2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 2 - Imputable Negligence
§ 51-2-5. Liability for Negligence of Contractor

An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor:

1. When the work is wrongful in itself or, if done in the ordinary manner, would result in a nuisance;
2. If, according to the employer's previous knowledge and experience, the work to be done is in its nature dangerous to others however carefully performed;
3. If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by express contract upon the employer;
4. If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute;
5. If the employer retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work or interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and servant or so that an injury results which is traceable to his interference; or
6. If the employer ratifies the unauthorized wrong of the independent contractor.

(Civil Code 1895, § 3819; Civil Code 1910, § 4415; Code 1933, § 105-502.)

- Liability of principal contractor or subcontractor for injuries suffered by employees engaged in working upon subject matter of contract, § 34-9-8.

- For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982). For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004). For annual survey of real property law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2005). For annual survey of law on labor and employment law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 181 (2010). For annual survey on construction law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2017). For comment criticizing Dekle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 208 Ga. 254, 66 S.E.2d 218 (1951), holding defendant not liable for negligence of independent contractor since excavating public street is not inherently dangerous as a matter of law, see 14 Ga. B. J. 228 (1951). For comment on Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 648, 188 S.E.2d 911 (1972), holding employer defendant may not use independent contractor defense to invasion of privacy suit resulting from actions of investigator working in his behalf, see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 519 (1973). For comment on Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979), discussing federal government's duty of care to employees of an independent contractor, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1095 (1980).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Other Specific Cases
• Applicability to Construction

General Consideration

Applicability.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 51-2-4 and51-2-5 limit an employer's vicarious liability only and do not apply to a claim arising from the employer's own conduct. England v. Beers Constr. Co., 224 Ga. App. 44, 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996).

- Independent contractor is person employed to perform work on terms that the contractor is to be free from the control of the employer as respects the manner in which the details of the work are to be executed. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

Employer is not liable for torts committed by an independent contractor, unless the work is in itself unlawful or attended with danger to others, or the wrongful act consists in the violation of a duty imposed by the employer, or is in violation of a duty imposed by statute, or the employer interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and servant, or ratifies the unauthorized wrong of the independent contractor. Massee & Felton Lumber Co. v. Macon Cooperage Co., 44 Ga. App. 590, 162 S.E. 396 (1932).

When an individual or corporation contracts with another individual or corporation, exercising an independent employment, for the latter to do a work not in itself unlawful or attended with danger to others, such work to be done and according to the contractor's own methods, and not subject to the employer's control or orders, except as to results to be obtained, the employer is not liable for the wrongful or negligent acts of the contractor or the contractor's servants. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

Person employing another to do a lawful act is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have employed one to do it in a lawful and reasonable manner; and, therefore, unless the parties stand in the relation of master and servant, the employer is not responsible for damages occasioned by the negligent mode in which the work is done. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

Absent an express contractual duty, a general contractor cannot be held liable for damage caused by the collateral torts of independent contractors. Faubion v. Piedmont Eng'g & Constr. Corp., 178 Ga. App. 256, 342 S.E.2d 718 (1986).

When a nonprofit corporation which encourages industrial and business development retained the right to approve a soils testing firm and to direct a general contractor when to begin construction, the retained rights did not constitute such control as to render the corporation liable. Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., 195 Ga. App. 195, 393 S.E.2d 44 (1990).

Trial court did not err in finding that a power company was not liable to an injured employee of a contractor hired by the power company under the theory that cutting timber by hand was inherently dangerous as the employee did not establish that the contractor's negligence led to the employee's injury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5; while the employee's experts testified that the contractor's safety program was lacking, the record did not show that any inadequacy in the safety program caused the employee's injury. Rayburn v. Ga. Power Co., 284 Ga. App. 131, 643 S.E.2d 385 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 507 (Ga. 2007).

In a wrongful death action premised on both negligence and negligence per se filed on behalf of a mother's deceased minor son, a premises owner was properly granted summary judgment as the independent contractor that hired the decedent, and not the premises owner, had sole control over its personnel, and the son's hazardous occupation on the owner's premises for a third party did not in and of itself demonstrate that the owner was in violation of Georgia's child labor laws; thus, the appeals court declined to reach the issue of whether an owner who knew or had reason to know that its independent contractor was employing a minor under the age of 16 to perform a dangerous occupation on the owner's premises was in violation of O.C.G.A. § 39-2-2. Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 579, 651 S.E.2d 839 (2007).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a home seller in an action filed by the buyers against the seller alleging negligence and a breach of contract; notwithstanding the general rule outlined in O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4, the seller could not escape liability for the alleged negligence by two of the seller's contractors in grading the property and installing the home because the seller assumed that responsibility under the sales contract. French v. Sinclair-Oconee Homes of Milledgeville, LLC, 289 Ga. App. 696, 658 S.E.2d 226 (2008).

- One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by the employer's servants is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them personally or by the employer's servants. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Principal may employ an agent and permit employment by the agent of subagents or servants to aid the agent in carrying on the business, without becoming liable for the acts of the subagents or servants. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Veal, 51 Ga. App. 755, 181 S.E. 705 (1935).

Employer of independent contractor may be liable to employees of independent contractor for own wrongful acts. Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979).

- Employer has the right to presume that the independent contractor will do the work in a prudent and proper manner. Dekle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 208 Ga. 254, 66 S.E.2d 218 (1951).

Employer has right to rely on presumption that contractor will discharge the contractor's legal duties owing to the contractor's employees and third persons. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

- Georgia law imposes liability on an employer for the torts of an independent contractor only when a duty imposed by statute, and not under common law, has been violated. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979).

Exceptions to the rule that only the master of a servant could be held liable for the servant's negligence are set forth in this section providing that in certain cases the employer of a contractor may be held liable for the negligence of the contractor, or the contractor's employees. Peabody Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga. App. 240, 94 S.E.2d 156 (1956).

General rule, absent any of the exceptions embodied in this section, is that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the contractor's negligence. McEntyre v. Clack, 104 Ga. App. 646, 122 S.E.2d 595 (1961).

Rule in employer-independent contractor situations is one of no liability on the part of the employer, unless some of the rule's recognized exceptions as set out in this section are met. Moore v. J.C. Penney Co., 107 Ga. App. 254, 129 S.E.2d 538 (1963).

- O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 does not represent an exclusive list of exceptions to the limitation of liability contained in O.C.G.A § 51-2-4. Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985).

- Responsibility of a general contractor is not unlimited, but the contractor is liable for the negligence of the subcontractor under any one of the alternative circumstances set forth in this section. Harrison & Ellis, Inc. v. Nashville Milling Co., 156 Ga. App. 697, 275 S.E.2d 374 (1980).

- One who carries on an independent business and who contracts with another to perform services, being answerable only for the result and not being under the control of the employer as to the time, manner, or method of doing the work, is an independent contractor for whose torts the other contracting party is not liable except in a few stated exceptions, such as those involving a nondelegable duty ensuing from work which according to previous knowledge and experience is by its nature dangerous to others, however carefully performed. St. Paul Cos. v. Capitol Office Supply Co., 158 Ga. App. 748, 282 S.E.2d 205 (1981).

Although exculpatory clauses signed by a pilot and a safety pilot who flew an aircraft company's plane and engaged in simulated aerial combat were not against public policy under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7, the clauses were not enforceable if the company was found to have been grossly negligent or to have engaged in willful misconduct, which was an issue to be resolved by the jury; additionally, a jury issue remained as to whether one of the pilots was an independent contractor for purposes of the company's liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5) and, accordingly, a grant of summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to the company was error. McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 750, 603 S.E.2d 7 (2004).

- Test to be applied in determining the relationship of the parties under the contract lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time and manner of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require results in conformity to the contract. Massee & Felton Lumber Co. v. Macon Cooperage Co., 44 Ga. App. 590, 162 S.E. 396 (1932); Yearwood v. Peabody, 45 Ga. App. 451, 164 S.E. 901 (1932); Cooper v. Dixie Constr. Co., 45 Ga. App. 420, 165 S.E. 152 (1932); Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934); Whitehall Chevrolet Co. v. Anderson, 53 Ga. App. 406, 186 S.E. 135 (1936); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Clements, 53 Ga. App. 622, 186 S.E. 764 (1936); De Bord v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 58 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ga. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1944); Morris v. Constitution Publishing Co., 84 Ga. App. 816, 67 S.E.2d 407 (1951); Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953); Weiss v. Kling, 96 Ga. App. 618, 101 S.E.2d 178 (1957); Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Savannah Elec. & Power Co. v. Edenfield, 118 Ga. App. 531, 164 S.E.2d 366 (1968); Hotel Storage, Inc. v. Fesler, 120 Ga. App. 672, 172 S.E.2d 174 (1969); Smith v. Poteet, 127 Ga. App. 735, 195 S.E.2d 213 (1972); Farmers Mut. Exch. of Commerce, Inc. v. Sisk, 131 Ga. App. 206, 205 S.E.2d 438 (1974); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974); Buchanan v. Canada Dry Corp., 138 Ga. App. 588, 226 S.E.2d 613 (1976); Jones v. International Inventors, Inc. E., 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Hodges v. Doctors Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649, 234 S.E.2d 116 (1977); Sloan v. Hobbs Sporting Goods Shop, 145 Ga. App. 255, 243 S.E.2d 673 (1978); Walton v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Dennis v. Malt, 196 Ga. App. 263, 395 S.E.2d 894 (1990).

