2020 Georgia Code
Title 39 - Minors
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 39-1-1. Age of Legal Majority; Residence of Persons in State for Purpose of Attending School

1. The age of legal majority in this state is 18 years; until that age all persons are minors.
2. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed automatically to render an individual a resident of this state when that individual is in the state for the purpose of attending school. In the case of such individual, his residence will be considered to be the state in which his parents reside if under the laws of that state the individual would still be considered a minor and he is incapable of proving his emancipation.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 1742; Code 1868, § 1782; Code 1873, § 1791; Code 1882, § 1791; Civil Code 1895, § 2500; Civil Code 1910, § 3019; Code 1933, § 74-104; Ga. L. 1972, p. 193, § 1.)

- Rights of minors generally, § 1-2-8.

Age restrictions in regard to purchase of alcoholic beverages, § 3-3-23.

Effect of minority status on tolling of limitations, § 9-3-90.

Service of process on resident minors over 14 temporarily outside state, § 9-10-70.

Appointment of guardian ad litem for minor not otherwise represented in court action, § 9-11-17.

Capacity of minors to enter into contracts, § 13-3-20 et seq.

Termination of juvenile's order of disposition, § 15-11-443.

Referral of juveniles to adult services upon reaching age of majority, § 15-11-451.

Minimum age at which person may be held criminally responsible for his actions, § 16-3-1.

Offenses relating to exhibition of lewd or indecent, etc., materials to minors, § 16-12-101 et seq.

Penalty for knowingly selling or delivering to minor any drug-related object, § 16-13-1.

Domicile of minors generally, § 19-2-4.

Age at which persons may contract marriage without parental consent, § 19-3-2.

Parental control of children under age of majority, § 19-7-1.

Age groups to which compulsory school attendance law applies, § 20-2-690.

Further provisions regarding determination of resident status of university students for tuition or fee purposes, § 20-3-66.

Guardians of minors, T. 29, C. 4.

Minimum age requirements for issuance of driver's license, § 40-5-22.

Applications by minors for instruction permits or drivers' licenses, § 40-5-26.

Making of certain gifts to persons under age 21, § 44-5-110 et seq.

Maximum age for pleading infancy as defense to tort action, § 51-11-6.

Minimum age at which person considered capable of making will, § 53-4-10.

- Ga. L. 1972, p. 193, § 10, effective July 1, 1972, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the purpose of the Act was to reduce the age of legal majority from 21 years of age to 18 years of age so that all persons, upon reaching the age of 18, would have the rights, privileges, powers, duties, responsibilities, and liabilities previously applicable to persons 21 years of age or over. The section further provided that the Act was not to be construed to have the effect of changing the age from 21 to 18 with respect to any legal instrument or court decree in existence prior to July 1, 1972, when the instrument referred only to "the age of majority" or words of similar import, except that any guardianship of the person or property of a minor under the provisions of Title 49 of the 1933 Code, whether such guardianship was created by court order or decree entered before or after July 1, 1972, or under the will of a testator which was executed after July 1, 1972, would terminate when the ward for whom such guardianship was created reached 18 years of age.

- For article, "The Georgia Power of Attorney Act," see 24 Ga. St. B. J. 20 (Dec. 2018). For comment on Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971), refusing to apply doctrine of parental immunity to suit brought by minor against father's estate, see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 544 (1972).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Computation.

- One becomes of full age on the day preceding the twenty-first (now eighteenth) anniversary of one's birth, on the first moment of that day. Thomas v. Couch, 171 Ga. 602, 156 S.E. 206 (1930) (decided under prior law).

- Any portion of a verdict and judgment intending to provide for support for any child beyond his or her eighteenth birthday is a nullity. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 242 Ga. 598, 250 S.E.2d 465 (1978).

- Without the consent of the husband-father in a child support controversy, neither the jury nor the court can require him to support his minor child beyond the child's eighteenth birthday, and an attempt to do so is a nullity. Ritchea v. Ritchea, 244 Ga. 476, 260 S.E.2d 871 (1979).

- When the age of majority at the time of divorce was 21, it was proper to continue child support in accordance with the original agreement even though the statute reduced the age of majority to 18. Spivey v. Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251 (1975).

