2020 Georgia Code
Title 19 - Domestic Relations
Chapter 7 - Parent and Child Relationship Generally
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 19-7-3. Actions by Grandparents or Other Family Members for Visitation Rights or Intervention; Revocation or Amendment of Visitation Rights; Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem; Mediation; Hearing; Notification to Family Members of Child's Participation in Events

1. As used in this Code section, the term:
   1. "Family member" means a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling.
   2. "Grandparent" means the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of a minor child's parent who has died, and the parent of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
   3. "Great-grandparent" means the parent of the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of the parent of a minor child's parent who has died, and the parent of the parent of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
   4. "Sibling" means the brother or sister of a parent of a minor child, the brother or sister of a minor child's parent who has died, and the brother or sister of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
2. 1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection:
      1. Any grandparent shall have the right to file an original action for visitation rights to a minor child; and
      2. Any family member shall have the right to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights in any action in which any court in this state shall have before it any question concerning the custody of a minor child, a divorce of the parents or a parent of such minor child, a termination of the parental rights of either parent of such minor child, or visitation rights concerning such minor child or whenever there has been an adoption in which the adopted child has been adopted by the child's blood relative or by a stepparent, notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 19-8-19.
   2. This subsection shall not authorize an original action when the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both parents.
3. 1. Upon the filing of an original action or upon intervention in an existing proceeding under subsection (b) of this Code section, the court may grant any family member of the child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation. The mere absence of an opportunity for a child to develop a relationship with a family member shall not be considered as harming the health or welfare of the child when there is no substantial preexisting relationship between the child and such family member. In considering whether the health or welfare of the child would be harmed without such visitation, the court shall consider and may find that harm to the child is reasonably likely to result when, prior to the original action or intervention:
      1. The minor child resided with the family member for six months or more;
      2. The family member provided financial support for the basic needs of the child for at least one year;
      3. There was an established pattern of regular visitation or child care by the family member with the child; or
      4. Any other circumstance exists indicating that emotional or physical harm would be reasonably likely to result if such visitation is not granted.

         The court shall make specific written findings of fact in support of its rulings.

   2. An original action requesting visitation rights shall not be filed by any grandparent more than once during any two-year period and shall not be filed during any year in which another custody action has been filed concerning the child. After visitation rights have been granted to any grandparent, the legal custodian, guardian of the person, or parent of the child may petition the court for revocation or amendment of such visitation rights, for good cause shown, which the court, in its discretion, may grant or deny; but such a petition shall not be filed more than once in any two-year period.
   3. While a parent's decision regarding family member visitation shall be given deference by the court, the parent's decision shall not be conclusive when failure to provide family member contact would result in emotional harm to the child. A court may presume that a child who is denied any contact with his or her family member or who is not provided some minimal opportunity for contact with his or her family member when there is a preexisting relationship between the child and such family member may suffer emotional injury that is harmful to such child's health. Such presumption shall be a rebuttable presumption.
   4. In no case shall the granting of visitation rights to a family member interfere with a child's school or regularly scheduled extracurricular activities.
   5. Visitation time awarded to a family member shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period; provided, however, that when more than one individual seeks visitation under this Code section, the court shall determine the amount of time to award to each petitioner which shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period in the aggregate.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section, if one of the parents of a minor child dies, is incapacitated, or is incarcerated, the court may award the parent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent of such minor child reasonable visitation to such child during his or her minority if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation would be in the best interests of the child. The custodial parent's judgment as to the best interests of the child regarding visitation shall be given deference by the court but shall not be conclusive.
5. If the court finds that the family member can bear the cost without unreasonable financial hardship, the court, at the sole expense of the petitioning family member, may:
   1. Appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor child; and
   2. Assign the issue of visitation rights of a family member for mediation.
6. In the event that the court does not order mediation or upon failure of the parties to reach an agreement through mediation, the court shall fix a time for the hearing of the issue of visitation rights of the family member.
7. Whether or not visitation is awarded to a family member, the court may direct a custodial parent, by court order, to notify such family member of every performance of the minor child to which the public is admitted, including, but not limited to, musical concerts, graduations, recitals, and sporting events or games.
8. When more than one family member files an action pursuant to this Code section, the court shall determine the priority of such actions.

(Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 936, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1318, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 10, § 19; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1516, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 864, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 4; Ga. L. 1993, p. 456, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1089, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 860, § 1/HB 1198; Ga. L. 2016, p. 87, § 1/HB 229.)

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote this Code section.

- Ga. L. 1996, p. 1089, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The trial court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a respondent in an action filed pursuant to this Act upon the finding that the petition is brought for the purpose of harassment or any other improper purpose."

- For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For article citing developments in Georgia juvenile court practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 167 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For annual survey of law of domestic relations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (1986). For annual survey article discussing developments in domestic relations law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (1999). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 133 (2006). For survey article on domestic relations law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2008). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2012). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 320 (2012). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 107 (2016). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2017). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2018). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2019). For note on permissive intervention of grandparents in divorce proceedings, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 787 (1992). For review of 1996 domestic relations legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 148 (1996). For comment on "Grandparents' Visitation Rights in Georgia," see 29 Emory L.J. 1083 (1980). For comment on Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (1995), appearing below, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 779 (1995).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application

General Consideration

Unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 is unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because the statute does not clearly promote the health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference is authorized. Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (1995).

Order granting a grandparent visitation rights to the child of the grandparent's deceased son under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d) was reversed because the statute was unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution as violating the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children since the statute did not require clear and convincing evidence of imminent harm to the child. Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 816 S.E.2d 633 (2018).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3, which provides visitation rights for grandparents in certain situations, is not an exception to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-14, which operates to terminate all legal relationships between an adopted person and that person's relatives, when both the natural mother and father have released the child for adoption. Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163 (1984).

"Grandparents' Bill of Rights" is not an exception to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-14. The only provision which grants grandparents visitation rights after an adoption is the limited one of the death of one parent, the remarriage of the surviving parent, followed by the adoption of the child by the stepparent. In other adoptions, the severance of relationships provision of § 19-8-14 controls, and no rights of visitation by former grandparents exist. Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga. App. 899, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987).

- Limiting language of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child, includes adoptive parents because in the absence of language limiting the term "parent" to only "natural parents" or "biological parents," there is no legislative intent to withhold from adoptive parents the same constitutionally protected status enjoyed by biological parents to raise their children without state interference, and in construing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), the definition of parent in the adoption statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6) and (8), which gives full legal status to adoptive parents, cannot be ignored; grandparents may have a sincere, beneficent interest in participating in their grandchildren's lives, and this interest often coincides with the best interest of the child, but beyond constitutional considerations, policy decisions addressing disputes between grandparents and parents are the province of the legislature. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(3) has been enacted to provide a mechanism for courts to grant a grandparent visitation rights with their minor grandchild, when a child's parent objects and, in that regard, the statute codified a standard for the trial courts to utilize in balancing the wishes of an alienated grandparent, the rights of the parents, and the interests of the child. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

- An adoption is not the equivalent to a proceeding to terminate parental rights within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

- Because O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19 provides for the termination of all legal relationships between an adopted child and his or her relatives, under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), grandparents' rights are not affected by an adoption by a stepparent. Lightfoot v. Hollins, 308 Ga. App. 538, 707 S.E.2d 491 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- Child custody action originated by a grandmother who sought visitation rights through an amendment to the custody petition was an "original action for visitation rights" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b). Sewell v. Bill Johnson Motors, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 853, 446 S.E.2d 239 (1994).

- General Assembly, by the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), has sought to limit the number of original actions for visitation which grandparents may file. Anderson v. Sanford, 198 Ga. App. 410, 401 S.E.2d 604 (1991).

- Any right of grandparents to visitation with their grandchildren is based on Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3). Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406 (1979).

