereafter be raised on appeal. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Massey, 162 Ga. App. 249, 291 S.E.2d 97 (1982).

- To allow reopening of a case after motion for directed verdict had been granted but before it had been reduced to writing was entirely within the court's discretion. Wallace v. Yarbrough, 155 Ga. App. 184, 270 S.E.2d 357 (1980).

Fact that the jury returns a verdict does not render the failure to direct verdict an error by hindsight. Craft v. Hospital Auth., 173 Ga. App. 444, 326 S.E.2d 590 (1985).

- Upon a claim that a pesticide company violated O.C.G.A. § 2-7-62(b)(3), given the multiple instructions included on the pesticide label, particularly that portion suggesting that the preparer reverse the order of the added components, the trial court properly concluded that the issue of whether the chemical was mixed in a manner inconsistent with its label was a jury question. Moreover, even if the company violated § 2-7-62(b)(3), it did not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law, as it would improperly remove the issue of proximate cause from the jury. Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co., 288 Ga. App. 767, 655 S.E.2d 228 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0642, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 459 (Ga. 2008).

- If neither a directed verdict nor a judgment n.o.v. is warranted, surely a defendant is not entitled to a new trial. Associated Software Consultants Org., Inc. v. Wysocki, 177 Ga. App. 135, 338 S.E.2d 679 (1985).

When the erroneous grant of a directed verdict to one of multiple defendants will require a new trial, particularly when there is extensive evidence and debate, it is a wise exercise in judicial economy to grant a judgment n.o.v., rather than try the matter again as to that defendant, with the resulting prejudice to all parties. Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 458 S.E.2d 883 (1995).

While the failure to move for a directed verdict barred a party from contending on appeal that the party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because of insufficient evidence, such did not bar that party from arguing their entitlement to a new trial on that ground, as fairness dictated that a party who has failed to move for a directed verdict at trial should not be able to obtain a judgment as a matter of law on appeal based on the contention the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Aldworth Co. v. England, 281 Ga. 197, 637 S.E.2d 198 (2006).

- In a medical malpractice action, an executrix failed to support a claim for punitive damages related to a claim of abandonment as the executrix failed to present any expert testimony that there was a reasonable degree of medical certainty the decedent would have survived, even if the doctor or another qualified surgeon had been at the hospital when the decedent began to bleed internally; thus, the trial court properly granted the doctor a directed verdict as to both claims. King v. Zakaria, 280 Ga. App. 570, 634 S.E.2d 444 (2006).

In a breach of contract action associated with a construction project, the trial court properly granted a limited liability company's motion for a directed verdict against a contractor as the contractor failed to present sufficient evidence linking the limited liability company to the contract sued upon, but all the evidence involved the contractor's negotiations and dealings with a businessperson and the businessperson's company. L. Lowe & Co., Inc. v. Sunset Strip Props., LLC, 283 Ga. App. 357, 641 S.E.2d 797 (2007).

Trial court did not err in directing a verdict as to a parent's ordinary negligence claim based on a hospital's decision to not follow the recommended protocol for testing the parent's newborn blood. The hospital had to exercise medical judgment to determine what to do to treat the child and assess the seriousness of the diseases tested for. Walls v. Sumter Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 292 Ga. App. 865, 666 S.E.2d 66 (2008).

Since the first subsidiary company undertook no contractual obligation to perform work on the project for another, but merely hired the contractor to perform the project work, the first company was not a statutory employer liable for compensation to the injured employee under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8, and had no immunity from suit under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. Therefore, the first company was entitled to a directed verdict in the company's favor on the basis that the company was a statutory employer under § 34-9-8, and was therefore entitled to Workers' Compensation immunity from suit under § 34-9-11. Ramcke v. Ga. Power Co., 306 Ga. App. 736, 703 S.E.2d 13 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0482, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. 2011).

Truck repairer's failures to repair an owner's truck to the owner's satisfaction or to agree on a trade-in price for the truck could not have justified the submission of attorney fees to the jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, such that the trial court properly granted a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 to the repairer. Puckette v. John Bailey Pontiac-Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 138, 714 S.E.2d 750 (2011).

- In a potential home purchaser's action to recover earnest money, the seller was entitled to a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) on the basis that the contract was unenforceable because the contract did not list the loan amount or the interest rate on the loan; however, because the contract was unenforceable, the purchaser was not estopped from recovering the earnest money. Parks v. Thompson Builders, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 704, 675 S.E.2d 583 (2009).

- Reversal on appeal of denial of motion for directed verdict means that a directed verdict should have been, and should be, entered. This is tantamount to a reversal with direction, and no retrial can be held. Kirkland v. Southern Disct. Co., 187 Ga. App. 453, 370 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 370 S.E.2d 640 (1988).

Standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict is the "any evidence" standard. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Connell, 166 Ga. App. 329, 304 S.E.2d 131 (1983); Southern Ry. v. Lawson, 256 Ga. 798, 353 S.E.2d 491 (1987); Davis v. Glaze, 182 Ga. App. 18, 354 S.E.2d 845 (1987); Rizer v. Harris, 182 Ga. App. 31, 354 S.E.2d 660 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Eileen B. White & Assocs. v. Gunnells, 263 Ga. 360, 434 S.E.2d 477 (1993); Honester v. Tinsley, 183 Ga. App. 146, 358 S.E.2d 295 (1987); Mitchell v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 218, 390 S.E.2d 79, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 912, 390 S.E.2d 79 (1990); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992); Mark Six Realty Assocs. v. Drake, 219 Ga. App. 57, 463 S.E.2d 917 (1995).

Requirements that must be met in a directed verdict situation are very strict, and when there is some, though slight, evidence to support an issue raised in the complaint, it cannot be said, as required by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, that "the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict." Hall v. Rome Auto. Co., 181 Ga. App. 621, 353 S.E.2d 542 (1987).

When determining whether a trial court erred by denying a motion for a directed verdict, this court reviews and resolves the evidence and any doubts or ambiguities in favor of the verdict. Canal Ins. Co. v. Wilkes Supply Co., 203 Ga. App. 35, 416 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 105 (1992); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).

In an action involving the sale of land, because no adequate description of the property sought to be sold could be found within the four corners of the parties' final agreement, no exhibits were attached, and the words used in the contract did not provide a sufficient description of the land, the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to provide a legally sufficient description of the property at issue; hence, the property owners' motion for a directed verdict was erroneously denied. McClung v. Atlanta Real Estate Acquisitions, LLC, 282 Ga. App. 759, 639 S.E.2d 331 (2006).

As the Supreme Court of Georgia previously concluded that there was no factual conflict during summary judgment or at trial as to an employee being within the zone of danger, on remand the appellate court could not revisit that issue or review whether the trial court's denial of the railway company's motion for a directed verdict on the zone of danger issue was error. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Everett, 322 Ga. App. 867, 747 S.E.2d 92 (2013).

- In reviewing grant of a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court must decide whether all the evidence demanded the verdict, or whether there was some evidence supporting the verdict of the jury. Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30, 302 S.E.2d 554 (1983).

Court of Appeals will consider the merits of the appeal after the trial court reserved ruling on a motion for directed verdict and then directed a verdict after the jury rendered a verdict but before there had been an entry of judgment on that verdict, since no special harm resulted to either party from such consideration; overruling Fabian v. Dykes, 210 Ga. App. 703, 436 S.E.2d 819 (1993); Wright v. Millines, 204 Ga. App. 111, 418 S.E.2d 453 (1993); Anaya v. Brooks Auto Parts, 203 Ga. App. 485, 417 S.E.2d 423 (1992), to the extent they are inconsistent. Continental Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 212 Ga. App. 839, 443 S.E.2d 509 (1994).

Grant of directed verdict can be upheld when it is determined that all the evidence demands that verdict; this requires a de novo review. Carden v. Burckhalter, 214 Ga. App. 487, 448 S.E.2d 251 (1994); Hulsey v. DOT, 230 Ga. App. 763, 498 S.E.2d 122 (1998).

- Husband's complaint of the trial court's denial of the corporation's motion for summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was moot as the trial court later granted the corporation's motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50. Moore v. Moore, 281 Ga. 81, 635 S.E.2d 107 (2006).

- On appeal from a directed verdict entered against them, because the landowners did not specifically challenge the trial court's ruling as to the denial of their claim for attorney fees and punitive damages, absent evidence of any error resulting from that ruling, to the extent they intended to challenge the directed verdict as to these two claims, that challenge was abandoned. Walls v. Moreland Altobelli Assocs., 290 Ga. App. 199, 659 S.E.2d 418 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying motion for directed verdict. See Hawkins v. Greenberg, 166 Ga. App. 574, 304 S.E.2d 922 (1983); Spoon v. Herndon, 167 Ga. App. 794, 307 S.E.2d 693 (1983); Brown v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 168 Ga. App. 385, 308 S.E.2d 850 (1983), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 253 Ga. 119, 317 S.E.2d 180 (1984); GEICO v. Presley, 174 Ga. App. 562, 330 S.E.2d 779 (1985); Price v. Hitchcock, 174 Ga. App. 606, 330 S.E.2d 807 (1985).

Employer's motion for a directed verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, was properly denied in an employee's breach of employment agreement claim after it was found that the elements of breach of contract were proved pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1; although the services to be provided were ambiguous in the contract, the use of parol evidence resolved the parties' intention on that issue. ISS Int'l Serv. Sys. v. Widmer, 264 Ga. App. 55, 589 S.E.2d 820 (2003).

Trial court did not err in a wrongful death action by denying the motion for a directed verdict of an engineering company that designed an allegedly defective reinforcing safety net that was installed in the soil above a combined sanitary and storm sewer, and which failed to prevent a hole from developing as: (1) the reinforcing safety net could have been considered a product under a theory of products liability; (2) there was evidence that the reinforcing safety net was not reasonably suited for its intended purposes; and (3) the engineering company could not have been considered a joint tortfeasor with the city for purposes of contribution. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 267 Ga. App. 45, 598 S.E.2d 815 (2004).

Trial court properly denied the defendants' motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in an action by one title company against another, seeking recovery for a mistaken title examination performed by the defendants, as there was evidence that the plaintiff had to reimburse the plaintiff's principal for an amount paid out on a claim due to the defendants not having seen a transfer of title when the defendants performed the title examination; further, because issues raised on appeal as to why the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions were not raised in the trial court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(b), or were not raised in the motion for directed verdict, those issues were not preserved for appellate court review. Southern Land Title, Inc. v. North Ga. Title, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 4, 606 S.E.2d 43 (2004).

County's motion for a directed verdict on the county's counterclaim and cross-claim for declaratory relief against the homeowners was properly denied because the jury was not asked to decide issues of inverse condemnation, nuisance, or other claims of county liability for damages purportedly caused when the county dug a trench across a dam in response to the demand for immediate action by the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Natural Resources Department, pursuant to the Georgia Safe Dams Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-370 et seq., due to the danger posed by the dam. Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 610 S.E.2d 512 (2005).

Trial court properly denied both a motion for directed verdict and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the claim by a dentist and a dental center that a former employee had failed to present evidence on the employee's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress that the dentist's actions in harassing the employee were extreme and outrageous or that the emotional distress suffered by the employee was severe; the evidence of the dentist's pervasive pattern of harassing behavior demonstrated the extreme and outrageous nature of the dentist's conduct, and the severity of the emotional distress suffered by the employee was evidenced by the fact that the employee became so fearful of the dentist that the employee obtained a gun and kept the gun under the employee's bed until the employee moved out of state. Furthermore, the former employee's claim of negligent hiring and retention of the dentist were well grounded because the former employee presented evidence that officers of the dental center knew, based on allegations that the dentist had previously harassed other employees of the dental center, that the dentist posed a risk of also harassing the former employee and additional motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied. Ferman v. Bailey, 292 Ga. App. 288, 664 S.E.2d 285 (2008).

Defendant not entitled to directed verdict. See Tiftarea Shopper, Inc. v. Maddox, 187 Ga. App. 227, 369 S.E.2d 545 (1988); Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994).

- Trial court erred in denying a lessee's motion for directed verdict in an action by an assignee for damages relating to the expiration of a lease between the lessee and the lessors because the assignee had no entitlement to recover its lost profits, based on allegations that it could not operate its own convenience store due to the lessee's failure to timely vacate the premises, when it was limited through the assignment to recover only the remedies available to the lessors, i.e., failure to timely deliver possession and property damages. Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 597 S.E.2d 659 (2004).

Because the provision in a business sales contract for $ 10,000 in liquidated damages for the seller's one-time use of its former name was unreasonable, and the parties did not attempt to estimate the loss, the liquidated damage clause was an unenforceable penalty; the trial court thus erred by failing to grant the seller's motion for a directed verdict. Caincare, Inc. v. Ellison, 272 Ga. App. 190, 612 S.E.2d 47 (2005).

After a trial court erroneously failed to grant a plaintiff a directed verdict on the plaintiff's claim that a liquidated damage clause was an unenforceable penalty, and the defendant only sought liquidated damages, there were no grounds upon which to remand for a new trial on actual or nominal damages under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(e) as a directed verdict on liquidated damages would have resolved the defendant's entire counterclaim. Caincare, Inc. v. Ellison, 272 Ga. App. 190, 612 S.E.2d 47 (2005).

Trial court erred in denying motions for directed verdict, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, because a real estate broker and a real estate agent owed no duty to a potential buyer of property when the buyer did not engage the broker as defined in the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq.; the buyer was, at most, a "customer" of the broker pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-3(8), and the broker exercised reasonable care in locating a property owner and checking on the status of desired property pursuant to § 10-6A-3. Harrouk v. Fierman, 291 Ga. App. 818, 662 S.E.2d 892 (2008).

It was error not to direct a verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) to a putative property owner in an action by various family members seeking to impose a constructive trust on real property under former O.C.G.A. § 53-12-93(a) as it was inequitable to grant the family members an interest in the property because the putative owner had worked the farm for over 18 years and had spent significant sums on the property compared to the very minimal amounts contributed by the family members over the years; the doctrine of part performance as an exception to the Statute of Frauds under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) was inapplicable because the oral agreement was not sufficiently certain or definite for purposes of enforcement. Troutman v. Troutman, 297 Ga. App. 62, 676 S.E.2d 787 (2009).

Trial court erred in directing a verdict as to damages after a landlord satisfied the requirement for submitting secondary evidence by establishing that the primary evidence, the purchase invoices, had been destroyed and that higher secondary evidence from the company was unavailable; the oral evidence as to the wholesale fair market value and as to the dealer's discount, based upon the actual damaged parts, was sufficient secondary evidence to go to a jury. Hodges v. Vara, 268 Ga. App. 815, 603 S.E.2d 327 (2004).

Because a police officer's evidence of damages was uncertain and there was some evidence that a police officer's shoulder injury was not caused by an individual's negligence, the trial court erred by entering a directed verdict in favor of the officer. Teklewold v. Taylor, 271 Ga. App. 664, 610 S.E.2d 617 (2005).

Trial court erred in granting a directed verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, to a pediatrician in a medical malpractice action by the parents of a minor whose undiagnosed bacterial meningitis caused brain damage and rendered the minor a quadriplegic as there was some evidence that the doctor violated the standard of care when the doctor allowed an unlicensed nurse to handle weekend calls from patients' families without the necessity of contacting the pediatrician; although the nurse, who spoke with the parents and gave them erroneous information that the child probably had a virus or was hungry, was employed by the pediatrician's professional corporation, the pediatrician could not be shielded from individual liability from the pediatrician's own acts, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-622(b). Snider v. Basilio, 276 Ga. App. 315, 623 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Evidence presented by a testator's child, which proved the testator's disease, medication, and its effects, the testator's dependence on the care givers, their isolation of the testator from the child; their active encouragement and arrangements for the drafting and execution of a new will, the testator's short-term relationship with them, the testator's sporadic contact with and lack of trust towards one of the challenged beneficiaries, and the testator's long-standing expressions of testamentary intent to leave all of the testator's property to the child, which the testator repeated the day after execution of the disposition, supplied sufficient evidence to support the child's claim of undue influence to support the jury verdict in the child's favor and not a directed verdict entered by the trial court in the face of this evidence; although this evidence did not demand a finding that the will was the product of undue influence, it was sufficient to authorize the submission of that question to the jury. Bailey v. Edmundson, 280 Ga. 528, 630 S.E.2d 396 (2006).

