2020 Georgia Code
Title 19 - Domestic Relations
Chapter 6 - Alimony and Child Support
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 19-6-19. Revision of Judgment for Permanent Alimony Generally - Petition and Hearing; Cohabitation With Third Party as Ground for Revision; Attorney's Fees; Temporary Modification

1. The judgment of a court providing permanent alimony for the support of a spouse rendered on or after July 1, 1977, shall be subject to revision upon petition filed by either former spouse showing a change in the income and financial status of either former spouse. A petition shall be filed and returnable under the same rules of procedure applicable to divorce proceedings. No petition may be filed by either former spouse under this subsection within a period of two years from the date of the final order on a previous petition by the same former spouse. After hearing both parties and the evidence, the jury, or the judge where a jury is not demanded by either party, may modify and revise the previous judgment, in accordance with the changed income and financial status of either former spouse in the case of permanent alimony for the support of a former spouse, or in accordance with the changed income and financial status of either former spouse if such a change in the income and financial status is satisfactorily proved so as to warrant the modification and revision. In the hearing upon a petition filed as provided in this subsection, testimony may be given and evidence introduced relative to the income and financial status of either former spouse.
2. Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation of such former spouse with a third party in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payments of permanent alimony for the support of the former spouse. As used in this subsection, the word "cohabitation" means dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with another person, regardless of the sex of the other person. In the event the petitioner does not prevail in the petition for modification on the ground set forth in this subsection, the petitioner shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the respondent for the defense of the action.
3. When an action for revision of a judgment for permanent alimony under this Code section is pending, the court in its discretion may allow, upon motion, the temporary modification of such a judgment, pending the final trial on the petition. In considering an application for temporary modification under this subsection, the court shall consider evidence of any changed circumstances of the parties and the reasonable probability of the petitioner obtaining revision upon final trial. The order granting temporary modification shall be subject to revision by the court at any time before final trial.
4. In proceedings for the modification of alimony for the support of a spouse pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may award attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses of litigation to the prevailing party as the interests of justice may require.

(Ga. L. 1955, p. 630, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 713, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 23; Ga. L. 1984, p. 606, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 279, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1259, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1091, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 224, § 6/HB 221; Ga. L. 2006, p. 583, § 8/SB 382.)

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, "judgement" was changed to "judgment" in the first sentence of subsection (b).

- Ga. L. 1984, p. 606, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the provisions of § 1 of that Act, which section amended subsection (a) of this Code section, would apply to judgments providing permanent alimony for the support of a spouse rendered on or after July 1, 1984, and to judgments providing permanent alimony for the support of a child or children rendered on or after July 1, 1984.

Ga. L. 1986, p. 1259, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provided: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 1986. The provisions of this Act shall apply to judgments providing permanent alimony for the support of a child or children rendered on or after July 1, 1986."

Ga. L. 1993, p. 1091, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 1993 amendment was applicable with respect to judgments entered before or after July 1, 1993.

Ga. L. 2005, p. 224, § 1/HB 221, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds and declares that it is important to assess periodically child support guidelines and determine whether existing guidelines continue to be viable and effective or whether they have failed or ceased to accomplish their original policy objectives. The General Assembly further finds that supporting Georgia's children is vitally important to the citizens of Georgia. Therefore, the General Assembly has determined that it is in the best interests of the state and its citizenry to undertake an evaluation of the child support guidelines on a continuing basis. The General Assembly declares that it is important that all of Georgia's children are provided with adequate financial support whether the children's parents are living together or not living together. The General Assembly finds that both parents have a continuing obligation with respect to providing financial and emotional stability for their child or children. It is the hope of the members of the General Assembly that all parents work together to advance the best interest of their children."

Ga. L. 2006, p. 583, § 10(b)/SB 382, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "Sections 1 through 7 of this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2007, and shall apply to all pending civil actions on or after January 1, 2007."

- For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of domestic relations from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (1980). For article, "An Analysis of the Georgia 'Live-In Lover' Law," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 375 (1980). For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For article discussing the law on alimony modification, see 19 Ga. St. B.J. 130 (1983). For article, "The Modification of Judgments for Spousal Alimony and for Child Support Alimony: Criticism and Suggested Reform," see 22 Ga. St. B.J. 76 (1985). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 159 (1989). For annual survey article discussing developments in domestic relations law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (1999). For survey article on domestic relations cases for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 223 (2003). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004). For article on 2005 amendment of this Code section, see 22 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 73 (2005). For annual survey of law on appellate practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 25 (2010). For article, "Live-In Lover Complaints: Think Twice Before You File," see 19 Ga. St. B.J. 11 (Oct. 2013). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2018). For note, "The Significance of Stokes v. Stokes: An Examination of Property Rights Upon Divorce in Georgia," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 695 (1982). For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 118 (1993). For comment, "Antenuptial Agreements and Divorce in Georgia: Scherer v. Scherer," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 231 (1982). For comment on adoptions by homosexuals, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1415 (2004).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Effect of 1977 Amendment to Section
• Waiver of Right to Modification
• Two-year Petition Limitation
• Changes Warranting Modification
• Live-in Lover Provision
• Application
• Attorney's Fees

Law fosters legitimate government objective of encouraging stability of marriage and family. Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

- For additional cases dealing with the same subject matter, but decided prior to the 1977 amendment to this Code section, see § 19-6-18.

Alimony is subject to modification. Taulbee v. Taulbee, 243 Ga. 52, 252 S.E.2d 481 (1979).

- Modification statute is not law under which grant of alimony is made to a wife nor is it law which fails to provide opportunity for a husband to sue for alimony. The modification statute is merely a remedial act which allows either the former wife or former husband to seek relief from the terms of the previous alimony judgment according to the ability of provider of alimony to pay. Summerlin v. Summerlin, 247 Ga. 5, 274 S.E.2d 523 (1981).

Statute provided exclusive method for modifying or revising alimony provisions of divorce decree. Lindwall v. Lindwall, 242 Ga. 13, 247 S.E.2d 752 (1978); Fuller v. Squires, 242 Ga. 475, 249 S.E.2d 261 (1978).

Modification of a child support obligation in a garnishment action, rather than a petition to modify, was erroneous. Twineham v. Daniel, 223 Ga. App. 25, 476 S.E.2d 814 (1996).

- When the divorce decree does, at the very least, address a question concerning the liability of the noncustodial parent for child-support-obligation items, a modification action under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 is the custodial parent's exclusive remedy in regard to supplementing the decree with a provision obligating the noncustodial parent to pay additional child support. Conley v. Conley, 259 Ga. 68, 377 S.E.2d 663 (1989).

