2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-4. Slight Diligence and Gross Negligence Defined

In general, slight diligence is that degree of care which every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or similar circumstances. As applied to the preservation of property, the term "slight diligence" means that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, takes of his own property. The absence of such care is termed gross negligence.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2036; Code 1868, § 2037; Code 1873, § 2063; Code 1882, § 2063; Civil Code 1895, § 2900; Civil Code 1910, § 3473; Code 1933, § 105-203.)

- For article, "The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench," see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 85 (1992). For article, "Georgia Law Needs Clarification: Does it Take Willful or Wanton Misconduct to Defeat a Contractual 'Exculpatory' Clause, or Will Gross Negligence Suffice," see 19 Ga. St. B. J. 10 (Feb. 2014). For comment on Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga. App. 418, 79 S.E.2d 558 (1954), finding that the lower court erred in defining gross negligence as the "entire absence of care," see 16 Ga. B. J. 464 (1954). For comment on Austin v. Smith, 96 Ga. App. 659, 101 S.E.2d 169 (1958), concerning gross negligence in relation to gratuitous automobile guest, see 20 Ga. B. J. 552 (1958).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Specific Cases
• Pleading and Practice
• Jury Instructions
• Gross Negligence as Jury Question

General Consideration

Basic definitions.

- Applied to the preservation of property, slight diligence means that care which every person of common sense, howsoever inattentive the person may be, takes of one's own property. The absence of such care is termed gross negligence. Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613, 181 S.E. 142 (1935); Kimberly v. Reed, 79 Ga. App. 137, 53 S.E.2d 208 (1949).

"Gross negligence," as applicable to particular facts and circumstances is defined as "the want of slight care and diligence," "such care as careless and inattentive persons would usually exercise under the circumstances," "want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise," "carelessness manifestly materially greater than want of common prudence." Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

Absence of ordinary diligence is not "gross negligence." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Leader, 121 Ga. 260, 48 S.E. 972 (1904); Brown Store Co. v. Chattahoochee Lumber Co., 121 Ga. 809, 49 S.E. 839 (1905).

- While defined in terms of property, the rule enunciated in this section applies with equal force to diligence to prevent injury to the person. Capers v. Martin, 54 Ga. App. 555, 188 S.E. 465 (1936); Moore v. Shirley, 68 Ga. App. 38, 21 S.E.2d 925 (1942); Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948).

- Gross negligence should not be confused with willful and wanton misconduct. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Moore, 5 Ga. App. 562, 63 S.E. 642 (1909); Lanier v. Bugg, 32 Ga. App. 294, 123 S.E. 145 (1924).

Negligence, including gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct are not construed as synonymous terms. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

Gross negligence does not amount to willful and wanton disregard for the rights of others, and one may be guilty of gross negligence and still be in the exercise of some degree of care. Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948).

Willful or wanton conduct is a different standard than that of gross negligence. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Coastal Transmission Serv., Inc., 167 Ga. App. 611, 307 S.E.2d 83 (1983).

- Gross negligence is not regarded as the equivalent of willful and wanton negligence in this state, unless the evidence indicates that entire absence of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference, or that, with reckless indifference, the person acted with actual or imputed knowledge that the inevitable or probable consequence of one's conduct would be to inflict injury. Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1929); Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613, 181 S.E. 142 (1935); Dixon v. Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 56 Ga. App. 626, 193 S.E. 599 (1937).

- If a person knowingly goes into a place of danger, when there is no urgent necessity for the person to do so, the person is guilty of such gross negligence that as a matter of law the person cannot recover any damages for injury the person might sustain under such circumstances. Yarbrough v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 176 Ga. 780, 168 S.E. 873 (1933).

- Patient sued an emergency room physician for malpractice for failing to diagnose a leg fracture. As the physician sought no orthopedic consult because a radiologist opined that the x-rays showed no serious fracture, the patient could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the physician acted with gross negligence, as required under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c); thus, the physician was entitled to summary judgment. Pottinger v. Smith, 293 Ga. App. 626, 667 S.E.2d 659 (2008).

