2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 11 - Civil Practice Act
Article 4 - Parties
§ 9-11-24. Intervention

1. Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
   1. When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
   2. When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject matter of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
2. Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
   1. When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or
   2. When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.

      In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

3. Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Code Section 9-11-5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. The same procedure shall be followed when a statute gives a right to intervene.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 24; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 12; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 8.)

- Form of motion to intervene as defendant, § 9-11-123.

Interposing of third-party claims in attachment proceedings, § 18-3-50 et seq.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, see 28 U.S.C.

- For article, "Synopses of 1968 Amendments to the Appellate Procedure Act and Georgia Civil Practice Act," see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 503 (1968). For article, "The Child as a Party in Interest in Custody Proceedings," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 577 (1974). For note on permissive intervention of grandparents in divorce proceedings, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 787 (1992). For comment on Rogers v. Medical Ass'n, 244 Ga. 151, 259 S.E.2d 85 (1979), as to unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to a private organization, see 29 Emory L.J. 1183 (1980).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Interventions of Right
• Permissive Intervention
• Time of Intervention

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Title 81 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Because the Georgia Business Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. Ch. 2, T. 14, does not provide any specific mechanism concerning the intervention of parties in derivative actions, courts apply the general intervention statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24, to motions to intervene in that context. Stephens v. McGarrity, 290 Ga. App. 755, 660 S.E.2d 770 (2008).

It is not the right of a stranger to a pending cause to intervene therein, unless it is necessary to the stranger's protection that the stranger be allowed to become a party to the litigation, and thus be afforded an opportunity to resist the rendition of a judgment which would operate to the stranger's prejudice. Clark v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 56, 184 S.E. 620 (1936); Walker v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 196 Ga. 361, 26 S.E.2d 695 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, T. 81).

- General rule at common law is that persons who are not parties to a suit cannot file an intervention therein; however, there are some exceptions to this rule as when an intervenor sets up some right that would be directly affected by the judgment, but in such a case the interest of the intervenor must be of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct effect of the judgment, and such interest must be created by the claim in suit, or a claim to a lien upon the property, or some part thereof, which is the subject matter of the litigation. Walker v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 196 Ga. 361, 26 S.E.2d 695 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, T. 81).

While the general rule is that intervenors pro interesse suo (according to his interest) are not known in common-law suits, an exception to the general rule is when the intervenor sets up some right which would be directly affected by the judgment; to come within such exception the interest of the intervenor must be of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct effect of the judgment, and must be created by the claim in suit, or a claim to a lien upon the property, or some part thereof, which is the subject matter of the litigation. Sampson v. Vann, 203 Ga. 612, 48 S.E.2d 293 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 81-1303).

One who had full knowledge of the pendency of a case in which one had a direct pecuniary interest, and neither sought to become a party thereto nor made any effort to intervene therein so as to protect one's rights, could not, after rendition of a judgment in plaintiff's favor, maintain an equitable petition to set such judgment aside or restrain the judgment's enforcement. Hurt Bldg., Inc. v. Atlanta Trust Co., 181 Ga. 274, 182 S.E. 187 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, T. 81).

§ 9-11-5 required. - Intervenor attempting to intervene pursuant to the right of intervention must comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5. State v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 188 Ga. App. 120, 372 S.E.2d 276 (1988).

- O.C.G.A. § 36-82-23, relating to bond validation hearings, does not provide for intervention by third parties; thus, becoming a party does not require mandatory compliance with the procedure of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24. Hay v. Development Auth., 239 Ga. App. 803, 521 S.E.2d 912 (1999), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hay v. Newton County, 246 Ga. App. 44, 538 S.E.2d 181 (2000).

- Order assigning a case to another judge pursuant to Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 3.3 did not violate O.C.G.A. §§ 9-8-1,9-8-5, and9-11-24 as: (1) neither O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 nor O.C.G.A. § 9-8-1 applied to the assignment; (2) the receiver transferred the property to a corporation before the property was sold to a limited liability company (LLC), and the receiver was not named as a defendant; (3) the appellate court was unable to determine the extent that the property remained subject to orders in the receiver case, and equitable remedies affected the rights of the receiver; (4) the LLC's action was against the corporation and the LLC's managing declarant, not the receiver, and included claims for monetary damages; and (5) the managing declarant failed to show a legal or factual basis for questioning the assigned judge's staffing to support the complex litigation. Leventhal v. Cumberland Dev., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 886, 600 S.E.2d 616 (2004).

