2020 Georgia Code
Title 44 - Property
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 44-1-3. "Personalty" Defined; Status of Certain Stocks
- As used in this title, the term "personalty" or "personal estate" means all property which is movable in nature, has inherent value or is representative of value, and is not otherwise defined as realty.
- Stocks representing shares in a corporation which holds lands or a franchise in or over lands are personalty.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2216; Code 1868, § 2211; Code 1873, § 2237; Code 1882, § 2237; Ga. L. 1882-83, p. 56, § 1; Ga. L. 1893, p. 35, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 3070; Civil Code 1910, § 3646; Code 1933, § 85-1701.)
Law reviews.- For comment on Grant v. Haymes, 164 Ga. 371, 138 S.E. 892 (1927), see 1 Ga. L. Rev. No. 2, p. 45 (1927).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Movable fixtures are considered personal property. McCall v. Walter, 71 Ga. 287 (1883).
Shares of corporate stock are personalty. Hamil v. Flowers, 133 Ga. 216, 65 S.E. 961 (1909).
Shares of stock as personalty.
- Shares of stock of domestic corporation, certificates of which are held by foreign corporation as transferee, are personalty. People's Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland, 117 Ga. 908, 44 S.E. 20 (1903).
Stock in a nonresident railroad corporation owned by a domestic railroad is personal property. Wright v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 U.S. 219, 25 S. Ct. 16, 49 L. Ed. 167 (1904); Greene County v. Wright, 126 Ga. 504, 54 S.E. 951 (1906).
Bond for title is personalty. Copeland v. Pyles, 25 Ga. App. 95, 102 S.E. 552 (1920).
Movable safe.
- Since a safe was not attached to the building and was movable at pleasure upon the safe's rollers, with no injury to any part of the building, the evidence did not demand finding that the safe was a fixture. Cozart v. Johnson, 181 Ga. 337, 182 S.E. 502 (1935).
Value of personalty including stock shares were recoverable.
- Trial court was authorized to award a wife cash and stock as proceeds after a cooperative converted to a publicly held company as: (1) the wife was entitled to receive the value of the equity account for the years 1987 to 1993 as consideration for the relinquishment of the interest the wife held in the real estate; (2) such was consistent with the intent and spirit of the final decree; and (3) to rule otherwise would have left the wife with an illusory or meaningless asset. Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 637 S.E.2d 716 (2006).
Cited in Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931); Evans v. Pennington, 177 Ga. 56, 169 S.E. 349 (1933); DeFoor v. State, 233 Ga. 190, 210 S.E.2d 707 (1974); Anderson v. Burnham, 12 Bankr. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); United States v. Wood, 28 Bankr. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 38, 502 S.E.2d 799 (1998).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Mobile homes.
- Mobile home can be considered as part of the realty when the mobile home is placed on the property with the intent that the mobile home remain permanently in place and that the mobile home pass as part of the realty when conveyed. In order to determine what the intent was with respect to the mobile home, all of the surrounding facts and circumstances should be considered in each case as outward manifestations of what was in fact intended. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-316.
Advertisement sign per se is personal property, but when placed with the intention that the sign remain permanently in that place, it may be considered as part of the realty. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-163.
