2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-12. Liability for Ratifying Tort

By ratification of a tort committed for his own benefit, the ratifier becomes as liable as if he had commanded that it be committed. A person ratifying a tort does not become liable, however, if the act was done for the benefit of a third person.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2906; Code 1868, § 2912; Code 1873, § 2963; Code 1882, § 2963; Civil Code 1895, § 3820; Civil Code 1910, § 4416; Code 1933, § 105-109.)

- For annual survey of labor and employment law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2006).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Specific Cases

There can be no ratification unless the act was done for the master, or at least, purported to be done for the master. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117, 185 S.E. 147 (1936); Parry v. Davison-Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1952).

There is no such thing as a master assuming, by ratification, liability for an act of another in which the master had no part. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117, 185 S.E. 147 (1936); Parry v. Davison-Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1952).

- As a general rule, in order that a ratification of an unauthorized act or transaction may be valid and binding, it is essential that the principal have full knowledge, at the time of the ratification, of all material facts and circumstances relative to the unauthorized act or transaction, or that some one authorized to represent the principal, except the agent, have such knowledge, unless the principal is willfully ignorant or purposely refrains from seeking information. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 56 Ga. App. 15, 192 S.E. 56 (1937).

Ratification of tort is question of intention, which should be referred to a jury when there is in the petition a clear allegation of facts tending to support that allegation. Estridge v. Hanna, 55 Ga. App. 159, 189 S.E. 364 (1936).

Intention to ratify may often be presumed by the law from the conduct of the principal, and that presumption may be conclusive, even against the actual intention of the principal, when the principal's conduct has been such that it would be inequitable to others to permit the principal to assert that the principal has not ratified the unauthorized act of the principal's agent. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 56 Ga. App. 15, 192 S.E. 56 (1937).

Retention of servant after commission of tort may be implied ratification. Gasway v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 58 Ga. 216 (1877).

- Since the employee was acting exclusively for the employee and was not acting at all for the master, and did not profess to be acting for the employer, the mere retaining of the servant after knowledge of the servant's tort would not constitute ratification binding the master. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117, 185 S.E. 147 (1936); Parry v. Davison-Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1952).

Cited in Harrison v. Kiser, 79 Ga. 588, 4 S.E. 320 (1887); Crockett Bros. v. Sibley, 3 Ga. App. 554, 60 S.E. 326 (1908); Smith v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 72 Ga. App. 186, 33 S.E.2d 360 (1945); Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co., 117 Ga. App. 22, 159 S.E.2d 734 (1967).

Applicability to Specific Cases

Conduct beyond scope of employment.

- When the conduct of the chauffeur took the chauffeur outside the scope of the chauffeur's employment and when the chauffeur's conduct was a complete departure, instead of a deviation or detour incidental to the chauffeur's employment, the mere retention of the employee, after knowledge of all the facts, would not constitute ratification on the part of the employer. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117, 185 S.E. 147 (1936).

Because a co-employee who sexually harassed an employee was acting exclusively for self interest and was not acting at all for the employer, although the actions occurred in the course of the employment, the actions did not arise out of the employment, and the employer could not be held liable under a vicarious liability theory of either respondeat superior or ratification for the co-employee's actions pursuant to common law and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-12; accordingly, the employer should have been granted summary judgment on the employee's claim to that effect. Travis Pruitt & Assocs., P.C. v. Hooper, 277 Ga. App. 1, 625 S.E.2d 445 (2005).

- When the doctor to whom a heart was taken for the purpose of dissection was either specially or generally employed by the defendant insurance company to dissect the heart of the deceased spouse of the plaintiff, and that the doctor did dissect and mutilate the heart, all without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and thereafter reported to the insurance company that the doctor had done so, and the insurance company paid the doctor for the doctor's services in the matter, a cause of action against the defendant insurance company existed. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 56 Ga. App. 15, 192 S.E. 56 (1937).

- When the designated examiner of the defendant insurance company directed defendant A to employ defendant B, a doctor, to remove the heart of the deceased spouse of the plaintiff and deliver the heart to another doctor for the purpose of dissection, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and that the second doctor did dissect the said heart, and that the insurance company ratified the acts of A and B by paying the two doctors for their services, but the insurance company did not have any knowledge of the act of A or B, or received or retained any benefit therefrom, and when defendant A is joined with defendant B and the insurance company as joint tort-feasors in an action for damages on account of the alleged unauthorized removal, and mutilation of the heart, a cause of action as to the acts of A and B, against the defendant insurance company under any theory of agency or of ratification of an unauthorized act did not exist. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 56 Ga. App. 15, 192 S.E. 56 (1937).

- Petition set forth no cause of action against the defendant employer on the grounds of condonation and ratification of the acts of its employees, since the two employees had departed from the prosecution of the master's business and begun a separate scheme of their own, from which no benefit could possibly inure to the master. Parry v. Davison-Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1952).

- Mere statement of the defendant that the defendant's insurance company would pay for the damages to the automobile would not in itself authorize a finding that the defendant ratified the acts of the nephew of the cropper who worked the defendant's farm and would not in itself authorize a finding that the defendant had admitted liability. Cox v. Estes, 96 Ga. App. 649, 101 S.E.2d 107 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Torts, § 64 et seq.

- 86 C.J.S., Torts, § 33.

- Liability of wife for husband's torts, 12 A.L.R. 1459.

What amounts to ratification by principal or master of libel or slander by agent or servant, 139 A.L.R. 1066.

Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negligence of physician or surgeon, 69 A.L.R.2d 305.

Parents' liability for injury or damage intentionally inflicted by minor child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974.

Liability of estate for tort of executor, administrator, or trustee, 82 A.L.R.3d 892.

Principal's liability for punitive damages because of false arrest or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 A.L.R.3d 826.

Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 235.