- Right in an adult child to recover support from his father (now parent) beyond the age of majority was barred by former Code 1933, §§ 74-104 and 74-105 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 39-1-1 and19-7-2, respectively) which provide together that a father's (now parent's) obligation to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of his child ceases when the child reaches majority. Crane v. Crane, 225 Ga. 605, 170 S.E.2d 392 (1969), (decided under prior law).

- Reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 did not modify the provisions of the Juvenile Court Code, which still applies to those under the age of 21 years who have committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 17. W.F. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 523, 241 S.E.2d 631 (1978).

- Georgia provides no "mature minor" exception to the state's general rule that only adults may refuse unwanted medical care. Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996).

- Provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., are manifestly general and not special laws and operate uniformly upon all minors who are employed under such circumstances as to come under the Workers' Compensation Act, who are 18 years of age or over, and who are not mentally incompetent or physically incapable of earning a livelihood. The legislature has ample power to regulate the age of minority or majority, and may divide minors into two classes, those above and those below a certain age, and endow all those above such age with all the rights of adults in reference to certain kinds of contracts without violating the provision of the Constitution. The effect of such an Act is merely to provide that in reference to certain kinds of contracts the age of majority shall be 18 instead of 21 years. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939) (decided under prior law).

- West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102, 89 S. Ct. 903, 21 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1969), which enumerates factors applying to confessions or statements of juveniles is inapposite if the defendant is 18 years or older. White v. State, 251 Ga. 482, 306 S.E.2d 636 (1983).

Cited in McDowell v. Georgia R.R., 60 Ga. 320 (1878); Dent v. Cock, 65 Ga. 400 (1880); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 149 S.E.2d 128 (1966); Ehrhart v. Brooks, 231 Ga. 272, 201 S.E.2d 464 (1973); Gould v. State, 131 Ga. App. 811, 207 S.E.2d 519 (1974); Choquette v. Choquette, 232 Ga. 759, 208 S.E.2d 848 (1974); Marchman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 677, 209 S.E.2d 88 (1974); State v. Gould, 232 Ga. 844, 209 S.E.2d 312 (1974); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 233 Ga. 53, 210 S.E.2d 9 (1974); Herring v. Herring, 233 Ga. 484, 211 S.E.2d 893 (1975); Welch v. State, 237 Ga. 665, 229 S.E.2d 390 (1976); Jones v. Jones, 244 Ga. 32, 257 S.E.2d 537 (1979); Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979); Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771, 279 S.E.2d 704 (1981); State v. Hasty, 158 Ga. App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873 (1981); Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 676, 426 S.E.2d 165 (1992); Penny v. McBride, 282 Ga. App. 590, 639 S.E.2d 561 (2006); Johnson v. Thompson, 286 Ga. App. 810, 650 S.E.2d 322 (2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Intent of age of majority law.

- Ga. L. 1972, p. 193, § 1 was intended to reduce the age at which an individual attained full legal capacity and thereby shed one's civil disabilities; it was not intended to necessarily affect all existing laws setting an age qualification of 21, unless such laws were tied directly to the age of majority. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-118.

- Department of Probation (now Department of Offender Rehabilitation) should collect child support payments for individuals between 18 and 21 when such payments arise out of court orders in existence prior to July 1, 1972. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-40.

- Since the age of majority, and consequently the age of emancipation from legal custody and control of the parent, is 18 years of age, a person 18 years of age or older may consent to an abortion. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-118.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 1, 3 et seq., 28, 31.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 2.

- Liability of parent for necessaries furnished to adult child, 42 A.L.R. 150.

Age at which female attains majority, 95 A.L.R. 355.

Calculation of newborn child's age for purposes of life insurance policy requiring that specified age be reached before coverage begins, 37 A.L.R.3d 1448.

Burden of proof of defendant's age, in prosecution where attainment of particular age is statutory requisite of guilt, 49 A.L.R.3d 526.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting preexisting status or rights, 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Responsibility of noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of child's college education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322.

Sec.