- If individual who seeks to intervene will still be left with right to pursue the individual's own independent remedy against the parties, regardless of the outcome of the pending case, the individual has no interest that needs protecting by intervention, and should not be allowed to intervene over objection. Gregory v. Tench, 138 Ga. App. 219, 225 S.E.2d 753 (1976).

County soil and water conservation district could not intervene as of right in an action by a landowner against a construction company, even though it had an interest in the action, when the district failed to make any argument or showing with respect to the potential of the ultimate disposition of the action to impair or impede its prosecution of an independent cause of action against the company. Stephens County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Wright Bros. Constr. Co., 215 Ga. App. 352, 451 S.E.2d 802 (1994).

Third party is not prohibited from intervention in probate court guardianship proceeding. Kipp v. Rawson, 193 Ga. App. 532, 388 S.E.2d 409 (1989).

- It was not error for the probate court to permit the Department of Human Resources to intervene in guardianship proceedings without requiring the Department to file a motion to intervene. In re Martin, 218 Ga. App. 79, 460 S.E.2d 304 (1995).

- Implicit in the requirements of this section is the requirement of an order allowing intervention. Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976).

Motion to intervene may not be allowed ex parte. Gregory v. Tench, 138 Ga. App. 219, 225 S.E.2d 753 (1976).

- When intervenors have been allowed by order of the court to file intervention and to become parties defendant under this section, the intervenors thereafter, for all intents and purposes, original parties, and may file any pleading in the case that original parties could have filed, just as though the intervenors had been named parties defendant in the complaint. Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 167 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889, 90 S. Ct. 175, 24 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1969).

In an action by a wife against her former husband seeking permanent injunction of the husband's assignment of receivables owned by his employer, after the trial court had determined that the wife's lien was superior to any alleged interest by the husband's assignee and that a conveyance to the assignee was null and void, the court erred in granting the assignee's motion to intervene. Zinser v. Tormenta, 213 Ga. App. 824, 446 S.E.2d 249 (1994).

- Since the intervention of grandparents into a custody proceeding and an order granting the grandparents temporary custody had already occurred, the later adult adoption of the child's father did not extinguish the legal status that the grandparents held; the trial court's subsequent order dismissing the intervention of the grandparents and setting aside the award of temporary custody to the grandparents was reversed. Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 599 S.E.2d 173 (2004).

- Denial of a motion to intervene is not a final judgment and, thus, is reviewable under the interlocutory appeal procedure. Morman v. Board of Regents, 198 Ga. App. 544, 402 S.E.2d 320 (1991).

Although an appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene usually requires an application for interlocutory appeal, when the denial of a party's motion to intervene was a final judgment, direct appeal was therefore proper. Burruss v. Ferdinand, 245 Ga. App. 203, 536 S.E.2d 555 (2000).

Appellate court denied a corporation and board of directors' motion to dismiss a shareholder's appeal of the trial court's denial of a motion to intervene in an underlying shareholder derivative action, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24, as the shareholder had standing to appeal that denial even if the denial was based on a lack of standing to become a party to the underlying action. Leventhal v. Post Props., 276 Ga. App. 742, 624 S.E.2d 223 (2005).

