2020 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 8 - Trial
Article 3 - Conduct of Proceedings
§ 17-8-57. Expression or Intimation of Opinion by Judge as to Matters Proved or Guilt of Accused

1. 1. It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge's opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.
   2. Any party who alleges a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall make a timely objection and inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection, outside of the jury's hearing and presence. After such objection has been made, and if it is sustained, it shall be the duty of the court to give a curative instruction to the jury or declare a mistrial, if appropriate.
2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, failure to make a timely objection to an alleged violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties. Plain error may be considered on appeal even when a timely objection informing the court of the specific objection was not made, so long as such error affects substantive rights of the parties.
3. Should any judge express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or the trial court in a motion for a new trial shall grant a new trial.

(Laws 1850, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 462; Code 1863, § 3172; Code 1868, § 3183; Code 1873, § 3248; Code 1882, § 3248; Civil Code 1895, § 4334; Penal Code 1895, § 1032; Civil Code 1910, § 4863; Penal Code 1910, § 1058; Code 1933, § 81-1104; Code 1981, §17-8-55; Code 1981, §17-8-57, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1190, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1050, § 1/SB 99.)

- Corresponding provision relating to civil procedure, § 9-10-7.

- Former Code Section 17-8-55 was redesignated as this Code section by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1190, § 1.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For article, "Criminal Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2001). For article, "Evidence," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (2001). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). For annual survey of criminal law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006). For annual survey of law on criminal law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 87 (2010). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 91 (2015). For annual survey of criminal law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2015). For comment on Sanders v. State, 66 Ga. App. 128, 17 S.E.2d 251 (1941), see 4 Ga. B.J. 51 (1942). For comment on Brock v. State, 91 Ga. App. 141, 85 S.E.2d 177 (1954), holding that a statement by the trial judge designating a witness as an accomplice is a violation by the trial court of the inhibition against an expression by the trial judge as to what has been proved, see 17 Ga. B.J. 501 (1955).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Inquiries by the Judge
• Rulings by the Judge
• Jury Charges and Curative Instructions
• Necessity for Objection or Motion

General Consideration

Purpose.

- Reason for this section prohibiting the judge from intimating the judge's opinion as to what has been proved is to keep the jury from being influenced, not to keep the judge from making up the judge's own mind. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

Purpose of the legal inhibition against the expression or intimation of opinion by the judge is to protect a defendant in the defendant's weakness, as well as in the defendant's strength, and to preserve inviolate the priceless right of trial by jury. Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 228 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 is limited to remarks made before the jury. See Dukes v. State, 186 Ga. App. 773, 369 S.E.2d 257 (1988); In re S.U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 503 S.E.2d 66 (1998); Miller v. State, 243 Ga. App. 764, 533 S.E.2d 787 (2000).

When the specific comments of the judge complained of by the defendant were made outside the presence of the jury, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Smith v. State, 236 Ga. App. 122, 511 S.E.2d 223 (1999).

Trial court did not err in allowing the state a recess to review a point of law and by offering to allow a recess for the state to subpoena a missing file as the scope of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 is confined to matters occurring before the jury; here, outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court impartially offered both sides opportunities to present their evidence in a manner that would best give legally admissible, efficient, and comprehensible testimony to the jury. Ingram v. State, 286 Ga. App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Trial judge's comments about venue and an open-container charge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the comments were made outside the jury's presence, the case was reopened without any reference to the judge's opinion, and the questions were then presented to the jury. Thus, there was no indication that the judge's comments in any way influenced, or even could have influenced, the jury. Davenport v. State, 308 Ga. App. 140, 706 S.E.2d 757 (2011).

Appellant's plea counsel's failure to object to comments made by the trial judge during the plea hearing, comments which the appellant argued violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, was not ineffective assistance; such an objection would have been meritless because § 17-8-57 only applied if a jury was present. Rhodes v. State, 296 Ga. 418, 768 S.E.2d 445 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Trial court's comments on the evidence did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because it was made outside the presence of the jury. Powell v. State, 352 Ga. App. 14, 833 S.E.2d 602 (2019).

- Judge's comment on the latent fingerprint cards, four years after the verdict, was not an opinion on guilt in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 676, 748 S.E.2d 419 (2013).

§ 17-8-57 violated. - O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 is only violated when the court's charge assumes certain things as facts and intimates to the jury what the judge believes the evidence to be. Mullinax v. State, 255 Ga. 442, 339 S.E.2d 704 (1986); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 788, 364 S.E.2d 569 (1988); Stephens v. State, 185 Ga. App. 825, 366 S.E.2d 211 (1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020); Turner v. State, 259 Ga. 873, 388 S.E.2d 857 (1990); Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112, 397 S.E.2d 605 (1990); Blackmon v. State, 197 Ga. App. 133, 397 S.E.2d 728 (1990).

When a habeas court found the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal, it was error for the habeas court to order that the defendant was entitled to a new appeal as: (1) this violated the rule that a criminal defendant was not entitled to a second appeal; (2) wasted judicial resources as an appeal required the appellate court to engage in the same analysis the habeas court had just performed; and (3) created the possibility, realized in this case, that an appellate court would be presented with a matter outside of the court's jurisdiction, as appeals of decisions of a habeas court were the sole province of the Georgia Supreme Court. Milliken v. Stewart, 276 Ga. 712, 583 S.E.2d 30 (2003).

On appeal from an aggravated assault conviction, because the trial judge improperly commented on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by telling the jury that the parties agreed that there was no gun involved in the incident, the comment amounted to reversible error entitling the defendant to a new trial. Brimidge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 23, 651 S.E.2d 344 (2007).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 is violated only when a court's charge assumes certain things as facts and intimates to the jury what the judge believes the evidence to be. Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (2009), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Violation of either the letter or spirit of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 constitutes reversible error. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979).

