2020 Georgia Code
Title 50 - State Government
Chapter 21 - Waiver of Sovereign Immunity as to Actions Ex Contractu; State Tort Claims
Article 2 - State Tort Claims
§ 50-21-24. Exceptions to State Liability

The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from:

1. An act or omission by a state officer or employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance, whether or not such statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance is valid;
2. The exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused;
3. The assessment or collection of any tax or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer;
4. Legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutorial action or inaction;
5. Administrative action or inaction of a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial nature;
6. Civil disturbance, riot, insurrection, or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method of providing, law enforcement, police, or fire protection;
7. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights;
8. Inspection powers or functions, including failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property other than property owned by the state to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law, regulation, code, or ordinance or contains a hazard to health or safety;
9. Licensing powers or functions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
10. The plan or design for construction of or improvement to highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public works where such plan or design is prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design;
11. Financing regulatory activities, including, but not limited to, examinations, inspections, audits, or other financial oversight activities;
12. Activities of the Georgia National Guard or organized militia as defined in Code Section 38-2-2 when engaged in state or federal training or duty, but this exception does not apply to vehicular accidents; or
13. Any failure or malfunction occurring before December 31, 2005, which is caused directly or indirectly by the failure of computer software or any device containing a computer processor to accurately or properly recognize, calculate, display, sort, or otherwise process dates or times, if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was unforeseeable or if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was foreseeable but the plan or design or both for identifying and preventing the failure or malfunction was prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted computer and information system design standards in effect at the time of the preparation of the plan or design.

(Code 1981, §50-21-24, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 850, § 2; Ga. L. 2018, p. 161, § 1/HB 309.)

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, inserted "or organized militia as defined in Code Section 38-2-2" in paragraph (12).

- For review of 1998 legislation relating to state government, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 245 (1998). For article, "Torts," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (2001). For survey article on trial practice and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 439 (2003). For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004). For annual survey of law of torts, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 415 (2004). For annual survey of administrative law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2005). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (2007).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Discretionary Functions
• Application
• Georgia Forestry Commission.

General Consideration

Contribution and indemnity.

- Georgia Torts Claim Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., waived sovereign immunity for suits seeking contribution and indemnity from the state when the state was a joint tortfeasor if the state's tortious activity did not fall within one of the waiver exceptions listed in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. DOT v. Montgomery Tank Lines, Inc., 276 Ga. 105, 575 S.E.2d 487 (2003).

§ 50-21-24(7). - O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) is not limited in application to acts taken by a state officer or employee, but covers all losses resulting from the torts enumerated therein. The focus, therefore, is not on the duty allegedly breached by the state but on the act causing the underlying loss, regardless of who committed the act. Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001).

§ 50-21-24(6). - In order for state policy decisions related to the provision of emergency services not to be directly or indirectly put on trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia construed O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6), an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity, to provide complete protection of the policy-making decisions in providing police and fire services from judicial review as such construction accomplished a balance between the inherently unfair and inequitable results from the strict application of sovereign immunity and the need to limit the state's exposure to tort liability that the General Assembly expressed as the General Assembly's goal in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21. Ga. Forestry Comm'n v. Canady, 280 Ga. 825, 632 S.E.2d 105 (2006).

- In determining whether the exception to state liability in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) applies, a court's focus is not on which particular state law causes of action a plaintiff has set forth in a complaint, but rather on the underlying conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff's loss. Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga. App. 769, 621 S.E.2d 852 (2005).

- Focus of the exceptions to liability in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) is not on the government action taken, but upon the act that produces the loss; thus, in an action against the Department of Human Resources by the operator of a contract home who was shot by a juvenile placed in the home, it was not the act of placing the juvenile that produced the operator's loss, it was the juvenile's independent tort, and the exception to the waiver of immunity covers any and all losses resulting from the torts enumerated in the paragraph, regardless of who committed the torts. Department of Human Resources v. Hutchinson, 217 Ga. App. 70, 456 S.E.2d 642 (1995); Christensen v. State, 219 Ga. App. 10, 464 S.E.2d 14 (1995); Board of Regents v. Riddle, 229 Ga. App. 15, 493 S.E.2d 208 (1997); Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Coley, 247 Ga. App. 392, 544 S.E.2d 165 (2000).

In determining whether an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applied, the proper focus was on the act causing the underlying loss and it was not necessary that such act have been committed by a state officer or employee; thus, since the loss was caused by the son's shooting of the decedent, the son's father, the state governmental entities could not be held liable because the loss was caused by an assault or battery for which the exception to the waiver of immunity applied. Ardizonne v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 258 Ga. App. 858, 575 S.E.2d 738 (2002).

Limited sovereign immunity waiver was subject to a specific exception for assault or battery, and in determining whether this exception applied, it was not necessary that the act have been committed by a state officer or employee. A community service board was a state agency and was immune from a claim arising from the stabbing death of a resident at a community home run by the board. Oconee Cmty. Serv. Bd. v. Holsey, 266 Ga. App. 385, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004).

- Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., waives sovereign immunity for suits to recover monetary damages for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a), subject to exceptions, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24, and limitations, such as O.C.G.A. § 50-21-29(b). Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).

Trial court did not err in dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds an inmate's tort claim alleging false imprisonment and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Department of Corrections since: (1) the state was shielded from liability against a false imprisonment claim, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7); and (2) neither the state nor the Department of Corrections was a "person" as that term was defined under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Watson v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 285 Ga. App. 143, 645 S.E.2d 629 (2007).

- Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the administrator of the State Employee Liability Trust Fund (administrator) because the General Liability Agreement (GLA) at issue did not cover any of the former employee's surviving claims in the underlying suit since those claims did not arise out of the employment with the state; thus, it followed that the administrator did not breach any obligation in the GLA to defend or to indemnify the employee for those claims. Ga. Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. McCoy, 340 Ga. App. 877, 798 S.E.2d 687 (2017).

- Trial court erred by denying the Georgia Department of Transportation's (DOT) motion to dismiss, based on sovereign immunity, the negligence action filed by the plaintiffs, the injured mother and children, as a result of an automobile accident because the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the DOT when the court ruled that the DOT had failed to put forth any testimonial evidence in rebuttal as the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that the DOT's conduct was excepted from sovereign immunity. DOT v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 840 S.E.2d 679 (2020).

- Public relations firm's claim against a state university board for misappropriation under the Trade Secrets Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-760 et seq., was barred by sovereign immunity; however, because a violation of the Act constituted a tort and the state waived sovereign immunity for torts, the firm could bring suit pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 351 Ga. App. 133, 830 S.E.2d 503 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1521, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 118 (Ga. 2020).

Cited in Miller v. Department of Pub. Safety, 221 Ga. App. 280, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996); Feist v. Dirr, 271 Ga. App. 169, 609 S.E.2d 111 (2004); Romano v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 303 Ga. App. 347, 693 S.E.2d 521 (2010); Considine v. Murphy, 297 Ga. 164, 773 S.E.2d 176 (2015); Bailey v. Ga. World Congress Ctr., 351 Ga. App. 629, 832 S.E.2d 446 (2019), cert. denied, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 262 (Ga. 2020).

Discretionary Functions

Exception applied.

- Decision of the Department of Human Resources to review records, discuss with staff residents' care needs in a personal care home, and obtain a physician's statement regarding a resident's condition in order to determine if the resident was a suitable resident at the home, rather than taking other action, including reassessing the patient or ordering emergency relocation, entailed policy judgments in which alternate courses of action were weighed in light of competing economic and social factors, and was the performance of a discretionary function or duty within the exception stated in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2). Bruton v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 235 Ga. App. 291, 509 S.E.2d 363 (1998).

When a high school student sued the board of trustees of the college and individual members of the board and staff, seeking damages arising from the injuries the student sustained after performing physical exercises as punishment for a violation of the honor code, the student's suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., because the instructor's decisions on how to carry out the exercises were discretionary as the standard operating procedures afforded the instructor the ability to choose from a number of exercises and to determine the exercise's duration; furthermore, the implementation of physical exercises was an extension of the college's public policy considerations as a military school. Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College v. O'Donnell, 352 Ga. App. 651, 835 S.E.2d 688 (2019).

When the ward, who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, walked into traffic on an interstate and was struck by a tractor trailer, the Georgia Department of Human Services' motion to dismiss was properly granted as the plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity because, under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., the ultimate determination of whether to take the ward into custody was a discretionary one, involving issues of policy. Garrett v. Dep't of Human Servs., 355 Ga. App. 714, 845 S.E.2d 742 (2020).

- Based upon the evidence, the homeowners' allegations that the building inspector failed to conduct adequate and proper inspections were merely allegations that the inspector failed to use proper judgment in conducting those inspections; the inspector was entitled to official immunity from the homeowners' claims under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2). Howell v. Willis, 317 Ga. App. 199, 729 S.E.2d 643 (2012).

- Decision by foster parents employed by the Department of Human Resources to leave a two-year-old child unattended in a swimming pool was an insufficient basis on which to invoke the discretionary function exception. Brantley v. Department of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 523 S.E.2d 571 (1999), reversing Brantley v. Department of Human Resources, 235 Ga. App. 863, 509 S.E.2d 645 (1998).

Georgia Department of Human Resources and the DeKalb Community Service Board were not entitled to summary judgment based on immunity in a foster child's parents' action against them arising out of the child's being hit by a car while in foster care. The foster parents' decision to leave the child was not a discretionary function under O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-22(2) and50-21-24(2); decisions about the child's care did not involve policy judgments based on social, political, or even economic factors. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Bulbalia, 303 Ga. App. 659, 694 S.E.2d 115 (2010).

