2020 Georgia Code
Title 7 - Banking and Finance
Chapter 4 - Interest and Usury
Article 1 - In General
§ 7-4-15. When Interest Runs on Liquidated Demands; Promissory Notes Payable on Demand

All liquidated demands, where by agreement or otherwise the sum to be paid is fixed or certain, bear interest from the time the party shall become liable and bound to pay them; if payable on demand, they shall bear interest from the time of the demand. In case of promissory notes payable on demand, the law presumes a demand instantly and gives interest from date.

(Laws 1799, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 405; Ga. L. 1858, p. 90, § 1; Code 1863, § 2029; Code 1868, § 2030; Code 1873, § 2056; Code 1882, § 2056; Civil Code 1895, § 2884; Civil Code 1910, § 3434; Code 1933, § 57-110.)

- For article, "2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments," see 21 Ga. St. Bar. J. 30 (Apr. 2016). For note discussing usury law application to interest charged on liquidated demands and promissory notes payable on demand, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Liquidated Demands
• Accounts
• Insurance
• When Interest Is Recoverable
• Effect of Tender

General Consideration

Prejudgment interest.

- Prejudgment interest is required when damages are liquidated. United States ex rel. Delta Metals, Inc. v. R.M. Wells Co., 497 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

Award of prejudgment interest is made by the judge as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15. American Family Life Assurance Co. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1989).

Award of interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 is not premised on bad faith but on the principle that when a debt is owed and the demands for funds is made, interest accrues from the time entitlement attaches. Rivergate Corp. v. Atlanta Indoor Adv. Concepts, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 501, 436 S.E.2d 697 (1993); United States ex rel. Ga. Elec. Supply Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 656 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1981).

Because the trial court in an action involving a tax lien encumbrance erred in calculating pre-judgment interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, which applies to commercial accounts, remand for re-calculation based on O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 was required. Homeland Communities, Inc. v. Rahall & Fryer, 235 Ga. App. 440, 509 S.E.2d 714 (1998).

Jury's award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $36,143 on a principal balance of $134,335 on a credit account for the sale of cattle feed products was proper and was affirmed. Dixon Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Purina Mills, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 738, 601 S.E.2d 152 (2004).

In determining the prejudgment interest to be added to a testamentary gift, the operative statute in a probate case is the more specific statute, O.C.G.A. § 53-4-61, rather than the more general one, O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15. In re Estate of Barr, 278 Ga. App. 837, 630 S.E.2d 135 (2006).

Because a stockholder failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, and prejudgment interest was not authorized by O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15, these awards entered in favor of the stockholder were reversed. Monterrey Mexican Rest. of Wise, Inc. v. Leon, 282 Ga. App. 439, 638 S.E.2d 879 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Temple v. Hillegass, 344 Ga. App. 454, 810 S.E.2d 625 (2018).

Since a former employee was entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the terms of an employment contract due to the employee's former employer's reduction of the employee's base salary, the employee was also entitled to prejudgment interest on the liquidated damages. McBride v. Mkt. St. Mortg., F.3d (10th Cir. June 2, 2010)(Unpublished).

Because the defendant's damages on the defendant's suit on account counterclaim were fixed, certain, and ascertainable making the damages liquidated (the plaintiff conceded that the plaintiff received and never paid for $1,017,551 worth of GPS units from the defendant), the district court erred in failing to award the defendant pre-judgment interest at the legal rate established by O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2. Discrete Wireless, Inc. v. Coleman Techs., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011)(Unpublished).

Trial court erred in denying a widow's motion for summary judgment on the widow's claim for prejudgment interest because the widow was entitled to collect credit life insurance proceeds since an insurer was precluded from denying or rescinding insurance coverage; the only issue contested by the insurer was the existence of coverage, not the amount of the widow's claim and, thus, the widow's claim to the insurance proceeds was liquidated. Flynt v. Life of the South Ins. Co., 312 Ga. App. 430, 718 S.E.2d 343 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0461, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 305 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court properly awarded a creditor prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 after the creditor, having been awarded partial summary judgment on the creditor's claim for money had and received, amended the creditor's complaint to seek prejudgment interest. The debtors were given an opportunity to contest the award of interest. Crisler v. Haugabook, 290 Ga. 863, 725 S.E.2d 318 (2012).

In a condemnation action, the property owner was properly awarded prejudgment interest on the purchase price on a second parcel because the price was fixed, certain, and ascertainable under the terms of the parties' contract such that the debt owed by the county was liquidated and subject to prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15. Gwinnett County v. Old Peachtree Partners, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 540, 764 S.E.2d 193 (2014).

Trial court did not err by awarding the lottery player prejudgment interest because the player's demand for interest was sufficient to be considered a demand for prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15. In the player's complaint the player demanded interest on the amount of the single cash payment that was due and owing, in the amended complaint the player demanded interest on the single cash payment, and in the statement of material undisputed facts and supporting theories that the player filed with the motion for summary judgment the player stated that the player was entitled to judgment in the player's favor for the lump sum payment plus interest and costs. Ga. Lottery Corp. v. Vasaya, 353 Ga. App. 52, 836 S.E.2d 107 (2019).

