2020 Georgia Code
Title 50 - State Government
Chapter 13 - Administrative Procedure
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 50-13-19. (See Editor's notes.) Judicial Review of Contested Cases

1. Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter. This Code section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.
2. Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the decision thereon. The petition may be filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county of residence of the petitioner; or, if the petitioner is a corporation, the appeal may be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county where the petitioner maintains its principal place of doing business in this state; and provided, further, that all proceedings for review with respect to orders, rules, regulations, or other decisions or directives of the Commissioner of Agriculture may also be brought in the Superior Court of Tift County or the Superior Court of Chatham County. All proceedings for review, however, with respect to orders, rules, regulations, or other decisions or directives of the Public Service Commission must be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall state the nature of the petitioner's interest, the fact showing that the petitioner is aggrieved by the decision, and the ground as specified in subsection (h) of this Code section upon which the petitioner contends that the decision should be reversed or modified. The petition may be amended by leave of court.
3. Irrespective of any provisions of statute or agency rule with respect to motions for rehearing or reconsideration after a final agency decision or order, the filing of such a motion shall not be a prerequisite to the filing of any appeal for judicial review or relief; provided, however, that no objection to any order or decision of any agency shall be considered by the court upon petition for review unless such objection has been urged before the agency.
4. 1. The filing of the petition for judicial review in superior court does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms for good cause shown.
   2. In cases involving the grant of a permit, permit amendment, or variance by the director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources in which the petition for judicial review in superior court was filed by any person to whom such contested order or action is not directed, a stay shall not be granted unless by order of the superior court upon motion for a temporary restraining order or interlocutory injunction in accordance with Code Section 9-11-65.
   3. The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection notwithstanding, in any case involving the grant of a permit, permit amendment, or variance by the director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources regarding water withdrawal for farm uses under Code Section 12-5-31 or Code Section 12-5-105, no stay shall be authorized if the petition for judicial review in superior court was filed by any person to whom such order or action is not directed.
   4. In contested cases involving a license to practice medicine or a license to practice dentistry in this state, a reviewing court may order a stay or an agency may grant a stay only if the court or agency makes a finding that the public health, safety, and welfare will not be harmed by the issuance of the stay.
5. Within 30 days after the service of the petition or within further time allowed by the court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings, the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for the additional costs. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.
6. If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court. The agency may modify its findings and decision by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.
7. The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
8. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
   1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
   2. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
   3. Made upon unlawful procedure;
   4. Affected by other error of law;
   5. Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
   6. Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

(Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 20; Ga. L. 1975, p. 404, § 8; Ga. L. 1977, p. 316, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1362, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 820, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 598, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 818, § 3/SB 190; Ga. L. 2016, p. 755, § 3/HB 1025.)

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted "appeal" for "action" near the middle of the second sentence of subsection (b) and in the middle of subsection (c).

For application of this statute in 2020, see Executive Orders 05.12.20.02, 05.28.20.02, 06.11.20.01, 06.29.20.02, 07.15.20.01, 07.31.20.02, 08.15.20.01, and 08.31.20.02.

A listing of Executive Orders issued in 2020 can be found at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders.

- For article discussing and comparing the principal means by which a Georgia taxpayer may obtain judicial review of his state tax liability with emphasis on income and sales tax, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 309 (1975). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with environment, natural resources, and land use from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (1978). For article, "A Practical Guide to State Tax Practice," see 15 Ga. St. B.J. 74 (1978). For article surveying developments in Georgia workers' compensation law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 323 (1981). For annual survey of recent developments, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1986). For article, "From Marshes to Mountains, Wetlands Come Under State Regulation," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 865 (1990). For article, "Administrative Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2001). For annual survey of administrative law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2005). For article, "The Status of Administrative Agencies under the Georgia Constitution," see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1109 (2006). For survey article on administrative law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2007). For annual survey on administrative law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2008). For annual survey on administrative law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2009). For annual survey of law on administrative law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2010). For article, "Administrative Law," see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 47 (2011). For annual survey on administrative law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 41 (2013). For annual survey of administrative law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2015). For annual survey on administrative law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2018).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Prerequisites to Judicial Review
• Scope of Judicial Review
• Sufficiency of Evidence

General Consideration

Due process issues.

- Because the plaintiff equine owner could, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1(n), seek judicial review of defendant Georgia Department of Agriculture Commissioner's final decision as to the seizure of the plaintiff's animals, and O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), (h), provided a judicial safety valve for review, the owner had no constitutional challenge to the procedural adequacy of the hearing and appeal procedure set forth in the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act, O.C.G.A. § 4-13-1 et seq., and the Commissioner thus had qualified immunity on a due process claim. Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009).

- Trial court did not err in the court's denial of the motion to transfer venue in a case involving an application for a Certificate of Need (CON) because the company began the process of purchasing property and applied for a CON to develop a psychiatric hospital in Coweta County, Georgia, therefore, the company engaged in business activities such that venue was proper there. Tanner Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Vest Newnan, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 884, 789 S.E.2d 258 (2016).

- When the claimant does not agree that the superior court could consider additional evidence, such as personnel records, and thereby waive the requirement of subsection (f), as to an application made to the court for leave to present additional evidence, and when counsel for the commissioner did not waive the requirement of the law but specifically pointed out that the case should be remanded to the board of review for purposes of introduction of such additional evidence, including personnel records, there has been no waiver of the requirement of subsection (f), and the presentation of additional evidence constitutes reversible error. Caldwell v. Corbin, 152 Ga. App. 153, 262 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

- In a proceeding wherein a trial court affirmatively granted a peace officer's reinstatement, the court held that the trial court erred by reversing the decision of the council based on grounds that were never urged before the trial court and that were not raised in the petition for judicial review or at the hearing on the petition. Ga. Peace Officer Standards and Training Council v. Hodges, 330 Ga. App. 145, 767 S.E.2d 286 (2014).

- In an action in which the school district appealed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in favor of the parents under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the district moved to dismiss the parents' counterclaim that sought additional reimbursement, arguing that the 30-day statute of limitations period in the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b), should apply, that the parents were required to appeal by January 19, 2006, 30 days after the December 20, 2005, final decision, and the counterclaim was not filed until March 14, 2006, the court rejected that argument because the 2004 version of the IDEA, which provided a statute of limitations of 90 days, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), applied and the appeal was timely, however, the ALJ appropriately limited the compensatory education award under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, which provided for a two-year limitations period and the fraudulent concealment exception of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 did not apply because the parents received a diagnosis in October of 2002 that the child was autistic, and thus, even if the district fraudulently concealed matters pertaining to the child's condition so as to toll the two-year limitations period prior to October 2002, by October 2002, the parents had actual knowledge of the child's true condition and the tolling stopped; the claim for fraudulent concealment had to be asserted within two years of October 2002 in order to not be barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 and the concealment claim was not asserted until the January 2005 due process hearing request and the counterclaim was dismissed. Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. J.W.M., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Affording due deference to an agency's interpretation of an agency's own rules regarding the reimbursement rate paid to a nursing facility, and pursuant to the sufficient evidence supporting that agency's decision, the appeals court found that the Department of Community Health did not err in finding that the 2001 cost report was the "last approved cost report," as that phrase was used in the Department's policies and procedures manual; hence, the superior court clearly erred in finding that the phrase was ambiguous, and thus had to be construed against the Department. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Pruitt Corp., 284 Ga. App. 888, 645 S.E.2d 13 (2007).

