2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 14 - Proof Generally
Article 2 - Presumptions and Estoppel
§ 24-14-29. Equitable Estoppel

In order for an equitable estoppel to arise, there shall generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his or her injury.

(Code 1981, §24-14-29, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- For article, "The Legislative Process in Georgia Local Government Law," see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1971). For article, "Promissory Estoppel and the Georgia Statute of Frauds," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 204 (1980).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Illustrations

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 5152, former Civil Code 1910, § 5738, former Code 1933, § 38-116, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- In order to constitute estoppel by conduct, there must concur: (1) a false representation or concealment of facts; (2) it must be within the knowledge of the party making the one or concealing the other; (3) the person affected thereby must be ignorant of the truth; (4) the person seeking to influence the conduct of the other must act intentionally for that purpose; and (5) persons complaining shall have been induced to act by reason of such conduct of the other. Harris v. Abney, 208 Ga. 518, 67 S.E.2d 724 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Cobb County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Board of Lights & Water Works, 211 Ga. 535, 87 S.E.2d 80 (1955); Jones v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 212 Ga. 577, 94 S.E.2d 497 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Estoppel may be used to prevent a party from denying at the time of litigation a representation that was made by that party and accepted and reasonably acted upon by another party with detrimental results to the party that acted thereon. Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Estoppels are not favored by Georgia law. Cobb County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Board of Lights & Water Works, 211 Ga. 535, 87 S.E.2d 80 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Estoppels are rarely resorted to, except when it would be more unjust and more productive of evil to hear the truth than to forbear the investigation. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Atlantic & Gulf Shipping Co., 51 Ga. App. 904, 181 S.E. 310 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Doctrines of estoppel are primarily negative in their operation against the party making the statement or admission, rather than creative of any new rights in the opposite party. Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Estoppel in pais operates only upon existing rights, not upon rights subsequently acquired. Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Williams, 50 Ga. App. 726, 179 S.E. 136 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Gellis v. B.L.I. Constr. Co., 148 Ga. App. 527, 251 S.E.2d 800 (1978);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Estoppel cannot legalize or vitalize that which the law declares unlawful and void. Macon Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Snow Properties, Inc., 218 Ga. 262, 127 S.E.2d 598 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Without some proper legal cause of action, establishing all the elements of equitable estoppel will not entitle plaintiff to relief. Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Equitable estoppel arises from the conduct of a party, using the word "conduct" in the term's broadest meaning as including that party's spoken words, the party's positive acts, and the party's silence when there is a duty to speak, and proceeds on the consideration that the author of misfortune shall not personally escape the consequences and cast the burden on another. Accordingly, it holds a person to a representation made or position assumed where otherwise inequitable consequences would result to another who, having the right to do so, under all the circumstances of the case, has in good faith relied thereon and been misled, to that person's injury. McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Equitable estoppel is an established principle of Georgia law and arises when a party has so acted that the party has by the party's conduct either gained some advantage for the party or caused some disadvantage to another by reason of which it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to permit the party to allege and prove the truth. A.S. Int'l Corp. v. Salem Carpet Mills, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Doctrine of estoppel in pais proceeds wholly on the theory that the party to be estopped has, by the party's declarations or conduct, misled another to the party's prejudice, so that it would be a fraud upon the party to allow the true state of the facts to be proved. Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 640, 278 S.E.2d 182 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