One who caused work to be done is liable for the acts of employees of an independent contractor since the resulting injury, instead of being collateral and flowing from the negligent act of the employee alone, is one that might have been anticipated as a direct or probable consequence of the performance of the work if reasonable case was omitted in the course of the performance. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

When one contracts with an individual exercising an independent employment, for one to do a work not in itself unlawful or attended with danger to others, such work to be done according to the contractor's own methods, and not subject to the employer's control or orders, except as to results to be obtained, the employer is not liable for the wrongful or negligent acts of such independent contractor or the contractor's servants. This rule is applicable under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

Undoubtedly one cannot shield oneself under the doctrine of independent contractors by simply employing another person, and giving that person a general authority to procure others to assist in work which requires no care or skill or experience, but which is merely such as might be done by any person with sufficient physical strength. Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S.E. 741 (1934).

If the act or negligence which produces the injury is purely collateral to the work contracted to be done, and is entirely the result of the wrongful acts of the contractor or the contractor's workers the rule is that the employer is not liable. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

Instructions such as giving a deadline for performance or requiring that work be completed at night or before the opening of business each day do not amount to control over the time of the work because the instructions do not purport to control specifically when any particular duties were to be performed. Adcox v. Atlanta Bldg. Maint. Co., 301 Ga. App. 74, 687 S.E.2d 137 (2009).

Evidence created a genuine dispute as to whether the realtor was an independent contractor of the corporation because the Federal National Mortgage Association's (Fannie Mae) contract was with the corporation, not the realtor, and Fannie Mae's master listing agreement with the corporation required the corporation to exercise considerable control over the time, manner, and method of the realtor's work, mandated that the corporation and its subcontractors comply with the requirements of Fannie Mae's sales guide, and held the corporation responsible for its subcontractors and personnel. Mwangi v. Fannie Mae, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1403 (N.D. Ga. 2016).

Controlling question is not whether employer actually did assume control of manner of doing work, but whether one had right to do so under contract. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934); Savannah Elec. & Power Co. v. Edenfield, 118 Ga. App. 531, 164 S.E.2d 366 (1968); Hodges v. Doctors Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649, 234 S.E.2d 116 (1977).

Fact that a contractor employs, controls, and assumes entire charge over the contractor's workers and that the employer neither has nor exercises any control, has, by many courts, including the courts of this state, been held practically decisive of the question of the independence of the contract. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

Main consideration in the definition of master and servant is the right of the employer to control the activities of the employee in the employment duties. Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801, 92 S.E.2d 871 (1956).

Specialization alone is not infallible test in determining whether one is servant or independent contractor. Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953).

Employer is not liable when nuisance was created, when right to inspect work before acceptance was provided for. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hughes, 134 Ga. 75, 67 S.E. 542 (1910).

Test under paragraph (1) of this section is would a nuisance result if work is done in the ordinary manner. Test is not would a nuisance result if the work is done in a careless and negligent manner. The nonliability of the employer would be abrogated if the law were to place an absolute duty on the employer to guard against injuries which might result from the negligence of the independent contractor in the performance of the stipulated work. Dekle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 208 Ga. 254, 66 S.E.2d 218 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985).

Paragraph (2) of this section holds employer liable only when work to be done is inherently dangerous however carefully done, not merely because of the absence of proper care. Pressley v. Wilson, 116 Ga. App. 206, 156 S.E.2d 399 (1967).

- When the work done is inherently dangerous, or involves peculiar risk of bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken, this duty is nondelegable and the employer is liable for negligence of the contractor which produces a result falling short of what it was the employer's duty to attain. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952).

When the employer of an independent contractor procures the latter to perform an act which, according to previous knowledge and experience, is in its nature dangerous to others, however carefully performed, the negligence of the independent contractor proximately resulting in the injuries and occurring in the course of the prosecution of the execution of the act which one was employed to perform is imputable to the contractor; the duty on the part of such contractor to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to others is nondelegable when according to previous knowledge and experience the work to be done is in its nature dangerous to others however carefully performed. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952).

Proprietor, landlord, owner, employer, or contractor, in dealing with an independent contractor or subcontractor, has certain duties relating to the exercise of reasonable care in work which from one's knowledge and experience is known to be intrinsically dangerous, which duties are nondelegable. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952); Georgia Indus. Realty Co. v. Maddox, 91 Ga. App. 565, 86 S.E.2d 628 (1955).

One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer: (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions; or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions. Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).

- When the work to be done is dangerous only because of the absence of proper care, the doctrine of nonresponsibility for the negligence of the independent contractor may apply, but if the work is dangerous in itself unless reasonable care is taken to render it harmless, this doctrine does not apply. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952).

When the work is not inherently dangerous except as a result of the negligence of the contractor, the employer is not liable. Mason v. Gracey, 189 Ga. App. 150, 375 S.E.2d 283 (1988).

Work is not "dangerous to others however carefully performed" if danger results from doing work in unsafe manner and there is safe way of doing work. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970); Horn v. C.L. Osborn Contracting Co., 591 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33155 (5th Cir. 2018).

When it is undisputed that there are several safe ways of doing the work, it is not inherently dangerous, and is not "in its nature dangerous to others, however carefully performed" within the meaning of this section so as to charge an employer with the duty of providing a subcontractor's employee a safe place to work. Horn v. C.L. Osborn Contracting Co., 591 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33155 (5th Cir. 2018).

Past knowledge and experience is gauge by which to measure dangerous nature of work to be done. Dekle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 208 Ga. 254, 66 S.E.2d 218 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985).

Purpose of inherently dangerous work doctrine is to allow a plaintiff to bring employer in as another defendant, not to take the independent contractor out of the case by relieving it of various liability. Berry v. Cordell, 120 Ga. App. 844, 172 S.E.2d 848 (1969).

Paragraph (3) of this section renders employer liable for negligence of contractor when wrongful act is violation of duty imposed by express contract upon the employer. However, unless the parties stand in the relation of master and servant, the employer is not responsible for the damages occasioned by the negligent mode in which work is done. Fields v. B & B Pipeline Co., 147 Ga. App. 875, 250 S.E.2d 582 (1978); PYA/Monarch, Inc. v. Higley, 219 Ga. App. 199, 464 S.E.2d 630 (1995).

When a contract between an employer and an independent contractor incorporates federal safety regulations promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., the employer is liable under paragraph (3) of this section for any violation of such regulations proximately causing an injury to an employee of the independent contractor. Horn v. C.L. Osborn Contracting Co., 591 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33155 (5th Cir. 2018).

Paragraph (3) of this section allows injured individual to ground the individual's argument on contract provision contained in a contract between the owner and the general contractor even when the actual breach of the provision is caused by the subcontractor not a party to the contract.

- It is not sufficient, in order to bring case within exception set forth in paragraph (3), to merely allege facts which show violation of legal duty common to all people. Rodgers v. Styles, 100 Ga. App. 124, 110 S.E.2d 582 (1959).

One charged by law with performance of absolute duties cannot, by delegating performance to independent contractor, escape liability for nonperformance. Southern Ry. v. Brooks, 112 Ga. App. 324, 145 S.E.2d 76 (1965).

In determining whether person is independent contractor or employee, courts have applied standard laid down in paragraph (5) of this section. Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801, 92 S.E.2d 871 (1956).

- This section provides for liability of the employer of an independent contractor for the negligence of the contractor, and apparently for the employer's own negligence also, if the employer interferes and assumes control so that an injury results which is traceable to the employer's interference. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970).

Owner does not assume control of the work when the contract stipulates that the work is subject to the supervision of an architect. Lampton v. Cedartown Co., 6 Ga. App. 147, 64 S.E. 495 (1909); Malin v. City Council, 29 Ga. App. 393, 115 S.E. 504 (1923).

Terms of this section require both interference with and assumption of control of some aspect of operation to which injury is traceable. The interference and assumption of control need not be of a degree great enough to create the relation of master and servant so long as the injury is traceable to the interference. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970).