- Award of attorney fees and litigation expenses is not liquidated until reduced to judgment and cannot support an award of prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15. Harkleroad v. Stringer, 231 Ga. App. 464, 499 S.E.2d 379 (1998).

Interest is allowed on liquidated accounts, and should be payable from due date. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 249, 280 S.E.2d 144 (1981).

- When the amount at issue is fixed and certain, the recovery of prejudgment interest is appropriate. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359 (11th Cir. 1987).

Prejudgment interest is allowed when the amount in question is liquidated, or is certain and fixed. Erickson's Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 330 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ga. 1971), aff 'd, 454 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S. Ct. 51, 34 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972).

Amount certain cannot be rendered uncertain by means of unsuccessful, invalid, or lack of defense. Bassett Furn. Indus. v. NVF Co., 576 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978).

Total amount due and owing is ascertained when bill is tendered, and a defendant owes interest thereon, subject to reduction if the defendant can establish that retention of part of the amount after the due date is justifiable. Bassett Furn. Indus. v. NVF Co., 576 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978).

- Even though there may have been no liability for interest under express provisions of the contract, the plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to interest at the legal rate on any matured portion of indebtedness from date the indebtedness matured. Considine Co. v. Turner Communications Corp., 155 Ga. App. 911, 273 S.E.2d 652 (1980).

- Taxpayer is allowed to recover prejudgment interest in an action for a refund of wrongfully collected taxes. Eastern Air Lines v. Fulton County, 183 Ga. App. 891, 360 S.E.2d 425, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 360 S.E.2d 425 (1987).

- When existence of debt is conditional on happening of some event, payment cannot be enforced until that event happens; but when payment of existing liability is postponed until happening of event which does not happen, payment must be made within a reasonable time. B.G. Sanders & Assocs. v. Castellow, 154 Ga. App. 433, 268 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

Jury rendering verdict for liquidated demand should give interest thereon. Earnest v. Nappier, 19 Ga. 537 (1856); Felker v. Johnson, 53 Ga. App. 390, 186 S.E. 144 (1936).

- When the jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, it was also required to find amount of interest due from the time the defendant became liable. Brandt v. Eckman, 79 Ga. App. 47, 52 S.E.2d 665 (1949).

- Former Code 1933, §§ 23-1604 - 23-1608 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 36-11-3 through36-11-6) did not expressly or impliedly repeal former Code 1933, §§ 57-101, 57-110 and § 14-207 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-2,7-4-15 and11-3-108, respectively). They all are to be considered together, and when so considered, the sections first mentioned contemplate administrative action by county officers in regard to an order in which lawful county orders shall be paid. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

- Provision in former Code 1933, § 23-1608 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-11-5) that county orders when legally issued and duly presented but not paid for want of funds, shall bear interest if endorsed by the treasurer as set forth, does not mean that interest allowed generally on liquidated demands under former Code 1933, §§ 57-101 and 57-110 (see now O.C.G.A §§ 7-4-2 and7-4-15) will be disallowed if sufficient available funds are in hand to pay warrant. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

- When the plaintiff seeks recovery on quantum meruit basis and not for a liquidated demand, former Code 1933, § 57-110 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 and former Code 1933, § 57-111 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16) were not applicable. Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S.E.2d 345 (1957).