- In an action for claims arising from a commercial property lease agreement, the trial court erred in denying the lessor's motion for partial summary judgment on the lessee's claim of gross negligence in the lessor's selection of a vendor to repair the roofs because the lessee did not identify any evidence that the lessor was indifferent to whether the roofing vendor it selected would do a good job or that it otherwise acted without even slight care when choosing the roofing contractor; and the lessee did not identify any evidence that the lessor acted without even slight care with regard to the quality of work of its chosen contractor. West Asset Mgmt. v. NW Parkway, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 775, 784 S.E.2d 147 (2016).

- Landowner was entitled to the protections from liability provided by the Georgia Prescribed Burning Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-6-148, because even assuming there was evidence sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether the landowner was negligent in some way while starting, controlling, or completing a prescribed burn, there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the landowner failed to exercise slight diligence and was, therefore, grossly negligent; according to the chief ranger with the local office of the forestry service, there was nothing actually physically that a landowner could do to stop a prescribed burn from smoldering or to prevent the resulting smoke, and an expert witness's argument that the landowner should have ignored the ranger's recommendations and should not have conducted the burn in order to ensure that the public would be protected from any possibility that smoke would emanate from the landowner's property clearly undermined the express purposes behind the Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-6-145 et seq. Morgan v. Horton, 308 Ga. App. 192, 707 S.E.2d 144 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1028, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 533 (Ga. 2011).

After the plaintiff was injured when the truck the plaintiff was riding in struck a fallen power cable in the roadway, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant as the Prescribed Burning Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-6-145 et seq., shielded the defendant from liability because the defendant's employees did not fail to ensure that the fire was adequately confined before leaving the area; and, even if the controlled burn was the source of the fire that burned the power pole, that did not establish that the defendant's employees were grossly negligent as the employees exercised at least slight diligence in handling the controlled burn because the employees cut firebreaks; patrolled the area; doused hot spots; and returned later that evening and extinguished a nearby fire. Patton v. Cumberland Corp., 347 Ga. App. 501, 819 S.E.2d 898 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0341, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 428 (Ga. 2019).

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-4, no reasonable juror could find that gross negligence occurred regarding reporting or preventing a fire because, although the security guard and the defendant homeowners' association may have been "inattentive" in the overseeing and monitoring of the surveillance cameras, their actions did not rise to the level of gross negligence. The primary purpose of monitoring the cameras was to maintain the security of access points and to prevent crime, not to prevent residential fires. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2010).

Cited in Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921); Arnold v. Darby, 49 Ga. App. 629, 176 S.E. 914 (1934); Cain v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 190 S.E. 371 (1937); White v. Boyd, 58 Ga. App. 219, 198 S.E. 81 (1938); Roberts v. Ethridge, 73 Ga. App. 400, 36 S.E.2d 883 (1946); Cedrone v. Beck, 74 Ga. App. 488, 40 S.E.2d 388 (1946); Barbre v. Scott, 75 Ga. App. 524, 43 S.E.2d 760 (1947); Parker v. Johnson, 97 Ga. App. 261, 102 S.E.2d 917 (1958); Barrow v. Georgia Lightweight Aggregate Co., 103 Ga. App. 704, 120 S.E.2d 636 (1961); Hines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App. 76, 120 S.E.2d 892 (1961); Porter v. Jack's Cookie Co., 106 Ga. App. 497, 127 S.E.2d 313 (1962); James Talcott, Inc. v. Carder, 300 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1962); Meeks v. Johnson, 112 Ga. App. 760, 146 S.E.2d 121 (1965); Ray Wright Enters., Inc. v. Reaves, 128 Ga. App. 745, 197 S.E.2d 856 (1973); Smith v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 152 Ga. App. 664, 263 S.E.2d 469 (1979); Levine v. Keene, 178 Ga. App. 832, 344 S.E.2d 684 (1986); Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

Applicability to Specific Cases

1. Automobiles

- Jury would be authorized to find that a person who failed without cause to observe a dangerous but clearly visible "isle of safety" in a street would be guilty of gross negligence. Smith v. Hodges, 44 Ga. App. 318, 161 S.E. 284 (1931).