No equitable estoppel arises when no harm or disadvantage is presented as injury is essential for an equitable estoppel. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 Ga. App. 66, 308 S.E.2d 193 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- To assert an estoppel in pais one must show that one has lost or the other party gained something which makes it unjust for the latter to insist upon preexistent rights. There must be inducement by which one changes one's position for the worse. Injury is its essence. Meeks v. Adams La. Co., 49 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ga. 1943), modified sub nom., Meeks v. Taylor, 138 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773, 64 S. Ct. 611, 88 L. Ed. 1067 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- When a party by making an invalid agreement or promise induces another to forego a valuable legal right, one waives and is estopped to deny the right of the promisee to have the agreement carried out or the promise fulfilled. Pethel v. Waters, 220 Ga. 543, 140 S.E.2d 252 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- When in a case no facts appear from which it can be said that a party has been injured or placed at any disadvantage by the conduct of the party allegedly estopped, no estoppel resulted therefrom. City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 870, 73 S. Ct. 169, 97 L. Ed. 675 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Rule which prevents one who has given a reason for one's conduct and decision in a matter from placing one's conduct upon another and different ground after litigation has begun is but an application of the principle of estoppel in pais, and applies only where one's conduct has caused another to act respecting the matter to the injury and detriment of the latter, and if the latter would be placed at an inequitable disadvantage, should the former be allowed to rely upon a ground other than that first urged as a reason for one's conduct and decision in the matter. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Atlantic & Gulf Shipping Co., 51 Ga. App. 904, 181 S.E. 310 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Party seeking the benefit of estoppel must not only have been free from fraud, but must have acted in good faith and reasonable diligence; otherwise no equity will arise in that party's favor. Tybrisa Co. v. Tybeeland, Inc., 220 Ga. 442, 139 S.E.2d 302 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Travelodge Corp. v. Carwen Realty Co., 223 Ga. 821, 158 S.E.2d 378 (1967); Whitco Produce Co. v. Bonanza Int'l, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 92, 267 S.E.2d 627 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Party claiming estoppel must have relied and acted upon declarations or conduct of the other party and not on one's own knowledge or judgment. Tybrisa Co. v. Tybeeland, Inc., 220 Ga. 442, 139 S.E.2d 302 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Doctrine of estoppel by representation is ordinarily applicable only to representations as to facts either past or present, and not to promises concerning the future which, if binding at all, must be binding as contracts. Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 640, 278 S.E.2d 182 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- General rule is that for an estoppel by misrepresentation to arise the false representation must be made to the person seeking the benefit of the estoppel or intended for communication to that person. James Talcott, Inc. v. Carder, 300 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Contract by estoppel presupposes that one party has a defense to imposition of contractual liability but, by reason of one's conduct, is estopped to assert it. Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 640, 278 S.E.2d 182 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- There is no estoppel by conduct when both parties have equal knowledge or equal means of obtaining the truth. Gay v. Laurens County, 213 Ga. 518, 100 S.E.2d 271 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Yancey Bros. Co. v. Dehco, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828 (1964); Tybrisa Co. v. Tybeeland, Inc., 220 Ga. 442, 139 S.E.2d 302 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- In cases of estoppel through silence there must be not only the right but the duty to speak before failure to do so can operate as an estoppel. Tybrisa Co. v. Tybeeland, Inc., 220 Ga. 442, 139 S.E.2d 302 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- In a second trial of a case, a party is not estopped to give testimony at the second trial which is different from the party's testimony given at the first trial. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brower, 106 Ga. App. 340, 127 S.E.2d 33, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 525, 128 S.E.2d 926 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Burden of proof rests upon the party asserting an estoppel to establish all the elements necessary to constitute an estoppel. Hartsfield Loan & Sav. Co. v. Garner, 184 Ga. 283, 191 S.E. 119 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58, 39 S.E.2d 3 (1946);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- In order for an estoppel to be proved, it must be properly pleaded; a defendant who relies upon equitable estoppel must set up the same by answer in the suit of one's adversary. Citizens & S. Bank v. Barron, 181 Ga. 351, 181 S.E. 859 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116); Hartsfield Loan & Sav. Co. v. Garner, 184 Ga. 283, 191 S.E. 119 (1937);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- It is not error for the trial court to strike the plaintiff in error's plea of estoppel when there is no allegation showing a concealment of facts which resulted in the party asserting the estoppel acting to one's detriment. Beeland v. Alston, 101 Ga. App. 584, 114 S.E.2d 545 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- When the facts relied on to establish estoppel do not unequivocally show an estoppel in pais, the jury, and not the judge, should determine whether the facts constitute such an estoppel. Tune v. Beeland, 131 Ga. 528, 62 S.E. 976 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5152).

As a factual determination, estoppel is a matter to be determined by a jury. Mathis v. Rock Springs Whsle. Co., 157 Ga. App. 726, 278 S.E.2d 484 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- State can only be estopped from asserting the state's right to the state's own property by legislative enactment or resolution. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467, 105 S.E.2d 299 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Illustrations

Admission in favor of third person.

