2020 Georgia Code
Title 19 - Domestic Relations
Chapter 13 - Family Violence
Article 1 - Granting of Relief by Superior Courts
§ 19-13-2. Jurisdiction of Superior Court

1. Except for proceedings involving a nonresident respondent, the superior court of the county where the respondent resides shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this article.
2. For proceedings under this article involving a nonresident respondent, the superior court where the petitioner resides or the superior court where an act involving family violence allegedly occurred shall have jurisdiction, where the act involving family violence meets the elements for personal jurisdiction provided for under paragraph (2) or (3) of Code Section 9-10-91.

(Ga. L. 1981, p. 880, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 19; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1543, § 1.)

- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 151 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Jurisdiction of superior court.

- Issuance of the protective order underlying the appellant prisoner's conviction for aggravated stalking under the Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., when the prisoner and the victim had never been married, were not living in the same house, and did not have children together, did not affect the court's jurisdiction since the order expressly provided that the order's violation would subject the prisoner to prosecution for aggravated stalking; a superior court judge had the authority to issue a protective order under the stalking statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94, or the Georgia Family Violence Act, specifically O.C.G.A. § 19-13-2. Giles v. State, 257 Ga. App. 65, 570 S.E.2d 375 (2002).

When a father made threatening telephone calls from another state to a mother and to their child, a trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over the father under the Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., which applied the long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, because, under § 9-10-91(3), even though the father committed a tortious injury in Georgia, no other factors in that section applied, and, under § 9-10-91(2), providing long arm jurisdiction over one committing a tortious act in Georgia, while the harmful effects of the father's acts were felt in Georgia, the father never came to Georgia to commit those acts. Anderson v. Deas, 273 Ga. App. 770, 615 S.E.2d 859 (2005).

Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., gave Georgia courts jurisdiction over a nonresident only if the act with which the nonresident was charged met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2), (3); further, the conduct giving rise to the offense occurred when the maker of the call spoke into the telephone; a father's daily calls to Georgia from another state to speak to the father's daughter or when the father made the calls that allegedly threatened and harassed the mother did not confer jurisdiction in Georgia. Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga. App. 892, 632 S.E.2d 682 (2006).

- In a family violence case in which the respondent has left the family home but has not avowed an intention to remain in that new location, venue is proper both in the county of the family's residence and in the county to which the respondent has relocated. Davis-Redding v. Redding, 246 Ga. App. 792, 542 S.E.2d 197 (2000).

- In a mother's suit for a permanent protective order against her former husband under the Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., the father waived his objection to venue under O.C.G.A. § 19-13-2 by not filing a responsive pleading or otherwise objecting; therefore, the trial court was not required to set aside the judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(1). McCarthy v. Ashment, 338 Ga. App. 858, 790 S.E.2d 651 (2016).