- When one is employed generally to perform certain services for another, and there is no specific contract to do a certain piece of work according to specifications for a stipulated sum, it is inferable that the employer has retained the right to control the manner, method, and means of the performance of the contract, and that the employee is not an independent contractor. Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S.E. 741 (1934).

Ground upon which some decisions may have been said to have proceeded was that, in view of the humble industrial status of the person employed and the simple charter of the work to be done, the only admissible inference was that the employers intended to retain the right to give direction in regard to details of the work. Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S.E. 741 (1934).

- If there is a specific contract to do a certain piece of work according to specifications for a stipulated sum, it is inferable that the employer has not retained the right to control the manner, method, and means of the performance of the contract, and that the employee is an independent contractor. Smith v. Poteet, 127 Ga. App. 735, 195 S.E.2d 213 (1972).

- Act of the employer in identifying the work, or pointing out to the contractor where the work is to be performed, is not an interference with, or direction of or control of, the manner of the work's execution. Edmondson v. Town of Morven, 41 Ga. App. 209, 152 S.E. 280 (1930); Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952); DeLoach v. Thelen, 233 Ga. 350, 211 S.E.2d 304 (1974).

When a corporation contracts with another to do work under a contract whereby the work is to be done according to the contractor's own methods, and not subject to the employers' control or orders except as to the results to be obtained, the employer is not liable for the wrongful or negligent acts of such independent contractor or of the contractor's servants, and the mere fact that the employer may have had an agent to supervise the work for the purpose of seeing that it was done in accordance with the contract, without interfering with the methods or means of executing the work, would not amount to such control or direction of the work as would render the employer responsible. Mount v. Southern Ry., 42 Ga. App. 546, 156 S.E. 701 (1931).

Right of the employer to exercise a certain control over the work, where the control reserved does not apply to the manner of doing the details of the work, and does not thereby take the work out of the hands of the contractor, but goes merely to a general supervision to ensure that the ends prescribed by the contract shall be substantially met, does not destroy the independence of the relation. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

There is in all agreements to do specific work for another the necessary and implied power in the person for whom the work is to be done to supervise the work, to see that the desired results are attained, and to reject all products that do not come up to specifications, but this control would not charge the relation of employer and independent contractor into that of master and servant. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

If relationship of employer and independent contractor is established, merely taking steps to see that the contractor carries out the contractor's agreement, by supervision of the intermediate results obtained, or reserving the right of dismissal on grounds of incompetence, is not such interference and assumption of control as will render the employer liable for the torts of the contractor. American Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 89 Ga. App. 672, 80 S.E.2d 832 (1954).

When there exists only the right under the contract to superintend the work to the end that the desired results contracted for are obtained and there is no right nor assumption of the right to control the manner in which it is done the relationship is that of an independent contractor. Helms v. Young, 130 Ga. App. 344, 203 S.E.2d 253 (1973).

Contract that gave the building owner the right to ensure that the general contractor's work conformed to the contract drawings and specifications and the general right to order the work stopped or resumed, inspect its progress, or prescribe alterations and deviations, and also allowed the owner to dismiss any person who was unfit or unskilled and restricted the contractor's right to terminate the job-site supervisor without the owner's consent did not give the owner control over the work of the general contractor or subcontractors. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Maxwell, 219 Ga. App. 211, 464 S.E.2d 639 (1995).

When injury results directly from acts which contractor agrees to and is authorized to do, person who employs contractor is equally liable to the injured party. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

It is true that ordinarily the principal or employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor but the rule is entirely different when the principal employs an independent contractor to perform a job which is itself wrongful or ratifies the unauthorized wrong of the independent contractor. Azar v. GMAC, 134 Ga. App. 176, 213 S.E.2d 500 (1975).

Ordinarily, in order to ratify act, one must have knowledge of act. Southern Mills, Inc. v. Newton, 91 Ga. App. 738, 87 S.E.2d 109 (1955).

- Mere proof of the completion of the job, without any other facts in evidence, will not amount to a ratification. Hickman v. Toole, 31 Ga. App. 230, 120 S.E. 438 (1923).

Ratification of wrongful act may result from acceptance of work on the theory that acceptance shifts the responsibility for maintaining the work in the work's defective condition to the employer. Southern Mills, Inc. v. Newton, 91 Ga. App. 738, 87 S.E.2d 109 (1955); Wilmock, Inc. v. French, 185 Ga. App. 259, 363 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 363 S.E.2d 789 (1987); Jenkins v. Georgia Power Co., 849 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S. Ct. 789, 102 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1989).

Acceptance of benefits will not ratify independent collateral tort committed in procuring the benefit as the ratification must be, not of the contract, but of the unauthorized wrong. Southern Mills, Inc. v. Newton, 91 Ga. App. 738, 87 S.E.2d 109 (1955).

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment when issues of fact existed over the company's and general contractor's knowledge of the condition left by independent contractor and over their acceptance of that condition. Considering their duty to maintain or leave the premises in a safe condition for invitees, along with the fact that the defective condition was allowed to exist for nine months, it could be argued that the evidence left little room for concluding anything other than a ratification of the independent contractor's work. Bodenheimer v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 Ga. App. 248, 433 S.E.2d 75 (1993).

- Independent contractor is not liable for injuries to a third person, occurring after the owner has accepted the work, though the injury results from the contractor's failure to properly carry out the contractor's contract. Young v. Smith & Kelly Co., 124 Ga. 475, 52 S.E. 765, 110 Am. St. R. 186, 4 Ann. Cas. 226 (1905).

If the work performed by the contractor is not shown to come within one of the exceptions to the general rule, when the work is finished by the contractor and accepted by the contractor's employer, the liability of the former generally ceases and the employer becomes answerable for damages which may thereafter accrue from the defective conditions of the work. Derryberry v. Robinson, 154 Ga. App. 694, 269 S.E.2d 525 (1980).

General rule is that the contractor is not liable to third persons for damages or injuries subsequently suffered by reason of the condition of the work, even though the contractor was negligent in carrying out the contract, at least, if the defect is not hidden but readily observable on reasonable inspection. Derryberry v. Robinson, 154 Ga. App. 694, 269 S.E.2d 525 (1980).

- Although a hospital may contract with emergency room physicians, characterizing the physicians as independent contractors, if the hospital cloaks the physicians with the vestments of agents and patients rely upon such apparent agency, the physicians may be held liable as employees. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

- When the employer has no contract right to and had not assumed control of the time, the manner, and the method of performance of the employee, a requirement that the employer purchase auto insurance and workers' compensation and comply with safety rules and regulations for the benefit of the employee did not bring the employer within the doctrine of respondeat superior. Slater v. Canal Wood Corp., 178 Ga. App. 877, 345 S.E.2d 71 (1986).

- When there is uncontradicted testimony that the employer did or did not have the right to any control over the manner of doing the details of the work to be performed, such testimony prevails against any antagonistic evidence that may be introduced. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

- Trial court erred in charging the jury in the following language: "I charge you members of the jury, that a general contractor is responsible for whatever his subcontractor might do." Harrison & Ellis, Inc. v. Nashville Milling Co., 156 Ga. App. 697, 275 S.E.2d 374 (1980).

- It is a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant retained, or interfered and assumed control of the work. Quinan v. Standard Fuel Supply Co., 25 Ga. App. 47, 102 S.E. 543 (1920).