Cited in Coogler v. Berry, 117 Ga. App. 614, 161 S.E.2d 428 (1968); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Logue, 117 Ga. App. 717, 162 S.E.2d 12 (1968); Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969); Bulloch County Bank v. Dodd, 226 Ga. 773, 177 S.E.2d 673 (1970); Lowe v. Lowe, 123 Ga. App. 525, 181 S.E.2d 715 (1971); Summerlin v. S & K of Statesboro, Inc., 124 Ga. 25, 183 S.E.2d 92 (1971); Autry v. Palmour, 124 Ga. App. 407, 184 S.E.2d 15 (1971); Berry v. Slappey, 229 Ga. 109, 189 S.E.2d 394 (1972); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coburn, 129 Ga. App. 520, 200 S.E.2d 146 (1973); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 231 Ga. 321, 201 S.E.2d 400 (1973); Sears v. State, 232 Ga. 547, 208 S.E.2d 93 (1974); Richmond County v. Jackson, 234 Ga. 717, 218 S.E.2d 11 (1975); Osteen v. GECC, 137 Ga. App. 546, 224 S.E.2d 453 (1976); Coursin v. Harper, 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976); Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977); C & S Land, Transp. & Dev. Corp. v. Grubbs, 141 Ga. App. 393, 233 S.E.2d 486 (1977); Lexington Developers, Inc. v. O'Neal Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 434, 236 S.E.2d 98 (1977); Coxwell v. Coxwell, 240 Ga. 46, 239 S.E.2d 371 (1977); Paulding County v. City of Hiram, 240 Ga. 220, 240 S.E.2d 71 (1977); Worthen v. Jones, 240 Ga. 388, 240 S.E.2d 842 (1977); Braddy v. Dessau Realty & Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 589, 252 S.E.2d 10 (1978); Morton v. Skrine, 242 Ga. 844, 252 S.E.2d 408 (1979); Sawyer v. Allison, 151 Ga. App. 334, 259 S.E.2d 721 (1979); DeKalb County v. Post Properties, Inc., 245 Ga. 214, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980); McMahan v. Koppers Co., 654 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1981); Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S.E.2d 920 (1982); Smith v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 26, 289 S.E.2d 520 (1982); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 249 Ga. 247, 290 S.E.2d 423 (1982); Shoemake v. Woodland Equities, Inc., 252 Ga. 389, 313 S.E.2d 689 (1984); 404 Music Group v. Bass, 170 Ga. App. 113, 316 S.E.2d 558 (1984); Polston v. Levine, 171 Ga. App. 893, 321 S.E.2d 350 (1984); Virginia Highland Assocs. v. Allen, 174 Ga. App. 706, 330 S.E.2d 892 (1985); Larkin v. Laster, 254 Ga. 716, 334 S.E.2d 158 (1985); GMC v. Rasmussen, 255 Ga. 544, 340 S.E.2d 586 (1986); Button Gwinnett Landfill, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 256 Ga. 818, 353 S.E.2d 328 (1987); Pope v. Department of Human Resources, 209 Ga. App. 835, 434 S.E.2d 731 (1993); Hulsey v. Hulsey, 212 Ga. App. 269, 441 S.E.2d 477 (1994); Rynerson v. Schat, 215 Ga. App. 250, 449 S.E.2d 901 (1994); Int'l Maint. Corp. v. Inland Paper Bd. & Packaging, Inc., 256 Ga. App. 752, 569 S.E.2d 865 (2002); Buckler v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. App. 190, 659 S.E.2d 398 (2008); In re Estate of Nesbit, 299 Ga. App. 496, 682 S.E.2d 641 (2009); Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 317 Ga. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2013); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC, 299 Ga. 891, 792 S.E.2d 680 (2016); Endsley v. Geotechnical & Envtl. Consultants Inc., 339 Ga. App. 663, 794 S.E.2d 174 (2016); Franzen v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Atlanta, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 539 (2020).

Interventions of Right

Requirements for intervention.

- Individual will not be permitted to intervene in an action unless the individual can establish: (1) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject matter of the action; (2) an impairment of the individual's interest which may result from an unfavorable disposition of the lawsuit; and (3) inadequate representation of this interest by the parties already involved. Brown v. Truluck, 239 Ga. 105, 236 S.E.2d 60 (1977).

Issue of adequacy of representation is a question of fact, which must be ruled on by the trial court in considering an application for intervention. Southwest Ga. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wainwright, 241 Ga. 355, 245 S.E.2d 306 (1978).

- As a general rule, there is no right to intervene in an ordinary action at law. Gregory v. Tench, 138 Ga. App. 219, 225 S.E.2d 753 (1976).

- When, prior to judgment, intervention is sought by a necessary party who should have been named and served in the original complaint, such intervention should be allowed, and failure to do so amounts to an abuse of discretion. State v. Bruce, 231 Ga. 783, 204 S.E.2d 106 (1974).

When interests of intervenor and governmental body or officer who is a named party are identical, it will be assumed that the intervenor's interests are adequately represented, absent a concrete showing of circumstances in the particular case that make representation inadequate. DeKalb County v. Post Properties, Inc., 245 Ga. 214, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980).

