2020 Georgia Code
Title 44 - Property
Chapter 12 - Rights in Personalty
Article 2 - Choses in Action
§ 44-12-24. What Rights of Action May and May Not Be Assigned

Universal Citation: GA Code § 44-12-24 (2020)

Except for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. A right of action for personal torts, for legal malpractice, or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned.

(Civil Code 1895, § 3079; Civil Code 1910, § 3655; Code 1933, § 85-1805; Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 33; Ga. L. 2013, p. 634, § 1/HB 160; Ga. L. 2013, p. 636, § 1/HB 359.)

The 2001 amendment, effective July 1, 2001, substituted "11-9-406" for "11-9-402" in the first sentence.

The 2013 amendments. The first 2013 amendment, effective May 6, 2013, inserted ", for legal malpractice," in the last sentence of this Code section. The second 2013 amendment, effective May 6, 2013, made identical changes.

Law reviews.

- For article, "Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Georgia," see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 329 (1968). For annual survey on legal ethics, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 189 (2012). For annual survey on legal ethics, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 175 (2013). For note, "Wrongful Refusal to Pay Insurance Claims in Georgia," see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 935 (1979). For note, "Conflicts of Interest in the Liability Insurance Setting," 13 Ga. L. Rev. 973 (1979). For note, "Laissez Fair: The Case for Alternative Litigation Funding and Assignment of Lawsuit Proceeds in Georgia," see 49 Ga. L. Rev. 1121 (2015). For comment, "The Employer's/Insurance Carrier's Right to Subrogation Under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act (O.C.G.A. Section 34-9-11.1): How Long Will It Last?," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1575 (1995).



  • General Consideration
  • Assignable Rights of Action
  • Nonassignable Rights of Action
General Consideration

"Assign" means transfer so as to vest title in the recipient and allow such person to sue directly. McLanahan v. Keith, 135 Ga. App. 117, 217 S.E.2d 420 (1975); In re Carroll, 89 Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); Shook v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 714, 373 S.E.2d 813, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

Right of action is assignable if it is for damage to property or a right of action or chose in action arising from tort which involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, 99 S.E. 533, 5 A.L.R. 124 (1919); Lumpkin v. American Sur. Co., 69 Ga. App. 887, 27 S.E.2d 412 (1943).

Contract to share recovery obtained not assignment of right of action.

- Where a widowed mother had a cause of action against a railway company to recover damages for the homicide of her son, and she entered into a contract with her children, by the terms of which she agreed, in consideration of advances, made by them to her for the purpose of defraying the expenses of prosecuting her cause of action to share equally with them in any recovery she might obtain in her suit, this was not an assignment of the right of action for the personal tort. Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Ga. App. 706, 78 S.E. 271 (1913).

Conveyance of title to land.

- Conveyance of title to land neither passes title to timber cut nor assigns the right to recover damages for the trespass resulting from its wrongful removal and conversion. Rome Kraft Co. v. Davis, 213 Ga. 899, 102 S.E.2d 571 (1958).

Agreement to pay contingent fee not assignment.

- An agreement to pay a contingent fee does not confer on an attorney the right of an assignee. Winslow Bros. Co. v. Murphy, 139 Ga. 231, 77 S.E. 25 (1913).

Subrogation generally.

- While the common law recognized subrogation in property damage claims, it did not recognize it in personal injury claims. These principles have been followed generally in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. Carter v. Banks, 254 Ga. 550, 330 S.E.2d 866 (1985).

Subrogation and assignment distinguished.

- Subrogation effects an assignment by operation of law, but differs from an ordinary assignment of the debt in that an assignment assumes the continued existence of the debt, while subrogation follows upon its payment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Health insurance policy which merely purported to give the insurer a right to be reimbursed for benefits paid on behalf of the insured, to the extent of monies received by the insured from the tort-feasor "as a result of judgment, settlement or otherwise" did not purport to effect an assignment of a cause of action, as proscribed by O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, but created a valid and enforceable right of subrogation. Shook v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 714, 373 S.E.2d 813, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

Subrogee is limited to indemnification only. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Judgment creditor could not set aside fraudulent transfers that occurred prior to assignment of loan.