Cited in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hughes, 143 Ga. 206, 84 S.E. 451 (1915); International Agric. Corp. v. Suber, 24 Ga. App. 445, 101 S.E. 300 (1919); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Southern Ry., 43 Ga. App. 445, 159 S.E. 301 (1931); De Bord v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 58 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ga. 1943); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 75 Ga. App. 549, 43 S.E.2d 784 (1947); Southern Mills, Inc. v. Newton, 91 Ga. App. 738, 87 S.E.2d 109 (1955); City of Villa Rica v. Couch, 281 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1960); Newsome v. Dunn, 103 Ga. App. 656, 120 S.E.2d 205 (1961); Webb v. Wright, 103 Ga. App. 776, 120 S.E.2d 806 (1961); Noxon Rug Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 220 Ga. 291, 138 S.E.2d 569 (1964); Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dowling, 111 Ga. App. 123, 140 S.E.2d 912 (1965); Townsend & Ghegan Enters. v. W.R. Bean & Son, 117 Ga. App. 109, 159 S.E.2d 776 (1968); Millard v. AAA Electrical Contractors & Eng'rs, 119 Ga. App. 548, 167 S.E.2d 679 (1969); Scarboro Enters., Inc. v. Hirsh, 119 Ga. App. 866, 169 S.E.2d 182 (1969); Herndon v. Aultman-Beasley, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 743, 195 S.E.2d 250 (1972); Neda Constr. Co. v. Jenkins, 137 Ga. App. 344, 223 S.E.2d 732 (1976); Allen v. Cooper, 145 Ga. App. 555, 244 S.E.2d 98 (1978); Blackwell v. Taylor, 497 F. Supp. 351 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 277 S.E.2d 312 (1981); Poppell v. Georgia Power Co., 157 Ga. App. 488, 277 S.E.2d 777 (1981); United States v. Aretz, 248 Ga. 19, 280 S.E.2d 345 (1981); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ring, 158 Ga. App. 525, 281 S.E.2d 247 (1981); Paul v. Jones, 160 Ga. App. 671, 288 S.E.2d 13 (1981); McGuire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 162 Ga. App. 312, 290 S.E.2d 487 (1982); Financial Bldg. Consultants, Inc. v. Guillebeau, Britt & Waldrop, 163 Ga. App. 607, 295 S.E.2d 355 (1982); Brewer v. Williams, 167 Ga. App. 151, 305 S.E.2d 891 (1983); Deitrich v. Trust Co. Bank, 179 Ga. App. 330, 346 S.E.2d 107 (1986); Caruso v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 181 Ga. App. 829, 354 S.E.2d 18 (1987); Spell v. Port City Adhesives, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 816, 360 S.E.2d 63 (1987); Jenkins v. Georgia Power Co., 668 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1987); BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Helton, 215 Ga. App. 435, 451 S.E.2d 76 (1994); Rice v. Delta Air Lines, 217 Ga. App. 452, 458 S.E.2d 359 (1995); Owens v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 218 Ga. App. 160, 460 S.E.2d 835 (1995); Finley v. Lehman, 218 Ga. App. 789, 463 S.E.2d 709 (1995); Stanley v. Fiber Transp., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 171, 470 S.E.2d 767 (1996); Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga. App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 249 (1997); Allen v. King Plow Co., 227 Ga. App. 795, 490 S.E.2d 457 (1997); Bell S. Telecommunications, Inc. v. Widner, 229 Ga. App. 634, 495 S.E.2d 52 (1998); Johnson v. Kimberly Clark, 233 Ga. App. 508, 504 S.E.2d 536 (1998); Grey v. Milliken & Co., 245 Ga. App. 804, 539 S.E.2d 186 (2000); Mitchell v. Jones, 247 Ga. App. 113, 541 S.E.2d 103 (2000); Enviromediation Servs., L.L.C. v. Boatwright, 256 Ga. App. 200, 568 S.E.2d 117 (2002); McLaine v. McLeod, 291 Ga. App. 335, 661 S.E.2d 695 (2008); O'Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 750 S.E.2d 689 (2013); Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight, 332 Ga. App. 82, 770 S.E.2d 334 (2015), overruled on other grounds, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 445 (Ga. 2016).

Applicability to Other Specific Cases

Automobiles.

- It is nowhere held that the negligence of a driver is ipso facto imputable to the owner simply because the owner may be a passenger at the time of the collision. At most there is only a presumption, or inference, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the owner has the right to control the driver as the owner's agent or servant and is therefore liable for the driver's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or is therefore chargeable with the driver's negligence in the owner's action against a third party. Floyd v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 852, 176 S.E.2d 111 (1970).

When uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence is produced as to the real facts, the inference that the owner of a car controls the driver simply because the owner is a passenger in the car disappears and does not create a conflict in the evidence so as to require submission to a jury. Floyd v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 852, 176 S.E.2d 111 (1970).

Joint interest with another in the object and purpose of an automobile trip is not enough to render one liable for the negligent acts of the other in the operation of the automobile. Floyd v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 852, 176 S.E.2d 111 (1970).

- Trial court erred in granting the employers' summary judgment in a driver's action to recover damages for injuries the driver sustained in a vehicle collision with an employee because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the degree of control exercised by the employers over the employee's work was such that the employers could be held liable for the employee's alleged negligence against the driver; a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether, at the time of the collision with the driver, the employee was acting in furtherance of the employers' business and within the scope of the business. Broadnax v. Daniel Custom Constr., LLC, 315 Ga. App. 291, 726 S.E.2d 770 (2012).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred in imposing liability on a condominium association for the security company's share of fault as the general verdict did not distinguish the award and the jury may have imposed fault on the condominium association based strictly on a theory of nuisance, and the imposition of fault on the security company under common law, which negligence could be completely independent of, and not imputable to the condominium association. Camelot Club Condo. Assoc. v. Afari-Opoku, 340 Ga. App. 618, 798 S.E.2d 241 (2017).

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs' respondeat superior claim because the record revealed genuine issues of disputed facts about whether the driver who hit their motorcycle was the defendant's temporary employee or an independent contractor as, while the defendant did not pay the driver directly or choose break times, there was also evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant maintained sufficient control over the driver, such as instructing the driver on the time, method, and manner of the daily drive. Boatner v. Show Media, LLC, 331 Ga. App. 332, 771 S.E.2d 40 (2015).

- There was no evidence that the car owner retained the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work to be done upon the owner's truck, or that the owner interfered and assumed control of any part of the work, when although the evidence showed that the owner told the garage owner to fix the carburetor and to put the truck on the street when the garage got through with it, these were instructions as to the end results desired, and not as to the means or manner of accomplishing these results. Strickland v. Baker, 91 Ga. App. 97, 84 S.E.2d 851 (1954).

Operation of a taxicab on public streets by a mechanic for the purpose of testing it in connection with maintenance required by a municipal ordinance was not a violation of any duty of the owner-operator arising from public ordinances, such as would subject the owner to liability for injuries caused by the wrongful act of the mechanic, under the provisions of this section. Pressley v. Wilson, 116 Ga. App. 226, 156 S.E.2d 398 (1967).

- Automobile repossession business and its owner were not liable for injuries arising from the repossession of a van by an independent contractor since there was no control over the time or manner of the repossession and there was no ratification of the wrongful act leading to the accident. Clayton v. Edwards, 225 Ga. App. 141, 483 S.E.2d 111 (1997).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of a creditor as to whether it could be held vicariously liable for an independent contractor's acts in attempting to repossess a debtor's car because the creditor had a non-delegable statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-609 to not breach the peace in repossessing the car, and if the contractor's attempt to repossess the car was in violation of the statute, the creditor would be chargeable with that conduct since it was done in violation of a duty imposed upon it by statute; the creditor's duty was personal and non-delegable, and a recovery based upon a breach of that duty would not constitute imposition of liability without fault. Lewis v. Nicholas Fin., Inc., 300 Ga. App. 888, 686 S.E.2d 468 (2009).

- Bulldozer operator was not a borrowed servant but more like an independent contractor, when although a property owner had asked the operator to do $200 worth of bulldozing for which the owner would pay the operator's employer, the operator was not subject to the owner's orders and control and was not liable to be discharged by the owner for misconduct or disobedience to orders. Wilson v. McCullough, 180 Ga. App. 579, 349 S.E.2d 751 (1986).

Trespasser who employed two workers to cut and remove trees from the trespasser's property was jointly liable for the two workers wrongfully removing timber from the property owners' land as the trespasser erroneously pointed out the property line to the two workers, permitted the two workers to cut trees on the property owners' land when the trespasser knew the two workers should not be doing so, and ratified the two workers' misconduct by accepting and retaining payment for the wrongfully cut timber. Jones v. Ceniza, 257 Ga. App. 806, 572 S.E.2d 362 (2002).

- If the excavation for a building is so negligently done as to injure a structure on adjoining premises, the owner will not be liable provided the plans and specifications furnished to the contractor were sufficient to secure a safe construction of the building, and provided the erection of the building was not, in its nature, dangerous to the adjacent property. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

- In a personal injury action against a utility and the utility's independent contractor, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against a cable installer, finding that: (1) the utility was not vicariously liable to the installer for the allegedly negligent acts of the contractor; (2) the utility's right to inspect the work did not render the utility liable for the utility's contractor's negligence, as that right was intended for the limited purpose of making sure the contractor competently carried out the terms of the contract; (3) the utility was not liable for the utility's failure to flag a power line trench in which the installer fell and was injured as surface markings showing the path of the trench would not have informed the installer of the danger, and the installer was not injured as a result of excavating or blasting; and (4) the High-voltage Safety Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 et seq., did not apply to afford the installer a remedy. Perry v. Georgia Power Co., 278 Ga. App. 759, 629 S.E.2d 588 (2006).

Applicability to Construction

Brushing land.

- Summary judgment was properly entered for a realtor and a developer as to a landowner's claim that the realtor and the developer were liable under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-2-4 and51-2-5 for failing to ascertain and communicate to an independent contractor hired by the developer to brush the realtor's lot the location of the boundary between the realtor's lot and the landowner's lot; the developer testified that the developer used a creek and a transformer as landmarks for the boundary line in instructing the contractor, and the landowner did not challenge the use of the landmarks. Sorrow v. Hadaway, 269 Ga. App. 446, 604 S.E.2d 197 (2004).