Appeal from a decision of the commissioner of securities was governed by O.C.G.A. § 10-5-17, part of the Georgia Securities Act, and not O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as the more specific statute governed over the more general one; thus, the 20-day time period of the securities statute applied, not the 30-day time period of the APA. Slater v. State ex rel. Cox, 287 Ga. App. 738, 653 S.E.2d 58 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 166 (Ga. 2008).

- This section does not repeal second requirement for issuance of writ of mandamus, that there must be no other adequate remedy. Carnes v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 272 S.E.2d 690 (1980).

- Proffered testimony of a witness does not meet the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(f) when the claimant could have requested, but did not, the Board of Review of the Employment Security Agency to issue a subpoena to compel the witness's attendance at the hearing pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 34-8-8. Swafford v. Tanner, 180 Ga. App. 468, 349 S.E.2d 498 (1986).

- Civil Practice Act (O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) has no application to judicial review of administrative agency decisions under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Hewes v. Cooler, 169 Ga. App. 762, 315 S.E.2d 276 (1984).

- There was a statutory right to obtain judicial review of Insurance Commissioner's order determining the workers' compensation insurance rates under former Code 1933, § 114-609 (see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-130). National Council on Comp. Ins. v. Caldwell, 154 Ga. App. 528, 268 S.E.2d 793 (1980).

- Venue for an employee's petition for judicial review from a denial of unemployment benefits lay in Fulton County pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-8-223(b); although the employee last worked in Laurens County pursuant to a subcontract, the employee's contractual employer was a staffing firm with the firm's principal place of business in Fulton. This provision, rather than O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19, applied to the employee's situation. Fed v. Butler, 327 Ga. App. 637, 760 S.E.2d 642 (2014).

- Person issued overweight vehicle assessment may prosecute action for judicial review of the administrative decision in the superior court of the county of his or her residence. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734, 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

- Generally, zoning cases are applicable authority for consideration on the issue of the definition of the "aggrieved person" as employed in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia v. Georgia Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263, 329 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

- The 30 day limitations period applicable to administrative appeals, rather than the two year personal injury limitations period, applies to an appeal of an educational agency's final administrative decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Cory D., by & Through Diane D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).

Suspension of real estate broker's license may be for a period greater than the unexpired portion of the license, and such action by the real estate commission is neither in violation of statutory provisions nor in excess of the statutory authority of the agency. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Howard, 133 Ga. App. 199, 210 S.E.2d 357 (1974).

- Whenever a superior court judge is required by law to make certain findings in order to return a verdict, the presumption is that the judge has made the required findings, absent a showing to the contrary. This presumption applies even if the required findings are not specifically set out in the order. Burson v. Collier, 226 Ga. 427, 175 S.E.2d 660 (1970).

- See Hardison v. Fayssoux, 168 Ga. App. 398, 309 S.E.2d 397 (1983).

Superior court erred in reversing the suspension of a driver's license and holding that, merely because the driver was found not guilty of a traffic violation, there could be no reasonable possibility that a civil judgment could be rendered against the driver. Miles v. Carr, 224 Ga. App. 247, 480 S.E.2d 282 (1997).

- Utility's loss of revenue pending appeal of an agency's ratemaking order does not render the review procedures of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 an "inadequate remedy at law" and does not support the superior court's exercise of equity jurisdiction to grant a temporary increase. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell, 254 Ga. 244, 327 S.E.2d 726 (1985).

- Provision authorizing stay by a superior court exercising appellate jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 does not authorize an interlocutory injunction. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell, 254 Ga. 244, 327 S.E.2d 726 (1985).

- Trial court properly denied injunctive relief against a power company because an injunction was no longer an appropriate method for challenging an agency order after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., which provides a statutory right of review pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Fulton County Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

- State Board of Pharmacy, being an agency which is also defined as a party, has the authority to appeal an adverse judgment of the superior court. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Bennett, 126 Ga. App. 307, 190 S.E.2d 788 (1972).

- Decision of the Department of Community Health (DCH) interpreting the phrase "last approved cost report" as used in the DCH's policies and procedures manual for purposes of computing an owner's reimbursement rate was not entitled to judicial deference because the phrase was not used in a statute, rule, or regulation, but rather in the manual, the terms of which had not undergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process. Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223 (2008).

- Trial court did not err, in an O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 review of an administrative decision regarding reimbursement of Medicaid and Peachcare program payments, in allowing a hospital to advance constitutional arguments not urged in the administrative proceeding because, although the hospital changed the legal theory the hospital advanced, the trial court claim, that the retroactive application of an administrative rule was illegal, was also raised in the administrative proceeding. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 294 Ga. App. 431, 669 S.E.2d 233 (2008).

- Even if the Georgia Commission on Professional Standards failed to comply with the proper statutory procedures under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-984(h) and20-2-984.4(b) in conducting the Commission's investigation of a school superintendent, the superintendent's substantial rights were not prejudiced by the impropriety, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h), which was cured by subsequent compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-984.3(a)(2),20-2-984.5(d), and50-13-13(a)(2)(D). Quigg v. Ga. Prof'l Stds. Comm'n, 344 Ga. App. 142, 809 S.E.2d 267 (2017).

- Order of the superior court affirming the administrative determination of the Department of Human Resources was not objectionable on the ground that the order was not labeled a judgment. Nolen v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 455, 260 S.E.2d 353 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S. Ct. 1059, 62 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1980).

- When there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff hospital provided emergency medical services to a child who received a bowel transplant without obtaining prior authorization from the defendant state department, the trial court's affirmance of the grant of summary determination to the department was an error of law. Children's Hosp. v. Department of Medical Assistance, 235 Ga. App. 697, 509 S.E.2d 725 (1998).

§ 290-9-7-.03(a). - Superior court properly affirmed an order denying a hospital's request to consolidate separate hospital permits of two of their facilities as the hospital's argument that the 35-mile rule in the federal regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.65(e)(3), should be applied did not establish an issue of material fact and the court owed deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency was empowered to enforce. Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 282 Ga. App. 302, 638 S.E.2d 447 (2006).

- Since a municipal association intervened in rate-making proceedings before the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC), and certain municipalities joined the association's arguments in the trial court, the municipalities had standing to appeal the PSC's decision concerning a reallocation of franchise fees paid to cities, even though the municipalities did not apply to intervene before the PSC under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59. Unified Gov't v. Ga. PSC, 293 Ga. App. 786, 668 S.E.2d 296 (2008).

