2020 Georgia Code
Title 40 - Motor Vehicles and Traffic
Chapter 6 - Uniform Rules of the Road
Article 12 - Accidents
§ 40-6-270. Hit and Run; Duty of Driver to Stop at or Return to Scene of Accident

1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or the death of any person or in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident or shall stop as close thereto as possible and forthwith return to the scene of the accident and shall:
   1. Give his or her name and address and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving;
   2. Upon request and if it is available, exhibit his or her operator's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with;
   3. Render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the transporting, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such transporting is requested by the injured person; and
   4. Where a person injured in such accident is unconscious, appears deceased, or is otherwise unable to communicate, make every reasonable effort to ensure that emergency medical services and local law enforcement are contacted for the purpose of reporting the accident and making a request for assistance.

      The driver shall in every event remain at the scene of the accident until fulfilling the requirements of this subsection. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

2. If such accident is the proximate cause of death or a serious injury, any person knowingly failing to stop and comply with the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.
3. 1. If such accident is the proximate cause of an injury other than a serious injury or if such accident resulted in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person, any person knowingly failing to stop or comply with the requirements of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and:
      1. Upon conviction shall be fined not less than $300.00 nor more than $1,000.00, which fine shall not be subject to suspension, stay, or probation, or imprisoned for up to 12 months, or both;
      2. Upon the second conviction within a five-year period of time, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which convictions were obtained to the date of the current arrest for which a conviction is obtained, shall be fined not less than $600.00 nor more than $1,000.00, which fine shall not be subject to suspension, stay, or probation, or imprisoned for up to12 months, or both; and for purposes of this subparagraph, previous pleas of nolo contendere accepted within such five-year period shall constitute convictions; and
      3. Upon the third or subsequent conviction within a five-year period of time, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which convictions were obtained to the date of the current arrest for which a conviction is obtained, shall be fined $1,000.00, which fine shall not be subject to suspension, stay, or probation, or imprisoned for up to12 months, or both; and for purposes of this subparagraph, previous pleas of nolo contendere accepted within such five-year period shall constitute convictions.
   2. For the purpose of imposing a sentence under this subsection, a plea of nolo contendere shall constitute a conviction.
   3. If the payment of the fine required under this subsection will impose an economic hardship on the defendant, the judge, at his sole discretion, may order the defendant to pay such fine in installments and such order may be enforced through a contempt proceeding or a revocation of any probation otherwise authorized by this Code section.
4. Notwithstanding the limits set forth in any municipal charter, any municipal court of any municipality shall be authorized to impose the punishments provided for in this Code section upon a conviction of violating this Code section or upon conviction of violating any ordinance adopting the provisions of this Code section.

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 40, 41; Ga. L. 1985, p. 758, § 16; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 40; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1499, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1893, § 6; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 2.1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1164, § 1/SB 529.)

- Suspension of driver's license for conviction for failure to stop and render aid, § 40-5-54.

- Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 3.1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsection (b) and paragraph (c)(1) are applicable to policies of motor vehicle insurance issued, issued for delivery, delivered, or renewed on and after October 1, 1991.

Ga. L. 2008, p. 1164, § 6/SB 529, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2008.

- For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 165 (1992). For note discussing relief from civil liability in legislation concerning emergency aid to accident victims, see 25 Ga. B.J. 90 (1962). For note on the 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 99 (1992).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Practice and Procedure
• Application
• Jury Instructions

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 17781(54), former Code 1933, § 68-308, and former Code Section 40-6-271, which was renumbered as Code Section 40-6-270 by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Georgia's hit-and run statute is not unconstitutional as the statute does not confront an individual with substantial hazards of self-incrimination through requiring certain disclosures as the statute is not directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Bell v. State, 293 Ga. 683, 748 S.E.2d 382 (2013).

- Word "accident" as used in the hit and run statute does not require that the act causing the injury be mere negligence or mishap, but is used broadly to include any incident where death or injury follows. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

- Duties of a driver to stop or to return to the scene of a vehicular collision do not apply only to the drivers of the vehicles which actually collide; the statutory duties apply to a driver who is "involved" in a collision. Bellamy v. Edwards, 181 Ga. App. 887, 354 S.E.2d 434 (1987).

- Because the vehicle struck by the defendant was not being driven or attended by any person, reversal of the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 was required. Melvin v. State, 225 Ga. App. 169, 483 S.E.2d 146 (1997).

