2020 Georgia Code
Title 48 - Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 5 - Ad Valorem Taxation of Property
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 48-5-2. Definitions

As used in this chapter, the term:

(.1) "Arm's length, bona fide sale" means a transaction which has occurred in good faith without fraud or deceit carried out by unrelated or unaffiliated parties, as by a willing buyer and a willing seller, each acting in his or her own self-interest, including but not limited to a distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.

1. "Current use value" of bona fide conservation use property means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property with the intention of continuing the property in its existing use and in an arm's length, bona fide sale and shall be determined in accordance with the specifications and criteria provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 48-5-269.
2. "Current use value" of bona fide residential transitional property means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property with the intention of continuing the property in its existing use and in an arm's length, bona fide sale.The tax assessor shall consider the following criteria, as applicable, in determining the current use value of bona fide residential transitional property:
   1. The current use of such property;
   2. Annual productivity; and
   3. Sales data of comparable real property with and for the same existing use.
3. "Fair market value of property" means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property and a willing seller would accept for the property at an arm's length, bona fide sale. The income approach, if data are available, shall be considered in determining the fair market value of income-producing property. If actual income and expense data are voluntarily supplied by the property owner, such data shall be considered in such determination. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the transaction amount of the most recent arm's length, bona fide sale in any year shall be the maximum allowable fair market value for the next taxable year. With respect to the valuation of equipment, machinery, and fixtures when no ready market exists for the sale of the equipment, machinery, and fixtures, fair market value may be determined by resorting to any reasonable, relevant, and useful information available, including, but not limited to, the original cost of the property, any depreciation or obsolescence, and any increase in value by reason of inflation. Each tax assessor shall have access to any public records of the taxpayer for the purpose of discovering such information.
   1. In determining the fair market value of a going business where its continued operation is reasonably anticipated, the tax assessor may value the equipment, machinery, and fixtures which are the property of the business as a whole where appropriate to reflect the accurate fair market value.
   2. The tax assessor shall apply the following criteria in determining the fair market value of real property:
      1. Existing zoning of property;
      2. Existing use of property, including any restrictions or limitations on the use of property resulting from state or federal law or rules or regulations adopted pursuant to the authority of state or federal law;
      3. Existing covenants or restrictions in deed dedicating the property to a particular use;
      4. Bank sales, other financial institution owned sales, or distressed sales, or any combination thereof, of comparable real property;
      5. Decreased value of the property based on limitations and restrictions resulting from the property being in a conservation easement;
      6. Rent limitations, higher operating costs resulting from regulatory requirements imposed on the property, and any other restrictions imposed upon the property in connection with the property being eligible for any income tax credits with respect to real property which are claimed and granted pursuant to either Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or Chapter 7 of this title or receiving any other state or federal subsidies provided with respect to the use of the property as residential rental property; provided, however, that properties described in this division shall not be considered comparable real property for the assessment or appeal of assessment of properties not covered by this division;
      7. (I) In establishing the value of any property subject to rent restrictions under the sales comparison approach, any income tax credits described in division (vi) of this subparagraph that are attributable to a property may be considered in determining the fair market value of the property, provided that the tax assessor uses comparable sales of property which, at the time of the comparable sale, had unused income tax credits that were transferred in an arm's length, bona fide sale.
   3. In establishing the value of any property subject to rent restrictions under the income approach, any income tax credits described in division (vi) of this subparagraph that are attributable to property may be considered in determining the fair market value of the property, provided that such income tax credits generate actual income to the record holder of title to the property; and
      1. Any other existing factors provided by law or by rule and regulation of the commissioner deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value.

      (B.1) The tax assessor shall not consider any income tax credits with respect to real property which are claimed and granted pursuant to either Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or Chapter 7 of this title in determining the fair market value of real property.

      (B.2) In determining the fair market value of real property, the tax assessor shall not include the value of any intangible assets used by a business, wherever located, including patents, trademarks, trade names, customer agreements, and merchandising agreements.

