2020 Georgia Code
Title 19 - Domestic Relations
Chapter 8 - Adoption
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 19-8-19. Effect of Decree of Adoption

1. A decree of adoption, whether issued by a court of this state or by a court of any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect as to matters within the jurisdiction of or before a court in this state:
   1. Except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the spouse, a decree of adoption shall terminate all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his or her relatives, including his or her parent, so that the adopted individual thereafter shall be a stranger to his or her former relatives for all purposes, including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the individual by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship; and
   2. A decree of adoption shall create the relationship of parent and child between each petitioner and the adopted individual, as if the adopted individual were a child of biological issue of that petitioner.The adopted individual shall enjoy every right and privilege of a biological child of that petitioner; shall be deemed a biological child of that petitioner, to inherit under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will, and to take under any instrument of testamentary gift, bequest, devise, or legacy, whether executed before or after the adoption is decreed, unless expressly excluded therefrom; shall take by inheritance from relatives of that petitioner; and shall also take as a child of that petitioner under a class gift made by the will of a third person.
2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, if a parent of a child dies without the relationship of parent and child having been previously terminated by court order, the child's right of inheritance from or through the deceased parent shall not be affected by the adoption.

(Code 1981, §19-8-19, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-1/HB 159.)

The 2018 amendment, effective September 1, 2018, in paragraph (a)(1), substituted "shall terminate" for "terminates" near the middle, inserted "or her" three times, and substituted "thereafter shall be" for "thereafter is" in the middle; in paragraph (a)(2), substituted "adoption shall create" for "adoption creates" near the beginning of the first sentence, in the second sentence, deleted "the provisions of" following "take under" in the middle, and deleted the quote marks from "child" near the end; and, in subsection (b), deleted "the provisions of" preceding "subsection (a)" near the beginning, and deleted "or unrevoked surrender of parental rights to the child" following "court order" near the end.

- For article discussing problems in construction of instrument conveying gift to a group or class, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 169 (1969). For article discussing inheritance by and from adopted child, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 447 (1976). For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia's will, trusts, and estate laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (1979). For survey article on wills, trusts, and administration of estates, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 323 (1982). For annual survey of law of wills, trusts, and administration of estates, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 417 (1986). For annual survey article discussing wills, trusts and administration of estates, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 487 (1999). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2012). For note discussing rights of inheritance after adoption in Georgia, see 24 Ga. B.J. 139 (1961). For note advocating consistency of inheritance and wrongful death rights with adopted child's new legal status, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 1003 (1972). For note, "In re Baby Girl Eason: Expanding the Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers," see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 997 (1988). For note, "Surrogate Mother Agreements in Georgia: Conflict and Accord with Statutory and Case Law," see 4 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 153 (1988). For note, "Status or Contract? A Comparative Analysis of Inheritance Rights under Equitable Adoption and Domestic Partnership Doctrines," 39 Ga. L. Rev. 675 (2005). For comment on Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 64 S.E.2d 186 (1951), see 3 Mercer L. Rev. 223 (1951). For comment on Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 64 S.E.2d 186 (1950), holding adoption of child serves as natural birth to revoke will, see 14 Ga. B.J. 86 (1951). For comment on "Grandparents' Visitation Rights in Georgia," see 29 Emory L.J. 1083 (1980). For comment on equitable adoption, equitable legitimation, and inheritance in extralegal family arrangements, see 48 Emory L.J. 943 (1999).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 11 and former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- After the natural father died in 1982 and his daughter had been adopted by another person prior to the 1977 enactment which severed an adopted child's right of inheritance from the child's natural parents and severed the adopted child's former right to bring a wrongful death action for the homicide of the child's natural parent, the decedent's daughter was not an heir of her natural father and had no vested right to bring an action in tort for his death. Eig v. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 339 S.E.2d 752 (1986) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

- Superior court erred in granting a mother's motion to dismiss a former partner's petition to adopt the mother's child because a judgment denying the mother's motion to set aside the adoption decree was res judicata as to the validity of the adoption decree; the superior court was competent to entertain the motion to set aside and to consider whether the court properly had jurisdiction when the court entered the adoption decree, and the court's denial of the motion to set aside was conclusive of the question of standing in the partner's case. Bates v. Bates, 317 Ga. App. 339, 730 S.E.2d 482 (2012).