- Because of the anti-assignment statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, a judgment creditor did not have standing under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) to contest transfers by the debtor that occurred prior to assignment of the debtor's loan to the creditor. Merrill Ranch Props., LLC v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 784 S.E.2d 125 (2016).

Cited in Southern Ry. v. Barrett, Denton & Lynn Co., 141 Ga. 584, 81 S.E. 863 (1914); West v. Anderson, 187 Ga. 587, 1 S.E.2d 671 (1939); Keene v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 864, 5 S.E.2d 379 (1939); American Ins. Co. v. Keene, 61 Ga. App. 754, 7 S.E.2d 427 (1940); Sanders v. Hepp, 190 Ga. 18, 8 S.E.2d 87 (1940); Delray, Inc. v. Reddick, 194 Ga. 676, 22 S.E.2d 599 (1942); James v. Emmco Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 196, 30 S.E.2d 361 (1944); Mangum v. Jones, 205 Ga. 661, 54 S.E.2d 603 (1949); Graham v. Frazier, 82 Ga. App. 185, 60 S.E.2d 833 (1950); Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 82 Ga. App. 460, 61 S.E.2d 510 (1950); Ernest L. Miller Co. v. Gauntt, 93 Ga. App. 178, 91 S.E.2d 104 (1956); White v. Gordon, 213 Ga. 730, 101 S.E.2d 759 (1958); Security Feed & Seed Co. v. Nesmith, 213 Ga. 783, 102 S.E.2d 37 (1958); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 98 Ga. App. 46, 104 S.E.2d 725 (1958); Thomas v. Cities Transit, Inc., 98 Ga. App. 694, 106 S.E.2d 351 (1958); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147 S.E.2d 860 (1966); S.M. & M. Realty Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 170, 179 S.E.2d 781 (1971); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 132 Ga. App. 121, 207 S.E.2d 599 (1974); American Sec. Van Lines v. AMOCO, 133 Ga. App. 368, 210 S.E.2d 832 (1974); Ramsey v. Thomas, 133 Ga. App. 869, 212 S.E.2d 444 (1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 165 Ga. App. 31, 299 S.E.2d 76 (1983); Tidwell v. Slocumb (In re Ga. Steel, Inc.), 71 Bankr. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987); Getz Exterminators of Ga., Inc. v. Towe, 193 Ga. App. 268, 387 S.E.2d 338 (1989); Santiago v. Klosik, 199 Ga. App. 276, 404 S.E.2d 605 (1991); GEICO v. Hardman, 212 Ga. App. 367, 444 S.E.2d 165 (1994); Hammond v. City of Warner Robins, 224 Ga. App. 684, 482 S.E.2d 422 (1997); Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 38, 502 S.E.2d 799 (1998); Outdoor Sys. v. Wood, 247 Ga. App. 287, 543 S.E.2d 414 (2000); Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017).

Assignable Rights of Action

1. Requirements for Assignment

Express agreement required to assign tort action.

- A right of action for a tort is not extinguished and hence not assignable under this section by a compromise settlement in which a given sum is to be paid to the injured party, unless it be expressly agreed between the parties that the promise to pay the amount fixed by the settlement shall be accepted as a satisfaction within terms of O.C.G.A. § 13-7-9 of the original claim. Fouche & Fouche v. Morris, 112 Ga. 143, 37 S.E. 182 (1900) (decided under former Civil Code § 3079).

Form of assignment of chose in action is immaterial; it is sufficient if it is in writing and manifests the intention of the owner to transfer to the assignee title in the chose in action. Lumpkin v. American Sur. Co., 69 Ga. App. 887, 27 S.E.2d 412 (1943).

No joinder of assignor in suit by assignee.

- Where the right of action does involve directly or indirectly a right of property, it is assignable, and the assignee must bring the suit in own name without joining the assignor. Browder v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 738, 64 S.E.2d 460 (1951).

Specific assignment required to pass right of action to subsequent purchaser.

- A right of action which arises from a tort and involves property does not "run with the land," and therefore does not pass to a subsequent purchaser by deed in the absence of a specific assignment thereof. Dougherty County v. Pylant, 104 Ga. App. 468, 122 S.E.2d 117 (1961).

