2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 12 - Damages
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-12-8. When Damage Too Remote for Recovery Generally

If the damage incurred by the plaintiff is only the imaginary or possible result of a tortious act or if other and contingent circumstances preponderate in causing the injury, such damage is too remote to be the basis of recovery against the wrongdoer.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3004; Code 1868, § 3017; Code 1873, § 3072; Code 1882, § 3072; Civil Code 1895, § 3912; Civil Code 1910, § 4509; Code 1933, § 105-2008.)

- For article discussing plaintiff conduct and the emerging doctrine of comparative causation of torts, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403 (1978). For article, "Pre-Impact Pain and Suffering," see 26 Ga. St. B. J. 60 (1989). For article, "Jury Instructions and Proximate Cause: An Uncertain Trumpet in Georgia," see 27 Ga. St. B. J. 60 (1990). For note discussing tavern keeper liability in Georgia for injury caused by a person to whom an intoxicant was sold, see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 239 (1974).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Specific Cases

Former Code 1933, §§ 105-2007, 105-2008, and 105-2009 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-3,51-12-8, and51-12-9) must be construed together. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Damages which are uncertain, speculative, remote or conjectural are not recoverable. YMCA v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 146 S.E.2d 324 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 868, 87 S. Ct. 131, 17 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1966).

Georgia law requires that injury be natural and probable consequence of negligence. Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932); Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933); Douglas v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1978).

Negligence, to be actionable, must be proximate cause or part of proximate cause of injury received. Lacy v. City of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 814, 140 S.E.2d 144 (1964).

Before any negligence, even if proven, can be actionable, that negligence must be the proximate cause of the injuries sued upon. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Davidson, 148 Ga. App. 82, 251 S.E.2d 32 (1978).

Damages growing out of breach of contract, in order to form basis of recovery, must be such as could be traced solely to breach, be capable of exact computation, must have arisen according to the usual course of things, and be such as the parties contemplated as a probable result of such breach. Lankford v. Trust Co. Bank, 141 Ga. App. 639, 234 S.E.2d 179 (1977).

If damages are traceable to an act of negligence, but are not its legal or material consequence, or if other and contingent circumstances preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect, such damages are too remote and contingent to be the basis of a recovery. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Stanfield, 213 Ga. 436, 99 S.E.2d 209 (1957).

It is not necessary that original wrongdoer anticipate or foresee details of possible injury that may result from the wrongdoer's negligence, but it is sufficient if the wrongdoer should anticipate from the nature and character of the negligent act committed by the wrongdoer that injury might result as a natural and reasonable consequence of the wrongdoer's negligence. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

In order that a party be made liable for negligence, it is not necessary that the party should have contemplated or even been able to anticipate the particular consequences which ensued, or the precise injuries sustained by the plaintiff, but it is sufficient, if, by exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from the defendant's act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Words "proximate," "immediate," and "direct" are frequently used as synonymous. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Phrase "proximate cause" refers to efficient cause, and in this sense is sometimes referred to as the "immediate and direct" cause, as opposed to "remote." Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Efficient proximate or intervening cause is force or operating factor without which accident could not have happened and must be active, operative, and containing within itself the possibility of potentiality for harm. Cain v. Georgia Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483, 186 S.E. 229 (1936).

In determining what constitutes proximate cause, each case must depend for solution upon its own particular facts. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933).

In order to establish proximate cause, it is necessary that there be a causal connection between negligent act and injury. Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933).

There may be more than one proximate cause of injury, and the proximate cause of an injury may be two separate and distinct acts of negligence acting concurrently. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

When two concurrent acts of negligence operate in bringing about an injury the person injured may recover from either or both of the persons responsible. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

The mere fact that the injury would not have been sustained had only one of the acts of negligence occurred will not of itself operate to define and limit the other act as constituting the proximate cause, for, if both acts of negligence contributed directly and concurrently in bringing about the injury, they together will constitute the proximate cause. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949); Herren v. Abba Cab Co., 155 Ga. App. 443, 271 S.E.2d 11 (1980).