- Aerial application of chemicals to open land involved sufficient inherent danger that it fell within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(2) such that an employer could be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor the employer hired to perform crop dusting work when chemicals drifted onto a neighboring crop, damaging the crop. Yancey v. Watkins, 308 Ga. App. 695, 708 S.E.2d 539 (2011).

- When a contract was on the contract's face one between a brick manufacturer and an independent contractor engaged in an independent and separate trucking business, the evidence did not authorize an inference that the truck driver was an agent or employee of the brick company since there was no evidence to show that the company retained the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work or that it interfered and assumed control. Jocie Motor Lines v. Burns Brick Co., 98 Ga. App. 404, 105 S.E.2d 780 (1958).

- General contractor's worker was injured in a crane accident at a mill. The mill owner was not liable for the contractor's negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) based on a violation of statutes as the contractor, not the owner, was the worker's "employer" for purposes of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.179(n)(3)(x) and 1926.550(a)(19), which obliged an "employer" to require a crane operator not to lift loads over employees. Furthermore, the mill owner was not liable under paragraph (2) based on the inherently dangerous nature of the work since there was no evidence the mill owner knew the activity was inherently dangerous based on the owner's prior knowledge and experience. Boyd v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 292 Ga. App. 281, 664 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

- Owner of premises is not liable when a contractor polluted a watercourse while engaged in making bricks. Sharp & Co. v. Parker, 108 Ga. 805, 34 S.E. 135 (1899).

- Owner of premises who retains control thereof will be held liable to the workers of a contractor when the hazard is latent or concealed. Huey v. City of Atlanta, 8 Ga. App. 597, 70 S.E. 71 (1911); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lawley, 33 Ga. App. 375, 126 S.E. 273, cert. denied, 33 Ga. App. 828 (1925).

- When the employer was a municipal corporation which had employed an independent contractor, the fact that no legally enforceable contract existed between the employer and the contractor by reason of failure of the contractor to give bond for the faithful performance of the contract did not operate to alter the status of the relationship between the parties as respects the nature and character of the work performed or the character and conduct of the employer with reference to the operation of the work, and the city therefore was not, by reason of the failure of the contractor to execute the required bond, liable for any damage resulting from negligence in the performance of the work. Edmondson v. Town of Morven, 41 Ga. App. 209, 152 S.E. 280 (1930).

- When the digging of a well, with the use of an engine apparatus, is in close proximity to an inflammable frame building, the employer of the independent contractor is not liable for damages sustained as a result of the ignition of the building from sparks emitted as the result of the negligence of the defendant in operating the engine. Edmondson v. Town of Morven, 41 Ga. App. 209, 152 S.E. 280 (1930).

The digging of a well which requires the use of apparatus consisting of a steam engine in which fire is used to generate steam is not work which "according to previous knowledge and experience . . . is in its nature dangerous" as an instrumentality likely to set fire to the neighboring buildings "however carefully" the work is performed, when, by the use of an engine properly equipped and properly operated, the danger from the spread of fire from the operation of the engine can be eliminated. Edmondson v. Town of Morven, 41 Ga. App. 209, 152 S.E. 280 (1930).

- If the owner of adjacent property merely hires an independent contractor to make excavations adjacent to the wall of the owner's neighbor's building without providing in any way for safeguarding such walls, and such contractor carries out the directions of the contractor's employer, such employer will be liable for any injury resulting from the work carried out in the manner directed by the employer. On the other hand, if the plans and specifications provided that proper and necessary precautions be taken to prevent injury and such independent contractor failed to obey such instructions, the employer would not be liable. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

- In the construction of a tall office building the owner would not be liable for the failure of the independent contractor to erect safe scaffolding in the construction of such building, although both the owner and the independent contractor knew that the failure so to do was necessarily dangerous to employees working thereon. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

- Electricity is a substance so inherently dangerous that a power company may not contract for the building of power lines with an independent contractor and absolve itself from liability for an injury which occurs solely because of the negligence of such independent contractor in the doing of the work. Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786 (1934).

- When an independent contractor in doing repair work for an owner causes an obstruction on the sidewalk or in the street adjoining the property being repaired, the owner by accepting the work done on the owner's own property does not thereby assume liability for the failure of the independent contractor in failing to remove in a reasonable time such obstruction, it appearing that such obstruction is not connected with nor does it form any part of the work accepted by the owner on the owner's own property. Goldman v. Clisby, 62 Ga. App. 516, 8 S.E.2d 701 (1940).

- Theory that the plaintiff was an invitee of the elevator company, employed to make alterations on the elevator because the plaintiff was an employee and invitee of the lessee would not be sustainable since if the elevator company had exclusive control of the elevators, the plaintiff as an employee of the lessee would not have occupied the status of invitee as to the elevator either as to the elevator company or the lessee, in the absence of allegations showing an authorized invitation otherwise. Callaham v. Carlson, 85 Ga. App. 4, 67 S.E.2d 726 (1951).

- The mere fact that an individual was present and directed where the propane tank was to be put would not make the individual liable for the tank's dropping and resultant explosion as an employer of the independent contractor under the fifth exception in this section on the theory that the individual interfered and assumed control, for an employer has the right to supervise the work to the extent of seeing that the results are in conformity with the specifications. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952).

- When the contractor had no initial or final control over the selection of subcontractors, so that both the contractor and subcontractor occupied the relationship of contractors to the landowner, only the subcontractor-employer of the welder who caused the fire could be held liable for negligence even though the contract between the landowner and the contractor stated that the contractor would have full directing authority over the execution of the contract. Peabody Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga. App. 240, 94 S.E.2d 156 (1956).

- When a prime contractor who is charged with constructing a bridge and a portion of a highway employs another company to build the bridge, although it may in general direct and supervise the work in accordance with the terms of its contract, the relationship insofar as building the bridge is concerned is not solely that of master and servant, and the subcontractor who is actually engaged in erecting the bridge must be considered to be in control of the construction to the extent of exercising ordinary care to avoid injuring others thereby; the prime contractor had a general duty respecting the entire project to warn the traveling public of dangers incident thereto and the subcontractor also had a duty to avoid injuring others in the construction work actually undertaken by the subcontractor. Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga. App. 361, 94 S.E.2d 503 (1956).

- When one company enters into a contract with the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) to do construction work on the public highways of this state and lets out a part of the contract to another company, the work to be under the direction and supervision of the former, the relation of contractor and subcontractor exists between the two and they may be jointly liable for injury resulting from negligence. Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga. App. 361, 94 S.E.2d 503 (1956).

- When the owner of premises employs a general contractor to construct a dwelling house upon the premises, and places the general contractor in possession and control of the premises, a subcontractor whom the general contractor employs to do certain work connected with the construction of the building is an invitee of the general contractor to whom the latter owes the duty of ordinary care. Braun v. Wright, 100 Ga. App. 295, 111 S.E.2d 100 (1959).

Builder-sellers have a right and a duty to direct and control the work of those employed by them to the extent that an ordinarily prudent builder would exercise such direction and control to build a fit and workmanlike structure. Even assuming the buyers, in the exercise of ordinary care, would not have known of the latent construction defect, the issue to be determined is whether such defects either were known to the builder-seller or in the exercise of ordinary care would have been discovered by the builder-seller. Seely v. Loyd H. Johnson Constr. Co., 220 Ga. App. 719, 470 S.E.2d 283 (1996).

- Cases which have construed this section have emphasized the word "express" and the necessity that as between an independent contractor and subcontractors, the contractual obligations should be placed upon the particular employer as opposed to any independent contractor since the contractual duty could be discharged in any effective manner, and the act of a subcontractor in negligently damaging the property would be a collateral tort for which the prime contractor would not be liable because this would not be a violation of an express contract obligation falling within the exception provided in this section. Fields v. B & B Pipeline Co., 147 Ga. App. 875, 250 S.E.2d 582 (1978).

- Petition for wrongful death of the plaintiff's wife and mother, who were riding in an automobile that was struck by road machinery operated by the subcontractor's employee, which alleged that the subcontractor had surrendered to the contractor the right to direct and control the manner in which the machinery was to be operated by the subcontractor's employee, failed to state a cause of action against the subcontractor due to this lack of control. Ed Smith & Sons v. Mathis, 217 Ga. 354, 122 S.E.2d 97 (1961).

- Since an insurance company did not retain or exercise any right of control over the time, manner or method of performance of a repair contractor's work, the insurance company could not be held vicariously liable for the contractor's alleged negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Carter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 738, 399 S.E.2d 500 (1990).