2. Specific Acts of Assignment

Right of action based on conversion of personal property is assignable. Ricketts v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 483, 194 S.E.2d 311 (1972).

A cause of action for unlawful conversion may be assigned. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Right of action based on destruction of property in tortious manner is assignable. Davis v. Rome Kraft Co., 96 Ga. App. 450, 100 S.E.2d 473 (1957).

A cause of action for damages to property resulting from the negligence of the defendant is an action which involves a property right and is assignable under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24. Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251, 103 S.E.2d 134 (1958).

Insured's right of action in tort assignable.

- Where property covered by a policy of fire insurance is destroyed, the insurer, when settling with the insured for the loss, may take, as a consideration for the settlement, an assignment of the insured's right of action in tort against another for the destruction of the property, thereby subrogating the insurer to the insured's right to recover for the loss. Hoxie v. Americus Auto. Co., 73 Ga. App. 686, 37 S.E.2d 808 (1946).

Counterclaim alleging that surveyor and agents trespassed on and to wife's property and interfered with her enjoyment of her real and personal property stated an assignable property injury claim; a right of action involving a property right is assignable, including a cause of action for a tort to property. Barnes v. Collins, 205 Ga. App. 750, 423 S.E.2d 308 (1992).

A tort cause of action for compensatory damages for loss of property resulting from an insurer's bad faith may be assigned. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 227 Ga. App. 191, 489 S.E.2d 53 (1997).

Reinsurance company proceeding as sole claimant.

- Trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to stay arbitration and granted the appellees' motion to compel arbitration because the assignment of the claims to the reinsurance company was valid and enforceable and, therefore, the reinsurance company could proceed as the sole claimant. McLarens Young Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co., 334 Ga. App. 819, 780 S.E.2d 464 (2015).

Assignment of tort proceeds.

- Although a court had earlier rejected a debtor's reliance on O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 in seeking a ruling that the assignment of a tort action was invalid because the debtor had assigned the future proceeds of the action, not the right of action, the assignee creditor's default allowed the court to accept the debtor's assertion that the assignment of the proceeds to be received in the future was not a valid, enforceable assignment under Georgia law; in addition, the creditor had no lien or perfected security interest in the proceeds under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-320; thus, because there was no valid assignment and because the creditor did not have a valid, perfected security interest under Georgia law, then the creditor was an unsecured creditor with only a claim based on the debtor's breach of her promise to pay. Carson v. Rhodes (In re Carson), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 12, 2006).

Heir's right of interest in estate assignable.

- The right of an heir to an interest in the estate of an ancestor is a chose in action; such choses in action are assignable. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ga. 605, 173 S.E. 858 (1934).

Deed made after breach assigns proper right.

- Any chose in action involving a property right may be assigned; thus, a deed made after a breach vests all the rights of the grantor as to the property, including the right of action. Evans v. Brown, 196 Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300 (1943).

Bank may properly transfer and assign its right of action against defalcating employee to recover the amount of its loss to a surety company where the surety company contracts to indemnify the bank against loss occasioned by the defalcation of any employee thereof, and upon an alleged defalcation by one of the bank's employees, the company pays the loss sustained by the bank upon the presentation to it by the bank of a claim of loss in accordance with the terms of the contract, the bank may properly transfer and assign its right of action against the employee to recover the amount of its loss to the company, and the company may maintain an action in its own name against the defalcating employee of the bank to recover the amount paid by it to the bank under the contract of indemnity made with the bank. Lumpkin v. American Sur. Co., 69 Ga. App. 887, 27 S.E.2d 412 (1943).

The right of a bank to recover of the defendant employee, on account of the employee's alleged wrongful acts in taking or removing the money of the bank and concealing defendant's wrongful acts by false entries upon the books of the bank, is a right to recover for injury involving the bank's property right in the money. Lumpkin v. American Sur. Co., 69 Ga. App. 887, 27 S.E.2d 412 (1943).

A right of action to recover amount of checks paid out by the defendant bank, the endorsements upon which were forged by the depositor's employee and which loss had been paid by insurers under policy indemnifying the depositor against dishonesty of its employees is assignable. First Nat'l Bank v. American Sur. Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944).