Now, if it appears that the injury resulted from a condition into which there entered both negligent and nonnegligent activities, and that according to the laws of human probability the injury would not have resulted but for the negligent activities, and that, when the negligent and nonnegligent activities united, the injury naturally followed, the law disregards the nonnegligent activities as causes, considers them as but a part of the normal environment, and considers the negligent actor as disturbing that normality, and therefore as being the juridic cause of the injury. Newill v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 48 Ga. App. 226, 172 S.E. 232 (1933).

- If two negligent acts are so related that the first would not probably have resulted in injury if the other had not occurred, and the latter amounts, to such a preponderating cause that it probably would have produced the injury even if the first negligence had not occurred, or if the author of the latter negligence, with the intermediate effects of the former negligence consciously before the author, is guilty of a new negligent act which preponderates in producing the injurious effect, we say that the first negligent cause is not the proximate cause, that the intervention of the latter negligence breaks the chain of causal connection so far as juridic purposes are concerned. Cain v. Georgia Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483, 186 S.E. 229 (1936).

To relieve the defendant from liability when both the defendant and a third party were negligent, it must appear that the negligence of the third party intervened and superseded the defendant's negligence. Herren v. Abba Cab Co., 155 Ga. App. 443, 271 S.E.2d 11 (1980).

Question of proximate cause is one for jury except in palpably clear and indisputable cases. Crankshaw v. Piedmont Driving Club, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 820, 156 S.E.2d 208 (1967).

Questions as to diligence and negligence, including contributory negligence, and what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the injury complained of, are questions peculiarly for the jury, except where the solution of the question appears to be palpably clear, plain, and indisputable. Brown v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 393, 167 S.E. 773 (1932).

The determination of questions as to negligence lies peculiarly within the province of the jury and in the exercise of this function, the question as to what constitutes the proximate cause of an injury complained of may be directly involved as one of the essential elements and disputed issues in the ascertainment of what negligence, as well as whose negligence, the injury is properly attributable to. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933).

The determination of the proximate cause of an injury is for determination by the jury except in clear and unmistakable cases, and not for determination as a matter of law by the court. Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933).

When the proximate cause of an injury depends upon a state of facts from which different minds might reasonably draw different inferences, it is a question for consideration by a jury. Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933).

Except in plain and indisputable cases, what negligence as well as whose negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury is for determination by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Whether injuries sued for by a plaintiff, and the damage resulting therefrom, when proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, either solely or concurrently with the negligence of other parties, is a question for the jury under the general rules of law applicable to the case. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

Ordinarily, the question of proximate cause is a question of fact properly for determination by the jury under appropriate instructions from the court as to the applicable principles of law. It is only in plain and indisputable cases that the court as a matter of law will undertake to determine it. Georgia Power Co. v. Womble, 150 Ga. App. 28, 256 S.E.2d 640 (1979).

- Only when it clearly appears from the petition that the negligence charged was not the proximate and effective cause of the injury that the court may upon general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), as a matter of law, so determine. Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932).

The court must assume the burden of deciding the question of proximate cause when a jury can draw but one reasonable conclusion if the facts alleged are proved, that conclusion being that the acts of the defendant were not the proximate cause of the injury. Crankshaw v. Piedmont Driving Club, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 820, 156 S.E.2d 208 (1967).

- The last clear chance doctrine is but a phase of proximate cause, and should, if desired to be given in charge, be specially requested. Wright v. Concrete Co., 107 Ga. App. 190, 129 S.E.2d 351 (1962).

- Failure to give the defendant's written request to charge in the language of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-8 was not error since the trial court instructed the jury on the principles found in the statute although not in the exact language requested. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Kneller, 194 Ga. App. 55, 390 S.E.2d 55 (1989), cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 55, 390 S.E.2d 55 (1990).

