2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 4 - Relevant Evidence and Its Limits
§ 24-4-414. Evidence of Similar Transaction Crimes in Child Molestation Cases

1. In a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the accused's commission of another offense of child molestation shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
2. In a proceeding in which the state intends to offer evidence under this Code section, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence to the accused, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that the prosecuting attorney expects to offer, at least ten days in advance of trial, unless the time is shortened or lengthened or pretrial notice is excused by the judge upon good cause shown.
3. This Code section shall not be the exclusive means to admit or consider evidence described under this Code section.
4. As used in this Code section, the term "offense of child molestation" means any conduct or attempt or conspiracy to engage in:
   1. Conduct that would be a violation of Code Section 16-6-4, 16-6-5, 16-12-100, 16-12-100.2, or 16-12-100.3;
   2. Any crime that involves contact between any part of the accused's body or an object and the genitals or anus of a child;
   3. Any crime that involves contact between the genitals or anus of the accused and any part of the body of a child; or
   4. Any crime that involves deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on a child.

(Code 1981, §24-4-414, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- Similar crimes in child-molestation cases, Fed. R. Evid. 414.

Notice of prosecution's intent to present evidence of similar transactions, Ga. S. Ct. R. 31.3.

- For annual survey on evidence law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 101 (2017).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Other Crimes
• Time Lapse

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 38-202 and former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Defendant failed to demonstrate that the state's notice of the state's intent to present evidence of similar transactions, provided under the old evidence code which was in effect at the time, was insufficient to satisfy the requirements under the new evidence code. Harris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 865, 798 S.E.2d 498 (2017).

- Evidence of similar or connected sexual offenses against children is admissible in child molestation cases to corroborate the testimony of the victim as well as to show the lustful disposition of the defendant. Sullivan v. State, 162 Ga. App. 297, 291 S.E.2d 127 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Since three prior incidents and the current child molestation charges against defendant all involved defendant going to locations frequented by children and exposing defendant's genitals to the children, the prior incidents were sufficiently similar to be admitted as similar transaction evidence in defendant's trial for child molestation; the fact that the prior incidents, unlike the current ones, did not involve touching the child victims did not mean that the prior incidents were not sufficiently similar to the current ones to be admitted, as there was no requirement that the prior crime or transaction had to be absolutely identical in every respect, and, in any event, the sexual abuse of young children, regardless of the sex of the victims or the nomenclature or type of acts perpetrated upon the children, was of sufficient similarity to make the evidence admissible. Hostetler v. State, 261 Ga. App. 237, 582 S.E.2d 197 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request for a continuance after allowing the state to present evidence of prior bad acts, specifically the defendant's relationship with the victim's mother that began when the victim was 14 years old, because the state moved to allow such evidence prior to trial and, thus, there was no surprise to the defendant. Aguilar v. State, 340 Ga. App. 522, 798 S.E.2d 60 (2017).

- Trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior convictions because the state failed to prove that the allegations for which the defendant was convicted of, aggravated criminal sexual abuse in Illinois, constituted an offense under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413 or O.C.G.A. § 24-4-414 as the state failed to prove the age of the victim in that case. King v. State, 346 Ga. App. 362, 816 S.E.2d 390 (2018).