It is error to violate even the spirit of this section. A violation thereof is a mandatory cause for a new trial. Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 228 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

- Defendant's conviction was affirmed because the trial court's questioning the conviction did not cross the line and violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, but rather was interposed for the purposes of developing the truth in the case and of clarifying the witnesses' testimony. Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (2013).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court announced to a panel of the jury venire during preliminary instructions that the indicted offense of malice murder occurred in the subject county as the court was merely explaining what was alleged in the indictment against the defendant, not what had been proven. Lindsey v. State, 295 Ga. 343, 760 S.E.2d 170 (2014).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the court's ruling that the court's finding of criminal contempt could not be used to impeach the second victim's testimony because allowing the jury to be informed that the court had found the second victim to have testified falsely would have directly violated the principle that it was error for a judge in any criminal case to express or intimate the judge's opinion as to what had or had not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Green v. State, 299 Ga. 337, 788 S.E.2d 380 (2016).

Trial court's comment to potential jurors that the defendant was charged with the murder of the defendant's wife did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 as the judge was explaining the nature of the case to help jurors determine if the jurors had been exposed to extensive media coverage. Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 788 S.E.2d 442 (2016).

Trial court did not commit plain error or violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court reminded a victim during direct examination that the victim was "in the room" when a co-defendant uttered a threat as the trial court's restatement of what the victim had testified to and its immediately following question were designed not to express an improper opinion as to what had or had not been proved, but to elucidate the issues before the jury. Carter v. State, 343 Ga. App. 853, 805 S.E.2d 924 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0568, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 519 (Ga. 2018).

Defendant failed to show that any of the trial court's comments violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the defendant's statement that it was taking a recess to provide the state an opportunity to talk with the witness was an exercise of the court's discretion to control the trial proceedings and not an expression of the court's opinion of the witness's credibility, the overall import of the trial court's statements about an officer's testimony was to explain to counsel why counsel had exhausted a particular line of question and why the court was directing counsel to move on to a different topic, and the judge's comments were meant to clarify the prior testimony of the sergeant. Thompson v. State, 349 Ga. App. 1, 825 S.E.2d 413 (2019).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 as the trial court's statement was a permissible clarification of a procedure that did not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial and the defendant could not establish plain error. Elrod v. State, 354 Ga. App. 177, 840 S.E.2d 658 (2020).

- When the defendant also pursued the alternative defense that the defendant did not cause the gun to fire, the jury charge as given did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because it would not have been error for the trial court to directly tell the jury that the defendant admitted the shooting for purposes of the defenses of justification and accident. McLean v. State, 297 Ga. 81, 772 S.E.2d 685 (2015).

- Trial court's admission of testimony from a victim of a prior aggravated assault and armed robbery was not subject to plain error review as the instant prosecution was not a death penalty case or action in which the trial judge expressed or intimated the judge's opinion as to the guilt of the accused or as to what had or had not been proved in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (2007).

- It is the prejudicial character of the remarks which constitutes the error. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

Fact must be material for this section to apply. Jones v. State, 65 Ga. 621 (1880).

- Defendants failed to show a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, when the defendants failed to identify the challenged comment with any particularity. Gorman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 535, 734 S.E.2d 263 (2012).

- It is error for the trial court to give an opinion as to what has been proved if the opinion goes to the essential question of guilt or innocence or if, although undisputed, it may be the subject of contrary inferences, and it is error to instruct the jury that there is no contention to the contrary even as to uncontradicted evidence when the defendant, by the defendant's plea of not guilty, has placed every material fact in issue. McFarland v. State, 109 Ga. App. 688, 137 S.E.2d 308 (1964).

Court of appeals did not err by finding that the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by expressing an opinion as to whether venue had been proven because following the prosecutor's attempt to elicit testimony from a salesperson as to the salesperson's store's location, the trial court asked the state if venue was established and commented that there had been some confusion since a salesperson had worked at one store and was working in another one, and that the court just wanted to make sure; the comment "I just wanted to make sure," following the trial court's questioning of the salesperson, constituted an expression of opinion that venue had in fact been proven, and the plain language of § 17-8-57 provided for reversal of the entire case, not a portion thereof. State v. Anderson, 287 Ga. 159, 695 S.E.2d 26 (2010).

- It was not an impermissible statement by the trial court that the crime actually happened in a specific county or that the state properly indicted the defendant therein. Mitchell v. State, 337 Ga. App. 841, 789 S.E.2d 797 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0012, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 211 (Ga. 2017).

Although it was unusual and unnecessary for the trial court to explain an accomplice's plea deal to the potential jurors, the explanations were not a comment on the defendant's guilt, nor were the explanations comments on whether a fact had or had not been proved. The court summarized the terms of the accomplice's plea deal, the court did not tell the jury that the accomplice's testimony would be truthful, but rather stated accurately that the state's sentencing recommendation would depend on whether the accomplice's testimony was truthful in the state's opinion. Barboza v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 673 (2020).

- Law conclusively presumes injury from the error of expressing an opinion as to proof or guilt, and the mandatory provisions of this section require reversal of the judgment of the trial court on proper assignment of error. Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 178, 21 S.E.2d 73, answer conformed to, 67 Ga. App. 607, 21 S.E.2d 280 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139 (1943).

Expression of opinion as to an uncontested and undisputed fact is not cause for reversal. Dixon v. State, 196 Ga. App. 15, 395 S.E.2d 577 (1990).

Trial court judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by questioning the defendant about a prior guilty plea that the defendant entered as the questioning involved matters that were not disputed; there was similarly no violation by the judge's questioning of the defendant's roommate as to why the defendant signed an affidavit indicating that cocaine found in their apartment belonged to the roommate, as the questioning only served to assist the defendant, and counsel's failure to object thereto indicated a lack of prejudice to the defendant. Branscomb v. State, 272 Ga. App. 700, 613 S.E.2d 222 (2005).

Trial court's statement to the jury in the defendant's felony murder and cruelty to children trial regarding the child victim's teething did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 since the fact of the child's teething was undisputed; defendant testified that the defendant was told that the child was teething, and another witness testified that they were using medication to alleviate the child's teething discomfort. Sauerwein v. State, 280 Ga. 438, 629 S.E.2d 235 (2006).