Evidence that the defendant, driving at 25 m.p.h., turned around briefly when children in the back seat spilled a bottle of milk, causing the car to strike a telegraph pole, did not show that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence. Tucker v. Andrews, 51 Ga. App. 841, 181 S.E. 673 (1935).

When several witnesses in a suit by a passenger for injuries received in an accident testified that a part of the defendant's car entered the wrong side of the road at a distance of from 100 yards to 15 yards from the point of collision and continued along such path, and when the other driver in the collision testified that "I dimmed my headlights, pulled over farther to the right, and when the approaching car was very near to mine it cut across the road to the left suddenly, striking the left front of my car," the jury was authorized to find that the act of the defendant amounted to gross negligence. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp. v. Newlin, 56 Ga. App. 428, 192 S.E. 915 (1937).

While there were no allegations and no evidence that the speed at which the defendant was operating an automobile was in violation of the law or of any ordinance, or that the failure to stop before entering the intersection was a violation of any ordinance, nevertheless, the jury was authorized to find that such acts on the part of the defendant, occurring as they did in a thickly populated section on a heavily traveled thoroughfare, together with the defendant's further act of looking to the rear for a period of three to five seconds, long enough to travel 200 to 225 feet, was gross negligence on the defendant's part and was authorized to award the plaintiffs damages on this theory. Chastain v. Lawton, 87 Ga. App. 35, 73 S.E.2d 38 (1952).

Finding is authorized that the defendant is guilty of gross negligence in taking a chance of meeting and passing another automobile on a familiar, narrow, country dirt road when there is barely room to pass, when about 3 feet of the defendant's side of the road are obstructed by limbs of trees, and in turning briefly to the defendant's left to avoid the obstructions with only a guess as to whether the defendant has time to get back on the defendant's side, especially since he knows that another automobile is approaching. Sutherland v. Woodring, 103 Ga. App. 205, 118 S.E.2d 846 (1961).

When evidence disclosed that the driver failed to heed the traffic signal, failed to keep a lookout for traffic, and failed to adhere to the speed limit, such a combination of circumstances would authorize a jury to find gross negligence. McDaniel v. Gysel, 155 Ga. App. 111, 270 S.E.2d 469 (1980).

In order for guest passenger to recover against host driver, the jury must find the host driver grossly negligent. Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1929); Meddin v. Karsman, 41 Ga. App. 282, 152 S.E. 601 (1930); Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp. v. Newlin, 56 Ga. App. 428, 192 S.E. 915 (1937); Sammons v. Webb, 86 Ga. App. 382, 71 S.E.2d 832 (1952); McGowan v. Camp, 87 Ga. App. 671, 75 S.E.2d 350 (1953); McDaniel v. Gysel, 155 Ga. App. 111, 270 S.E.2d 469 (1980).

- When a person who is in an automobile which is being operated by another takes the steering wheel and undertakes to steer the automobile, and while so doing fails to look ahead and observe the course of the automobile, but gives the passenger's attention to what the operator is doing, and when the automobile while thus being steered collides with a telegraph pole, and as a result of the collision a person on the back seat is thrown forward and sustains a fracture of the collar bone and the shoulder blade and other injuries from the effects of which the person is confined in a hospital for several months, the inference is authorized that the person in taking the steering wheel and steering the automobile, under the circumstances, was guilty of gross negligence. McCord v. Benford, 48 Ga. App. 738, 173 S.E. 208 (1934).

- It has long been the rule in this state that one riding by invitation and gratuitously in another's automobile cannot recover for injury caused by the other's negligence in driving, unless it amounted to gross negligence. However, effective July 1, 1982, the "guest passenger" rule cited above was changed by O.C.G.A. § 51-1-36, stating: "The operator of a motor vehicle owes to passengers therein the same duty of ordinary care owed by others." Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