Former wife, or the wife's father as assignee, could not enforce a note signed by the former husband that allegedly represented the husband's additional child support obligation since the note had not been mentioned or incorporated into the parties' settlement agreement or divorce decree, and the wife had not sought recourse by way of modification of the husband's child support obligation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Cawley v. Bennett, 293 Ga. App. 46, 666 S.E.2d 438 (2008).

- Trial court erred by determining that the enactment of the guidelines of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b) alone was sufficient to justify modifying a father's support obligation without any threshold showing by the mother of a substantial change in financial circumstances. Willingham v. Willingham, 216 Ga. 674, 410 S.E.2d 98 (1991).

Proper scope of the trial court's consideration is whether there had been, as alleged by the appellant, such a change in the financial status of each parent as would support a reconsideration of the level of the appellant's obligation to provide financial support for the parties' child. Miller v. Tashie, 265 Ga. 147, 454 S.E.2d 498 (1995).

Construction with § 19-11-12. - Fact that jury trials are allowed in private child support modification proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19, but denied in agency modification proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12, does not create a separate classification for litigants in proceedings under the latter provision in violation of equal protection rights. Kelley v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources ex rel. Kelley, 269 Ga. 384, 498 S.E.2d 741 (1998).

O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34 and subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 compared. See Hudson v. State, 248 Ga. 397, 283 S.E.2d 271 (1981).

- Change in father's income or financial status does not mandate revision in child support; statute merely permits such revision. Ivester v. Ivester, 242 Ga. 386, 249 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

- Failure of the father to comply with terms of the divorce decree requiring him to provide health insurance for the children did not act as a bar to his petition for modification of child support. Scott v. Perkins, 230 Ga. App. 496, 497 S.E.2d 21 (1998).

- Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 are not intended to and do not provide any limitation on the filing of subsequent Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., actions. Department of Human Resources v. Westmoreland, 210 Ga. App. 603, 436 S.E.2d 706 (1993).

- Purpose of O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19 (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) is to improve enforcement of duty of support, not to impair that duty; if an intrastate support obligor wants modification of child support provisions of a divorce and alimony decree, the obligor can bring a suit for modification, but the obligor is not entitled to precipitate a URESA action in order to obtain modification. Ray v. Ray, 247 Ga. 467, 277 S.E.2d 495 (1981).

- Any order of support issued by court of this state, entered in action filed under O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19 (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act), shall not supersede any previous order of support issued in a divorce or separate maintenance action, and the latter order will not constitute a modification of the former order; thus, amounts for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under both. Ray v. Ray, 247 Ga. 467, 277 S.E.2d 495 (1981).

- Trial court has no authority to modify the child support provisions of a final judgment and divorce decree in a garnishment action; such a modification must be accomplished by the filing of a petition in superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-18 or O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. In addition, the court lacks equity jurisdiction in garnishment cases, even under unusual and exceptional circumstances. Davis v. Davis, 220 Ga. App. 745, 470 S.E.2d 268 (1996).

- Final decision of whether to modify award is within discretion of trier of fact. Marsh v. Marsh, 243 Ga. 742, 256 S.E.2d 442 (1979).

- Although wife's receipt of social security benefits might constitute grounds for husband's obtaining future modification of alimony provisions of the parties' divorce decree, either on a discretionary basis under the statute, or as a matter of right, until the parties' divorce decree is so modified the decree remains a valid judgment binding on parties and enforceable according to the decree's terms. Kight v. Kight, 242 Ga. 563, 250 S.E.2d 451 (1978).

- Even though evidence of former spouse's voluntary cohabitation with another subsequent to final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony is grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payments of permanent alimony, this does not preclude holding obligor in contempt for arrearages in alimony payments due, when previously decreed provisions have not been modified by separate proceeding instituted by petition for modification. Lindwall v. Lindwall, 242 Ga. 13, 247 S.E.2d 752 (1978).

- Action for modification of child support is not part of the original divorce action but is a new in personam proceeding for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over parties and venue. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 244 Ga. 313, 260 S.E.2d 47 (1979).

Modification proceedings must be brought in respondent's county of residence, and this is so regardless of the fact that the decree may be modified by the court other than the court which rendered the decree. Austin v. Austin, 245 Ga. 487, 265 S.E.2d 788 (1980).

Actions to modify alimony and divorce decrees must proceed in the county where the defendant currently resides. Buckholts v. Buckholts, 251 Ga. 58, 302 S.E.2d 676 (1983).

- Cases holding that judgment for child support may be modified only by raising or lowering amount of payments, and that while periodic payments for child support can be changed from a group award to a per capita award in a modification action, other terms and conditions of the original judgment cannot be changed, apply equally to spouse support as well as child support. Fender v. Fender, 249 Ga. 765, 294 S.E.2d 472 (1982).

- When the financial circumstances of the parties so warrant, it is not error in a modification action for the amount of alimony payments to be lowered to zero. Reduction of the amount of alimony payments to zero does not terminate the alimony award in that it does not preclude the possibility of future modification. Temples v. Temples, 262 Ga. 779, 425 S.E.2d 851 (1993).

- Child support award may be modified only prospectively, pursuant to a modification action under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Bankston v. Warbington, 332 Ga. App. 29, 771 S.E.2d 726 (2015).

Retroactive modification of an alimony obligation would vitiate the finality of the judgment obtained as to each past due installment. Therefore, a judgment modifying an alimony obligation can be effective no earlier than the date of the judgment. Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874, 412 S.E.2d 536 (1992).

Trial court may not retroactively modify an alimony obligation. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 262 Ga. 231, 416 S.E.2d 514 (1992).

Trial court could not order the mother to reimburse the father for child support for the month prior to the order because it would have effectively been a retroactive modification of the mother's child support obligation. Moore v. McKinney, 335 Ga. App. 855, 783 S.E.2d 373 (2016).

- In appeals filed by both former spouses from a trial court order modifying visitation and child support provisions in their final judgment and decree of divorce, neither party was correct in claiming that the petitions were inadequate to permit the relief granted; the petition of one of the spouses for a change in custody and a corresponding change in child support embraced the change in visitation because visitation rights were a part of custody, and that spouse's request for a modification of child support met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a). Facey v. Facey, 281 Ga. 367, 638 S.E.2d 273 (2006).

- Trial court did not err in dismissing a former spouse's motion for modification of alimony because the award was a lump sum settlement of property rights not subject to modification under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) or lump sum alimony not subject to modification under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-21. Rivera v. Rivera, 283 Ga. 547, 661 S.E.2d 541 (2008).

- Findings made by a trial court that a former spouse's income had decreased significantly since the entry of a final judgment and decree of divorce directing the former spouse to pay child support of 25 percent of the former spouse's gross income as a photographer were sufficient to constitute the required findings under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 and to support a downward modification. Facey v. Facey, 281 Ga. 367, 638 S.E.2d 273 (2006).