- Legislature's intent in enacting 1980 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 was to give grandparents standing to seek visitation in a situation in which their own child had lost his or her parental rights through death or termination; therefore, that section constitutes specific exception to provision of former § 19-8-14 that adopted child shall become a legal stranger to his former relatives for all purposes. Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

§ 19-7-3 not an exception. - O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3, which provides visitation rights for grandparents in certain situations, is not an exception to former § 19-8-14 when both the natural mother and father have released the child for adoption. Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163 (1984) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

"Grandparents' Bill of Rights" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 is not an exception to former § 19-8-14. The only provision which grants grandparents visitation rights after an adoption is the limited one of the death of one parent, the remarriage of the surviving parent, followed by the adoption of the child by the stepparent. In other adoptions, the severance of relationships provision of former § 19-8-14 controls, and no rights of visitation by former grandparents existed. Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga. App. 899, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

- In a custody dispute between a biological parent and an adoptive parent, preference cannot be given to the biological parent. The test is the best interest of the child. Ivey v. Ivey, 264 Ga. 435, 445 S.E.2d 258 (1994).

- Trial court did not err in awarding primary physical custody of the couple's biological child to the wife as the court's determination that splitting the siblings would cause emotional harm to both children was sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of the husband with respect to custody of the older child, who was the biological child of the husband and adopted by the wife. Hastings v. Hastings, 291 Ga. 782, 732 S.E.2d 272 (2012).

- Paternal grandparents were not entitled to visitation rights after the child's natural father's parental rights had been terminated and the child had been adopted by the child's stepfather. Campbell v. Holcomb, 193 Ga. App. 474, 388 S.E.2d 65 (1989) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

Limiting language of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child, includes adoptive parents because in the absence of language limiting the term "parent" to only "natural parents" or "biological parents", there is no legislative intent to withhold from adoptive parents the same constitutionally protected status enjoyed by biological parents to raise their children without state interference; in construing § 19-7-3(b), the definition of parent in the adoption statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6) and (8), which gives full legal status to adoptive parents, cannot be ignored, and the clear intent of the adoption statute is to give adoptive parents full legal rights. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- Term "parents" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) did not exclude a child's adoptive parent; therefore, because a child was living with the child's mother and adoptive father, who were not separated, the child's natural grandparents had no right to file an original action for visitation with the child under the statute. Upon their son's termination of his parental rights to the child, the grandparents became strangers to the child, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19. Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- Child's biological grandmother lacked standing to bring an action for injuries arising from illegitimacy since the child was adopted and the grandmother's legal relationship was terminated. Vance v. T.R.C., 229 Ga. App. 608, 494 S.E.2d 714 (1997).

Since the intervention of grandparents into a custody proceeding and an order granting them temporary custody had already occurred, the later adult adoption of the child's father did not extinguish the legal status that the grandparents held; the trial court's subsequent order dismissing the intervention of the grandparents, and setting aside the award of temporary custody to the grandparents was reversed. Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 599 S.E.2d 173 (2004).

- Arrearages in child support payments which accrued prior to adoption are not eradicated by the adoption decree. Sample v. Poteralski, 169 Ga. App. 448, 313 S.E.2d 145 (1984) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

Status of parent and child exists after parental rights terminated. However, "child" no longer exists between the natural parent and "child" but exists between the child and the adopting parent. Menard v. Fairchild, 254 Ga. 275, 328 S.E.2d 721 (1985) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

- In construing rights of adopted child to take under a will, it is not a question of right of adopted child to inherit, but simply a question of the testator's intent with respect to those who are to share in the estate. Thomas v. Trust Co. Bank, 247 Ga. 693, 279 S.E.2d 440 (1981) (decided under former § 19-8-14, as enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201, § 1).