- Despite the defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously admitted improper character evidence from the victims' parents when the parents both testified that the defendant agreed to obtain counseling in exchange for the parents' agreement not to report the incidents of molestation to law enforcement, the evidence was properly admitted as: (1) the defendant cited no case law supporting a finding that amounted to improper character evidence; and (2) the testimony was admissible to explain why the victims and their parents did not immediately report the matter to police. Head v. State, 285 Ga. App. 471, 646 S.E.2d 699 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Child molestation defendant did not put the defendant's good character into issue so as to require a jury charge; the defendant's testimony regarding the defendant's attempts to help the victim was more reasonably construed as an explanation for the inordinate amount of time the defendant spent with the victim than as evidence of good character, and the defendant's testimony regarding the defendant's two part-time jobs only inadvertently placed the defendant's good character into issue. Kurtz v. State, 287 Ga. App. 823, 652 S.E.2d 858 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0321, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 184 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Although the state prematurely bolstered a child victim's testimony, the parties knew that the victim's credibility would be immediately undermined; evidence that defendant told the victim that a relative had been imprisoned for improper "touching" and that defendant masturbated with the victim's underwear were admissible as relevant. Robinson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 537, 621 S.E.2d 770 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Defendant's character was not erroneously put into issue by the admission of testimony of defendant's niece as to an incident during which defendant, while in the water at the beach and attempting to teach the witness how to float on her stomach, touched the witness in the area of her vagina because the evidence was admissible to show lustful disposition and to corroborate the testimony of the victim as to the acts charged. Evans v. State, 180 Ga. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 561 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- In a prosecution for child molestation, the court properly refused to allow the defendant to present witness evidence of defendant's experience in caring for young girls since character witnesses for a defendant are not permitted to testify about specific instances of conduct by the defendant during direct examination. Shelnutt v. State, 234 Ga. App. 655, 506 S.E.2d 643 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Evidence supported the trial court's charge on the law regarding prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim because the defendant was charged with child molestation for placing his penis on or about the victim's vagina with criminal attempt to commit rape, and with false imprisonment for illegally detaining the victim, but the victim also testified to various other instances of the defendant touching her breasts and vagina, all of which constituted evidence of prior difficulties; by giving the charge, the trial court was not commenting on the evidence. Rayner v. State, 307 Ga. App. 861, 706 S.E.2d 205 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Defendant's motion to sever the failure to register as a sex offender counts under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 from the remaining aggravated sodomy and child molestation counts was properly denied as: (1) the defendant was not entitled to severance as a matter of right since the charges involved a series of acts which were connected together; (2) the case was not so complex as to impair the jury's ability to distinguish the evidence and to apply the law intelligently to the counts as joined; and (3) the failure to sever the failure to register as a sex offender counts was proper as the failure to report charges were legally material to the crimes against two children because the failure constituted evasive conduct that was circumstantial evidence of guilt and evidence of the conduct underlying the defendant's conviction of a sex offense that was admissible as a similar transaction. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- In the defendant's criminal case, the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-404,24-4-405,24-4-413, and24-4-414) a prior difficulty the defendant previously had with one of the witnesses in the case; the evidence at issue was the defendant's performance of sexual acts on a juvenile victim prior to the acts that were alleged in the indictment, and this was relevant to show the defendant's motive, intent, and bent of mind in committing the acts against the victim for which the defendant was indicted. Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App. 248, 638 S.E.2d 397 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- When the defendant was accused of touching the "private part" of a 12-year-old girl, it was proper to admit evidence of a 22-year-old woman's rape. Both victims were females with whom the defendant had a previous good relationship and over whom he had authority, and both incidents occurred in the middle of the night when the victims were not fully alert or fully capable of resisting; a mere difference in the victims' ages would not render a prior transaction inadmissible. Walley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 483, 680 S.E.2d 550 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- In a prosecution for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and statutory rape allegedly committed by the defendant against three of the defendant's children, testimony from one of the defendant's other sons concerning similar transactions committed against that son was properly admitted in order to show the defendant's bent of mind and lustful disposition towards the defendant's own children. McCoy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 492, 629 S.E.2d 493 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Similar transaction evidence of crimes against a rape victim was properly admitted for identification purposes in the defendant's trial for assault because the witness testimony, DNA evidence, and the discovery of the rape victim's possessions in the defendant's car tied the defendant to the sexual assaults and because the assailant in both cases hid the assailant's face with a dark-colored raincoat and used the same gun. Lampkin v. State, 277 Ga. App. 237, 626 S.E.2d 199 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

When the defendant was charged with malice murder, felony murder, and cruelty to children, it was proper to admit similar transaction evidence about the defendant's violent acts toward the defendant's elementary-school-aged siblings and about the defendant's wife-beating; the evidence at issue dealt with the defendant's violent behavior toward family members residing in the same home, even those significantly younger than the defendant. Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 642 S.E.2d 640 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

When there was evidence that the defendant performed an oral act on the vagina of the ten-year-old victim while she was sleeping in a camper, it was proper to admit evidence of an incident 14 years before when the defendant had taken a four-year-old into a bedroom and performed a similar oral act on her vagina; the lapse of 14 years did not make the evidence inadmissible, and the incidents were sufficiently similar. Boileau v. State, 285 Ga. App. 221, 645 S.E.2d 577 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

In a sexual battery case involving a 13-year-old victim, the trial court properly admitted evidence of a similar transaction regarding a 12-year-old girl. The trial court found that both incidents involved girls of a similar age who developed some sort of romantic relationship with the defendant and that the incidents occurred at the same residence and at about the same time. Engle v. State, 290 Ga. App. 396, 659 S.E.2d 795 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