Effect of assignment by debtor of property before garnishment.

- Choses in action are not subject to seizure and sale under executions based upon ordinary judgments, and can only be reached by the judgment creditor through a garnishment or some other collateral proceeding; and, inasmuch as such garnishment or collateral proceeding is necessary to fix the lien of the judgment so as to make it effective, an assignment of the chose in action by the debtor before the institution of such collateral proceeding passes to the assignee the property of the debtor in the chose in action assigned, freed from the lien of a general judgment previously rendered against the assignor. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ga. 605, 173 S.E. 858 (1934).

Judgments are transferable.

- Transfer of debt owed by debtor from judgment creditor to judgment creditor's son was effective because judgments, even if based on fraud or personal torts, were transferable. McAfee v. Harman (In re Harman), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2019).

Tax preparer's payment to a taxpayer of a discounted sum in exchange for the right to a refund was not a "loan" but instead constituted a "sale" by the taxpayer of a chose in action. Cullen v. Bragg, 180 Ga. App. 866, 350 S.E.2d 798 (1986).

Legal malpractice claim.

- Trial court did not err in denying an attorney summary judgment on an insurer's malpractice claim because the loss was solely a financial loss, the claim involved a right of property, and the claim was assignable; the closing protection letter from the insurer to the insured created an assignment because the claim transferred to the insurer not merely the insured's rights of recovery but also the right of action. Villanueva v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 313 Ga. App. 164, 721 S.E.2d 150 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0502, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 607 (Ga. 2012).

Appellate court properly affirmed the denial of summary judgment to a lawyer on a legal malpractice claim because in light of assignments allowable under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-22 and44-12-24, the Georgia Supreme Court agrees that the assignment of legal malpractice claims is not prohibited as a matter of law. Villanueva v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 292 Ga. 630, 740 S.E.2d 108 (2013).

Georgia Supreme Court agrees with the Georgia Court of Appeals that legal malpractice claims are not per se unassignable. Villanueva v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 292 Ga. 630, 740 S.E.2d 108 (2013).

Nonassignable Rights of Action

1. In General

Tort action and action for fraud.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, a personal tort action and an action for fraud are non-assignable. Additionally, the rights to punitive damages are not assignable. In re Estate of Sims, 259 Ga. App. 786, 578 S.E.2d 498 (2003).

Absent plaintiff's ownership or claim of property at institution of action, suit not maintainable.

- Where property previously belonging to the plaintiff is illegally converted at a time when the title was vested in plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an action in trover where it appears that at the time the suit was instituted plaintiff did not own and does not claim the property for which plaintiff sues. Browder v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 738, 64 S.E.2d 460 (1951).

A conveyance of land, without more, does not assign a right of action to the grantee resulting from a trespass previously committed on such land. Rome Kraft Co. v. Davis, 213 Ga. 899, 102 S.E.2d 571 (1958).

Exemplary damages and attorney fees are recoverable only by the party who has suffered a tortious loss of property, not by those harmed only vicariously; a subrogee under the law of Georgia is limited to indemnification. Southern Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, 174 Ga. App. 405, 330 S.E.2d 371 (1985).

2. Personal Torts

Right to bring action of trespass for damage to realty is not assignable by a landowner to the successor in title. Allen v. Macon, D. & S.R.R., 107 Ga. 838, 33 S.E. 696 (1899).

A vendee of land, upon which a trespass is committed while it is the property of the vendor, has no right of action against the trespasser for damages thus occasioned; such damages are recoverable by the vendor. Rome Kraft Co. v. Davis, 213 Ga. 899, 102 S.E.2d 571 (1958).

In Georgia, assignment of a personal injury claim is not permitted. American Chain & Cable Co. v. Brunson, 157 Ga. App. 833, 278 S.E.2d 719 (1981).

Subrogation provision in an automobile policy, which provided that if the insurer paid under the policy it had the right to sue anyone else who may be responsible, was a statutorily prohibited assignment of a personal injury claim. GEICO v. Hirsh, 211 Ga. App. 374, 439 S.E.2d 59 (1993).