- Judgment reversing a decision of the Georgia Department of Transportation overruling an administrative law judge's finding that one owner had a valid multiple message permit for ithe owner's sign and that a second owner's application for a permit was properly denied was remanded because the superior court ignored the basis for the GDOT's conclusion and reviewed the ALJ's decision instead, and the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Commissioner of the GDOT pertaining to governmental restrictions on commercial speech did not properly address and resolve the issues; in its final agency decision, the Deputy Commissioner essentially sidestepped the issues the ALJ addressed and resolved and did not directly address the issue of whether, applying the applicable provisions and regulations, the first owner failed to make the necessary revisions to the owners' sign, and the GDOT's conclusion that allowing the first owner to keep the owner's permit would be unduly restrictive was arbitrary and capricious. Lamar Co., LLC v. Whiteway Neon-Ad, 303 Ga. App. 495, 693 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

Administrative Procedures Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., clearly contemplated applications to an agency to review initial decisions in contested cases; accordingly, even when an agency referred administrative proceedings to an administrative law judge with the Office of State Administrative Hearings for an initial decision pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41, a person aggrieved by the initial decision can make application to the agency under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17 for review of that initial decision. Alexander v. Dep't of Revenue, 316 Ga. App. 543, 728 S.E.2d 320 (2012).

- Superior court exceeded the court's authority in overturning the Professional Standards Commission's (PSC) decision to revoke a teacher's teaching certificate because the PSC's decision had a rational basis since the record contained evidence of an adverse consequence to a female student as well as evidence about the teacher's lack of leadership and unprofessional behavior; the PSC specifically adopted an administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the full record, and the superior court was bound to uphold the PSC's judgment because the record contained evidence supporting the sanction. Prof'l Stds. Comm'n v. Adams, 306 Ga. App. 343, 702 S.E.2d 675 (2010).

- Superior court's decision that a candidate had not shown irreparable harm justifying immediate appeal to the superior court under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) from an interim decision of the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission was a final decision appealable to the Court of Appeals. Oxendine v. Gov't Transparency & Campaign Fin. Comm'n, 341 Ga. App. 901, 802 S.E.2d 310 (2017).

Cited in Epstein v. Maddox, 277 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Salerno v. Board of Dental Exmrs., 119 Ga. App. 743, 168 S.E.2d 875 (1969); Burson v. Faith, 227 Ga. 526, 181 S.E.2d 827 (1971); Burson v. Webb, 125 Ga. App. 824, 189 S.E.2d 120 (1972); Department of Pub. Safety v. Byars, 127 Ga. App. 190, 192 S.E.2d 926 (1972); Freeman v. Department of Pub. Safety, 127 Ga. App. 773, 195 S.E.2d 203 (1972); Butts v. Department of Pub. Safety, 128 Ga. App. 490, 197 S.E.2d 474 (1973); Howell v. Harden, 129 Ga. App. 200, 198 S.E.2d 890 (1973); Clark v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 129 Ga. App. 741, 200 S.E.2d 926 (1973); Graham v. Board of Exmrs., 133 Ga. App. 430, 211 S.E.2d 385 (1974); Wall v. American Optometric Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Gainesville-Hall County Economic Opportunity Org., Inc. v. Blackmon, 233 Ga. 507, 212 S.E.2d 341 (1975); Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 212 S.E.2d 628 (1975); Tellis v. Saucier, 133 Ga. App. 779, 213 S.E.2d 39 (1975); Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975); Hinson v. Georgia State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 135 Ga. App. 488, 218 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Pfeffer v. Department of Pub. Safety, 136 Ga. App. 448, 221 S.E.2d 658 (1975); Turner v. Harden, 136 Ga. App. 842, 222 S.E.2d 621 (1975); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d 396 (1976); Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia DOT, 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976); Hawthorn Envtl. Preservation Ass'n v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Horne, 141 Ga. App. 226, 233 S.E.2d 16 (1977); Cofer v. Schultz, 146 Ga. App. 771, 247 S.E.2d 586 (1978); Smith v. State, 147 Ga. App. 549, 249 S.E.2d 353 (1978); Courts v. Economic Opportunity Auth. for Savannah - Chatham County Area, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ga. 1978); General Communications Serv., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 149 Ga. App. 466, 254 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Burnette, 243 Ga. 516, 255 S.E.2d 38 (1979); Georgia Consumer Ctr., Inc. v. Georgia Power Co., 150 Ga. App. 511, 258 S.E.2d 250 (1979); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 152 Ga. App. 366, 262 S.E.2d 628 (1979); Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Purvis, 155 Ga. App. 597, 271 S.E.2d 870 (1980); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 158 Ga. App. 739, 282 S.E.2d 198 (1981); Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465, 284 S.E.2d 263 (1981); Village Ctrs., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981); Fluker v. Edwards, 161 Ga. App. 418, 288 S.E.2d 684 (1982); Geron v. Calibre Cos., 250 Ga. 213, 296 S.E.2d 602 (1982); Hicks v. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 553 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ga. 1982); DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66, 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983); Loyd v. Georgia State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 850, 310 S.E.2d 738 (1983); North Fulton Community Hosp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 801, 310 S.E.2d 764 (1983); DOT v. Sapp Outdoor Adv. Co., 171 Ga. App. 228, 319 S.E.2d 87 (1984); Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985); Johnson v. Ellis, 174 Ga. App. 861, 331 S.E.2d 884 (1985); Swafford v. Tanner, 180 Ga. App. 468, 349 S.E.2d 498 (1986); Ledbetter v. Foster, 180 Ga. App. 696, 350 S.E.2d 31 (1986); Coin Call, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 636 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Carnes v. Charlock Invs. (USA), Inc., 258 Ga. 771, 373 S.E.2d 742 (1988); Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources v. Union Timber Corp., 258 Ga. 873, 375 S.E.2d 856 (1989); Earp v. Harris, 191 Ga. App. 414, 382 S.E.2d 156 (1989); Wills v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 259 Ga. 549, 384 S.E.2d 636 (1989); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Ga., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 227, 398 S.E.2d 254 (1990); Board of Regents v. Cohen, 197 Ga. App. 463, 398 S.E.2d 758 (1990); Colquitt Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Moultrie, 197 Ga. App. 794, 399 S.E.2d 497 (1990); Board of Natural Resources v. Walker County, 200 Ga. App. 301, 407 S.E.2d 436 (1991); Department of Medical Assistance v. Presbyterian Home, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 885, 409 S.E.2d 881 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1697, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 357 (1992); Nix v. Long Mtn. Resources, Inc., 262 Ga. 506, 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992); Ledbetter v. McDougald, 209 Ga. App. 907, 434 S.E.2d 763 (1993); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 212 Ga. App. 575, 442 S.E.2d 860 (1994); Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Peavy, 229 Ga. App. 201, 493 S.E.2d 602 (1997); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Alltel Ga. Communications Corp., 230 Ga. App. 563, 497 S.E.2d 50 (1998); Reheis v. AZS Corp., 232 Ga. App. 852, 503 S.E.2d 36 (1998); Miles v. Smith, 239 Ga. App. 641, 521 S.E.2d 687 (1999); Georgia PSC v. ALLTEL Ga. Communs. Corp., 244 Ga. App. 645, 536 S.E.2d 542 (2000); Ga. Bd. of Natural Res. v. Ga. Emission Testing Co., 249 Ga. App. 817, 548 S.E.2d 141 (2001); Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, Div. of Health Planning v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 262 Ga. App. 879, 586 S.E.2d 762 (2003); Couch v. Parker, 280 Ga. 580, 630 S.E.2d 364 (2006); Prof'l Stds. Comm'n v. Peterson, 284 Ga. App. 424, 643 S.E.2d 899 (2007); Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker, 295 Ga. App. 115, 670 S.E.2d 811 (2008); Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431, 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013); Barnett v. Ga. Dep't of Labor, 323 Ga. App. 882, 748 S.E.2d 688 (2013); DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013); Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP, 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017); C&M Enters. of Ga., LLC v. Williams, 346 Ga. App. 79, 816 S.E.2d 44 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1407, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 52 (Ga. 2019); Crittenden v. White, 346 Ga. App. 179, 816 S.E.2d 308 (2018); Ga. Lottery Corp. v. Tabletop Media, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 498, 816 S.E.2d 438 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1520, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 175 (Ga. 2019); Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 304 Ga. 425, 819 S.E.2d 20 (2018); UHS of Anchor, L.P. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 351 Ga. App. 29, 830 S.E.2d 413 (2019); Central Ga. Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 351 Ga. App. 69, 830 S.E.2d 459 (2019); Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Emory Univ., 351 Ga. App. 257, 830 S.E.2d 628 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1532, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 157 (Ga. 2020); Schuman v. Dep't of Human Servs., 354 Ga. App. 509, 841 S.E.2d 218 (2020).