In defendant's prosecution for, inter alia, aggravated child molestation, evidence that the defendant previously engaged in a similar pattern of grooming a nine-year-old victim by, inter alia, giving the victim expensive presents before eventually molesting the victim was properly admitted to show bent of mind, common scheme or plan, and modus operandi; any objection to that victim's recantation of the accusation at the time because of fear for the victim's mother only went to the weight and credibility of the victim's testimony rather than the testimony's admissibility. Cannon v. State, 296 Ga. App. 687, 675 S.E.2d 560 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Trial court did not err in allowing similar transaction evidence because a jury could determine that the defendant took the actions in the similar transaction with the intent to arouse the defendant's sexual desires, especially given that the defendant asked that victim if the victim felt like the defendant would molest the victim. Dority v. State, 335 Ga. App. 83, 780 S.E.2d 129 (2015).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence of prior molestation acts upon a minor victim witness because the jury could have concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the acts described by the witness and the probative value was great based on the overall similarity of the acts, each involved inappropriate sexual contact between the defendant and a child of similar age to whom the defendant gained access through a relationship with the child's mother. Dixon v. State, 341 Ga. App. 255, 800 S.E.2d 11 (2017).

Trial court abused the court's discretion by excluding prior acts of child molestation allegedly committed by the defendant because such evidence was admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-414(a), and nothing in the record supported the extraordinary remedy of exclusion as unduly prejudicial under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403, particularly given the statutory presumption of admissibility and the close similarities between the crimes at issue. State v. McPherson, 341 Ga. App. 871, 800 S.E.2d 389 (2017).

Trial court did not err in admitting, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-413 and24-4-414, evidence of the defendant's sexual behavior toward another student as a jury could have determined that the defendant acted with the intent to arouse the defendant's sexual desires, especially given that while driving the student home from a music lesson, the defendant said the defendant was taking the student to the defendant's house to "make whoopee," a clear reference to sex. Blevins v. State, 343 Ga. App. 539, 808 S.E.2d 740 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0502, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 371 (Ga. 2018), overruled on other grounds by McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 839 S.E.2d 573 (2020).

- Trial court did not err in allowing similar acts testimony by the victim's half-sister in an aggravated sexual battery and child molestation trial. Although the half-sister did not allege penetration by the defendant, she explained that she awoke after he pulled at her shorts, and she described how the defendant fled across the room in much the same way that the victim testified that the defendant fled from her room when she stirred; furthermore, the fact that the half-sister did not speak out about the abuse prior to the victim's outcry did not warrant a determination that the trial court abused the court's discretion by allowing the half-sister's testimony. Hilliard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 473, 680 S.E.2d 541 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Evidence that the defendant displayed indecent notes, including an indecent image on the defendant's phone depicting oral sex, to an 11-year-old child for sexual gratification was admissible for purposes of showing the defendant's lustful interest in minor girls of approximately the same age as the victim. Holzheuser v. State, 351 Ga. App. 286, 828 S.E.2d 664 (2019), cert. denied, 308 Ga. 401, 841 S.E.2d 735 (2020).

