2020 Georgia Code
Title 33 - Insurance
Chapter 24 - Insurance Generally
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 33-24-4. Insurable Interest; Property Insurance

1. As used in this Code section, the term "insurable interest" means any actual, lawful, and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage or impairment.
2. No insurance contract on property or of any interest therein or arising therefrom shall be enforceable except for the benefit of persons having, at the time of the loss, an insurable interest in the things insured.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2745; Code 1868, § 2753; Code 1873, § 2795; Code 1882, § 2795; Civil Code 1895, § 2090; Civil Code 1910, § 2472; Code 1933, § 56-812; Code 1933, § 56-2405, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1; Ga. L. 2019, p. 386, § 24/SB 133; Ga. L. 2020, p. 493, § 33/SB 429.)

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, deleted former subsection (c), which read: "The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss, injury, or impairment of such interest in such property."

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "section, the term 'insurable interest'" for "section, 'insurable interest'" in subsection (a).

- For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For annual survey of insurance law, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 259 (1990). For comment on American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Pioneer Coop. Fire Ins. Co., 100 R.I. 375, 216 A.2d 139 (1966), as to effect of transfer of insured property to third party absent a clause in the policy prohibiting alienation, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 483 (1966).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Parties With Insurable Interest
• Parties Without Insurable Interest
• Policy Provisions
• Practice and Procedure

General Consideration

Test of insurable interest is whether insured will suffer direct pecuniary loss.

- Test of insurable interest in property is whether insured has such a right, title, or interest therein, or relation thereto, that the insured will be benefited by the property's preservation and continued existence or suffer a direct pecuniary loss from the property's destruction or injury by the peril insured against. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 157 Ga. 360, 121 S.E. 414, answer conformed to, 32 Ga. App. 16, 123 S.E. 38 (1924), later appeal, 33 Ga. App. 552, 126 S.E. 892 (1925); Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pollock, 52 Ga. App. 603, 184 S.E. 383 (1936).

It is enough if the assured holds such a relation to the property that the property's destruction by the peril insured against involves pecuniary loss to the assured. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 157 Ga. 360, 121 S.E. 414, answer conformed to, 32 Ga. App. 16, 123 S.E. 38 (1924), later appeal, 33 Ga. App. 552, 126 S.E. 892 (1925).

Title is not the sole test for determining an insurable interest. It may be a special or limited interest, disconnected from any title, lien, or possession, whereby the holder of the interest will suffer loss by the interest's destruction, etc., and that will entitle the holder to protect the interest by insurance; but the holder must have some lawful interest. Gordon v. Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 113 Ga. App. 755, 149 S.E.2d 725 (1966).

When by virtue of a quitclaim deed to his ex-wife as well as by their divorce decree itself, a husband was divested of equitable title to their residential property, he retained an equitable interest in it because of his continuing liability on and payment of a note given with a deed to secure a loan for improvements on the property. Republic Ins. Co. v. Martin, 182 Ga. App. 390, 355 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

When a daughter had acquired an insurable interest in residential property by a quitclaim deed to her from her mother, the daughter had an equitable interest, in addition to that of her mother, arising from her obligation on a note under a deed to secure a loan for improvements and from her occupancy of the residence. Republic Ins. Co. v. Martin, 182 Ga. App. 390, 355 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

- While title may not always be the determinative factor, the insured must have some lawful interest in property before the insured can have an insurable interest in the property, although that interest may be slight or contingent, legal or equitable. Splish Splash Waterslides, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589, 307 S.E.2d 107 (1983).

- Mere possession of property, although giving the possessor certain rights against a trespasser, is in and of itself not sufficient to constitute an insurable interest. Splish Splash Waterslides, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589, 307 S.E.2d 107 (1983).

- Vendor who had given a "security deed" to fire-damaged property, and who had remained liable on a promissory note to bank-mortgagee, had an insurable interest in the property. Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Gravitt, 187 Ga. App. 179, 369 S.E.2d 779 (1988).