- State had a duty to provide youth in the state's custody with medical care and treatment, but the details of that care were discretionary and therefore subject to immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. Edwards v. Department of Children & Youth Servs., 236 Ga. App. 696, 512 S.E.2d 339 (1999).

- State employee's claims for negligent misrepresentation regarding information on in-network providers of a PPO under a state health benefit plan failed because the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., precluded any action for employees exercising due care in the execution of a regulation and the regulations of the Community Health Board § 478-6.10(6) specifically stated that sovereign immunity was not waived as to actions in law or equity against the Board or the state to recover money under a plan. Mitchell v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 174, 635 S.E.2d 798 (2006).

- Hiring, firing, and disciplining a police officer requires the exercise of professional deliberation and judgment and, therefore, constitutes a discretionary function within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. Harper v. City of E. Point, 237 Ga. App. 375, 515 S.E.2d 623 (1999).

State board's acts in terminating a state employee were discretionary acts; thus, an employee's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the board was precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Bd. of Pub. Safety v. Jordan, 252 Ga. App. 577, 556 S.E.2d 837 (2001).

- Decision of state employees on the type of emergency medical care to provide incarcerated juveniles does not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. Edwards v. Georgia Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 271 Ga. 890, 525 S.E.2d 83 (2000).

- Decision of a caseworker for the Department of Human Resources to place children in a particular home setting was a "discretionary function" and was protected by immunity. Jackson v. Department of Human Resources, 230 Ga. App. 595, 497 S.E.2d 58 (1998).

- Appellate court erred by reversing the dismissal of a negligence suit against a state agency regarding a report of abuse from a pediatrician of two children because the case manager's decisions about how to investigate the report required a balancing of policy considerations, thus, the discretionary function exception under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2), applied and the case was properly dismissed by the trial court. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Spruill, 294 Ga. 100, 751 S.E.2d 315 (2013).

Application

1. Department of Transportation

- In an action against the DOT arising from an intersectional collision, the public duty doctrine did not require that a special relationship be shown between the victim and the department because the enactment of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., created state exposure to potential liability for losses. DOT v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity filed by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) because it was clear from a review of the agency agreement and the GDOT policy that the plaintiff's claims for failing to monitor I-16 for hazardous conditions were barred since neither policy imposed any duty on the GDOT to monitor roadways for hazardous conditions. Grant v. Ga. Forestry Comm'n, 338 Ga. App. 146, 789 S.E.2d 343 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0003, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, No. S17C0037, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2017).

- Dismissal of an injured couple's claims against the DOT to the extent those claims were based on a theory of negligent inspection of the county-owned area in which the accident occurred was proper under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8); the waiver of immunity with respect to design claims under § 50-21-24(10) did not extend to waive immunity for inspection claims. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189, 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err in finding the Georgia Department of Transportation immune from suit from liability to the decedent's estate and survivors for failing to maintain an overgrown area of shrubbery that bordered an intersection as neither O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2, when read in concert with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93, nor O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) imposed liability on the department; hence, maintenance of the area did not constitute a "substantial" or "other major" maintenance activity. Welch v. Ga. DOT, 283 Ga. App. 903, 642 S.E.2d 913 (2007).

- Decision of the DOT to open a road with a change from an all-way to two-way stop configuration was not a policy determination entitling the department to immunity under the discretionary functions exception. DOT v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).

- In an action arising from an intersectional collision, when there was sufficient evidence as to whether the DOT complied with generally accepted engineering or design standards in opening a road with a change from an all-way to two-way stop configuration, the trial court did not err in denying a motion for a directed verdict regarding the highway design exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. DOT v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).

Exemption of the DOT from liability for highway design deficiencies when the design was in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of construction includes protection for the department's failure to upgrade a highway to meet current design standards. Daniels v. DOT, 222 Ga. App. 237, 474 S.E.2d 26 (1996).

In an action for injuries sustained in a collision at a highway intersection, since there were no published design guidelines in effect when the highway was designed and the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence that the design was not in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time the DOT was exempt from liability. Daniels v. DOT, 222 Ga. App. 237, 474 S.E.2d 26 (1996); DOT v. Cox, 246 Ga. App. 221, 540 S.E.2d 218 (2000).

Trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's expert's affidavit was insufficient to meet the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 when the expert supplemented the affidavit with testimony adequate to aver that DOT failed to comply substantially with engineering standards applicable at the time an intersection was planned and designed as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10). Lennen v. DOT, 239 Ga. App. 729, 521 S.E.2d 885 (1999).

When an injured party sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) for injuries received in a single-car accident on a county road, the party did not show DOT was liable under any of the exceptions to sovereign immunity because the party did not show, as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10), that DOT's plans for the road on which the accident occurred did not comply with generally accepted engineering or design standards and, in fact, the party's expert testified that the plans complied with such standards. Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22, 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005).