- Award of a home to the wife and the children until the youngest child turns 18 or the wife remarries constitutes an illegal future modification of child support not tied to income fluctuation. Scherberger v. Scherberger, 260 Ga. 635, 398 S.E.2d 363 (1990).

- Award of periodic alimony for a specified number of years may not be modified to extend beyond the termination date in the original judgment. Howard v. Howard, 262 Ga. 144, 414 S.E.2d 203 (1992).

Purpose of a modification action is to decide whether the existing alimony or child support comports with the current financial circumstances. To make this determination, the modification jury must find a present change in financial conditions. Because the verdict of the jury must rest upon this limited evidence, it cannot reach into speculative future circumstances. Therefore, any modification award which attempts to reach that far by changing the time frames established in the original decree cannot stand. Howard v. Howard, 262 Ga. 144, 414 S.E.2d 203 (1992).

- When alimony is awarded for the support of minor children, the mother acquires no interest in the funds, and when the funds are paid to her she is a mere trustee charged with the duty of seeing that they are applied solely for the benefit of the children. She cannot consent to a reduction or remission of the alimony, and ordinarily her conduct cannot relieve the father of paying the alimony as directed by the court. Law Office of Tony Center v. Baker, 185 Ga. App. 809, 366 S.E.2d 167 (1988).

- When the plaintiff brings suit for change of custody in county other than county of his residence, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court in which suit is filed for purpose of allowing the defendant to file a counterclaim for revision of child support. Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

- When divorced nonresident had voluntarily submitted himself to jurisdiction of court in order to assert his claims to modify visitation rights, mother is not required to state her claim requesting increase in child support in an independent and separate action. Houck v. Houck, 248 Ga. 419, 284 S.E.2d 12 (1981).

- Husband's obligation (labeled as alimony in the parties' settlement agreement) to make payment on indebtedness secured by an automobile was not subject to revision. Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. 519, 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985).

- Once the bankruptcy court concluded that alimony payments were "actually in the nature of alimony," and thereby nondischargeable, the court's task was at an end. There was no necessity for a precise investigation of the spouse's circumstances to determine the appropriate level of need or support. Harrell v. Sharp, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).

- It was error to permit a mother to testify in an action to modify child support payments as to the amount of money the father was paying her as alimony and child support pursuant to a temporary order, which payments were an increase over the amount of the order the mother was attempting to modify. Haselden v. Haselden, 255 Ga. 366, 338 S.E.2d 257 (1986).

§ 9-11-55 default provisions to modification of alimony. - Default provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 have no application to proceedings for modification of alimony. McElroy v. McElroy, 252 Ga. 553, 314 S.E.2d 893 (1984).

- Fact that a lump sum alimony award to a wife was non-modifiable did not negate the possibility that the award was for the wife's maintenance and support; even though a lump sum alimony award was in the "nature" of a property settlement since the evidence showed that the lump sum award was for the wife's maintenance and support, the finding that it was for that purpose, rather than a division of property which was dischargeable in bankruptcy, was affirmed. Daniel v. Daniel, 277 Ga. 871, 596 S.E.2d 608 (2004).

- When modification under the statutory procedure is available, court-approved modification must be sought; but, once property rights have become fixed or perfected those rights may not be modified by the court, and the parties are free to contract with each other regarding that property. Such dealings between former spouses are governed by contract law rather than domestic relations law. Spivey v. McClellan, 259 Ga. 181, 378 S.E.2d 123 (1989).

- While parties may enter into an agreement concerning modification of child support, the agreement becomes an enforceable agreement only when made an order of the court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100, 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995).

Before a private agreement which includes child support may be incorporated into a court order, the trial court has an obligation to consider whether the agreed-upon support is sufficient based on the child's needs and the parents' ability to pay. Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100, 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 is not authority for the modification or revision of judgments for equitable division of property. Douglas v. Cook, 266 Ga. 644, 469 S.E.2d 656 (1996).

Overpayment is not a basis for modification of child support. Rather, the focus must be on a change in circumstances. Gowins v. Gary, 288 Ga. App. 409, 654 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

Cited in Fetzer v. Fetzer, 240 Ga. 862, 242 S.E.2d 597 (1978); Lamb v. Lamb, 241 Ga. 545, 246 S.E.2d 665 (1978); McLean v. McLean, 242 Ga. 71, 247 S.E.2d 867 (1978); Moon v. Moon, 242 Ga. 406, 249 S.E.2d 91 (1978); Davidson v. Peck, 242 Ga. 198, 249 S.E.2d 557 (1978); LaMontagne v. Griffin, 242 Ga. 98, 249 S.E.2d 593 (1978); Browne v. Browne, 242 Ga. 107, 249 S.E.2d 594 (1978); Thumser v. Thumser, 242 Ga. 509, 249 S.E.2d 616 (1978); Sims v. Sims, 243 Ga. 275, 253 S.E.2d 762 (1979); Sims v. Sims, 243 Ga. 276, 253 S.E.2d 763 (1979); Ford v. Ford, 243 Ga. 763, 256 S.E.2d 446 (1979); Oliver v. Oliver, 244 Ga. 20, 257 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Tiller v. Tiller, 245 Ga. 27, 262 S.E.2d 819 (1980); Cale v. Cale, 245 Ga. 62, 264 S.E.2d 22 (1980); Lawrence v. Day, 247 Ga. 474, 277 S.E.2d 35 (1981); Norman v. Norman, 255 Ga. 32, 334 S.E.2d 687 (1985); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987); Newsom v. Newsom, 257 Ga. 238, 356 S.E.2d 883 (1987); Shelor v. Shelor, 259 Ga. 462, 383 S.E.2d 895 (1989); Giugliano v. Giugliano, 260 Ga. 467, 396 S.E.2d 897 (1990); Byrd v. Ault, 260 Ga. 893, 401 S.E.2d 690 (1991); Allen v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 262 Ga. 521, 423 S.E.2d 383 (1992); Kent v. Kent, 265 Ga. 211, 452 S.E.2d 764 (1995); Department of Human Resources v. Siggers, 219 Ga. App. 1, 463 S.E.2d 544 (1995); Ashworth v. Busby, 272 Ga. 228, 526 S.E.2d 570 (2000); Williams v. Martin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011).

Effect of 1977 Amendment to Section

Distinction between 1976 and 1979 versions of section.

- The 1979 version of these provisions is dissimilar to the 1976 version because it allows the income and financial status of the former wife to be considered along with the income and financial status of the former husband, whereas the law in 1976 allowed only consideration of the income and financial status of the former husband. Shure v. Shure, 245 Ga. 36, 262 S.E.2d 800 (1980).

Applicable modification statute is that statute in effect at time of divorce. Summerlin v. Summerlin, 247 Ga. 5, 274 S.E.2d 523 (1981).