Cited in Harrison v. Constitution Publishing Co., 41 Ga. App. 102, 152 S.E. 131 (1930); Cochran v. Wadley S. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 208, 160 S.E. 706 (1931); Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 173 S.E. 443 (1934); Lawrence v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 444, 176 S.E. 75 (1934); Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935); Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943); East Ala. Coach Lines v. Boyd, 80 Ga. App. 93, 55 S.E.2d 634 (1949); Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Carr v. Jacuzzi Bros., 133 Ga. App. 70, 210 S.E.2d 16 (1974); Rhodes v. Levitz Furn. Co., 136 Ga. App. 514, 221 S.E.2d 687 (1975); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1976); LDH Properties, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 145 Ga. App. 132, 243 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Tyler, 161 Ga. App. 267, 291 S.E.2d 6 (1982); Baranan v. Fulton County, 250 Ga. 531, 299 S.E.2d 722 (1983); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Ross, 176 Ga. App. 221, 335 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 341 S.E.2d 250 (1986); Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welchel, 181 Ga. App. 224, 351 S.E.2d 645 (1986); Newman v. Collins, 186 Ga. App. 595, 367 S.E.2d 866 (1988); Williams v. Opriciu, 198 Ga. App. 663, 402 S.E.2d 744 (1991).

Applicability to Specific Cases

1. Lost Profits

Recovery may be had for loss of profits, provided their loss is proximate result of the defendant's wrong and the wrongs can be shown with reasonable certainty. The profits recoverable in such cases are limited to probable, as distinguished from possible benefits, and the profits must be such as would be expected to follow naturally the wrongful act and be certain both in their nature and the cause from which they proceed. Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949).

When the plaintiff seeks, as damages, the loss of expected profits and additional expenses incurred during the time that the plaintiff was away from the plaintiff's candy manufacturing business, while recuperating from the effects of the plaintiff's alleged injuries, and when it appears that the plant would probably have remained open and that production would have continued if the plaintiff's foreman had not also been absent on account of drunkenness, the alleged damages are remote, speculative, contingent, and uncertain. Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949).

Claim for damages by reason of loss of anticipated profits is too remote, conjectural, and speculative to afford basis for cause of action. Tovell v. Legum, 207 Ga. 193, 60 S.E.2d 339 (1950).

- The profits of a commercial business are dependent on so many hazards and chances that unless the anticipated profits are capable of ascertainment, and the loss of them traceable directly to the defendant's wrongful act, they are too speculative to afford a basis for the computation of damages. Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949); Georgia Grain Growers Ass'n v. Craven, 95 Ga. App. 741, 98 S.E.2d 633 (1957).

The general rule is that the expected profits of a commercial business are too uncertain, speculative, and remote to permit a recovery for their loss. Georgia Grain Growers Ass'n v. Craven, 95 Ga. App. 741, 98 S.E.2d 633 (1957); Roswell Apts., Inc. v. D.L. Stokes & Co., 105 Ga. App. 163, 123 S.E.2d 682 (1961).

Principle of remoteness is applicable to situations when intervening agency, such as negligence of another, preponderates in causing plaintiff's injury. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

- The rule that an intervening act may break the causal connection between an original act of negligence and injury to another is not applicable if the nature of such intervening act was such that it could have reasonably been anticipated or foreseen by the original wrongdoer. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690, 51 S.E.2d 705 (1949).

While the general rule is that if, subsequent to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the former must be considered as too remote, still if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act. Blakely v. Johnson, 220 Ga. 572, 140 S.E.2d 857 (1965); Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dowling, 111 Ga. App. 123, 140 S.E.2d 912 (1965); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Herren v. Abba Cab Co., 155 Ga. App. 443, 271 S.E.2d 11 (1980).

- The mere negligence of a third person in failing to guard against the defect or specific act or omission of the defendant which caused the injury will not constitute an intervening efficient act which will relieve the defendant from liability. But, when the evidence plainly and manifestly shows that the injury was caused by the intervening efficient act of the third person or the conjunctive acts or omissions of such person and the plaintiff, the defendant cannot be held responsible for having produced the injury, and the question is then one of law for determination by the court, and not one of fact for the jury. The liability of the defendant is limited to those consequences which it should reasonably have anticipated as the natural and probable result of its own act or omission. Georgia Power Co. v. Kinard, 47 Ga. App. 483, 170 S.E. 688 (1933).