In a wrongful death action, the Georgia DOT was entitled to sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(9). Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10) granted immunity to the DOT from a claim that the fatal accident was proximately caused by a deficiently designed intersection, especially when no evidence was presented that the intersection was not initially designed in substantial compliance with existing engineering or design standards; moreover, under both O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and32-6-51(a)(1), the decision of the county department of transportation and the department's employees to install the traffic signal necessarily entailed discretionary acts done to perform a specific duty or a mandatory fixed obligation for which mandamus would lie to compel performance, entitling the county and the county's employees to official or qualified immunity. Murray v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 263, 644 S.E.2d 290 (2007).

In a wrongful death and nuisance suit wherein the victim was killed while traveling in a taxi cab on a state highway, the trial court erred in granting the Georgia Department of Transportation's (DOT's) motion to dismiss on the basis of the inspection and permitting exceptions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) and (9), upon concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the DOT on the basis of sovereign immunity; there was expert testimony in the record that the DOT failed to follow generally accepted design, construction, and maintenance practices with regard to the roadway and adjacent areas, and that the deviation from the standard of care contributed to the victim's death. Further, the DOT may be held liable as a joint tortfeasor, and it would be a matter for a jury to decide whether the DOT was liable under § 50-21-24(10) for negligent design and negligent maintenance. Heller v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. App. 345, 659 S.E.2d 617 (2008), aff'd, Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

- Although the Georgia Department of Transportation was entitled to sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10) based on the placement of signs warning of a limited sight distance and advising speed reduction at an intersection, the slope of a shoulder did not comply with the standards in effect at the time of the alteration. Steele v. Ga. DOT, 271 Ga. App. 374, 609 S.E.2d 715 (2005).

- Injured driver's suit against the GDOT alleging negligent road design and operation was subject to dismissal because the GDOT was immune from negligent design suits if the road substantially complied with industry design standards, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10); the driver's expert testified that the road's cross slopes met industry standards. DOT v. Balamo, 343 Ga. App. 169, 806 S.E.2d 622 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 329 (Ga. 2018).

- Summary judgment for the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) was improper as the affidavits of the plaintiffs' expert, a DOT witness, and a City's Director of Public Works created a fact issue as to whether the DOT's failure to consider excess fill soil disposal in the DOT's design plans complied with generally accepted engineering and design standards under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10); the design standards exception was a limitation on the exceptions to a state's sovereign immunity established by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. Reidling v. City of Gainesville, 280 Ga. App. 698, 634 S.E.2d 862 (2006).

- Decedent was killed when the taxi in which the decedent was riding spun out of control on a rain-slick interstate highway and hit a tree. Assuming arguendo that the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) was immune from a negligence suit under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 for a city employee's negligent inspection of the taxi's tires, expert testimony that the tree's proximity to the highway may have violated generally accepted engineering standards rendered the DOT liable under § 50-21-24(10), the design standards exception. Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

Trial court did not err when the court dismissed the claims against the Department of Transportation (DOT) because the tree which fell on the decedent was about 8.1 feet beyond the easement identified in the initial deed and, thus, the trial court properly concluded that the tree was not on the DOT's right-of-way and, therefore, the DOT could not be liable for any negligent inspection or refusal to remove the tree from the owner's property. White v. DOT, 337 Ga. App. 572, 788 S.E.2d 500 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1819, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 111 (Ga. 2017).

- In an accident case arising out of the DOT's actions in reviewing and approving a materials stockpile location in a highway construction project and a traffic plan proposed by the contractor, under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(9), the DOT was immune from liability resulting from the DOT's approval of the stockpile plan. DOT v. Jarvie, 329 Ga. App. 681, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014), overruled on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 2016).

- Trial court did not err in granting the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) summary judgment in a driver's action alleging that the DOT's failure to properly design an intersection and to replace a sign was the proximate cause of the driver's injuries because the DOT was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the driver's claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10); because the generally accepted standards did not require the DOT to post the sign, the DOT's failure to replace the sign later could not constitute a deviation from the same standards, and the affidavit of the driver's expert did not state that the design of the intersection failed to substantially comply with generally accepted engineering or design standards in any other manner that caused or contributed to the driver's injuries. O'Hara v. Ga. DOT, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Nov. 20, 2007).

- Sovereign immunity barred a negligence action against the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), pursuant to the permitting exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(9), because there was no evidence that the intersection at which an automobile accident occurred warranted a signal and the GDOT had no duty to upgrade the intersection. Sadler v. DOT, 311 Ga. App. 601, 716 S.E.2d 639 (2011).

- In a case in which a parent filed a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Transportation, alleging that the department's negligence in choosing to set the speed limit along a certain stretch of highway at 50 miles per hour led to the death of the parent's child, the trial court erred in denying the department's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(5) given that: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-182 provided that the Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety and the Commissioner of the Georgia Transportation Department could set the speed limit on any part of the state highway system based on the conditions in that area; (2) the department's participation in setting the speed limit pursuant to § 40-6-182 was quasi-legislative action as the decision entailed adopting rules and was analogous to the legislative activity of making laws; and (3) pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(5), the department could not be held liable for losses resulting from such quasi-legislative action. DOT v. Watts, 260 Ga. App. 905, 581 S.E.2d 410 (2003).