"Aggrieved," as used in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), has been interpreted to mean that the person seeking to appeal must show that the person has an interest in the agency decision that has been specially and adversely affected thereby. Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985); Thebaut v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).

Provision for immediate review under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) is not applicable simply because an administrative ruling risks duplication of effort or expense; instead, there must be some suggestion that the administrative ruling, if incorrect, could not be remedied so as to cause irreparable harm. Schlachter v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. of Psychologists, 215 Ga. App. 171, 450 S.E.2d 242 (1994).

- Candidate had not shown irreparable harm justifying immediate appeal to the superior court under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) from an interim decision of the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission because judicial review would be available after the final decision; that the charges had been pending over eight years and alleged damage to the candidate's reputation was not irreparable harm. Oxendine v. Gov't Transparency & Campaign Fin. Comm'n, 341 Ga. App. 901, 802 S.E.2d 310 (2017).

- Because challengers who opposed a decision of the Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee granting a permit to a developer failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challengers' untimely petition; nevertheless, because the committee and the developer filed timely petitions for review in the trial court, and then appealed to the court of appeals, the challengers' appeals were properly before the court of appeals as cross-appeals filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a). Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, 286 Ga. App. 518, 649 S.E.2d 619 (2007), aff'd, 284 Ga. 736, 670 S.E.2d 429 (2008).

- Applicable 30-day statute of limitations of the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b), applied to defeat a suit contesting an administrative order that plaintiff State Department of Education reimburse parents of a disabled child for the child's placement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), the "stay-put" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Ga. State Dep't of Educ. v. Cherry, 314 F.3d 545 (11th Cir. 2002).

§ 50-13-19(f) required. - Superior court erred in reversing the suspension and reinstating a driver's license based on grounds and proffered evidence that the driver had not urged in the driver's original petition for judicial review and that were not covered by amendment to the original petition or prior application to the court to present additional evidence. Department of Pub. Safety v. Bell, 215 Ga. App. 301, 450 S.E.2d 320 (1994).

- Georgia Civil Practice Act's three-day rule under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(e) was inapplicable to a determination of timeliness with respect to a petition for judicial review of a Medicaid applicant's claim for benefits, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19; similarly, the certified mail rule under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-23 was expressly deemed inapplicable pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153(c) and, accordingly, the applicant's petition was properly denied as untimely. Gladowski v. Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 281 Ga. App. 299, 635 S.E.2d 886 (2006).

- In an action involving a dispute over Medicaid reimbursement rates, the plaintiffs were not excused from the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement because the plaintiffs were required to raise the plaintiffs' defective notice claims in the administrative review process in the first instance and O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153 governed that administrative review process. Ga. Dep't of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities v. United Cerebral Palsy of Ga., Inc., 298 Ga. 779, 784 S.E.2d 781 (2016).

- Matter before the state revenue commissioner (the proposed termination by a liquor producer of four of its designated wholesalers) was a "contested case" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), not involving the suspension or cancellation of licenses, and the trial court was thus correct in treating the review of the commissioner's order denying the proposal as a petition for judicial review pursuant to the APA; and, there having been no application to appeal the decision of the superior court affirming the commissioner's order, as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. Schieffelin & Co. v. Strickland, 253 Ga. 385, 320 S.E.2d 358 (1984).

- Trial court did not err in dismissing a retailer's petition for judicial review of the orders entered on an investigatory docket proceeding by the Georgia Public Service Commission, as it was not a contested case permitting review under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a); further, this disposition did not prevent the retailer in pursuing a remedy in its rate case against the Georgia Power Company. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 278 Ga. App. 239, 628 S.E.2d 658 (2006).

- Although the Georgia Board of Dentistry conducted an adjudicatory hearing, made findings of fact justifying discipline, and issued a letter of concern, the fact that the board could have issued a letter of concern without such procedures did not preclude judicial review since the sanction was issued as the result of contested case proceedings. Thebaut v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).

- Dentist was "aggrieved" by the Board of Dentistry's action in issuing a letter of concern and was therefore entitled to judicial review, in spite of the non-public nature of the letter, since the dentist had a professional interest in the board's decision that criticized the dentist's actions. Thebaut v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).

- Physicians and a sociologist had not shown aggrievement and thus lacked standing to seek judicial review of a decision of the Georgia Composite State Board of Medical Examiners (now Georgia Composite Medical Board) in which the board refused to open a disciplinary investigation against physicians who had participated in executions; they had not shown how the board's refusal to act adversely affected their practice of medicine or threatened them with an economic injury, and they had not shown how any injuries were special to them, rather than common to all those physicians practicing medicine in Georgia. Zitrin v. Ga. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 288 Ga. App. 295, 653 S.E.2d 758 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0500, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 285 (Ga. 2008).

First property owner's petition for judicial review of a decision by the Georgia Public Service Commission not to consider the propriety of the siting of an electrical substation near the first owner's residential property was denied because the first owner was not aggrieved under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) as no evidence was presented of any specific damage unique to the first owner's property. Ga. PSC v. Turnage, 284 Ga. 610, 669 S.E.2d 138 (2008).

- When an appeal of an adverse decision by an administrative agency is filed beyond the time allowed by law, the superior court has no jurisdiction to take any action other than to dismiss the case. Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 136 Ga. App. 718, 222 S.E.2d 183 (1975).

Finality of decision is unyielding prerequisite to judicial review. Department of Human Resources v. Williams, 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

- Trial court erred by affirming a decision of the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) in a ratemaking appeal filed by a gas distribution company and by denying the PSC's motion to dismiss the company's appeal; the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the company's petition for judicial review since one order appealed from was an interim order, and not a final order, and a voice vote appealed from was not even a decision subject to review. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 290 Ga. App. 243, 659 S.E.2d 385 (2008).

Because the order of the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding a construction monitoring report was the result of a semi-annual review process, the order stated that jurisdiction over the matters was expressly retained for the purpose of entering such further order or orders as the PSC might deem just and proper, and the order explained that all PSC decisions regarding cost recovery would be made after a prudence review at the end of construction, the order was not a final decision by the PSC, and the superior court properly held that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the order under the portion of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 providing for judicial review of a final decision. Ga. Interfaith Power & Light, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co., 352 Ga. App. 670, 835 S.E.2d 656 (2019).

