2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-40. Liability for Acts of Intoxicated Persons

1. The General Assembly finds and declares that the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.
2. A person who sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury, death, or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, including injury or death to other persons; provided, however, a person who willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age, knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, or who knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is the proximate cause of such injury or damage. Nothing contained in this Code section shall authorize the consumer of any alcoholic beverage to recover from the provider of such alcoholic beverage for injuries or damages suffered by the consumer.
3. In determining whether the sale, furnishing, or serving of alcoholic beverages to a person not of legal drinking age is done willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, evidence that the person selling, furnishing, or serving alcoholic beverages had been furnished with and acted in reliance on identification as defined in subsection (d) of Code Section 3-3-23 showing that the person to whom the alcoholic beverages were sold, furnished, or served was 21 years of age or older shall constitute rebuttable proof that the alcoholic beverages were not sold, furnished, or served willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully.
4. No person who owns, leases, or otherwise lawfully occupies a premises, except a premises licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages, shall be liable to any person who consumes alcoholic beverages on the premises in the absence of and without the consent of the owner, lessee, or lawful occupant or to any other person, or to the estate or survivors of either, for any injury or death suffered on or off the premises, including damage to property, caused by the intoxication of the person who consumed the alcoholic beverages.

(Code 1981, §51-1-40, enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1692, § 1.)

- Sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons, § 3-3-22.

Sale of alcoholic beverages to underage persons, § 3-3-23.

- Ga. L. 1988, p. 1692, § 2, as amended by Ga. L. 1989, p. 301, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall apply only to causes of action which arise under Code Section 51-1-40 on or after the effective date of this Act [April 12, 1988]."

- For survey article on tort law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (2003). For annual survey of tort law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (2005). For survey article on tort law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 375 (2008). For annual survey of law on torts, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 317 (2010).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Commercial Environments
• Domestic Environments

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- Word "soon" in subsection (b) is sufficiently definite and certain in meaning to give notice to a seller that the seller could be held liable for injuries occurring four and one-half hours after the sale of alcohol to a minor; the dictates of due process do not demand that the word be construed as having so narrow a time frame as to exclude such an interval from the ambit of that section. Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).

§ 51-1-18(a). - Trial court erroneously denied a motion to dismiss a personal injury action filed by two parents against two social hosts, arising out the death of the parents' 20-year-old daughter, which alleged that the social hosts served the daughter alcohol, and the daughter died when the daughter drunkenly drove into a tree after leaving the social hosts' home, as the action was barred due to the fact that the daughter had already reached the age of majority at the time of the accident; moreover, because the daughter could not recover from the social hosts, neither could the parents recover under a wrongful death theory. Penny v. McBride, 282 Ga. App. 590, 639 S.E.2d 561 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0478, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 223 (Ga. 2007).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. - Punitive damages are not authorized against a server of alcohol under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f). O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f) provides that if the defendant acted or failed to act while under the influence of alcohol, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages against such an active tortfeasor; however, such damages shall not be the liability of any defendant other than an active tortfeasor, that is, the defendant acting under the influence of alcohol. Capp v. Carlito's Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779, 655 S.E.2d 232 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2008).

Term "consumer" as used in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 means one who purchases and consumes alcohol, then injures oneself; it does not refer to one who purchases and consumes alcohol, then is injured by another. Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland, 223 Ga. App. 812, 479 S.E.2d 401 (1996).

- Provider of alcohol is insulated from liability to third parties except as provided in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40; thus, in a wrongful death action against a fraternity arising from an accident caused by an intoxicated driver who consumed alcohol at a party sponsored by the fraternity, the trial court erred in denying the fraternity's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's general negligence claims. Kappa Sigma Int'l Fraternity v. Tootle, 221 Ga. App. 890, 473 S.E.2d 213 (1996).

Because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) afforded the plaintiff an exclusive remedy against the defendant tavern for damages arising from an accident caused by an employee of the defendant, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant on the claim based on common law general negligence principles. Hulsey v. Northside Equities, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 474, 548 S.E.2d 41 (2001).

- Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 does not impose liability upon one who merely furnishes the premises upon which alcohol is consumed. Viau v. Fred Dean, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 801, 418 S.E.2d 604, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 418 S.E.2d 604 (1992).