The 1977 amendment to Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 did not apply retroactively and thus was not applicable to alimony judgments rendered prior to the effective date of the 1977 amendment. Jowers v. Jowers, 242 Ga. 208, 248 S.E.2d 618 (1978).

- Until 1977, only a change in the former husband's financial status could form the basis for a modification action. Summerlin v. Summerlin, 247 Ga. 5, 274 S.E.2d 523 (1981).

Agreement based on 1976 version of Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 cannot be legislatively modified by amendments which change the law and the law's application. Shure v. Shure, 245 Ga. 36, 262 S.E.2d 800 (1980).

- Party in an alimony action in which a final judgment was entered prior to the 1977 amendment to Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 had a vested right in the judgment not being subject to modification because of a change in income of the recipient because the law in effect at the time of the judgment did not permit modification on such change. McClain v. McClain, 241 Ga. 422, 246 S.E.2d 187 (1978).

- Prior to 1979, there could have been no judgments for alimony to husband. Summerlin v. Summerlin, 247 Ga. 5, 274 S.E.2d 523 (1981).

Women awarded permanent alimony before July 1, 1977, are not permitted to seek temporary modification under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(c). Young v. Young, 252 Ga. 564, 315 S.E.2d 878 (1984).

Waiver of right to modification is not void as against public policy. Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 301 S.E.2d 643 (1983).

- Former husband could not seek modification of his $2,000 monthly alimony obligation to his former wife, although he was 88 years old and had only $2,953 income per month, because the parties had waived their right to seek modification in the divorce agreement; however, an award of attorney fees to the wife under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) was an abuse of discretion because the husband had conceded that his argument was barred by the waiver but sought a change in the law. Naar v. Naar, 350 Ga. App. 21, 827 S.E.2d 711 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1229, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 856 (Ga. 2019).

Alimony judgment based on agreement is subject to revision unless this right is waived by the parties by appropriate contract language in the agreement. Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978).

- In alimony agreements entered into after November 23, 1978, parties to the agreement may obtain modification unless the agreement expressly waives the right of modification by referring specifically to that right; the right to modification will be waived by agreement of the parties only in very clear waiver language which refers to the right of modification. Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978).

Language incorporated in a divorce decree that "[t]he parties expressly waive their right to petition for any modification of the terms of this [settlement] agreement" did not waive the obligor parent's right to seek a downward modification of child support payments since the language did not refer specifically to the right to seek modification, nor describe such right as statutory. Nelson v. Mixon, 265 Ga. 441, 457 S.E.2d 669 (1995).

- In waiving the right to modify an alimony agreement the following waiver language will be deemed to comply with the requirement of express waiver: "The parties hereby waive their statutory right to future modifications, up or down, of the alimony payments provided for herein, based upon a change in the income or financial status of either party." Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978).

- Trial court properly dismissed the husband's petition for alimony modification as the waiver language employed in the parties' premarital agreement was plain and unambiguous, and the reference to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 clarified that the parties intended to waive alimony revision under all subsections of the statute. Carlos v. Lane, 275 Ga. 762, 571 S.E.2d 735 (2002).

Settlement and release language in divorce agreement couched in present tense does not waive right to modification. Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

- While neither wife nor parents may waive or bargain away right of child to seek periodic child support payments, despite original decree which provides none, and when father has not relinquished all parental rights, he may waive right to seek reduction of periodic child support payments. Forrester v. Buerger, 241 Ga. 34, 244 S.E.2d 345 (1978).

- Settlement agreement providing that parties "expressly waive any and all rights that they may have under § 30-220(a) (now O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19) to seek a revision of the Judicial Decree with respect to permanent alimony for Wife," did not waive right to modification of child support obligation. Beard v. Beard, 250 Ga. 449, 298 S.E.2d 495 (1983).

- Language in separation agreement that husband and wife expressly waived "their right to petition for any modification of . . . future alimony payments in accordance with the existing or future laws and statutes" of Georgia or any other state constituted a valid waiver of any right to seek modification pursuant to subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 301 S.E.2d 643 (1983).

- See Parker v. Parker, 254 Ga. 188, 326 S.E.2d 451 (1985).

- Since the written agreement between the parties which was incorporated into their final divorce decree provided: "10. MODIFICATION. The provisions of this agreement shall not be modified or changed except by mutual consent and agreement of the parties, expressed in writing," the waiver language in the agreement did not refer to the right of modification of alimony, or to any waiver of that right, and was therefore not sufficient to meet the test that the right to modification will be waived by agreement of the parties only in very clear waiver language which refers to the right of modification. Brenizer v. Brenizer, 257 Ga. 427, 360 S.E.2d 250 (1987).

Because there was no evidence to support a trial court's decision to deem void a husband's waiver in the parties' original agreement of downward modification below a pre-determined "floor amount" of alimony in the form of child support, the trial court erred by relieving the husband of the husband's obligations imposed by the agreement and in reducing the husband's child support below the agreed-upon "floor amount." Jones v. Jones, 280 Ga. 712, 632 S.E.2d 121 (2006).

One purpose of two-year limitation is to protect parties from excessive litigation over same issues within two-year period. Griffin v. Griffin, 248 Ga. 743, 285 S.E.2d 710 (1982).

- General Assembly intended for the two-year petition limitation to apply only to modification actions grounded upon financial and income changes; the two-year limitation does not apply to the live-in lover provision of subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 23. Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

- Limitation period did not apply to a father's petition for a change in child custody. Petry v. Romo, 249 Ga. App. 99, 547 S.E.2d 736 (2001).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 should be strictly applied to multiple petitions for modification filed within this state. Thomas v. Whaley, 208 Ga. App. 362, 430 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 does not apply if the previous adjudication occurred in another state. Thomas v. Whaley, 208 Ga. App. 362, 430 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

Dismissal of petition for lack of jurisdiction does not preclude filing in appropriate court. Harrison v. Speidel, 244 Ga. 643, 261 S.E.2d 577 (1979).

- While it is true that O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 and cases applying that statute hold that filing date, rather than date of any order, controls, this does not mean that mere filing of modification petition, which is subsequently dismissed without prejudice prior to entry of any order thereon, would per se bar filing of subsequent petition within two-year period. Rather, filing date is merely used to compute time interval between viable petition upon which final orders have been entered. A contrary construction would result in a litigant being deprived of the litigant's day in court upon either petition merely because of the litigant's perhaps inadvertent filing of a second petition. Griffin v. Griffin, 248 Ga. 743, 285 S.E.2d 710 (1982).

- When the first modification action, which was voluntarily dismissed, resulted in significant litigation and in the entry of a temporary, but binding order lowering the husband's alimony obligation, a second modification petition filed by the husband was barred by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ga. 479, 512 S.E.2d 255 (1999).