Fact that an item seized from the defendant's person was cocaine was not contradicted at trial, and the defendant personally referred to the substance as cocaine. Therefore, the trial court's comment that Exhibit 1 "is the cocaine" as the court collected the evidence was not an improper comment on the evidence contrary to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and any error was cured by an instruction to the jury that whether or not the substance was cocaine was for the jury to determine. Nelson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 65, 699 S.E.2d 66 (2010).

- Provisions of this section are mandatory, and a charge which discloses the court's opinion on an issue of fact cannot be treated as harmless. Mitchell v. State, 89 Ga. App. 80, 78 S.E.2d 563 (1953).

Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, requiring a reversal of the defendant's convictions, even though defense counsel did not object to the trial court's comments because a violation of § 17-8-57 was always "plain error." Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 722 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Defendant was entitled to a new trial because by stating to the jury venire that the crime happened in Taylor County, Georgia, the trial court judge expressed or intimated the court's opinion as to a disputed issue of fact and thus violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Sales v. State, 296 Ga. 538, 769 S.E.2d 374 (2015).

An expression of opinion by the court with regard to what had or had not been proved cannot be deemed harmless. Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 228 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

§ 17-8-57 are mandatory. - This section forbids a trial judge to express or intimate the judge's opinion as to what has or has not been proved, and declares that should the judge violate this section, the reversal of the case is mandatory. Demonia v. State, 69 Ga. App. 862, 27 S.E.2d 101 (1943).

There can be no finding of harmless error if a trial court violates O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; thus, the law is well-established that instructions given to a jury by a trial court cannot cure a violation of § 17-8-57 and the Georgia Supreme Court disapproves any case law language intimating the contrary. Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007).

- Section gives to one accused of crime the absolute guarantee of a new trial in the event the accused is deprived of a fair and impartial trial because of error under that section committed by the judge before whom the accused is convicted. Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 178, 21 S.E.2d 73, answer conformed to, 67 Ga. App. 607, 21 S.E.2d 280 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139 (1943).

§ 17-8-57 is violated, even in clear case of guilt, new trial must be granted. - Even in a clear case of guilt, an appellate court has no other alternative, and the court desires no other, than to grant a new trial when the court comes to the conclusion that the right of the defendant to have the fact of the defendant's guilt or innocence determined exclusively by the jury has been in the slightest degree infringed by judicial intimation or expression. Cook v. State, 40 Ga. App. 125, 149 S.E. 79 (1929).

- When a defendant has been deprived of a fair and impartial trial, the grant of a new trial is imperative, without reference to the correctness of the verdict. Cook v. State, 40 Ga. App. 125, 149 S.E. 79 (1929).

Expression of opinion on facts renders the grant of a new trial imperative, without reference to the correctness of the verdict. Golden v. State, 45 Ga. App. 501, 165 S.E. 299 (1932).

Disregard of this section on the part of a trial judge renders the grant of a new trial imperative, without reference to the correctness of the verdict. Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 178, 21 S.E.2d 73, answer conformed to, 67 Ga. App. 607, 21 S.E.2d 280 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139 (1943).

- If the defendant is of the opinion that any remarks made by officers of the court might prejudice the jurors, the defendant's remedy is to purge the jury on the trial of the case. Robinson v. State, 86 Ga. App. 375, 71 S.E.2d 677 (1952).

- Judge's comments at the outset of the trial that the judge would keep breaks as brief as possible and that, if the jury had not begun deliberations by Friday, it was possible the jury would have to return the following week were not intended to hurry the trial to a conclusion and did not indicate an opinion that the defendant was guilty. Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 475 S.E.2d 918 (1996).

- Trial court's statement to the venire that the crime took place in Muscogee County expressed or intimated the court's opinion as to a disputed issue of fact at trial in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and entitled the defendant to a new trial. Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 765 S.E.2d 879 (2014).

- Although the trial court's comments to the jury venire three weeks prior to their service may have come close to commenting on the defendant's guilt or innocence, the comments were made to explain the procedure leading up to the jurors' service and, thus, did not necessitate a new trial. Hicks v. State, 326 Ga. App. 46, 755 S.E.2d 855 (2014).

- Trial judge's explanation to a defendant's counsel that based on the counsel's questioning of an investigator regarding the defendant's statement to the investigator that the defendant lived in Florida, the judge was going to expand the indictment to include falsifying or concealing a material fact, which was one possible violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, when the defendant had only been charged with making a false statement, did not constitute an improper remark under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because it was a colloquy with counsel regarding possible jury charges and did not express an opinion on what had or had not been proved. Adams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 570, 718 S.E.2d 899 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0500, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 263 (Ga. 2012).

- Court found no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because: (1) the trial court's comment, made in an effort to keep the proceedings under control and to prevent a disturbance, warning the defendant outside the presence of the jury that the defendant would be removed from the courtroom if the defendant could not stay under control, was not improper; and (2) the remaining comments were limited to a clarification of procedures and did not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial, and thus, did not constitute a basis for reversal. Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010).

Trial judge's comment, after excusing for cause a jury panel member who was a sworn police officer, that the judge had no discretion in the matter because of a prior appellate ruling, and that the judge disagreed with that ruling, did not constitute a statement of opinion either as to proof or as to guilt, and thus did not impermissibly bolster any witness's credibility. Najmaister v. State, 196 Ga. App. 345, 396 S.E.2d 71 (1990).

- When the record shows that the defendant's election to question all the jurors on the panel before starting to strike a jury prompted the trial court to comment to the jury, "Do not let it prejudice your minds against the defendant in any way whatsoever," nothing in the record showed that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by this remark. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 420 S.E.2d 349 (1992).

- None of the trial court's statements to the jury was an improper comment on the evidence because the record showed that the trial court explained to the jury that the defendant chose not to be present during jury selection, that the trial would proceed in the defendant's absence, that the defendant would have an opportunity to participate if the defendant changed the defendant's mind, that the defendant had been offered an attorney, and that the trial court had advised the defendant to accept the offer but the defendant had chosen self representation. Caldwell v. State, 273 Ga. App. 135, 614 S.E.2d 246 (2005).