- Violation of the provision relative to stopping without obstructing traffic is not negligence per se, as it is too indefinite for enforcement, but the provision does furnish a rule of civil conduct under the circumstances of each case, and the jury may find negligence in fact as a result of its violation. Brock v. Avery Co., 99 Ga. App. 881, 110 S.E.2d 122 (1959).

Instruction for offenses under § 40-6-270. - After the defendant was charged with failing to maintain the defendant's lane in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48 and failing to use a turn signal in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-123, the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the definition of the standard for strict liability offenses because the state was not required to prove mental fault or mens rea in those offenses; although O.C.G.A. § 40-6-10(b) required proof that the defendant knowingly operated the vehicle with no insurance, and O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 required proof that the defendant knowingly failed to stop and comply with the statute's mandates, the trial court's charge on intent was found sufficient. Augustin v. State, 260 Ga. App. 631, 580 S.E.2d 640 (2003).

- Trial court distinguished between the counts charging the defendant with violating O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-49(d) and40-6-270 because the trial court fairly instructed the jurors that knowledge was an element of the hit-and-run count. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict in a trial for leaving the scene of an accident as it was not necessary that the state show actual damage or injury; because the defendant knew that the defendant's tractor-trailer had hit the rear of a car, the defendant should have stopped to see if damage resulted. Dalton v. State, 286 Ga. App. 666, 650 S.E.2d 591 (2007).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of leaving the scene of an accident since, while driving the defendant's truck, the defendant accidentally struck the victim, the defendant knew about that fact, the defendant did not dispute the victim's testimony that the defendant had stated to the victim that the defendant had not hit the victim that hard, and eyewitnesses testified that while the eyewitnesses blocked the defendant's truck's egress while police were on route to the scene, the defendant fled on foot without providing defendant's name, address, license, or other identifying information. McKay v. State, 264 Ga. App. 726, 592 S.E.2d 135 (2003).

Motorist's identification of the defendant as the driver of a pick-up truck that hit the motorist's vehicle and then drove away was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish the defendant's identity for purposes of the defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident and following too closely in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-49 and40-6-270(a)(1). Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005).

Evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, failure to stop upon striking an unattended vehicle, and failure to stop at or return to the scene of an accident, violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270(a),40-6-271(a), and40-6-395(a) and (b)(5)(A)when the defendant refused to stop a vehicle for two bicycle-patrol uniformed officers, drove the vehicle into one of the officers, struck two unattended vehicles, and struck an officer's marked bicycle. Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga. App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Jury was authorized to find that the defendant "knowingly" failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 because the victim testified that the defendant hit the victim's car, the car was damaged, the victim showed the defendant the damage to the car, and the defendant left without giving the information required. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant rear-ended a car and left the scene without providing the victim with any identifying information. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident which caused damage to the victim's vehicle as it provided that the defendant did not stop at the scene and provide the defendant's name and registration information. Johnson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 622, 788 S.E.2d 559 (2016).

Cited in Pryor v. State, 102 Ga. App. 744, 117 S.E.2d 880 (1960); Glover v. State, 123 Ga. App. 348, 181 S.E.2d 98 (1971); Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 342 S.E.2d 1 (1986); Scott v. State, 230 Ga. App. 522, 496 S.E.2d 494 (1998); Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 327, 503 S.E.2d 924 (1998); Couch v. State, 246 Ga. App. 106, 539 S.E.2d 609 (2000); Maxwell v. State, 282 Ga. 22, 644 S.E.2d 822 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 645 S.E.2d 545 (2007); Leachman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 708, 649 S.E.2d 886 (2007); Green v. State, 287 Ga. App. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007); Merritt v. State, 288 Ga. App. 89, 653 S.E.2d 368 (2007).

Practice and Procedure

Sufficiency of indictment.

- An essential element of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, is failing to return to the scene of an accident and remaining until fulfilling the requirements of former § 40-6-271 (see now paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of § 40-6-270). Omission of such element renders void a count in an indictment charging the offense. Thomason v. State, 196 Ga. App. 447, 396 S.E.2d 79 (1990).

Indictment which alleged that the defendants acted "unlawfully" with reference to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, and that the defendants' actions resulted in death, sufficiently charged the intent to commit the criminal act, the knowledge necessary to form such intent, and adequately asserted proximate cause. Tidwell v. State, 216 Ga. App. 8, 453 S.E.2d 64 (1994).