- Trial court did not err in refusing to apply O.C.G.A. § 51-1-36, changing the "guest passenger" rule as to the duty owed by an automobile operator to passengers to ordinary care, to a case involving a January 1981 accident, since, although a statute is "remedial" which affects only the procedure and practice of the courts and thus may be retroactive in application, the "guest passenger" rule established the duty owed by an automobile owner or operator to a nonpaying guest passenger, and there is nothing in the enactment of § 51-1-36 which discloses a legislative intent to apply the terms thereof retroactively. Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

- Although speed coupled with other circumstances may amount to gross negligence, when the record is devoid of any other circumstances which could be coupled with the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant was driving too fast for conditions, the plaintiffs have failed to make the requisite showing of gross negligence. Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

Gross negligence, such as will authorize recovery by guest in automobile against a host, must be expressly pled, unless the facts alleged in the petition are such as to demand the inference of its existence. Capers v. Martin, 54 Ga. App. 555, 188 S.E. 465 (1936).

- Allegations that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence in willfully and deliberately driving the automobile into a ditch at the side of the road, without warning the petitioner of the petitioner's intention to do so, are not subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground that they are a mere conclusion of the pleader without any facts alleged on which to base such charge of gross negligence. Frank v. Horovitz, 52 Ga. App. 651, 183 S.E. 835 (1936).

- When the gravamen of the action alleged is gross negligence, the characterization in the petition of the act of negligence as willful and wanton is a mere conclusion of the pleader and may be treated as surplusage if it be regarded as attempting to allege willful and wanton misconduct, and does not affect the sufficiency of a cause of action for gross negligence. Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613, 181 S.E. 142 (1935).

- When a petition, in a suit against two defendants, alleges that the plaintiff, while riding in the automobile which was owned by the defendant husband and at the time was being operated by the defendant wife, was injured by the automobile's overturning on the road as a result of the blow-out of a tire and the sudden application of the brakes by the driver while the plaintiff was riding in the car either as a guest or in attendance on business for either the husband or the wife, and that the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the alleged negligence of both defendants, the allegations are sufficient as charging gross negligence against both defendants in the maintenance and operation of the automobile under the circumstances indicated and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Ragsdale v. Love, 50 Ga. App. 900, 178 S.E. 755 (1935).

- When the plaintiff sets forth facts and alleges acts of omission and commission on the part of the defendant which amount to gross negligence, and thereafter sets forth additional facts which would give rise to a duty on the part of the defendant to exercise ordinary care, and alleges that the same acts of omission and commission amount to ordinary neglect, such allegations would not be inconsistent, since any acts of omission or commission which amounted to the want of that care which is characterized as gross negligence would necessarily show an absence of that care which amounts to ordinary neglect. Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1929).

- While the rule of evidence expressed in the maxim res ipsa loquitur may make out a prima facie case of ordinary negligence, it is insufficient in itself to make out a prima facie case of gross negligence. Minkovitz v. Fine, 67 Ga. App. 176, 19 S.E.2d 561 (1942).

Court in undertaking to give definition of this section should not omit the words, "how inattentive soever he may be." Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Ga. 434, 38 S.E. 964 (1901); Seaboard & R.R. v. Cauthen, 115 Ga. 422, 41 S.E. 653 (1902).

It is error for trial court to use the words "entire absence of care" in defining gross negligence when the use of such expression can be interpreted as meaning that in order to prove gross negligence an entire absence of care must be proved. Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga. App. 418, 79 S.E.2d 558 (1953).

- When a case was based on gross negligence by the pleadings and the evidence, and not on willful and wanton negligence or misconduct, it was error for the court to charge the jury that if it found from the evidence that the driver of the car showed that entire absence of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference, or that the driver acted with reckless indifference, or with actual or imputed knowledge that the inevitable or probable consequences of the driver's conduct would be to inflict injury, the jury would be authorized to find that the driver's conduct amounted to gross negligence, as this charge placed too great a burden on the plaintiff. Dixon v. Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 56 Ga. App. 626, 193 S.E. 599 (1937).

Entire absence of care would generally, if not always, result in wanton misconduct; also, charging the entire absence of care as a part of the definition of gross negligence would very likely confuse the jury and cause the jury to assume that before one could be guilty of gross negligence there must be an entire absence of care. Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga. App. 418, 79 S.E.2d 558 (1953).