Cited in Howard v. Chamberlain, Boynton & Co., 64 Ga. 684 (1880); Merck v. American Freehold Land Mtg. Co., 79 Ga. 213, 7 S.E. 265 (1887); Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S.E. 217 (1899); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Central Trust Co., 135 Ga. 472, 69 S.E. 708 (1910); Hobbs v. Citizens Bank, 32 Ga. App. 522, 124 S.E. 72 (1924); Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Barrow, 33 Ga. App. 26, 125 S.E. 505 (1924); Stover v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 159 Ga. 357, 125 S.E. 837 (1924); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Koehler, 36 Ga. App. 396, 137 S.E. 85 (1927); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 40 Ga. 431, 149 S.E. 799 (1929); Donalsonville Chevrolet Co. v. Dickenson, 41 Ga. App. 392, 153 S.E. 106 (1930); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines, 171 Ga. 154, 155 S.E. 484 (1930); Barrow County Cotton Mills v. Sams, 48 Ga. App. 357, 172 S.E. 820 (1934); Williams Realty & Loan Co. v. Simmons, 188 Ga. 184, 3 S.E.2d 580 (1939); Brown v. Parks, 190 Ga. 540, 9 S.E.2d 897 (1940); Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821, 14 S.E.2d 64 (1941); Lively v. Munday, 201 Ga. 409, 40 S.E.2d 62 (1946); Haygood v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 461, 56 S.E.2d 310 (1949); Browne v. Makin, 177 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1949); Carroll v. Taylor, 87 Ga. App. 815, 75 S.E.2d 346 (1953); Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Trammell Hardwood Flooring Co., 170 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Swanson v. Chase, 107 Ga. App. 295, 129 S.E.2d 873 (1963); First Nat'l Bank v. State Hwy. Dep't, 219 Ga. 144, 132 S.E.2d 263 (1963); Housing Auth. v. New, 220 Ga. 1, 136 S.E.2d 732 (1964); Smith v. Maples, 114 Ga. App. 529, 151 S.E.2d 815 (1966); State Hwy. Dep't v. Knox-Rivers Constr. Co., 117 Ga. App. 453, 160 S.E.2d 641 (1968); Fried v. Morris & Eckels Co., 118 Ga. App. 595, 164 S.E.2d 732 (1968); Turpin v. North Am. Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 212, 166 S.E.2d 588 (1969); Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Shure v. Willner & Millkey, 126 Ga. App. 368, 190 S.E.2d 620 (1972); Hardy v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 131 Ga. App. 282, 205 S.E.2d 526 (1974); Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Midtown Properties, Inc. v. George F. Richardson, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 182, 228 S.E.2d 303 (1976); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 152 Ga. App. 176, 262 S.E.2d 485 (1979); Norair Eng'r Corp. v. Erickson's, Inc., 152 Ga. App. 489, 263 S.E.2d 165 (1979); Bennett v. McGinty, 160 Ga. App. 640, 287 S.E.2d 644 (1981); Barge & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. App. 675, 288 S.E.2d 98 (1982); Stenger Indus., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 165 Ga. App. 77, 298 S.E.2d 628 (1983); International Indem. Co. v. Collins, 258 Ga. 236, 367 S.E.2d 786 (1988); Vulcan Life Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 191 Ga. App. 79, 380 S.E.2d 751 (1989); Northside Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. National Bank, 191 Ga. App. 348, 381 S.E.2d 536 (1989); Dalcor Mgt., Inc. v. Sewer Rooter, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 681, 423 S.E.2d 419 (1992); Adler v. Hertling, 215 Ga. App. 769, 451 S.E.2d 91 (1994); Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga. App. 375, 454 S.E.2d 550 (1995); T & R Custom, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 227 Ga. App. 144, 488 S.E.2d 705 (1997); Kent v. Brown, 238 Ga. App. 607, 518 S.E.2d 737 (1999); Associated Mechanical Corp. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (M.D. Ga. 1999); Colonial Bank v. Boulder Bankcard Processing, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 686, 563 S.E.2d 492 (2002); Cmty. & S. Bank v. First Bank of Dalton, 344 Ga. App. 815, 811 S.E.2d 490 (2018).

Liquidated Demands

Definition of liquidated debt.-

- Liquidation is an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of parties, or by operation of law; a sum which cannot be changed by proof; it is so much or nothing; and the term does not necessarily refer to a writing. Nisbet v. Lawson, 1 Ga. 275 (1846); Council v. Hixon, 11 Ga. App. 818, 76 S.E. 603 (1912).

A liquidated demand is an amount certain and fixed . . . a sum which cannot be changed by proof. GECC v. Strickle Properties, 861 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1988).

A liquidated sum is an amount certain and fixed, either by the act and agreement of the parties or by operation of law; a sum which cannot be changed by the proof; it is so much or nothing. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. International Ins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 357 (M.D. Ga. 1990).

Liquidated claim is for an amount certain and fixed. International Indem. Co. v. Terrell, 178 Ga. App. 570, 344 S.E.2d 239 (1986); American Family Life Assurance Co. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1989); Tower Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 423 S.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992).

Liquidated damages were damages that were in an amount that were certain and fixed, and since the trial court did not have before the court such evidence, the court erred in determining that the damages in the contract between the services provider and the corporation were liquidated, and entering a corresponding judgment. Mitchell v. Gilwil Group, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 882, 583 S.E.2d 911 (2003).

Debt is liquidated when it is certain how much is due and when it is due. Roberts v. Prior, 20 Ga. 561 (1856); Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Keeter, 167 Ga. 231, 145 S.E. 68 (1928); Continental Carriers, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 129 Ga. App. 889, 201 S.E.2d 826 (1973); B.G. Sanders & Assocs. v. Castellow, 154 Ga. App. 433, 268 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

- Certainty as to amount due and when it is due need not be contemporaneous with agreement out of which it results. Bartee v. Andrews, 18 Ga. 407 (1855); Council v. Hixon, 11 Ga. App. 818, 76 S.E. 603 (1912).

Demand for "$30,500.00 approx" did not demand liquidated damages in a fixed or certain amount. Rice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 430 S.E.2d 75 (1993).

Liquidation of claim may be achieved by agreement of parties among other methods. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cantex Mfg. Co., 262 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1958).

Trial court properly found that the liquidated damages provision of a contract was enforceable since the plaintiff 's damages would be difficult to assess with accuracy, the parties' intent was to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the amount specified was a reasonable pre-estimation of the plaintiff 's probable loss. Maz Medics, Inc. v. Satellite Adv. Sys., 194 Ga. App. 583, 391 S.E.2d 446 (1990).

Service provider was entitled to recover prejudgment interest on the liquidated damages amounts under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 because the liquidated damages were "fixed and certain" "by agreement" as provided in the statute. Sovereign Healthcare v. Mariner Health Care Mgmt. Co., 329 Ga. App. 782, 766 S.E.2d 172 (2014).

Claim which one party to transaction cannot alone render certain is unliquidated. Roberts v. Prior, 20 Ga. 561 (1856); Council v. Hixon, 11 Ga. App. 818, 76 S.E. 603 (1912); Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Keeter, 167 Ga. 231, 145 S.E. 68 (1928); Buck Creek Indus., Inc. v. Crutchfield & Co., 133 Ga. App. 80, 210 S.E.2d 32 (1974).