• 39-2-1. Restrictions on employment of minors under 16 years of age.
• 39-2-2. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Dangerous employment.
• 39-2-3. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Hours of work generally.
• 39-2-4. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Employment during school hours.
• 39-2-5. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Delivery of messages.
• 39-2-6. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Sale or delivery of newspapers.
• 39-2-7. Employment of minors under 16 years of age generally - Maximum hours of employment.
• 39-2-8. Employment of minors 15 years of age during school vacation months [Repealed].
• 39-2-9. Employment of minors under 12 years of age generally.
• 39-2-10. Employment of minors 12 and 13 years of age in wholesale and retail stores [Repealed].
• 39-2-11. Employment certificates - Required; requirements for issuance.
• 39-2-11.1. Employment of minors 14 years of age or older during school vacation months for care of lawns, gardens, and shrubbery.
• 39-2-12. Employment certificates - Contents; availability of blank forms; filing of duplicate copies.
• 39-2-13. Employment certificates - Disposition of certificates upon termination of employment or failure to appear for work for 30 days; requirements as to issuance of subsequent certificates.
• 39-2-14. Employment certificates - Revocation of certificates by Commissioner of Labor.
• 39-2-15. Maximum hours of employment of minors; effect of contracts providing longer hours [Repealed].
• 39-2-16. Prohibition on corporal punishment of minors; actions for damages [Repealed].
• 39-2-17. Improper dispositions of minor under 12; penalty.
• 39-2-18. Applicability of provisions of chapter to minors employed as actors or performers.
• 39-2-19. Enforcement of chapter.
• 39-2-20. Penalty for violations of chapter.
• 39-2-21. Injunctions.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 3149(1), are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- One of the objects of the statute was to prevent the exposure of children under a designated age, and of the employers who would otherwise be called upon to work with such children, to the dangers incident to the presence of these immature and indiscreet persons in work places. Platt v. Southern Photo Material Co., 4 Ga. App. 159, 60 S.E. 1068 (1908), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

- In a case not covered by the statute, the question of the defendant's negligence in employing the young person at the particular occupation is usually one for the jury. Platt v. Southern Photo Material Co., 4 Ga. App. 159, 60 S.E. 1068 (1908), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

- Minor under the age of 14 years, by accepting employment in a cotton mill in violation of statute, is not guilty of contributory negligence proximately causing injuries. International Cotton Mills v. Burnham, 284 F. 351 (5th Cir. 1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

- Statutory prohibition against employing children under a prescribed age in a factory excludes the defense of the assumptions by the children of risks incident to such employment. Ransom v. Nunnally Co., 26 Ga. App. 222, 105 S.E. 822 (1921), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

- Diligence required of children of tender years is not to be measured by the ordinary care required of an adult; but due care in such a child is such care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation. Infants under 14 years of age are chargeable with contributory negligence resulting from a want of such care, and assuming the risk of those patent, obvious, and known dangers which the infants are able to appreciate and avoid. Evans v. Mills, 119 Ga. 448, 46 S.E. 674 (1904), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

- As a general rule, the master is not liable to one servant for injuries inflicted by a fellow servant because the risk thereof is one of those assumed in the contract of employment. But this doctrine does not apply to infants of tender years and the question of such negligence should be submitted to the jury. Evans v. Mills, 119 Ga. 448, 46 S.E. 674 (1904), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

Provision in an employer's liability policy of insurance to the effect that the policy shall not apply to injuries sustained by any person employed by the insured "in violation of law as to age, or under the age of 14 years if there is no legal age limit," contemplates a violation of statutory law. Savannah Kaolin Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 Ga. App. 24, 131 S.E. 919 (1926), (decided under former Code 1910, § 3149(1)).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Constitutionality of child labor laws, 12 A.L.R. 1216; 21 A.L.R. 1437.

Right of parent who consents to or acquiesces in employment of child under statutory age to recover for latter's injury or death while in such employment, 40 A.L.R. 1206.

Applicability and effect of workmen's compensation acts in case of injuries to minors, 49 A.L.R. 1435; 60 A.L.R. 847; 83 A.L.R. 416; 142 A.L.R. 1018.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute or ordinance relating to child labor in streets, 152 A.L.R. 579.

What is a "factory" within statutes relating to safety and health of employees, 163 A.L.R. 447.

Validity, construction, and effect of court's approval of contract of minor's services, 3 A.L.R.2d 702.

Lawn mowing by minors as violation of child labor statutes, 56 A.L.R.3d 1166.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting preexisting status or rights, 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Workers' compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77 A.L.R.4th 844.