When judge gave elaborate definition of gross negligence and later in charge gave exact definition appearing in this section, the two definitions are in no wise conflicting. Hatcher v. Bray, 88 Ga. App. 344, 77 S.E.2d 64 (1953).

Gross Negligence as Jury Question

When jury question is presented.

- Jury question is presented only when reasonable men could disagree as to whether the facts alleged constitute gross negligence. Harris v. National Evaluation Sys., 719 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990).

When a community service participant was assigned to work for the county sanitation department and was killed after falling from the back of a garbage truck while doing this work, no liability could be assigned for assigning the participant to work for the department, as it was properly authorized to participate in the community service program, but the facts that the participant was not issued safety shoes issued to department employees and was told to ride on the back of the truck, even though it was going over 10 miles per hour on a busy highway, contrary to department policy, created a fact issue as to the county's gross negligence, under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-4, and willful misconduct; therefore, the county was not entitled to summary judgment, under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-71(d). Currid v. DeKalb State Court Prob. Dep't, 274 Ga. App. 704, 618 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Services provided by an emergency room physician to a patient who presented with a high pressure puncture wound to one hand were "bona fide emergency services" under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(a)(5), and the physician was therefore only liable if grossly negligent; evidence that the physician failed to contact a hand surgeon for 7 hours after determining that emergency surgery was necessary was sufficient to go to the jury. Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).

Questions of negligence and diligence, even of gross negligence and slight diligence, are as a rule to be determined by the jury, and should not be settled by the court as a matter of law, except in plain and indisputable cases. Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613, 181 S.E. 142 (1935); Frank v. Horovitz, 52 Ga. App. 651, 183 S.E. 835 (1936); Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp. v. Newlin, 56 Ga. App. 428, 192 S.E. 915 (1937); Moore v. Shirley, 68 Ga. App. 38, 21 S.E.2d 925 (1942); Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948); Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948); Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S.E.2d 102 (1955); Pannell v. Fuqua, 111 Ga. App. 18, 140 S.E.2d 280 (1965); McDaniel v. Gysel, 155 Ga. App. 111, 270 S.E.2d 469 (1980).

When one driving an automobile is so inattentive as to look to the side and not keep a constant lookout ahead, when there is an object in the driver's path which is clearly visible that the driver might run into, the question is ordinarily one for the jury as to whether, under all of the proven relevant facts and circumstances of the case, the driver's failure to exercise the precaution of looking along the street ahead of the vehicle is gross negligence. Capers v. Martin, 54 Ga. App. 555, 188 S.E. 465 (1936).

In an action by a gratuitous invited guest against the owner of the automobile in which the guest was riding when injured, the allegations of the petition presented a jury question as to whether the driver was guilty of gross negligence. Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948).

While violation of the speed laws alone would not in and of itself constitute gross negligence, and the violation of a state law by the driver of an automobile does not necessarily amount to gross negligence, it cannot be said as a matter of law that one driving an automobile 70 miles per hour around a 45 degree curve, and attempting to pass another automobile on such curve, is not guilty of gross negligence; this would be a question for the jury. Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948).

Exact point when ordinary negligence or lack of ordinary care passes into and becomes willful and wanton negligence is jury question, under definite instruction from the trial judge that the facts must show that the failure to exercise ordinary care was not only negligence but that it amounted to willful and wanton negligence. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935).

- Because a doctor provided care to a patient who had received a high pressure puncture wound to the patient's hand that required emergency surgery, it was clear that the heightened burden of proving gross negligence for emergency services in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) was applicable. The facts were sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of gross negligence. Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).

Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a fitness facility because a decedent who drowned in the facility's pool had signed a valid exculpatory agreement that waived the facility's liability for negligence and the facility's lifeguards had not acted grossly negligently pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-4 in turning their attention to a maintenance duty because: (1) there were few swimmers in the pool; (2) the decedent was an experienced swimmer who was in training to be a military rescue swimmer; and (3) upon discovering that the decedent was unconscious for three to five minutes, the lifeguards began immediate rescue and resuscitation efforts; further, the facility's failure to follow Red Cross safety standards did not constitute gross negligence because there was no evidence that the facility was required to follow such standards. Flood v. Young Woman's Christian Ass'n of Brunswick, Ga., Inc., 398 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 57A Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, §§ 5 et seq., 218 et seq., 227 et seq., 239.