Claim unliquidated when there is a bona fide contention as to amount owing. Ryan v. Progressive Retailer Publishing Co., 16 Ga. App. 83, 84 S.E. 834 (1915); International Indem. Co. v. Terrell, 178 Ga. App. 570, 344 S.E.2d 239 (1986).

When there remains question of fact as to amount of money defendant owes the plaintiff, the damages are no longer liquidated, and an award of prejudgment interest would not be authorized. Spears v. Allied Eng'g Assocs., 186 Ga. App. 878, 368 S.E.2d 818 (1988).

- In a suit to collect an alleged contractual indebtedness arising from the dissolution of a partnership agreement, under which each partner would receive that partner's share of the assets of the partnership, including accounts receivable to the extent that "charges made exceeded collections credited to such charges during the 180-day period immediately preceding the date of dissolution," since the entire principal amount of the indebtedness was in dispute, it necessarily followed that no portion of the claim was liquidated and that the plaintiff was not entitled to pre-judgment interest. Arora v. Thakrar, 187 Ga. App. 170, 369 S.E.2d 524 (1988).

- When the amount of the surplus (if any) from a foreclosure sale on real estate was in dispute throughout the course of litigation (that is, it was the subject of conflicting testimony, which might be resolved only by a final court decision), this surplus figure clearly did not fall within the concept of "liquidation" under Georgia law. Walton Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ross, 736 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1984).

- Award of prejudgment interest was error when demand for damages was not liquidated because its amount could only be established by submission to a jury. Marathon Oil Co. v. Hollis, 167 Ga. App. 48, 305 S.E.2d 864 (1983); Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 927 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1991); Jennings Enters., Inc. v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 481 S.E.2d 541 (1997).

When the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for a definite sum, interest is properly allowed thereon. Thompson v. Ocmulgee Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 56 Ga. 350 (1876).

Claim resting entirely in parol may be a liquidated demand. Nisbet v. Lawson, 1 Ga. 275 (1846); Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370 (1847); Council v. Hixon, 11 Ga. App. 818, 76 S.E. 603 (1912).

Unliquidated demands arising ex delicto do not bear interest as a matter of law. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Brown, 102 Ga. 13, 29 S.E. 130 (1897).

- If interest is allowed, it is really not interest but damages and the verdict should not express damages in an aggregate sum. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Crawley, 87 Ga. 191, 13 S.E. 508 (1891).

In actions ex delicto, the jury may allow interest as part of damages. If interest is allowed it is not recoverable eo nomine and the verdict should express damages in the aggregate sum. Mayor of Milledgeville v. Stembridge, 139 Ga. 692, 78 S.E. 35 (1913).

- Claim for purchase price, when contract of sale has been fixed at definite sum, is a liquidated demand; and, in absence of proof of either contract or custom concerning payment, such purchase price is due when material is delivered and amount bears interest at legal rate from date of delivery. McCarthy v. Nixon Grocery Co., 126 Ga. 762, 56 S.E. 72 (1906); Howard Supply Co. v. Bunn, 127 Ga. 663, 56 S.E. 757 (1907); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601, 89 S.E. 680 (1916); Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Friedlander Bros., 30 Ga. App. 312, 117 S.E. 762 (1923), aff 'd, 158 Ga. 303, 122 S.E. 890 (1924); Horkan v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 211 Ga. 690, 88 S.E.2d 13 (1955); National Recording Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 112 Ga. App. 310, 145 S.E.2d 382 (1965).

When purchaser breached contract by failure to pay purchase-money on delivery of goods, the seller was entitled to recover agreed purchase-price as liquidated damages, with interest thereon from the time the purchaser was liable and bound to pay. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga. App. 630, 130 S.E. 600 (1925).

- When interest was due and payable on installments of certain paving assessments, such accrued and matured interest was a liquidated demand, and itself bore interest from its maturity at legal rate. Steele v. City of Waycross, 187 Ga. 382, 200 S.E. 704 (1938).

- Stipulation in note that interest shall be paid annually renders past due interest a liquidated demand which itself bears interest. Butler v. First Nat'l Bank, 13 Ga. App. 35, 78 S.E. 772 (1913).

- When obligation to pay interest is put in form of interest note, that note becomes a liquidated demand; and when the note is not paid at maturity the note bears interest as such, certainly if parties have contracted that the note should. Byrd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 185 Ga. 628, 196 S.E. 63 (1938).

- Note for sum payable in 18 monthly installments, but bearing no interest, is liquidated debt. Recordex Corp. v. Southeastern Metal Prods., Inc., 147 Ga. App. 79, 248 S.E.2d 159 (1978).

- See Florida Int'l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 503 S.E.2d 371 (1998).

- When note stipulates for attorney's fees in case of collection by suit, it is part of principal debt and bears interest. Baxter v. Bates, 69 Ga. 587 (1882).

- Trial court's grant of a default judgment to the appellee on the issue of the appellant's liability on a promissory note was upheld but the trial court's award of damages, interest, and attorney fees to the appellee was vacated because material conflicts in the pleadings existed that had to be resolved before the trial court could calculate the value of the stock on the day the appellee submitted the June Conversion Notice and could award that amount as damages. Pure Hospitality Solutions, Inc. v. Canouse, 347 Ga. App. 592, 820 S.E.2d 434 (2018).