- Trial judge's statement that the judge would "get reversed probably" if the judge failed to read the jury charge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(1) because the statement did not suggest the judge believed the defendant would be found guilty and appeal but merely stressed the importance of the jury charge. DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga. 283, 840 S.E.2d 396 (2020).

Trial court's inadvertent statements that the allegations in the indictment were facts, that the indictment was evidence, that the jurors had to base the jurors' decision on what the attorneys said, and that the jurors were to report any evidence the jurors heard outside the courtroom did not constitute comments on the evidence. Atkins v. State, 253 Ga. App. 169, 558 S.E.2d 755 (2002).

- As the record showed that the trial court's joking comment was directed at a juror, and not the defendant, and defense counsel did not object to the statement, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 574, 630 S.E.2d 421 (2006).

- No abuse of discretion resulted from the trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial after the court advised defense counsel to refrain from inappropriately interrupting the testimony of the medical examiner; moreover, the defendant failed to show by the record that the court's purportedly damaging rebuke constituted an expression of opinion on the case, especially when the court reminded the jury of the court's previous instruction not to consider any actions, comments, or opinions of the court in reaching a verdict. Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 631 S.E.2d 642 (2006).

- Trial court judge's use of the word "honey" to refer to an eight-year-old child victim while the victim was testifying was not an opinion of the victim's credibility and did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Moore v. State, 319 Ga. App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (2013).

- There is a difference between evidence and proof: evidence tends to establish or disprove an alleged matter of fact in issue; proof is the effect of evidence, while evidence is merely the means of making proof. A fact is not proved unless it is established. Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. 264, 170 S.E. 26 (1933).

Statement that there is no dispute about a fact in evidence does not express an opinion. McCloud v. State, 166 Ga. 436, 143 S.E. 558 (1928).

If there is no conflict in the evidence on a certain point the trial court may take the fact to have been admitted or proved as the case may be. McFarland v. State, 109 Ga. App. 688, 137 S.E.2d 308 (1964).

Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by referring to the composition of exhibits which contained cocaine and ecstasy because there was never any dispute at trial as to the composition of the exhibits. Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012).

- That the trial court intimates an opinion upon an uncontested and undisputed fact is not cause for a new trial as being in violation of this section. Abbott v. State, 91 Ga. App. 380, 85 S.E.2d 615 (1955).

§ 17-8-57 inapplicable to facts conceded by both parties. - This section refers to the expression or intimation of an opinion touching some fact at issue involved in the case, and not to something that is conceded by both parties. Thomas v. State, 27 Ga. App. 38, 107 S.E. 418 (1921).

- While the trial court may not under this section express an opinion as to what has been proved in the case, when only one inference is possible from the evidence it is not improper for the court to assume the fact to be true. Green v. State, 129 Ga. App. 27, 198 S.E.2d 343 (1973); Lyle v. State, 131 Ga. App. 8, 205 S.E.2d 126 (1974).

Stating an admitted fact does not constitute an expression or intimation of opinion. Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 135 S.E. 187 (1926).

- Since the fact that the victim's home was burglarized was not an issue in the case because the defendant put forth an alibi defense readily agreeing that the home had been burglarized, the court's comment about the home being "burglarized" did not constitute plain error. Archie v. State, 248 Ga. App. 56, 545 S.E.2d 179 (2001).

Defendant's claim that the trial court's comments on the credibility of the co-defendant failed as any error did not amount to plain error because the defendant failed to establish that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights given the strong evidence of guilt against the defendant, including the defendant's admission to being present for the shooting and admission to a fellow gang member that the defendant shot the victim. Harris v. State, 302 Ga. 832, 809 S.E.2d 723 (2018).

- In a defendant's trial for aggravated assault and other charges arising out of a road rage incident, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by interrupting defense counsel's closing argument to request that counsel not stray into matters that were not relevant; the instruction that the arguments raised by defense counsel were not relevant was neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

- To assume in a criminal case that the testimony for the state is the truth, though such testimony is not contradicted by evidence for the defendant, and to charge the jury that such testimony is the truth and that there is no contention to the contrary, is violative of this section and demands a new trial. Golden v. State, 45 Ga. App. 501, 165 S.E. 299 (1932).

- If there is nothing in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to dispute the fact that the alleged crime was committed, and the defendant's defense rests solely upon the contention that the defendant did not participate in the offense, the court does not violate this section in assuming that a crime has been committed. Pruitt v. State, 36 Ga. App. 736, 138 S.E. 251 (1927).

- Plea of not guilty, by one accused of crime, is an express contention on the accused's part antagonistic to every fact necessary to be proved by the state in order to establish the accused's guilt. Unless the accused admits one or more of the facts which it devolves upon the state to prove, such facts must be established by evidence. To assume that an important fact in the case on trial has been admitted, and to so instruct the jury when no such admission has been made, is error requiring a new trial. Duke v. State, 43 Ga. App. 428, 158 S.E. 919 (1931).

Stressing the contentions of one party at the expense of an adversary may amount to such an intimation of opinion as to demand the grant of a new trial. Screven v. State, 169 Ga. 384, 150 S.E. 558 (1929).

- Question put by the judge in a colloquy between the judge and counsel on a question of the admissibility of certain evidence is not error. Davis v. State, 72 Ga. App. 631, 34 S.E.2d 672 (1945).

It is not reversible error for the judge, in discussing with counsel the admissibility of testimony, the propriety of a nonsuit, the direction of a verdict, or similar matters in the progress of the trial, or in explaining the judge's rulings upon questions of this nature, to refer to the evidence or to the statements of witnesses, provided the judge does not go out of the line of legitimate discussion upon the point presented, or use such language as to indicate apparent or actual judicial approval or disparagement of any witness or of any part of the testimony. Miller v. State, 122 Ga. App. 553, 177 S.E.2d 838 (1970); Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 634, 284 S.E.2d 651 (1981).

Inhibition against an expression or intimation of opinion by the trial judge as to the facts of the case does not extend to colloquies between the judge and counsel as to the admissibility of certain evidence, especially if the judge is ruling upon a point made by counsel for the accused. Bradley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 670, 224 S.E.2d 778, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 918, 97 S. Ct. 310, 50 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1976); Fletcher v. State, 157 Ga. App. 707, 278 S.E.2d 444 (1981); Troutman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 314, 342 S.E.2d 785 (1986).