Lessee has insurable interest in leased property. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 157 Ga. 360, 121 S.E. 414, answer conformed to, 32 Ga. App. 16, 123 S.E. 38 (1924), later appeal, 33 Ga. App. 552, 126 S.E. 892 (1925).

- Mere intruder or trespasser on the land of another has no insurable interest in that real estate or the buildings thereon. Consequently, a lease assignee can claim no insurable interest in realty buildings unless the lease in question has been effectively assigned. Splish Splash Waterslides, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589, 307 S.E.2d 107 (1983).

Right to remove trade fixtures does not provide an independent basis for finding that one has an insurable interest in property when the right to remove such fixtures has ended with the cessation of the right of possession, unless the landlord acquiesces in continual possession. Splish Splash Waterslides, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589, 307 S.E.2d 107 (1983).

- It is not necessary that the policy shall specifically insure or define in terms the nature of the insurable interest of the assured, especially when there is no fraud or deception, and the company through the company's agent is informed as to the facts of such "interests." Hagan v. Hudson Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 558, 173 S.E. 477 (1934).

- When the insurer, with full knowledge of the interest of the assured, recognizes it as insurable by issuing a policy which expressly refers to the nature of such interest, it will not be permitted, as a general rule, to question the sufficiency of such interest, and the principle of estoppel will apply. Hagan v. Hudson Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 558, 173 S.E. 477 (1934).

Cited in Townsend v. Morris, 222 Ga. 242, 149 S.E.2d 464 (1966); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Lipe, 116 Ga. App. 169, 156 S.E.2d 490 (1967); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Associates Disct. Corp., 116 Ga. App. 792, 159 S.E.2d 97 (1967); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 389 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1967); Greenbriar Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Lorne Co., 310 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Interstate Motel Developers, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Trust Co. v. Thompson, 133 Ga. App. 866, 212 S.E.2d 498 (1975); Huckaby v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 493, 231 S.E.2d 378 (1976); American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Woodward, 143 Ga. App. 652, 239 S.E.2d 543 (1977); Canal Ins. Co. v. P & J Truck Lines, 145 Ga. App. 545, 244 S.E.2d 81 (1978); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 151 Ga. App. 328, 259 S.E.2d 717 (1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ammons, 160 Ga. App. 257, 286 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Smith, 162 Ga. App. 612, 292 S.E.2d 456 (1982); James v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 427, 306 S.E.2d 422 (1983); Crews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 646, 373 S.E.2d 782 (1988); Jet Air, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 189 Ga. App. 399, 375 S.E.2d 873 (1988); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 202 Ga. App. 127, 413 S.E.2d 770 (1991); Conex Freight Sys. v. Ga. Ins. Insolvency Pool, 254 Ga. App. 92, 561 S.E.2d 221 (2002).

Secondary liability on lease for coal auger gave debtor insurable interest in the coal auger even though it did not have title to the property. Bryan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (In re Mr. Mach., Inc.), 29 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).

- Appellant, who guaranteed a loan from a commercial loan from a bank to appellee, had an insurable interest in the truck which was financed through that loan to appellee. Whitaker v. Ranow, 173 Ga. App. 746, 327 S.E.2d 855 (1985).

- Party who purchased chattel had an insurable interest in that chattel but as the purchaser had no policy of insurance, the purchaser could not recover from the prior owner's insurer when the chattel was totally destroyed. Roach v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 229, 325 S.E.2d 797 (1984).

- When the jury was authorized to find that an implied trust resulted in favor of the insured when the insured conveyed the property involved to the insured's brother, the insured had an insurable interest in the house at the time of the house's destruction by fire, even though the property was no longer titled in the insured's name. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 399, 346 S.E.2d 848 (1986).