- Petition for revision cannot be brought under Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19) within two years of action under Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19) seeking the same relief, but the converse does not hold true since Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1, by its terms, imposes no limitation upon bringing of subsequent actions under URESA. Konscol v. Konscol, 151 Ga. App. 696, 261 S.E.2d 438 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875, 101 S. Ct. 218, 66 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1980).

When a party has unsuccessfully brought an action seeking an increased child support under O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19 (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) that party may not seek an increase in child support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 within two years. Ray v. Ray, 247 Ga. 467, 277 S.E.2d 495 (1981).

- Father's action for modification of child support would not lie until two years had passed since the entry of an order on his first petition in which he sought and obtained a change of custody and, although he had also sought an award of child support, he failed to invoke a ruling on the latter issue. Taylor v. Taylor, 182 Ga. App. 412, 356 S.E.2d 236 (1987).

Husband was not precluded from filing a complaint for the modification of child support two months after a final divorce decree since the judgment of divorce was not a "final order on a previous petition" for modification. Thorp v. Thorp, 258 Ga. 220, 367 S.E.2d 232 (1988); Gaultney v. Gaultney, 258 Ga. 602, 372 S.E.2d 814 (1988).

- Two-year proscription did not bar the wife's modification petition filed within two years of a divorce decree since the proscription would only apply when a petition for modification had been filed within two years of a previous petition for modification. McAlpine v. Leveille, 258 Ga. 422, 369 S.E.2d 907 (1988).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 did not bar a husband's petition for modification when the petition was filed within two years of a consent judgment and decree of divorce entered into after the husband's motion for a new trial was consented to by the parties and granted by the court; the second final judgment of divorce was not a "modification" of the original decree. Wood v. Wood, 263 Ga. 566, 436 S.E.2d 478 (1993).

Modification of permanent award of child support requires showing of a change in the income and financial status of either former spouse or in the needs of the child or children; it is not necessary to show both a change in financial status as well as a change in the child's needs. Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999).

- Decrease of alimony and child support payments may be warranted, but is not demanded by substantial increase in former wife's income or financial status since the date of the divorce decree or a substantial decrease in the former husband's income or financial status in such period. Cowan v. Cowan, 243 Ga. 25, 252 S.E.2d 454 (1979).

Upon change in income and financial status of obligor, child support judgment may be revised. Revision of child support judgment under such circumstances is not, however, mandatory. Marsh v. Marsh, 243 Ga. 742, 256 S.E.2d 442 (1979).

Child support requirement bestowed upon a parent did not preclude the parent from seeking downward modification of the parent's support obligation should the parent experience in the future a reduction in income that made the parent's child support payments fall outside the Georgia Child Support Guidelines. Moon v. Moon, 277 Ga. 375, 589 S.E.2d 76 (2003).

Child support award may be revised upon change in obligor's ability to pay. Wright v. Wright, 246 Ga. 81, 268 S.E.2d 666 (1980).

Ability to pay is function of income and recognized expenses. Wright v. Wright, 246 Ga. 81, 268 S.E.2d 666 (1980).

- When a mother sought to increase the father's child support under earlier provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) based on his increased income, the trial court properly included capital gains realized by reselling real property in the father's gross income; earlier provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 stated that gross income included "all other income" except for public assistance, and 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(3) included "gains derived from dealings in property" in gross income. Sharpe v. Perkins, 284 Ga. App. 376, 644 S.E.2d 178 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1123, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 509 (Ga. 2007).

- To determine if there has been a change in income and financial status of supporting spouse, a comparison must be made between the supporting spouse's financial status at the time of the original decree and at the time of trial. Marsh v. Marsh, 243 Ga. 742, 256 S.E.2d 442 (1979).

- Increase in value of an asset allocated in a property settlement is not a change in financial status warranting modification of alimony or child support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Williams v. Williams, 268 Ga. 126, 485 S.E.2d 772 (1997).

- Increased expenses resulting from spouse's new wife and child are not such a change in financial status as would authorize a jury to reduce child support payments a father is obligated to pay. Wright v. Wright, 246 Ga. 81, 268 S.E.2d 666 (1980).

Remarriage of former spouse was not sufficient to support modification of divorce decree provisions regarding tax exemptions and responsibility for health care. Douglas v. Cook, 266 Ga. 644, 469 S.E.2d 656 (1996).

Because the cost to the husband and the value to the wife of the requirement that he maintain $100,000 in life insurance for her benefit for 12 years were indefinite when the decree was entered, as the amount of that award depended on how long the husband will live, the award was periodic alimony as a matter of law; and, as permanent periodic alimony, the husband's life insurance obligation terminated upon the wife's remarriage because the divorce decree did not expressly provide otherwise. White v. Howard, 295 Ga. 210, 758 S.E.2d 824 (2014).

- If obligor's income has increased from the time of divorce, increased expenses resulting from the spouse's new wife and child will not preclude trier of fact from exercising the court's discretion so as to increase the child support payments that the spouse is obligated to pay. Wright v. Wright, 246 Ga. 81, 268 S.E.2d 666 (1980).

- In finding that a mother's financial situation improved for purposes of modifying the child support she received, the trial court did not err in considering a capital gain since the original source of the investment was derived from child support. The income generated was not a direct child support payment but was a return on the investment derived from the child support payments; moreover, there was no merit to the argument that a one-time, non-recurring capital gain could not qualify as gross income in a child support modification action. Gowins v. Gary, 288 Ga. App. 409, 654 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

Automatic future modification is valid when a fixed amount of alimony is awarded, and the variable award is contingent upon a specified change in income. Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177, 304 S.E.2d 65 (1983).

Automatic future modification is invalid when it is not based upon a specified change in income, but is based upon the passage of time and the possibility of a change in income during that time. Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177, 304 S.E.2d 65 (1983).

Appropriate comparison for measuring change is between the relevant factors existing at the time of the original judgment or from the most recent judgment revising child support and the relevant factors existing at the time of the hearing on the current petition for revision. When a petition for revision does not result in a judgment of revision it is not a proper point from which to measure change. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 258 Ga. 208, 367 S.E.2d 540 (1988).

Future improvement of an obligor's financial condition as a result of termination of child support obligations is a change in "income" so as to render valid a verdict requiring an automatic future alimony modification. Wood v. Wood, 257 Ga. 598, 361 S.E.2d 819 (1987).

- It was error to modify a child support award of $28,000 per month for twins to $5,000 on the grounds that the award was excessive and that the mother's financial situation had improved. Even if the payment was excessive, there was no proof that the twins' needs had changed; the mere appreciation of the mother's house did not constitute a change in financial circumstances; the mother's unemployment had not changed since the trial court enforced the $28,000 payment; the mother's receipt of child support could not be treated as a change in her financial condition; and the mother's improved credit rating was not an appropriate consideration unless it was linked to a change of income or financial status. Gowins v. Gary, 288 Ga. App. 409, 654 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

- It is clear that the extrajudicial agreements concerning child support payments entered into by defendant and plaintiff subsequent to the Georgia decree would not be recognized by the courts of this state as a viable modification of defendant's obligation for support payments otherwise established by a judicial decree. Earley v. Earley, 165 Ga. App. 483, 300 S.E.2d 814 (1983).