The rule that an intervening and independent wrongful act of a third person producing the injury, and without which it would not have occurred, should be treated as the proximate cause, insulating and excluding the negligence of the defendant, would not apply if the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such wrongful act would be committed. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982).

- In a suit for damages, when it appears upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff the independent criminal act of a third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), but this general rule does not if the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that the criminal act would be committed. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Stanfield, 213 Ga. 436, 99 S.E.2d 209 (1957); Blakely v. Johnson, 220 Ga. 572, 140 S.E.2d 857 (1965).

3. Miscellaneous

No recovery for malpractice when no proof physician's acts proximately caused additional suffering.

- A plaintiff cannot recover for malpractice when there is not sufficient evidence that such physician's alleged failure to use the requisite degree of skill and diligence in treatment either proximately caused or contributed to cause the plaintiff additional suffering. Parrott v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 145 Ga. App. 113, 243 S.E.2d 269 (1978).

- Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of proximate causation, i.e., evidence within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the decedent would have survived but for the defendant's alleged negligence, based on the physician's decision to transfer the decedent to another hospital. Anthony v. Chambless, 231 Ga. App. 657, 500 S.E.2d 402 (1998).

In an action based on a non-sterile needle strike injury, because the plaintiffs offered no evidence of actual exposure to HIV or AIDS or hepatitis, their recovery for fear and mental anguish was per se unreasonable as a matter of law. Russaw v. Martin, 221 Ga. App. 683, 472 S.E.2d 508 (1996).

- When, in order to avoid a street obstruction, a person traveling in an automobile along the street went upon the track in front of a streetcar which the person saw approaching and which was in about 50 yards of the person, and was injured by being run into by the streetcar before the person could get off the track, although in going upon the track the person may have been negligent in misjudging the speed at which the streetcar was being operated, the person's negligence in this respect did not as a matter of law constitute the proximate cause of the injury and bar a recovery by the person when the operator of the streetcar saw the person go upon the track when 50 yards away, and was aware of the person's dangerous situation upon the track, and could afterwards, in the exercise of ordinary care, have checked the speed of the streetcar, and thereby avoided the injury, but on the contrary, accelerated the speed of the car, was a new operator, and, at the time of the injury, was negligently operating the car. Georgia Power Co. v. Mendelson, 45 Ga. App. 82, 163 S.E. 243 (1932).

One who is unlawfully ejected from train may recover all damages which proximately flow from expulsion, excluding all damages which, although in some measure traceable to the wrongful act, are not its natural and provable consequence. Devero v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 51 Ga. App. 699, 181 S.E. 421 (1935).

A recovery for damage which, after an illegal ejection, is sustained because of any resulting peril or resulting exposure or from a necessary effort to reach a place of security, is proper; but not damage which arises from needless exposure or unnecessary effort; any consequential damages also must be lightened so far as may be done by the use of ordinary care and diligence. Devero v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 51 Ga. App. 699, 181 S.E. 421 (1935).

Truck, stationary at curb, though illegally parked, cannot be proximate cause of accident to child who ran from behind it in front of another automobile, but was only an obstruction to the vision, which imposed upon the child and the driver of the other automobile an added duty to exercise care. Cain v. Georgia Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483, 186 S.E. 229 (1936).

- There was no evidence that the driver could have anticipated the drunk front seat passenger's suicidal criminal act before the fatal collision. Brown v. Mobley, 227 Ga. App. 140, 488 S.E.2d 710 (1997).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a driver on the owner's claim to recover the loan deficiency on the owner's wrecked vehicle as consequential damages because the owner had already been compensated for the fair market value of the wrecked vehicle and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-3(b),51-12-8, and51-12-9, the owner's outstanding vehicle loan amount was not the legal and natural consequence of the collision. McIntire v. Perkins, 317 Ga. App. 181, 729 S.E.2d 529 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1976, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 37 (Ga. 2013).

- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-8 did not apply when the only evidence was that the plaintiff's injuries were received in the accident in which the defendant admitted the defendant was negligent. Richardson v. Downer, 232 Ga. App. 721, 502 S.E.2d 744 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 834 S.E.2d 77 (2019).