Grandparents have no right to visitation, but only a right to request privilege of visitation. Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

- Statute allows court having before it a custody question to grant visitation to child's grandparents. However, any such grant is purely discretionary, and may be exercised only when the court is considering custody matters and finds that conditions are such that it is appropriate to allow this privilege to the grandparents. Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 allows trial court discretion to grant or deny visitation rights to grandparents. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982); Welch v. Suggs, 175 Ga. App. 233, 333 S.E.2d 31 (1985).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying visitation rights to grandparent since the court found that to grant visitation privileges would disturb present stability of the child and would probably result in severe emotional trauma. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982).

Trial court may grant any grandparent reasonable visitation rights if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

- Becuase it was unclear whether the trial court exercised the court's discretion to find clear and convincing harm if the grandparents were not awarded visitation, or whether the court mistakenly believed the court was required to find clear and convincing evidence of harm if the statutory factors were met, the order granting the grandparents visitation had to be vacated. Elmore v. Clay, 348 Ga. App. 625, 824 S.E.2d 84 (2019).

- Georgia law expressly provides that while a parent's decision shall be given deference by the court, the parent's decision shall not be conclusive when failure to provide the grandparent contact would result in emotional harm to the child. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

- It is only when custody questions are in issue that statute may be invoked. Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406 (1979).

Court may consider grant of visitation rights to grandparents only in cases when the court has before it a question concerning custody. Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431 (1979).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 only authorizes grandparents to intervene to obtain visitation rights in the proceedings specified in the section. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

- Trial court correctly dismissed a grandmother's claim for grandparent visitation for lack of jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(2) and awarded attorneys' fees against her under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) because her action was filed during the same year as the parents' divorce action in which custody was determined, which was prohibited by statute. Gnam v. Livingston, 353 Ga. App. 701, 839 S.E.2d 200 (2020).

- Dismissal of the grandparents' action on the ground that the grandparents lacked standing for failing to comply with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) was error because the grandparents were the parents of the deceased parent of the minor child at issue and fell within the ambit of § 19-7-3(d), and the trial court erred by interpreting that § 19-7-3(d) applied only when one parent was dead, resulting in a single parent situation only, as a result of the father being remarried. Fielder v. Johnson, 333 Ga. App. 658, 773 S.E.2d 831 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1893, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 1 (Ga. 2016).

- Trial court's conclusory statement to the effect that the granddaughter's visitation with the maternal grandparents was in the granddaughter's best interests failed to set forth specific findings of fact supporting the trial court's grant of grandparent visitation; those findings enable a reviewing court to conduct an intelligent review of the merits of the visitation case, and absent those findings the case had to be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for adequate findings. Rainey v. Lange, 261 Ga. App. 491, 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003).

Trial court erred in failing to rule upon a maternal grandfather's request for visitation with a mother's child because the trial court was required to apply O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c) and determine whether the grandfather had presented clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless visitation was granted and whether the child's best interests would be served by allowing such visitation. Sheppard v. McCraney, 317 Ga. App. 91, 730 S.E.2d 721 (2012).

Trial court erred in failing to show that the court applied the proper evidentiary standard and in failing to include written findings of fact to support the court's broad, conclusory ruling as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1); the trial court stated only that the court had considered the entire record before concluding that the grandmother had shown, pursuant to § 19-7-3, that the health and welfare of the minor child would be harmed unless visitation was provided for the child with the grandmother. Van Leuvan v. Carlisle, 322 Ga. App. 576, 745 S.E.2d 814 (2013).

- Custody question arises when grandparents seek modification of habeas corpus order denying the grandparents custody. George v. Sizemore, 238 Ga. 525, 233 S.E.2d 779 (1977).

- Mother argued that the grandparents were not authorized to seek, and the trial court was not authorized to grant, a change of the grandparent visitation provided in the original consent order, but O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 did not limit the grandparents' ability to counterclaim for a modification of visitation in response to an action by the mother in which the mother requested that the grandparents' visitation rights be revisited, reviewed, and modified on a temporary and permanent basis and that their visitation for summer 2016 be suspended pending further investigation of the court; thus, the grandparents had the authority to seek, and the trial court had the authority to grant, a temporary modification of the grandparents' visitation rights. Pate v. Sadlock, 345 Ga. App. 591, 814 S.E.2d 760 (2018).