Directed verdict on a breach of contract claim involving a promissory note was inappropriate because although the amount due was admittedly not paid, fraud and misrepresentation by plaintiffs, a corporation and the corporation's principal, were defenses to that claim; because the evidence presented to support a fraud defense by defendants, a corporation and two guarantors, also supported defendants' counterclaims, the error in granting the directed verdict was not harmless as the jury could have been influenced by that action in determining the viability of the counterclaims. Jocelyn Canyon, Inc. v. Lentjes, 292 Ga. App. 608, 664 S.E.2d 908 (2008).

In a homeowner's breach of contract and negligent construction case, because there was no indication in the record that the trial court determined the cost of repair to be an inappropriate measure of damages and because the homeowner presented some evidence of the cost to repair fire damage, the trial court erred in directing a verdict against the homeowner. John Thurmond & Assocs. v. Kennedy, 284 Ga. 469, 668 S.E.2d 666 (2008).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in the defendant's competency trial because the evidence on competency was in conflict; even though the defendant's expert witness opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, the state's expert testified that the defendant was competent to do so. Smith v. State, 312 Ga. App. 174, 718 S.E.2d 43 (2011).

- Trial court's denial of a directed verdict in favor of the insurer was reversed on the issue of whether the policy was void based upon misrepresentations in the application because the undisputed evidence showed that the use of a certified public accountant audit and a requirement that checks be countersigned were material to the insurer's decision to issue crime coverage to the insured and that the insurer would not have issued the policy if the insurer had known the true facts. Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Wood, Inc., 336 Ga. App. 795, 783 S.E.2d 441 (2016).

- When a carrier did not file a motion for a directed verdict until after the case had been submitted to the jury, it was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50. Furthermore, the untimely motion also barred the carrier from contending on appeal that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because of insufficient evidence. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hyers, 291 Ga. App. 316, 661 S.E.2d 682 (2008).

2. Grounds for Directed Verdict

Directed verdicts to be granted reluctantly and scrutinized with care.

- Motions for directed verdict should be granted reluctantly by the trial courts, and upon appeal should be scrutinized with great care by the reviewing court. Lingo v. Kirby, 142 Ga. App. 278, 236 S.E.2d 26 (1977).

- Verdict should not be directed unless there is no issue of fact, or unless proved facts, viewed from every possible legal point of view, can sustain no other finding than that directed. Davis v. Wight, 207 Ga. 590, 63 S.E.2d 405 (1951); Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield, 83 Ga. App. 593, 64 S.E.2d 356 (1951); Whitlock v. Michael, 208 Ga. 229, 65 S.E.2d 797 (1951); Miles v. Blanton, 211 Ga. 754, 88 S.E.2d 273 (1955); Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 103 S.E.2d 557 (1958); Stone v. Jernigan, 214 Ga. 249, 104 S.E.2d 101 (1958); Bridges v. Elrod, 216 Ga. 102, 114 S.E.2d 874 (1960); Tift v. Gulf Oil Corp., 223 Ga. 83, 153 S.E.2d 702 (1967).

It is error for the court to direct a verdict in favor of a particular party or parties unless there is no issue of fact, or unless proved facts, viewed from every possible legal point, would sustain no other finding than the one so directed. Horn v. Preston, 217 Ga. 165, 121 S.E.2d 775 (1961); Belch v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 823, 136 S.E.2d 351 (1964); Gibson v. Filter Queen Co., 109 Ga. App. 650, 136 S.E.2d 922 (1964).

Test required by subsection (a) of this section is that evidence demands a verdict, not merely that the evidence supports a verdict in favor of the moving party. Jenkins v. Gulf States Mtg. Co., 138 Ga. App. 835, 227 S.E.2d 522 (1976).

Rule in the final sentence of subsection (a) of this section purports to set forth the standard for directed verdict long recognized in this state. Georgia Power Co. v. Nix, 147 Ga. App. 681, 250 S.E.2d 17 (1978).

Verdict may be legally directed when evidence is not conflicting. Tilley v. Cox, 119 Ga. 867, 47 S.E. 219 (1904); Price v. Central of Ga. Ry., 124 Ga. 899, 53 S.E. 455 (1906).

Directed verdict is appropriate only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, demands a particular verdict. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga. 136, 508 S.E.2d 646 (1998).

- General rule on a motion for directed verdict is that the evidence must be construed most favorably to the nonmovant. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972); Folsom v. Vangilder, 159 Ga. App. 844, 285 S.E.2d 583 (1981).

On directed verdict, the court is bound to consider evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is asked to be directed. Murray v. Gamble, 127 Ga. App. 855, 195 S.E.2d 461 (1973); North Ga. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Vandergrift, 239 Ga. 755, 238 S.E.2d 869 (1977); Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609, 247 S.E.2d 61 (1978).

Evidence in cases of directed verdict must be construed most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. Kalish v. King Cabinet Co., 140 Ga. App. 345, 232 S.E.2d 86 (1976).

Court's duty is to construe the evidence most favorably toward the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict, and it will labor to retain intact the verdict returned by the jury to whom the system has entrusted the dispensing of justice. Eddie Parker Interests, Inc. v. Booth, 160 Ga. App. 15, 285 S.E.2d 753 (1981).

Evidence should be construed in the light most favorable to the respondent to a motion for directed verdict. Ranger Constr. Co. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 166 Ga. App. 679, 305 S.E.2d 361 (1983).

In determining whether any conflict in the evidence exists, the court must construe the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion for directed verdict. Skelton v. Skelton, 251 Ga. 631, 308 S.E.2d 838 (1983).

- It is error to direct a verdict, except when there is no conflict in the evidence as to the material facts, and the evidence introduced, together with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom, demands a particular verdict. Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 38 S.E.2d 534 (1946); Jones v. Smith, 206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949); Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Ga. App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961); Kesler v. Kesler, 219 Ga. 592, 134 S.E.2d 811 (1964).

Directed verdict is authorized when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. Grace v. Rouse, 202 Ga. 720, 44 S.E.2d 762 (1947); Isom v. Schettino, 129 Ga. App. 73, 199 S.E.2d 89 (1973); Allred v. Dobbs, 137 Ga. App. 227, 223 S.E.2d 265 (1976); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bowers, 139 Ga. App. 416, 228 S.E.2d 348 (1976); Brown v. Truluck, 239 Ga. 105, 236 S.E.2d 60 (1977); Hall County Mem. Park v. Baker, 145 Ga. App. 296, 243 S.E.2d 689 (1978); Wilborn v. Elliott, 149 Ga. App. 541, 254 S.E.2d 755 (1979); Spivey v. Eavenson, 150 Ga. App. 429, 258 S.E.2d 54 (1979); Darwin v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 158 Ga. App. 635, 281 S.E.2d 361 (1981); Jones v. Smith, 160 Ga. App. 147, 286 S.E.2d 478 (1981); Levine v. Peachtree-Twin Towers Co., 161 Ga. App. 103, 289 S.E.2d 306 (1982); Gibson v. Talley, 162 Ga. App. 303, 291 S.E.2d 72 (1982); Canal Ins. Co. v. Wilkes Supply Co., 203 Ga. App. 35, 416 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 105 (1992); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).

When there are no material issues of fact, it is proper to direct a verdict in favor of a party entitled to the verdict under evidence submitted. Seabolt v. Christian, 82 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E.2d 540 (1950).

It is only when evidence adduced demands that the jury find in favor of a certain party that it is proper to direct a verdict for such party. Taylor v. Gill Equip. Co., 87 Ga. App. 309, 73 S.E.2d 755 (1952).

It is not erroneous to direct a verdict when there is no conflict in the evidence introduced and when all reasonable deductions or inferences which may be drawn therefrom demand a verdict so directed. Smith v. Welch, 212 Ga. 345, 92 S.E.2d 297 (1956); McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962).

It is error for the trial judge to direct a verdict, except when there is no conflict in the evidence introduced as to the material facts, and evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom, demands a particular verdict; and when there is a material conflict in the evidence upon a material issue, the trial judge cannot usurp the province of the jury and instruct the jury to render a given verdict. Parker v. Parker, 214 Ga. 509, 105 S.E.2d 742 (1958).

Motion for directed verdict is in order only when there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict in the movant's favor is demanded. Daniel v. Weeks, 217 Ga. 388, 122 S.E.2d 564 (1961).

Before the trial court would be authorized to direct a verdict in favor of one party and against another, the evidence must demand the verdict directed. Crosby Aeromarine, Inc. v. Hyde, 115 Ga. App. 836, 156 S.E.2d 106 (1967).

It is only when there is no conflict in the evidence, or when all the evidence introduced, together with all reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom, demands a particular verdict that the court is authorized to direct the verdict. Maryfield Plantation, Inc. v. Harris Gin Co., 116 Ga. App. 744, 159 S.E.2d 125 (1967).

It is not error to direct a verdict if the evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent, demands the verdict and fails to disclose any material issue for jury resolution. Burney v. Butler, 243 Ga. 620, 255 S.E.2d 686 (1979).

Directed verdict is proper only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced together with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom demands a particular verdict. Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga. App. 197, 303 S.E.2d 529 (1983); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Beard v. Fender, 179 Ga. App. 465, 346 S.E.2d 901 (1986); Harrell v. Thompson, 182 Ga. App. 470, 356 S.E.2d 69 (1987).

Directed verdict is not authorized unless there is no conflict in the evidence on any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions demands a certain verdict. Canal Ins. Co. v. Wilkes Supply Co., 203 Ga. App. 35, 416 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 105 (1992).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demanded a verdict for the defendant. B & C Tire & Battery, Inc. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 212 Ga. App. 228, 441 S.E.2d 468 (1994).

Trial court erred by not granting a city a directed verdict in a personal injury suit brought by a driver who hit an uncovered manhole because the driver did not establish all of the elements required to hold the city liable for a public nuisance as the driver did not establish that the alleged defect of the deteriorated condition of the manhole existed on or before the day the driver collided with the open manhole to establish the necessary elements of nuisance. City of Atlanta v. Dale, 353 Ga. App. 817, 840 S.E.2d 56 (2020).

- Because an injured party did not show that a truck driver was employed by the owner at the time of a motor vehicle accident or that the owner actually owned the truck, a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) in favor of the owner was proper. King v. Evans, 259 Ga. App. 626, 578 S.E.2d 480 (2003).

- In a tenant's action against the leasing agent of an apartment complex alleging injury caused by soot emitted from the apartment's heating system, a motion for a directed verdict filed by the agent that claimed that the tenant failed to exercise ordinary care for the tenant's personal safety and assumed the risk of being exposed to a hazardous condition was properly denied; construed to favor the tenant, the evidence did not mandate a finding that the tenant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known of an intentional and unreasonable exposure to a hazard, or that the tenant had actual knowledge of the danger and knew of a specific, particular risk of harm associated with conditions in the apartment. Ambling Mgmt. Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 640 S.E.2d 620 (2006).

Tenant's action against the leasing agent of the tenant's apartment complex alleging that the tenant was injured over a period of almost three years by soot emitted from the apartment's heating system was not time-barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 because the continuing tort theory tolled the running of the statute of limitations to within two years before the action was filed; because there was evidence that the tenant's exposure to the hazard was not eliminated more than two years before the action was filed, the agent's motion for a directed verdict on that ground was properly denied. Ambling Mgmt. Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 640 S.E.2d 620 (2006).

- In a contractor's quantum meruit action, a former high school baseball coach was erroneously denied a directed verdict as the evidence showed that although the contractor rendered a valuable service to a school by building an indoor baseball hitting facility, when the school board, and not the coach, accepted those services to create an implied promise of payment, quantum meruit payment for construction of the facility could not lie against the coach; moreover, because there was no implied agreement requiring the coach to pay for the hitting facility, the contractor's argument that the coach was liable for having received a personal benefit from the construction of the hitting facility went to the question of unjust enrichment, and not quantum meruit. Brown v. Penland Constr. Co., 281 Ga. 625, 641 S.E.2d 522 (2007).

- In an action premised on allegations of a breach of a land sales contract between a group of sellers and an investor, because testimony regarding the sale of an identical parcel at a different price and time failed to establish as a matter of law the precise market value as of the date of the breach, the trial court erred in denying the third seller's motion for directed verdict or JNOV. Dunn v. Venture Bldg. Group, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 500, 642 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

- Decedent's parents and the administrator of the decedent's estate failed to present evidence showing the proximate cause element for a medical malpractice claim; the lack of continuous monitoring at a hospital was too remote as a matter of law to be the proximate cause of the decedent's suicide approximately 335 miles away in another state, and thus the trial court properly directed a verdict for the hospitals and physicians. Miranda v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 284 Ga. App. 203, 644 S.E.2d 164 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 516 (Ga. 2007).

- Absent evidence that a criminal prosecution for check fraud filed against a car buyer was terminated in the car buyer's favor, showing instead that the action against the car buyer remained pending, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict on the car buyer's malicious prosecution claim in favor of a car dealer and two of the dealer's employees. Heflin v. Goodman, 288 Ga. App. 454, 654 S.E.2d 417 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2008).

- Directed verdicts in favor of the defendants in a Georgia corporation's claims for tortious interference with business relations were proper as the assertion that the corporation was affiliated with an Alabama corporation and had a business relationship with the Alabama corporation's customers disregarded the legal significance of the undisputed fact that the Georgia corporation and the Alabama corporation were each a corporation. All Star, Inc. v. Fellows, 297 Ga. App. 142, 676 S.E.2d 808 (2009).

- Trial court did not err in entering a judgment in favor of a church in the church's action against an adjoining landowner to establish a boundary line between their properties because the evidence the landowners presented to support the landowners' claimed boundary line was too vague and indefinite to allow any recovery, and the evidence demanded a judgment for the church with regard to the boundary line established in a survey. Spivey v. Smith, 303 Ga. App. 469, 693 S.E.2d 830 (2010).

- Trial court did not err in granting a nightclub's motion for directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) in a patron's action to recover for the pain and suffering the patron sustained when the patron was shot at the nightclub because the patron presented no evidence that the nightclub's security measures were insufficient or that the nightclub negligently performed the security measures the nightclub implemented. Yearwood v. Club Miami, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 155, 728 S.E.2d 790 (2012).

- Trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict in a negligence suit arising from an automobile accident because a stipulated admission of a codefendant did not admit a prima facie case of liability and the codefendants presented evidence supporting an alternate cause for the plaintiff's claimed damages, namely that the damages were pre-existing. Stoddard v. Greenberg, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Apr. 25, 2012).

- Trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of a hotel in a guest's suit against the hotel on the guest's premises liability claim after a massage therapist allegedly sexually assaulted the guest because that claim required that the guest show a causal connection between the massage therapist's background and the injuries sustained, and the guest failed to show that the hotel knew or reasonably should have known that the massage therapist had a tendency to engage in behavior relevant to the guest's injuries. Tomsic v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 374, 739 S.E.2d 521 (2013).

- Only when there is no conflict and a verdict is demanded as a matter of law is it error for the trial court to fail to direct a verdict. Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497, 277 S.E.2d 785 (1981).

- In a medical malpractice action arising from an alleged mismanagement of an obstetrical complication during the birth of the patient's child, absent any record evidence of causation, the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and given that the trial court did not err in the court's evidentiary rulings against the patient, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict to the doctor sued. Hawkins v. OB-GYN Assocs., P.A., 290 Ga. App. 892, 660 S.E.2d 835 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1440, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. 2008).