   4. Fair market value of "rehabilitated historic property" as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.2 means:
      1. For the first eight years in which the property is classified as rehabilitated historic property, the value equal to the greater of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time preliminary certification on such property was received by the county board of tax assessors pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-7.2;
      2. For the ninth year in which the property is classified as rehabilitated historic property, the value of the property as determined by division (i) of this subparagraph plus one-half of the difference between such value and the current fair market value exclusive of the provisions of this subparagraph; and
      3. For the tenth and following years, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.
   5. Fair market value of "landmark historic property" as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.3 means:
      1. For the first eight years in which the property is classified as landmark historic property, the value equal to the greater of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time certification on such property was received by the county board of tax assessors pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-7.3;
      2. For the ninth year in which the property is classified as landmark historic property, the value of the property as determined by division (i) of this subparagraph plus one-half of the difference between such value and the current fair market value exclusive of the provisions of this subparagraph; and
      3. For the tenth and following years, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.
   6. Timber shall be valued at its fair market value at the time of its harvest or sale in the manner specified in Code Section 48-5-7.5.
   7. Fair market value of "brownfield property" as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.6 means:
      1. Unless sooner disqualified pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, for the first ten years in which the property is classified as brownfield property, or as this period of preferential assessment may be extended pursuant to subsection (o) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, the value equal to the lesser of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time application was made to the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources for participation under Article 9 of Chapter 8 of Title 12, the "Georgia Brownfield Act," as amended; and
      2. Unless sooner disqualified pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, for the eleventh and following years, or at the end of any extension of this period of preferential assessment pursuant to subsection (o) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.
   8. Fair market value of "qualified timberland property" means the fair market value determined in accordance with Article 13 of this chapter.
4. "Foreign merchandise in transit" means personal property of any description which has been or will be moved by waterborne commerce through any port located in this state and:
   1. Which has entered the export stream, although temporarily stored or warehoused in the county where the port of export is located; or
   2. Which was shipped from a point of origin located outside the customs territory of the United States and on which United States customs duties are paid at or through any customs district or port located in this state, although stored or warehoused in the county where the port of entry is located while in transit to a final destination.
5. "Forest land conservation use value" of forest land conservation use property means the amount determined in accordance with the specifications and criteria provided for in Code Section 48-5-271 and Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III(f) of the Constitution.
6. "Forest land fair market value" means the fair market value of the forest land determined in accordance with Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III(f) of the Constitution.

(Ga. L. 1909, p. 36, § 22; Civil Code 1910, § 1004; Code 1933, § 92-5702; Ga. L. 1968, p. 358, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 980, § 2; Ga. L. 1975, p. 96, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1950, § 1; Code 1933, § 91A-1001, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 17; Ga. L. 1983, p. 716, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1585, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1122, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1869, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1903, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1008, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1098, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 170, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 297, § 1/HB 1211; Ga. L. 2009, p. 27, § 1/SB 55; Ga. L. 2010, p. 1104, §§ 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4/SB 346; Ga. L. 2012, p. 843, § 3/HB 1102; Ga. L. 2014, p. 672, § 1/HB 755; Ga. L. 2014, p. 820, § 1/HB 954; Ga. L. 2017, p. 55, § 1/HB 196; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 48/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 119, §§ 1, 2/HB 85; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 48/SB 365; Ga. L. 2019, p. 651, § 1/HB 507.)

The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in the second sentence of paragraph (3), substituted "utilized" for "considered" near the middle and inserted ", and, if actual income and expense data are voluntarily supplied by the property owner, such data shall be considered in such determination" at the end; rewrote division (3)(B)(vi); added division (3)(B)(vii); and redesignated former division (3)(B)(vii) as present division (3)(B)(viii). The second 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised language in paragraph (3), and, in division (3)(F)(i), revised punctuation and substituted "'Georgia Brownfield Act'" for "'Georgia Hazardous Site Reuse and Redevelopment Act'".

The 2018 amendments. The first 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added subparagraph (3)(G), inserted "use" following "Forestland conservation" in paragraph (5), and rewrote paragraph (6). The second 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in subdivisions (3)(B)(vii)(I) and (3)(B)(vii)(II).

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, in paragraph (3), near the middle of the second sentence, substituted "considered in" for "utilized in" and substituted "property. If actual" for "property, and, if actual"; substituted "rehabilitated historic property," for " 'rehabilitated historic property,'" near the middle of divisions (3)(C)(i) and (3)(C)(ii); and substituted "landmark historic property," for " 'landmark historic property,'" near the middle of divisions (3)(D)(i) and (3)(D)(ii).