Trial court's reference to a witness's testimony during colloquy with counsel respecting an evidentiary ruling was not an impermissible expression of opinion. Mooney v. State, 221 Ga. App. 420, 471 S.E.2d 904 (1996).

Trial court simply admonishing defense counsel for questioning a witness about what the witness was asked in the witness's plea did not rise to the level of an expression or intimation of opinion by the judge as to matters proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Wooten v. State, 240 Ga. App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999).

- Statutory inhibition against an expression or intimation of opinion by the trial court as to the facts of the case does not generally extend to colloquies between the judge and counsel regarding the admissibility of evidence. Havard v. State, 175 Ga. App. 798, 334 S.E.2d 381 (1985); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. App. 27, 375 S.E.2d 69 (1988); Whitt v. State, 215 Ga. App. 704, 452 S.E.2d 125 (1994); Aman v. State, 223 Ga. App. 309, 477 S.E.2d 431 (1996); Williams v. State, 244 Ga. App. 692, 536 S.E.2d 572 (2000).

Mere colloquies between counsel and the trial court regarding evidentiary issues do not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 664, 492 S.E.2d 868 (1997); Loveless v. State, 245 Ga. App. 555, 538 S.E.2d 464 (2000).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in explaining the basis for an evidentiary ruling outside the presence of the jury. Singleton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 240, 522 S.E.2d 734 (1999).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by qualifying an expert witness in the presence of the jury since the court later charged the jurors that it was the jury's function to determine the credibility or believability of the witnesses and that the court had not intended, by any ruling or comment made during the progress of the trial, to express any opinion upon the credibility of the witnesses. Davitt v. State, 257 Ga. App. 384, 571 S.E.2d 427 (2002).

- Trial court's explanation of certain evidence given at trial as being an example of direct testimony or evidence did not amount to an improper comment by the trial court or an intimation of the court's opinion as to the defendant's guilt. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985).

If the jury asked a question regarding specific evidence, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury that the jury must remember the evidence. Nealy v. State, 230 Ga. App. 747, 498 S.E.2d 119 (1998).

- Trial court's statement to the jury that the defendant "is about to testify as to I believe some bases for his change in testimony which you may have observed yesterday," followed with an instruction that the testimony should be considered solely for the purpose of explaining the change did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Nealy v. State, 239 Ga. App. 651, 522 S.E.2d 34 (1999).

- Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in asking a witness whether the witness was lying or being truthful, intimating the court's opinion regarding the credibility of the witness's testimony. Williams v. State, 329 Ga. App. 706, 766 S.E.2d 474 (2014).

- Trial court's statement that a witness was an expert and was a frequent witness did not amount to plain error because the defendant failed to show a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, much less an obvious error, as the comment indicated nothing about the defendant's guilt and did not likely affect the outcome of the trial. Hightower v. State, 304 Ga. 755, 822 S.E.2d 273 (2018).

- Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by expressing the court's opinion about the credibility of a neighbor, who testified for the state at the defendant's trial, because the trial court's question and comment about the neighbor's testimony intimated the court's opinion that the testimony was believable since the neighbor was an independent witness, unrelated to any of the parties involved in the case; any reasonable juror, having heard the trial court's comments, could construe the comments as an expression of opinion on the neighbor's credibility, and the trial court's purported curative instruction did not eradicate the court's inappropriate comments. Callaham v. State, 305 Ga. App. 626, 700 S.E.2d 624 (2010).

Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, requiring a reversal of the defendant's convictions because: (1) the jury could have interpreted the court calling a witness a "good detective" as expressing a favorable opinion of the witness's abilities and thus bolstering the witness's credibility; and (2) it was impossible to say the jurors were not influenced to some extent. Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 722 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, requiring a reversal of the defendant's convictions because: (1) the jury could have construed the court's comments on an officer's use of a written document and the officer's "best efforts" as expressing an opinion that the officer's recollection of the defendant's statement was reliable or credible; and (2) it was impossible to say the jurors were not influenced to some extent. Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 722 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Trial court's admonition to defense counsel and instructions to the jury to disregard defense counsel's challenge to an officer's credibility clearly intimated the court's opinion that the officer's testimony was believable and violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and the purported curative instruction did not eradicate the trial court's inappropriate comments. Wilson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 859, 755 S.E.2d 253 (2014).

- Comment was clearly a preliminary reference to what the jury could expect to hear once the evidence began, and was not an unauthorized expression of an opinion by the trial court as to what actually had been proven in the case. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).

In defendant's shoplifting case, when the judge explained that the judge had directed a verdict on certain items because no evidence was presented that the items were stolen, the judge's explanation was not an expression of opinion on the remainder of the evidence in the case. Smith v. State, 275 Ga. App. 60, 619 S.E.2d 694 (2005).

Court of appeals erred by reversing the defendant's convictions for armed robbery because the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court did not express or intimate the court's opinion as to what had or had not been proved since the court's directive to prove venue was followed by a question as to whether venue had been proven; in order to violate § 17-8-57, the trial court's comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact. State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).

Trial court did not improperly express the court's opinion of the case in front of the jury in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because, although the trial judge told the prosecution that the prosecution needed another witness after venue was put into question, the only possible inference was that venue had not been proven. Furthermore, the trial court was within the court's discretion to limit the scope of the testimony of the following witness to the issue of venue as the prosecution had already rested the prosecutor's case; the trial court had discretion to propound the court's own questions to the witness; and the trial court never stated that the alleged crime took place in the county where the trial occurred and never expressed the court's opinion or commented on what had been proven. Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 693, 703 S.E.2d 329 (2010).

Trial court did not err when the court charged the jury by intimating the court's opinion as to the defendant's credibility, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, because, when the charge on impeachment was considered in context, no reasonable juror could have construed the charge as an expression of the trial court's own opinion that the defendant had been impeached or committed the alleged crimes. Moreover, the jury was instructed that the jury alone would decide whether the defendant was guilty of a crime. Pullen v. State, 315 Ga. App. 125, 726 S.E.2d 621 (2012).