- Admissions against one's title to land, and in favor of the title of a third person, will be no estoppel in behalf of one to whom they were not made and who has merely heard of them, it not appearing that they were made for the purpose of being acted upon or with any design or intention that they should be acted upon. Randolph v. Merchants & Mechanics Banking & Loan Co., 181 Ga. 671, 183 S.E. 801 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- When plaintiff did not stand by at the time of the sale with knowledge that the sale was taking place, but only remained silent after learning of the sale previously made and of the valuable, permanent, and expensive improvements made thereon by the purchaser, the plaintiff is not estopped to assert the plaintiff's title or claim of interest in the property within seven years from the date of the sale. Owen v. Miller, 209 Ga. 875, 76 S.E.2d 772 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Persons sui juris, who acquiesced in a partition and took possession of their shares, could not recover from a grantee of one partitioner. Watkins v. Gilmore, 130 Ga. 797, 62 S.E. 32 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5152).

- Fact that a deed from a husband to his wife, under which a wife claimed title, may have been based upon a valuable consideration and duly recorded would not necessarily prevent a subsequent purchaser, by security deed, from relying upon the principle of estoppel, if he was in fact ignorant of the true title. Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 25 S.E.2d 705 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- If a person having legal title to land, which fact person does not know but has convenient means of knowing, and after a lapse of 27 years, during which time person was under no legal disability, person still has not learned the fact of the person's interest in the land, and in those circumstances the person induces one to buy the land from a third person by representations that the land is the property of such third person, the person's misrepresentations to the purchaser innocently made, coupled with the person's delay in ascertaining the truth, will amount to constructive fraud, and they may be pleaded as an estoppel by the purchaser on the faith of the title of the person's vendor. Lanier v. Bryant, 180 Ga. 409, 179 S.E. 346 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- One who has title to land and sees another who is in bona fide possession thereof place valuable improvements thereon, without giving notice of one's title, is not thereby subsequently estopped from asserting ones' title. Owen v. Miller, 209 Ga. 875, 76 S.E.2d 772 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Plaintiff was not estopped by acquiescence from seeking to enjoin violations of restrictive covenants by defendants merely because the same covenants were previously violated by other and different parties by more remote sales. Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Even if the claimant by the claimant's signature to the waiver of the claimant's landlord's lien against the immediately preceding bill of sale to secure debt, and by the express reference in the claimant's waiver to such bill of sale, did not in effect so recognize the covenant and warranty of title made by the debtor in the bill of sale to the property in question as to be conclusively bound thereby the same as if the claimant had signed the bill of sale as a party thereto, the claimant will at least be prima facie presumed to have read the bill of sale, to which the claimant expressly referred, or to have had knowledge of its essential contents; the claimant will be assumed not to have acted without knowledge of the property on which the claimant expressly waived the claimant's lien. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Sherrod, 50 Ga. App. 501, 178 S.E. 477 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- When there was no evidence of intentional deception on the part of the plaintiff, or any conduct which actually misled the defendant, the plaintiff would not be estopped from asserting any of the plaintiff's legal rights in injunction proceedings against the condemnation of property for a railroad right of way. Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 62 S.E. 52 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5152).

- When a wife, who claimed the equitable title to property, knowingly permitted her husband to retain the legal title and possession thereof, and credit was extended to him upon the faith of his apparent ownership or arose from the purchase of his outstanding promissory note, she was estopped from asserting her secret equity as against a creditor, whether or not he had reduced his claim to judgment, who had no notice of such equity. Rowe v. Cole, 171 Ga. 391, 155 S.E. 473 (1930), later appeal, 176 Ga. 592, 168 S.E. 882 (1933), and, 183 Ga. 477, 188 S.E. 668 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- In a trust administration dispute, the trial court's ruling that a trustee's attempt to rely on the equitable defenses of unclean hands, laches, and equitable estoppel failed was proper because the challenging beneficiary filed an action at law against the trustee seeking only money damages; thus, because it was an action at law, the equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands had no application to the case. Hasty v. Castleberry, 293 Ga. 727, 749 S.E.2d 676 (2013).

- When one knows that one owns the title to or an interest in real or personal property, and knowingly permits or acquiesces in the property's sale, encumbrance, or pledge by another, one will be estopped from setting up one's title or interest against the person who by such conduct has been misled to one's injury; however, when the estoppel relied upon is not one by deed or from an express contract, signed by the person against whom the rule is invoked, and is merely an equitable estoppel, it is the general rule that such person must, before the injury, have had actual knowledge of the transfer, sale, or encumbrance, and the material facts and circumstances attending the transaction. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Sherrod, 50 Ga. App. 501, 178 S.E. 477 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Trial court did not err in finding the lending company failed to comply with the foreclosure notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because the company's attorney failed to offer any reasonable explanation as to why, despite knowing that the debtor was the record owner of the properties, it only sent the notices to the predecessor in interest, and its agent, and the lending company was not entitled to equitable estoppel despite actual notice to the debtor. DIP Lending I, LLC v. Cleveland Avenue Properties, LLC, 345 Ga. App. 155, 812 S.E.2d 532 (2018).