Partner has an insurable interest in the firm property which will support a policy taken out thereon for the partner's own benefit. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 191 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

Partner has an insurable interest in the firm's property because the partner has an actual, lawful, and substantial economic interest in the property's preservation. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 191 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

- Insurable interest in the property of a partnership exists in both the partnership and the partners. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 191 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

- Partner who insures a partnership property in the partner's own name without any stipulation or understanding that the insurance is for the benefit of the firm or a co-partner is presumed to have insured only the named partner's own interest in the property. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 191 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

- Insurance apparently made for an individual partner may be shown to have been for the benefit of the partnership when the parties deal on that basis, or when the entity entitled to the insurance so authorizes or ratifies the action. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 126 Ga. App. 640, 191 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

- Mortgagee or one succeeding to the interest or rights of a mortgagee in the mortgaged property has an insurable interest therein. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pollock, 52 Ga. App. 603, 184 S.E. 383 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-812).

Bankruptcy court found that under the security deed the credit company held a valid security interest in the destroyed property and the security deed provided sufficient language to grant the credit company a security interest in the proceeds of the collateral, including any insurance proceeds. Altegra Credit Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Brantley), 286 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002).

- When plaintiff's spouse held a mortgage against the property, and when the mortgage was not paid spouse, gave spouses interest in the mortgage and mortgaged property to the plaintiff and the plaintiff paid the expenses of the foreclosure, and while the sheriff's deed was made to the spouse and not to the plaintiff, as the plaintiff had directed, it was intended to have been made to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff thought it was so made until action was brought, and the plaintiff's spouse did not claim any interest in or title to the property, but it belonged to the plaintiff, subject to an outstanding security deed, the plaintiff having exclusive and sole possession and had rented the property out to the plaintiff's tenants, the plaintiff had an interest, legal or equitable, in the insured property, such as could be made the subject matter of a fire insurance policy. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pollock, 52 Ga. App. 603, 184 S.E. 383 (1936).

Parties holding bond for title may be regarded as owners, even when the purchase money is not all paid. Southern Ins. & Trust Co. v. A. Lewis & Bros., 42 Ga. 587 (1871).

- When a married person is deserted by the other spouse and by such desertion is left in the exclusive possession and control of the dwelling house in which they previously lived together, and the abandoned spouse continues thereafter to occupy the house as the spouse's home, paying the taxes thereon and removing with spouse's own funds a mortgage which the other spouse had placed against it, the first spouse has an insurable interest therein, notwithstanding the legal title to the property may be in the other spouse. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Foster, 43 Ga. App. 658, 159 S.E. 882 (1931).

- When a policy of fire insurance was issued to a married person, designated generally as "trustee," and another, the married person, if the other spouse was part owner of the property covered by the policy, has such an insurable interest therein as would authorize the former for the latter's benefit to join with the other person insured in an action upon the policy. Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897).

Estranged spouse who relinquished title to property to the other spouse retained an insurable interest in the property. Brown v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 239 Ga. App. 251, 519 S.E.2d 726 (1999).

- In the absence of an express statutory prohibition, a parent as the natural guardian of the parent's minor children, and being endowed with the children's custody, control, and management has the legal right to execute a contract of insurance in the children's behalf. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nix, 113 Ga. App. 735, 149 S.E.2d 494 (1966).

- This section simply provides that a contract of insurance shall be unenforceable "except for the benefit of persons" having an insurable interest in the thing insured; and when it is alleged that the defendant insurance company, through the agent issuing the policy, had actual knowledge that title to the insured property was in the plaintiff's son, the policy will be construed as a valid contract of insurance covering the property of the son, issued to the father as trustee, and he can recover therefor for the benefit of his son. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nix, 113 Ga. App. 735, 149 S.E.2d 494 (1966).

- Owner may insure the owner's interest in the property under construction, and contractors may indemnify themselves against loss during the same period of time, and both policies will be payable, in the event of a fire, to the extent of loss of each insured under that insured's separate policy. American Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 125 Ga. App. 189, 186 S.E.2d 547 (1971); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Fowler, 148 Ga. App. 509, 251 S.E.2d 594 (1978).

- When the subject matter of insurance is a builder's risk policy, whether for construction, alteration, or repair, the building contractor who has entered into such a contract has an insurable interest in the building. Unless when such risk is deemed to have commenced is decided by the wording of the policy, it is normally while "under construction." E.C. Long, Inc. v. Brennan's of Atlanta, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 796, 252 S.E.2d 642 (1979).