- Fact that one basis, or even the sole basis, of a respondent's complaint as to the hearing officer's initial decision is a constitutional attack does not eliminate the necessity for agency review as a prerequisite to judicial review. Department of Pub. Safety v. Foreman, 130 Ga. App. 71, 202 S.E.2d 196 (1973); Georgia Bd. of Dentistry v. Pence, 223 Ga. App. 603, 478 S.E.2d 437 (1996).

Constitutional attack on notice of appeal provision must first be made before agency, and then before the superior court. Sparks v. Caldwell, 244 Ga. 530, 261 S.E.2d 590 (1979).

- No provision permits an aggrieved party to ignore prerequisite of agency review of an initial decision before petitioning the courts for relief. Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 230 Ga. 22, 195 S.E.2d 748 (1973).

Exhaustion of all administrative remedies available within the Department of Public Safety is necessary for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case. Department of Pub. Safety v. Foreman, 130 Ga. App. 71, 202 S.E.2d 196 (1973).

Agency review is a necessary step in exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to judicial review. Department of Pub. Safety v. Foreman, 130 Ga. App. 71, 202 S.E.2d 196 (1973).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies available within the agency is necessary for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case, and an aggrieved person who fails to seek review by the agency of an initial decision of a hearing officer fails to exhaust administrative remedies. Carnes v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 272 S.E.2d 690 (1980).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's amended motion for a new trial holding that the administration of breath tests pursuant to Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 92-3-.06(12)(b) did not violate the due process clause under both U.S. Const., amend. 5 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, given that: (1) the claim was raised for the first time in the new trial motion, and was thus untimely; (2) the defendant had an alternative remedy under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., by filing an action for a declaratory judgment; (3) the defendant failed to show that the Division of Forensic Sciences (DFS) eliminated meaningful procedures for conducting breath tests when it promulgated the rule; and (4) the techniques and methods approved by DFS were sufficient to ensure fair and accurate testing. Palmaka v. State, 280 Ga. App. 761, 634 S.E.2d 883 (2006).

That the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), refers to a "person" does not negate the Act's requirement that all administrative remedies be exhausted; in order to exhaust administrative remedies before the Georgia Public Service Commission, a person must file a timely application for leave to intervene and participate in the certification proceedings. Fulton County Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

Court of appeals erred in ruling that a society of surgery centers did not have to exhaust administrative remedies under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), in the society's action seeking to prevent the Georgia Department of Community Health and the Department's Commissioner from requiring the society's members to respond to certain disputed requests in an annual survey because the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement was inapplicable; the Commissioner's position in the lawsuit did not establish futility because actions taken to defend a lawsuit could not establish futility. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Ga. Soc'y of Ambulatory Surgery Ctrs., 290 Ga. 628, 724 S.E.2d 386 (2012).

Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a society of surgery centers did not have to exhaust administrative remedies under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), in the society's action seeking to prevent the Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH) and the Department's Commissioner from requiring the society's members to respond to certain disputed requests in an annual survey because the "acting outside statutory authority" exception to the exhaustion requirement did not apply; the society did not allege that DCH was acting wholly outside DCH's jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 31-6-70 to conduct surveys, but instead, the society claimed that the manner in which the survey was being conducted did not fully comply with the procedural requirements of the statute. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Ga. Soc'y of Ambulatory Surgery Ctrs., 290 Ga. 628, 724 S.E.2d 386 (2012).

Superior court did not err in dismissing a taxpayer's petition for judicial review of a decision of the Department of Revenue because the taxpayer failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available; the taxpayer never asked the commissioner of revenue to review the department's initial decision. Alexander v. Dep't of Revenue, 316 Ga. App. 543, 728 S.E.2d 320 (2012).

Because the Georgia Society of Ambulatory Surgical Centers represented the interests of members that had adequate administrative remedies, and those members had not exhausted those remedies, the trial court was required to dismiss its case alleging that an annual survey the Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH) issued to ambulatory surgery centers (ACS) sought information beyond the scope of O.C.G.A. § 31-6-70. Furthermore, because the procedures set forth in the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 and O.C.G.A. §§ 31-6-40(c), and31-6-47(a)(18), and Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 111-2-2-.05(2)(e) were available to ASCs before DCH took any final adverse action against them for failing to provide the required survey information, the procedures afforded adequate administrative remedies to aggrieved ACSs. Ga. Soc'y of Ambulatory Surgery Ctrs. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 316 Ga. App. 433, 729 S.E.2d 565 (2012).

Trial court properly upheld an agency decision that a power company had the right to continue service to an apartment complex under the grandfather clause to the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(b), after individual meters were installed to replace one master meter because none of the exceptions to the grandfather clause existed and the challenging electric corporation failed to raise its challenge to the application of the grandfather clause before the agency. Excelsior Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 322 Ga. App. 687, 745 S.E.2d 870 (2013).

- Mere existence of an unexhausted administrative remedy does not, standing alone, afford a defendant an absolute defense to a legal action. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Leafmore Forest Condominium Ass'n of Owners, 235 Ga. App. 319, 509 S.E.2d 374 (1998).

Because the plaintiffs' challenge was to the authority of the Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee to issue a water bottom lease, plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 before filing a declaratory judgment action. DBL, Inc. v. Carson, 284 Ga. App. 898, 645 S.E.2d 56, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 566 (2007).

- Public assistance recipients' claim against the commissioner of the Department of Human Resources for automatic grant adjustments was not barred by the recipients' failure to exhaust administrative remedies since the department's rules precluded a hearing in cases of requests for automatic grant adjustments. Wilson v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 180, 390 S.E.2d 846 (1990).

- Aggrieved party has no standing to complain of a hearing officer's initial decision if the hearing officer does not exhaust administrative remedies by applying to the agency for review of the hearing officer's decision. Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 230 Ga. 22, 195 S.E.2d 748 (1973).

- Although petitioners for judicial review of an administrative decision have the right to file briefs if the petitioners wish to do so under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(g), briefs are not required for superior court review of such decisions as a general matter. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga./Albany State College v. Moore, 210 Ga. App. 623, 436 S.E.2d 789 (1993).

- "Standing to challenge" the administrative decision is what is intended to be established by the requirement in Ga. L. 1978, p. 1362, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19) that the judicial review be of a "contested case"; and that is what is meant to be described by the language at Ga. L. 1975, p. 404, § 3 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2). National Council on Comp. Ins. v. Caldwell, 154 Ga. App. 528, 268 S.E.2d 793 (1980).

- Trial court properly concluded that the taxpayers lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Georgia Public Service Commission's (PSC) certification order because the taxpayers did not file a timely application to intervene in the certification proceedings and, thus, did not satisfy the first requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a); the taxpayers had an available administrative remedy by applying for intervention status in the proceedings conducted by the PSC on the company's application for certification within 30 days following the first published notice of the proceeding, O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59(c), but the taxpayers did not seek to intervene until eight months after notice of the proceedings were first published by the PSC. Fulton County Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

- Litigant is not required to exhaust an optional administrative process before seeking redress to the courts. Motor Fin. Co. v. Harris, 150 Ga. App. 762, 258 S.E.2d 628 (1979).