- Virginia court order reducing father's child support payments to zero after finding that the father had no real income was changed less than two years later by the Georgia court because of an improvement in his financial status and ability to pay demonstrated by his having provided financial support for his 21-year-old daughter. Thomas v. Whaley, 208 Ga. App. 362, 430 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

- Child support obligor's imprisonment for voluntary criminal acts was not grounds for a downward modification of child support obligations; the parent's motion to decrease or suspend the parent's child support based on the parent's incarceration for drug possession was properly denied. Staffon v. Staffon, 277 Ga. 179, 587 S.E.2d 630 (2003).

- After a parent agreed to child support in excess of the O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 support guidelines and did not subsequently show a reduction in the parent's financial status and income, a downward modification of child support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) was properly denied. Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571, 592 S.E.2d 664 (2004).

Live-in Lover Provision

Classification by O.C.G.A.

§ 19-6- 19(b) is rational and furthers legitimate governmental objectives. - Classification of former spouses who have elected voluntarily to cohabit with a third party of a different sex in a meretricious relationship is a rational classification which furthers legitimate governmental objectives. Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

- General Assembly intended O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) to include those instances in which persons of the opposite sex dwell together continuously and openly in a relationship similar or akin to marriage (including either sexual intercourse or the sharing of living expenses) albeit they are not husband and wife in contemplation of the law. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74, 287 S.E.2d 19 (1982).

- Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 applies upon proof of sexual intercourse between former spouse and third party although no proof is offered tending to establish that former spouse received from, gave to, or shared with third party, expenses of their cohabitation. Conversely, subsection (b) also applies upon proof that former spouse received from, gave to, or shared with third party, expenses of their cohabitation although no proof is offered tending to establish sexual intercourse between former spouse and third party. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74, 287 S.E.2d 19 (1982).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6- 19(b) does not permit, in accordance with the statute's plain language, the modification of alimony when a former spouse is living in a homosexual meretricious relationship. Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 262 Ga. 720, 425 S.E.2d 853 (1993).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) not limited to relationships in which a former spouse derives economic benefit from cohabitation with a third party. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74, 287 S.E.2d 19 (1982).

Definition of cohabitation in subsection (b) is clear and is not unconstitutional for vagueness. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

- Trial court erred by holding that the ex-wife was engaged in a meretricious relationship because she and her romantic partner did not live together without interruption; their weekend cohabitation was interrupted when the partner stayed at the partner's apartment out-of-state on the days the partner's clinic was open. Schaffeld v. Schaffeld, 349 Ga. App. 688, 824 S.E.2d 735 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1082, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 887 (Ga. 2019).

- Since the record on appeal reveals no evidence that the appellee and her "live-in lover" dwelled together continuously, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the appellee. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 259 Ga. 405, 383 S.E.2d 134 (1989).

§ 19-6-19(b) plainly requires a two-element relationship. - Relationship must be meretricious and it must be continuous and open. Since the constitutionality of the subsection depends upon the meretricious relationship being one of marriage, it follows that the cohabitation must go beyond periodic, physical interludes. Reiter v. Reiter, 258 Ga. 101, 365 S.E.2d 826 (1988).

Relationship failed to meet the standard authorizing a modification of permanent alimony under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) since, although the evidence supported a finding of periodic sexual encounters, there was no evidence that the parties dwelled together continuously or openly. Daniels v. Daniels, 258 Ga. 791, 374 S.E.2d 735 (1989).

- Purpose of the "live-in lover" statute would not be served by interpreting the words "third party" to include the first and second parties. Upton v. Duck, 249 Ga. 267, 290 S.E.2d 92 (1982).

Neither party has vested right to continued full alimony while contemporaneously sharing living quarters with another mate. Morris v. Morris, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 65 (1979).

- Alimony judgments entered prior to effective date of subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 are not immune from modification based upon live-in lover laws. Morris v. Morris, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 65 (1979); Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

Evidence of "living in" existing at and prior to effective dates of section is admissible. Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980).

- Right to terminate alimony payments under subsection (b), having come into existence in 1977, could not have been a "known right" in 1975 when settlement agreement was made part of divorce decree. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b), which provides that "voluntary cohabitation of such former spouse with a third party in a meretricious relationship shall . . . be grounds to modify provisions for periodic payments of permanent alimony," does not mandate the termination of periodic alimony. Hurley v. Hurley, 249 Ga. 220, 290 S.E.2d 70 (1982); Allen v. Allen, 265 Ga. 53, 452 S.E.2d 767 (1995).

- Reduction of a wife's alimony from $3,000 to $2,000 per month was upheld because the wife had voluntarily cohabited with her boyfriend, admitted the sexual nature of the relationship and that she had shared household and related expenses and it did not matter that the cohabitation had ended by the time the modification action was filed. Provenzano v. Jones, 302 Ga. 139, 805 S.E.2d 909 (2017).

Finding of a meretricious relationship under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) does not mandate reduction of periodic alimony, and a jury charge forcing the jury to either reduce or terminate alimony upon such a finding was in error. Berman v. Berman, 253 Ga. 298, 319 S.E.2d 846 (1984).

- Evidence that the former wife engaged in a meretricious relationship was not relevant to retroactively excuse the former husband's failure to pay alimony since the parties' settlement agreement did not state that alimony would cease upon the commencement of a meretricious relationship by the former wife and, instead, stated that alimony would cease upon the cessation of the former wife's entitlement to alimony under the statute. Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724, 506 S.E.2d 108 (1998).

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 provides that divorcing parties themselves cannot contract for the automatic termination of the alimony obligation of one party upon the cohabitation of the other. Quillen v. Quillen, 265 Ga. 779, 462 S.E.2d 750 (1995).

- Because there was no agreement that husband's alimony obligation would terminate upon wife's cohabitation, the trial court erred by including in the final divorce decree a provision for the prospective termination of alimony in that event. Metzler v. Metzler, 267 Ga. 892, 485 S.E.2d 459 (1997).

- After the trial court found that the former wife was not cohabitating with a third party in a meretricious relationship, but the trial court's order attempted to set forth a future standard of conduct on the part of the former wife which would automatically trigger a modification of alimony, this standard for modification set by the trial court was not only unreasonably intrusive, it was also unauthorized. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 262 Ga. 231, 416 S.E.2d 514 (1992).