Indictment against codefendants couched in the specific charge of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 was not fatally defective because the indictment failed to differentiate or name the actual driver. Tidwell v. State, 216 Ga. App. 8, 453 S.E.2d 64 (1994).

Indictment charging the defendant with homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on a hit-and-run offense and hit and run was improperly dismissed because the defendant could not admit the allegations in the hit-and-run count of the indictment and not be guilty of that crime because, if the defendant admitted that the defendant was involved in an accident which was the proximate cause of the victim's death and that the defendant knowingly failed to stop the defendant's vehicle at the scene of the accident or stop the defendant's vehicle as close thereto as possible and return to the scene as alleged in the indictment, the defendant would be guilty of hit and run. State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 830 S.E.2d 206 (2019).

- Because the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree vehicular homicide under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(a) predicated on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(b), and specifically, the state failed to prove that the defendant's failure to remain at the scene of the accident contributed to the death of the victim, but instead the evidence showed that the victim died on impact, the defendant's vehicular homicide conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for resentencing on the lesser included offense of felony hit-and-run. Henry v. State, 284 Ga. App. 893, 645 S.E.2d 32 (2007).

- Rule of lenity did not apply to the two felony charges of hit-and-run under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(b) and vehicular homicide under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(b) because it was essential to the rule that both crimes be proved with the same evidence. The element of causation of the accident was essential to prove first degree vehicular homicide, but was not necessary to prove felony hit-and-run. Rouen v. State, 312 Ga. App. 8, 717 S.E.2d 519 (2011).

- Defendant was entitled to a new trial when the victim's testimony and the defendant's testimony conflicted as to whether the victim acknowledged that the victim was unhurt after being struck by the defendant's vehicle and since the court disallowed any testimony regarding whether the victim was the plaintiff in a pending civil action against the defendant arising out of the same circumstances as the criminal prosecution. Spitzberg v. State, 233 Ga. App. 848, 506 S.E.2d 143 (1998).

- Petition in this case by which the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries inflicted by an automobile when the plaintiff was walking on a public highway, and which alleged, as specific acts of negligence contributing to the injuries, the failure of the defendants to stop after the infliction of the injuries, and the defendant's failure to give the name and address of the operator and the name and address of the owner of the automobile as required by former Code 1910, § 1778, was subject to a special demurrer as to these and other allegations in regard to the conduct of the defendant after the injuries had been inflicted. Springer v. Adams, 37 Ga. App. 344, 140 S.E. 390 (1927) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1778(54)).

- In remanding a felony hit-and-run case for resentencing, the court directed that the defendant be resentenced on only one of the two counts. Accordingly, the trial court was not authorized to resentence the defendant on both counts. Henry v. State, 291 Ga. App. 482, 662 S.E.2d 260 (2008).

Application

Relevance of evidence of leaving scene.

- Although the defendant's conduct in leaving the scene bore no causal connection to the collision, the jury was authorized to consider it in connection with the defendant's other acts preceding the injury as tending to establish the defendant's conduct in causing the injury as being negligence, and defendant's subsequent conduct in this regard was relevant to the issue of punitive damages. Bellamy v. Edwards, 181 Ga. App. 887, 354 S.E.2d 434 (1987).

Testimony concerning the defendant's prior high-speed vehicular flight from a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395 was sufficiently similar to the defendant's alleged flight from the instant vehicular collision so as to be admissible on the issue of the defendant's identity and bent of mind. Cabral v. State, 199 Ga. App. 557, 405 S.E.2d 556 (1991).

- Aggravated assault with a motor vehicle and hit-and-run with that same vehicle are not mutually exclusive crimes, since an aggravated assault includes a finding of intent which is not an element of hit-and-run. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

- Habeas court erred in denying relief to a prisoner who was serving a term of imprisonment for first degree vehicular homicide with failure to stop and render aid as the predicate offense in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(b) because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's death was caused by the prisoner's failure to stop and render aid; the evidence at the prisoner's trial was uncontroverted that the victim would have died regardless of whether or not the prisoner remained at the scene. In the prisoner's direct appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the illegal act in first degree vehicular homicide predicated on failure to stop and render aid was causing the death or injury by the accident and then failing to stop and render assistance but five years later, a unanimous court of appeals issued a whole-court decision, concluding that the crime was causing the victim's death by driving in the way prohibited by the predicate driving offense and overruling the decision in the prisoner's direct appeal. Klaub v. Battle, 286 Ga. 156, 686 S.E.2d 117 (2009).