- When the plaintiffs sought an interpretation of a plan of conversion which had been reviewed and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, the parties were required to follow the administrative review process before seeking judicial review. Cerulean Cos. v. Tiller, 271 Ga. 65, 516 S.E.2d 522 (1999).

Trial court erred in accepting jurisdiction over a proceeding seeking an interpretation of a plan of conversion because the Commissioner of Insurance had reviewed the plan, approved the plan, and participated in the conversion process after approval, and the parties were required to follow the administrative review process before seeking judicial review. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. v. Deal, 244 Ga. App. 700, 536 S.E.2d 590 (2000).

- Because a peace officer's invocation of a right against self-incrimination could not shield that officer from an inquiry into the effect of that assertion on the officer's job performance, and because the record supported an administrative decision that the officer's refusal to cooperate in an investigation provided sufficient grounds for the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council to enter an order of decertification, the superior court erred in reversing an administrative law judge's decision upholding the decertification. Ga. Peace Officers Stds. & Training Council v. Anderson, 290 Ga. App. 91, 658 S.E.2d 840 (2008).

- Dentist's action for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to prevent the board of dentistry from taking action against the dentist based on an opinion of the attorney general to the effect that certain procedures being performed by the dentist were not within the lawful scope of the practice of dentistry, was not barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies since the only way for the dentist to challenge the board's position was to continue performing the procedures, thereby risking criminal prosecution for the felony offense of practicing medicine without a license and/or the initiation of administrative proceedings to revoke a dentist's license to practice dentistry. Thomas v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 197 Ga. App. 589, 398 S.E.2d 730 (1990).

O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(f) establishes a two-prong test that must be met before a superior court can grant an application for leave to present additional evidence. The evidence sought to be introduced must be material and good reason for failure to present such evidence at the hearing must be shown. Golden v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 198 Ga. App. 115, 400 S.E.2d 668 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 400 S.E.2d 668 (1991).

- Trial court erred in dismissing a petition for failure to join a party to an appellate proceeding when such party was served with the petition (though not specifically named therein) and was therefore subject to the appellate court's jurisdiction. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia v. Georgia Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263, 329 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

- Although a trial court erred in failing to hear oral argument and receive written briefs as requested by a power company, a remand was unnecessary because the company, by requesting that the appellate court consider the merits of the company's appeal of a Public Service Commission ruling, had essentially withdrawn or abandoned the company's briefing and hearing request. Ga. Power Co. v. Ga. PSC, 296 Ga. App. 556, 675 S.E.2d 294 (2009).

Scope of Judicial Review

Effect of remand on jurisdiction of reviewing court.

- Reviewing superior court does not lose jurisdiction of case on remand to agency but the court retains jurisdiction under subsection (f). Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974).

No need to exhaust administrative remedy under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-90. - Trial court erred in concluding that the petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and by dismissing the petition challenging the calculation of municipal franchise fees because the petitioners were not required to exhaust any administrative remedy before proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-90 as that statute does not contemplate any administrative proceedings before the Georgia Public Service Commission. Cazier v. Georgia Power Company, 339 Ga. App. 506, 793 S.E.2d 668 (2016), aff'd, 303 Ga. 820, 815 S.E.2d 922 (2018).

Because it was unclear whether the superior court determined that a case in which the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) explained in its order that all PSC decisions regarding cost recovery would be made after a prudence review at the end of construction was the type of case where the lack of adequate remedy exception would never be applicable or whether the superior court determined that the appellants had not shown that review of the PSC's final decision would not provide an adequate remedy, the case was remanded to determine whether the appellants met the appellants' burden to show that review of the PSC's final order would not provide the appellants an adequate remedy, thereby authorizing the superior court to review the order under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Ga. Interfaith Power & Light, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co., 352 Ga. App. 670, 835 S.E.2d 656 (2019).

- Function of an appellate court is to determine whether the judge of the superior court has in the judge's own final ruling committed an error of law. DeWeese v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 136 Ga. App. 154, 220 S.E.2d 458 (1975).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)(1), another superior court could consider a claim provided that the claim was preserved in the administrative proceedings below; thus, the claim for taking was ripe for judicial review at the time the administrative decision was appealed to the superior court. GSW, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 254 Ga. App. 283, 562 S.E.2d 253 (2002).

Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH) erred by deeming recovery from a Medicaid claimant's estate appropriate under O.C.G.A. § 49-4-147.1(a) as the claimant was still alive. But nothing in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) authorized the trial court to bar DCH from ever pursuing the claimant's estate to recover Medicaid payments. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Medders, 292 Ga. App. 439, 664 S.E.2d 832 (2008).

- Action for declaratory judgment challenging the validity of an agency rule has no place once judicial review of an administrative decision is sought. State Health Planning Agency v. Coastal Empire Rehabilitation Hosp., 261 Ga. 832, 412 S.E.2d 532 (1992).

- Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division's (EPD's) interpretation of the narrative standard was entitled to deference as it was proper for the EPD to interpret the narrative standard as not intended to convert the designated use of a water body to a more protected use as the plain language of the narrative standard does not specify the degree of interference with legitimate water uses that would constitute a violation of the rule. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 269, 816 S.E.2d 125 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1474, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 554 (Ga. 2019).

Judicial review contemplated is appellate in nature and is not such a "pretrial, trial, or post trial procedure" as is provided for in Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974).

- Rehearing or reconsideration contemplates a second, a de novo, consideration of a cause or a retrial of the issues; while a review involves only the examination of the record by an appellate tribunal and consideration for the purpose of correction. Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 230 Ga. 22, 195 S.E.2d 748 (1973).

- Absent an application to the court for leave to present additional evidence, appellate review of administrative decisions is confined to the record. Quarterman v. Edwards, 169 Ga. App. 300, 312 S.E.2d 643 (1983); Department of Pub. Safety v. Ramey, 215 Ga. App. 334, 450 S.E.2d 332 (1994).

Trial court did not err in affirming the state community health department's administrative decision to order the healthcare provider to cease operations until the healthcare provider obtained a certificate of need; with judicial review limited to the record, the healthcare provider did not show that the state community health department committed an error of law in issuing that order. N. Atlanta Scan Assocs. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 277 Ga. App. 583, 627 S.E.2d 67 (2006).

By the statute's express provisions, an appeal from the denial of a request to expunge a criminal record under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)(6) is as provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. In such case, the review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record; the court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs. Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010).

- Because a city could have challenged an agency consent order under O.C.G.A. §§ 12-2-2(c) and50-13-19, but did not, the city's appeal of a judgment to enforce the consent order did not fall under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), but arose from proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 12-5-189; since the city did not appeal the director's decision, the appellate issue was limited to the propriety of the judgment and not the correctness of the decision. City of Rincon v. Couch, 272 Ga. App. 411, 612 S.E.2d 596 (2005).