In a wrongful death action against a fraternity arising from an accident caused by an intoxicated driver, although the fraternity sponsored the party at which the driver consumed alcohol, that was insufficient to impose liability upon the fraternity since the fraternity did not furnish the alcohol consumed by the driver. Kappa Sigma Int'l Fraternity v. Tootle, 221 Ga. App. 890, 473 S.E.2d 213 (1996).

Neither the resident's allowance of underage drinking at the apartment nor the landlord's failure to call the police when drinking was detected was the proximate cause of death of a guest who was stabbed while attempting to break up a fight at the party. Hansen v. Etheridge, 232 Ga. App. 408, 501 S.E.2d 517 (1998).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a tavern's sole shareholder for individual liability on plaintiff's claims for negligent training and supervision because the general rule that an officer of a corporation who takes part in a tort is personally liable was inapplicable to claims against officers involving negligent training as a corporate officer's failure to properly train does not constitute sufficiently direct participation in a tort leading to a plaintiff's injuries. Barnes v. Smith, 339 Ga. App. 607, 794 S.E.2d 262 (2016).

Duty imposed on alcohol providers to protect third parties by not serving intoxicated patrons could not likewise be imposed on doctors treating patients and, thus, the doctor did not owe a duty to the decedent based on the doctor's provision of a medical certificate to the truck driver that the truck driver was physically fit to drive a commercial vehicle, when the truck driver died of preexisting coronary disease three months after receiving the certificate while driving a truck and the truck then struck the decedent's vehicle and killed the decedent. The doctor did not have any legal authority to restrain the truck driver for the benefit of the public, and, therefore, owed no duty to the decedent to not have provided the certificate to the truck driver. Houston v. Bedgood, 263 Ga. App. 139, 588 S.E.2d 437 (2003).

In an action arising from a patient's driving under the influence and killing another, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the psychiatrist as to the ordinary-negligence claim because the decedent's spouse cited no authority to support the implicit contention that the psychiatrist was required to initiate involuntary treatment on a patient any time the psychiatrist believed a patient was under the influence of alcohol. Graham Stanley v. Garrett, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 17, 2020).

- O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 does not preclude a cause of action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-18 so long as the damages sought are only those contemplated by the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. Leach v. Braswell, 804 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 8 F.3d 37 (11th Cir. 1993).

- Physician who administered medication to a patient who later was involved in an automobile accident was not under a duty similar to that imposed on providers of alcohol under O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-22 and51-1-40, as requiring health care providers to consider the risk of harm to third persons before prescribing medication would have been inconsistent with the physician-patient relationship. Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 252 Ga. App. 321, 556 S.E.2d 209 (2001).

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 or any other provision of Georgia law mandates that a provider of alcoholic beverages must prevent an intoxicated person from driving. Armstrong v. State, 244 Ga. App. 871, 537 S.E.2d 147 (2000).

- In an action alleging that the defendant willfully and knowingly sold beer to a third party who negligently caused the death of the plaintiff's decedent, the defendant properly asserted as a defense that the deceased assumed the risk of riding with the obviously intoxicated third party. Taylor v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 761, 519 S.E.2d 282 (1999).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err by entering a judgment against the defendant as to liability even though it was in default because the facts as alleged in the complaint, together with the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from those allegations, supported a claim against the defendant under the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40. Freese II, Inc. v. Mitchell, 318 Ga. App. 662, 734 S.E.2d 491 (2012).

- Circumstantial evidence provided by a deputy sheriff that the deputy found a motorist in an intoxicated condition four hours after the motorist left the host's party was insufficient to contradict the host's direct and positive evidence that the motorist was not noticeably intoxicated when the motorist was furnished alcoholic beverages at the party. McElroy v. Cody, 210 Ga. App. 201, 435 S.E.2d 618 (1993).

Evidence showing only that the defendant unlawfully sold beer to underaged purchasers, which later in the day was consumed by another underaged person who, while intoxicated, drove a motor vehicle, which was involved in a fatal accident, is not sufficient to establish liability O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40. Taylor v. N.I.L., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 99, 470 S.E.2d 491 (1996).

Employer was entitled to summary judgment when uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that the employer's employee, who was involved in an automobile collision, did not appear to be in a state of noticeable intoxication while at the employer's annual holiday luncheon prior to the accident. Birnbrey, Minsk & Minsk, L.L.C. v. Yirga, 244 Ga. App. 726, 535 S.E.2d 792 (2000).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) because scientific evidence of the driver's blood alcohol level created a genuine issue of material fact on the crucial issue of whether the driver was noticeably intoxicated at the time the driver was served a last drink by defendant tavern. Hulsey v. Northside Equities, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 474, 548 S.E.2d 41 (2001).