- Trial court properly excluded evidence of seatbelt use because evidence of the victim's failure to wear a seatbelt was irrelevant to causation and inadmissible in a criminal case as it did not tend to make it either more or less probable that an accident caused by the defendant proximately caused the victim's death, in violation of the statutes for homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on a hit-and-run offense and for hit and run. State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 830 S.E.2d 206 (2019).

- Defendant's conviction for the offense of hit and run could not stand as the evidence was insufficient to show that the vehicle which the defendant collided with sustained any damage, and also did not show that the defendant knew the defendant committed any damage as the defendant first got out of the defendant's car, looked for damages, and left only when the defendant did not see any damage. Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. App. 592, 571 S.E.2d 812 (2002).

Since the state failed to show that the defendant had driven any vehicle during the relevant period or that a particular vehicle was involved in a hit-and-run incident, the evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for hit-and-run and less safe DUI, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270 and40-6-391(a)(1); there was also no evidence that the defendant owned the car or was authorized to drive the car. Reynolds v. State, 306 Ga. App. 1, 700 S.E.2d 888 (2010).

- Evidence that the defendant's truck pushed a compact car a distance of at least 64 feet and that the defendant was stopped heading away from the scene, one to one-and-a-half miles from the accident, supported the jury's determination that the defendant intended not to stop. Burden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 778, 371 S.E.2d 410, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 410 (1988).

Since the defendant stipulated that the defendant was driving the car that hit the victim, evidence of the defendant's driving the defendant's car toward the victim, speeding up after the victim screamed, and slowing the car down and applying the brake lights about two football fields away, showed that the defendant had knowledge of the accident and the requisite general intent. Dworkin v. State, 210 Ga. App. 461, 436 S.E.2d 665 (1993).

Evidence that the defendant left the scene after backing into the car behind the defendant's vehicle and injuring an officer was sufficient for conviction. Priester v. State, 249 Ga. App. 594, 549 S.E.2d 429 (2001).

Conviction for hit and run was supported by sufficient evidence that there was an extremely loud noise made by the impact as well as testimony concerning how the impact would be perceived inside the defendant's truck, that the defendant seemed to slow temporarily before proceeding, and by testimony concerning the appearance of the rig and the defendant's conduct when the defendant arrived at the defendant's destination. Gibson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006).

Adjudications as to two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of failing to stop at or return to an accident scene were supported by sufficient evidence detailing the juvenile's act of striking two individuals with a car, and then leaving the scene of that accident; moreover, decisions as to the credibility of witnesses were in the province of the juvenile court, which apparently determined that the state disproved the juvenile's defense. In the Interest of J.L., 281 Ga. App. 105, 635 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

Given sufficient evidence that the defendant left the scene of an accident without providing the mandatory identifying information to the other party involved in the accident, the defendant's hit-and-run conviction was upheld on appeal; the fact that the defendant presented a different version of the events was immaterial. London v. State, 289 Ga. App. 17, 656 S.E.2d 180 (2007), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

- Conduct of a defendant at the time of a vehicular homicide may well be measured, inferentially and circumstantially by the conduct which the provisions of former Code 1933, § 68-308 proposed to regulate. Hunter v. State, 65 Ga. App. 766, 16 S.E.2d 500 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-308).

- Conduct of a hit and run driver of an automobile in failing to stop and give the driver's name, other information, and render assistance to the person injured by the driver in the operation of the driver's automobile along a public highway may, in that it is in violation of a statute, be regarded as negligence as a matter of law, and although, when taken alone, such conduct may have no causal connection with the act which caused the injuries, it is a circumstance which may be considered, in connection with the driver's other acts preceding the injury, as tending to establish the driver's conduct in causing the injury as being negligence. Battle v. Kilcrease, 54 Ga. App. 808, 189 S.E. 573 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-308).