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2010, a misspelling of "occurred" was corrected in paragraph (.1).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2018, "rehabilitated" was inserted before "historic property" in subparagraph (3)(C).

- Ga. L. 1991, p. 1903, § 15, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall be applicable beginning January 1, 1992, with respect to ad valorem taxation of timber and shall be applicable beginning January 1, 1992, for all other purposes. Taxation for prior periods shall continue to be governed by prior law.

Ga. L. 2008, p. 297, § 5/HB 1211, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2008 amendment becomes effective on January 1, 2009, upon the ratification of a resolution at the November 2008, state-wide general election, which resolution amends the Constitution so as to provide for the special assessment and taxation of forest land conservation use property and for local government assistance grants. The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 2008, p. 1209) was ratified at the general election held on November 4, 2008.

Ga. L. 2009, p. 27, § 5/SB 55, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment to this Code section shall be applicable to all taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009.

Ga. L. 2017, p. 55, § 1/HB 196, which amended this Code section, purported to amend paragraph (3) but no changes were made to subparagraphs (B.1), (B.2), and (C) through (F).

Ga. L. 2018, p. 119, § 7/HB 85, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2019, upon the ratification of the question presented to the voters at the November 6, 2018 election. The constitutional amendment was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election held on November 6, 2018.

- For article discussing tax exemptions and deductions as incentives for establishment of foreign business in Georgia, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (1976). For article, "The Tax Abatement Program for Historic Properties in Georgia," see 28 Ga. St. B. J. 129 (1992). For annual survey on law of real property, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 353 (1991). For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009). For annual survey on real property, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 151 (2014). For survey article on local government law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 147 (2015). For survey article on real property law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 193 (2015). For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016). For annual survey of real property law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2016). For annual survey on local government law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2017). For annual survey on local government law, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 189 (2019). For note on the 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 173 (1989).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Factors to Be Considered

General Consideration

Constitutionality of utilizing other methods for determining fair market value.

- Utilization of different methods for determining fair market value for purposes of taxation creates no infirmity under the United States Constitution or under the state constitution or laws. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Burt Realty Co., 250 Ga. 467, 298 S.E.2d 475, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 3540, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1390 (1983).

Statute is not unconstitutional for vagueness of the term "fair market value of property." Chilivis v. Backus, 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

- Inasmuch as O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B.1) exempted the low-income housing tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties, the statute granted preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and created a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (b), which ran afoul of the taxation uniformity provision. Heron Lake II Apts., L. P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 299 Ga. 598, 791 S.E.2d 77 (2016).

Definition of "fair market value of property" is not too vague and indefinite to be enforced. Chilivis v. Kell, 236 Ga. 226, 223 S.E.2d 117, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891, 97 S. Ct. 249, 50 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1976).

- Term "fair market value of property" as defined in this statute is not too vague and indefinite to be enforced, and there is no merit in the constitutional attacks on county ad valorem tax assessments statutes because of their use of this term. Butts County v. Briscoe, 236 Ga. 233, 223 S.E.2d 199 (1976).

- Because "fair market value of property" was not defined as the amount a buyer would pay to purchase, and a willing seller would accept, for a defeasable interest in property; the appellate court concluded the tax sale did not qualify as an arm's length, bona fide sale such that the one-year freeze applied and, thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Newton County Board of Tax Assessors, and in denying the buyers' cross-motion on that ground. Ballard v. Newton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 332 Ga. App. 521, 773 S.E.2d 780 (2015).

- In assessing the fair market value of real property, tax assessors may, when appropriate, consider the "highest and best use" of real property under the statutory criterion allowing "[A]ny other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at a fair market value." Sibley v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 171 Ga. App. 65, 318 S.E.2d 643 (1984).

- Change made by Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 17, is not to the tax year 1979 but to tax years 1980 and thereafter. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Remick, 165 Ga. App. 616, 300 S.E.2d 203 (1983).