- County warrant, which is a liquidated demand even though it does not express any date for payment, is as matter of law payable on demand, made five days after date on which it is issued, and will ordinarily bear interest from and after demand so made. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Debt based on published tariffs is liquidated and bears interest from the time the party becomes liable. National Carloading Corp. v. Security Van Lines, 164 Ga. App. 850, 297 S.E.2d 740 (1982).

- Action in fraud to recover a fixed amount of money lost in a fraudulently acquired loan is a liquidated demand eligible for prejudgment interest. Gorlin v. Halpern, 184 Ga. App. 10, 360 S.E.2d 729 (1987), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Burgess & Brown v. Gorlin & Long, 258 Ga. 127, 365 S.E.2d 405 (1988).

Insured's demand for payment of attorney's fees did not become liquidated until judgment because the amount of attorney's fees was not fixed and certain until that time. American Family Life Assurance Co. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1989).

- When a promissory note secured by a deed to secure debt provided for payment in a principal amount, together with interest at the rate of nine percent per annum from date until paid in full, together with all costs of collection including 15 percent as attorney's fees if collected by law or through an attorney at law, at the time of the sale of the property at a foreclosure sale after notice, the obligation to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff had become fixed and certain, and from that time forward interest on such sum began to run. Bulman v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 Ga. App. 843, 303 S.E.2d 29 (1983).

- In a case arising out of breach of a stock purchase agreement, in which the trial court ordered specific performance of the agreement for a purchase price of $1.2 million, the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13 because § 13-6-13 only allowed interest on "damages" and did not apply to specific performance. Whether the sellers were entitled to prejudgment interest on O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 (liquidated demands) was a question for the trial court on remand. Estate of Callaway v. Garner, 297 Ga. 52, 772 S.E.2d 668 (2015).

- No exclusion is made in O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 to liquidated demands underpinning a materialman's lien and prejudgment interest is not precluded merely because the aggregate amount of liens exceeds the contract price under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1. Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning, 219 Ga. App. 435, 465 S.E.2d 524 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 72, 475 S.E.2d 576 (1996).

Fact that defendant claimed a credit against undisputed specific amount that the plaintiff claimed the plaintiff was fully owed under the executed contract would not render the plaintiff's claim unliquidated. The credit only reduced the net balance on the liquidated claim; it would not render the claim unliquidated. Gold Kist Peanuts v. Alberson, 178 Ga. App. 253, 342 S.E.2d 694 (1986); Hendricks v. Blake & Pendleton, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 651, 472 S.E.2d 482 (1996).

- Taxes are not debts in ordinary sense of word so as to bear interest as liquidated demands. State v. Southwestern R.R., 70 Ga. 11 (1883).

- When a claim was undisputed, the defendant was entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent per annum from the date the debt became due and the trial court's judgment of prejudgment interest of 18% per annum was in excess of the statutorily required amount. Turner Constr. Co. v. Electrical Distribs., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 726, 415 S.E.2d 325 (1992).

Because there was no dispute about the specific amount that a realty firm was entitled to receive from the firm's owner if the firm earned the full commission set forth in the operative contracts, that amount was liquidated, and the fact that the owner offered to pay only one-half of that amount did not render the realty firm's claim unliquidated; hence, the realty firm was entitled to prejudgment interest on the unpaid commission from the date of closing. Tommy McBride Realty v. Nicholson, 286 Ga. App. 135, 648 S.E.2d 468 (2007).

Trial court erred when the court concluded upon default that only liquidated damages were involved and awarded a manufacturer damages without an evidentiary hearing in the manufacturer's breach of contract action against a distributor because the complaint did not contain sufficient information to allow the trial court to ascertain the amount owed under the contract and that the amount was fixed and certain; the trial court could not properly award damages and pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 to the manufacturer without an evidentiary hearing because the manufacturer's complaint did not show that the manufacturer's claims were for liquidated damages. Kitchen Int'l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 310 Ga. App. 648, 714 S.E.2d 139 (2011).

Plaintiff's claim for statutory interest was improperly denied as sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiff's breach of contract claim against the Georgia Lottery Corporation and, thus, it did not bar the award of prejudgment interest in the plaintiff's breach of contract action; however, whether the plaintiff made a sufficient demand for prejudgment interest and was otherwise entitled to recover interest were questions to be resolved on remand. Patel v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 350 Ga. App. 883, 830 S.E.2d 393 (2019).

When the plaintiff sued the Georgia Lottery Corporation for breach of contract after the Corporation denied the plaintiff's claim for a $5,000,000 lottery prize, because the amount due on the lottery ticket was fixed, the damages sought were liquidated, and O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 was applicable to the award of prejudgment interest; however, whether the plaintiff made a sufficient demand for prejudgment interest and was otherwise entitled to recover interest were questions to be resolved on remand. Patel v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 350 Ga. App. 883, 830 S.E.2d 393 (2019).