Subrogation provision in an automobile policy, which provided that if the insurer paid under the policy it was entitled to all rights of recovery which the person to whom payment was made had against any other person, was a prohibited assignment of a personal injury claim. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ezekiel, 213 Ga. App. 665, 445 S.E.2d 807 (1994).

Although uninsured motorist coverage in a policy provided the insurer was subrogated to the rights of recovery of its insured, the right of action belonged to the insured, and any action against the uninsured motorist had to be brought in the name of the insured. Generali - United States Branch v. Owens, 218 Ga. App. 584, 462 S.E.2d 464 (1995); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Harris, 226 Ga. App. 269, 486 S.E.2d 427 (1997).

Punitive damages are not assignable as property right. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Southern Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, 174 Ga. App. 405, 330 S.E.2d 371 (1985).

Bare right to file bill or maintain suit is not assignable. Hayslip v. Speed Check Co., 214 Ga. 479, 105 S.E.2d 455 (1958).

Title VII claims not assignable.

- Because claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for back pay, front pay, emotional pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and punitive damages were more similar to a personal injury tort action than an action to enforce contractual or property rights, an employee's assignment of a Title VII religious discrimination claim to a third party was invalid. Under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, a right of action for personal torts could not be assigned, and under federal common law personal injury claims were not assignable absent a statute to the contrary. Evans v. Boyd Rest. Group, LLC, 240 Fed. Appx. 393 (11th Cir. 2007)(Unpublished).

A bankruptcy trustee was the real party in interest regarding a tort action of the debtor regardless of the trustee's purported assignment to the debtor of the right to prosecute the action while the trustee retained legal title to it. United Techs. Corp. v. Gaines, 225 Ga. App. 191, 483 S.E.2d 357 (1997).

Federal bankruptcy law pre-empts the statute; therefore, a bankruptcy trustee properly abandoned a tort claim back to the debtor/tort victim. Denis v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 377, 546 S.E.2d 805 (2001).

Tort claim becomes part of bankruptcy estate.

- The defendant in a tort action which was based on an unliquidated claim that the plaintiff failed to disclose when plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 13 federal bankruptcy petition was entitled to summary judgment because the claim became part of the bankruptcy estate even though the statute normally prohibits the assignment of personal tort causes of action, and the federal doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded the prosecution of the claim. Spoon v. Johnson, 247 Ga. App. 754, 545 S.E.2d 328 (2001).

Bankruptcy debtor's agreement to pay a health care provider from the proceeds of a personal injury action created an invalid assignment since the assignment of personal injury claims was prohibited under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, and the putative assignment was not limited to an interest in any recovery and extended to the action itself. Klosinski v. Southeastern Neurologic Assocs. P.C (In re Oglesby), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2000).

Automobile insurance policy provision requiring only that the insured reimburse the company from the insured's recovery against a tortfeasor for medical expenses paid by the company was not an assignment of a right of action for personal torts. Sheppard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 222 Ga. App. 619, 475 S.E.2d 675 (1996).

Subrogation right.

- An uninsured motorist insurer could not file a subrogation action in its own name because O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 prohibits the assignment of rights of action for personal torts. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 233 Ga. App. 296, 502 S.E.2d 778 (1998), aff'd, 271 Ga. 77, 515 S.E.2d 832 (1999).

Purported assignment to attorney void.

- A purported assignment of an interest in a personal injury action to an attorney made in an attempt to survive termination of the attorney's contract and to give the attorney an interest in the litigation separate from statutory lien rights was void as a violation of public policy. Peoples v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 265, 486 S.E.2d 604 (1997).

Executor's commission not assigned.

- Contracts are to be construed so as to uphold and give effect to the agreement as lawful and not to render portions of the agreement meaningless; to construe a settlement agreement and promissory note as assigning an executor's commission would have risked making the settlement agreement void ab initio under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, and the ambiguity was resolved by holding that the executor did not waive the executor's right to a commission. In re Estate of Sims, 259 Ga. App. 786, 578 S.E.2d 498 (2003).

Insufficient evidence of assignment.