Trial court did not intimate an opinion on any facts or any of the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the court's comments to the jury were limited to a clarification of procedures and did not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue. Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 722 S.E.2d 714 (2012).

Judge's friendly exchange with the assistant district attorney and a witness did not amount to an impermissible comment on the witness's credibility. Griffin v. State, 331 Ga. App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (2015).

Court's comment on the obvious confusion between the prosecutor and a witness regarding the insurer's decision to cover the loss as opposed to its consent to the fire was not an opinion about what had or had not been proven. Frey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 583, 790 S.E.2d 835 (2016).

Judge's commenting on the materiality of certain evidence, questioning defense counsel about the purpose of a cross-examination, and observing that the case was "sloppily run" did not harm the defendant's right to a fair trial. Boyd v. State, 267 Ga. 453, 479 S.E.2d 724 (1997).

- Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by responding to the jury's request for "all of the evidence" that if the court gave the jury other items "it would be reversible error" and "we would have to try the case all over again"; these statements improperly referred to the availability of appellate review, intimating that the defendant was guilty and would need to appeal. Gibson v. State, 288 Ga. 617, 706 S.E.2d 412 (2011).

- There was reversible error when the court's remark assuming the truth of a fact stated therein controverted a central theme of the defense. Sweat v. State, 173 Ga. App. 441, 326 S.E.2d 809 (1985).

- Trial court's explanation to the jury that the delay of the witness was not willful and that the witness had been sent for but not arrested, thereby causing an early noon recess, did not constitute an expression of an opinion as to what had been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Hendricks v. State, 157 Ga. App. 715, 278 S.E.2d 453 (1981).

When the trial court instructed the jury immediately after sending a witness out to listen to a tape recording of the witness's interview with the police, instructed the jury in the court's general charge that nothing the court said was to be construed as a comment on the evidence or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and also instructed the jury that the purpose in postponing the examination of the witness was to control the progress of the trial and "make the orderly presentation of the case go a little bit faster," the instructions were proper and demonstrated that no comment made in the jury's presence was directed toward a material issue or relevant evidence in the case. Smith v. State, 236 Ga. App. 122, 511 S.E.2d 223 (1999).

- Remarks by judge assigning a reason for a ruling are neither an improper expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence. McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1106, 118 S. Ct. 2485, 138 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1997).

There was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the comment was explanatory of the trial court's ruling on the objection to the admission of testimony. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).

Trial court did not improperly comment upon the evidence at trial because the court's statements were clearly intended to explain the court's ruling on the state's objection to defense counsel's closing argument. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010).

Trial court did not state an opinion on an expert's testimony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the trial court exercised the court's judgment and discretion by stopping the testimony and explaining the court's evidentiary ruling to trial counsel. Ridley v. State, 290 Ga. 798, 725 S.E.2d 223 (2012).

- Court could not conclude that a judge's brief explanation that the judge restricted the defendant's movement around the courtroom during trial amounted to a "continuing" or "constant" reminder that the defendant was detained at the time of trial; evidence that an accused was confined in jail for the offense at issue in a criminal trial did not place the defendant's character in evidence. Walker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 83, 576 S.E.2d 62 (2003).

- Trial court's explanation to the jury out of the presence of defense counsel regarding the purpose of a Jackson-Denno hearing did not constitute an expression of the court's opinion as to the the voluntariness of the defendant's statement. Harper v. State, 171 Ga. App. 57, 318 S.E.2d 787 (1984).

- Judge's comment to the jury that the case "should be very straightforward ... once we get the trial underway" was not an expression of opinion regarding facts. Bradford v. State, 221 Ga. App. 232, 471 S.E.2d 248 (1996).

Judge's comments regarding pro se defendant's behavior in the courtroom were not comments directed toward a material issue or relevant evidence in the case. Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998).

- Trial court's statement explaining the defendant's absence from the courtroom because of disruptive behavior did not constitute an expression or intimation of the court's opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Williams v. State, 183 Ga. App. 373, 358 S.E.2d 914 (1987).

- Trial court does not err in directing the defendant to testify from defense counsel's table, if the trial court does not express an opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the defendant, as the conduct of the trial, especially matters of courtroom security, are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Lee v. State, 166 Ga. App. 644, 305 S.E.2d 175 (1983).

- Judge's informing a defendant in the defendant's capacity as cocounsel in defendant's own defense that the defendant could not make speeches while ostensibly cross-examining a state's witness and that the defendant should limit the defendant's remarks to asking questions was not violative of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Powers v. State, 168 Ga. App. 642, 310 S.E.2d 260 (1983).

Although, in a criminal trial, a trial judge agreed with the prosecution that defense counsel's question mischaracterized a witness's plea bargain, the judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because: (1) the remark did not state or imply an opinion as to what had or had not been proved or as to a defendant's guilt; and (2) the remark merely exercised the judge's duty to manage the trial proceedings. White v. State, 315 Ga. App. 54, 726 S.E.2d 548 (2012).

- Statements and questions by the court merely clarifying the nature of a demonstration by defense counsel and enunciating a correct statement of the law were not improper comments on the evidence. Rowe v. State, 266 Ga. 136, 464 S.E.2d 811 (1996).

- Judge's statement to the jury "[a] lot of times when you sleep on it, things have a way of coming together" did not constitute an impermissible comment as to what had been proved or as to how the jury should find. Schwerdtfeger v. State, 167 Ga. App. 19, 305 S.E.2d 834 (1983).

- There was no error in a charge to the jury that "the state will introduce evidence in support of the charges contained in the indictment," since such statement did not predict that the state's evidence would establish the charges. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986).

Statement by the court as to what a witness has testified has been construed to be an intimation or expression of opinion as to what has been proven. Golden v. State, 45 Ga. App. 501, 165 S.E. 299 (1932).

- It is permissible for the trial judge to state the judge's recollection of what has been testified when in doing this the judge does not intimate any opinion. Saffold v. State, 11 Ga. App. 329, 75 S.E. 338 (1912).