- Although the definition of "grandparents" found in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(a) is limited to that Code section, outlining visitation rights for grandparents, the statute sheds light upon a grandparent's status as that of the parent of a parent; the paternal grandparents' right to bring an action for custody of a child was controlled by a showing that their son was the parent of the child, not by their son legitimating that child, and a trial court's order dismissing the paternal grandparents' custody action for lack of standing due to a void legitimation of the child was reversed. Reeves v. Hayes, 266 Ga. App. 297, 596 S.E.2d 668 (2004).

- Because a parent's only objection to the grandparents' visitation raised at the hearing was the parent's concern for advance notice by the grandparents before scheduling a visit, the parent failed to preserve any objection that the grandparents had failed to intervene in the action as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(b). Grove v. Grove, 296 Ga. 435, 768 S.E.2d 453 (2015).

Legislature's intent in enacting 1980 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 was to give grandparents standing to seek visitation in a situation in which their own child had lost his or her parental rights through death or termination. Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981).

Law as amended in 1980 applies retroactively, and reviewing court should apply law as the law exists at time of the court's judgment rather than law prevailing at rendition of judgment under review. Houston v. Houston, 156 Ga. App. 47, 274 S.E.2d 91 (1980).

Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 granting visitation rights to grandparents are retroactive. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982).

- Because no one may acquire a vested interest in custody of a minor child, no vested rights are affected by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 and, therefore, the statute's retroactive application is not unconstitutional. Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981).

Application of the 1976 law (Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1) in modification of the 1975 child custody award was not impermissible as a retroactive application of the 1976 statute. George v. Sizemore, 238 Ga. 525, 233 S.E.2d 779 (1977).

- In ruling on the grandfather's request for visitation, the trial court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the evidence, necessitating remand. Ballweg v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 336 Ga. App. 372, 785 S.E.2d 47 (2016).

- Although the juvenile court technically denied the grandmother's motion to intervene seeking custody of and visitation with the child, the juvenile court held a hearing in which the grandmother was allowed to present evidence in support of the grandmother's request for visitation and custody, and the court fully considered the merits of the grandmother's claims before denying the grandmother's motion to intervene. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

- Because the trial court denied the grandmother's petition for custody and visitation, the denial of the grandmother's motion was directly appealable. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Cited in Dyer v. Allen, 238 Ga. 516, 233 S.E.2d 772 (1977); Rhodes v. Peacock, 142 Ga. App. 328, 235 S.E.2d 762 (1977); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 194 Ga. App. 147, 390 S.E.2d 247 (1990); Motes v. Love, 202 Ga. App. 749, 415 S.E.2d 334 (1992); Bergmann v. McCullough, 218 Ga. App. 353, 461 S.E.2d 544 (1995); Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809 (2011); Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 308 Ga. 714, 843 S.E.2d 582 (2020).

Application

Child in temporary custody of paternal grandmother.

- When a child was in the temporary custody of the child's paternal grandmother, the trial court erred in applying O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 to the petition of the maternal grandmother for unsupervised visitation with her grandchild. Perrin v. Stansell, 243 Ga. App. 475, 533 S.E.2d 458 (2000).

In order to gain visitation rights with a grandchild who is in the temporary custody of a third party, i.e., another grandparent or a stranger, it is not necessary for the petitioning grandparent to prove that the child would be harmed without visitation; instead, the petitioner must demonstrate by a simple preponderance of the evidence that visitation is in the best interest of the child. Perrin v. Stansell, 243 Ga. App. 475, 533 S.E.2d 458 (2000).