- Trial court erred in failing to grant a defending driver's motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(e) as to the plaintiff driver's damages for future medical expenses because the plaintiff presented no evidence from which it could be inferred that the plaintiff would have future medical expenses nor, if the plaintiff did, the amount thereof. Bennett v. Moore, 312 Ga. App. 445, 718 S.E.2d 311 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2012).

Directed verdict is authorized when there is no conflict in the evidence and such a verdict is demanded. Lakeview Memory Gardens, Inc. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 155 Ga. App. 478, 271 S.E.2d 219 (1980); Steele v. Turner, 158 Ga. App. 838, 282 S.E.2d 365 (1981); Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Ehlers v. Schwall & Heuett, 177 Ga. App. 548, 340 S.E.2d 207 (1986).

Directed verdict is authorized only if there is no conflict in the evidence, and the evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom demand a certain verdict. Dick 'N Dale Sys., Inc. v. Danwil Int'l Trading Co., 199 Ga. App. 840, 406 S.E.2d 270 (1991).

Directed verdict is authorized only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence adduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. Lawson v. Athens Auto Supply & Elec., Inc., 200 Ga. App. 609, 409 S.E.2d 60, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 409 S.E.2d 60 (1991); Palmer v. Taylor, 215 Ga. App. 546, 451 S.E.2d 486 (1994).

- In a pedestrian's personal injury action, because a jury question existed as to whether a cab service's employee was acting within the scope of the employee's employment at the time of the accident striking the pedestrian, a directed verdict in favor of the cab service was properly denied. Decatur's Best Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 282 Ga. App. 731, 639 S.E.2d 482 (2006).

Mere existence of conflicts in evidence does not render direction of verdict erroneous if it is demanded, either from proof or lack of proof on the controlling issue or issues. Carr v. Jacuzzi Bros., 133 Ga. App. 70, 210 S.E.2d 16 (1974); Lingo v. Kirby, 142 Ga. App. 278, 236 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Lakeview Memory Gardens, Inc. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 155 Ga. App. 478, 271 S.E.2d 219 (1980); Wagner v. Timms, 158 Ga. App. 538, 281 S.E.2d 295 (1981); Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Simmons v. Boros, 176 Ga. App. 346, 335 S.E.2d 662 (1985), aff'd, 255 Ga. 524, 341 S.E.2d 2 (1986).

Mere conflicts in evidence do not render direction of a verdict erroneous, if the verdict was demanded on the controlling issue or issues. Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581 (1968).

Trial court properly granted a motion for directed verdict as to all the plaintiffs. Although superficially the evidence was far from harmonious, there was sufficient competent evidence to authorize the trial court to conclude that there existed no genuine conflict as to any material issue. Hutchinson v. Perkins, 194 Ga. App. 389, 391 S.E.2d 122, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 391 S.E.2d 122 (1990).

- Mere fact of conflicts in testimony does not render direction of verdict erroneous when it appears that the conflicts are immaterial, and that, giving to the opposite party the benefit of the most favorable view of the evidence as a whole, and of all legitimate inferences therefrom, a verdict against that party is demanded. Gillen v. Coconut Grove Bank & Trust Co., 172 Ga. 908, 159 S.E. 282 (1931); Veal v. Jenkins, 58 Ga. App. 4, 197 S.E. 328 (1938); Oliver v. Wayne, 58 Ga. App. 787, 199 S.E. 841 (1938); Stepp v. Stepp, 195 Ga. 595, 25 S.E.2d 6 (1943); Seabolt v. Christian, 82 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E.2d 540 (1950); Anderson v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 464, 80 S.E.2d 807 (1954); Healan v. Powell, 91 Ga. App. 787, 87 S.E.2d 332 (1955); Carter v. Whatley, 97 Ga. App. 10, 101 S.E.2d 899 (1958).

Mere fact that there are conflicts in testimony does not render direction of verdict erroneous if the conflicts are immaterial. Berger v. Georgia Power Co., 77 Ga. App. 672, 49 S.E.2d 668 (1948).

Mere conflicts in testimony do not render the direction of a judgment erroneous when it appears that the conflicts are not material. Blalock v. Central Bank, 170 Ga. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 474 (1984).

Directed verdict was properly granted as to a purchaser's fraud claim against a manufacturer because the purchaser did not show that the manufacturer's alleged fraud proximately caused the purchaser's damages, which consisted of a loss of customers. Pendley Quality Trailer Supply, Inc. v. B&F Plastics, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 125, 578 S.E.2d 915 (2003).

- Trial court did err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant because the plaintiffs relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur but submitted no evidence showing that the plaintiffs damages "were caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant" at the time of the collision, and because there was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding that the defendant was negligent. Johnson v. Dallas Glass Co., 183 Ga. App. 584, 359 S.E.2d 448 (1987).

Trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant because the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but failed to present evidence showing that the alleged servant's negligence was the cause of the plaintiffs' damages. Johnson v. Dallas Glass Co., 183 Ga. App. 584, 359 S.E.2d 448 (1987).

Because the plaintiff failed to advance any evidence of the requisite agency relationship or of any proximate causation for a realtor's activities, there was no conflict as to any material issue, and the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Marcoux v. Northside Realty Assocs., 207 Ga. App. 99, 427 S.E.2d 72 (1993).

In an action for a bank's conversion of loan commitment fees and breach of contract, a directed verdict for the bank was proper because the evidence demanded a finding that the plaintiffs surrendered the plaintiffs' title and right to the loan commitment fees when the plaintiffs paid the fees pursuant to the agreements that clearly provided that such fees were nonrefundable and the evidence further demanded a finding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy several condition precedents to the loan commitments, the most important being the rehabilitation of the property in question. Bryant v. Carver State Bank, 207 Ga. App. 659, 428 S.E.2d 621 (1993).

Trial court erred in not granting a beauty pageant operators' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, directed verdict, or a new trial, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 5-5-23 and9-11-50, in an action by a beauty pageant contestant who was banned from the contest after it was rumored that she was "stuffing" the ballot boxes, because the contestant failed to establish her claim for tortious interference with business relations because she did not offer direct evidence of the operators' actions to her alleged loss of work and earnings following the pageant, nor could the operators be held liable for tortious interference with the contestant's relationships with others, as they were not strangers to those relationships; it was similarly error to deny the motions with respect to the contestant's slander claim as she failed to show that an employee was directly ordered to make the statements by the employer, there was no respondeat superior liability in slander cases, and the statements between the contest's joint venturers were privileged as intra-corporate communications and, accordingly, publication was also not shown. Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 597 S.E.2d 571 (2004).

In an action by an injured party against a taxicab company, alleging injuries by a taxicab owned by the company that was negligently operated by its driver, who was the company's employee, the evidence at trial showed that the driver leased the taxicab from the company for a certain daily amount and that the company had no control over the manner in which the driver performed the driver's work; therefore, the driver was an independent contractor, the company could not be held liable for the driver's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and it was error for the trial court to deny the company's motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a). Metro Taxi, Inc. v. Brackett, 273 Ga. App. 122, 614 S.E.2d 232 (2005).

If plaintiff simply fails to prove case, direction of verdict is proper. Carr v. Jacuzzi Bros., 133 Ga. App. 70, 210 S.E.2d 16 (1974); Neal v. Miller, 194 Ga. App. 231, 390 S.E.2d 125 (1990).

In an action for negligence, plaintiffs' failure to prove any fault on the part of the defendant meant that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. Collins v. Ralston & Ogletree, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 583, 367 S.E.2d 861, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 367 S.E.2d 861 (1988).

- If there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is insufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, it is not error for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Stewart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ga. App. 532, 64 S.E.2d 327 (1951).

If the defendant admits a prima facie case by the plaintiff and assumes the burden of proving an affirmative defense, failure to carry such burden may result in the court properly directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Hall v. Beavers, 78 Ga. App. 722, 51 S.E.2d 879 (1949).

Trial court erred in denying a bank's motion for a directed verdict in a borrower's breach of contract claim against the bank, arising from the bank's foreclosure sale of the borrower's property upon a default in payments, as an enforceable contract did not exist; although the borrower offered to pay a sum in order to postpone the sale, which was accepted by the bank, sufficient consideration was lacking because the borrower already had an obligation to pay that amount, which was due under the mortgage. Citizens Trust Bank v. White, 274 Ga. App. 508, 618 S.E.2d 9 (2005).

As evidence existed to support claims of fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and conversion, alleged by a group of investors against a company and the company's fundraisers regarding a patent the fundraisers convinced the investors to support, the trial court did not err in granting the investors a directed verdict; moreover, the fraud claims were not dependent on the characterization of the investments as either debt or equity. Argentum Int'l, LLC v. Woods, 280 Ga. App. 440, 634 S.E.2d 195 (2006).

In a divorce, the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in the wife's claim of fraudulent conveyances; because the wife failed to present any evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that a specific conveyance from the husband to the corporation was fraudulent, there was no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demanded a verdict in favor of the corporation. Moore v. Moore, 281 Ga. 81, 635 S.E.2d 107 (2006).

- Only if the plaintiff's evidence fails to prove the case as laid, without revealing as defense matter fatal to the cause pled, or when evidence adduced by the defendant, as a matter of law, conclusively refutes proof made of the plaintiff's case, may verdict for the defendant be directed. Halligan v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 102 Ga. App. 905, 118 S.E.2d 107 (1960).

- Although the court is bound to consider evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is asked to be directed, if, having done so, it appears that a verdict for that party is not authorized and cannot stand, motion for directed verdict on behalf of the moving party should be granted. Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581 (1968); City of Atlanta v. West, 160 Ga. App. 609, 287 S.E.2d 558 (1981).

- Trial court erred in not granting the first property owner's motion for directed verdict regarding whether the second property owner could park vehicles on the easement that ran between their property, as neither the recorded easement, nor a personal agreement the parties signed later on following a dispute, was ambiguous regarding the fact that there was to be no interference with the easement; accordingly, the second property owner could not park vehicles on the easement and the trial court should have granted the first property owner's motion for a directed verdict on that issue. Huckaby v. Cheatham, 272 Ga. App. 746, 612 S.E.2d 810 (2005).

It is proper to grant directed verdict on single issue. Taylor v. Buckhead Glass Co., 120 Ga. App. 663, 171 S.E.2d 779 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 226 Ga. 247, 174 S.E.2d 566 (1970).

- Court cannot direct verdict if there is any reasonable inference, supported by evidence, that would authorize a verdict to the contrary. Taylor v. Chattooga County, 180 Ga. 90, 178 S.E. 298 (1935); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 38 S.E.2d 534 (1946).

If there are issues of fact, it is error to direct verdict. North v. Tolbert, 80 Ga. App. 110, 55 S.E.2d 661 (1949).

Direction of verdict is error if the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom, would have authorized the verdict for the opposite party. Glover v. City Council, 83 Ga. App. 314, 63 S.E.2d 422 (1951); Williams v. Slusser, 104 Ga. App. 412, 121 S.E.2d 796 (1961).

It is error to direct verdict in any case if the evidence as to any material fact is in conflict or if circumstantial evidence does not demand the particular verdict. Canal Ins. Co. v. Tate, 111 Ga. App. 377, 141 S.E.2d 851 (1965).

If there is any evidence to support a verdict, denial of a motion for directed verdict is proper. Maloy v. Planter's Whse. & Lumber Co., 142 Ga. App. 69, 234 S.E.2d 807 (1977).

It is error to direct a verdict unless evidence demands the particular verdict and fails to disclose any material issue for jury resolution. Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609, 247 S.E.2d 61 (1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Nix, 147 Ga. App. 681, 250 S.E.2d 17 (1978); Lorick v. Na-Churs Plant Food Co., 150 Ga. App. 209, 257 S.E.2d 332 (1979); Gibbs v. Jim Wilson Chevrolet Co., 161 Ga. App. 171, 288 S.E.2d 264 (1982); Camelot Club Condominium Ass'n v. Metro Lawns, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 574, 288 S.E.2d 325 (1982); Freyermuth v. Chon, 212 Ga. App. 845, 443 S.E.2d 636 (1994).

- Based on the evidence recited, a verdict for the defendant was authorized but not demanded as there was no evidence the plaintiff knowingly tempted fate by intentionally placing a hand into the discharge chute, as would demonstrate assumption of a known risk; therefore, the court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict. Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 723, 499 S.E.2d 737 (1998).

- In a case in which the plaintiff restaurant manager sued the defendant food vendor to recover damages for personal injuries that the manager sustained when the manager was knocked to the ground by the door of the vendor's delivery truck, which had a broken door latch, and the vendor claimed that the vendor was entitled to judgment because the failure of the leather strap that was used to secure the door was not foreseeable and that there was no evidence as to what caused the strap to break, the trial court did not err in denying the vendor's motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial because the evidence: (1) that the vendor's driver knew about the broken latch when the driver left the vendor's warehouse; (2) that the doors were very large; (3) that it was windy when the driver and the manager's employee were unloading the truck; (4) that because of the wind, the driver's attempts to secure the truck door by propping dollies against the door had failed; and (5) regarding the actual strap that was used, was adequate to support inferences by the jury that the vendor was negligent by allowing the use of a delivery truck with an inoperable door latch or was vicariously liable for the negligent attempt to secure the door with an inadequate strap. Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 580 S.E.2d 342 (2003).

- No error occurred when the trial court denied the insurer's motion for directed verdict on the injured party's bad faith or refusal to settle claim that was assigned to the injured party by the insured as the insurer was liable to the insured and, thus, to the assignee, the injured party, for failing to tender its policy limits even though the settlement offer made acceptance of the settlement contingent upon the injured party receiving the policy limits of a separate policy from a separate insurance company as the insurer was obligated to do what the insurer prudently could that was within the insurer's control, which included tendering the insurer's policy limits. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).

- Though a buyer's failure to get financing, which was a condition precedent to a contract, was not a breach of contract, the buyer was required to pursue the financing diligently, in good faith, and, as there was a question of a material issue of fact on the reasonableness of the buyer's actions, a directed verdict was error. Patel v. Burt Dev. Co., 261 Ga. App. 436, 582 S.E.2d 495 (2003).

- Because some evidence supported the jury's award and the individual ran the companies as one unit and did not inform the supplier that there were separate entities, the trial court properly allowed the corporate veil to be pierced and denied the individual's and the companies' motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a). Scott Bros. v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 285, 582 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

- Directed verdict for a seller on the buyers' breach of a confidential relationship claim was reversed because there was a fact issue as to whether the seller exercised a controlling influence over the buyers in the buyer's application for a mobile home permit, such that the buyers were kept from discovering zoning for the property or that the seller had an increased duty to disclose the zoning. Howard v. Barron, 272 Ga. App. 360, 612 S.E.2d 569 (2005).

- Trial court erred in granting a city's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in vacating an owner's attorney fees award because there was sufficient evidence that the city acted in bad faith by refusing to take any action to alleviate damage that the city knew or should have known was being caused by the city's sewer lines because: (1) the city was notified of raw sewage feces floating in a ravine across the street from the property; (2) the city received numerous complaints about an odor in the area; (3) the city's own samplings confirmed that the property was contaminated by unsafe levels of fecal coliform bacteria; and (4) the city's partial compliance with a Georgia Environmental Protection Department order confirmed that the sewer system contained numerous cracks, openings, and separations. City of Atlanta v. Landmark Envtl. Indus., 272 Ga. App. 732, 613 S.E.2d 131 (2005).

- Trial court's denial of appellee insurer's motion for a directed verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, in the appellant insurer's declaratory judgment action regarding contested motor vehicle coverage was proper as the appellant met the three-step requirement for institution of a declaratory judgment action since there was no suit pending that could have gone into default or been prejudiced, the declaratory judgment action was timely filed, and it provided a reservation-of-rights letter which listed the insured's lack of cooperation as the basis for questioning coverage; although the appellant later provided four additional reasons in the declaratory judgment action, including fraud and misrepresentation, which was found by the jury, such additional reasons did not have to be set forth in the reservation-of-rights letter as amendments under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) were permissible. Gov't Emples. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 275 Ga. App. 872, 622 S.E.2d 92 (2005).