- Georgia Department of Transportation's decision of when and where to inspect for road hazards during and following a rain event was not a policy decision requiring the exercise of discretion within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2), although it involved a "judgment call" by DOT employees, and therefore the DOT did not have immunity from a suit stemming from a driver's hydroplaning in water on the road and drowning in a pond caused by a backed up storm drain. Ga. DOT v. Miller, 300 Ga. App. 857, 686 S.E.2d 455 (2009).

- Trial court did not err by dismissing a pedestrian's slip and fall claims against the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) based on the bar of sovereign immunity because GDOT's specific decision to forego routine inspections, repairs, or maintenance of sidewalks within a state right-of-way as a result of prioritizing maintenance activities based on budgetary constraints fell under the discretionary function exception. Hagan v. Ga. DOT, 321 Ga. App. 472, 739 S.E.2d 123 (2013).

- Trial court did not err by denying the Georgia Department of Transportation's (GDOT) motion to dismiss a wrongful death action filed by the decedents' parents based on sovereign immunity because the licensing exception under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(9) did not provide immunity for liability for the claims regarding the GDOT's decision on whether and how to reopen the railroad crossing after the paving work was completed. DOT v. Delor, 351 Ga. App. 414, 830 S.E.2d 519 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0086, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. 2020).

2. Criminal Acts

False imprisonment.

- Commissioner of Georgia Department of Corrections was entitled to official immunity in case of claim by former prisoner of false imprisonment. Collier v. Whitworth, 205 Ga. App. 758, 423 S.E.2d 440 (1992).

- Action by inmate against a correctional officer alleging that the officer was liable for libel and slander for writing false disciplinary reports was barred by provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., that the state will have no liability for losses resulting from libel and slander. Howard v. Burch, 210 Ga. App. 515, 436 S.E.2d 573 (1993).

Inmate's state law battery claim against the Department of Corrections was barred by the exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 for losses caused by battery. Mattox v. Bailey, 221 Ga. App. 546, 472 S.E.2d 130 (1996).

- Claims of foster parents against the Department of Human Resources and a caseworker based on an assault committed by a teenage boy who was placed in the parents' home were precluded by the exception for losses caused by assault and battery. Sherin v. Department of Human Resources, 229 Ga. App. 621, 494 S.E.2d 518 (1998).

Any alleged losses arising out of conduct that would constitute the common law tort of assault or battery upon a plaintiff's person fall within the exception to state liability found in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7), irrespective of what particular state law causes of action the plaintiff brings in order to recover for those losses, including state constitutional claims. Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga. App. 769, 621 S.E.2d 852 (2005).

When a citizen alleged that a state trooper sexually assaulted the citizen during a traffic stop, and the trooper was found to be immune from liability under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a) because any alleged assault would have occurred while the trooper was performing official duties, the Georgia State Patrol and the Department of Public Safety could not be held liable under the state's waiver of sovereign immunity because O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) provided that the state had no liability for losses resulting from assault and battery, such as alleged by the citizen, and this exception to immunity applied to all of the citizen's state law allegations arising from these facts, including claims of mental and emotional anguish and harm, assault under color of state law, violating state constitutional rights, negligence, or deliberate indifference in hiring, instruction, supervision, control, and discipline of the trooper, or acquiescence to the trooper's conduct. Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga. App. 769, 621 S.E.2d 852 (2005).

Trial court properly dismissed a wrongful death suit against a State of Georgia mental health agency for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the act causing the underlying loss in the case, namely a discharged psychiatric patient setting the patient's mother on fire, constituted an assault or battery; thus, the exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) to the waiver of sovereign immunity applied. Pak v. Ga. Dep't of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities, 317 Ga. App. 486, 731 S.E.2d 384 (2012).

- Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) did not bar plaintiff's claim against the defendant college because the claim was based not upon the rape by a fellow student, which the plaintiff described as "incidental," but upon the breach of the affirmative duty the defendant undertook to protect the plaintiff while in the care of the school. Georgia Military College v. Santamorena, 237 Ga. App. 58, 514 S.E.2d 82 (1999).

- In an action against a community service board arising from the beating of a resident in a residential home sponsored by the defendant, because the act causing the underlying loss constituted a battery, the exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) to the waiver of sovereign immunity applied. Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001).

Assault and battery exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., barred the student's claims for negligence, negligence per se, and negligent training and supervision against the Board of Regents because the loss suffered by the student was a severe injury to the leg resulting from a fight with another football player after the football coach instructed the players to fight to prove the players were worthy of membership on the team. Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 321 Ga. App. 791, 743 S.E.2d 469 (2013).