- Grandparents' intervention in a proceeding to determine deprivation did not bar their subsequent petition for visitation rights since there had been no previous adjudication of their right to visitation, nor had the grandparents brought any other action seeking visitation with their grandchildren. Anderson v. Sanford, 198 Ga. App. 410, 401 S.E.2d 604 (1991).

- Adoption proceeding in which all paternal rights are sought to be severed is not such a proceeding concerning custody or guardianship as will support an intervening petition by paternal grandparents for visitation privileges. Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431 (1979).

Superior court erred in permitting the paternal grandparents of a minor child to intervene in the third party's petition to adopt the child because O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 only authorized the grandparents to intervene to obtain visitation rights, and the statute did not authorize intervention by the grandparents to object to the adoption and to obtain custody themselves. McDowell v. Bowers, 342 Ga. App. 811, 805 S.E.2d 136 (2017).

- When grandparents have not intervened in the proceedings, the grandparents are not parties to the action, nor are the grandparents otherwise before the trial court, and the grandparents are not entitled to be granted relief. Smith v. Smith, 174 Ga. App. 903, 332 S.E.2d 41 (1985).

Grandparents were not statutorily authorized to intervene in adoption proceedings brought by a married couple who were not blood relatives of the child since the child's parents were living, and the grandparents did not intervene to seek visitation rights, but instead intervened to object to the adoption and to seek to adopt the child themselves. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

Grandmother who was temporary legal custodian of child under juvenile court deprivation order did not have standing to intervene in adoption proceedings. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992).

Trial court erred in denying a motion filed by a child's mother and stepfather to dismiss a paternal grandparents' petition for visitation with the child because the petition was not authorized, and the trial court erred by interpreting the word "parent" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) to include only biological parents; the child's father surrendered his parental rights, the stepfather adopted the child, and the mother and stepfather lived with the child. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- Paternal grandparents were not entitled to visitation rights after the child's natural father's parental rights had been terminated and the child had been adopted by his stepfather, who was not a "blood relative". Campbell v. Holcomb, 193 Ga. App. 474, 388 S.E.2d 65 (1989); Echols v. Smith, 207 Ga. App. 317, 427 S.E.2d 820 (1993).

Term "parents" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) did not exclude a child's adoptive parent; therefore, because a child was living with the child's mother and adoptive father, who were not separated, the child's natural grandparents had no right to file an original action for visitation with the child under the statute. Upon their son's termination of his parental rights to the child, the grandparents became strangers to the child, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19. Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

- There was no error in the trial court's conclusion that the court was authorized to find that giving the grandmother's visitation priority over non-school related activities was in the child's best interest. Reid v. Lindsey, 348 Ga. App. 425, 823 S.E.2d 359 (2019).

- Trial court was specifically authorized to award grandparent visitation into a stepparent adoption decree pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1); although, generally, the adoption of the child would have extinguished any visitation rights of the child's former grandparents under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(1). Evans v. Sangster, 330 Ga. App. 533, 768 S.E.2d 278 (2015).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 does not require finding that parent is unfit, but simply that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless grandparent visitation is granted. Rogers v. Barnett, 237 Ga. App. 301, 514 S.E.2d 443 (1999).

- Grandmother's request for custody and visitation was properly denied because the Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) took the child into custody while the child was living with the grandmother and mother, and there was some evidence that the mother continued to live with the grandmother despite their protestations otherwise; the conditions precipitating the DFCS's involvement remained as the mother had not made any progress with the DFCS case plan and continued to use drugs; and the grandmother knew that the mother was not allowed to have unsupervised visitation with the child, but the grandmother ignored that restriction and allowed the mother to have such visitation while the child was in the grandmother's care. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