- Because it had liability to the owner of cargo for loss to the cargo during transportation under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), a cargo carrier had an insurable interest in cargo it was transporting for an owner. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc., 300 Ga. App. 715, 686 S.E.2d 333 (2009).

Parties Without Insurable Interest

Simple creditor has no insurable interest in debtor's property.

- Simple contract creditor, without a lien either statutory or contract, without a jus in re or jus in rem, owning a mere personal claim against a debtor, has no insurable interest in the property of the debtors. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Southern States Phosphate & Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 506, 93 S.E. 157 (1917).

- Bona fide possession of stolen property does not give the holder any sort of title whatever, such as would come up to the rule governing an insurable interest; nor does the possessor's bona fide possession of stolen property constitute such an exclusive and undisputed claim as would entitle the possessor to be called the "sole and exclusive" owner. Not only has the real owner a contrary claim, but an uncontestable claim, and the fact that the owner is unable to assert it until the whereabouts of the property has been located does not render the claim of the bona fide holder in possession either undisputed or uncontested. Giles v. Citizens Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S.E. 890 (1924).

One who purchases stolen property, though in good faith, can acquire no title - hence no lawful interest. Gordon v. Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 113 Ga. App. 755, 149 S.E.2d 725 (1966).

Alienation of property, standing alone, effectively renders the policy unenforceable, and furthermore, if the insured was divested of all interest and right under the policy by an outright assignment, the insured could not thereafter claim an interest or maintain an action to recover under the policy in the insured's name. Curtis v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 854, 11 S.E.2d 3 (1940) (bill of sale to secure debt).

- Policy of fire insurance issued to one who has only a life estate in the property insured is inoperative as to loss occurring after the life tenant's death since the termination of the life estate by the life tenant's death terminates the life tenant's insurable interest in the property. Garnett v. Royal Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 432, 98 S.E. 363 (1919) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 2472).

Mere possession or license to use an outbuilding standing alone was insufficient to create an insurable interest in the outbuilding. Sapp v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 209, 424 S.E.2d 871 (1992).

- Individual who was a sole shareholder of a corporation did not have an insurable interest in property that was quitclaimed to a corporation, absent any showing that the individual had an interest in the grantee corporation or that the two corporations were the same. Muhammad v. Allstate Ins. Co., 313 Ga. App. 531, 722 S.E.2d 136 (2012).

Policy Provisions

Company cannot name amount and then contend insured's interest is limited.

- Insurance company may not, with full knowledge of the interest being insured, contract to insure and collect assessments on a named amount, and then in the event of loss contend that insured's interest is limited to the value of the rental of the leasehold for the remainder of the term. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harris, 50 Ga. App. 75, 177 S.E. 65 (1934).

- There is no rule of law that when various interests and various insurance policies are involved, the total payable under all the policies must necessarily be equivalent to the market value of the property. American Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 125 Ga. App. 189, 186 S.E.2d 547 (1971).

- While under the section an insurable interest is defined as some interest in the property or event insured, and a slight or contingent interest is sufficient, whether legal or equitable, such insurable interest is not to be taken as synonymous with the sole and unconditional ownership required by the terms of the policy. Nor does the rule as to an insurable interest dispense with the contractual requirement as to liens upon the property constituting the subject matter of the risk. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App. 497, 137 S.E. 277, cert. denied, 36 Ga. App. 825, S.E. (1927).

- Policy of fire insurance was issued to A individually, purporting to insure a described building. There was nothing in the policy to indicate that A's interest was other than individual. The policy contained a stipulation that the policy should be void "if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional or sole ownership, or if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple." After loss an action was brought upon the policy by A as trustee for A's children, A alleging that A held title to the property in trust for A's children. It was held that A's pleading was properly dismissed. Fox v. Queen Ins. Co., 124 Ga. 948, 53 S.E. 271 (1906).