3. Law Enforcement

No liability for not interfering with arrests.

- Decision of police officers not to interfere with the arrests of the plaintiffs called for a consideration of discretion and liability therefor was barred by sovereign immunity. Rhoden v. Department of Pub. Safety, 221 Ga. App. 844, 473 S.E.2d 537 (1996).

- It would have defied logic to classify the decision of police officers to arrest the plaintiffs, or the alleged use of excessive force therein, as "negligence". Any losses arising from such actions were caused by intentional acts and the state has no liability for such losses. Rhoden v. Department of Pub. Safety, 221 Ga. App. 844, 473 S.E.2d 537 (1996).

- In an action arising from injuries to plaintiffs in a collision with a truck stolen by an escaped prison inmate, an allegation that the correction officer negligently supervised the work detail from which the inmate escaped amounted to a failure to provide law enforcement services within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. Long v. Hall County Bd. of Comm'rs, 219 Ga. App. 853, 467 S.E.2d 186 (1996).

- In a case arising from a police chase, the trial court properly granted the police department's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds because the trial court correctly found that the police department did not waive sovereign immunity since the pursuing officers faithfully implemented the police department's policies and procedures and did not waive sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6). Loehle v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 334 Ga. App. 836, 780 S.E.2d 469 (2015).

In a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Public Safety in which the decedent died from injuries sustained in a high-speed chase with the Georgia State Patrol officers, the Department's motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction was properly granted based on sovereign immunity because the officer's actions during the pursuit were objectively reasonable and in compliance with the Department's pursuit policy, and the execution of the Precision Immobilization Technique was done in compliance with the policy; the officer considered the factors set forth in the policy in deciding to continue the pursuit; and none of the circumstances that would have prohibited a pursuit under the policy existed. James v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 789 S.E.2d 236 (2016).

Trooper's pursuit of a speeding vehicle falls within the parameters of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) as a "method of providing law enforcement." Hilson v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 236 Ga. App. 638, 512 S.E.2d 910 (1999).

Because police officers followed procedures in pursuing an individual in a high-speed chase, the officers did not violate O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6; consequently, because O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) provided the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) with immunity from liability for injuries resulting from the pursuit, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the DPS. Blackston v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 274 Ga. App. 373, 618 S.E.2d 78 (2005).

Trial court correctly found that the Georgia Department of Public Safety did not waive sovereign immunity as one of the troopers involved testified that the decision to initiate a traffic stop on the stolen vehicle was the result of the trooper's training in pursuit policy and experience in apprehending fleeing motorists, that the trooper believed there was a threat to the public based on a report a firearm was used during the carjacking, and that the trooper considered traffic conditions. Loehle v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 334 Ga. App. 836, 780 S.E.2d 469 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0500, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 213 (Ga. 2016).

- In a suit by a passenger against a Department of Corrections (DOC) probation officer whose vehicle collided with the passenger's vehicle during a police chase, because the officer's actions were consistent with DOC's non-defective policy, which allowed the officer to assist law enforcement, DOC had sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6). Britt v. Jackson, 348 Ga. App. 159, 819 S.E.2d 677 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0483, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 539 (Ga. 2019).

- In a personal injury suit brought by a driver who was rear-ended by a state trooper conducting radar detecting to catch speeders and using the driver's mail truck as a block, the trial court properly denied summary judgment to the Department of Public Safety because the record established evidence that the accident was preventable, and that, therefore, the exception set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) to sovereign immunity may be overcome by the driver at trial. By following too closely and not paying attention, the situation presented preventable negligence as opposed to a policy decision on the part of the trooper. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Davis, 289 Ga. App. 21, 656 S.E.2d 178 (2007), aff'd, 285 Ga. 203, 676 S.E.2d 1 (2009).

State public safety department was not immune from liability under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) for an accident which was caused when a trooper collided with a motorist's truck while the trooper was running radar using the truck as cover because the trooper's actions were not a policy decision, but rather simple, preventable negligence while implementing a non-defective policy. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Davis, 285 Ga. 203, 676 S.E.2d 1 (2009).

- When the plaintiff alleged that an officer negligently implemented a Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) policy, and performed an unjustified PIT maneuver by using a patrol vehicle to intentionally strike the plaintiff's vehicle, causing the plaintiff to lose control, strike a tree, and suffer injuries, the trial court abused the court's discretion by deferring until a trial on the merits the determination of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for losses resulting from an assault or battery as the factors controlling the court's exercise of discretion were clearly balanced in favor of a prompt pre-trial determination of the DPS's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dep't of Public Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 806 S.E.2d 195 (2017).

Operation of a state or county correctional institute and the related supervision of convicts on outside work details, including the degree of training and supervision provided to officers, was a discretionary function of the Georgia Department of Corrections and, through it, the county warden. Bontwell v. Department of Cors., 226 Ga. App. 524, 486 S.E.2d 917 (1997).