Clearly erroneous standard of review to be applied by the superior court prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the administrative law judge were supported by any evidence. Commissioner of Ins. v. Stryker, 218 Ga. App. 716, 463 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

- Superior court erroneously conducted a de novo review of an ALJ's findings affirming a decision to suspend a driver's license, when, after being advised of the implied consent rights and of the consequences of refusing to submit to a state-administered breath test, the driver refused the test; as the correct standard of review was the "any evidence" test, because the hearing before the ALJ was conducted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1, the appeal in the superior court was expressly excepted from O.C.G.A. § 40-5-66(a), and had to be conducted pursuant to § 40-5-67.1(h); moreover, the administered breath tests were not invalid merely because the officer gave the tests ten minutes apart, and the driver's failure to give an adequate sample could not be used to suspend the license. Dozier v. Pierce, 279 Ga. App. 464, 631 S.E.2d 379 (2006).

Trial court erred by failing to apply the proper standard of review to a decision of the Georgia Department of Community Health that terminated a claimant's medical assistance under a Medicaid waiver program available to qualifying children. The appellate court directed that the standard of review set forth in O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153(c) was applicable to the case, which called for application of the substantial evidence standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. Greene v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 293 Ga. App. 201, 666 S.E.2d 590 (2008).

Record contained no showing that the trial court applied an incorrect standard to any legal conclusions made by the Georgia Public Service Commission because both at the hearing and in the court's order, the trial court correctly framed the issue and explicitly considered the issue at length; because there was no evidence in the record affirmatively showing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review, the court of appeals would not presume error. MXenergy Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 310 Ga. App. 630, 714 S.E.2d 132 (2011).

Order affirming the issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit was vacated and the case remanded with direction to the superior court to in turn remand the case to the administrative law judge (ALJ) for reconsideration because the ALJ applied an erroneous theory of law to the evidence and the evidence had to be considered anew in assessing whether the interference with legitimate water uses was unreasonable, as opposed to whether there was any interference. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 269, 816 S.E.2d 125 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1474, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 554 (Ga. 2019).

- Scope of judicial review is limited to those objections upon which the agency has had an opportunity to rule. Department of Pub. Safety v. Foreman, 130 Ga. App. 71, 202 S.E.2d 196 (1973).

Court correctly held that an intervenor's failure to raise the issue of allegedly improper ex parte communications before the Public Service Commission precluded the court's consideration of the issue. Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562 (1990).

Consideration of new evidence which goes to merits is not authorized during judicial review of an agency decision. Caldwell v. Corbin, 152 Ga. App. 153, 262 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

- Trial court erred in substituting the court's judgment for that of the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Services and in setting aside a driver's license suspension as an officer complied with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(f)(1) by handing the driver a copy of the DPS Form 1205 when the driver was arrested. Davis v. Brown, 274 Ga. App. 48, 616 S.E.2d 826 (2005).

Civil Practice Act, (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) is inapplicable to judicial review of administrative agency decisions and motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment are "functionless" and are not appropriate in the superior court when that court is sitting as an appellate court under authority of the law. Walker v. Harden, 129 Ga. App. 782, 201 S.E.2d 483 (1973).

Judicial review provided is not governed by the provisions of the Civil Practice Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 136 Ga. App. 718, 222 S.E.2d 183 (1975).

- Standards for review set forth in subsection (h) of this section, properly applied, do not transfer to courts powers which under the Constitution belong to the Insurance Commissioner, nor do the standards usurp the commissioner's function to tell the commissioner how the commissioner should discharge the task and how the commissioner should protect the various interests which are deemed to be in the commissioner's, not the court's, keeping. National Council on Comp. Ins. v. Caldwell, 154 Ga. App. 528, 268 S.E.2d 793 (1980).

§ 5-6-35(a)(1) required. - In a case involving a white supremacist organization being denied a permit for the Adopt-A-Highway program administered by the Georgia Department of Transportation (Department), the court dismissed the Department's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Department sought review of a decision of a state administrative agency and was required under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) to bring the Department's appeal by way of an application for discretionary review, but failed to do so. State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).

- Trial court decision invalidating an air quality permit issued by the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources to a power company to construct a pulverized coal-fired electric power plant in a particular county contained an erroneous ruling that the permit was invalid because the permit failed to include a limit on the power plant's carbon dioxide gas (CO 2 ) emissions since no provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., or the state implementation plan controlled or limited CO 2 emissions. Because CO 2 was not a pollutant that "otherwise is subject to regulation under the CAA," CO 2 was not a regulated new source review pollutant in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program and was not required to be controlled by use of best available control technology (BACT), therefore, the trial court erred by ruling that the PSD permit was required to include a BACT emission limit to control the power company's CO 2 emissions. Longleaf Energy Assocs., LLC v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 753, 681 S.E.2d 203 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1879, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 809 (Ga. 2009).

Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellate review for sufficiency of evidence.

- Paragraphs (h)(1) through (6) of this section clearly authorize appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the agency's decision on questions of law. Stevens v. Board of Regents, 129 Ga. App. 347, 199 S.E.2d 620 (1973).

- When the trial judge would be authorized to reverse the administrative agency pursuant to paragraph (h)(5) of this section, the appellate court is still bound by the evidence rule and can only reverse when there is no competent evidence to authorize the findings by the trial court. Hicks v. Harden, 133 Ga. App. 789, 213 S.E.2d 49 (1975).

- Under paragraph (h)(5) of this section, "clearly erroneous" is the "any evidence rule," making findings of facts under this section binding on appeal unless wholly unsupported. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616, 211 S.E.2d 635 (1974).

"Clearly erroneous" criterion for judicial review is the same as the "any evidence rule," which has long been binding on the appellate courts. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Hooks, 139 Ga. App. 34, 227 S.E.2d 864 (1976).

Paragraph (h)(5) of this section precludes review if "any evidence" on the record substantiates the administrative agency's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Flowers v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 141 Ga. App. 105, 232 S.E.2d 586 (1977).

"Clearly erroneous" criterion of paragraph (h)(5) of this section for judicial review is the same as the "any evidence rule." DOT v. Rushing, 143 Ga. App. 235, 237 S.E.2d 722 (1977).

"Clearly erroneous" language of paragraph (h)(5) of this section is the same as the "any evidence rule." Hall v. Ault, 143 Ga. App. 158, 237 S.E.2d 653 (1977), aff'd, 240 Ga. 585, 242 S.E.2d 101 (1978).

Rather than applying the "any evidence" standard of review, a trial court improperly made an independent determination that a university registrar's termination was "arbitrary and capricious and was not the meaningful hearing that due process requires." Under the "any evidence" standard, the trial court was not allowed to substitute the court's judgment for that of the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge properly upheld a university registrar's termination since the evidence showed that the registrar's office was in chaos; that students, alumni, parents, and faculty complained about the office; that registrar staff employees complained about the registrar; that the registrar did not know how to use the student information management system on the computer; and that the registrar had not done an adequate job of staff development. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Hogan, 298 Ga. App. 454, 680 S.E.2d 518 (2009).

"Any-evidence" standard was the appropriate standard of review for the superior court in reviewing the grant of a zoning variance by a county board of commissioners. Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 401 S.E.2d 691 (1991).