- In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the child would experience actual physical, mental, or emotional harm if visitation was denied, the trial court's order granting visitation rights to the grandparents was not justified. Hunter v. Carter, 226 Ga. App. 251, 485 S.E.2d 827 (1997).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in relying on the testimony of the grandparents and the father to make the court's judgment denying the grandparents' request for visitation rights with their granddaughter or in choosing not to appoint a guardian ad litem because, while the grandparents claimed that the trial court failed to consider their granddaughter's best interests, the trial court heard testimony on that subject from them as well as from the father; both the grant of visitation rights to a grandparent under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), and the appointment of a guardian ad litem under § 19-7-3 (d) are purely within the discretion of the trial court. Srader v. Midkiff, 303 Ga. App. 514, 693 S.E.2d 856 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the grandparents' request for visitation rights with their granddaughter because the trial court held a hearing on the issue of grandparent visitation and determined that the grandparents failed to show that the health or welfare of the granddaughter would be harmed unless such visitation was granted and that the best interests of the granddaughter would be served by such visitation; the trial court did not err in failing to assign the issue to mediation because under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d)(2), assignment of grandparent visitation cases to mediation was within the discretion of the trial court. Srader v. Midkiff, 303 Ga. App. 514, 693 S.E.2d 856 (2010).

- Because the mother and the father objected to court-mandated visitation with the grandparents and there was no showing that a failure to grant visitation to the grandparents would be harmful to the children, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), the trial court erred in awarding visitation to the grandparents. Ormond v. Ormond, 274 Ga. App. 869, 619 S.E.2d 370 (2005).

- Trial court's grandparent visitation award contained a finding that the children would have suffered emotional harm unless grandparent visitation was granted, and that such visitation was in the best interests of the children; thus, visitation was granted on the grounds authorized by the Grandparent Visitation Statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga. App. 607, 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006).

Juvenile court erred by terminating a grandparent's visitation rights previously granted by relying on the child's out-of-court statements and by failing to recite what standard the court was using to modify the previous visitation awarded to the grandparent. In re K. I. S., 294 Ga. App. 295, 669 S.E.2d 207 (2008).

Trial court did not err by granting the maternal grandmother visitation rights over the child because the mother's decision against it was not conclusive and the court considered all of the circumstances, including the grandmother's fear of the mother's new husband, whom had been aggressive and combative toward the grandmother in the past. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

- Since visitation privileges are, of course, part of custody, grandparents seeking appellate review of an unfavorable ruling regarding visitation privileges are, like parents, required to follow the procedure necessary to secure a discretionary appeal. Tuttle v. Stauffer, 177 Ga. App. 112, 338 S.E.2d 544 (1985).

- When the trial court denied a couple's petition to adopt a child and to terminate the parental rights of the child's legal father, the trial court did not err in also finding that it was in the child's best interest to continue the child's relationship with a paternal grandmother; the couple offered no evidence that it was not in the child's best interest to continue such visitation, and the trial court found that the paternal grandmother exercised regular visitation with the child and that it was in the child's best interests for all of the grandparents to cooperate in providing for the child. Thaggard v. Willard, 285 Ga. App. 384, 646 S.E.2d 479 (2007).

Portion of the judgment finding a father in willful contempt of a previous contempt order and ordering that the father be incarcerated until the contempt was purged by giving the paternal grandfather 40 consecutive days of visitation was affirmed because the record supported the trial judge's determination that the father had willfully disobeyed the order and withheld the child from visitation. Roberts v. Roberts, 347 Ga. App. 360, 819 S.E.2d 521 (2018).

- Trial court did not err in denying a father's motion for summary judgment in maternal grandparents' action seeking visitation with his child pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) because the trial court had the discretion to choose to allow the case to go forward under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f) in order for the guardian ad litem to investigate the facts since the lack of a relationship between the grandparents and the child could or could not be the fault of the grandparents when there was some evidence that the father had thwarted attempts at visitation in the early years following the mother's death; although the grandparents' affidavits in opposition to the father's motion for summary judgment contained information about the child's best interests, the grandparents did not provide any direct evidence of harm that the child would suffer as a result of not having visitation with the grandparents, but instead, the grandparents relied on § 9-11-56(f) and the trial court's appointment of a guardian ad litem under § 19-7-3(d)(1) to argue that the facts needed to be further developed and that a decision on summary judgment was premature. Lightfoot v. Hollins, 308 Ga. App. 538, 707 S.E.2d 491 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Mother was a proper party to a maternal grandfather's action seeking visitation with the mother's child, and the mother's objection to the grandfather's request for visitation was pertinent to the claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 because the award of temporary guardianship and custody of the child to the paternal grandparents did not terminate the mother's rights or confer permanent guardianship or custody. Sheppard v. McCraney, 317 Ga. App. 91, 730 S.E.2d 721 (2012).