- Debtor's motion for default judgment, in an action for a declaration that the assignment of proceeds from a lawsuit to a defendant was invalid, was denied because the debtor did not assign a right of action, so O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 did not apply, and there was no allegation that the defendant had a lien and if so, whether it was unperfected, so O.C.G.A. § 44-14-320 did not apply. Carson v. Rhodes (In re Carson), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2005).

Creditors' 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) claim against a Chapter 13 debtor, their attorney, was dismissed because although the attorney failed to file a wrongful death complaint on the creditors' behalf and represented to the creditors that the attorney had, the creditors failed to allege a contract or other agreement establishing a technical trust. The creditors' wrongful death cause of action did not comprise the res of a technical trust because under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 only property subject to transfer by the settler could become the subject matter of a trust, and under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 the creditors' wrongful death action was non-transferable. Crisler v. Farr (In re Farr), Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. May 18, 2011).

3. Injuries Arising from Fraud

Right of action for injuries arising from fraud cannot be assigned. Morehead v. Ayers, 136 Ga. 488, 71 S.E. 798 (1911); Couch v. Crane, 142 Ga. 22, 82 S.E. 459 (1914); Hayslip v. Speed Check Co., 214 Ga. 479, 105 S.E.2d 455 (1958).

It cannot be said that because money possessed by defendants was the money and property of the plaintiff, and that as it was defrauded out of this money by the defendants, a right of property was involved, either directly or indirectly. Feeney v. Decatur Developing Co., 47 Ga. App. 353, 170 S.E. 518 (1933).

While a judgment based on fraud could be assigned, a right of action for fraud could not; the Superior Court Consent Order assigned to the assignee did not contain a judgment based on fraud, as the lender's claim for fraud was specifically excepted from the judgment, and thus, the assignee had no standing to bring an action based on injuries arising from fraud to the lender. Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Pittard (In re Pittard), 358 Bankr. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).

Plaintiff assignee's objection to dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) failed because its claim was that debtor allegedly misrepresented the state of the company's accounts receivable at the time the lender made a loan; this was a right of action arising from alleged fraud, not a right to property, and as such, the lender's right of action was not assignable under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 (2002). Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Pittard (In re Pittard), 358 Bankr. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).

An assignee of debt is precluded from pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim even though the assignee met the definitions of a creditor with a claim under the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (now the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., because the non-assignment statute provides that a right of action for injuries arising from fraud cannot be assigned; thus, the second assignee had no standing to assert a fraudulent transfer claim against the appellee regarding two parcels of real property because a fraudulent transfer claim could not be assigned under Georgia law. RES-GA Hightower, LLC v. Golshani, 334 Ga. App. 176, 778 S.E.2d 805 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0330, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 54 (Ga. 2016).

Action under Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act could not be assigned.

- In a suit by an assignee of a judgment seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor to a corporation, the assignee's fraudulent transfer claim did not survive the assignment of the California judgment based on Georgia's assignment statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, and was not revived by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25(c). EMM Credit, LLC v. Remington, 343 Ga. App. 710, 808 S.E.2d 96 (2017).

Fraudulent transfer claim could not be assigned.

- Lender's assignee had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim against a guarantor because such claims were not assignable under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24; therefore, the assignee could not prevail on a legal malpractice action against attorneys who failed to timely assert a fraudulent transfer claim. O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 was not preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 1821 of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) or by O.C.G.A. § 11-1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code. RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 807 S.E.2d 381 (2017).

Fraudulent transfer claim could not be assigned.

- Georgia's bar against the assignment of fraud claims applies to claims under the former Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA); an issue of whether federal law preempted that bar as to direct assignees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was not resolved and was remanded to the trial court. Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 302 Ga. 375, 807 S.E.2d 444 (2017).

Assignee of debt could bring fraudulent transfer claim.

- Judgment creditor had standing to pursue its claim against a judgment debtor and the transferees, although the judgment creditor was the assignee of the debt leading to the judgment, because it did not seek a remedy for an injury stemming from the previous holder of the note, but for an injury that was committed directly against it; O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 did not apply. RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland, 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315 (2017).


Federal preemption as to employee welfare benefit plans.

- The federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), preempts the application of O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 to employee welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-40.

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