- Parent's wrongful death suit against a prison where the parent's adult child was incarcerated was properly dismissed by the trial court as the suit was barred by the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7), since the adult child was killed as a result of an assault and battery committed by a cell mate. Southerland v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 293 Ga. App. 56, 666 S.E.2d 383 (2008).

- Defense of sovereign immunity applies to a complaint against the parole board and the board's former chairperson acting in an official capacity. Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 213 Ga. App. 545, 445 S.E.2d 535 (1994), cert. denied, 5 U.S. 1040, 115 S. Ct. 1409, 131 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1995).

- Parole officer's duties under O.C.G.A. § 42-9-48(d) are discretionary within the meaning of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., and therefore not subject to liability. Rowe v. State Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 240 Ga. App. 163, 523 S.E.2d 40 (1999).

Physician whose license was temporarily suspended could not file suit against the state for actions of officers of the Board of Medical Examiners relating to the suspension. Howard v. Miller, 222 Ga. App. 868, 476 S.E.2d 636 (1996).

- To the extent that plaintiff's claims stated the Department of Human Resources was negligent in conducting or failing to conduct adequate inspections of a personal care home, the department was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity under the inspection exception. Bruton v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 235 Ga. App. 291, 509 S.E.2d 363 (1998).

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) applies not only to inspection powers and functions imposed by the legislature but also to inspection duties voluntarily assumed by the state pursuant to a contractual relationship; thus, since the plaintiff alleged that the Department of Transportation violated a duty to notify a county that a road as designed and as constructed by the county contained safety hazards, the duty involved an inspection power or function for which the department was immune under the statute. Magueur v. DOT, 248 Ga. App. 575, 547 S.E.2d 304 (2001).

Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) had sovereign immunity under the inspection powers exception of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8); the injured party claimed that injuries sustained due to a detour sign blocking a stop sign were the result of DOT approval of a contractor's traffic control plan and inspection of the detour route; DOT delegated responsibility to place the traffic control devices on a county road to the contractor. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766, 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005).

When an injured party sued the Georgia Department of Transportation for injuries received in a single-car accident on a county road, under a theory of negligent inspection, the claim was barred by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8), which provided an exception to state liability with respect to inspection powers or functions. Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22, 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005).

- O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) allowed the DNR director or an authorized agent the authority to ensure that the owner brought the owner's property into compliance with the environmental regulations. Price v. State, 250 Ga. App. 872, 553 S.E.2d 194 (2001).

State was not liable for losses incurred from the Department of Natural Resources' inspection of the party's property; DNR was immune from liability pursuant to the inspection powers or functions exception to the state's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Price v. State, 250 Ga. App. 872, 553 S.E.2d 194 (2001).

- Because in meetings and at all other relevant times college officials were engaged in the performance of their official duties, under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a), the officials had state tort immunity for statements the officials may have made at those meetings concerning the reasons for a teacher's dismissal, and for actions taken to effect the teacher's dismissal. Tootle v. Cartee, 280 Ga. App. 428, 634 S.E.2d 90 (2006).

College and a department were entitled to sovereign immunity in a claim seeking damages arising from the purchase of a nail primer product at the college because there was no showing of a waiver of sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a); among other things, the record, including the allegations of the complaint, established that the nail kit purchased was owned and sold by a vendor who was an independent contractor. Accordingly, the college and the department had no liability based on a failure to inspect the vendor's nail kits, which included the primer. Coosa Valley Tech. College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 682 S.E.2d 187 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1954, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 9 (Ga. 2010).

Because a university president failed to show an enforceable employment contract, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity on the basis of a written contract. The president's tort claims against the state and Board of Regents were exclusively governed and barred by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., and the president could not invoke the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1, et seq., as an alternative remedy. Tricoli v. Watts, 336 Ga. App. 837, 783 S.E.2d 475 (2016).

- Georgia Tort Claims Act barred a state university professor's tortious interference claim against the university and the university's officials because the individual defendants were immune under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21(b), and, under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7), the state had no liability for losses resulting from interference with contractual rights. Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents, 302 Ga. App. 1, 689 S.E.2d 352 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0824, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Wolfe v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2016).

- Administrative and judicial action taken by the Department of Human Resources to enforce mandates set out in the Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq., clearly fell within the exceptions to waiver of sovereign immunity. Department of Human Resources v. Money, 222 Ga. App. 149, 473 S.E.2d 200 (1996).

DOT was exempt from liability for any losses attributed to either the DOT's issuing a permit to a shopping center owner to build a commercial driveway across from the median opening where an accident occurred or attributable to the alleged delay in issuing a city permit to install a traffic signal at that driveway. DOT v. Cox, 246 Ga. App. 221, 540 S.E.2d 218 (2000).