- 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 1 et seq.

- Automobiles: liability of owner or operator for injury to guest, 20 A.L.R. 1014; 26 A.L.R. 1425; 40 A.L.R. 1338; 47 A.L.R. 327; 51 A.L.R. 581, 61 A.L.R. 1252, 65 A.L.R. 952; 61 A.L.R. 1252; 65 A.L.R. 952.

Duty of carrier to guard young children against danger of falling from car, 28 A.L.R. 1035.

What amounts to gross or wanton negligence in driving an automobile precluding the defense of contributory negligence, 72 A.L.R. 1357; 92 A.L.R. 1367; 119 A.L.R. 654.

What constitutes gross negligence or the like, within statute limiting liability of owner or operator of automobile for injury to guest, 74 A.L.R. 1198; 86 A.L.R. 1145; 96 A.L.R. 1479.

Who is a guest within contemplation of statute regarding liability of owner or operator of motor vehicle for injury to guest, 82 A.L.R. 1365; 95 A.L.R. 1180.

Test or criterion of gross negligence or other misconduct that will support recovery of exemplary damages for bodily injury or death unintentionally inflicted, 98 A.L.R. 267.

Automobiles: gross negligence, recklessness, or the like, within "guest" statute or rule, predicated upon manner of operating car on curve or hill, 136 A.L.R. 1270.

Conduct of operator of automobile at railroad crossing as gross negligence, recklessness, etc., within guest statute, 143 A.L.R. 1144.

Custom or practice of drivers of motor vehicles as affecting question of negligence, 172 A.L.R. 1141; 77 A.L.R.2d 1327.

Custom or practice of drivers of motor vehicles as affecting question of negligence, 77 A.L.R.2d 1327.

Payments or contributions by or on behalf of automobile rider as affecting his status as guest, 10 A.L.R.2d 1351.

Guest's knowledge that automobile driver has been drinking as precluding recovery, under guest statutes or equivalent common-law rule, 15 A.L.R.2d 1165.

Propriety of granting summary judgment in case involving issue of gross or wanton negligence, 50 A.L.R.2d 1309.

Mutual business or commercial objects or benefits as affecting status of rider under automobile guest statute, 59 A.L.R.2d 336.

Applicability of guest statute where motor vehicle accident occurs on private way or property, 64 A.L.R.2d 694.

Intoxication, unconsciousness, or mental incompetency of person as affecting his status as guest within automobile guest statute or similar common-law rule, 66 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Applicability of res ispa loquitur doctrine where motor vehicle turns over on highway, 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Applicability of guest statute and its requirement of gross negligence, wanton or wilful misconduct, or the like, to owner's liability for injuries to guest in vehicle negligently entrusted to incompetent driver, 91 A.L.R.2d 323.

Liability, under guest statutes, of driver or owner of motor vehicle for running over or hitting person attempting to enter the vehicle, 1 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Speed, alone or in connection with other circumstances, as gross negligence, wantonness, recklessness, or the like, under automobile guest statute, 6 A.L.R.3d 769.

Gross negligence, recklessness, or the like, within "guest" statute, predicated upon conduct in passing cars ahead or position of car on wrong side of the road, 6 A.L.R.3d 832.

Share-the-ride arrangement or car pool as affecting status of automobile rider as guest, 10 A.L.R.3d 1087.

Liability insurance as covering accident, damage, or injury due to wanton or wilful misconduct or gross negligence, 20 A.L.R.3d 320.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff must prove active or gross negligence, willful misconduct, recklessness, or the like, 23 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Nonmonetary benefits or contributions by rider as affecting his status under automobile guest statute, 39 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Automobile guest statute: status of rider as affected by payment, amount of which is not determined by expenses incurred, 39 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Payments on expense-sharing basis as affecting guest status of automobile passenger, 39 A.L.R.3d 1224.