- In an action by a patient who was allergic to latex alleging that the hospital's negligent use of a latex catheter caused the patient to develop interstitial cystitis (IC), despite the medical expert's admission that the causes of IC were unknown and that no research linked IC to latex allergies, the expert's testimony that allergic reactions could trigger IC, and did so in the patient's case, was sufficient evidence of medical causation to justify denying the hospital's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. EHCA Dunwoody, LLC v. Daniel, 277 Ga. App. 783, 627 S.E.2d 830 (2006).

- Trial court did not err in denying the niece's motion for directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a), as some evidence supported the finding that the deed naming the niece as grantee was never delivered to the niece as required under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-30; there was evidence that the original deed was found in the decedent's safe deposit box and that the key to the box had been in the decedent's control when the decedent died. Robinson v. Williams, 280 Ga. 877, 635 S.E.2d 120 (2006).

- In a personal injury action, because a fact issue was presented as to whether, at the time of the incident, a partnership's employee was within the scope of employment at the time a pedestrian was injured, and the jury was properly charged on this issue, the pedestrian was properly denied a directed verdict. Marwede v. EQR/Lincoln L.P., 284 Ga. App. 404, 643 S.E.2d 766 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 504 (Ga. 2007).

- Given evidence that the father performed part of the agreement at issue with a son for the latter to transfer title to a house, specifically by selling the father's house and paying the son the proceeds in exchange for the son's promise to convey, when the son failed to convey the house the trial court properly granted the father a constructive trust based on fraud, denied the son a directed verdict, and sustained the jury's verdict. Perry v. Perry, 285 Ga. App. 892, 648 S.E.2d 193 (2007).

- Trial court did not err in denying a boyfriend a directed verdict on a fraud in the inducement claim asserted by the boyfriend's girlfriend, given evidence of the personal nature of their relationship which caused the girlfriend to place trust and confidence in the boyfriend's repeated promises of marriage and believe that the boyfriend was acting in the girlfriend's best interest by taking the monies loaned to use for a business, which would ultimately allow the boyfriend to repay the girlfriend and support them after they were married. Tankersley v. Barker, 286 Ga. App. 788, 651 S.E.2d 435 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1821, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 742 (Ga. 2007).

- Trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict for a vehicle manufacturer in a failure to warn action due to lack of causation evidence as representatives of victims who died as a result of an accident involving the van provided evidence to support the causation element by showing that the van had a high center of gravity and lacked stability when fully loaded, and that the driver would not have operated the van if there had been a warning about the instability. Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co., 297 Ga. App. 835, 678 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

- Directed verdict for the caveators of a will was improper, although the witnesses to the will had died, given prior testimony from one witness by interrogatory and deposition that the decedent, who was blind, had signed the will voluntarily and knew it was the decedent's will; under O.C.G.A. § 53-5-23(a), this evidence presented a jury question. Ammons v. Clouds, 295 Ga. 225, 758 S.E.2d 282 (2014).

- Trial court did not err in denying the seller's motion for a directed verdict on the purchaser's rescission claim for fraud because the purchaser made a sufficient offer to restore to support a claim for rescission pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-4-60 and the purchaser did not have to return the car when the seller refused to give the purchaser the money back. Krayev v. Johnson, 327 Ga. App. 213, 757 S.E.2d 872 (2014).

In a medical malpractice action, the trial court erred by directing a verdict in favor of the defending urologist because a trier of fact could have concluded that the urologist did not simply offer informal assistance to colleagues, but by answering the emergency call, conferring with other doctors, then ordering or suggesting specialized tests, was acting as the patient's urologist and, therefore, consented to a physician-patient relationship. Smith v. Rodillo, 330 Ga. App. 365, 765 S.E.2d 432 (2014).

Jury verdict in favor of a former client was upheld on appeal because the trial court properly admitted evidence of the arbitration award involving the fee dispute and did not err by denying the firm a directed verdict on all claims since there was evidence to support the claims that the firm performed work on the former client's divorce case and billed in a manner that placed the firm's financial interests above the interests of the former client, in violation of both the terms of the parties' contract and the firm's fiduciary duties. Cordell & Cordell, P.C. v. Gao, 331 Ga. App. 522, 771 S.E.2d 196 (2015), overruled on other grounds, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 137 (Ga. 2019).

If evidence is in conflict on an issue and does not demand a verdict, it is error to direct a verdict thereon. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

If there is any material conflict in the evidence, and when the evidence introduced, if all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, does not demand a particular verdict, it is error to direct a verdict. Garrison v. Garmon, 94 Ga. App. 868, 96 S.E.2d 550 (1957).

Because the evidence was conflicting concerning the mutual intention of the parties in a contract case, a material issue of fact remained for resolution by the jury, and the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict. Doyle v. Estes Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 491, 326 S.E.2d 846 (1985).

- Because there was conflicting evidence as to material issues of fact with regard to the defendant's contractual liability to the plaintiff for the debt evidenced by one note and concerning the capacity in which the defendant executed another note, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Smith v. Allen, 180 Ga. App. 624, 349 S.E.2d 548 (1986).

- Will propounder's claim in a motion for a directed verdict that caveators failed to plead fraud with particularity was procedurally improper as the proper remedy to seek more particularity was by a motion for a more definite statement or by the rules of discovery. Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 748 S.E.2d 839 (2013).

If there is a conflict in material evidence, it is reversible error to direct a verdict. Duncan v. Mayfield, 209 Ga. 882, 76 S.E.2d 805 (1953); Livingston v. Livingston, 210 Ga. 607, 82 S.E.2d 1 (1954).

Evidence does not demand a verdict for any party if it is in sharp conflict concerning material issues. Peacock Constr. Co. v. Turner Concrete, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 357, 170 S.E.2d 440 (1969).

Directed verdict does not lie if there is conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the verdict is not demanded. Whiddon v. Forshee, 228 Ga. 133, 184 S.E.2d 349 (1971).

It is error to direct a verdict if conflicts exist that would necessitate a jury's resolution. Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609, 247 S.E.2d 61 (1978).

- On motion for directed verdict, the general rule applies that testimony of a party litigant that is contradictory, vague, inconclusive, and ambiguous must be construed most strongly against such litigant when that party is the sole witness in that party's behalf. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972).

General principle concerning adverse construction of a litigant's equivocal and contradictory testimony clearly applies on consideration of a directed verdict, if the sole evidence on essential elements submitted by the party is that party's own testimony. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972).

If the evidence relied upon to support a party's case is from that party, and this testimony is vague, contradictory, or evasive, it must be construed against that party; and if that version of the testimony most unfavorable shows that the verdict should be against that party, unless other evidence is presented tending to establish a right to recover, the party is not entitled to a favorable finding. Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581 (1968).

Because there was no conflict in the evidence as to the issue of an insured's receipt of an umbrella policy, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of an insurer as to that policy; the insured's testimony that the insured could not say if the insured had read the policy because the insured did not know if the insured had received the policy contradicted the insured's earlier testimony that the insured had actually scanned the policy. Gov't Emples. Ins. Co. v. Kralick, 313 Ga. App. 492, 722 S.E.2d 107 (2012).

Evidence strongly supporting, but not demanding, a particular finding does not warrant a directed verdict. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodgen, 148 Ga. App. 725, 252 S.E.2d 629 (1979); Barber v. Atlas Concrete Pools, Inc., 155 Ga. App. 118, 270 S.E.2d 471 (1980); Sugrue v. Flint Elec. Membership Corp., 155 Ga. App. 481, 270 S.E.2d 921 (1980); United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Connell, 166 Ga. App. 329, 304 S.E.2d 131 (1983).

If the evidence strongly supports, but does not demand, a certain verdict, the factual determination remains for the jury. Ranger Constr. Co. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 166 Ga. App. 679, 305 S.E.2d 361 (1983); Timber Equip., Inc. v. McKinney, 166 Ga. App. 757, 305 S.E.2d 468 (1983).

Merely having strength or weight of evidence in one's favor is not sufficient cause for the court to take the case from the jury by direction of verdict. Heaton v. Smith, 121 Ga. App. 348, 174 S.E.2d 197 (1970).

- If there is any material conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, does not demand a particular verdict, it is error to direct a verdict, even though the evidence may preponderate strongly in favor of one party. Shockey v. Baker, 212 Ga. 106, 90 S.E.2d 654 (1955).

Court cannot properly direct a verdict merely because it may find the strength or weight of evidence is on one side, or because it might grant a new trial if a verdict should be returned against what it determines to be the preponderance of the evidence. Northwestern Univ. v. Crisp, 211 Ga. 636, 88 S.E.2d 26 (1955); McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962); Kesler v. Kesler, 219 Ga. 592, 134 S.E.2d 811 (1964).

Trial judge cannot properly direct a verdict merely because the evidence preponderates to one side rather than the other. Cook v. Sheats, 222 Ga. 70, 148 S.E.2d 382 (1966).

Judge cannot direct verdict because the judge thinks the strength or weight of evidence is on one side, or because the judge might grant a new trial if a verdict should be returned that is contrary to a preponderance of the evidence. Findley v. McDaniel, 158 Ga. App. 445, 280 S.E.2d 858 (1981).

Verdict should not be directed unless there is no issue of fact or proved facts can sustain no other finding than that directed. Pennington v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 151, 253 S.E.2d 830 (1979).

Verdict should not be directed unless there is no issue of fact, or unless proved facts, viewed from all possible legal points of view, sustain no other finding than that directed. Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 267 S.E.2d 505 (1980).

- Directed verdict is not a vehicle to obtain a judgment on the technical grounds that a plaintiff has merely neglected to show some evidence material to the plaintiff's case. Particularly, since the trial court may in the court's discretion permit the plaintiff to reopen the plaintiff's case and offer some neglected evidence, in such a case a directed verdict is generally improvident. Able-Craft, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 167 Ga. App. 725, 307 S.E.2d 671 (1983).

- See May v. Poole, 174 Ga. App. 224, 329 S.E.2d 561 (1985).

It is never error to refuse to grant motion for directed verdict when questions of fact remain, even though the evidence is strongly supportive of the appellant's contentions. Eddie Parker Interests, Inc. v. Booth, 160 Ga. App. 15, 285 S.E.2d 753 (1981).

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, an appellate court reviews and resolves the evidence and any doubts or ambiguities in favor of the verdict; a directed verdict is not appropriate unless there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands a certain verdict. The buyers' motion for a directed verdict on the issue of fraud in an action by the seller for rescission of a quitclaim deed was proper when jury questions existed regarding whether the buyers' real estate agent misrepresented, or failed to disclose after being questioned, whether adjoining landowners had made improvements on a disputed strip of land that was covered by the quitclaim deed. Cistola v. Daniel, 266 Ga. App. 891, 598 S.E.2d 535 (2004).

- Denial of motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is error only if the evidence fails to disclose any material issue for jury resolution. Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 216 S.E.2d 288 (1975), later appeal, 140 Ga. App. 210, 230 S.E.2d 359 (1976).

- If evidence at the time of the motion for directed verdict is subject to more than one construction and does not demand the verdict for either party, the trial court does not err in denying such motion. Powell v. Ferguson Tile & Terrazzo Co., 125 Ga. App. 683, 188 S.E.2d 901 (1972), overruled on other grounds, Fountain v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 252 Ga. 543, 314 S.E.2d 906 (1984).

- In an action for wrongful dispossession, trespass, conversion, and theft, the plaintiffs tendered into evidence a list of belongings taken from their mobile home and a price estimate on those items and testified that they were recently married, that the majority of their belongings were newly acquired as wedding or bridal shower gifts, some still in their original packages, and that the items had been priced by plaintiffs either by contacting the gift donors or by checking the Sears catalogue, and also testified about the condition and estimated value of their few older belongings; inasmuch as this evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom did not demand a verdict for the defendants, the denial of the guardians' motion for directed verdict was not error. Sanders v. Hughes, 183 Ga. App. 601, 359 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 359 S.E.2d 396 (1987).

Injured party was properly awarded damages for litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 as a driver's testimony tended to show that the injured party did not yield the right-of-way and that the driver was liable; the trial court was authorized to conclude that a bona fide controversy did not exist as to liability for the automobile accident and did not err by allowing evidence of the injured party's litigation expenses, denying the driver's motion for a directed verdict, or in charging the jury on the claim for litigation expenses. Daniel v. Smith, 266 Ga. App. 637, 597 S.E.2d 432 (2004).

Court cannot direct verdict if there is any reasonable inference supported by evidence that would authorize verdict to the contrary. Findley v. McDaniel, 158 Ga. App. 445, 280 S.E.2d 858 (1981).

Even if evidence strongly supports but does not demand a particular finding, directed verdict is not warranted. Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Williams, 159 Ga. App. 679, 285 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

- In order for direction of verdict to be error, it must appear that there was some evidence, together with all reasonable deductions and inferences from the evidence, to support a verdict for the party against whom the verdict was directed; and in determining this question, evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. Whitaker v. Paden, 78 Ga. App. 145, 50 S.E.2d 774 (1948); Curry v. Durden, 103 Ga. App. 371, 118 S.E.2d 871 (1961).

It is not reversible error to direct verdict if no other finding than that directed can legally be reached or sustained. Charles S. Jacobowitz Co. v. Ferguson, 78 Ga. App. 589, 51 S.E.2d 581 (1949).

There is no error in directing a verdict that is inevitable and the only legal result of the pleadings and evidence. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949); Mize v. Paschal, 206 Ga. 189, 56 S.E.2d 266 (1949); Turner v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 Ga. App. 693, 122 S.E.2d 479 (1961).

Because there were issues of fact that should have been submitted to the jury, the trial judge committed error in directing a verdict for the defendant. Williams v. Williams, 206 Ga. 395, 57 S.E.2d 337 (1950).

Direction of a particular verdict is not error if, under the pleadings and evidence, no other legal verdict could be reached. Williams v. Harris, 207 Ga. 576, 63 S.E.2d 386 (1951).

It is error to direct verdict unless, construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, judgment in that party's favor would not be allowed to stand. Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957).

If more than one inference can be drawn from evidence, the duty of solving the mystery should be placed upon the jury and not the trial judge; this is true with respect to circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962).

Verdict may only be directed in situations in which, if there were a determination by the jury the other way, it would have to be set aside by the court. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 125 Ga. App. 352, 187 S.E.2d 878 (1972); Raybon v. Reimers, 138 Ga. App. 511, 226 S.E.2d 620 (1976); Kalish v. King Cabinet Co., 140 Ga. App. 345, 232 S.E.2d 86 (1976); Kelly Ford, Inc. v. Paracsi, 141 Ga. App. 626, 234 S.E.2d 170 (1977); Georgia Power Co. v. Nix, 147 Ga. App. 681, 250 S.E.2d 17 (1978); Spivey v. Eavenson, 150 Ga. App. 429, 258 S.E.2d 54 (1979).

- It is only when reasonable people may not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from evidence that it is proper to direct verdict. Canal Ins. Co. v. Tate, 111 Ga. App. 377, 141 S.E.2d 851 (1965).

Trial judge has no right whatever to weigh evidence or decide any issue of fact, and before the court can legally direct a verdict for the defendants, the judge must find that there is no evidence of any kind supporting the plaintiff's position. Barber v. Atlas Concrete Pools, Inc., 155 Ga. App. 118, 270 S.E.2d 471 (1980); Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. v. Johnson, 161 Ga. App. 634, 288 S.E.2d 320 (1982).

It is only if reasonable persons may not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence that it is proper for the judge to remove the case from jury consideration. Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Raybon v. Reimers, 138 Ga. App. 511, 226 S.E.2d 620 (1976); Brown v. Truluck, 239 Ga. 105, 236 S.E.2d 60 (1977); Plough Broadcasting Co. v. Dobbs, 163 Ga. App. 264, 293 S.E.2d 526 (1982).