- Because the amount due on a note and a personal guaranty was ascertainable under their instrumental terms, the damages sought were liquidated. Consulting Constr. Corp. v. Edwards, 207 Ga. App. 296, 427 S.E.2d 789 (1993).

Open accounts bear interest from due date, at which time the accounts are considered liquidated demands. Intercompany Servs. Corp. v. Kleeb, 140 Ga. App. 512, 231 S.E.2d 505 (1976).

Account not liquidated demand until amount due is expressly or impliedly fixed and determined. Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Friedlander Bros., 30 Ga. App. 312, 117 S.E. 762 (1923), aff 'd, 158 Ga. 303, 122 S.E. 890 (1924); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Folds, 42 Ga. App. 306, 155 S.E. 782 (1930); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 53 Ga. App. 638, 186 S.E. 706 (1936).

Assent to correctness of open accounts makes the accounts liquidated demands. Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370 (1847); Kelley & McWilliams v. Terhune, Nixon & Co., 113 Ga. 365, 38 S.E. 839 (1901); Council v. Hixon, 11 Ga. App. 818, 76 S.E. 603 (1912). But see Fell v. Abbot, 1 Ga. Rpt. Ann. (R.M.C. 452) 278 (1835).

- Verbal acknowledgment of indebtedness on open account accompanied by promise to pay does not constitute a liquidated demand. Fell v. Abbot, 1 Ga. Rpt. Ann. (R.M.C. 452) 278 (1835).

- Acknowledgment of open account by letter is such a liquidation of demand as will enable creditor to obtain interest from date of acknowledgment. Hicks v. Thomas, 1 Ga. Rpt. Ann. (Dud. 218) 472 (1825).

- When decedent in decedent's lifetime assented to correctness of account rendered decedent it became after such assent, a liquidated demand. Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370 (1847); Bartee v. Andrews, 18 Ga. 407 (1855); Kelley & McWilliams v. Terhune, Nixon & Co., 113 Ga. 365, 38 S.E. 839 (1901).

Written guarantee to pay future indebtedness of another, on open account, is not liquidated. Hargroves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321 (1854).

Insurance

Policy not liquidated demand until amount of loss and liability established.

- Fire insurance policies which insure against all direct loss or damage by fire to an amount not exceeding named sums are not themselves liquidated demands, nor is there originally any amount ascertained payable under those policies. The process of adjustment may result in ascertainment of amount of loss, though liability be denied, in which case interest may be recovered when liability is established. Merchants Ins. Co. v. Lilgeomont, Inc., 84 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1936).

In a suit on a property damage insurance policy (e.g., fire, lightning, windstorm, etc.), when liability is not disputed but when the amount of damage is disputed, the amount is unliquidated. Braner v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117, 335 S.E.2d 547 (1985).

In a suit against an insurer under a policy covering rugs, because there was a bona fide dispute between the parties as to the extent of water damage to the rugs that was not resolved until trial, it was only after entry of the judgment that the claim became liquidated, and the trial court did not err in denying an award of prejudgment interest on that claim. Holloway v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 245 Ga. App. 319, 537 S.E.2d 121 (2000).

- It is the general rule that interest is recoverable on a loss by fire from time when amount payable has been made certain and has become due. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Folds, 42 Ga. App. 306, 155 S.E. 782 (1930); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 53 Ga. App. 638, 186 S.E. 706 (1936).

- Claim for face amount of fire insurance policy on dwelling is to be deemed fixed, certain, and determined under contract, so as to authorize interest thereon, when loss was admittedly total, and insurance company neither prior to nor in action on policy in any way questioned the amount, but based its sole defense on alleged forfeiture of policy by breaches of its conditions. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 51 Ga. App. 625, 181 S.E. 101 (1935).

When jury was authorized to find that an insurance company agreed to pay the full face amount of the policy covering undisputed total loss, the verdict was not illegal because the verdict included interest. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co. v. McRoberts, 50 Ga. App. 732, 179 S.E. 256 (1934).

- Demand of employer against insurance company under "Employers' Liability Policy," for loss or damage sustained by the employer by reason of a judgment (together with the cost and expenses thereof) recovered by an employee accidentally injured, is a liquidated demand upon which interest may be claimed. Georgia Iron & Coal Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 133 Ga. 326, 65 S.E. 775 (1909).

- Insurer is indebted for prejudgment interest at the legal rate on optional no-fault benefits, from the date of demand until the date of tender, less the 30-day statutory exclusion under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-6(b). International Indem. Co. v. Enfinger, 181 Ga. App. 420, 352 S.E.2d 575 (1986), aff'd, 257 Ga. 385, 359 S.E.2d 884 (1987).

O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 is inapplicable to prejudgment interest on life insurance proceeds. Southwestern Life v. Middle Ga. Neurological, 262 Ga. 273, 416 S.E.2d 496 (1992).

O.C.G.A. § 33-25-10 governs the entitlement to prejudgment interest on life insurance proceeds and does not require the payment of prejudgment interest when the insured dies within 12 months of issuance of the policy. O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 is inapplicable to prejudgment interest on life insurance proceeds. Middle Ga. Neurological Specialists v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1992).

- When an insurer had to pay the insured because of the agent's negligence in binding a risk not within insurer's guidelines, prejudgment interest was appropriate given the fact that the amount in dispute had been at all times certain and fixed, and there has been no dispute over whether the sums paid to insured were excessive or in any other way inappropriate. Valiant Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 665 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Ga. 1987).