- Under Georgia law, the United States owed the contractor's employee a duty to exercise ordinary care in carrying out the contractor's safety responsibilities for the construction project at an Air Force base, even though a subcontractor created the dangerous scaffold situation. Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1992).

- Property owner was not liable for injuries sustained by the subcontractor's employee since the independent contractor alone had assumed the duty of providing for the safety of the contractor's workers. Englehart v. Oki Am., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 151, 433 S.E.2d 331 (1993).

- Since the employer's contract mandated compliance with regulations of OSHA and safety standards of Associated General Contractors, and there was evidence that the employer was aware that the contractor was in violation of such regulations and standards, a material issue of fact existed as to whether the employer ratified the conduct of the contractor and grant of summary judgment was error. Styles v. Mobil Oil Corp., 218 Ga. App. 48, 459 S.E.2d 578 (1995).

- After the plaintiff's car fell into a trench that had been dug across a public road to lay a telephone cable, the defendant construction contractor could not be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor based on an implied duty to restore the road to the road's original condition after the utility work was completed or based on a ratification of the wrong of the independent contractor. Widner v. Brookins, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 563, 512 S.E.2d 405 (1999).

- When an independent subcontractor sued a retailer for injuries occurring while the subcontractor was doing work on the retailer's premises, the retailer was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor as the retailer exercised no control over the subcontractor's work, and any control over that work was contractually ceded to the subcontractor and to the contractor who hired the subcontractor. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dufour, 268 Ga. App. 104, 601 S.E.2d 375 (2004).

- Summary judgment was properly entered for a realtor and a developer as to a landowner's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(1) that the developer hired an independent contractor to undertake activities that were wrongful in that the contractor had no right to enter the landowner's land; the realtor did not hire the contractor, and the developer hired the contractor to brush the realtor's property, which was not wrongful in itself. Sorrow v. Hadaway, 269 Ga. App. 446, 604 S.E.2d 197 (2004).

- In a premises liability action filed by a repairman arising from injuries suffered while repairing a roof, because the trial court properly found that an out-of-possession landlord and its tenants who surrendered control of the owned premises did not ratify the repairman's employer's actions in not providing safety equipment, and did not have superior knowledge of the dangers involved, the out-of-possession landlord and its tenants were properly granted summary judgment in the repairman's premises liability action. Saunders v. Indus. Metals & Surplus, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415, 646 S.E.2d 294 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 624 (Ga. 2007).

- The Department of Transportation's Utility Accommodation Policy and Standards did not impose the nondelegable duties of an applicant for an utility encroachment permit upon contractors doing work for the applicant; thus, in a personal injury suit, a contractor and a subcontractor doing work for a utility were not liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) for the actions of an independent contractor that was trimming trees for the subcontractor. Watkins v. First South Util. Constr., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 547, 644 S.E.2d 449 (2007).

- Subcontractor's agreement to comply with "OSHA, state and local" safety regulations did not expressly impose a duty upon the subcontractor to ensure that safety devices were in place, as was required for it to be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(3) for the negligence of an independent contractor doing work for the subcontractor. Watkins v. First South Util. Constr., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 547, 644 S.E.2d 449 (2007).

- Trial court erred in granting an apartment owner and a manager summary judgment in a tenant's action to recover damages for the personal injuries the tenant sustained from carbon-monoxide poisoning because the owner and manager could be liable for the actions of a construction company's workers even if the company, which was orally hired to assist in the clean up of the owner's apartments, was an independent contractor; the evidence showed that a temporary tarp repair the workers performed was completed so negligently that a defect in the premises was created, and some evidence showed that the company and its workers were not independent contractors. In placing a temporary tarp on the roof of the tenant's apartment, the company was performing the duty of the owner and manager to repair the premises by stopping a leak until a more permanent repair could be effected, and no written or oral contract outlined the company's precise responsibilities, setting forth specifications as to the work to be performed, nor did any contract identify a stipulated sum. Atkins v. MRP Park Lake, L. P., 301 Ga. App. 275, 687 S.E.2d 215 (2009).

- Because an employer, as bailor, sent the employer's own employee with the thing bailed, a tractor with attached trash trailer, under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-62(b), a contractor, as the hirer, was liable only for the consequences of its own directions or for its gross negligence; the trial court erred in concluding that the contractor was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the employee was not its borrowed servant because the evidence presented at least a factual issue regarding whether the employee was the contractor's borrowed servant since there was evidence that the contractor alone supervised the employee's work hauling debris, that the contractor controlled the employee's schedule for each day, and that the contractor dictated which landfill would receive the debris and when a load was ready. Coe v. Carroll & Carroll, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 777, 709 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

- In a construction site delivery driver's claims against a general contractor and a subcontractor arising out of injuries that occurred when the driver was struck by the subcontractor's concrete-filled hose on the construction site, the contractor was not liable for the subcontractor's negligence because, although the contractor's contract with the owner made it responsible for the subcontractors' work, the driver was a stranger to the contract and could not enforce the contract. Card v. Dublin Constr. Co., 337 Ga. App. 804, 788 S.E.2d 845 (2016), cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 140 (Ga. 2017).

- Even if privity of contract existed, an injured party's claims failed, because the party neglected to point out an express contractual provision that would cast liability on either the supplier or distributor of an x-ray machine which allegedly caused the injuries due to poor installation by an installer, who was an independent contractor of the distributor. Kidd v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 346, 629 S.E.2d 58 (2006).

In a case in which an individual sought to impose vicarious liability on a company for the installation of the company's cable line by a subcontractor, the individual's nuisance allegations, as they appeared in the individual's proposed amendment focused on the improper installation of the cable line, rather than on whether the cable line, if installed correctly, would pose a nuisance, the nuisance allegations did not fit within the exception to O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(1), and the individual could not amend the complaint to add that claim against a company; that part of the proposed amendment would be futile. Whitley v. Comcast of Georgia, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007).

- No Georgia authority existed finding that welding was an inherently dangerous activity; therefore, there was no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the home center company on the homeowners' negligence claim that welding was an inherently dangerous activity for which the company remained responsible under the exception of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(2). Luther v. Wayne Frier Home Ctr. of Tifton, Inc., 264 Ga. App. 827, 592 S.E.2d 470 (2003).

- Defendant was not entitled to immunity in a slip and fall case, notwithstanding its assertion that the fall was caused by the actions of an independent contractor, as the duty imposed on owner/occupiers to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe is statutory; therefore, the defendant was liable for the acts and omissions of its independent contractor. Kroger Co. v. Strickland, 248 Ga. App. 613, 548 S.E.2d 375 (2001).

- Because no evidence was presented that a hardware store had actual knowledge that a hazard existed, summary judgment for the hardware store was proper in a claim for damages arising from an incident when a box fell on a customer at the hardware store. Green v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 779, 627 S.E.2d 836 (2006).

- Department of Veterans Services does not have a non-delegable duty to care for its veterans and it properly contracted with an independent contractor to run the State War Veterans' Home; thus, in an action based on negligent acts of the contractor resulting in the death of a veteran at the Home, the trial court erred in concluding that the Department could not avail itself of the independent contractor defense. Department of Veterans Servs. v. Robinson, 244 Ga. App. 878, 536 S.E.2d 617 (2000).

Trial court, in a wrongful death suit, erred by denying the motions of the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice to dismiss and for a directed verdict, following the death of a juvenile the agencies placed in a corporate child care institution as the two agencies were immune from suit under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., and there was no waiver of sovereign immunity by the state. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124 (2003).

Plaintiff did not have grounds for holding the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the Department of Juvenile Justice liable for the electrocution death of the plaintiff's child, which was caused by an employee for an independent contractor for the state, in part, because O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 did not provide grounds for waiver of the state agencies' sovereign immunity. Johnson v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 278 Ga. 714, 606 S.E.2d 270 (2004).

Dismantling of elevator was not inherently dangerous since evidence showed that the elevator could have been safely dismantled with the use of additional cranes and structural bracing. Brooks v. Oil-Dri Corp., 205 Ga. App. 214, 422 S.E.2d 22, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 422 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

- Whether the statute embodied in former Code 1933, §§ 105-501 and 105-502 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-2-4 and51-2-5) was exhaustive as to exceptions to the rule of nonliability of an employer for the acts of an independent contractor, it must yield to and cannot control the constitutional duty imposed upon a condemnor to pay compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for public purposes whether or not such taking or damaging was done by an independent contractor hired by the condemnor. Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316, 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967); Georgia Power Co. v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 614, 178 S.E.2d 265 (1970).