Summary judgment was properly granted dismissing motorists' suit against a restaurant under the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), for injuries sustained in a collision with one of the restaurant's patrons because the evidence did not present a question of fact as to whether the restaurant knew that the patron would be driving soon after leaving the premises. Sugarloaf Cafe, Inc. v. Willbanks, 279 Ga. 255, 612 S.E.2d 279 (2005).

- Given proof of spoliation under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-22, in an action filed against a tavern pursuant to Georgia's Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to an injured party's guardian as the tavern's manager was aware of the potential for litigation and failed to preserve whatever videotaped evidence might have been captured as to whether one of the tavern's intoxicated patron's would soon be driving; hence, a rebuttable presumption arose against the tavern that the evidence destroyed would have been harmful to the tavern, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., 282 Ga. 312, 647 S.E.2d 29 (2007).

- In a suit brought by an adoptive parent of a child pursuant to Georgia's Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, the adoptive parent was not entitled to recover for medical expenses incurred prior to the time that the child was adopted as the action to recover for a child's medical expenses does not become vested in the adopting parent until after the adoption becomes final. That a Medicaid lien may have been imposed upon any recovery that was obtained by the child did not alter the decision. Capp v. Carlito's Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779, 655 S.E.2d 232 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2008).

Commercial Environments

Statute applies to convenience stores.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 uses the terms "sells, furnishes, or serves" alcohol in the disjunctive, it is clear that the statute was intended to encompass the sale of an alcoholic beverage at places other than the proverbial dram shop; the statutory requirements of the Dram Shop Act, § 51-1-40, are straightforward and under the plain language of the statute are equally applicable to convenience stores and traditional dram shops. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368 (2011).

When a convenience store sells alcoholic beverages to a customer the store will often have an opportunity to observe how the customer arrived and, conversely, the manner in which he or she will depart and, thus, a convenience store may very well know if a customer will soon be driving a motor vehicle and does have an opportunity to observe the customer to determine if he or she appears to be noticeably intoxicated; if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the convenience store knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person who would soon be driving a motor vehicle, the convenience store would be entitled to summary judgment, and this is not to say that the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, cannot be applied to sales made by convenience stores as a matter of law, but each case must rise or fall on the case's own facts. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368 (2011).

- Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, does not require the seller of alcoholic beverages to know when or how much alcohol a purchaser will consume before the purchaser gets behind the wheel; the focus should be solely on a convenience store's knowledge as to whether the store's customer was noticeably intoxicated and would be driving soon because if a convenience store sells alcohol to such a customer, it is foreseeable that the customer will drive while intoxicated and injure an innocent third party, and if the plaintiff can prove that such sale of alcohol was a proximate cause of any injuries, the convenience store will be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b). Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368 (2011).

- The store clerk must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the elements of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 in order to be held liable. Jaques v. Kendrick, 43 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 1995).

Actual knowledge that a customer would be driving soon was not required since there was evidence that the defendant, a tavern, should have known that the customer would be driving. Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland, 223 Ga. App. 812, 479 S.E.2d 401 (1996).

Actual knowledge that the buyer is a minor and will be driving soon is not required; if one in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the recipient of the alcohol was a minor and would be driving soon, he or she will be deemed to have knowledge of that fact. Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).

Exclusion in comprehensive business liability insurance policy applying to sale of intoxicated beverages to a minor or to an intoxicated person excluded coverage for claims based on violations of statute on sales of alcohol to minors and drams shop law and was not void as against public policy. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 206 Ga. App. 193, 424 S.E.2d 803 (1992); Kirby v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 213 Ga. App. 673, 445 S.E.2d 791 (1994).

- The trial court erred by denying a motion for summary judgment when the uncontroverted evidence established that the defendant, a minor hosting an unattended party at the minor's parents' residence, watched as the minor's friend departed as a passenger in a vehicle which the minor understood would conduct the minor's friend home. Manuel v. Koonce, 206 Ga. App. 582, 425 S.E.2d 921 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).