- Wife was estopped from claiming title to personalty in her husband's possession and mortgaged by him. Whitchard v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 15 Ga. App. 190, 82 S.E. 770 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5738).

- Fact that a wife may have consented for her husband to include personal property, belonging to her, in a mortgage executed by him to secure his individual debt would not estop her from thereafter setting up her title to the property, where the mortgagee had knowledge of the true ownership of the property at the time the mortgage was executed. Whitchard v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 15 Ga. App. 190, 82 S.E. 770 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5738).

- When one who is not a party to the instrument of sale signs an ancillary agreement thereon, which agreement is material to the force and effect of the instrument on the signer, and which expressly refers to the preceding instrument, one is estopped from asserting any interest one may have. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Sherrod, 50 Ga. App. 501, 178 S.E. 477 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- One's failure to move in the matter of compelling another to file the alleged will after one's refusal, and to apply to have the will probated for so long a time, is such gross negligence as would amount to constructive fraud against a purchaser from the other without notice of the will and acting on faith of one's apparent title as heir at law, and would estop one and one's assigns from setting up title under the subsequently probated will as against such purchaser from the husband claiming as heir at law. Hadden v. Stevens, 181 Ga. 165, 181 S.E. 767 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Acceptance of insurance premiums and placing the money in the general funds of the defendant insurer amounted to such an unconditional acceptance as to estop the defendant to contend that the insured's policy was not in force at the date of the fire. Progressive Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 72 Ga. App. 473, 34 S.E.2d 173 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

State utility company and railroad station owner were estopped from contending that debtor's lease had been terminated prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing since a revised memorandum effecting only the minor change of extending a termination date did not serve to negate the debtor's reasonable reliance on the previously established general terms of the contested deal. Historic Macon Station Ltd. Partnership v. Piedmont-Forrest Corp., 152 Bankr. 358 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

- Regardless of the amount of expenditures holder of franchise and transferee might have made in connection therewith, no equitable estoppel would arise against city barring it from challenging validity of the franchise since there was evidence to show such expenses were incurred with knowledge of the invalidity of the franchise and therefore good faith was wholly lacking. Mid-Georgia Natural Gas Co. v. City of Covington, 211 Ga. 163, 84 S.E.2d 451 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

- Car auction contended that a bank should have been equitably estopped from denying that the bank had an obligation to honor checks drawn on a special account. However, the bank made no intentional misrepresentations and had no duty to disclose the bank's customer's financial status. The car auction, also, did not act with reasonable diligence by relying on the credit history of the customer's father instead of performing the auction's standard credit check. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Tennille Banking Co. (In re Smith), 51 Bankr. 904 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

- Use of out-of-state party's name and address to avoid payment of state sales tax does not give rise to estoppel to assert title to diamond ring since such party knew of the use of her name and address and has not adversely changed position in reliance thereon. Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 278 S.E.2d 140 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-116).

Wife who benefited from a loan obtained by her husband from his mother because it protected the marital home from foreclosure was not estopped from pursuing a claim to the residence since it was not shown that the wife was in any way directly involved in the discussions and negotiations that procured the loan. Watkins v. Watkins, 256 Ga. 58, 344 S.E.2d 220 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

No evidence party misled to that party's detriment. Cowen v. Snellgrove, 169 Ga. App. 271, 312 S.E.2d 623 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

In a dispute between adjoining landowners over title to approximately six acres of land, because appellant adjoining neighbors failed to identify any evidence of deception on the part of the adjoining landowner or the landowner's predecessors, the trial court did not err by omitting a jury charge on equitable estoppel. Pirkle v. Turner, 281 Ga. 846, 642 S.E.2d 849 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

- In an action brought by the purchasers of a lot seeking to cancel the developer's security deed based upon alleged fraud, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the developer as, even if the developer knew of the sale of the lot to the purchasers, such sale did not estop the developer from the developer's claim against the lot pursuant to the developer's security deed; however, the trial court did err by denying the equitable subrogation claim asserted by the purchasers' lender since exercising subrogation did not prejudice the developer in any manner. Byers v. McGuire Props., 285 Ga. 530, 679 S.E.2d 1 (2009), overruled on other grounds by SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 308 Ga. 404, 841 S.E.2d 729 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27).