- Trial court erred in granting a father's sister visitation because the sister was neither a grandparent seeking visitation nor a family member seeking custody but was a non-party to the mother's action seeking child support and the father's counterclaim for legitimation. Morris v. Morris, 309 Ga. App. 387, 710 S.E.2d 601 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 353 (Ga. 2020).

- Contrary to the father's contention, the trial court made specific findings of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence that the child's health and welfare would be harmed unless visitation was granted and the visitation was in the child's best interest, including that the child had lived with the grandparents for ten years and they had provided financial support for the child, and the grandmother and child had a strong emotional bond between them. Reid v. Lindsey, 348 Ga. App. 425, 823 S.E.2d 359 (2019).

- Order denying the paternal grandparents' visitation was vacated when the grandparents' son was incarcerated, the trial court should have applied the best interests standard set out in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d) instead of the less favorable harmed unless such visitation is granted standard set out in subsection (c). Vincent v. Vincent, 333 Ga. App. 902, 777 S.E.2d 729 (2015).

- Trial court erred in dismissing a paternal grandmother's petition for visitation with three minor grandchildren who had been adopted by their stepfather because the trial court was required to determine if the parents were separated and whether the child was living with both of the parents. If the parents were separated and the child was not living with both of the parents, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 would authorize the grandmother to seek visitation. Hudgins v. Harding, 313 Ga. App. 613, 722 S.E.2d 355 (2012).

To resolve the issue of visitation, a trial court is required to apply O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c) in the court's determination of whether a grandparent has presented clear and convincing evidence that the child's health or welfare would be harmed unless visitation was granted, and whether such visitation was in the child's best interests with the inclusion of specific written findings of fact supported by clear and convincing record evidence being mandatory to justify a grant of visitation. Therefore, the trial court erred by awarding a biological grandmother visitation when the court failed to make the specific findings of fact. Esasky v. Ford, 321 Ga. App. 891, 743 S.E.2d 550 (2013).

- In a grandparent visitation matter, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in connection with the court's denial of the grandmother's request to appear by telephone, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-50(b), because the trial court properly determined that the grandmother was not indigent based on the information provided that the grandmother's monthly income was $4,669. Devlin v. Devlin, 339 Ga. App. 520, 791 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

- After entering judgment for the defendant in an action for grandparent's visitation, the trial court abused the court's discretion in deciding the defendant's motion for attorney fees without properly reviewing her claim that the grandparents harassed her or unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct. McKeen v. McKeen, 224 Ga. App. 410, 481 S.E.2d 236 (1997).

- Trial court erred in ordering the father to pay 50% of the guardian ad litem fees because the guardian ad litem was at the grandmother's sole expense. Reid v. Lindsey, 348 Ga. App. 425, 823 S.E.2d 359 (2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 13.

Grandparent Visitation and Custody Awards, 69 POF3d 281.

- 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 52 et seq., 357, 358.

- Award of custody of child where contest is between child's father and grandparent, 25 A.L.R.3d 7.

Award of custody of child where contest is between child's parents and grandparents, 31 A.L.R.3d 1187.

Grandparents' visitation rights, 90 A.L.R.3d 222.

Visitation rights of persons other than natural parents or grandparents, 1 A.L.R.4th 1270.

Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.

Attorneys' fee awards in parent-nonparent child custody cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 212.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified, 69 A.L.R.5th 1.

Grandparent's visitation rights where child's parents are living, 71 A.L.R.5th 99.

Validity of grandparent visitation statutes, 86 A.L.R.6th 1.