Modification of child support arising out of a Department of Human Resources review under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 invokes the supreme court's divorce and alimony jurisdiction because appeals from orders in proceedings for modification of a child support award which arose from a prior divorce or alimony action, regardless of the code section under which the modification was pursued, are subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and an action for child support modification under § 19-11-12 is neither inconsistent with, nor materially distinguishable from, a modification action under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19, such that the former, unlike the latter, does not invoke the supreme court's jurisdiction; an award of child support always constitutes alimony if it is made in a divorce decree proceeding, but it may or may not represent alimony outside the divorce context, and the supreme court has jurisdiction over a case involving an original claim for child support that arose in either a divorce or alimony proceeding. Spurlock v. Dep't of Human Res., 286 Ga. 512, 690 S.E.2d 378 (2010).

Parties cannot by private agreement foreclose court from exercising judgment regarding questions of alimony to be awarded in a divorce decree. It would be anomalous indeed if the parties, by private agreement after decree, could modify the terms of judgment which they had no power to dictate to the court in the first place. If the parties to a divorce decree agree to a modification of alimony, they must present their agreement to the court for the court's approval. Fuller v. Squires, 242 Ga. 475, 249 S.E.2d 261 (1978).

- Trial court did not improperly attempt to retain jurisdiction over post-divorce proceedings by directing the parties to follow an established mechanism to resolve disputes concerning the children, to alternate annual expenses such as the cost of uniforms, or to give the trial court a status report when the youngest child reached the age of 18; the order established permanent awards, and nothing in the language of the status report provision provided that the trial court could issue a modification of custody, visitation, or child support without a petition being properly filed by one of the parties under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-19 and19-9-23. Facey v. Facey, 281 Ga. 367, 638 S.E.2d 273 (2006).

- In a proceeding for modification of child support, the trial court erred in considering evidence of a "compromise" agreement by the parties in calculating the amount of arrearage owed by the father. Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996).

- Parties to divorce decree agreeing to modification of alimony must present agreement to the court for approval. McLure v. McLure, 159 Ga. App. 18, 282 S.E.2d 674 (1981).

- Obligation of father under law to support his children terminates at age 18. Jones v. Jones, 244 Ga. 32, 257 S.E.2d 537 (1979).

- Court cannot alter voluntary obligation undertaken by parent beyond the parent's legal obligation. Jones v. Jones, 244 Ga. 32, 257 S.E.2d 537 (1979).

- When definite amount of alimony or child support is awarded, automatic future modification is not invalid. Hayes v. Hayes, 248 Ga. 526, 283 S.E.2d 875 (1981).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 does not preclude award providing for automatic adjustments based on changes in Consumer Price Index. Hayes v. Hayes, 248 Ga. 526, 283 S.E.2d 875 (1981).

- Automatic adjustment provision does not preclude either party from seeking modification under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. Hayes v. Hayes, 248 Ga. 526, 283 S.E.2d 875 (1981).

- Provision requiring that an ex-husband's child-support obligation be modified annually based on his annual gross income, providing that the change never be downward, did not improperly prohibit the ex-husband from exercising his right under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 to seek a downward modification of child support based on a change in his financial status. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560, 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989).

- Effect of a retroactive award of child support in a West German Government judgment is not significantly different from a temporary modification under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19, since both provide an increased level of support for the period while the proceeding for modification is pending. Knothe v. Rose, 195 Ga. App. 7, 392 S.E.2d 570 (1990).

- In determining liability for child support payments, credit should be given for social security benefits received by custodial spouse for the benefit of minor children. Kight v. Kight, 242 Ga. 563, 250 S.E.2d 451 (1978).

Order requiring payment of reasonable medical expenses may be entered in modification proceeding, although there is no such provision in a divorce decree because the essence of such order is that child support merely is being increased in amount, albeit perhaps, in an indefinite amount. Price v. Dawkins, 242 Ga. 41, 247 S.E.2d 844 (1978).

- When in an alimony modification proceeding brought pursuant to Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 it has been shown that there has been a change in income or financial status of a former spouse sufficient to warrant revision of alimony or child support payable to a group, then as an incident of the modification proceeding the court may modify the group award into a per capita award according to the needs of the recipients. Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979).

- Son's selection of the father as custodial parent, when custody had originally been awarded to the mother, is a factor which may be considered in a claim for modification of child support based on changed financial conditions, but the father is not entitled as a matter of right to a per capita reduction of child support awarded to a group of children. Ivester v. Ivester, 242 Ga. 386, 249 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

- Unless decree or alimony trial transcript shows to the contrary: (a) a decree specifying periodic payments for an uncertain time (e.g., until death or remarriage) with no indication of gross amount is alimony and is revisable; (b) a decree specifying periodic payments for a given time with no indication of gross amount other than by multiplying the amount due by the number of payment periods is alimony and is revisable; (c) a decree specifying periodic payments to be made until a given sum (i.e., an amount stated) has been paid is division of property or payment of corpus and is not revisable. Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979).

Fact that parties call payments "alimony" for income tax purposes is not controlling. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

- When other provisions of agreement provided specifically for weekly payments of alimony, payments of $2,000.00 per year for 10 years irrespective of remarriage or death of either party were a property settlement rather than alimony. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

- Because an antenuptial agreement failed to disclose a husband's income and a wife waived the right to alimony as a part of the agreement, the husband's income was material to the antenuptial agreement and would have been a critical factor in the wife's decision to waive alimony, and thus a trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding the agreement unenforceable. Corbett v. Corbett, 280 Ga. 369, 628 S.E.2d 585 (2006).

- Periodic payments over a given time, with no indication of a lump sum payment or in gross payment other than by multiplying amount due by number of times it is to be paid, constitute alimony. Hathcock v. Hathcock, 246 Ga. 233, 271 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

- When a wife was awarded title to the marital home until she remarried, sold the home, or died, the award of the house to the wife was an award of lump sum alimony and was not subject to modification. Estlund v. Estlund, 260 Ga. 225, 391 S.E.2d 763 (1990); McLendon v. McLendon, 262 Ga. 657, 424 S.E.2d 283 (1993).

- When parties in a divorce enter into agreement whereby wife releases husband from permanent alimony payment in exchange for $15,000 to be paid in periodic installments, such installments are in the nature of a property settlement and not permanent alimony subject to revision under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. McLure v. McLure, 159 Ga. App. 18, 282 S.E.2d 674 (1981).

- Even though a petition for modification of child support could be brought in the context of a legitimation proceeding, a showing of changed circumstances is required before an existing award may be modified. Department of Human Resources v. Jones, 215 Ga. App. 322, 450 S.E.2d 339 (1994).

- Husband's obligation to the wife was one for lump sum alimony rather than periodic alimony because the alimony provision stated the exact amount of each payment and the exact number of payments without other limitations, conditions, or statements of intent; thus, O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 did not apply. The trial court awarded the wife monthly alimony of $5,000 for the first year, $4,000 for the following two years, and $3,000 for the final year. Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 677 S.E.2d 114 (2009).