- Although an owner's property qualified for preferential assessment under the Rehabilitated Historic Property Preferential Assessment Act (RHPPA), O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.2, the owner was allowed to use the effective date of the local Act homestead exemption, Ga. L. 1999, p. 4213, § 1, as the base year for the fair market valuation assessment of the property because the simultaneous application of the RHPPA and the local Act homestead exemption was not precluded. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Bock, 299 Ga. App. 257, 682 S.E.2d 355 (2009).

- Imported stone tile/slab, which was stored at the taxpayer's pleasure for sale to anyone who might wish to purchase it, was not "in transit to a final destination" within the contemplation of subparagraph (4)(B) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 and was consequently not exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-5. Seabrook Corp. v. Chatham County Bd. of Equalization, 195 Ga. App. 730, 394 S.E.2d 796 (1990).

Merchandise brought into the United States through the port of Charleston, South Carolina and transported, via land freight carrier to a container freight station in Chatham County, was not "foreign merchandise in transit" and was therefore not exempt from ad valorem taxation. Pier 1 Imports v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 199 Ga. App. 294, 404 S.E.2d 637 (1991).

§ 48-5-2(3) with local constitutional amendment. - Trial court properly determined that no conflict existed between a local constitutional amendment (LCA) and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) because the statute focused on the market-determined value of property on the actual date the property was acquired, rather than the property's value as much as a year later and was entirely consistent with the LCA, which froze the ad valorem tax value of homestead property in the county at the property's fair market value at the start of the year after a homestead exemption was allowed or after ownership of the property changed. Columbus Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman, 293 Ga. 107, 744 S.E.2d 18 (2013).

Trial court is correct in disregarding valuation placed on property by board of tax assessors when the chairperson concedes that the chairperson has no knowledge of the existing use of the property, that the existing zoning is not indicative of any use to which the property might reasonably be put, and that the chairperson knows of no other factors, other than the property's general location, which might be pertinent in determining the amount the property would bring at a cash sale. Evans v. Board of Tax Assessors, 168 Ga. App. 792, 310 S.E.2d 562 (1983).

No distinction between property owned by public utility corporations and individuals. Ogletree v. Woodward, 150 Ga. 691, 105 S.E. 243 (1920).

- Provision requiring that all property be returned for taxation at the property's fair market value is, undeniably, a statutory mandate. McLennan v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 302, 149 S.E.2d 705 (1966).

Duty to return all property at fair market value is not supreme, but yields to the duty to avoid discrimination. McLennan v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 302, 149 S.E.2d 705 (1966); Griggs v. Greene, 230 Ga. 257, 197 S.E.2d 116 (1973).

- Term "existing use of property" as used in the definition of "fair market value of property" cannot be assigned any particular value since real property is unique and the extent to which existing use affects the property's value is dependent upon a great variety of other factors. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

- Assessments lacked uniformity in failing to follow the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 regarding consideration of "existing use of the property" and "other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value" and in failing to exempt standing timber under the mandate of O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-7.1(a)(1) and48-5-7.5 as set forth in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III. Leverett v. Jasper County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 233 Ga. App. 470, 504 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

- Trial court erred in concluding that a 2011 sale of taxable property by Freddie Mac did not qualify as an arm's length, bona fide sale for purposes of limiting the assessment value of the property in the next year under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3); O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) expressly defined a bona fide sale to include distress transactions. CPF Invs., LLLP v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga. App. 744, 769 S.E.2d 159 (2015).

- Trial court erred by determining that the sheriff's sale of certain real property was not an arm's length, bona fide sale under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) because the sheriff's sale of the subject property was a distress sale and public auction; thus, it was an arm's length, bona fide sale under the plain terms of § 48-5-2(.1). Park Solutions, LLC v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 336 Ga. App. 832, 783 S.E.2d 453 (2016).

- Foreclosure sale was an arm's length, bona fide sale and, thus, the trial court properly determined that the DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors was precluded from taxing the subject properties at fair market values higher than the amounts paid at public auctions. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Astor Atl, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 867, 826 S.E.2d 685 (2019).

- Bankruptcy court found that for the purposes of ad valorem tax on the debtors' equipment that: (1) for 1997, the value was the lowest of the tax assessors' value due to discrepancies in the tax assessors' values; (2) for 1998, the court accepted the value determined by the board of equalization which gave some weight to the debtors' appraiser who considered comparable sales; (3) for 1999, the court took the tax assessors' lowest value as the debtors' appraiser omitted a laser device; and (4) for 2000, the debtors did not challenge the tax assessors' value. In re R-P Packaging, Inc., 278 Bankr. 281 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).