Equitable Adoption, 18 POF2d 531.

- Estoppel to assert title to real property by conduct subsequent to contract between third persons, 1 A.L.R. 1482.

What names import corporation within rule that one contracting with body described by corporate name is estopped to deny its corporate existence, 5 A.L.R. 1580.

Loss of right to contest assessment in proceeding for street or sewer improvement by waiver, estoppel, or the like, 9 A.L.R. 634.

Loss of right to contest assessment in drainage proceeding by waiver, estoppel, or the like, 9 A.L.R. 842.

Denial of, or expression of doubt as to paternity or other relationship as estoppel to assert right of inheritance by virtue of such relationship, 33 A.L.R. 579.

Estoppel of mortgagor or seller to deny existence of property mortgaged or sold, 40 A.L.R. 382.

Failure to record or delay in recording an instrument affecting real property as basis of estoppel in favor of creditors not directly within protection of recording acts, 52 A.L.R. 183.

Execution of deed in representative or fiduciary capacity as estoppel of one in his individual capacity, 64 A.L.R. 1556.

Effect of intrusting another with stock certificate endorsed or assigned in blank to estop owner as against a bona fide purchaser or pledgee for value, 73 A.L.R. 1405.

Estoppel by conduct during testator's life to dissent from or attack validity of will, 74 A.L.R. 659.

Estoppel of one riparian owner to complain of diversion of water by another riparian owner, 74 A.L.R. 1129.

Estoppel by apparent acquiescence in or silence concerning improvements of real property to assert antagonistic title or interest, 76 A.L.R. 304.

Estoppel of wife who permits record title to realty to remain in husband's name to assert her own title as against one extending credit to husband, 76 A.L.R. 1501.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, debtor's exemption, by laches or delay, 82 A.L.R. 648.

Right of a purchaser assuming a mortgage debt, with the authorization of the mortgagor, to set up usury in mortgage as a defense or rely upon it as a ground of relief in equity, 82 A.L.R. 1153.

Estoppel of municipality to deny that it gave its consent to street franchise, 89 A.L.R. 619.

Principle which denies relief to party who has conveyed or transferred property in fraud of his creditors, as affected by execution, as part of, or as contemplated at time of, the fraudulent transaction, of reconveyance or retransfer of the property to him, 89 A.L.R. 1166.

Rule of estoppel of tenant to deny landlord's title as applicable where landlord affirmatively asserts a title or interest beyond that essential to his right to create the tenancy, 89 A.L.R. 1295.

Intrusting possession of securities to bank officer or employee who uses them to make a fraudulent showing of bank assets as estoppel of owner to reclaim them as against bank receivers, 100 A.L.R. 679.

Estoppel to question validity of proceedings extending boundaries of municipality, 101 A.L.R. 581.

Effect of silence of surety or endorser after knowledge or notice of facts relied upon as releasing him, 101 A.L.R. 1310.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, or election not to assert, forfeiture of executory land contract because of default in payment, 107 A.L.R. 345.

Abandonment of appeal or right of appeal by commencement, or prosecution to judgment, of another action, 115 A.L.R. 121.

Promissory estoppel, 115 A.L.R. 152; 48 A.L.R.2d 1069.

Tax exemption as affected by failure to claim or delay in claiming it for past years, 115 A.L.R. 1484.

Estoppel as ground for holding defendant liable for negligence in conduct of business which appears to be his but which in fact belongs to another, 122 A.L.R. 256.

Estoppel to assert invalidity of foreign decree of divorce for lack of domicil at divorce forum or failure to obtain jurisdiction of person of defendant, 122 A.L.R. 1321; 140 A.L.R. 914; 153 A.L.R. 941; 175 A.L.R. 538.

Creditor's statement or assurance to debtor, not supported by a consideration, that payment need not be made at time due, as binding upon creditor by way of estoppel, 124 A.L.R. 1248.

Doctrine of estoppel as applicable against one's right to hold a public office or his status as a public officer, 125 A.L.R. 294.

Mistake as to date of lapse of policy in insurer's statement of reason for denial of claim under policy as affecting its right to insist upon lapse as defense, 125 A.L.R. 1270.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 130 A.L.R. 8; 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.