- When an insurance company was awarded damages for fraudulent claims submitted by the owner of an insured in the amount of the fraudulent claims on which the company paid, the company was entitled to prejudgment interest on the award of damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 because the award was fixed and certain, but was not entitled to interest on its claims for punitive damages and attorney fees because such claims were unliquidated. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Porter (In re Porter), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 23, 2007).

- Damages for cargo stolen from an insured's truck were liquidated under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 because the insured presented the invoice price of the stolen cargo at trial, and it was undisputed that the total cargo was lost; the insurer did not contest the amount of the invoices or present an alternate calculation of the amount. The insurer was therefore liable for prejudgment interest on the liquidated amount. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc., 300 Ga. App. 715, 686 S.E.2d 333 (2009).

Interest is recoverable from date when amount of claim has been liquidated and determined. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Folds, 42 Ga. App. 306, 155 S.E. 782 (1930).

- Trial court properly granted a title insurance company's motion for directed verdict as to the insured's claim for prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 because damages were properly argued and precedent has established that when on entering upon trial the insurer disputes the amount of loss claimed by the insured, interest on the amount recovered begins after entry of judgment. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. RM Kids, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 638, 788 S.E.2d 542 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1843, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 117 (Ga. 2017).

Prejudgment interest on liquidated demands accrues from the time of demand. International Indem. Co. v. Terrell, 178 Ga. App. 570, 344 S.E.2d 239 (1986).

When a guardian disputed whether the guardian was owed commissions for stocks and bonds under former O.C.G.A. § 29-2-42(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 29-5-50), not the amount paid for such commissions, the estate's administrator was entitled to prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15; the fact that the guardian disputed liability at trial did not convert the claim into a claim for an uncertain and, therefore, unliquidated amount. In re Estate of Miraglia, 290 Ga. App. 28, 658 S.E.2d 777 (2008).

- When a promissory note calls for payment of the principal at a fixed time and for payment of interest on the principal at fixed times during the term of the note, the failure to pay the interest when due renders the past due interest a liquidated demand which would itself bear interest prior to judgment. Bryant v. Kenerly, 238 Ga. App. 153, 518 S.E.2d 172 (1999).

Rate of prejudgment interest payable on past due interest is determined by the note if the note provides for the interest to be charged on past due interest, but if no such provision is made, then the applicable statutory rate of interest would control. Bryant v. Kenerly, 238 Ga. App. 153, 518 S.E.2d 172 (1999).

Award of interest on past due interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 is subject to the limitation that, in the absence of a contrary agreement, no such interest on interest may be awarded when the interest installments mature after the principal itself has fallen due. Bryant v. Kenerly, 238 Ga. App. 153, 518 S.E.2d 172 (1999).

- When amount for which recovery is sought, even though not liquidated, is based upon readily ascertainable value of services or property, the general and better considered rule is to allow interest, at least in absence of strong equities to the contrary. Erickson's Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 330 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ga. 1971), aff 'd, 454 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S. Ct. 51, 34 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972).

- Court does not err in instructing the jury that the jury may award interest from the time of the theft of a bailed good until trial when the jury finds that the sum awarded is a liquidated sum. Wheels & Brakes, Inc. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 532, 307 S.E.2d 13 (1983).

- Though interest on unpaid wages was not expressly claimed, jury could allow interest from time wages became due according to terms of contract for amount of money wages was liquidated by contract, and would bear interest from time payment ought to have been made. Ansley v. Jordan, 61 Ga. 482 (1878).

There is a definite contractual relation between every employee and employer, whether the employee is a public officer or not, which entitles the employee to payment of the employee's salary, and when demand is made therefor and refused, the court may award interest on the salary. Undercofler v. Scott, 220 Ga. 406, 139 S.E.2d 299 (1964).

- Interest upon valid subsisting obligation of county is of same nature as principal, and is collectible upon same terms and in same manner as principal. Hartley v. Nash, 157 Ga. 402, 121 S.E. 295 (1924).

- When one fraudulently sold land which one did not own and received part of purchase money, the buyer would be entitled to recover interest on sum so paid from date of payment; if no fraud, interest from date of demand for repayment of money; and if no fraud and no demand, interest from date of filing plea of set-off. Phillips v. O'Neil, 85 Ga. 142, 11 S.E. 581 (1890).

- Fair rule to be applied in building contracts is to ascertain the stated debt due at a certain time and deduct therefrom a reasonable amount for remedying defects. The former should bear interest from the date it is ascertained or demanded; the latter should bear interest only from the time the dispute is resolved, even if it is at trial. J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Greenbriar Shopping Ctr., 332 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff 'd, 461 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1972).

- Orders absolute given by inferior courts of counties in this state for payment of money to persons in liquidation of debts due by those courts draw interest just as other liquidated demands do. State ex rel. Greer v. Speer, 33 Ga. 93 (1864).

- When payment of funds to rightful owner is prohibited by court order or by garnishment proceeding, interest does not accrue until order or garnishment has been dissolved. Cochran v. Bank of Hancock County, 118 Ga. App. 100, 162 S.E.2d 765 (1968).