Cited in Williamson v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 168 Ga. App. 47, 308 S.E.2d 55 (1983); Hawkins v. Grady County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 180 Ga. App. 834, 350 S.E.2d 790 (1986); Hawkins v. Grady County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 192 Ga. App. 416, 385 S.E.2d 305 (1989); Coleman v. Montgomery County, 228 Ga. App. 276, 491 S.E.2d 495 (1997); Jones v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 270 Ga. App. 483, 606 S.E.2d 673 (2004).

Existing use of property is not exclusive factor in determining fair market value; assessors are directed to consider also existing zoning of property, existing covenants or restrictions in the deed dedicating the property to a particular use, or any other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at a fair market value. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

Existing use must be employed as a yardstick with which to measure fair market value. Inland Container Corp. v. Paulding County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 220 Ga. App. 878, 470 S.E.2d 702 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51(2011).

- Evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court that assessors failed to consider the existing use of land which is generally categorized as vacant land, not commercial, industrial, or residential subdivision, when assessors, relying on the property's highest and best use, assigned such land a base value according to the district in which the land was located, which value was determined by the sale price of other vacant lands purchased for development, which sales did not accurately reflect the value of other vacant land because such sales were often for special purposes such as schools or parks, or speculative development. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

- It is error for a court to approve a valuation which tilts market value in favor of an assumed highest and best use to appear from future speculation and development, rather than first determining the criteria for zoning, existing use, and deed restrictions, if any, at which time other pertinent factors may be considered. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980); Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 161 Ga. App. 257, 287 S.E.2d 696 (1982).

- While under the criterion "any other factors deemed pertinent" the highest and best use may be considered, the General Assembly did not base market value on highest and best use, nor did the General Assembly list highest and best use as a specific criterion. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

"Highest and best use" is factor only if it reflects amount realized from cash sale of the property. That valuation will not be confined to actual use alone, and all criteria added by the General Assembly are to be considered. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

"Highest and best use" is a much more speculative assigned value than existing use. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

- In considering existing use, when the use is income producing, it would appear that the income capitalization method should at least be considered, this being a standard method of arriving at value. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

- In fixing the fair market value of a leasehold for tax purposes, the rule of "fair market value of property" should always be applied. Delta Air Lines v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 131 S.E.2d 768, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904, 84 S. Ct. 195, 11 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1963).

- Existence of separate taxable interests and estates in the same property and determination of their respective fair market values for assessment purposes is necessary only when the tax liability is likewise divided among the owners. Martin v. Liberty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga. App. 340, 262 S.E.2d 609 (1979).

- Assessed value must consider, inter alia: existing zoning, existing use, and "any other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value." Therefore, a consideration of "existing use" (the current leases) must be employed as a "'yardstick' with which to measure fair market value" not hypothetical non-existing leases. Dougherty County Bd. of Equalization v. Castro Dev. Co., 228 Ga. App. 293, 491 S.E.2d 483 (1997).

- When the assessed value of rural acreage used as a dairy farm is based primarily on sales of other property, and all the so-called comparable sales are for speculative or development purposes, with the exception of one which was intended for use as a private airport, the statutory formula has not been properly applied. Dotson v. Henry County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

- Although the taxpayers' memberships in a club were not subject to taxation, if a taxpayer relinquished that membership upon sale of the taxpayer's real estate, the buyer could apply for immediate membership, and such an application would normally be granted. Therefore, a county board of tax assessors would have violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 if the board excluded the enhanced value of the properties attributable to the right to apply for such memberships from ad valorem taxation because the membership was part of the properties' fair market value. Morton v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 294 Ga. App. 901, 670 S.E.2d 528 (2008).

Trial court erred by holding as a matter of law that the county was required to reduce the relevant valuations by the value of reduced dues for the club membership associated with quarter ownership interests in the condominium to determine the fair market value as the club membership was part of, and could not be separated from, the value of the membership. Glynn County Bd. of Assessors v. SIA Propco I, LLC, 351 Ga. App. 103, 830 S.E.2d 403 (2019).