- In a derivative action suit, a trial court abused the court's discretion by denying a minority shareholder's motion to intervene since the motion was timely and the minority shareholder established that the minority shareholder's interests were not adequately represented by the suing shareholder based on the large investment the minority shareholder had in the corporation and the fact that the settlement reached in the action would impact the minority shareholder's direct claims against the corporation. Further, the minority shareholder was entitled to a determination that the suing shareholder had adequately represented the corporation's interests up to and including the reaching of the settlement. Stephens v. McGarrity, 290 Ga. App. 755, 660 S.E.2d 770 (2008).

In an action against a nonprofit corporation that operated a school and its president, a director of the corporation and its president established a right of intervention based on evidence that the interests of the corporation and the state were not adequately represented. Ebon Found., Inc. v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340, 498 S.E.2d 728 (1998).

In divorce against husband when creditor bank filed action claiming equitable interest in property titled in husband, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the wife's intervention and consolidating the two cases as the bank's equitable lien prejudiced the wife's potential interest in the marital estate. First Nat'l Bank v. Blackburn, 254 Ga. 379, 329 S.E.2d 897 (1985).

- Relatives of child may not file objections to the child's adoption as long as one natural parent is living and has consented, nor may the relatives intervene in the action, as the relatives lack the required interest therein. Lockey v. Bennett, 244 Ga. 339, 260 S.E.2d 56 (1979).

Agency and adoptive parents had interest, as legal custodians of child, in petition for father to legitimate the child and when their rights were not represented, the agency and adoptive parents had a right to intervene. In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982).

In an adoption proceeding, the trial court erred in allowing the Georgia Department of Human Resources to intervene since, even if it had an interest as temporary custodian of the child, there was no evidence that such interest would be impaired by the disposition of the case. In re Stroh, 240 Ga. App. 835, 523 S.E.2d 887 (1999).

County Department of Family and Children Services was properly permitted to intervene with regard to a couple's petition seeking to adopt a child as the child was adjudicated deprived and placed in the temporary custody of the Department. While the biological parents' surrenders of their parental rights was the basis for the adoption petition in the superior court, the Department remained the temporary legal custodian of the child pursuant to the juvenile court's deprivation order and, given that the Department's interest in the child as the temporary legal custodian was unrepresented in the adoption proceedings and at risk of impairment, the juvenile court did not err by allowing the Department to intervene through its objection to the adoption. Sastre v. McDaniel, 293 Ga. App. 671, 667 S.E.2d 896 (2008).

- Secured creditor's claim to commissions and fees at issue in garnishment proceeding provided interest in subject matter of proceeding sufficient to grant the creditors motion to intervene. Perry v. Freeman, 163 Ga. App. 186, 293 S.E.2d 381 (1982).

- Both O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-24 and34-9-11.1, creating a subrogation lien on behalf of workers' compensation employers and insurers, granted a workers' compensation insurer the right to intervene in a personal injury case against third parties and their insurers brought by a claimant to whom the insurer had paid benefits. Department of Admin. Servs. v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 27, 464 S.E.2d 7 (1995).

- Since an employee settled the employee's lawsuit and released third-party tortfeasors prior to receiving workers' compensation payment, the settlement and release extinguished subrogation rights asserted by the employer and the employer's insurer. It was irrelevant that the tortfeasors settled with the employee after receiving notice of the pending workers' compensation claim. Georgia Star Plumbing, Inc. v. Bowen, 225 Ga. App. 379, 484 S.E.2d 26 (1997).

- Party whose interest in property derived from a deed under power from a party who was the holder of a deed to secure debt from the record owner of the property was not an "interested party" under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-77(1) and that party had no right under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 to intervene in an in rem judicial tax foreclosure proceeding. Burruss v. Ferdinand, 245 Ga. App. 203, 536 S.E.2d 555 (2000).

- Trial court abused the court's discretion in allowing a borrower's judgment creditor to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 in the borrower's action against the lender for reformation of a deed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-2-25. The creditor had no interest directly relating to the subject matter of the suit and had other remedies. Potter's Props., LLC v. VNS Corp., 306 Ga. App. 621, 703 S.E.2d 79 (2010).