Conduct of sheriff and the sheriff's deputies in transporting a felon was too remote to be the basis of recovery for the death of the plaintiff's husband, who was accidentally shot and killed by the felon using a gun wrested from a deputy during a successful escape attempt shortly before the shooting incident. Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga. App. 672, 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985).

- Since the owners of a restaurant suffered no physical impact or injury of any kind when bricks collapsed and caused damage to their restaurant, and it was clear from their testimony that their alleged mental anguish did not result from shock or fright at the trespass, but was a consequence of their worry and distress over the failure of their business and subsequent bankruptcy, damages traceable to the act, but which were not its legal and natural consequence, were too remote and contingent to be recovered. Broadfoot v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 755, 409 S.E.2d 870 (1991).

- Noting that Georgia courts and O.C.G.A. § 51-12-8 appeared to have not adopted a theory of liability premised on the mere "increased risk" of suffering from a future disease or injury, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia did not perceive the presence of subclinical effects from the workers' exposure to beryllium at the manufacturer employer's plant as a cognizable "injury" under Georgia law; thus, those workers who were alleged to have endured only such effects failed to cross the threshold hurdle the Georgia courts had erected for recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

- Plaintiff had no cognizable claim for damage to the plaintiff's credit reputation which could be attributed to the collapse of an adjacent building since there was evidence that the restaurant had been in financial trouble from the day the restaurant opened and had consistently lost money. Broadfoot v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 755, 409 S.E.2d 870 (1991).

- Appellate court affirmed a trial court's grant of partial summary judgment as it related to any claim by the property owner to recover for the cost of remediation of a potential contamination because the mere possibility or potential for bacterial contamination was insufficient to state a claim to damages for a continuing, abatable nuisance, but was reversed to the extent that the trial court granted summary judgment on any claim to recover for the remediation of any actual contamination found in the building. J. N. Legacy Group v. City of Dallas, 322 Ga. App. 475, 745 S.E.2d 721 (2013).

- When an employee forged mammogram reports, denial of summary judgment to the hospital was reversed because the plaintiffs failed to show that the plaintiffs suffered physical, emotional, or pecuniary injury as they consented to undergoing a second mammogram, the plaintiffs did not have breast cancer, and therefore failure of the radiologist to examine their mammography films did not exacerbate the plaintiffs' existing condition. Houston Hospitals, Inc. v. Felder, 351 Ga. App. 394, 829 S.E.2d 182 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1628, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 210 (Ga. 2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §§ 312, 334.

- 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 36 et seq.

- Right of landowner to recover for personal injuries incidental to trespass on his land, 32 A.L.R. 921.

Right of one who has acted for another to recover for damage to reputation or business in consequence of the latter's failure to keep his engagement with third persons, 42 A.L.R. 1094.

Liability of carrier which negligently delays transportation or delivery for loss of or damage to goods from causes for which it is not otherwise responsible, 46 A.L.R. 302.

Pain incident to surgical operation or medical treatment as an element of damages for personal injuries, 51 A.L.R. 1122.

Liability of one who leaves building materials accessible to children for injury to third person by child's act, 62 A.L.R. 833.

"Sentimental" losses, including mental anguish, loss of society, and loss of marital, filial, or parental care and guidance, as elements of damages in action for wrongful death, 74 A.L.R. 11.

Intervening criminal act as breaking causal chain, 78 A.L.R. 471.

Liability of manufacturer or packer of defective article for injury to person or property of ultimate consumer who purchased from a middleman, 88 A.L.R. 527; 105 A.L.R. 1502; 111 A.L.R. 1239; 140 A.L.R. 191; 142 A.L.R. 1490.

Liability of telegraph company for punitive damages for wrongful or negligent acts of employees as regards messages, 89 A.L.R. 356.

Increase in insurance rates or loss of opportunity to obtain insurance in consequence of another's tort as ground of liability, 92 A.L.R. 1205.

Inadequacy of appliance for purpose contemplated by safety appliance act as proximate cause of and ground of liability for injury to employee who was using it for another purpose, 96 A.L.R. 1138.