- Evidence of a prior sexual assault was properly admitted in defendant's child molestation trial as similar transaction evidence even though the trial court failed to make a determination as to the proper purposes for which the evidence was offered or as to defendant's identity as perpetrator of the independent act; the error was harmless as the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to have concluded that the Williams (Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) requirements were satisfied. Howse v. State, 273 Ga. App. 252, 614 S.E.2d 869 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Similar transaction evidence was properly admitted in a prosecution for enticing a minor for indecent purposes and statutory rape because, in each case, the defendant obtained permission from the mothers of girls he knew well to take the girls for a specific purpose, diverted to an apartment, carried the girls to his bedroom, partially disrobed them, attempted to or did perform various sex acts, gave them a food treat, then returned them to their mothers with a fictitious explanation; the similar transaction evidence was not tainted, even though the victims' mothers knew one another. Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 26, 619 S.E.2d 294 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- During a defendant's trial for aggravated child molestation and related charges, evidence of the defendant's sexual misconduct against two younger children at the age of 12 was improperly admitted and was more prejudicial than probative because: (1) there was no logical connection between the charged offenses and the prior misconduct as no pattern of continuous conduct or periods of incarceration between the incidents were shown; (2) the defendant was a child when the previous events occurred and an adult at the time of the charged events; and (3) no sexual misconduct was alleged to have occurred in the intervening years. Maynard v. State, 282 Ga. App. 598, 639 S.E.2d 389 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- In a prosecution for aggravated sexual battery and aggravated child molestation involving a 12-year-old child, evidence that the defendant had sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old child shortly before committing the charged crimes was properly admitted as the evidence was relevant to show bent of mind, course of conduct, and to corroborate the victim's testimony; the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not outweigh the probative value. Martin v. State, 294 Ga. App. 117, 668 S.E.2d 549 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Three prior acts of child molestation were admissible in defendant's trial for child molestation and sexual battery of an 11-year-old female victim, although one victim was a male, one was four years younger, and the acts committed were different. The sexual abuse of young children, regardless of the sex of the victims or the nomenclature or type of acts or other conduct perpetrated upon the children, was of sufficient similarity to make the evidence admissible because sex crimes against children require a unique bent of mind. Gunn v. State, 300 Ga. App. 229, 684 S.E.2d 380 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence related to a prior offense of child molestation because it was admissible for a relevant purpose, the defendant's intent and motive. Wilson v. State, 354 Ga. App. 64, 840 S.E.2d 601 (2020).

- Evidence of a prior sexual assault was sufficiently similar for purposes of the admission of similar transaction evidence in defendant's child molestation trial, despite a difference in the victim's ages, because in the prior assault the victim was 23 years old and in the charged assault the victim was 14 years old as there was sufficient similarity between the two acts; in both cases: (1) the events occurred in defendant's trailer home; (2) defendant initiated unwanted sexual attacks; (3) defendant put defendant's hands down the panties of the victim; (4) defendant masturbated and ejaculated on the victims; and (5) defendant unsuccessfully attempted penetration. Howse v. State, 273 Ga. App. 252, 614 S.E.2d 869 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Transcript of an Internet chat room conversation between defendant and a police officer, posing as a 14-year-old girl, was properly admitted as similar transaction evidence in defendant's trial for pimping, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor; the officer was present to testify, personally witnessed the real-time chat recorded in the transcript as it was taking place, and testified that the transcript accurately represented the on-line conversation; the officer's testimony was tantamount to that of a witness to an event and was sufficient to authenticate the transcript. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the defendant's prior sexual battery conviction during the defendant's trial for child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), and aggravated child molestation, § 16-6-4(c), because the prior sexual battery and the molestation of the victim were similar; the defendant pled guilty to the sexual battery, establishing that the defendant had committed the separate offense, and both the prior sexual battery and the molestation involved the defendant's acts of touching the female victims' breasts and occurred within a three-month time frame. Stepho v. State, 312 Ga. App. 495, 718 S.E.2d 852 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- When the trial court refused to allow evidence as to whether defendant consented to intercourse with the victim in the sexual molestation case under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) and evidence that the defendant bragged about it to others after the fact, the trial court did not err; evidence as to the victim's nonchastity was inadmissible as irrelevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-404 and24-4-405) as was evidence of the victim's preoccupation with sex. Slack v. State, 265 Ga. App. 306, 593 S.E.2d 664 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- See Spinks v. State, 92 Ga. App. 878, 90 S.E.2d 590 (1955) (sodomy in child molesting case) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-202).

- Halloween mask was properly admitted in a trial for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery because the mask was relevant to the victim's state of mind as the victim testified that the defendant wore a Halloween mask on the night of the incident. Ward v. State, 274 Ga. App. 511, 618 S.E.2d 154 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).

- During the defendant's trial for child molestation and statutory rape, the trial court did not err in admitting similar transaction testimony regarding the defendant's unwanted sexual advances toward his girlfriend's younger sister because the difference in the victims' ages did not make the similar transaction inadmissible; it is the totality of the similar facts surrounding the crimes that are properly considered in a similar transaction analysis. Gresham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 682, 695 S.E.2d 73 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- In a child molestation prosecution, since evidence of the defendant's uncharged molestation of the victim was admissible without notice or a hearing, defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to such evidence. Stillwell v. State, 294 Ga. App. 805, 670 S.E.2d 452 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0493, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court properly refused to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence for child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(C) because the court found the defendant's conviction for sexual exploitation of children was a relevant similar transaction and the phrase relevant similar transaction under § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(C) included a conviction for a sexual offense charged within the same indictment as the offense for which a deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence was considered. Evans v. State, 334 Ga. App. 104, 778 S.E.2d 360 (2015), aff'd, 300 Ga. 271, 794 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 2016).