- Challenger in an action validating and confirming taxable revenue bonds lacked standing to intervene in the action as a result of failing to comply with the intervention procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c); and, because the challenger lacked standing to become a party in the trial court, the challenger also lacked standing to appeal the trial court's judgment, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 324 Ga. App. 23, 749 S.E.2d 29 (2013).

- Trial court abused the court's discretion by denying a county's motion to intervene in a boundary dispute action that effected the county's boundary since the county was not provided notice of the mandamus action and it promptly sought intervention upon discovery of the action. Bibb County v. Monroe County, 294 Ga. 730, 755 S.E.2d 760 (2014).

Most important factor is whether intervention will prejudice existing parties in the case. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

- When intervention is permissive, the crucial determination to be made by the trial court, in the court's discretion, is whether the counterclaim will unduly delay or prejudice the existing parties. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Mayo, 120 Ga. App. 495, 171 S.E.2d 542 (1969).

When a trial court is exercising the court's discretion in determining whether to allow intervention, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and other relevant circumstances such as the degree to which the intervenor would be affected by the outcome in the underlying case. Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 417 S.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

- While trial court must consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice adjudication of the rights of the original parties, the court is not limited to considering these factors alone. Allgood v. Georgia Marble Co., 239 Ga. 858, 239 S.E.2d 31 (1977).

- Fact that intervenor meets requirements of a common question of law or fact does not automatically entitle the intervenor to be made a party. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Mayo, 120 Ga. App. 495, 171 S.E.2d 542 (1969).

- Trial court erred in granting a putative biological father's legitimation petition while a husband's timely, meritorious motion to intervene of right under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a) was pending because when the husband moved to intervene in the legitimation proceeding he was the child's legal father and had parental and custodial rights to the child, and the husband clearly had an interest in the legitimation proceeding; the husband's interest as the child's legal father would be impaired by a decision of the trial court that was unfavorable to him, and his interest was not adequately represented by the parties to the action since the child's mother consented to the legitimation action. Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 702 S.E.2d 666 (2010).

- Whether permissive intervention should be granted is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Allgood v. Georgia Marble Co., 239 Ga. 858, 239 S.E.2d 31 (1977).

Whether permissive intervention is granted is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a decision on this issue will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of discretion. Sloan v. Southern Floridabanc Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 197 Ga. App. 601, 398 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

If there is intervention before final judgment, if the rights of the intervening parties have not been protected, and if the denial of intervention would dispose of the intervening parties' cause of action, intervention should be allowed and the failure to do so amounts to an abuse of discretion. Payne v. Dundee Mills, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 514, 510 S.E.2d 67 (1998).

Trial court abused the court's discretion when the court denied an insurer's motion to intervene as untimely and unmeritorious because it was so situated by the sisters' settlement that the disposition of the original action, including the entry of the default judgment against the other sister, the settlement, and the consequent withdrawal of the motion to set aside as a practical matter impaired or impeded its ability to protect its interest, which was not adequately represented by existing parties. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Quiroga-Saenz, 343 Ga. App. 494, 807 S.E.2d 460 (2017).

In a suit alleging defective construction, the trial court abused the court's discretion by granting the insurance company's motion to intervene because after the outcome of the underlying case, the company still was left with the company's right to pursue the company's own independent declaratory judgment action against certain defendants in order to determine insurance coverage. O'Brien v. Builders Insurance, 350 Ga. App. 77, 827 S.E.2d 917 (2019).

Intervention was properly allowed when the intervenor filed a motion to intervene and served the parties as required by subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24, and when the motion sought no further relief than that which the plaintiff already sought against the defendants. AC Corp. v. Myree, 221 Ga. App. 513, 471 S.E.2d 922 (1996).

When signatories to contribution agreement sought a judgment declaring the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement, the bank president was properly allowed to intervene under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(b)(2) to claim unpaid salary; as the bank was to be organized under the agreement, signatories of which also guaranteed employment contract, there were questions of law or fact in common, and no undue delay or prejudice to rights of original parties had been shown. Ervin v. Turner, 291 Ga. App. 719, 662 S.E.2d 721 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 773, 774, 794 (Ga. 2008).