Use of a "value in use in place" standard was not an inappropriate method of determining the fair market value of machinery and equipment for taxation purposes. Flambeau Corp. v. Morgan County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 238 Ga. App. 812, 520 S.E.2d 275 (1999).

- Prior to the statutory amendment contained in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B.1), tax credits under 26 U.S.C. § 42 were properly considered in establishing the fair market value of real estate for property tax purposes. Pine Pointe Hous., L.P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 254 Ga. App. 197, 561 S.E.2d 860 (2002).

Low income housing tax credits awarded to taxpayers who owned low income housing properties did not constitute actual income for purposes of determining the value of the property under the income method, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II), and neither (3)(B)(vii)(I) or (3)(B)(v)(II) violated the taxation uniformity provision under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III(a). Heron Lake II Apartments, LP v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. 816, 833 S.E.2d 528 (2019).

- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(C) defines "fair market value" of property classified as rehabilitated historic property under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.2 and sets forth the same test to be used when the county tax receiver or tax commissioner enters the basis or value of a parcel of rehabilitated historic property; thus, § 48-5-7.2 did not require that both the rehabilitation process and the Department of Natural Resources final certification process be completed within the two-year period before the owner may have applied for and obtained preferential assessment for the property and a tax board's argument that the board had no value upon which to base the preferential assessment whenever the owner allows the preliminary assessment to lapse upon expiration of the two-year rehabilitation period was without merit. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Emmoth, 278 Ga. 144, 598 S.E.2d 495 (2004).

Tax commissioner may legitimately inquire into the cost, depreciation, age, and use of property which is subject to taxation for purposes of investigating the property's fair market value. This does not mean that property is to be returned or assessed for taxation at other than the property's fair market value; nor does it mean property should be assessed at book value rather than fair market value, although in many cases, fair market value may, in fact, be identical with book value. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 113.

- Formula taking earnings into consideration may be used in arriving at the fair market value of property of a public service corporation; the formula used should not be considered conclusive but be used merely as a guide. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-12.

- If the fair market value of property increases every two years, then it is the duty of the county tax assessors to increase the valuation of property for tax purposes every two years. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-504.

- Neither subsection (1)(E) (now subparagraph (3)(E) ) nor § 48-5-33 (repealed) applies to the 1990 tax year. With respect to the 1991 tax year, absent further constitutional amendment or action by the General Assembly, § 48-5-33 (repealed) governs over subsection (1)(E) to the extent they are inconsistent. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-17.

- Because neither Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III nor the Forest Land Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.7, authorize or contemplate a cap on assistance grants based on the total exemption value of forest land conservation use property, the Department of Revenue would not be authorized to impose an administrative cap on assistance grants issued pursuant to the Forest Land Protection Act of 2008 in the manner proposed. 2016 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 16-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Taxes: valuing undeveloped mining property as prospect, 2 A.L.R. 1550.

Assessment of corporate property at full value according to law when valuations generally are illegally fixed lower, 3 A.L.R. 1370; 28 A.L.R. 983; 55 A.L.R. 503.

Prospective value as basis of valuation of land for purposes of property taxation, 24 A.L.R. 649.

Method or rule for valuation of leasehold interest for purpose of property taxation, 84 A.L.R. 1310.

Rights appurtenant, easements, restrictions, or charges in respect of land as factors in assessment of real property for property taxation, 108 A.L.R. 829.

Valuation of property for purpose of taxation as affected by variation of tax rates for local or special purposes in different local taxing units, or inclusion of property within particular taxing unit, 119 A.L.R. 1300.

Easement as factor in property taxation, 134 A.L.R. 963.

Discretion of court or referee as to mode of valuation of real property for tax purposes, 152 A.L.R. 611.

Application of "blockage rule" or "blockage discount theory" in determining stock valuation, for purposes of taxation of intangibles, 33 A.L.R.2d 607.

Income or rental value as a factor in evaluation of real property for purposes of taxation, 96 A.L.R.2d 666.

Separate assessment and taxation of air rights, 56 A.L.R.3d 1300.

Situs of tangible personal property for purposes of property taxation, 2 A.L.R.4th 432.