- In a wrongful death action filed against a county sheriff's deputy and the county, the administrator's claim that the deputy failed to report an accident and failed to render aid, in violation of both O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270(a)(3) and40-6-273, were rejected, and the deputy and the county were erroneously denied summary judgment as the evidence showed that: (1) the deputy radioed for officer assistance; (2) the two officers looked for a second vehicle that might have been involved in the accident, to no avail; and (3) based on these factors, no evidence existed that the deputy breached the duty imposed by § 40-6-273. Purvis v. Steve, 284 Ga. App. 116, 643 S.E.2d 380, cert. denied, No. S07C1063, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2007).

Penalty is assessed only against the operator, without reference to the owner of the vehicle involved or the employer of the driver, as the case may be. Georgia Power Co. v. Shipp, 195 Ga. 446, 24 S.E.2d 764 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-308).

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-2(2) and17-14-9, restitution was not available for defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(a) because the damage to the other vehicle was solely attributable to the collision between the cars defendant's failure to stop after the collision neither caused nor contributed to the damage. Zipperer v. State, 299 Ga. App. 792, 683 S.E.2d 865 (2009).

Jury Instructions

Instruction required.

- Trial court's instruction on former § 40-6-271 (see now paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270) was essential when a defendant was charged with violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, one specific element of which involves fulfilling the requirements of former § 40-6-271. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

- Since the jury was previously charged on theories of general negligence and proximate cause, it was not error not to charge that the failure to render aid must proximately cause the injury. Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Smith, 141 Ga. App. 87, 232 S.E.2d 580 (1977).

Instruction for offenses under § 40-6-270. - Trial court's instruction on former § 40-6-271 (see now paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270), relating to the duty to give information and render aid, was essential when a defendant was charged with violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, one specific element of which involved fulfilling the requirements of former § 40-6-271. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Even though the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury on knowing failure as stated in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(b) and (c), giving the pattern charge on intent was sufficient to inform the jury that the defendants intended to evade the duty imposed by that section. Tidwell v. State, 216 Ga. App. 8, 453 S.E.2d 64 (1994).

Trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the entirety of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, even though the defendant was only accused of violating § 40-6-270(a), as the evidence that the defendant fled the scene of the accident without providing a name and other information was sufficient to sustain the conviction without even implicating the remainder of the statute. Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005).

- Because the defendant contested the state's claim of being impaired and challenged the results of the Intoxilyzer test, the defendant was not entitled to assert the defense of justification after being charged with leaving the scene of an accident and other related offenses; thus, an instruction on a justification defense was not warranted by the evidence. London v. State, 289 Ga. App. 17, 656 S.E.2d 180 (2007), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Duty to stop not extended to trains and crews.

- Requirement to stop at the scene of a motor vehicle incident does not extend to railroad trains and their operating crews. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-32.

Effect of § 51-1-29. - Ga. L. 1962, p. 534, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29) apparently relieves one not at fault but involved in an automobile accident from liability because one is required under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 40 and 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270) to render aid and provide transportation to a hospital, even though the person believes that the person is not competent to undertake such responsibility. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-333.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 326, 327 et seq.

Identification of Hit-And-Run Vehicle and Driver, 60 POF3d 91.

- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 46. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1692 et seq., 1695.

- Liability for injuries due to collision between street car and automobile at street intersection, 28 A.L.R. 217; 46 A.L.R. 1000.

Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statute in relation to conduct of driver of automobile after happening of an accident, 66 A.L.R. 1228; 101 A.L.R. 911.

Liability for injury to pedestrian struck by automobile while walking along street or highway, 67 A.L.R. 96; 93 A.L.R. 551.

Duty toward travelers as regards condition of street or highway left as result of an accident therein, 81 A.L.R. 1004.

Violation of statute requiring one involved in an accident to stop and render aid as affecting civil liability, 80 A.L.R.2d 299.

Construction and application of "amnesty" provision whereby automobile driver leaving scene of accident may report to police within stated time without risk of use of his report against him, 36 A.L.R.4th 907.

Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid, 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Necessity and sufficiency of showing, in criminal prosecution under "hit-and-run" statute, accused's knowledge of accident, injury, or damage, 26 A.L.R.5th 1.

Uninsured motorist indorsement: construction and application of requirement that there be "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-and-run vehicle; "miss-and-run" cases, 77 A.L.R.5th 319.

Uninsured motorist indorsement: general issues regarding requirement that there be "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-and-run vehicle, 78 A.L.R.5th 341.

Uninsured motorist indorsement: construction and application of requirement that there be "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-and-run vehicle; "hit-and-run" cases, 79 A.L.R.5th 289.