Because the trial court applied the correct legal standard in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) in finding that the natural parent presumption was rebutted and that awarding custody to the grandparents was in the child's best interests, and because the grandparents were properly permitted to intervene under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2), the mother was not entitled to appellate relief. Trotter v. Ayres, 315 Ga. App. 7, 726 S.E.2d 424 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1206, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 666 (Ga. 2012).

- Appellate court will not reverse grant or denial of permissive intervention unless there is an abuse of discretion. Allgood v. Georgia Marble Co., 239 Ga. 858, 239 S.E.2d 31 (1977); Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 417 S.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

When permissive intervention is sought, subsection (b) of this section confers discretion upon the trial court, and such discretion will not be controlled unless the discretion is manifestly abused. Barber & Barber, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 231 Ga. 574, 203 S.E.2d 192 (1974); Mt. Paran Area Civic Ass'n v. Cates, 240 Ga. 191, 240 S.E.2d 7 (1977).

Absent clear showing that the trial judge acted arbitrarily, the appellate court should not control the trial judge's discretion in determining whether a permissive motion to intervene would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Mayo, 120 Ga. App. 495, 171 S.E.2d 542 (1969).

Grandson did not have the right to intervene in proceedings by children for the appointment of a guardian for their mother. White v. Heard, 225 Ga. App. 351, 484 S.E.2d 12 (1997).

- Trial court's order allowing an insurer to intervene under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2) in the insured homeowner's action against a vehicle manufacturer for fire damage to the insured's home when the vehicle spontaneously caught fire was contradictory because the order did not allow the insurer to appear in the caption of the action or participate in the main action, amounting to a denial of the motion. Therefore, remand was required. Andrews v. Ford Motor Co., 310 Ga. App. 449, 713 S.E.2d 474 (2011).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a law firm's motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2) to intervene in a former client's case because the firm was discharged from the case and filed the firm's lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) before the settlement, and the firm knew when the client had reached a settlement agreement but did not move to intervene as a party until over a month later; the firm was allowed to prosecute the firm's fee lien to the jury as a party, making opening statements, calling witnesses, introducing evidence, and arguing in closing. Jones, Martin, Parriz & Tessener Law Offices, PLLC v. Westrex Corp., 310 Ga. App. 192, 712 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

Employer was entitled to intervene in a workers' compensation action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2) because the employer claimed an interest in the property or transaction that was the subject to the suit because the employer's subrogation rights were not protected by the existing parties to the employee's suit, and because the trial court's denial of the employer's motion to intervene disposed of the only legal remedy for that claim. Kroger v. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. 298, 739 S.E.2d 767 (2013).

- Subsequently-named corporation lacked standing to appeal from orders against the previously-named corporation as that corporation was not a party to the litigation, was not granted or denied intervention pursuant to a motion to amend with leave of court, and an attempted substitution by the predecessor was more than an attempt to correct a misnomer. Degussa Wall Sys. v. Sharp, 286 Ga. App. 349, 648 S.E.2d 687 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 701 (Ga. 2007).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a shareholder's motion to intervene, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24, in pending shareholder derivative actions that had been consolidated as the shareholder lacked standing to assert derivative claims in the shareholder's own non-consolidated action without the representation of counsel, and the claims that the shareholder asserted belonged to the corporation; there was no showing that the shareholder had an interest relating to the property or transaction that was the subject matter of the pending action, pursuant to the requirement of § 9-11-24(2). Leventhal v. Post Props., 276 Ga. App. 742, 624 S.E.2d 223 (2005).

Despite the claim by the owners of a corporation that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the owners to intervene in the case as the true owners of the property in question because the owners never properly filed or asserted a motion to intervene, no error resulted; moreover, the owners' argument that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the owners to file the owners' motion to intervene also provided no basis for relief. Rice v. Champion Bldgs., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 597, 654 S.E.2d 390 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 326 (Ga. 2008).

Time of Intervention

Order granting intervention ex parte and without timely notice properly vacated.

- Under Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, §§ 5 and 6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(d)), written motions, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing, shall be served not later than five days before the time specified for the hearing, and if service is by mail, three extra days shall be added; hence, an order granting intervention ex parte, albeit subject to objection of the parties, without the giving of timely notice, was properly vacated by the trial court. Gregory v. Tench, 138 Ga. App. 219, 225 S.E.2d 753 (1976).

