2020 Georgia Code
Title 23 - Equity
Chapter 3 - Equitable Remedies and Proceedings Generally
Article 3 - Quia Timet
Part 2 - Quia Timet Against All the World
§ 23-3-61. Who May Bring Proceeding

Universal Citation: GA Code § 23-3-61 (2020)

Any person, which term shall include a corporation, partnership, or other association, who claims an estate of freehold present or future or any estate for years of which at least five years are unexpired, including persons holding lands under tax deeds, in any land in this state, whether in the actual and peaceable possession thereof or not and whether the land is vacant or not, may bring a proceeding in rem against all the world to establish his title to the land and to determine all adverse claims thereto or to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon his title to the land, including an equity of redemption, which proceeding may be against all persons known or unknown who claim or might claim adversely to him, whether or not the petition discloses any known or possible claimants.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "Tracing Georgia's English Common Law Equity Jurisprudential Roots: Quia Timet," see 14 The Journal of Southern Legal History 135 (2006).


Legislative intent.

- This section creates an efficient, speedy, and effective means of adjudicating disputed title claims and was intended by the General Assembly to serve as an additional remedy to other legal and equitable actions. Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

A plaintiff in an action to quiet title must assert that he holds some current record title or current prescriptive title, and not only an expectancy, in order to maintain his suit. In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994), appeal dismissed, 269 Ga. 475, 498 S.E.2d 266 (1998).

Plaintiff in the action to quiet title failed to bring itself within the language of this section where it showed no current claim to an estate of freehold nor an estate of years. In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979).

Dismissal of quiet title claim improper.

- Trial court erred in dismissing the property owner's quiet title claim because, although the bank tried to reform the deed and void the foreclosure that listed 2253 Dawnville as the property foreclosed upon, and the bank's counsel filed an affidavit of title that the bank intended the deed to encumber 2215 Dawnville, the allegations of the property owner's counterclaim disclosed that the property owner would be entitled to relief if it was determined that the property owner did in fact hold unencumbered legal title to 2215 Dawnville, and that the bank through the filing of the affidavits of title and the foreclosure and resulting deed under power, cast a cloud upon that title. Cronan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 336 Ga. App. 201, 784 S.E.2d 57 (2016).

Dismissal of homeowner's claim based on assignment of security deed.

- Homeowner's action to quiet title against an assignee of the security deed to the homeowner's property failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the homeowner's security deed had been granted to the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) and then to the assignee and was never held by the lender that had since become defunct. Bank of America, N.A. v. Johnson, 299 Ga. 861, 792 S.E.2d 704 (2016).

Proof of title.

- The Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., does not require the same proof of title as an ejectment action. Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994), appeal dismissed, 269 Ga. 475, 498 S.E.2d 266 (1998).

Evidence sufficient to support plaintiff's boundaries.

- In a boundary line dispute filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-61, the trial court properly entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, two landowners, and against their neighbor, and then denied the neighbor a new trial, or alternatively a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as: (1) the boundary line indicated on a plat reflecting the locations of monuments on the parcel owned by two landowners complied with the monuments referenced in the original warranty deed; and (2) the neighbor agreed to a special verdict form allowing the jury to find that the plat submitted by the two landowners accurately and sufficiently showed the true boundary line. Dover v. Higgins, 287 Ga. App. 861, 652 S.E.2d 829 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0402, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 237 (Ga. 2008).

All known heirs not required parties.

- Action brought by decedent's grandson to quiet title to real property was not subject to dismissal for failure to join all the known heirs of the decedent. Resseau v. Bland, 268 Ga. 634, 491 S.E.2d 809 (1997).

Easement insufficient to support claim.

- A homeowner's association was not entitled to bring a quiet title action against a subdivision developer; the association's allegations that the developer should convey future title and that the association had an easement were insufficient to support a claim for quiet title, as a petition to quiet title could not depend upon an easement. Dykes Paving & Constr. Co. v. Hawk's Landing Homeowners Ass'n, 282 Ga. 305, 647 S.E.2d 579 (2007).

Res judicata.

- Trial court did not err in ruling that a church's prior quia timet action under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., barred an heir's action against the church seeking title to the property because the prior action settled the church's ownership interest in the property. Cartwright v. First Baptist Church of Keysville, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 299, 728 S.E.2d 893 (2012).

Cited in Pittard v. McMillon, 225 Ga. 239, 167 S.E.2d 644 (1969); McGee v. Craig, 230 Ga. 553, 198 S.E.2d 165 (1973); Gauker v. Eubanks, 230 Ga. 893, 199 S.E.2d 771 (1973); James v. Gainey, 231 Ga. 543, 203 S.E.2d 163 (1974); Rockmart Bank v. Dister, 233 Ga. 748, 213 S.E.2d 645 (1975); Williams v. Mathis, 237 Ga. 305, 227 S.E.2d 378 (1976); Burruss v. Bailey, 238 Ga. 72, 230 S.E.2d 878 (1976); Selby v. Gilmer, 240 Ga. 241, 240 S.E.2d 80 (1977); Peacock v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 241 Ga. 280, 244 S.E.2d 816 (1978); Ferguson v. Golf Course Consultants, Inc., 243 Ga. 112, 252 S.E.2d 907 (1979); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga. 117, 259 S.E.2d 62 (1979); Wiggins v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 245 Ga. 526, 266 S.E.2d 148 (1980); Flaum v. Middlebury, Inc., 246 Ga. 682, 272 S.E.2d 695 (1980); Cole v. Thrasher, 246 Ga. 683, 272 S.E.2d 696 (1980); Cooley v. All The World, 247 Ga. 459, 276 S.E.2d 615 (1981); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 249 Ga. 832, 294 S.E.2d 512 (1982); Holden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 597, 370 S.E.2d 847 (1988); Norton v. Holcomb, 285 Ga. App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94 (2007); Republic Title Company, LLC v. Freeport Title and Guaranty, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 408, 829 S.E.2d 172 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1616, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 168 (Ga. 2020).


Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, § 41. 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims, § 6.


- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 102.


- Doctrine of after-acquired title as between one who took before and one who took after common grantor or mortgagor acquired title, 25 A.L.R. 83.

Tax deed and recitals therein as evidence of regularity of tax proceedings as to advertising and notice of sale, and as to time, manner, and place of sale, 30 A.L.R. 8; 88 A.L.R. 264.

Return of payments as condition of cancellation of land contract as cloud on title, 35 A.L.R. 274.

Right of one not in possession to maintain suit to remove cloud on title in case of fraud, 36 A.L.R. 698.

Judgment (or final order) affecting title or interest in real property as subject to collateral attack because of insufficiency of description in the pleadings, 111 A.L.R. 1200.

Suit to determine ownership, or protect rights, in respect of instruments not physically within the state but relating to real estate therein as one in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction of which may rest upon constructive service, 161 A.L.R. 1073.

Constitutionality of a statute which, regardless of possession by the owner, reduces title to real estate to a mere right of action to be asserted within a prescribed period of time, 7 A.L.R.2d 1366.

Marketability of title derived from or through, or affected by possible claim of, infant, 24 A.L.R.2d 1306.

Maintainability, by lessee, of action to quiet title to leasehold, 51 A.L.R.2d 1227.

Common source of title doctrine, 5 A.L.R.3d 375.

Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title by adverse possession, 56 A.L.R.3d 1182.

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