Attorney's Fees

Attorney's lien not enforceable against child support payments.

- Attorney's charging lien should not be allowed to nullify an award determined to be necessary to assure the support of a child and is not enforceable against child support payments. Law Office of Tony Center v. Baker, 185 Ga. App. 809, 366 S.E.2d 167 (1988).

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d) will be applied to modification petitions filed after the statute's effective date, without regard to the date of the underlying decree. Crecelius v. Brooks, 258 Ga. 372, 369 S.E.2d 743 (1988).

- Although O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d) gives the court discretion whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing party, the statute does not authorize the court to designate who is the prevailing party. That determination is made by the trier of fact. Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 377 S.E.2d 673 (1989).

Trial court's award of attorney fees to the wife, based on an erroneous determination that she was the prevailing party, did not need to be reversed since the court would have been authorized in the court's discretion to award her fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-22. Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 377 S.E.2d 673 (1989).

Husband was not the prevailing party because the jury's award was less than he had offered in settlement and because the modification would have resulted ultimately in a net loss to the wife. Thus, the husband could not have been awarded attorney's fees. Keeler v. Keeler, 263 Ga. 151, 430 S.E.2d 5 (1993).

When the former wife filed a complaint for domestication of a foreign judgment and modification of a child support order and dismissed the action without prejudice, since no trier of fact heard the merits of the claim, the former husband could not acquire prevailing party status, and the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the husband. Morris v. Morris, 222 Ga. App. 617, 475 S.E.2d 676 (1996).

- Even though O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d) uses the term "former spouse," it authorizes an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a child support modification action, regardless of whether the child's parents were ever married because, for purposes of O.C.G.A. T. 19, Ch. 6, the term "former spouse" is equated with "parent" when considering issues of child support; accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting a mother who prevailed on her claim for modification of child support an award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d) even though she and her child's father were never married. Monroe v. Taylor, 259 Ga. App. 600, 577 S.E.2d 810 (2003).

§ 19-6-19(d), controlled. - Trial court did not exceed the court's discretion in awarding reasonable and appropriate attorney fees to the prevailing spouse as the court's decision was dictated by the parties' settlement agreement, and not O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d), as the attorney-fee clause in the settlement agreement made no reference to § 19-6-19(d). Haley v. Haley, 282 Ga. 204, 647 S.E.2d 10 (2007).

Two-year limitation on filing of modification petitions discussed. See 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-46.

Construed with § 19-11-12. - O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 and the statute's provisions did not prejudice or otherwise affect a right to employ the modification of child support remedy available under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 704, 729 et seq., 998 et seq.

- 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 652 et seq. 27C C.J.S., Divorce, § 1011 et seq.

- Unchastity of wife as affecting prior separation agreement, 8 A.L.R. 1452.

Decree for alimony in installments as within full faith and credit provision, 41 A.L.R. 1419; 157 A.L.R. 170.

Power, in absence of reservation by statute or decree, to modify provision in decree of divorce or separation as to alimony or separate maintenance, 71 A.L.R. 723; 127 A.L.R. 741.

Validity and enforceability of agreement to pay more or less alimony than that provided for by decree or order, 84 A.L.R. 299.

Divorced wife's failure to comply with order or decree as affecting her right to enforce provision for alimony, 88 A.L.R. 199.

Power of court to relieve husband permanently of duty to pay alimony awarded by decree, 100 A.L.R. 1262.

Alimony as affected by remarriage, 112 A.L.R. 246; 48 A.L.R.2d 270.

Attack on divorce decree by second spouse of party to divorce, 120 A.L.R. 815.

Change of conditions since decree for alimony rendered in another state as proper matter for consideration in enforcement of local decree based on the decree in the other state, 134 A.L.R. 321.

Propriety and effect of anticipatory provision in decree for alimony in respect of remarriage or other change of circumstances, 155 A.L.R. 609.

Power of court to modify decree for alimony or support as affected by agreement or release executed after entry of decree, 166 A.L.R. 370.

Power of court to modify decree for support, alimony, or the like based on agreement of parties, 166 A.L.R. 675.

Husband's default, contempt, or other misconduct as affecting modification of decree for alimony, separate maintenance, or support, 6 A.L.R.2d 835.

Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10.

Service of notice to modify divorce decree or other judgment as to child's custody upon attorney who represented opposing party, 42 A.L.R.2d 1115.

Necessity of personal service within state upon nonresident spouse as prerequisite of court's power to modify its decree as to alimony or child support in matrimonial action, 62 A.L.R.2d 544.

Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy, 74 A.L.R.2d 758.

Change in financial condition or needs of parents or children as ground for modification of decree for child support payments, 89 A.L.R.2d 7.

Divorce and separation: mutual mistake as to tax consequences as ground for relief against property settlement, 39 A.L.R.3d 1376.

Annulment of later marriage as reviving prior husband's obligations under alimony decree or separation agreement, 45 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support, 52 A.L.R.3d 156.

Divorce: power of court to modify decree for alimony or support of spouse which was based on agreement of parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520.

Divorce: power of court to modify decree for support of child which was based on agreement of parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 657.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846.

Divorced wife's subsequent sexual relations or misconduct as warranting, alone or with other circumstances, modification of alimony decree, 98 A.L.R.3d 453.

Responsibility of noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of child's college education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support, 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support, 19 A.L.R.4th 830.

Effect of remarriage of spouses to each other on child custody and support provisions of prior divorce decree, 26 A.L.R.4th 325.

Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of combined property division and spousal support awards - modern cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 14.

Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710.

Power to modify spousal support award for a limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180.

Divorce: voluntary contributions to child's education expenses as factor justifying modification of spousal support award, 63 A.L.R.4th 436.

Loss of income due to incarceration as affecting child support obligation, 27 A.L.R.5th 540.

Alimony as affected by recipient spouse's remarriage in absence of controlling specific statute, 47 A.L.R.5th 129.

Initial award or denial of child custody to homosexual or lesbian parent, 62 A.L.R.5th 591.

Custodial parent's homosexual or lesbian relationship with third person as justifying modification of child custody order, 65 A.L.R.5th 591.

Custodial parent's relocation as grounds for change of custody, 70 A.L.R.5th 377.

Right to credit on child support for health insurance, medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses paid for child's benefit while child is not living with obligor parent, 1 A.L.R.6th 493.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to educational expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent, 2 A.L.R.6th 439.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to travel expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent, 3 A.L.R.6th 641.

Right to credit on child support for continued payments to custodial parent for child who has reached majority or otherwise become emancipated, 4 A.L.R.6th 531.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree - Conventional retirement at 65 years of age or older, 11 A.L.R.6th 125.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree - early retirement, 36 A.L.R.6th 1.