Cited in Vaughn v. State, 352 Ga. App. 32, 833 S.E.2d 723 (2019); In the Interest of P. T., 353 Ga. App. 511, 838 S.E.2d 596 (2020); Shaum v. State, 355 Ga. App. 513, 844 S.E.2d 863 (2020).

Other Crimes

Evidence of similar prior offense held admissible.

- Defendant was charged with raping a mentally retarded 27-year-old. Evidence that two years earlier the defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with an eight- and an 11-year-old child was properly admitted as the evidence was probative to show the defendant's lustful disposition toward persons of limited mental capacity, and the evidence's relevance outweighed any prejudice. Kent v. State, 294 Ga. App. 134, 668 S.E.2d 442 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Trial court properly permitted the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's two prior bad acts, a 2009 incident of exposure in front of underage girls and a 2012 incident of attempt to sexually assault a female neighbor, because they were not the faultless acts of an innocent child, but rather demonstrated evidence of the defendant's lustful disposition and were relevant. Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 805 S.E.2d 103 (2017).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the defendant's prior conviction for sexual battery of a minor as a lesser offense to child molestation because a certified copy of the conviction was admitted. Chitwood v. State, 352 Ga. App. 218, 834 S.E.2d 334 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the evidence that the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with two other victims who were around the same age as the 14-year-old victim as the defendant put the defendant's intent at issue in the case, and the probative value of the extrinsic acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Boyd v. State, 351 Ga. App. 469, 829 S.E.2d 163 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the two prior acts of child molestation against the defendant especially given the strong presumption in favor of admissibility; the defendant's prior acts against two other women when they were young girls were relevant and probative regarding the defendant's intent and propensity to commit the charged crimes against the victim as there was no showing either on direct or cross-examination that the witnesses' memories were at issue. Sturgis v. State, Ga. App. , 842 S.E.2d 82 (2020).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence of a past statutory rape because, although somewhat dissimilar and occurring 15 years earlier, the defendant's stated intent to attack the victim's credibility created a need for the state to use the evidence and the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury. McAllister v. State, 351 Ga. App. 76, 830 S.E.2d 443 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1489, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 115 (Ga. 2020).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting testimony regarding the appellant's prior acts of sexual assault because that evidence was relevant to the appellant's intent, identity, and propensity and three other family members testified that the appellant engaged in the same conduct of rubbing their genitals and inserting the defendant's finger into their vaginas when the witnesses were the same age as the victim, which testimony was relevant to show the appellant's propensity and that it was the appellant who molested the victim. Dixon v. State, 350 Ga. App. 211, 828 S.E.2d 427 (2019).

- Evidence of defendant's prior sexual battery of a juvenile was properly admitted in defendant's trial for child molestation and attempted child molestation of a nine-year-old girl to show defendant's lustful disposition toward molesting young girls because several years earlier defendant had pled nolo contendere to charges arising out of defendant touching the breast of a 16-year-old girl and placing her hand on his genitals. Cook v. State, 276 Ga. App. 803, 625 S.E.2d 83 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for solicitation of sodomy was properly admitted as a similar transaction in the defendant's trial for child molestation and sexual battery against a child since the victims of the current child molestation and the defendant's prior offense were both young girls whom the defendant knew, and in both instances, while the defendant was alone with the girls, the defendant placed the defendant's hands on their vaginal areas. Attaway v. State, 279 Ga. App. 781, 632 S.E.2d 397 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- During the defendant's trial for aggravated child molestation and child molestation, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the similar transaction evidence regarding the defendant's prior aggravated molestation of another young boy because the evidence of the defendant's prior aggravated child molestation was appropriate for showing the defendant's lustful disposition toward molesting young boys; the state indicated that the state wished to introduce the similar transaction evidence for all appropriate purposes: identity, plan, motive, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 450, 710 S.E.2d 649 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court did not err in admitting similar transaction evidence because certified copies of the defendant's prior conviction were sufficient to prove not only the similarity between the crimes for which the defendant was convicted, aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sodomy, child molestation, and enticing a child for indecent purposes, and the former crimes but also to establish that the defendant was, in fact, convicted of those offenses; the certified copies the state submitted included an indictment charging the defendant with continuous sexual abuse against a child to whom the defendant had recurring access and with whom the defendant engaged in three and more acts of lewd and lascivious conduct and with lewd and lascivious conduct upon the same child. Spradling v. State, 310 Ga. App. 337, 715 S.E.2d 672 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence during the defendant's trial for aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual battery, and child molestation because despite the defendant's age at the time, the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's lustful disposition with regard to younger females, the conduct with which the defendant was charged; the trial court properly considered the defendant's youth at the time of the similar transaction, along with the significant age difference between the defendant and the victim, the defendant's attempt to conceal the defendant's behavior by acting in secluded locations, and the nature of the acts the defendant committed before concluding that the evidence was admissible. Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 721 S.E.2d 585 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Trial court did not err by admitting evidence that the defendant committed prior acts of child molestation as the circumstances were similar, the age of the victim during the abuse overlapped with the age of the victim in the instant case, and the manner of abuse was the same, making the prior offense highly probative with regard to the defendant's intent. Eubanks v. State, 332 Ga. App. 568, 774 S.E.2d 146 (2015).