- Statement by the court to the jury as to what a witness has testified, when such testimony is material and prejudicial to the accused, is reversible error. Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E. 1033 (1908).

- Trial judge should not, in the hearing of the jury, make any remark tending to compliment or disparage a witness. Cole v. State, 6 Ga. App. 798, 65 S.E. 839 (1909).

- While the trial court's casual colloquy with witnesses should have been minimized in front of the jury, the trial court's merely thanking a law enforcement witness, as a courtesy, for the officer's service as a witness did not rise to the level of improperly intimating an opinion about the testimony of the witness. Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012).

- It is reversible error for the judge to state facts of the judge's own knowledge, or as of the judge's own knowledge, tending to exculpate the witness from an offense charged against the witness, or tending to show that there were mitigating circumstances connected with the offense. Cole v. State, 6 Ga. App. 798, 65 S.E. 839 (1909).

- Statement of judge that certain evidence might be admissible on the idea of impeachment cannot be construed as expressing the opinion of the judge that the witness in question had been impeached by the evidence, particularly if the charge of the court did not contain any instructions upon the subject of the impeachment of witnesses. Cole v. State, 63 Ga. App. 418, 11 S.E.2d 239 (1940).

Judge's remark in regard to the cross-examination by counsel for the defendant of an alleged accomplice of the defendant that, "you put him under a severe cross-examination," is not an expression of opinion by the trial judge as to the severity of the cross-examination of the witness for the state. Gravitt v. State, 220 Ga. 781, 141 S.E.2d 893 (1965).

- It is not error for the trial judge to merely state an hypothesis if the judge does not intimate any opinion as to guilt or innocence of the accused, especially if the jury is properly instructed that nothing said or done by the judge should influence the verdict. Mays v. State, 237 Ga. 907, 230 S.E.2d 282 (1976).

- Statement that certain evidence, which is entirely irrelevant, has no probative value is not a violation of this section. Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 135 S.E. 917 (1926).

- Judge did not improperly comment on evidence by referring to evidence that was introduced. The reference was not telling the jury what the evidence proved, but instead was merely drawing the jury's attention to evidence which was relevant to the next charge to be given. Slaton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 422, 480 S.E.2d 872 (1997).

Repetitive instructions by the trial court on four occasions, after defining charged offenses and lesser included offenses, as to the form of the verdict should the jury find the defendant guilty of an offense did not constitute an improper expression or intimation of guilt. Reid v. State, 232 Ga. App. 313, 501 S.E.2d 842 (1998).

For comment by court on qualifications of expert witness, see Westbrook v. State, 242 Ga. 151, 249 S.E.2d 524 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1102, 99 S. Ct. 881, 59 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1979).

If a trial judge refers to a witness as the "victim," and the defendant makes no objection to such comments at trial, the defendant is estopped from raising this issue on appeal. Brown v. State, 150 Ga. App. 289, 257 S.E.2d 359 (1979).

Since the trial court did not impermissibly give an expression of an opinion concerning the evidence when the court used the word "victim," the defendant could not show deficient performance on the part of counsel for failing to object. Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 184, 625 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

- Trial court's references to the state's witnesses in open court as "young lady" or as "little girls" in bench conferences with the attorneys did not express or intimate the court's opinion as to the evidence or the guilt of the accused. Jennette v. State, 197 Ga. App. 580, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).

Allowing a child-victim to sit on the mother's lap during questioning did not amount to an intimation of the trial court's opinion as to what had been proven or the accused's guilt. Murchison v. State, 231 Ga. App. 769, 500 S.E.2d 651 (1998).

Reference by the court to "the confession testified about" by a witness does not express or intimate an opinion that any confession has been proved. Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. 264, 170 S.E. 26 (1933).

If court remarks "he has answered that" in response to question posed to witness the court is not intimating or expressing an opinion as to what had been proved. Hamilton v. State, 91 Ga. App. 295, 85 S.E.2d 496 (1954).

- Rulings on admissibility of evidence, consisting of remarks by the court as to whether counsel would connect up certain evidence later, and statement that the court would rule on the admissibility later, do not express an opinion on the facts of the case. Pierce v. State, 212 Ga. 88, 90 S.E.2d 417 (1955).

Mere challenging by the court of question asked by the defendant of a witness for the state without challenging a like question asked by the state of the defendant cannot be taken as impliedly expressing an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Williams v. State, 186 Ga. 251, 197 S.E. 838 (1938).

- For inference from judge's remarks that the judge is looking for a quick verdict, see Dyson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 297, 270 S.E.2d 711 (1980).

- If a witness is jointly indicted with the defendant on trial, and the witness and the accused are the only two alleged to be involved in the criminal transaction, and the court charges the jury that the witness, having been convicted, is an accomplice as a matter of law, this is an expression of an opinion by the trial judge upon a matter of fact as to what had been proved upon trial. Such an error renders the grant of a new trial imperative, without reference to the correctness of the verdict. Sellers v. State, 41 Ga. App. 572, 153 S.E. 782 (1930).

Statement that the codefendants "appear in this case as accomplices" is error, and a reversal for such error is mandatory. Mitchell v. State, 89 Ga. App. 80, 78 S.E.2d 563 (1953).

- If, in response to an objection of the defendant's counsel to a question propounded by the solicitor to a witness, the court allows the question stating "we want the truth about it," and it is contended that this statement is error because the court complimented the witness, and intimated and expressed an opinion in the presence of the jury that the witness would tell the truth, the remark deals with future testimony and not with facts which have been proved. Accordingly, it does not come within the inhibition of this section making it mandatory to reverse any case in which the court has expressed or intimated an opinion. Whether or not reversal would follow from the remark made would depend not only on whether it was error, but on whether the error was harmful to the movant. Hamilton v. State, 91 Ga. App. 299, 85 S.E.2d 557 (1954).

- When remark of the judge in answer to counsel is made in the hearing of the jurors and is prejudicial to the defendant, the defendant should either have moved to declare a mistrial or for postponement of the case that other jurors might be impaneled to try the defendant. Armstrong v. State, 181 Ga. 538, 183 S.E. 67 (1935).