- On motion for directed verdict, question is whether testimony on the plaintiff's behalf and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a prima facie case allowing the plaintiff to have the jury pass on the alleged cause of action. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 585, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1973); Simmons v. Boros, 176 Ga. App. 346, 335 S.E.2d 662 (1985), aff'd, 255 Ga. 524, 341 S.E.2d 2 (1986).

In a suit on open account, oral evidence concerning the amount of the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff was introduced without objection. This evidence made out a prima facie case and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to introduce other documents reflecting the balance due in order to prevail against the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Professional Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Sizemore Elec. Co., 188 Ga. App. 463, 373 S.E.2d 276 (1988).

- Although it is true that questions of negligence are ordinarily for the trier of fact, if the plaintiff's evidence suggests only the elements of duty and injury, and nothing is offered to indicate breach of duty or causation, the plaintiff fails to establish the elements of negligence and thereby to make out a prima-facie case. Smith v. Morico, 166 Ga. App. 737, 305 S.E.2d 465 (1983).

Negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury, and the court should not take the place of the jury in solving them, except in plain and indisputable cases. Eyster v. Borg-Warner Corp., 131 Ga. App. 702, 206 S.E.2d 668 (1974).

Because, in an auto accident case, on the evidence of record, reasonable men could have differed on whether the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's claimed permanent injuries and the evidence was neither plain nor palpable, nor was a verdict for the plaintiff demanded, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability. Campbell v. Forsyth, 187 Ga. App. 352, 370 S.E.2d 207 (1988).

- In an action for fraud, because the evidence showed the sellers of a restaurant made at least two significant misrepresentations, it was a jury question whether additional diligence by the buyer was necessary; the trial court did not err by denying the seller's motion for a directed verdict. Southern Store & Restaurant Equip. Co. v. Maddox, 195 Ga. App. 2, 392 S.E.2d 268, cert. denied, 195 Ga. App. 2, 392 S.E.2d 268 (1990).

- Trial judge may, under the correct circumstances, direct verdict for the plaintiff as to liability in a personal injury action, while leaving damages issue to the jury. Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 279 (1972).

- In a will contest, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the propounder on the caveators' claim of improper execution because the evidence was insufficient to raise a conflict as to that issue. Dyer v. Souther, 272 Ga. 263, 528 S.E.2d 242 (2000).

- When an independent subcontractor sued a retailer for injuries occurring while the subcontractor was doing work on the retailer's premises, the retailer was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor as the retailer exercised no control over the subcontractor's work, and any control over that work was contractually ceded to the subcontractor and to the contractor who hired the subcontractor. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dufour, 268 Ga. App. 104, 601 S.E.2d 375 (2004).

- Dog-bite victim sued the dog's owners, alleging the owners failed to warn the victim of the dog's vicious tendencies. As there was no evidence the dog had ever previously bitten or attacked anyone, and an owner's alleged statement that children would not "have to worry about getting bit" if the children stayed away from the owner's truck, when the dog was chained in the truck bed, was insufficient to establish the owners' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity; thus, the owners were properly granted a directed verdict on this claim. Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (2009).

- When a contractor stated under oath that home, office, business records, and reporting requirements were maintained in Tennessee, the trial court's factual determination as to nonresidency was correct and did not raise a jury issue. Gorrell v. Fowler, 248 Ga. 801, 286 S.E.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1113, 102 S. Ct. 2918, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1324 (1982).

- Because the plaintiff raised the issue of a fraudulent conveyance and established that the signature on the warranty deed was not made by the deceased, a directed verdict for the defendant was not required. Smith v. Greenwood, 247 Ga. 632, 278 S.E.2d 380 (1981).

In an insureds' suit against an insurer, because there was the slightest evidence of waiver of policy requirement of written proof of loss on the insurer's part, it was error to direct a verdict for the appellee-insurance company; rather, a jury question was presented. Worth v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ga. App. 194, 330 S.E.2d 1 (1985).

- Directed verdict for a seller on the buyers' fraud claim was proper because, although the jury could find that the seller intentionally concealed from the buyers that the property's zoning required five-acres for a home to induce the buyers to buy the one-acre tract, misrepresentation as to zoning could not support a fraud claim. Howard v. Barron, 272 Ga. App. 360, 612 S.E.2d 569 (2005).

Trial court properly directed a verdict against the county and in favor of the homeowners on the issue of the county's ownership interest in a dam in the homeowners' suit seeking to limit the county's ability to breach the dam; that issue was resolved in a prior administrative action and appeals from that determination in which the county was found to be an owner required to repair or breach the dam pursuant to the Georgia Safe Dams Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-370 et seq., and the suit did not concern whether there were additional owners of the dam. Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 610 S.E.2d 512 (2005).

Trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of an engineering firm on the landowners' claims relating to the landowner's standing water and drainage issues because regardless of whether these claims sounded in nuisance, trespass, or negligence, causation was a central element which the landowners failed to support with any evidence. Further, the mere fact that one event chronologically followed another was alone insufficient to establish a causal relation between the events. Walls v. Moreland Altobelli Assocs., 290 Ga. App. 199, 659 S.E.2d 418 (2008).

- Trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants in a fraud case because of insufficient evidence of damages as the evidence, construed in favor of the plaintiff, provided the jury with a basis to estimate the plaintiff's damages. McCannon v. McCannon, 231 Ga. App. 601, 499 S.E.2d 684 (1998).

Trial court erred in directing a verdict as to damages as a landlord presented a detailed, itemized statement describing each item destroyed by water putting out a fire negligently caused by a tenant's guest and showing its approximate wholesale cost as the jury could determine damages without speculation or guess work; further, the landlord had a specific memory of the price the landlord paid for three planetary assemblies and seven blowers and there was testimony as to their fair market value. Hodges v. Vara, 268 Ga. App. 815, 603 S.E.2d 327 (2004).

Trial court erred in failing to order a new trial on the issue of damages after the court granted a directed verdict in favor of a church in the church's action against an adjoining landowner to establish a boundary line between their properties because when the trial court entered the judgment for the church the court should have also refused to enter judgment on the damages portion of the jury's verdict and should have granted a new trial to the church on the issue of damages; if any evidence supported the jury's award in favor of the landowner, then the jury's award of no damages to the church would have been correct. Spivey v. Smith, 303 Ga. App. 469, 693 S.E.2d 830 (2010).

- Because the trial court erred in not granting a plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict as to the defendant's counterclaim, the defendant was not entitled to fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 for prosecuting a successful counterclaim. Caincare, Inc. v. Ellison, 272 Ga. App. 190, 612 S.E.2d 47 (2005).

- Standard used to review grant or denial of directed verdict is the "any evidence" test. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465, 284 S.E.2d 263 (1981).

Standard of appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a direct verdict is the "any evidence test"; when evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, the trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for directed verdict. Little v. Little, 173 Ga. App. 116, 325 S.E.2d 624 (1984).

- Although a motion for a directed verdict must state specific grounds therefor as a basis for appeal, it obviously is not possible to state grounds which do not exist at the time; and, to give effect to the rule that the law is applied as it exists at the time of appeal, the movant, who by new law is entitled to a certain judgment, should not be deprived of it for failure to state as grounds for directed verdict what did not exist at the time. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 164 Ga. App. 404, 298 S.E.2d 261 (1982).

- Because the evidence unequivocably showed that the plaintiff's knowledge of the danger of the wasps swarming was equal to the defendant-landowner's knowledge, the evidence demanded a verdict in the defendant's favor on the plaintiff's claim of negligence based on the defendant's superior knowledge of the danger. Beard v. Fender, 179 Ga. App. 465, 346 S.E.2d 901 (1986).

- Because the testimony of the defendant's agent established without any evidence to the contrary that the only demand for possession of the premises had been made on the previous tenant, not on the defendant, the presumption raised by the allegation in the affidavit that demand was made was rebutted by direct and positive evidence; a directed verdict in the defendant's favor was thereby demanded, and the trial court erred by denying the appellant's motion. Jet Air, Inc. v. Management/USA, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 648, 350 S.E.2d 40 (1986).

- Because the plaintiff failed to offer evidence as to what portion of attorney fees, if any, was attributable to the defendant's negligence, or whether the plaintiff's estimate of legal expenses was a reasonable value of the professional services rendered, the plaintiff did not carry the plaintiff's burden of proof, and the trial court properly directed a verdict on this issue. Redwine v. Windham, 237 Ga. App. 149, 513 S.E.2d 13 (1999).

- Evidence having shown that the plaintiff was completely free of negligence and the defendant's testimony having revealed no legal reason or excuse for the defendant's failure to avoid colliding with the rear of the plaintiff's automobile, the trial judge did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on the question of liability. R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 246 Ga. App. 177, 539 S.E.2d 873 (2000).

- Trial court correctly granted a directed verdict as to the dog owner's liability after the injured party failed to submit evidence that the dog owner knew that the dog had the propensity to commit the act that caused the injury and that the dog had ever bit anyone, or that the dog had a tendency to attack humans. However, the trial court did abuse the court's discretion in failing to allow the injured party to reopen the evidence in order to submit a certified copy of the leash law as it did not appear that reopening the evidence would have subjected the dog owner to unfairness or undue prejudice, or that the injured party was trifling with the court or intentionally delaying the trial. Phiel v. Boston, 262 Ga. App. 814, 586 S.E.2d 718 (2003).

- Trial court properly granted the insurer's motion for a directed verdict on the insurer's indemnity claim against the mortgage broker since the broker never requested that the insurer litigate or defend against the claim, and the insurer did confirm that the mortgage company either had paid or would have to pay damages in excess of the $50,000 bond. Nguyen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 261 Ga. App. 553, 583 S.E.2d 220 (2003).

- Directed verdict was proper on the buyer's fraud claims because the defendants admitted the foundation wall was defective; the disagreement went to the repair method not the condition of the wall. McEntyre v. Edwards, 261 Ga. App. 843, 583 S.E.2d 889 (2003).

- In an action to recover from the guarantor, the trial court's entry of a directed verdict was upheld when the undisputed evidence showed that the guarantor did not withdraw the guaranty in the manner expressly required by its terms, and there was no evidence that the retailer consented to revocation on any terms other than those specified in the guaranty. Hill Roofing Co. v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 265 Ga. App. 822, 595 S.E.2d 638 (2004).

In an action filed by a bank to recover on a promissory note, as well as to recover on the guaranty tied to that note, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict to the bank, and against both the debtor and the guarantor, as the bank made out the bank's prima facie case by showing that the note was executed and the debtor remained liable thereunder; moreover, the guaranty's broad language obligated the guarantor to the bank, and no issue of fact existed as to whether the guarantor was discharged by any increased risk or any purported novation. Fielbon Dev. Co. v. Colony Bank, 290 Ga. App. 847, 660 S.E.2d 801 (2008).

- Trial court properly entered a directed verdict in favor of the new owners on the former company president's claims for conversion when there was a dispute as to whether the president had a legal right to the funds from the check on which payment was stopped and the president was the guarantor rather than the owner of the trucks the president claimed the president was owed for. Habel v. Tavormina, 266 Ga. App. 613, 597 S.E.2d 645 (2004).

- Customer failed to show that a construction company owed the customer a duty in the customer's action to recover for an alleged defective construction of the customer's home, and also failed to show any demonstrable damages; thus, the trial court did not err in entering a directed verdict against the customer. Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., 270 Ga. App. 725, 608 S.E.2d 11 (2004).

- Trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motion for a directed verdict as a child who drowned in an apartment complex swimming pool was capable of appreciating the risk associated with swimming in the pool, and the child's parent explicitly instructed the child to stay out of the deep end of a pool and never to swim without adult supervision. Rice v. Oaks Investors II, 292 Ga. App. 692, 666 S.E.2d 63 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 963 (Ga. 2008).

- In a case involving a home buyer's fraudulent conveyance and negligent construction claims against a corporation, given the buyer's failure to present required evidence on the buyer's attorney fee claim under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to submit the issue to the jury and in directing a verdict on this claim. Sims v. GT Architecture Contrs. Corp., 292 Ga. App. 94, 663 S.E.2d 797 (2008).

- Evidence that a dog might have previously harmed a small kitten and puppy did not indicate that the owner had any reason to suspect the dog had a propensity to bite, and was properly excluded. Absent evidence that the dog had any known vicious tendency, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in directing a verdict for the dog owner. Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 686 S.E.2d 665 (2009).

- Because correspondence between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's former employer acknowledged that there was an agreement between the parties, and the plaintiff's testimony and letters between the parties were sufficient to show that the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff for one-half of the plaintiff's loss on the sale of the plaintiff's house and that the plaintiff had suffered a loss on the plaintiff's house, there was evidence to establish a valid contract under Georgia law, and the trial court erred by directing the verdict for the defendant. Foreman v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 332, 393 S.E.2d 695 (1990).

Because an employer did not show that an employee solicited the employer's clients or improperly took its business or money while still an employee, the trial court properly granted the employee's O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) motion for directed verdict on the employer's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and interference with business relations. Thomas County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomasville Garden Ctr., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 591, 627 S.E.2d 192 (2006).

- Trial court invaded the province of the jury when the court directed a verdict in favor of the truck-operator who had injured the plaintiff's son in a vehicular collision because the plaintiff testified regarding the sound of slamming brakes immediately prior to the collision, thereby raising an inference of negligence. Cagle v. Ameagle Contractors, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 712, 434 S.E.2d 546 (1993).

In a suit seeking recovery for injuries sustained in a vehicular collision, a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) was erroneous because cross-examination testimony of a treating doctor created a disputed factual issue as to whether all of the medical expenses were caused by the collision, and thus, this issue should have been presented to the jury. Allen v. Spiker, 301 Ga. App. 893, 689 S.E.2d 326 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0740, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 454 (Ga. 2010).

- Trial court correctly denied a directed verdict to the state's port authority as to its liability as the evidence did not demand that a contested signal by authority's employee was in fact given. Georgia Ports Auth. v. Hutchinson, 209 Ga. App. 726, 434 S.E.2d 791 (1993).

Military truck refurbishing company's foreign corporate representative was entitled to summary judgment when the representative performed the representative's obligations under the contract, the contract was no longer executory, and it suffered compensatory damages as a result; therefore, the company was not entitled to a directed verdict. Commercial & Military Sys. Co. v. Sudimat, C.A., 267 Ga. App. 32, 599 S.E.2d 7 (2004).

- Motion for a directed verdict was properly denied in a case in which a supplier sought to recover money owed on an account because a purchaser failed to refute the supplier's evidence regarding indebtedness and delivery of goods; the purchaser did not show that the goods were not delivered by way of employee testimony, nor did the purchaser show that the amount allegedly owed was not accurate. Kroger Co. v. U.S. Foodservice of Atlanta, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 525, 607 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

- President's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied as fraud and justifiable reliance were not required to rescind the additional shares of stock that were obtained by telling a director that the director had had sexual relations with an employee and that the employee was threatening to sue the close corporation; the president's actions were illegal, oppressive, and unfairly prejudicial. Gallagher v. McKinnon, 273 Ga. App. 727, 615 S.E.2d 746 (2005).

- Because the testimony by the insured's daughter as to how the purchase price of the items contained on an inventory of the personal property lost in a fire was calculated, all of which were common household goods, coupled with the proof of loss form showing a depreciated value, was sufficient to uphold the monetary judgment entered, the insurer's motion for a directed verdict on this issue was properly denied. Moreover, the decedent-insured had already submitted a discounted actual cash value in the proof of loss form, the form was timely submitted to the insurer, and it also was admitted at trial absent any objection. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Payton, 289 Ga. App. 202, 656 S.E.2d 554 (2008).