Sufficiency of instruction on contributory negligence as respects the element of proximate cause, 102 A.L.R. 411.

Measure of damages recoverable for loss of or failure to obtain employment for indefinite term, as result of telegraph company's breach of duty as to transmission or delivery of message, 103 A.L.R. 546.

Defect in street or highway as proximate cause of injury immediately caused by collision between two vehicles, 104 A.L.R. 1231.

Damage incident to travel on detour as part of recovery for wrongfully preventing or impeding use of highway, 106 A.L.R. 1305.

Negligence in repairing or servicing automobile as proximate cause of subsequent injury or damage, 118 A.L.R. 1129.

Nuisance as entitling owner or occupant of real estate to recover damages for personal inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance, anguish, or sickness, distinct from, or in addition to, damages for depreciation in value of property or its use, 142 A.L.R. 1307.

Damages on account of loss of earnings or impairment of earning capacity due to wife's personal injury as recoverable by her or by her husband, 151 A.L.R. 479.

Foreseeability as an element of negligence and proximate cause, 155 A.L.R. 157; 100 A.L.R.2d 942.

Loss of profits of a business in which plaintiff is interested as a factor in determining damages in action for personal injuries, 12 A.L.R.2d 288.

Proximate cause in malpractice cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11.

Seller's or manufacturer's liability for injuries as affected by buyer's or user's allergy or unusual susceptibility to injury from article, 26 A.L.R.2d 963.

Negligence causing dazed or stunned condition as proximate cause of injuries occasioned by such condition, 29 A.L.R.2d 690.

Liability of storekeeper for injury of customer by another customer's use or handling of stock or equipment, 42 A.L.R.2d 1103.

Liability of private person negligently causing malfunctioning, removal, or extinguishment of traffic signal or sign for subsequent motor vehicle accident, 64 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Admissibility, as against objection of remoteness, of evidence as to past earnings, upon issue as to amount of damages in an action for personal injury or death, 81 A.L.R.2d 733.

Obstruction of sidewalk as proximate cause of injury to pedestrian forced to go into street and there injured, 93 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Right of tort-feasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution from medical attendant causing new injury or aggravating injury in course of treatment, 8 A.L.R.3d 639.

Injury or disability resulting from medical treatment for accident as proximately caused by original accident within coverage of accident or disability insurance, 25 A.L.R.3d 1386.

Proximate cause: liability of tort-feasor for injured person's subsequent injury or reinjury, 31 A.L.R.3d 1000.

Products liability: alteration of product after it leaves hands of manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for product-caused harm, 41 A.L.R.3d 1251.

Profits of business as factor in determining loss of earnings or earning capacity in action for personal injury or death, 45 A.L.R.3d 345.

Absolute liability for blasting operations as extending to injury or damage not directly caused by debris or concussion from explosion, 56 A.L.R.3d 1017.

Recovery for mental anguish or emotional distress, absent independent physical injury, consequent upon breach of contract in connection with sale of real property, 61 A.L.R.3d 922.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from discrimination because of sex or marital status, 61 A.L.R.3d 944.

Proof of causation of intoxication as a prerequisite to recovery under Civil Damage Act, 64 A.L.R.3d 882.

Civil Damage Act: liability of one who furnishes liquor to another for consumption by third parties, for injury caused by consumer, 64 A.L.R.3d 922.

Liability of one causing physical injuries as a result of which injured party attempts or commits suicide, 77 A.L.R.3d 311.

Right of action at common law for damages sustained by plaintiff in consequence of sale of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drugs to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528; 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Recovery of anticipated lost profits of new business: post-1965 cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 507.

Social host's liability for injuries incurred by third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution from medical attendant aggravating injury or causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 A.L.R.4th 231.

Recovery for emotional distress based on fear of contracting HIV or AIDS, 59 A.L.R.5th 535.

Recovery for exposure to beryllium, 16 A.L.R.6th 143.

Validity, construction, and application of products liability statute precluding or limiting recovery where product has been altered or modified after leaving hands of manufacturer or seller, 13 A.L.R.7th 8.