Trial court applied the correct "any evidence" standard of review to the administrative law judge's findings that the factual evidence of misrepresentation and concealment regarding a solid waste landfill permit application satisfied the clear and convincing evidence standard of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-23.1(a)(3)(B)(ii). Bartram Envtl., Inc. v. Reheis, 235 Ga. App. 204, 509 S.E.2d 114 (1998).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)(5), the "any evidence" is the applicable touchstone and the presence of conflicting evidence is sufficient to satisfy that test. Bowman v. Palmour, 209 Ga. App. 270, 433 S.E.2d 380 (1993).

Presence of conflicting evidence, including dueling experts, is sufficient to satisfy the "any evidence" standard. Sawyer v. Reheis, 213 Ga. App. 727, 445 S.E.2d 837 (1994).

Judgment affirming a decision of the Department of Community Health based on the court's finding that there was evidence to support the judgment was error because, under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h), a reviewing court was authorized to reverse or modify an agency decision if its application of the law to the facts was erroneous; a reviewing court was statutorily required to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law drawn from the findings of fact supported by any evidence. A determination that the findings of fact were supported by evidence did not end judicial review of an administrative decision. Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223 (2008).

- Georgia Department of Community Health made an error of law under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)(4) in testing whether a patient's hyperbaric oxygen therapy treatment was an accepted treatment that was medically necessary; in determining whether the treatment was reimbursable under Medicaid, the proper standard was, under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5), whether the treatment was necessary "to correct or ameliorate a physical or mental defect or condition" regardless of whether the treatment was an accepted medical practice. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Freels, 258 Ga. App. 446, 576 S.E.2d 2 (2002).

Trial court could have found that the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Services acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused the Department's discretion in applying the 10-day notice requirement as it could be inferred that the DPS Form 1205 served on a driver was seized by an officer during the driver's arrest; the driver was entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge, despite the driver's failure to request a hearing within the 10-day time period. Davis v. Brown, 274 Ga. App. 48, 616 S.E.2d 826 (2005).

Georgia Public Service Commission was authorized to dismiss a natural gas company's application for certification because creation of a natural gas company as a Limited Liability Company (LLC) wholly owned by the city's utility board was in derogation of a city charter as the charter required the utility board to create a wholly owned subsidiary in the form of a non-profit corporation rather than a LLC, thus, the city's creation of a LLC was an ultra vires act. Infinite Energy v. Marietta Natural Gas, 349 Ga. App. 343, 826 S.E.2d 189 (2019).

- Superior court erred in the court's determination that the Georgia Department of Community Health's experts were not qualified to testify about the efficacy of hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and in substituting the court's judgment for that of the department, which was entitled to rely on the department's experts' testimony. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Freels, 258 Ga. App. 446, 576 S.E.2d 2 (2002).

- Georgia Professional Standards Commission's suspension of a school superintendent's educator certificate for one year for violating Interim Ethics Rules 505-2-.03(1)(n) and (o), Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 505-2-.03(1)(n) and (o), was not clearly erroneous since: (1) the superintendent, believing that the Sheriff's Department's response to an elderly friend's report of suspicions of criminal activity was too slow, twice confronted a suspect; (2) the superintendent displayed a firearm to the suspect; (3) the superintendent instigated the confrontations on a public highway, on a school day, during school hours; (4) the superintendent was a role model to students; and (5) violence and the use of weapons by students was a significant public policy concern in the Georgia educational system. Prof'l Stds. Comm'n v. Alberson, 273 Ga. App. 1, 614 S.E.2d 132 (2005).

- Trial court's order requiring a student's reinstatement as a student and a member of a university's varsity football team was reversed due to a lack of a justiciable controversy as: (1) Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II clearly manifested an intent to entrust the schools to supervising authorities rather than the courts; (2) the student admitted that the suspension arose from a telephone call the student made to facilitate a drug sale and it was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious for lack of evidence; (3) the student suffered no deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights as there was no right to participate in extracurricular sports; and (4) the suspension did not prejudice the student's substantial rights as the suspension was tailored to permit the student's eventual re-enrollment to complete the student's degree requirements, did not render the student ineligible for a scholarship, and was not a deprivation of major proportion warranting judicial intervention. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Houston, 282 Ga. App. 412, 638 S.E.2d 750 (2006).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(e), an administrative agency was responsible for transmitting the entire record of the agency proceeding to the trial court upon a petition seeking review of an agency decision; since an appellate court was unable to locate transcripts from a hearing before an administrative law judge, or a proceeding before the full agency board, the appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly reviewed a psychologist's petition for review of the board's decision without the entire record, and the trial court's judgment affirming the agency decision was vacated and the case was remanded. Farrar v. Ga. Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 280 Ga. App. 455, 634 S.E.2d 79 (2006).

- Since the Public Service Commission granted a rate increase, but disallowed some of the utility company's costs in calculating the rate base for a fair increase because the commission concluded that some of the costs were the result of the company's imprudent management of the project, in that some were attributable to avoidable delay and some were caused by poor productivity of the construction work force, the agency's decision was within the agency's authority and was supported by the facts. Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562 (1990).

- Appellate court reinstated the agency denial of a Certificate of Need to establish an inpatient psychiatric hospital because the agency's conclusion that the applicant did not meet the applicant's burden of establishing no adverse impact on similar existing programs was supported by substantial evidence, in particular, expert testimony and exhibits regarding the applicant's unrealistic projections, overinflated market share, and failure to account for an existing facility's additional 30 pediatric beds. Tanner Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Vest Newnan, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 884, 789 S.E.2d 258 (2016).

- Electric membership corporation alleged that an electric utility company, a consumer's designated territorial supplier, falsely told the consumer that the consumer did not qualify as a large load consumer under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a) and thus had to select the utility as the consumer's provider, and that the consumer's request-for-services form was void because the form was based on this misrepresentation. As the hearing officer's findings - that the allegations of misrepresentation were untenable and that the consumer and utility had a binding contract - were supported by the evidence, the findings were upheld. Jackson Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 294 Ga. App. 253, 668 S.E.2d 867 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0356, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 402 et seq.

1A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Administrative Law, § 185 et seq.

- 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 313 et seq.

- Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 5-101 et seq.

- Exhaustion of administrative remedies as condition of resort to court in respect of right claimed under social security or old age acts, 130 A.L.R. 882.

Approval of or refusal to approve bond of public officer as subject of judicial review, 134 A.L.R. 1359.

Malicious prosecution predicated upon prosecution, institution, or instigation of administrative proceedings, 143 A.L.R. 157.

Propriety of ruling by which ultimate disposition of issue between private parties is made to depend upon correction by administrative authority of antecedent defective regulation, 153 A.L.R. 1026.

Stay, pending review, of judgment or order revoking or suspending a professional, trade, or occupational license, 166 A.L.R. 575.

Validity of administrative proceedings conducted on Sunday or holiday, 26 A.L.R.2d 996.

Exhaustion of grievance procedures or of remedies provided in collective bargaining agreement as condition of employee's resort to civil courts for assertedly wrongful discharge, 72 A.L.R.2d 1439.

Revocation of teacher's certificate for moral unfitness, 97 A.L.R.2d 827.

Failure to pursue or exhaust remedies under union contract as affecting employee's right of state civil action for retaliatory discharge, 32 A.L.R.4th 350.

Wrongful discharge based on public policy derived from professional ethics codes, 52 A.L.R.5th 405.