- In a suit for damages to a crane leased to defendant corporation's wholly owned subsidiary, the complaint alleging that the subsidiary was employed by the defendant corporation as servant and agent at the time the crane was damaged was good against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Condenser Serv. & Eng'r Co. v. Brunswick Port Auth., 87 Ga. App. 469, 74 S.E.2d 398 (1953).

- Factory was not liable for the independent contractor's unauthorized, unsupervised use of a forklift to raise the defendant to a higher level for the purpose of repairing the factory fan, resulting in the employee's falling from the forklift and sustaining injury. Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 429 S.E.2d 530 (1993).

Worker's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) against a tire manufacturing plant, for which the worker did independent contractor work pursuant to an agreement between the plant and the worker's employer, failed because the plant had no statutory or contractual duty to maintain a forklift or to ensure that the employer properly maintained it and, accordingly, the trial court should have granted the plant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50; the forklift jumped backwards and due to a malfunctioning emergency brake, the transformer that it was carrying dropped and crushed the worker's arm, and it was noted that the forklift was purchased by the employer but was delivered directly to the plant and remained on those premises. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Merritt, 271 Ga. App. 16, 608 S.E.2d 714 (2004).

- Even though a floor cleaning service was an independent contractor of defendant grocery store, because the store was open for business with employees present during the time the service worked on the floor, material issues of fact existed as to whether the store had turned full possession and control of the floor over to the service and whether warning signs were posted. Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47, 476 S.E.2d 822 (1996).

- Trial court did not err in granting a janitorial services contractor summary judgment in an employee's suit to recover damages for injuries sustained when the employee slipped and fell on ice in the employer's parking lot because, under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5), the contractor's indication to a subcontractor that mop water could be discarded in back of the building was insufficient to constitute an assumption of control by the contractor so as to create the relation of master and servant or so that an injury resulted that was traceable to its interference but was no more than a general indication that the mop water could be discarded in back of the building, and the contractor's willingness to supply materials to the subcontractor did not intrude into the subcontractor's ability to control the daily operations of its business; the agreement between the contractor and subcontractor provided for an independent contractor relationship because the subcontractor had full authority and responsibility over its employees, including hiring and firing, and under the agreement, the contractor had delivered full and complete possession of the premises to the subcontractor, which gave the specific instructions about where to discard the water. Adcox v. Atlanta Bldg. Maint. Co., 301 Ga. App. 74, 687 S.E.2d 137 (2009).

- Company that leased property and sold gas to a gas station was not the employer of the operator of the station and could not be held vicariously liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 for the operator's negligence. Wells v. Vi-Mac, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 261, 486 S.E.2d 400 (1997).

Materials recovery facility was responsible for ensuring transportation of the facility's waste in compliance with regulations promulgated pursuant to the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-20 et seq., and could be responsible for an injury caused by a contractor's violation of the regulations. Perry v. Soil Remediation, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 386, 471 S.E.2d 320 (1996).

- Manufacturer that hired a contractor to galvanize nails could not be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 for the contractor's negligence with respect to treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Serv., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 566 (M.D. Ga. 1997).

Hauling logging equipment was not shown to be inherently dangerous. Jacobs v. Thomson Oak Flooring, 250 Ga. App. 56, 550 S.E.2d 465 (2001).

- Physician on the staff of a hospital is not automatically an employee of the hospital and when a physician is an independent contractor the hospital is not liable for the physician's negligent performance of professional services unless it negligently selected the physician or undertook to direct the physician in the manner and method of treating the patient. Hollingsworth v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 145 Ga. App. 870, 245 S.E.2d 60, aff'd, 242 Ga. 522, 250 S.E.2d 433 (1978).

Department of Human Resources cannot be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Georgia General Assembly has spoken by removing from the pool of state employees covered by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., independent contractors and corporations, and by failing to include in O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 a waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, the plaintiff's claim of negligence, based on a failure to notify of the child's sickle cell anemia, against the department was barred by sovereign immunity. In re Carter, 288 Ga. App. 276, 653 S.E.2d 860 (2007).

When the attending physician was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the hospital, and it is not alleged that the hospital was negligent in having the physician on the hospital's staff or that the hospital undertook to direct the physician in the physician's treatment of the patient, the hospital cannot be held liable for the physician's alleged negligence. Moore v. Carrington, 155 Ga. App. 12, 270 S.E.2d 222 (1980).

In a medical malpractice action, the court correctly charged that if the hospital were found to be providing professional services through its actual or apparent agent, the hospital's actions in providing those services should be judged by the standard of such profession. Doctors Hosp. v. Bonner, 195 Ga. App. 152, 392 S.E.2d 897 (1990).

- While contract between solicitor of insurance and insurance company indicated relationship of independent contractor and employer, when evidence discloses that insurance company's state manager, by whom the contractor was employed and under whose supervision the contractor worked, allotted certain territory to the contractor, and required regular attendance at morning staff meetings, and that the insurance company paid for the contractor's (salesperson's) license, furnished the contractor all literature and selling aids, required the contractor to own an automobile as a condition of employment, and that at the time of the collision the contractor was on the contractor's way to interview a prospective customer whose name had been given the contractor at the office, evidence authorizes finding that the master-servant relationship existed. American Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 89 Ga. App. 672, 80 S.E.2d 832 (1954).

- Publisher could not be held liable for negligent driving of distributor's delivery vehicle on the ground that the driver was not licensed since there was no duty on the part of the newspaper publisher to inquire and ascertain if the distributor was properly licensed. Tanner v. USA Today, 179 Ga. App. 722, 347 S.E.2d 690 (1986).

Newspaper publisher was not vicariously liable to the owner of a newspaper distribution service since the newspaper truck involved in a collision was owned, maintained, and insured by the distributor and the publisher had no right to control the route used by the truck, the choice of driver, or the way in which the truck was driven. Tanner v. USA Today, 179 Ga. App. 722, 347 S.E.2d 690 (1986).

- Defendant-employer has the right to invade the injured plaintiffs-employee's privacy, but only in a reasonable and proper manner and only in furtherance of the employer's interest with regard to the suit for personal injuries against the employer. The employer cannot delegate the employer's duty of conducting a proper investigation to a third party so as to insulate itself from suit if the third party failed to conduct a reasonable surveillance. That being true, the independent contractor rationale is not applicable in a case of this kind. Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 648, 188 S.E.2d 911 (1972), later appeal, 130 Ga. App. 254, 202 S.E.2d 701 (1973).

Employer of a private detective agency was held liable to a third person for an invasion of privacy committed during the course of an investigation by the agency's personnel, despite the fact that the agency was employed as an independent contractor. United States Shoe Corp. v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 595, 255 S.E.2d 73 (1979).

Even though hirers of an independent security or protective agency have generally been held not liable for negligent torts of agency personnel, when the hirer did not exercise control over the agency, the hirers have been held liable for the intentional torts of the agency's personnel committed in the scope of the agency's employment against the hirer's invitees. United States Shoe Corp. v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 595, 255 S.E.2d 73 (1979).

Rule that a property owner is liable for the intentional torts of an employee of a private security agency hired to guard the property is applicable when the agency is hired by the manager of the property rather than by the owner personally. Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985).

After the night watchman was hired by Contractor A, who directed the watchman in all of the watchman's duties and activities and gave the watchman a paycheck, the fact that Contractor B had agreed (unknown to the watchman) with Contractor A to pay half of the watchman's costs to guard Contractor B's equipment did not create a master-and-servant relationship between Contractor B and the watchman under the terms of paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5. Gilleland & Son v. Misener Marine Constr., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 713, 327 S.E.2d 829 (1985).

Landlord had vicarious liability for any negligent act or omission of its independent contractor/security guard, separate from its own liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton, 240 Ga. App. 880, 524 S.E.2d 524 (1999).

- When an oil refining company made a written contract with another as its agent to sell its products within a certain territory, and provided that agent should pay all necessary expenses in draying the company's products and equipment and in making sales, deliveries, and collections, and the company merely furnished the products to be sold, notwithstanding it may have had rules and regulations binding upon its agent as to the character of the subagent and as to the conduct of the business for the sale of its product, and when a truck driver was employed by the agent to drive the truck furnished by the agent to transport, sell, and deliver the company's products to customers, and was hired and paid by the agent out of the agent's own funds, and the agent had control and direction of the operation of the truck and gave orders and directions to the driver as to what to do, and had control of the driver and the driver's activities, and control of the time, manner, means, and methods of the driver in the execution of the work, the truck driver, in selling the products of the company by delivery from the truck while in the performance of the work for which the driver was employed, was the servant of the agent, and not the servant of the company; the company, therefore, was not liable for a mistake of the driver in delivering gasoline instead of kerosene to a purchaser. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Veal, 51 Ga. App. 755, 181 S.E. 705 (1935).