- Insured will be deemed to have "sole and unconditional" ownership whenever, under a claim of right, the insured has the exclusive and undisputed use, possession, and enjoyment of the property. Giles v. Citizens Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S.E. 890 (1924).

- When one spouse has an equitable interest in the house, which interest is recognized by the other spouse, the equitable interest, together with the legal title held by the other spouse, constitutes a complete fee simple title in the house and premises in the insured, and sufficiently meets the requirements of the policy that the property insured be on premises owned by the insured in fee simple, that the interest of the insured therein be truly stated, and that the ownership of the insured be sole and unconditional. Hurley v. National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 515, 167 S.E. 917 (1933).

Perfect equitable title in the insured to property covered by a policy of fire insurance satisfies the condition in the policy that the policy "shall be void, if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership; or if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple." Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y Ltd. v. Sawyer, 57 Ga. App. 739, 196 S.E. 223 (1938).

- Bill of sale to secure debt was an alienation of the property insured and rendered void the policy under the terms of the policy. Curtis v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 854, 11 S.E.2d 3 (1940).

- If the agent of the insurance company knew at the time of issuance of the policy the real facts as to ownership, the policy would nevertheless be binding since the company would be estopped by reason of such knowledge from setting up the noncompliance of the insured with the sole and unconstitutional ownership provision of the policy. Blackstock v. Jefferson Ins. Agency, 23 Ga. App. 642, 99 S.E. 142 (1919).

- While it is true that a plaintiff cannot recover in an action on a fire insurance policy except by showing that the property in the plaintiff's possession at the time the policy was issued was the same as that described in the policy, still when the insured is the actual owner of the property which is the subject matter of the contract of insurance, and has an insurable interest therein, the mere fact that the original factory number of the motor of an insured automobile may have been changed without the owner's knowledge would not of itself render the contract of insurance null and void with reference to the insurance on the car actually dealt with by the contracting parties. Giles v. Citizens Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S.E. 890 (1924).

Practice and Procedure

Ownership or insurable interest must be alleged in action on policy.

- By virtue of this section, in an action upon a policy fire insurance, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege that the property destroyed by fire belonged to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff had some insurable interest therein, at the time of the fire. When the plaintiff's pleading contains no such allegation, no cause of action is set forth. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Southern States Phosphate & Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 506, 93 S.E. 157 (1917).

- Assignment of the policy as collateral security will not enable the assignee to maintain an action, unless it is alleged that at the time of the fire the assignee had an interest in the property insured. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Southern States Phosphate & Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 506, 93 S.E. 157 (1917).

- Possessor of personal property is presumed to be the property's owner, until the contrary appears. In an action against an insurance company upon a policy insuring property as belonging to the policyholder, when the company sets up the defense that the policyholder is not the owner of the property, the burden is upon the company to disprove the policyholder's ownership. Giles v. Citizens Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S.E. 890 (1924).

- On the trial of a case by an insured under a fire insurance policy against the insurer to recover for the loss by fire of property alleged to have been covered by the policy, if it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff's title to the property was sole and unconditional, or that the plaintiff had such title to the property as would entitle the plaintiff to recover as the owner having an insurable interest in the property, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case of the required ownership, which the plaintiff may do by showing that the policy covered the property damaged and that the plaintiff was in possession of the property claiming to be the owner thereof. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tatum, 56 Ga. App. 740, 193 S.E. 799 (1937).

- Evidence was sufficient to authorize the inference that property covered by an insurance policy belonged to the insured, and that no person other than the insured had any right, title, or interest in the property, unless it was a creditor of the insured for whose benefit the policy was issued, and to whom, as a person entitled to possession of the policy, the defendant had delivered the policy, and that the insurer at the time had knowledge of whatever right, title, and interest in the property may have been in the creditor, and therefore had waived the provision in the policy that the policy, unless otherwise provided for by agreement, or by endorsement on the policy or addition to it, would be void if the interest of the insured were other than unconditional and sole ownership. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tatum, 56 Ga. App. 740, 193 S.E. 799 (1937).