- Trial court properly denied a home remodeling company's motion for a directed verdict on a buyer's breach of home warranty claim as there was evidence that, contrary to the remodeler's assertions, the company had waived the formal notice of defects requirements in a purchase agreement, and the ultimate determination of waiver was a jury question. RHL Props., LLC v. Neese, 293 Ga. App. 838, 668 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for a directed verdict filed by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia on the issue of whether an assistant professor's employment contract incorporated the Rules and Procedures for Responding to Allegations of Research Misconduct because the Rules were issued by the medical college where the professor worked and were thus "regulations of this institution" within the meaning of the professor's contract, and the contract incorporated the Rules by reference thereto. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Ambati, 299 Ga. App. 804, 685 S.E.2d 719 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0086, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 34 (Ga. 2010).

- Trial court properly denied the Department of Correction's motion for directed verdict as to the issue of duty in a premises liability action by an inmate because there was conflicting evidence as to whether the inmate was in the warden's home on a work detail as a benefit to the department and whether the inmate was warned to stay out of the kitchen and dining area where an accident occurred. Ga. Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 312 Ga. App. 544, 718 S.E.2d 875 (2011).

- Trial court properly denied a store's motion for a directed verdict in a slip and fall case because the suing couple presented evidence from which the jury could infer the store's constructive knowledge of the hazard based on water on the floor in the floral area being a recurrent problem and mats on the floor to catch the water were not in place on the day the wife fell. The Kroger Co. v. Schoenhoff, 324 Ga. App. 619, 751 S.E.2d 438 (2013).

- In a suit against the driver of a truck who collided with the back of a pickup in which the plaintiff was a passenger, the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict on the defendant's liability. Although the defendant received a traffic citation and pleaded guilty to the offense, the defendant explained that the defendant did this because the defendant did not understand its significance and had no time to contest the citation, which facts created a jury issue as to liability. Pryor v. Phillips, 222 Ga. App. 116, 473 S.E.2d 535 (1996).

Building purchaser was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a), in a case in which the purchaser contended that the purchaser had done a portion of the salvage work on a contract to remove building materials from a warehouse that was being demolished prior to the seller barring the purchaser's workers from continuing due to the purchaser's failure to have obtained a certificate of worker's compensation; evidence in the record indicated that the lumber removed was valued in excess of the amount claimed due for the work done and, accordingly, there was evidence upon which the jury's verdict could be supported. Lawrence v. Bland, 259 Ga. App. 366, 577 S.E.2d 64 (2003).

Directed verdict was properly denied on negligent hiring and retention claims because there was a conflict in the evidence on the material issue of whether an employee's attack on and killing of a person in the person's apartment was foreseeable by the apartment complex that hired the employee. The issue of foreseeability remained based on evidence: (1) that the property manager who hired the employee knew the employee had been in trouble with the law but kept silent; (2) that the complex did not completely follow the complex's hiring policies; (3) that the complex's hiring process was not designed to determine whether a potential employee was convicted of a crime; (4) that the property manager, district manager, and regional manager did not do their respective jobs in hiring the employee; (5) that apartment key control policies were routinely violated; (6) that the complex knew that there were a recent series of unforced entries and robberies; (7) that an employee was suspected, but no criminal background checks were conducted; (8) that the employee was caught in an apartment; and (9) that despite all this, the complex's management still did not undertake criminal background checks of the small number of employees, control access to the keys, or alert residents to the situation. TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

- Motions for a directed verdict on the issue of due diligence in land transaction cases are properly denied if, in addition to inspecting the property, a home buyer asked the seller questions to which the seller gave false, deceptive, or otherwise reckless answers. Cistola v. Daniel, 266 Ga. App. 891, 598 S.E.2d 535 (2004).

- Trial court did not err in denying the airplane company's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the corporation's claims for negligent misrepresentation because Georgia law did not require written proof of an oral promise as an element of a negligent misrepresentation claim; also, the evidence supported a finding that the company requested the corporation to purchase two Russian missile launchers and told the owner it would process all paperwork and pay $80,000 for the launchers if the owner delivered the launches. Boeing Co. v. Blane Int'l Group, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 672, 624 S.E.2d 227 (2005).

- Given that defendants, a newspaper, the editor, and a columnist, so doubted the truthfulness of their articles (alleging that a deputy sheriff beat an arrestee to death with a flashlight) that they refused to print contradictory versions of the events, actual malice could be inferred; as a result, the trial court properly denied their motions for a directed verdict and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to a deputy sheriff in the deputy's libel action. Lake Park Post, Inc. v. Farmer, 264 Ga. App. 299, 590 S.E.2d 254 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 875, 125 S. Ct. 104, 160 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2004).

- In an action between a business and a bank for breach of contract, conversion, and damage to property, the bank's motion for directed verdict on the issue of conversion was properly denied because: (1) the business sufficiently proved ownership of the allegedly converted property and that the bank damaged the business's property; and (2) the seller's valuation of the items was not speculative as the seller was familiar with the items and the seller's figures were based on the value of the items in a used condition. Cmty. Bank v. Handy Auto Parts, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 640, 607 S.E.2d 241 (2004).

- Trial court properly denied an employer's motion for directed verdict as to a malicious prosecution claim because the employee showed that the employer authorized the employee to write checks to herself and then reported the money stolen, the employer manufactured and post-dated documents to erroneously show that the employee wrote checks in violation of company policy and that the employee was not authorized to use a credit card, and the employer hired investigators to inquire about the alleged theft, who then contacted the police and provided the fabricated documents. Vojnovic v. Brants, 272 Ga. App. 475, 612 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

- Trial court correctly denied an executor's motion for directed verdict in an action wherein the child of the testator filed a caveat and objection to the probate of the testator's last will and testament on the grounds that the will was the product of undue influence as sufficient evidence existed to support the conclusion that undue influence was used to have the testator bequeath the only asset, namely a home, to the caregiver who was hired by the executor. The record established that the executor blocked calls from the testator's child, refused to let the child see the testator, and a confidential relationship was established between the caregiver and the testator as the caregiver took an active role in the planning, preparation, and execution of the will. Bean v. Wilson, 283 Ga. 511, 661 S.E.2d 518 (2008).

- Since the bar allowed combative patrons to remain on the premises for an inordinate amount of time until a patron's foreseeable and permanent injury occurred during a fight, the denial of a motion for a directed verdict by the bar and the bar's owner in the patron's personal injury action was proper. Mulligan's Bar & Grill v. Stanfield, 294 Ga. App. 250, 668 S.E.2d 874 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0351, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 192 (Ga. 2009).

- Trial court erred in denying the vehicle owner's motion for directed verdict as the evidence showed that the wrecker company's default judgment was improperly entered against the vehicle owner since the vehicle owner was improperly notified of the wrecker company's foreclosure action against it after it found the vehicle owner's vehicle abandoned; no dispute existed but that the wrecker company sent notice of the foreclosure proceeding to the wrong address in a different state than where the vehicle owner was located, through no fault of the vehicle owner. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc. v. Robinson & Stephens, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 168, 587 S.E.2d 146 (2003).

Since the adjoining property owners did not show that the owners' had an interest in their neighbors' property, the trial court erred in denying the homebuilders' motion for directed verdict regarding the adjoining property owners' claims for negligent construction, negligent design, and negligent reconstruction as Georgia law did not permit a plaintiff with no interest in the relevant property to bring such claims. D. G. Jenkins Homes, Inc. v. Wood, 261 Ga. App. 322, 582 S.E.2d 478 (2003).

- Trial court erred in denying the airplane company's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the corporation's claims for tortious interference with business and contractual relations because the corporation did not produce any probative evidence to show that the airplane company's letters or telephone calls induced a breach of contract or caused a third party to discontinue a business relationship with the corporation; the corporation did not present any evidence that any party, including the addressees, had seen or even knew about the letters and telephone calls. Boeing Co. v. Blane Int'l Group, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 672, 624 S.E.2d 227 (2005).

- As the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds as to what type of trust was contemplated for purposes of a former business partner's deposit of insurance proceeds into a trust for the benefit of the deceased partner's minor daughter, there was no enforceable contract under O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1 and the trial court's denial of a directed verdict to the former business partner was error pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50. Oldham v. Self, 279 Ga. App. 703, 632 S.E.2d 446 (2006).

- In an action to recover on a promissory note filed by a bank, while the bank might have been negligent in managing and monitoring the loan to the bank's debtor, absent any contrary evidence, the debtor remained obligated under the parties' contractual relationship. Hence, the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict to the bank on the debtor's claim for negligence, attorney's fees, and punitive damages. Fielbon Dev. Co. v. Colony Bank, 290 Ga. App. 847, 660 S.E.2d 801 (2008).

- It was error to deny an adjacent lot owner's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in an action by property owners, alleging property damage and requesting an award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, as there was a bona fide controversy regarding the adjacent lot owner's liability in the circumstances; further, there was no showing that the adjacent lot owner acted with bad faith. Lowery v. Roper, 293 Ga. App. 243, 666 S.E.2d 710 (2008).

- Because an owner did not take a neighbor's threat seriously, and because the neighbor's later trespasses were not committed in the owner's presence, the trial court erred when the court denied the neighbor's O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) motion for directed verdict on the owner's emotional distress claim. Norton v. Holcomb, 299 Ga. App. 207, 682 S.E.2d 336 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1929, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 804 (Ga. 2009).

There are only two points in time when a motion for directed verdict may be made: (1) at the close of the plaintiff's evidence; and (2) at the close of all the evidence. Gleaton v. City of Atlanta, 131 Ga. App. 399, 206 S.E.2d 46 (1974).

Defendant may be able to reserve right to move for directed verdict out of order or at a time not allowed by law, by stipulation. Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).

Only the defendant may move for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. Inabinet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 514, 184 S.E.2d 514 (1971); Allied Van Lines v. Hanson, 131 Ga. App. 506, 206 S.E.2d 108 (1974).

- Under subsection (a) of this section, the defendant, but not the plaintiff, may move for directed verdict at the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, and the trial judge has no authority to direct a verdict for the plaintiff on the plaintiff's motion at this stage of the trial. Kay Enters., Inc. v. Shawmac, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 225, 183 S.E.2d 503 (1971); Carpenter v. Citizens & S. Bank, 143 Ga. App. 765, 240 S.E.2d 106 (1977); Colonial Film & Equip. Co. v. MacMillan Professional Magazines, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 632, 252 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

- When the defendants' motion for directed verdict was made before the plaintiff had a full opportunity to present evidence and was based on the defendants' attorney's allegation that testimony that the plaintiff would elicit from the remaining witnesses would not support the plaintiff's case, the trial judge had no authority to direct a verdict for the defendants on motion at this stage of the trial. Williams v. Buckley, 148 Ga. App. 778, 252 S.E.2d 692 (1979).

There is no requirement that the defendant move for directed verdict prior to close of all evidence. Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).

- There was no error in the trial court's grant of a truck repairer's motion for directed verdict before the evidence was closed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) as the owner failed to proffer additional evidence on the issue such that the owner could not show that the owner was harmed by the trial court's ruling. Puckette v. John Bailey Pontiac-Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 138, 714 S.E.2d 750 (2011).

Renewal of a motion for directed verdict at the end of the trial is not required. GLW Int'l Corp. v. Yao, 243 Ga. App. 38, 532 S.E.2d 151 (2000).

Trial court erred in finding that the carpet supplier was required to move for a directed verdict on the issue of attorney fees awarded to the carpet purchaser at the close of all of the evidence and not only at the close of the carpet purchaser's evidence as there was no statutory requirement that a motion for directed verdict be renewed at the end of the trial. Lexmark Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Color Concepts, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 622, 583 S.E.2d 458 (2003).

§ 9-11-50 is not to be construed to vitiate motion not made immediately after close of evidence. - To construe this section so narrowly as to vitiate a motion for directed verdict unless it is made immediately after close of all the evidence would defeat the motion's general purpose and violate the express legislative intent that the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).

- Trial court did not err in deferring the court's ruling on the motion for directed verdict until after the verdict was returned. Steinberg v. City of Atlanta, 213 Ga. App. 491, 444 S.E.2d 873 (1994).

- Because the plaintiff made a motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability of the defendant after the jury was charged, having made no such motion during the trial, nothing was presented for the trial court's ruling nor appellate court's review. Dukes v. Ruth, 203 Ga. App. 246, 416 S.E.2d 565 (1992).

- Because the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, renewal of the defendant's motion after close of all the evidence and oral argument, but prior to the court's charge to the jury, was timely made. Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).

- Since a case is viable up to the return of the verdict, and the plaintiff can still withdraw the case from the jury by voluntary dismissal at any time before the verdict via O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41, there is no logical reason why the case could not be withdrawn during such period of viability by a motion for directed verdict, giving the defendant somewhat correlative rights with the plaintiff. Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).

Trial judge may grant a post-verdict motion for directed verdict of the winning party. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

- This section does not by the statute's express terms require that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be filed in order to preserve jurisdiction of the trial court to rule on a motion for directed verdict after the verdict itself has been returned. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

- Trial judge may insulate jury charges from appellate review by granting a post-verdict motion for a directed verdict, so long as the appellate court determines that the trial court was correct in granting the motion for a directed verdict. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

- When a motion for directed verdict is properly granted, any question as to the correctness of the trial court's instructions to the jury is moot. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict

Federal rule compared.

- Former Code 1933, § 110-113 was in substance copied from Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the only difference being as to time of filing and provision that a new trial may be prayed in the alternative. Echols v. Thompson, 211 Ga. 299, 85 S.E.2d 423 (1955).

- Function of motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is not the same as that of a motion for new trial, but is a summary method of disposing of the entire litigation if it is obvious that the party against whom the motion is directed cannot under any circumstances win the case. McClelland v. Carmichael Tile Co., 94 Ga. App. 645, 96 S.E.2d 202 (1956).

- Sole purpose of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to permit a court to review and reconsider a ruling on an antecedent motion for directed verdict, and the ultimate result intended is avoidance of another trial when the law demanded a result for the movant on the first trial. Shetzen v. C.G. Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E.2d 114 (1956).

Section providing for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50) provides for correction of error in refusing to direct verdict in the first instance, and obviates necessity for a second trial. Shetzen v. C.G. Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E.2d 114 (1956).

Purpose of adoption of the law providing for motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict was to provide for final disposition of the case by the appellate court if evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict rendered on any theory or if judgment for the losing party in the trial court is demanded by law. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Brackin, 215 Ga. 225, 109 S.E.2d 782 (1959); Kicklighter v. Kicklighter, 217 Ga. 54, 121 S.E.2d 122 (1961).

- Purpose of allowing the trial judge to submit the case to the jury and then grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to avoid the necessity of retrial if the appellate court determines that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict since under these circumstances the appellate court can simply reinstate the verdict. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Purpose of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to provide for final disposition by the appellate court if evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict rendered on any theory or if judgment for the losing party in the trial court is demanded by the law. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Parsons, 155 Ga. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is simply a reasserted motion for directed verdict, with a second opportunity for the trial court to rule on the motion before time and expenses are incurred and appellate judicial resources are expended. It is an instrument designed to reduce court costs and delay. Famiglietti v. Brevard Medical Investors, Ltd., 197 Ga. App. 164, 397 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

- Section dealing with judgments notwithstanding the verdict relates solely to pleading, procedure, and practice in trial of civil actions. Wilson v. State, 215 Ga. 775, 113 S.E.2d 607 (1960); Fair v. State, 220 Ga. 750, 141 S.E.2d 431 (1965).

- In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict; and this approach governs appellate courts as well as trial courts. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

In considering a motion for judgment n.o.v., the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict. Bryant v. Colvin, 160 Ga. App. 442, 287 S.E.2d 238 (1981).

In considering a motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Connell, 166 Ga. App. 329, 304 S.E.2d 131 (1983).

On motion for judgment n.o.v., the evidence is to be construed most favorably to the nonmovant. Davis v. Glaze, 182 Ga. App. 18, 354 S.E.2d 845 (1987).