- Taxicab company was not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor driver based on the driver's violation of the statute prohibiting leaving the scene of an accident; the statutory duty was imposed on the driver, not on the company, so the exception pertaining to violation of a duty imposed by statute does not apply. Loudermilk Enters., Inc. v. Hurtig, 214 Ga. App. 746, 449 S.E.2d 141 (1994).

- In civil action for damages caused by felling of a tree under doctrine of respondeat superior, the trial court erroneously denied the homeowner's motion for summary judgment as an independent contractor was hired to fell the tree and the homeowner had no control over the contractor's actions, and the act of felling the tree was not wrongful in itself; moreover, the homeowner's single suggestion or comment that the contractor could proceed with felling the tree as an entire unit did not necessarily have to be followed and did not create liability on the homeowner's part, but was simply confirming the freedom of the contractor to fell the tree as that contractor deemed appropriate. Whatley v. Sharma, 291 Ga. App. 228, 661 S.E.2d 590 (2008).

- In order for one to recover compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., it must be shown that the relation of master and servant existed between the servant and the person from whom the servant claims compensation. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934).

- Trial court correctly granted limited liability companies (LLC) summary judgment on the mortgagors' wrongful eviction and trespass claims given the absence of an independent legal duty imposed upon the companies; because a mortgagee was the legal title holder of foreclosed property, the duty to comply with the statutory dispossessory procedures provided in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 et seq. was imposed upon the mortgagee and could not be delegated to a third party, and since there was no evidence that the mortgagee ever sought to accomplish the mortgagee's statutory duties through an agent by contracting with either company to file a dispossessory action against the mortgagors on the mortgagee's behalf. The independent contractors had no separate legal duty to file a dispossessory action and then comply with the statutory procedures. Ikomoni v. Exec. Asset Mgmt., LLC, 309 Ga. App. 81, 709 S.E.2d 282 (2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Independent Contractors, § 43 et seq.

Complicity Rule in Motor Vehicle Accident Cases: Employer's Authorization or Ratification of Driver's Conduct, 19 POF3d 437.

Structural Damage to Residential Buildings, 51 Am. Jur. Trials 493.

- 30 C.J.S., Employer-Employee, § 246 et seq.

- Liability for injuries resulting from failure of independent contractor to guard opening in sidewalk while delivering merchandise, etc., 11 A.L.R. 571; 53 A.L.R. 932.

Duty of an employer with respect to the timbering of a mine, under the common law and general statutes, 15 A.L.R. 1380.

Nonliability of an employer in respect of injuries caused by the torts of an independent contractor, 18 A.L.R. 801.

General discussion of the nature of the relationship of employer and independent contractor, 19 A.L.R. 226.

Elements bearing directly upon the quality of a contract as affecting the character of one as independent contractor, 20 A.L.R. 684.

Liability of the employer for torts of independent contractor as predicated on the ground that the injury complained of was a direct and necessary result of the stipulated work, 21 A.L.R. 1229.

Liability of employer as predicated on the ground of his being subject to a nondelegable duty in regard to the injured person, 23 A.L.R. 984.

Nondelegable duty of employer in respect of work which will in the natural course of events produce injury, unless certain precautions are taken, 23 A.L.R. 1016.

Nondelegable duty of employer with respect to work which is inherently or intrinsically dangerous, 23 A.L.R. 1084.

Liability of municipal corporations and their licensees for the torts of independent contractors, 25 A.L.R. 426; 52 A.L.R. 1012.

Independent contractor remedial rights in respect of injuries caused by breaches of positive duties correlative to corporate franchises, 28 A.L.R. 122.

Liability of employer for acts or omissions of independent contractor in respect of positive duties or former arising from or incidental to contractual relationships, 29 A.L.R. 736.

Independent contractor liability of employer as predicated on the ground of his personal fault, 30 A.L.R. 1502.

Independent contractor extent of the employer's liability after he has assumed control of the subject-matter of the stipulated work, 31 A.L.R. 1029.

Liability of independent contractors for injuries to third persons by defects in completed work, 41 A.L.R. 8; 123 A.L.R. 1197.

Liability of contractee and contractor inter se with respect to injuries sustained while the stipulated work is in course of performance, 44 A.L.R. 891.

Liability of the contractee for injuries sustained by the contractor's servants in the course of the stipulated work, 44 A.L.R. 932.

Liability of one undertaking to repair automobile for injury to third person, 52 A.L.R. 857.

Independent contractor non-delegable duties with respect to intrinsically dangerous or unlawful work, 76 A.L.R. 1257.

Liability of company which maintains poles for acts or omissions of other companies using the poles under lease or license rendering them unsafe to persons working thereon, 81 A.L.R. 415.

Negligence of driver of automobile as imputed to members of joint enterprise, 85 A.L.R. 630.

Employment of independent contractor as affecting landlord's liability for personal injury to tenant or to one in like case with tenant, 90 A.L.R. 50; 162 A.L.R. 1111.

Independent contractor rule as applied to injuries resulting from conditions created by independent contractors in streets, 115 A.L.R. 965.

Owner's liability for injury by automobile while being used for servant's own pleasure or business, 122 A.L.R. 858; 51 A.L.R.2d 8; 51 A.L.R.2d 120; 52 A.L.R.2d 350.

Homework by employee as affecting employer's responsibility for injury to third person due to employee's negligence while on way to or from home, 146 A.L.R. 1193.

Loaned servant doctrine under Federal Employers' Liability or Safety Appliance Act, 1 A.L.R.2d 302.

Liability of freight motor carrier possessing certificate from Interstate Commerce Commission and employing noncertified independent contractor under "one-way" lease of latter's vehicle for negligence of latter's employee on return trip, 16 A.L.R.2d 960.

Liability in damages for injury or death of window washer, 17 A.L.R.2d 637.

Liability under respondeat superior doctrine for acts of operator furnished with leased machine or motor vehicle, 17 A.L.R.2d 1388.

Duty of owner of premises to furnish independent contractor or his employee a safe place of work, where contract is for repairs, 31 A.L.R.2d 1375.

Independent contractor rule as applicable to injury or death of third person as result of excavation and refill work, 33 A.L.R.2d 7.

Independent contractor rule as applicable to injury or death of third person as result of demolition work, 33 A.L.R.2d 89.

Liability of employer for injury to adjoining realty resulting from excavation work by independent contractor on his premises, 33 A.L.R.2d 111.

Liability of lessor motor carrier for lessee's torts or nonperformance of franchise duties, 34 A.L.R.2d 1121.

Deviation from employment in use of employer's car during regular hours of work, 51 A.L.R.2d 8; 51 A.L.R.2d 120; 52 A.L.R.2d 350.

Route driver or salesman as independent contractor or employee of merchandise producer or processor, for purposes of respondeat superior doctrine, 53 A.L.R.2d 183.

Liability of employer for negligent operation of motor vehicle by automobile salesman, 53 A.L.R.2d 631.

Right to join master and servant as defendants in tort action based on respondeat superior, 59 A.L.R.2d 1066.

Independent contractor's or subcontractor's liability for injury or death of third person occurring during excavation work not in street or highway, 62 A.L.R.2d 1052.

Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of sidewalk, 88 A.L.R.2d 331.

Right of contractor with federal, state, or local public body to latter's immunity from tort liability, 9 A.L.R.3d 382.

Master's liability for injury to or death of person, or damage to property, resulting from fire allegedly caused by servant's smoking, 20 A.L.R.3d 893.

Liability of builder-vendor or other vendor of new dwelling for loss, injury, or damage occasioned by defective condition thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383.

Liability of one contracting for private police security service for acts of personnel supplied, 38 A.L.R.3d 1332.

Liability to one injured in course of construction, based upon architect's alleged failure to carry out supervisory responsibilities, 59 A.L.R.3d 869.

Liability of builder or subcontractor for insufficiency of building resulting from latent defects in materials used, 61 A.L.R.3d 792.

Liability of subcontractor upon bond or other agreement indemnifying general contractor against liability for damage to person or property, 68 A.L.R.3d 7.

When is employer chargeable with negligence in hiring careless, reckless, or incompetent independent contractor, 78 A.L.R.3d 910.

Storekeeper's liability for personal injury to customer caused by independent contractor's negligence in performing alterations or repair work, 96 A.L.R.3d 1213.

Tort liability for window washer's injury or death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207.

Modern status of rule imputing motor vehicle driver's negligence to passenger on joint venture theory, 3 A.L.R.5th 1.

The government-contractor defense to state products-liability cases, 53 A.L.R.5th 535.

Modern status of rules regarding tort liability of building or construction contractor for injury or damage to third person occurring after completion and acceptance of work; "foreseeability" or "modern" rule, 75 A.L.R.5th 413.