- When the judge charged the jury that in the judge's opinion A had an insurable interest; it was held that this was an improper mode of presenting the case. The judge ought to have called the attention of the jury to the facts, and then stated: "If you believe, etc., etc., then in the opinion of the court, under the law, you will find that he had an insurable interest." Southern Ins. & Trust Co. v. A. Lewis & Bros., 42 Ga. 587 (1871).

Leasehold interest coupled with a right or option to purchase or otherwise acquire the leased property upon expiration of the lease agreement is an "insurable interest" which may be protected by the lessee. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 404.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 933 et seq.

- 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 317 et seq.

- Insurance: effect of violation of warranty or condition of sole and unconditional ownership as regards one or more of several items of property covered by policy, 5 A.L.R. 808.

Right of reinsurer to question the insurable interest or eligibility of beneficiary, 18 A.L.R. 1163.

Insurance: effect of provision declaring loss, in case of mortgagee's interest, subject to all the terms and conditions of the policy, 19 A.L.R. 1449; 56 A.L.R. 850.

Insurable interest in landlord in crops raised by tenant, or in chattels or fixtures placed on the premises by the latter, 45 A.L.R. 863.

Tenant by entirety as sole and unconditional owner within insurance policy, 48 A.L.R. 353.

Levy of process, or seizure and possession of officer thereunder, as change of interest, title, or possession, avoiding insurance policy, 48 A.L.R. 1021.

Divorce decree as effecting a change of ownership or interest within policy of insurance, 48 A.L.R. 1232.

Reacquisition or extinguishment of title or interest as affecting provision in fire insurance policy against change of title, interest, or possession, or against encumbrance, 52 A.L.R. 843.

Right in proceeds of insurance taken out by warehouseman on goods stored, 53 A.L.R. 1409.

Vendee or vendor under executory contract as having exclusive ownership or interest, within the meaning of condition in insurance policy requiring interest of insured to be that of "unconditional and sole ownership," or the like, 60 A.L.R. 11.

Condition vendor or vendee of personal property as sole and unconditional owner within an insurance policy, 61 A.L.R. 661.

Voidability of deed to insured as affecting his status as sole and unconditional owner, 64 A.L.R. 757.

Insurable interest of husband or wife in other's property, 68 A.L.R. 362; 27 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Extent of recovery by insured who has only a partial or limited interest in the insured property, 68 A.L.R. 1344.

Property insurance taken out by, or endorsed to, receiver in bankruptcy or trustee in bankruptcy, 74 A.L.R. 1347.

Right of mortgagee to benefit of insurance taken out by, or in name of, receiver, trustee, or assignee for creditors of own of equity of redemption, 94 A.L.R. 1387.

Default on part of vendee in land contract as change in title, interest, or possession within provision of insurance policy in that regard, 97 A.L.R. 769.

Insurer's right of subrogation to mortgagee where it is not liable to mortgagor as subordinate to mortgagee's right as regards amount of mortgage debt remaining unpaid after application of proceeds of insurance, 106 A.L.R. 679.

Validity of insurance property possessed in violation of law or used for unlawful purpose, 132 A.L.R. 125.

Mortgagee's knowledge or acceptance of mortgagee clause before loss, as condition of his right to benefit of it, 132 A.L.R. 355.

Conditional sale as affecting provision in insurance policy against change of title, interest, or possession, 133 A.L.R. 785.

Fire insurance: sole and unconditional ownership provision as applicable where insured's title is defective, but in itself subject to no inherent limitation or condition affecting his exclusive ownership, 133 A.L.R. 1344.

Waiver or estoppel regarding sole and unconditional ownership clause, where both insurer and insured are aware of the uncertainty as to the title, 140 A.L.R. 1235.

Insurable interest predicated upon invalid or unenforceable contract, 9 A.L.R.2d 181.

Validity and construction of provision of automobile policy against encumbrances, 16 A.L.R.2d 736.

Condemnation proceedings as affecting insurable interest of property owner, 29 A.L.R.2d 888.