Intervention must be timely, whether asserted as a right or as a matter of discretion. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

- Decision whether application for intervention is timely and the showing sufficient are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

Decisions whether intervention is timely and the showing sufficient are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be controlled absent an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Garcia, 177 Ga. App. 61, 338 S.E.2d 710 (1985).

Whether an intervention is timely is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and that decision will not be controlled absent an abuse of discretion. Wigley v. Hambrick, 193 Ga. App. 903, 389 S.E.2d 763, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 911, 389 S.E.2d 763 (1989).

- When notice of the motion to intervene is personally served two days prior to a confirmation hearing, the plaintiff's objection to such motion for lack of proper notice is well taken since the motion to intervene is not timely; such motion cannot, in view of the objection, be taken up until a day subsequent to the confirmation hearing date. Greer v. Federal Land Bank, 158 Ga. App. 60, 279 S.E.2d 308 (1981).

When the superior court granted the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment and held that the taxpayer's inventory was exempt from property tax, the trial court properly denied the school district's motion to intervene as untimely because the school district moved to intervene after the final judgment and after the appeal period had run; the school district failed to make the required showing to justify intervention; it was the duty of the tax assessor to protect the interests of every recipient of taxes collected, including the school district; and the tax assessor was the appropriate party to appeal the decision of the board of equalization to the superior court. Henry County Sch. Dist. v. Home Depot U.S. A., Inc., 348 Ga. App. 723, 824 S.E.2d 622 (2019).

Intervention after judgment is not usually permitted, and to justify intervention requires a strong showing. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

Intervention may be allowed after final judgment to preserve some right which cannot otherwise be protected. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

- When intervenor plaintiffs have not been properly represented in an original action, the intervenors may be added after the judgment. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

In a class action when discovery of all persons in the class is required to be made of the defendant and discovery is unduly delayed by failure of the defendant to comply with an order of the court, addition of intervenor plaintiffs, after imposition of authorized sanction of default judgment, is authorized in the discretion of the trial court. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, § 144 et seq.

19 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Parties, § 130.

- 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 162 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parties, §§ 63, 64.

- Right of nonparties to move for the vacation of a judgment and to intervene in action or proceeding in respect of a matter in which they have an interest common with or similar to that of the parties, 112 A.L.R. 434.

Right of attorney to intervene in an action or proceeding so that he may refute or deny charges of fraud or other professional misconduct relating to the matter involved, 128 A.L.R. 581.

Intervention or subsequent joinder of parties as affecting jurisdiction of federal court based upon diversity of citizenship, 134 A.L.R. 335.

Right of one covered by a fidelity bond to intervene in action by obligee against obligor, 157 A.L.R. 159.

Demurring to complaint or petition in intervention as waiver of right to stand upon motion to strike, 163 A.L.R. 917.

Right to intervene in suit to determine validity or construction of law or governmental regulations, 169 A.L.R. 851.

Who may intervene in suit to quiet title, 170 A.L.R. 149.

Right of correspondent to intervene in suit for divorce, 170 A.L.R. 161.

Assertion of fiduciary status of party to litigation as basis for intervention by one claiming interest in fruits thereof as trust beneficiary, 2 A.L.R.2d 227.

Appealability of order granting or denying right of intervention, 15 A.L.R.2d 336.

Intervention by stockholder for purpose of interposing defense for corporation, 33 A.L.R.2d 473.

Time within which right to intervene may be exercised, 37 A.L.R.2d 1306.

When is representation of applicant's interest by existing parties inadequate and applicant bound by judgment so as to be entitled to intervention as of right under Federal Rule 24(a)(2) and similar state statutes or rules, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412.

Intervenor's right to disqualify judge, 92 A.L.R.2d 1110.

Who may intervene in action between union and union member, 93 A.L.R.2d 1037.

Propriety of consideration of, and disposition as to, third persons' property claims in divorce litigation, 63 A.L.R.3d 373.

Right of insurer issuing "uninsured motorist" coverage to intervene in action by insured against uninsured motorist, 35 A.L.R.4th 757.

Right to intervene in court review of zoning proceeding, 47 A.L.R.6th 439.

Right to intervene in federal hazardous waste enforcement action, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 35.

When is intervention as matter of right appropriate under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in civil rights action, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 147.

Construction and application of rule against one-way intervention, 14 A.L.R.7th 5.