- In a prosecution for incest, although the state did not introduce documentary evidence of adoption, unrebutted testimony of the adoption by the defendant, his wife, and the victim was sufficient to establish the relationship. Edmonson v. State, 219 Ga. App. 323, 464 S.E.2d 839 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Collins v. State, 229 Ga. App. 658, 495 S.E.2d 59 (1997).

Because adopted individuals "enjoy every right and privilege of a biological child," they are statutorily protected from incest. Edmonson v. State, 219 Ga. App. 323, 464 S.E.2d 839 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Collins v. State, 229 Ga. App. 658, 495 S.E.2d 59 (1997).

- Trial court erred when the court denied the defendant's motion to quash the count of an indictment charging the defendant with incest because the defendant did not commit incest since the defendant's adoptive sister was not a whole blood or half blood sibling; the incest statute does not prohibit sexual intercourse between a brother and an adoptive sister not related by blood. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. 757, 717 S.E.2d 280 (2011).

Cited in Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431 (1979); O'Quinn v. Bunkley, 185 Ga. App. 673, 365 S.E.2d 460 (1988); Garcia v. Garcia, 284 Ga. 152, 663 S.E.2d 709 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, § 129 et seq.

1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Adoption, § 214 et seq.

- 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Persons, § 133 et seq.

- Adoption of child as satisfying condition of devise or bequest when or if beneficiary has a child, 30 A.L.R. 1412.

Right to disinherit adopted child, 97 A.L.R. 1015.

Adoption as affecting duty of support or assistance otherwise owed by natural parent to child, or by child to natural parent, 114 A.L.R. 494.

Adoption as affecting right of inheritance by, through, or from natural parent or other natural kin, 123 A.L.R. 1038.

Underformed or imperfectly performed agreement to adopt child as giving child the status of an adopted child for purposes of succession or estate tax, 141 A.L.R. 1302; 97 A.L.R.3d 347.

Right of parent to recover for injury to or death of minor child as affected by award of custody of child to another, 147 A.L.R. 482.

Relationship created by adoption as within statute prohibiting marriage between parties in specified relationships, or statute regarding incest, 151 A.L.R. 1146.

Descent and distribution of property of adopted child, 170 A.L.R. 742.

Annulment or vacation of adoption decree by adopting parent or natural parent consenting to adoption, 2 A.L.R.2d 887.

Adoption of child as revoking will, 24 A.L.R.2d 1085.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument, 37 A.L.R.2d 237.

Adoption as affecting right of inheritance through or from natural parent or other natural kin, 37 A.L.R.2d 333.

Right of adopted child to inherit from kindred of adoptive parent, 43 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Applicability of res judicata to decrees or judgments in adoption proceedings, 52 A.L.R.2d 406.

What law, in point of time, governs inheritance from or through adopted person, 52 A.L.R.2d 1228.

Change of child's name in adoption proceeding, 53 A.L.R.2d 927.

Conflict of laws as to adoption as affecting descent and distribution of decedent's estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Right of adopted child to inherit from intestate natural grandparent, 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child, 74 A.L.R.3d 421.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency, 74 A.L.R.3d 489.

What constitutes "duress" in obtaining parent's consent to adoption of child or surrender of child to adoption agency, 74 A.L.R.3d 527.

Validity, construction, and application of statute imposing upon stepparent obligation to support child, 75 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Adoption as precluding testamentary gift under natural relative's will, 71 A.L.R.4th 374.

Liability of public or private agency or its employees to prospective adoptive parents in contract or tort for failure to complete arrangement for adoption, 8 A.L.R.5th 860.

Adopted child as within class named in testamentary gift, 36 A.L.R.5th 395.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument, 37 A.L.R.5th 237.

Modern status of law as to equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel, 122 A.L.R.5th 205.