Intermediate court erred in reinstating an injured party's Georgia Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, claim against an airline as the Georgia General Assembly intended to abrogate the common law principle that the negligent driver was the sole proximate cause of injuries resulting from an inebriated condition only in the limited case of a traditional land-based supplier of the alcohol. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 511, 614 S.E.2d 745 (2005).

Employer could not be held liable for injuries caused by the employer's employees to the plaintiff, a limousine service driver, on the ground that the employer provided alcoholic beverages to the employees because the employer arranged for the employees be transported home to prevent the employees from driving; the case did not fall within any exception delineated in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40. Ihesiaba v. Pelletier, 214 Ga. App. 721, 448 S.E.2d 920 (1994).

- Former employer was not liable to a former employee for injuries from an attack by the employee's former love interest, who was the employer's sole owner, after the former love interest became intoxicated at a company party, because the injuries were not the result of a vehicular accident caused by the employer's serving alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person. Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., 301 Ga. App. 565, 687 S.E.2d 924 (2009).

Trial court erred in denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in a guest's action to recover damages for injuries the guest sustained when an employee and an unidentified person assaulted the guest at a private party because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 foreclosed the guest's theory that the employer was negligent on the ground that the employer sponsored a party at which unlimited alcohol was served and that the service of alcohol to partygoers was a proximate cause of the guest's injuries; to the extent that the guest's assailants were intoxicated at the time of the assault and that the intoxication contributed to the assault, it was the assailants' consumption of alcohol, not the service of alcohol to the assailants', that could have been the proximate cause of the guest's injuries. B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011).

- Constructive knowledge is insufficient for liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 and when there was no evidence that the cashier knew of the other minor's presence, the cashier could not be said to have "willingly or knowingly" furnished the group with alcohol or to have known of the group's imminent driving. Jaques v. Lever, 831 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 43 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 1995).

- Seller, furnisher, or supplier of alcoholic beverages to a minor cannot be held liable for the negligent acts of a second minor intoxicated by such beverages when the seller is not alleged to have had actual knowledge of the second minor's presence and affiliation with the first. Perryman v. Lufran, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 654, 434 S.E.2d 112 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).

- A defendant will not be liable for serving alcohol unless the consumer of the alcohol is noticeably intoxicated when served. Thus, the plaintiff's evidence regarding the employee's level of intoxication, taken together with expert testimony that such a level of intoxication would produce manifestations of intoxication, was sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the employee was noticeably intoxicated at work where the drinking was occurring and, thereby, to avoid summary judgment. Northside Equities, Inc. v. Hulsey, 275 Ga. 364, 567 S.E.2d 4 (2002).

Summary judgment for a country club in an injured driver's suit under the Georgia Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, was affirmed when: (1) the admission of an additional statement, which the driver contended was not inadmissible hearsay, would not have changed the result; (2) the unrebutted evidence was that the country club did not serve alcoholic beverages to the tortfeasor while the tortfeasor was noticeably intoxicated or knew that the tortfeasor would be driving soon; and (3) the driver did not present any expert testimony to supplement the evidence of the tortfeasor's post-death blood alcohol level or to explain the liquid found in the tortfeasor's alimentary tract. Wright v. Pine Hills Country Club, 261 Ga. App. 748, 583 S.E.2d 569 (2003).

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of a restaurant in a negligence suit brought against the restaurant pursuant to Georgia's Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), wherein an adoptive parent brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries to a child who was injured in a motor vehicle accident in a vehicle driven by the intoxicated biological parent of the child, as the record revealed conflicting evidence on the issue as to whether the driving parent was noticeably intoxicated at the time of last service at the restaurant. As a result, the conflicting evidence was sufficient to have created a question of fact for a jury to determine, thereby making summary disposition of the matter inappropriate. Capp v. Carlito's Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779, 655 S.E.2d 232 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2008).

- Grant of summary judgment was reversed because direct evidence that the driver entered the store and shortly thereafter exited the store carrying packaged beer was circumstantial evidence that the driver purchased the beer in the store, and that circumstantial evidence pointed more strongly to a conclusion opposite to the direct testimony from the store employee that there was no sale of beer. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 570, 724 S.E.2d 870 (2012), overruled in part Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 485 (2015).

- Trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the bar in the passenger's Georgia Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, case; there was no evidence that the bar's employees should have known that the bar patron would be driving soon, there was no evidence that the patron had displayed the patron's keys or that the employees were familiar enough with the patron to know that the patron would be driving, and the fact that most patrons drove to the bar was insufficient to show that the server knew the patron would soon be driving. Becks v. Pierce, 282 Ga. App. 229, 638 S.E.2d 390 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 154 (2007).

- Widow's wrongful death action against a bar that served alcohol to her husband for 8 hours, and who then died in a one-vehicle crash, was barred by the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, which barred claims by consumers of alcohol; § 51-1-40 did not violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, because the legislature had the authority to enact legislation codifying the common law. Dion v. Y.S.G. Enters., 296 Ga. 185, 766 S.E.2d 48 (2014).

Domestic Environments

No parental liability for unattended minor son's gathering.

- The trial court erred by denying a motion for summary judgment when the uncontroverted evidence established that parents of a minor neither knew nor should have known their son had a propensity for making alcohol available to underage guests at their home during their absence, the parents left no alcohol in the home upon their departure and had strictly prohibited the use of alcohol during their absence. Manuel v. Koonce, 206 Ga. App. 582, 425 S.E.2d 921 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 did not apply in an action by parents under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-18, based on allegations that the defendants furnished alcoholic beverages to their son without their permission. Eldridge v. Aronson, 221 Ga. App. 662, 472 S.E.2d 497 (1996).

When evidence showed that the deceased was not driving when the deceased fell out of the Jeep, the statutory exception to the common law rule did not apply. Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom, 256 Ga. App. 83, 567 S.E.2d 728 (2002).

- Trial court properly granted the hosts' motion for summary judgment in an injured party's action under the Georgia Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), since: (1) the intoxicated driver's brother testified that the driver was not noticeably intoxicated at the party; (2) at the request of the driver's brother, the driver agreed to stay with the hosts after the party because the driver had been drinking; and (3) because there was direct evidence that the driver agreed not to drive soon, contrary knowledge could not be imputed to the hosts. Hodges v. Erickson, 264 Ga. App. 516, 591 S.E.2d 360 (2003).

- Trial court erred in denying a homeowner's motion for summary judgment in a dram shop action filed by a decedent's estate because the homeowner showed that: (1) there was no evidence in the record that, when a guest was in a state of noticeable intoxication, the homeowner knowingly furnished alcoholic beverages to the guest; and (2) after the guest's intoxication became apparent, the homeowner expressed concern that the guest not drive until the guest became sober, urged the guest to stay and rest as long as necessary, and offered to drive the guest home if the guest could not wait; because there was no evidence that the homeowner knew or should have known that the guest consumed additional alcoholic beverages after the guest became noticeably intoxicated, there was no record evidence that the homeowner knowingly furnished or served alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated guest. Shin v. Estate of Camacho, 302 Ga. App. 243, 690 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, No. S10C0965, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 528 (Ga. 2010).

- Tortfeasor's guilty plea to driving under the influence did not, by itself, make the homeowners, who had a party where the tortfeasor was not an invited guest, liable for the injuries sustained in the subsequent car accident. Erickson v. Hodges, 257 Ga. App. 144, 570 S.E.2d 420 (2002).

Cited in Steedley v. Huntley's Jiffy Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 23, 432 S.E.2d 625 (1993); Pass v. Bouwsma, 239 Ga. App. 902, 522 S.E.2d 484 (1999); La Cosecha, Inc. v. Hall, 246 Ga. App. 441, 540 S.E.2d 659 (2000); Powell v. Alan Young Homes, Inc., 251 Ga. App. 72, 554 S.E.2d 186 (2001); Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 801, 748 S.E.2d 281 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, § 452 et seq.

Negligent Failure to Detain Intoxicated Motorist, 1 POF3d 545.

Liability of Social Host for Negligent Driving of Intoxicated Adult Guest, 3 POF3d 697.

Dram Shop Litigation, 12 Am. Jur. Trials 729.

Liquor Provider Liability, 43 Am. Jur. Trials 527.

- 48A C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, § 824 et seq.

- Social host's liability for injuries incurred by third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Tort liability of college or university for injury suffered by student as a result of own or fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81.

Passenger's liability to vehicular accident victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R.4th 272.

Validity, construction, and effect of statute limiting amount recoverable in dram shop action, 78 A.L.R.4th 542.

Social host's liability for death or injuries incurred by person to whom alcohol was served, 54 A.L.R.5th 313.