- When promissory note specifies that stated sum "without interest" is to be paid on certain date, phrase "without interest" refers only to time between execution of note and date of maturity as interest will accrue from date holder has right to make demand for payment. Jenkins v. Morgan, 100 Ga. App. 561, 112 S.E.2d 23 (1959).

- Having found there was no jury issue as to whether the buyers owed the earnest money payment plus interest to sellers under the contract, as well as under principles of promissory estoppel, the trial court erred in failing to award such interest for the period money was due until final judgment. Ware v. Renfroe, 231 Ga. App. 529, 499 S.E.2d 907 (1998).

Cash sale of property bears interest from date, although day of payment may be postponed until a particular event transpires. Parke v. Foster, 26 Ga. 465, 71 Am. Dec. 221 (1858).

Rent obligation which is certain and payable on a day certain bears interest therefrom at rate imposed by law if contract is silent as to rate. In re Cent. of Ga. Ry., 47 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Ga. 1942).

Interest for remaindermen does not run until death of tenant for life, the estate being in money. McCook v. Harp, 81 Ga. 229, 7 S.E. 174 (1888).

- When cash award of year's support to widow could not be paid until four years after judgment, the widow was entitled to interest from the date of judgment. Clark v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 182 Ga. 472, 185 S.E. 716 (1936).

Factor entitled to interest upon draft paid upon faith of produce which was never received. Field & Adams v. Reid, 21 Ga. 314 (1857); Howard v. Behn & Foster, 27 Ga. 174 (1859).

- One who has fraudulently received or wrongfully detained money of another is chargeable with interest thereon from the time the person received the money. Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370 (1847).

- Agent who admits money in agent's hands belonging to agent's principal is liable for interest thereon from time the agent received the money. Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370 (1847).

- When one partner misapplies partnership funds to the partner's own use, that partner will be held liable for the misapplication, with interest thereon from time of such misapplication. Solomon v. Solomon, 2 Ga. 18 (1847).

- When interest is computed on amount which condemnee must refund to condemnor, interest is computed only from the date of adjudication of the principal amount. State Hwy. Dep't v. Rogers, 118 Ga. App. 626, 165 S.E.2d 172 (1968).

- When there was no evidence in the record of any demand upon surety of tax commissioner prior to the date of execution, an execution against the surety could not properly be issued for interest alleged to have accrued prior to the date thereof. Keen v. Lewis, 215 Ga. 166, 109 S.E.2d 764 (1959).

- Former Code 1933, § 23-1608 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-11-5) assumed that the county treasurer would pay the warrant when payment was demanded, and if the treasurer failed to do so, the section contemplated that interest would run by virtue of former Code 1933, §§ 57-101 and 57-110 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-2 and7-4-15) from the date of demand. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

- When bank became insolvent and was taken in charge for liquidation by superintendent of banks for this state, and one had claim to funds held for it by bank which was afterwards adjudicated to be a preferred claim for a specified sum, and when, after final adjudication in favor of standing of claim as a preferred claim, the superintendent of banks paid over amount of principal to the claimant, mandamus would not lie to compel the superintendent to pay interest accruing on amount of preferred claim after the superintendent took charge of such bank since the fund had not produced interest. Macon Grocery Co. v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 185, 162 S.E. 711 (1931).

- Award of prejudgment interest was proper in a hospital's breach of contract action, wherein the hospital was awarded judgment in the hospital's favor on a claim for recovery of monies due that had been loaned to a doctor, who did not repay the full sum; pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-15 and13-6-13, when the balance was a liquidated amount, as here, the court was authorized to award prejudgment interest. Walker v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 263 Ga. App. 554, 588 S.E.2d 441 (2003).

- In breach of contract action brought by attorney to recover legal fees from a client, attorney was entitled to prejudgment interest on one-third of the cash settlement as of the date the client received a settlement check; the contract was clear that the attorney was entitled to the cash settlement and when the client received the settlement check, the attorney's one-third share of the cash payment was liquidated and due. Hardnett v. Ogundele, 291 Ga. App. 241, 661 S.E.2d 627 (2008).

Effect of Tender

Tender to prevent running of interest must be continuing.

- Using money after refusal by creditor to receive the money destroys this necessary attribute of a legal tender. Fortson v. Strickland, 23 Ga. App. 607, 99 S.E. 147 (1919).

- Formal tender of payment of note was in effect waived by a statement on the part of the plaintiff, when the defendant offered to pay the note, that amount due thereon would not be accepted unless amount due on former note was also paid, and the plaintiff could not recover interest from that time on the first mentioned note. Washington Exch. Bank v. Smith, 23 Ga. App. 356, 98 S.E. 418 (1919), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Ga. 650, 101 S.E. 769 (1920).

When proof of tender is insufficient, note bears interest after maturity. Dumas v. Pepper, 43 Ga. 361 (1871).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 44B Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury, § 36.

- 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 82, 231, 301. 47 C.J.S., Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit, § 42 et seq.

- Right to interest for period before advances under a loan to be advanced to the borrower in installments, 40 A.L.R. 825.

Time from which interest is recoverable on demand note or like demand instrument containing no provision as to interest, 45 A.L.R.2d 1202.