Estoppel by acquiescence or delay to question validity of plan for reorganization of bank, 139 A.L.R. 659.

Estoppel of grantee or mortgagee as to amount of prior mortgage recited, 141 A.L.R. 1184.

What agreement or conduct subsequent to assignment of lease amounts to assumption by assignee of covenants of lease, or estoppel to deny such assumption, 148 A.L.R. 393.

Estoppel of owner of tangible personal property who knowingly or voluntarily permits another to have possession of certificates or other evidences of title, endorsed in blank or otherwise showing ownership in possessor, to deny latter's authority to sell, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise deal with, the property, 151 A.L.R. 690.

Estoppel to invoke rule or statute against perpetuities, 162 A.L.R. 156.

Estoppel of intervener to assert claim against original complainant, 166 A.L.R. 911.

Construction and application of statute respecting estoppel of insurer where insured was examined by medical examiner, 172 A.L.R. 143.

Acceptance by building or construction contractor of payments under his contract as a waiver of right of action upon implied warranty as to conditions affecting cost, 173 A.L.R. 308.

Joining in instrument as ratification of or estoppel as to prior ineffective instrument affecting real property, 7 A.L.R.2d 294.

Insurer's demand for additional or corrected proof of loss as waiver or estoppel as to right to assert contractual limitation provision, or as suspending running thereof, 15 A.L.R.2d 955.

Estoppel of one selling or conveying property to dissolved or defunct corporation to deny its existence, 20 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Renunciation of beneficial interest under inter vivos trust as condition of right to contest its validity, 21 A.L.R.2d 1457.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity, 28 A.L.R.2d 116.

Insurer's admission of liability, offers of settlement, negotiations, and the like, as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, contractual limitation provision, 29 A.L.R.2d 636.

Insurer's admission of liability, offers of settlement, and negotiations for adjustment or settlement, as waiver of proof of property loss, 49 A.L.R.2d 87.

Denial of liability as waiver of proofs of loss required by insurance policy, 49 A.L.R.2d 161.

Estoppel to assert that article annexed to realty is or is not a fixture, 60 A.L.R.2d 1209.

Right to attack validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to occupational or professional license as affected by applying for, or securing license, 65 A.L.R.2d 660.

Partial payment on private building or construction contract as waiver of defects, 66 A.L.R.2d 570.

Waiver of, or estoppel to rely upon, contractual limitation of time for bringing action against municipality or other political subdivision, 81 A.L.R.2d 1039.

Purchaser's right to set up invalidity of contract because of violation of state securities regulation as affected by doctrines of estoppel or pari delicto, 84 A.L.R.2d 479.

Estoppel of lessee, because of occupancy of, or other activities in connection with, premises, to assert invalidity of lease because of irregularities in description or defects in execution, 84 A.L.R.2d 920.

Physician giving medical examination to insurance applicant as agent of insured or of insurer, 94 A.L.R.2d 1389.

Quantum or degree of evidence necessary to prove an equitable estoppel, 4 A.L.R.3d 361.

Infant's misrepresentation as to his age as estopping him from disaffirming his voidable transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270.

Settlement negotiations as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 39 A.L.R.3d 127.

Agreement of parties as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43 A.L.R.3d 756.

Estoppel of municipality as to encroachments upon public streets, 44 A.L.R.3d 257.

Promises to settle or perform as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 482.

Plaintiff's diligence as affecting his right to have defendant estopped from pleading the statute of limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 760.

Fiduciary or confidential relationship as affecting estoppel to plead statute of limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d 630.

Delay caused by other litigation as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d 703.

Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of statute of frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037.

Automobile or motorcycle as necessary for infant, 56 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Public contracts: duty of public authority to disclose to contractor information, allegedly in its possession, affecting cost or feasibility of project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182.

Failure of creditor, or creditor's assignee, to secure credit insurance as affecting rights or liabilities of debtor, upon debtor's loss, 88 A.L.R.3d 794.

Modern status of law as to equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347.

Liability insurer's waiver of right, or estoppel, to set up breach of cooperation clause, 30 A.L.R.4th 620.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder, 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

Laches or delay in bringing suit as affecting right to enforce restrictive building covenant, 25 A.L.R.5th 233.

ARTICLE 3 PARTICULAR MATTERS OF PROOF

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2011 enactment of this article, see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2011).