- If evidence demands verdict for the defendant, it is error to deny the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wright Contracting Co. v. Davis, 93 Ga. App. 810, 92 S.E.2d 812 (1956).

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be rendered only when evidence demands a verdict contrary to the one returned by the jury. Osborn v. Youmans, 219 Ga. 476, 134 S.E.2d 22 (1963).

It is only if a verdict for one party is demanded as a matter of law and the jury has returned an adverse verdict that a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto will lie. Board of Educ. v. Fredericks, 113 Ga. App. 199, 147 S.E.2d 789 (1966).

Grant of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands a particular verdict. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Blankenship Plumbing Co., 153 Ga. App. 335, 265 S.E.2d 66 (1980).

As with a directed verdict, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. Hiers-Wright Assocs. v. Manufacturers Hanover Mtg. Corp., 182 Ga. App. 732, 356 S.E.2d 903 (1987).

- Trial court erred in denying a landlord's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in the tenants' breach of lease action; the landlord could not be charged with failing to consent to an assignment arrangement that was offered to the tenants and was refused. Coordinated Props. v. Johnston, 267 Ga. App. 298, 599 S.E.2d 213 (2004).

- In a case in which judgment was entered in favor of an independent subcontractor who sued a retailer for injuries occurring while the subcontractor was doing work on the retailer's premises, the retailer was entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the retailer exercised no control over the subcontractor's work, and any control over that work was contractually ceded to the subcontractor and to the contractor who hired the subcontractor. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dufour, 268 Ga. App. 104, 601 S.E.2d 375 (2004).

- In a debtor's lawsuit against a bank for breach of contract, trespass, conversion, tortious interference with contractual relations, and tortious interference with business relations, the bank's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was correctly granted on the conversion and trespass claims because the bank had title, under a management agreement, to the debtor's allegedly converted invoices as receivables, and could keep them. Dalton Diversified, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 270 Ga. App. 203, 605 S.E.2d 892 (2004).

- Worker's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) against a tire manufacturing plant, for which the worker did independent contractor work pursuant to an agreement between the plant and the worker's employer, failed because the plant had no statutory or contractual duty to maintain a forklift or to ensure that the employer properly maintained the forklift, and, accordingly, the trial court should have granted the plant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50; the forklift jumped backwards and due to a malfunctioning emergency brake, the transformer that it was carrying dropped and crushed the worker's arm, and it was noted that the forklift was purchased by the employer but was delivered directly to the plant and remained on those premises. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Merritt, 271 Ga. App. 16, 608 S.E.2d 714 (2004).

- Will proponent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of undue influence was properly granted to the proponent because the evidence failed to show undue influence, in that the attorney who prepared the will testified that the will proponent was not present at the execution of the will, that the attorney discussed the contents of the will only with the testatrix, and that the testatrix had no doubt about what provisions the testatrix wanted in the will; the record also established that the proponent, who lived with the testatrix during the testatrix's last days, did not isolate the testatrix but that, instead, hospice personnel, friends, and family frequented the testatrix's house between the time when the proponent came to live with the testatrix and the time that the testatrix executed the will. Smith v. Liney, 280 Ga. 600, 631 S.E.2d 648 (2006).

- In an action involving the sale of land, because no adequate description of the property sought to be sold could be found within the four corners of the parties' final agreement, no exhibits were attached, and the words used in the contract did not provide a sufficient description of the land, the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to provide a legally sufficient description of the property at issue; hence, the property owners' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the buyer was erroneously denied. McClung v. Atlanta Real Estate Acquisitions, LLC, 282 Ga. App. 759, 639 S.E.2d 331 (2006).

- In a boundary line dispute filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-61, the trial court properly entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, two landowners, and against their neighbor, and then denied the neighbor a new trial, or alternatively a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as: (1) the boundary line indicated on a plat reflecting the locations of monuments on the parcel owned by two landowners complied with the monuments referenced in the original warranty deed; and (2) the neighbor agreed to a special verdict form allowing the jury to find that the plat submitted by the two landowners accurately and sufficiently showed the true boundary line. Dover v. Higgins, 287 Ga. App. 861, 652 S.E.2d 829 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0402, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 237 (Ga. 2008).

- Truck seller and the truck's body shop were entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(b) on the truck purchasers' counterclaim regarding damages to the truck's engine during the truck's bailment for repairs to the truck's body because the purchasers failed to provide evidence as to the truck's post-bailment fair market value. Newberry v. TriStar Auto Group, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 313, 677 S.E.2d 370 (2009).

- If the evidence supports the verdict for the plaintiff, it is not error for the court to refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant and to overrule the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Echols v. Thompson, 211 Ga. 299, 85 S.E.2d 423 (1955).

If there is any evidence to support the verdict, denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v. is proper. Maloy v. Planter's Whse. & Lumber Co., 142 Ga. App. 69, 234 S.E.2d 807 (1977).

- Trial court properly denied a railroad's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because there was evidence that an employee's view was obstructed by vegetation on the railroad's property adjacent to the roadbed in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 213.37(c); further, the railroad's motion for a JNOV based on the fact that it was the employee's job to inspect for hazards was properly rejected because: (1) the employee was a railroad employee who clearly was performing the employee's normal trackside duties and was an intended beneficiary of the regulation; (2) the regulation was unambiguous; and (3) the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., was to be liberally construed. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Blackmon, 262 Ga. App. 266, 585 S.E.2d 194 (2003).

- In victims' lawsuit against the perpetrator of a fraudulent scheme under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., after the victims had previously unsuccessfully sued the perpetrator for fraud and related claims, judgment n.o.v. was properly entered in favor of the perpetrator because the victims' claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel as those claims should have been raised in their previous suits against the perpetrator, which involved the same parties and the same subject matter. Austin v. Cohen, 268 Ga. App. 650, 602 S.E.2d 146 (2004).

Based on evidence that a manufacturer interfered with a distributor's business relationship with its customers by marketing to those customers a product the manufacturer had no legal right to sell, that claim was erroneously set aside. Fertility Tech. Res., Inc. v. Lifetek Med., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 148, 637 S.E.2d 844 (2006).

- Because sufficient evidence was presented to support a distributor's tortious interference with a contractual or business relationship claim alleged against a manufacturer, and because such was an intentional tort, demonstrating evidence of the manufacturer's bad faith, when coupled with other evidence of bad faith, an attorney-fee award under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 was authorized; thus, the trial court erred in setting the award aside in granting the manufacturer's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Fertility Tech. Res., Inc. v. Lifetek Med., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 148, 637 S.E.2d 844 (2006).

- Because there was some evidence supporting the jury's verdict in favor of homeowners in the homeowners' class action against a private water system owner, the trial court did not err in denying the owner's motion for new trial and the owner's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on general grounds, and since the case involved disputed factual issues, the trial court properly allowed the jury to resolve those issues; although the owner argued that the jury did not interpret the facts as the owner believes the jury should have, that argument presented no grounds that would allow the court of appeals to find error by the trial court in refusing to overturn the jury's verdict. Jones v. Forest Lake Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 304 Ga. App. 495, 696 S.E.2d 453 (2010).

- Trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' JNOV motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in an action arising from an auto accident; the driver did not admit liability, the relevant facts were disputed, and the fact that the driver was unable to stop in time to avoid the collision did not demand a finding that the driver was following too closely in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49. Cameron v. Peterson, 264 Ga. App. 1, 589 S.E.2d 834 (2003).

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the sellers' claim for promissory estoppel because: (1) the promise to purchase was to be performed within a reasonable time based upon clear and unambiguous terms, and the closing date was set for a day certain in the immediate future; (2) all actions necessary for the sale, except the actual closing, occurred prior to the first closing date, including audits, examination of financial records, change in inventory code, and delivery of additional inventory; (3) all the basic terms of the promise were clear and certain so as to be enforceable; and (4) the sellers established reasonable reliance to their detriment based on their rejection of another potential purchaser's bona fide offer to purchase, change in value of the property, sale of inventory later needed, and other harm shown by the evidence. Rental Equip. Group, LLC v. Maci, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 155, 587 S.E.2d 364 (2003).

- Corporate defendant, in a negligence and product liability action, was not entitled to a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the jury was properly charged that each individual tortfeasor's conduct did not have to constitute a substantial contributing factor in the plaintiff's injury in order to be considered a proximate cause thereof. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 604 S.E.2d 822 (2004).

- Trial court properly denied a city's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in an inverse condemnation case because a corporation showed that the corporation's lease was unique: (1) the location was within the traveling range of the corporation's customers who delivered the raw materials and of its customers who purchased the company's finished soil product; (2) some key customers were unwilling to travel very far and if the corporation relocated, the corporation would have lost their business; (3) the property permitted access for large trucks and contained a railroad spur; (4) the property had a dedicated scale house and a building for storing equipment; and (5) the corporation was using all of the nearly 20 acres. City of Atlanta v. Landmark Envtl. Indus., 272 Ga. App. 732, 613 S.E.2d 131 (2005).

- JNOV was improperly granted to a chemical supplier in a property owner's suit to recover under the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act (HSRA), O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq., and under theories of nuisance and trespass for the hazardous waste contamination of the owner's property because while there was testimony that actions of the dry cleaning business in the shopping center on the owner's property may also have contributed to the contamination, there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the supplier spilled solvent on many occasions over its 30-year history of monthly deliveries to the cleaners and contributed to the contamination even if its spillage was not the sole cause of contamination. Sprayberry Crossing P'ship v. Phenix Supply Co., 274 Ga. App. 364, 617 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

- Trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or, alternatively, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 5-5-25 and9-11-50, after a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant in a shareholder dispute arising from an agreement for purchase of the defendant's shares as the direct action by the defendant on a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty/usurpation of corporate opportunity was properly brought under Thomas v. Dickens, 250 Ga. 772 (1983) because there were exceptional circumstances, despite the fact that the corporation did not fit the definition of a statutory close corporation under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-902. Telcom Cost Consulting, Inc. v. Warren, 275 Ga. App. 830, 621 S.E.2d 864 (2005).

- General partners' (GPs') motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was properly denied as: (1) a $ 1.6 million award for the limited partners (LPs) for breach of a partnership agreement was supported by expert testimony that damages could be calculated by taking the value of the LPs' interest in a partnership and estimating the increase in that value if it were invested in a manner similar to the LPs' other investments; (2) even if a previous judge's comments as to the determination of damages was an order, it was not the law of the case; (3) the GPs did not object to the verdict form, which allowed the jury free reign to set damages; and (4) the GPs' claim that the award did not directly correspond with specific evidence was properly rejected. Kellett v. Kumar, 281 Ga. App. 120, 635 S.E.2d 310 (2006).

- In a negligence action seeking damages for a disabling injury filed against a property owner by a friend who assisted the owner in building a fence because the evidence supported a verdict against the friend, and the trial court's various evidentiary rulings regarding: (1) the admission of evidence under both the medical records and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule; (2) the admission of evidence regarding the parties' friendship; (3) the impeachment of the friend's credibility; (4) the opening statement presented by the owner's counsel; and (5) the use of a leading question regarding the friend's use of Oxycontin, did not support a different result, the friend was not entitled to a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Imm v. Chaney, 287 Ga. App. 606, 651 S.E.2d 855 (2007).

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury awarded damages on an insurer's subrogation claim as there could be no apportionment of damages with a city, even if the city was deemed liable, because the city was not a party to the action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. Universal Underwriters Group v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 297 Ga. App. 587, 677 S.E.2d 760 (2009).

Statute allows a trial court to defer the ruling on a motion for directed verdict and submit the case to the jury, subject to later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 allows the device of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to be used when a motion for directed verdict does not end a trial and the trial proceeds to verdict. It is narrow, however, and does not permit reopening the case for new legal issues which are thought of retrospectively, with hindsight. Famiglietti v. Brevard Medical Investors, Ltd., 197 Ga. App. 164, 397 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not actually change the verdict, but merely enters a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, thus, avoiding application of the old rule that it was error to direct a verdict and was never error to refuse to direct a verdict, and the constitutional problems involved therein as well as to eliminate a new trial. Ammons v. Horton, 128 Ga. App. 273, 196 S.E.2d 318 (1973).

Standard for granting judgment notwithstanding verdict is the same as that for directed verdict. Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980).

Appellant's standard of review in a judgment notwithstanding the verdict case is whether the evidence, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demanded a verdict contrary to that returned by the fact-finder. Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 454 S.E.2d 478 (1995).

General grounds of motion for new trial and for JNOV are not always identical. Shetzen v. C.G. Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E.2d 114 (1956).

It was never intended that the movant be made to choose between moving for new trial and moving for judgment notwithstanding verdict. Shetzen v. C.G. Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E.2d 114 (1956).

- Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment; if there is conflicting evidence or if there is insufficient evidence to make a "one-way" verdict proper, judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be awarded. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979); Bryant v. Colvin, 160 Ga. App. 442, 287 S.E.2d 238 (1981).

- If the verdict returned is not supported by any evidence, denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is error. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Parsons, 155 Ga. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 230 (1980); City of Atlanta v. West, 160 Ga. App. 609, 287 S.E.2d 558 (1981).

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improperly granted in the face of conflicting evidence, and an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict. Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30, 302 S.E.2d 554 (1983).

- Motion to strike is not a precursor to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, the court may not excise some of the evidence admitted and then rule on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict viewed with that evidence absent. Famiglietti v. Brevard Medical Investors, Ltd., 197 Ga. App. 164, 397 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

- To warrant a grant of a motion for judgment notwithstanding mistrial, the same test obtains as that for directed verdict. Long v. Walls, 226 Ga. 737, 177 S.E.2d 373 (1970).

Motion for judgment notwithstanding mistrial is analogous to a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in that the motion can be sustained only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and when the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. Georgia Power Co. v. Purser, 152 Ga. App. 181, 262 S.E.2d 473 (1979); Findley v. McDaniel, 158 Ga. App. 445, 280 S.E.2d 858 (1981).

Motion for directed verdict is a condition precedent to a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whitman v. Burden, 155 Ga. App. 67, 270 S.E.2d 235 (1980).

- It is a condition precedent to a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict that a motion for directed verdict must have been made and denied. Southwind Trucking Co. v. Harvey, 96 Ga. App. 715, 101 S.E.2d 223 (1957); Fulton v. Chattanooga Publishing Co., 100 Ga. App. 573, 112 S.E.2d 15 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 215 Ga. 880, 114 S.E.2d 138 (1960).

Motion for directed verdict is a prerequisite to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and if it appears from the record that no such motion was made, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be considered on appeal. Kiser v. Kiser, 101 Ga. App. 511, 114 S.E.2d 397 (1960).

Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only when a valid motion for directed verdict has been made by the movant and erroneously denied. Daniel v. Weeks, 217 Ga. 388, 122 S.E.2d 564 (1961); Simmons v. Watson, 221 Ga. 765, 147 S.E.2d 322 (1966); Maloy v. Planter's Whse. & Lumber Co., 142 Ga. App. 69, 234 S.E.2d 807 (1977).

If the record does not disclose the making of a motion for directed verdict, there is no error in the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. DeKalb County v. Brewer, 111 Ga. App. 269, 141 S.E.2d 234 (1965); Tadlock v. Duncan, 215 Ga. App. 441, 451 S.E.2d 80 (1994).

When error is assigned on overruling of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made after trial, but no motion for directed verdict was made, no question is presented for determination by the appellate court. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackwell, 112 Ga. App. 398, 145 S.E.2d 287 (1965).

Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be entertained only if the movant has previously moved for a directed verdict and is seeking to have judgment entered "in accordance with" that motion. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhee, 160 Ga. App. 468, 287 S.E.2d 257 (1981).

If review of the record and transcript reveals that no motion for directed verdict was made in the case, it follows that a motion for judgment n.o.v. was not appropriate, and the trial court erred in granting the judgment. Gray v. Miller, 166 Ga. App. 792, 305 S.E.2d 651 (1983).