- In choosing to have a witness testify as to a defendant's good character, the defendant opened the door for the state to introduce all evidence bearing on the defendant's character, including a juvenile adjudication; the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant's character witness regarding the defendant's prior juvenile adjudication for child molestation because a certified copy of the juvenile adjudication was not tendered was without merit. Redman v. State, 281 Ga. App. 605, 636 S.E.2d 680 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- When the minor victim testified that she had not initially told her mother about the defendant's sexual offenses because she feared that the defendant, who had been arrested for battery of the mother and who had hit the mother, would harm the victim and her mother, evidence that the defendant had hit the mother and that the defendant had been arrested for assault and battery of the mother did not improperly put the defendant's character into issue; it was properly admitted to explain the victim's delay in reporting the crime. Borders v. State, 285 Ga. App. 337, 646 S.E.2d 319 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1374, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 640 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Admission of testimony from the mother of a child molestation victim describing a defendant's incidents of violence toward her was not erroneous admission of character evidence because it explained the mother's three-month delay in reporting the incident. Hernandez v. State, 304 Ga. App. 435, 696 S.E.2d 155 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting evidence in defendant's trial for child molestation, attempted child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and statutory rape that defendant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and multiple counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor after defendant was discovered smoking marijuana with a 13-year-old girl. Weathersby v. State, 262 Ga. 126, 414 S.E.2d 200 (1992) (child abuse and child molestation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2); Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga. App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (2005);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Time Lapse

Eleven-year lapse does not render prior similar offense inadmissible.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting defendant's conviction for criminal attempt, second-degree sexual assault, in which the victim was over 25 years old, but was developmentally disabled and mildly retarded; this evidence was admissible in defendant's trial for child molestation, attempted child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and statutory rape to show course of conduct, bent of mind, lustful disposition, and modus operandi and as tending to corroborate the child victims' testimony; the conviction, which occurred almost 11 years earlier, was not too remote to be admissible. Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga. App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Evidence that defendant had perpetrated similar sexual offenses against children of the same age and gender using a similar method of operation was properly admitted because the requisite similarity between the independent offenses and the crimes charged was clearly established; a time lapse of about eight years went to the weight and credibility of the evidence. Hogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 19, 611 S.E.2d 689 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

In a child molestation case involving relations of the defendant, the trial court did not err in introducing evidence of similar transactions involving other child relations that happened 16 to 29 years before the trial on the present charges; the lapse of time between these offenses went to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not to the admissibility of the offenses. Boynton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 778, 653 S.E.2d 110 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

- Testimony that an older granddaughter was molested 25 years ago was not so remote as to be inadmissible in the defendant's trial for the child molestation of a 15-year-old granddaughter; similar transaction evidence, including the older granddaughter's testimony and evidence involving the molestation of the defendant's five-year-old great-granddaughter, was admissible to show the defendant's bent of mind or lustful disposition. Delk v. State, 274 Ga. App. 261, 619 S.E.2d 310 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the evidence of 11-year-old and 15-year-old similar transactions because both similar transactions and the instant crimes involved defendant committing sexual acts against children with the second similar transaction and the instant crimes having defendant in a position of authority over the victims; thus, the similarity to the present crimes and their probative value to show unique bent of mind made them admissible. Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (2015).