When the assisted living facility owner claimed that the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the Georgia Department of Medical Assistance were liable under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., for relocating the owner's residents to other facilities and for terminating the owner's Medicaid provider status, and the departments later rescinded these actions, the departments were immune under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(9), because removal of the residents constituted an action by one department in response to the other department's revocation of the owner's Medicaid authorization, which was a licensing power or function. Smith v. Dep't of Human Res., 257 Ga. App. 33, 570 S.E.2d 337 (2002).

- In the parents' action alleging that the Georgia Department of Education (DOE) was liable for their child's death by failing to fulfill a duty under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., to regulate a school's disciplinary procedures, the trial court did not err in granting the DOE's motion to dismiss because the DOE had not waived DOE's sovereign immunity, and, given that the DOE had not waived DOE's sovereign immunity with regard to any quasi-legislative action DOE undertook, it similarly could not be held to have waived DOE's immunity when DOE chose to impose no administrative regulations whatsoever; although the DOE did inspect the school's time-out room logs during the course of DOE's IDEA compliance review, that inspection did not render the DOE liable for injuries related to use of such rooms, and because the school was not a state-owned property, the DOE did not waive DOE's sovereign immunity when DOE inspected the logs. King v. Pioneer Reg'l Educ. Serv. Agency, 301 Ga. App. 547, 688 S.E.2d 7 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0634, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga.); cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 504, 178 L. Ed. 2d 370 (2010).

- Summary judgment based on official immunity for a school teacher sued over a student's death was proper as certain school employees were immune from liability for supervising students on a school bus and the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., was inapplicable. Aliffi v. Liberty County Sch. Dist., 259 Ga. App. 713, 578 S.E.2d 146 (2003).

- In a suit against the state arising out of the death of an infant at the hands of the infant's drug-addicted parents, dismissal of claims for battery on the child was proper under the assault and battery exception to the state's waiver of sovereign immunity, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7); however, more information was needed to determine if the discretionary function exception, § 50-21-24(2), applied. Cowart v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ga. App. 183, 796 S.E.2d 903 (2017).

Georgia Forestry Commission.

Georgia Forestry Commission's duty to advise.

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred in finding that the Georgia Forestry Commission (GFC) was not negligent in carrying out the Commission's duty to advise Georgia State Patrol (GSP) of a fire and that the Commission was entitled to sovereign immunity on that ground because the record showed that an agency agreement imposed a separate and independent duty on GFC, regardless of visibility conditions, to advise GSP of the existence of any large controlled burns or wildfires in the vicinity of state roadways. Grant v. Ga. Forestry Comm'n, 338 Ga. App. 146, 789 S.E.2d 343 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0003, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, No. S17C0037, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2017).

- Upon certiorari review by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court held that the exception to the sovereign immunity waiver authorized the application of immunity to the making of policy decisions by state employees and officers including those relating to the amount, disbursement, and use of equipment and personnel to provide law enforcement, police or fire protection services, and to the acts and omissions of state employees and officers executing and implementing those policies; thus, inasmuch as this rationale was at odds with that of the Court of Appeals of Georgia in its prior decision that the employee's claim as to the Commission's allegedly deficient notice to other governmental entities of a visibility hazard did not fall within the fire protection exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity, remand to the trial court was ordered for the court to proceed in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Ga. Forestry Comm'n v. Canady, 281 Ga. App. 505, 637 S.E.2d 212 (2006).

- In a state employee's suit asserting defamation against a state director, the trial court properly granted the director summary judgment and dismissed the complaint as the records established that the director was a state employee at the time the alleged statements were made and, therefore, any libelous or slanderous statements were made by the director within the scope of the director's official duties and, thus, the director was immune from liability. Ford v. Caffrey, 293 Ga. App. 269, 666 S.E.2d 623 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Claims arising from governmental conduct causing damage to plaintiff's real property as within discretionary function exception of federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 167 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard not directly created by act or omission of federal government and not in national parks as affected by "discretionary function or duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 169 A.L.R. Fed. 421.

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard resulting from governmental act or omission as affected by "discretionary function or duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 170 A.L.R. Fed. 365.

Liability of United States for failure to warn local police or individuals of discharge, release, or escape of person who is deemed dangerous to public as affected by "discretionary act or duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 171 A.L.R. Fed. 655.

Claims arising from conduct of governmental employer in administering or failing to administer medical care as within discretionary function exception of Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 172 A.L.R. Fed. 407.

Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2680), for damages caused by ingestion or administration of government-approved drugs, vaccines, and medications, 173 A.L.R. Fed. 431.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) exception in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(c), concerning claims arising in respect of assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer, 173 A.L.R. Fed. 465.

Liability of state or municipality for unsafe roadway condition arising from rain, snow, fog, or other atmospheric condition, naturally occurring or created by another, 57 A.L.R.6th 355.

Liability of public or private schools or institutions of higher learning, or personnel thereof, in connection with suicide of student, 100 A.L.R.6th 563.

Propriety of and liability arising from police use of precision immobilization technique or similar act, 42 A.L.R.7th Art. 2.