If the ground asserted in defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. in the trial court is argued on appeal, but it was not contained in the motion for directed verdict, as required by subsection (b), it will not be considered on appeal. Wehunt v. ITT Bus. Communications Corp., 183 Ga. App. 560, 359 S.E.2d 383 (1987).

Grounds asserted in the motion for judgment n.o.v. and on appeal were not considered because those grounds were not asserted in support of the motions for directed verdict. Glenridge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Felton, 183 Ga. App. 858, 360 S.E.2d 418 (1987); Tanner v. Gilleland, 186 Ga. App. 377, 367 S.E.2d 257 (1988).

Questions concerning the evidence offered to support a claim for attorney fees raised in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict would not be reviewed because the defendants did not raise the questions in the defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Dee v. Sweet, 218 Ga. App. 18, 460 S.E.2d 110 (1995).

In light of the guardians' failure to move for a directed verdict during the case, the trial court correctly found that their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was procedurally barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(b). Moore v. Stewart, 315 Ga. App. 388, 727 S.E.2d 159 (2012).

- Motion made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, described by the movant as one for "involuntary nonsuit," was a sufficient prerequisite for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Jones v. Spindel, 128 Ga. App. 88, 196 S.E.2d 22 (1973).

- Although subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 provides that a motion for judgment n.o.v. may be made "whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied," the statutory phrase "at the close of all the evidence" does not deny to a defendant who has moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence the opportunity to move for judgment n.o.v. on the grounds presented in the plaintiff's motion for directed verdict. Marett v. Professional Ins. Careers, Inc., 201 Ga. App. 178, 410 S.E.2d 373 (1991); Professional Consulting Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Ibrahim, 206 Ga. App. 663, 426 S.E.2d 376 (1992).

- Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be based on the same grounds raised initially in the motion for directed verdict, for it is in effect only a new ruling on a renewed motion. Famiglietti v. Brevard Medical Investors, Ltd., 197 Ga. App. 164, 397 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

In an action among members of a limited liability company (LLC) that included a breach of contract by a physician against the LLC, in which the physician was awarded attorney fees, the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the LLC on the issue of attorney fees because the LLC failed to raise, in the LLC's motion for directed verdict, the claim that the physician failed to apportion the proof of attorney fees among the claims. James E. Warren, M.D., P.C. v. Weber & Warren Anesthesia Servs., 272 Ga. App. 232, 612 S.E.2d 17 (2005).

In a negligence action by an automobile driver, a trial court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(b) to the driver and amending the verdict to include a truck driver in the punitive damages portion thereof as the driver's motion for directed verdict made after the appellants, the truck driver, the driver's employer, and the employer's insurer, rested only addressed the issue of the truck driver's and the employer's liability for compensatory damages. Am. Material Servs. v. Giddens, 296 Ga. App. 643, 675 S.E.2d 540 (2009).

Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be considered only when based upon a motion for directed verdict timely made, that is, at the close of all the evidence. Battle v. Yancey Bros. Co., 157 Ga. App. 277, 277 S.E.2d 280 (1981); Buffington v. Haldi, 210 Ga. App. 542, 436 S.E.2d 740 (1993).

Record as the record exists at the close of trial controls whether a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted. DeLoach v. Myers, 215 Ga. 255, 109 S.E.2d 777 (1959).

- As a motion for new trial may be passed on before the transcript of evidence is filed, and as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be joined with the motion for new trial with a prayer for relief in the alternative, if the court is familiar with the evidence, such latter motion may be heard and, if proper, granted, even though the transcript is not physically available at the time. Castile v. Rich's, Inc., 131 Ga. App. 586, 206 S.E.2d 851 (1974).

- If a party after suffering an adverse judgment filed only a motion for new trial within the 30-day period specified in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50, then after the 30-day period expired the party sought to file, in the form of an amendment to the new trial motion, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the latter motion must be considered invalid. Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 174 Ga. App. 269, 329 S.E.2d 900, cert. denied, 254 Ga. 349, 331 S.E.2d 879 (1985).

- Because a motion for directed verdict was made by the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and was denied, and then evidence was offered by the defendant, who failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, the enumeration of error based on failure to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be considered. Battle v. Yancey Bros. Co., 157 Ga. App. 277, 277 S.E.2d 280 (1981).

- Because a motion for directed verdict, renewed at the close of the case, was preserved by the court's reserving ruling until after the jury's verdict, the court's ruling on the pending motion for directed verdict and grant of j.n.o.v. based on it without a formal motion for j.n.o.v. was not error. Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 188 Ga. App. 106, 372 S.E.2d 265 (1988), aff'd, 259 Ga. 376, 382 S.E.2d 597 (1989).

- Because the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and the trial court granted the j.n.o.v. motion, the case would be remanded for a conditional determination on the new trial motion. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 221 Ga. App. 363, 471 S.E.2d 287 (1996).

Trial court erred in denying a city's motion for a new trial because a corporation failed to cite evidentiary support for the difference between the amount that its expert considered for abandoned processed soil product and the amount of the jury's award. City of Atlanta v. Landmark Envtl. Indus., 272 Ga. App. 732, 613 S.E.2d 131 (2005).

- If a mistrial has been declared due to the inability of the jury to reach a verdict, and the defendant thereafter files a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the mistrial, the plaintiff's right of voluntary dismissal is not restored unless and until that motion has been denied. LeRoux v. Levine, 194 Ga. App. 381, 390 S.E.2d 629 (1990).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(b) allows the device of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to be used when a motion for directed verdict does not end a trial and it proceeds to verdict; it is narrow, however, and does not permit reopening the case for new legal issues that are thought of retrospectively, with hindsight. Therefore, the developers' contention that an attorney fee award was based on a legal bill containing inadmissible hearsay did not preserve the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for appeal when the developers failed to raise the argument in the developers' motions for directed verdict. Lincoln v. Tyler, 258 Ga. App. 374, 574 S.E.2d 440 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Monterrey Mexican Rest. of Wise, Inc. v. Leon, 282 Ga. App. 439, 638 S.E.2d 879 (2006).

- Evidence supported the jury's verdict and there was no error in denying the property owner's motion for JNOV because the trial court correctly determined that a jury should decide whether the property owner was wanton or wilful in failing to take ordinary care to warn invitees and their guests, such as the plaintiff, of the hazardous conditions on the owner's premises, including frequent criminal activity and gunfire, of which the owner arguably had knowledge. Khalia, Inc. v. Rosebud, 353 Ga. App. 350, 836 S.E.2d 840 (2019).

- Standard for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that for a motion for directed verdict; it is warranted only when no conflict exists as to any material issue, and the evidence presented, together with all reasonable inferences, demands a certain verdict. On appeal, a court reviews the denial of either motion under the any evidence standard. Bacon v. Volvo Serv. Ctr., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 543, 597 S.E.2d 440 (2004).

- Trial court did not err in denying the manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as evidence was introduced in the decedent's case against the manufacturer to show that the manufacturer produced products containing asbestos, to which the decedent was exposed at the plant where the decedent worked and that such exposure was a contributing factor to the decedent's asbestos-related illness. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531, 586 S.E.2d 26 (2003).

- Limited liability company's (LLC) motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was properly denied as the member presented evidence of the LLC's collected funds and cash on hand as aids in the jury's determination of damages for breach of contract, which were based on accounts receivable; the jury's verdict was well within the range of the evidence. James E. Warren, M.D., P.C. v. Weber & Warren Anesthesia Servs., 272 Ga. App. 232, 612 S.E.2d 17 (2005).

- Trial court erred in denying the doctor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of attorney fees awarded to the hospital under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 because the hospital failed to segregate the attorney fees allocable to the hospital's counterclaim, which were recoverable, from those attorney fees incurred in defending against the doctor's suit alleging that the hospital inappropriately revoked the doctor's privileges in violation of the hospital's bylaws and Georgia public policy, which were not recoverable. Whitaker v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 272 Ga. App. 870, 613 S.E.2d 664 (2005).

- Trial court erred in denying a doctor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages awarded to a hospital on the hospital's breach of contract claim as punitive damages are not available for breach of contract claims. Whitaker v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 272 Ga. App. 870, 613 S.E.2d 664 (2005).

- Because the alleged illegalities cited by a trustee were incidental to the purpose of the contracts with the investors, those contracts did not require a securities violation or usurious interest rate; thus, it followed that the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the trustee's recission claim Douglas v. Bigley, 278 Ga. App. 117, 628 S.E.2d 199 (2006).

Because: (1) the appellate court could not agree that the broad statements regarding merger in the business plan between two investment companies and in an investing trustee's testimony rendered the second of these two companies liable for the first company's conduct; (2) the trustee failed to present evidence documenting a merger transaction between the two companies or establishing that either or both companies no longer existed; (3) the evidence failed to show that one of the companies was absorbed into the other, creating a de facto merger; and (4) the trustee failed to show that the companies lacked separate personalities, the jury was not authorized to find the second company liable for the first company's activities; thus, the trial court erred in failing to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the trustee's claims against the second company. Douglas v. Bigley, 278 Ga. App. 117, 628 S.E.2d 199 (2006).

Trial court erred when the court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed by two relatives in an action by a third relative to quiet title in property that had been owned by a decedent; the deed filed by the third relative did not contain a complete description of the property to which the deed pertained, and therefore, the deed was invalid and could not supply the third relative with good title. Lord v. Holland, 282 Ga. 890, 655 S.E.2d 602 (2008).

Paragraph (c)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 does not require the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981).

Paragraph (c)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 does not require the trial court to state the reasons for the court's holding on a motion for judgment n.o.v. and, as to a motion for new trial, it applies only when the movant for judgment n.o.v. and the movant for new trial are one and the same party. Jamison v. First Ga. Bank, 193 Ga. App. 219, 387 S.E.2d 375 (1989).

- Trial judge has discretion remaining after the trial is over, when the proper motions are made, whether to finally end the litigation or not; if the judge grants a new trial, the litigation is not finally disposed of. Wilson v. Matthews, 120 Ga. App. 284, 170 S.E.2d 346 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Burton, 238 Ga. 394, 233 S.E.2d 367 (1977).

- Requirement that, in passing upon a motion for new trial, the trial judge shall specify grounds for granting or denying such motion is only applicable under paragraph (c)(1) of this section if the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted. Guest v. Guest, 150 Ga. App. 48, 256 S.E.2d 654 (1979).

- Neither subsection (c) of Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, §§ 22, 43, and 48 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50) nor any other provision changes the law under former Code 1933, § 6-1608 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-5-50), providing that the first grant of a new trial was not error unless the evidence demanded a verdict for the party opposing the motion therefor. Martin v. Denson, 117 Ga. App. 288, 160 S.E.2d 210 (1968).

When the trial court grants separate motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on general grounds, the grant of a motion for new trial is conditional on the appellate court's vacating or reversing the judgment n.o.v.; when the law and facts of the case do not demand a verdict for either party, the first grant of a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal. Hicks v. American Interstate Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 220, 279 S.E.2d 517 (1981).

- In an action involving the sale of land, because no adequate description of the property sought to be sold could be found within the four corners of the parties' final agreement, no exhibits were attached, and the words used in the contract did not provide a sufficient description of the land, the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to provide a legally sufficient description of the property at issue; hence, the property owners' motion for a new trial was erroneously denied. McClung v. Atlanta Real Estate Acquisitions, LLC, 282 Ga. App. 759, 639 S.E.2d 331 (2006).

- Award of $130,000.00 nominal damages, if palpably unreasonable, excessive, or the product of bias, may be set aside, but these are not the criteria for a directed verdict; the motion for a new trial is the proper means of attack. Miller & Meier & Assocs. v. Diedrich, 174 Ga. App. 249, 329 S.E.2d 918, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 254 Ga. 734, 334 S.E.2d 308, vacated in part on other grounds, 176 Ga. App. 770, 338 S.E.2d 546 (1985).

- At a second trial following the grant of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the trial court was authorized to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims and grant a directed verdict for the plaintiff. Tyson v. Cheek Mechanical & Elec. Serv., Inc., 218 Ga. App. 134, 460 S.E.2d 536 (1995).

- In an action filed by a trustee alleging various claims, including breach of contract, rescission, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud against two investors and their two companies, while evidence supported some, but not all of a trustee's claims, because the jury returned a general verdict, it was difficult to decipher on which claims the jury found the defendants liable, warranting a new trial on remand; but, judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been entered against the second company as to all claims. Douglas v. Bigley, 278 Ga. App. 117, 628 S.E.2d 199 (2006).

When a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) on medical expenses was erroneously granted in a suit based on a vehicular collision, a new trial was required because after the directed verdict, the jury awarded general damages, and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the error was harmless since it could not determine if the jury factored the medical bills into account in awarding the general damages. Allen v. Spiker, 301 Ga. App. 893, 689 S.E.2d 326 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0740, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 454 (Ga. 2010).

- On remand, because the only relief sought by a distributor in a contract action with a buyer was a new trial, and not the denial of a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the distributor without conducting a new trial; moreover, the buyer was not foreclosed from presenting additional or different evidence in support of the buyer's claim for lost profits in the trial. Strickland & Smith, Inc. v. Williamson, 281 Ga. App. 784, 637 S.E.2d 170 (2006).

As a former husband failed to seek a directed verdict in the trial court, the husband could not argue on appeal that the court should enter judgment in the husband's favor as a matter of law based on the insufficiency of the evidence in a matter, wherein the husband was sued for alleged nonpayment under a promissory note; however, the husband was not barred on appeal from arguing that a new trial was warranted. Cawley v. Bennett, 293 Ga. App. 46, 666 S.E.2d 438 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 291 et seq. 75A Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §§ 727 et seq., 767.

- 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 1261, 1262. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 82, 83, 84, 85, 99. 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 511 et seq.

- Right of insurer to directed verdict on issue of suicide, 37 A.L.R. 171.

Direction of verdict: effect of explanatory testimony of witness to deprive other testimony given by him of all probative effect, 66 A.L.R. 1517.

Direction of verdict: effect of explanatory or qualifying testimony to nullify prima facie case made by plaintiff, 66 A.L.R. 1532.

Right or duty of court to direct verdict where based upon testimony of party or interested witness, 72 A.L.R. 27.

Absence of issue as to amount of recovery as distinguished from right to recover, as justifying direction of verdict as to amount, or return of verdict which does not assess amount, 105 A.L.R. 1075.

Power of court to mold or amend verdict with respect to the parties for or against whom it was rendered, 106 A.L.R. 418.

Objectionable evidence, admitted without objection, as entitled to consideration on demurrer to evidence or motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, 120 A.L.R. 205.

Constitutional or statutory provision forbidding reexamination of facts tried by a jury as affecting power to reduce or set aside verdict because of excessiveness or inadequacy, 11 A.L.R.2d 1217.

Entry of final judgment after disagreement of jury, 31 A.L.R.2d 885.

Appealability of order denying motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where movant has been granted a new trial, 57 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Motion by each party for a directed verdict as waiving the submission of fact questions to the jury, 68 A.L.R.2d 300.

Practice and procedure with respect to motions for judgment notwithstanding or in default or verdict under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 50(b) or like state provisions, 69 A.L.R.2d 449.

Res ipsa loquitur as ground for direction of verdict in favor of plaintiff, 97 A.L.R.2d 522.

Dismissal nonsuit, judgment, or direction of verdict on opening statement of counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Power of court sitting as trier of fact to dismiss at close of plaintiff's evidence, notwithstanding plaintiff has made out prima facie case, 55 A.L.R.3d 272.

Propriety of direction of verdict in favor of fewer than all defendants at close of plaintiff's case, 82 A.L.R.3d 974.

Withdrawal or disregard of waiver of jury trial in civil action, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.

Propriety, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of granting summary judgment when deponent contradicts in affidavit earlier admission of fact in deposition, 131 A.L.R. Fed. 403.