- Although merely ruling on a point of law raised by the parties in a case does not constitute an expression of opinion of the trial court under this section, even though the judge must refer to testimony in order to make the judge's ruling intelligible, nevertheless, it is very possible that the jury, being laymen, might consider the fact that the court refused to direct a verdict for one of the parties as an implication that the judge was of the opinion that one party should not prevail. In such a case, it is not necessary for the movant to show that the court's error in refusing to grant the motion to remove the jury actually entered into and influenced the jury's verdict, but it is sufficient to show that the ruling would have been likely to produce that effect in order for it to constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Poole v. State, 100 Ga. App. 380, 111 S.E.2d 265 (1959).

- Court's statement to counsel for the defendant, not made before a jury, that the court believes that the defendant is guilty, cannot be made the basis for legal error when it is not contended that the court so acted as to communicate this belief to the jury during the trial. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

- As a general rule, directions by the court, in the presence of the jury, that a witness who has testified on behalf of the defendant, or a witness for the state who has refused to testify to matters prejudicial to the defendant, be arrested for perjury, constitutes reversible error in that the statement is a comment upon, or expression of opinion as to, the credibility of such witness, and as to the guilt of the defendant, expressly prohibited by this section. Benton v. State, 58 Ga. App. 633, 199 S.E. 561 (1938).

- Distinction must be drawn between cases of this character and cases where the witness is ordered into custody because of persistent refusal to answer and evasion of questions propounded. The trial judge is given wide discretion in dealing with and controlling witnesses and in adjudging them in contempt, and as a general rule the judge's action in placing a refractory witness under arrest for refusal to respond to questions propounded does not amount to an expression or intimation of opinion prohibited by this section. Benton v. State, 58 Ga. App. 633, 199 S.E. 561 (1938).

- This section relates only to statements made during the progress of the case or in the charge to the jury. It is not applicable to remarks made by the judge prior to the trial, though made in open court and in the presence of persons who afterwards served on the jury in the case. White v. State, 7 Ga. App. 20, 65 S.E. 1073 (1909).

- When remarks are made by the trial judge to counsel in a criminal case in the hearing of the jurors, which counsel contend were of such a character as to prejudice the minds of the jurors hearing the remarks against the cause of their client, counsel should either move for a postponement of the hearing in order that other jurors may be impaneled than those present when the remark is made, or, if the jurors have actually been selected and impaneled to try the particular case, a motion should be made to have a mistrial declared. Counsel, having failed to make such motion and having proceeded without objection with the trial, cannot after conviction raise the question as to the prejudicial nature of the remarks complained of in a motion for a new trial. Navarra v. State, 51 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E. 375 (1935).

- Question of whether O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 has been violated is not reached unless objection or motion for mistrial is made. Smith v. State, 158 Ga. App. 330, 280 S.E.2d 162 (1981); Davitt v. State, 232 Ga. App. 427, 502 S.E.2d 300 (1998); Zehner v. State, 241 Ga. App. 345, 525 S.E.2d 416 (1999).

- Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court warned trial counsel about keeping the clients under control based on the defendant's inappropriate behavior in laughing as the comment was not directed toward a material issue nor was it an intimation on the defendant's guilt or innocence during the defendant's trial for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Wright v. State, 294 Ga. App. 20, 668 S.E.2d 505 (2008).

- Trial court did not undermine the integrity of the process or improperly enhance the credibility of the witness by engaging in a brief, friendly exchange with the witness to which defendant posed no objection at the time. O'Hara v. State, 241 Ga. App. 855, 528 S.E.2d 296 (2000).

No error occurred regarding comments the trial court made during trial as the comments did not involve the trial court's expression of opinion about what had or had not been proven concerning the defendant's guilt. Mai v. State, 259 Ga. App. 471, 577 S.E.2d 288 (2003).

Trial court did not impermissibly comment on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the judge merely directed that the witness be allowed to finish the witness's answer; the trial court did not assume any facts or intimate to the jury the judge's opinion of the evidence. Patterson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 630, 577 S.E.2d 850 (2003).

Defendant waived any error resulting from the trial court's violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by commenting on the length of the indictment as the defendant neither objected nor moved for a mistrial after the statement was made; further, the statement was not a violation of the statute as the statement was not a comment on the evidence or the guilt of the defendant, but only on the length of the indictment. Osterhout v. State, 266 Ga. App. 319, 596 S.E.2d 766 (2004).

Trial judge did not breach the limitations of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the judge made it clear to the jury that the judge would not address the facts of the case and did not express any opinion as to what had been proven at trial. Copeny v. State, 316 Ga. App. 347, 729 S.E.2d 487 (2012).

At defendant's trial for drug possession and sale, O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was not violated when the trial judge commented on the sufficiency of the evidence because the purpose of § 17-8-57 is to prevent the jury from being influenced, and the jury was not present at the time of the remarks. Clowers v. State, 324 Ga. App. 264, 750 S.E.2d 169 (2013).

Comment by the trial judge that a crime was no less punishable if committed against a bad person than a good person was not reversible error as the jury was instructed not to construe any comment by the trial court as an expression of opinion upon the facts or evidence, credibility of witnesses, or guilt or innocence of the accused. Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 759 S.E.2d 525 (2014).

Court's statement requiring that the medical examiner state that the autopsy photographs would assist the medical examiner's testimony did not express or intimate an opinion in alignment with the state. Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (2015).

Because defense counsel in opening and closing remarks explained to the jury that the defendant fired the gun at the second victim in defense of another person, whom the defendant thought was in danger, two witnesses observed the defendant fire the gun at the second victim, and the defendant told police that the defendant fired the gun at the second victim, it was undisputed and never contradicted by any evidence that the defendant shot the second victim; thus, the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding identity as to the robbery count, in which the trial court stated that the defendant admitted to shooting and firing the weapon at the second victim, did not constitute an impermissible comment on the evidence. McNeal v. State, 302 Ga. 222, 805 S.E.2d 820 (2017).

Incident in which the trial judge gave an audible grunt, and tossed a pen down on the bench did not constitute a comment on the evidence because the second defendant had already left the witness stand when the incident took place; thus, the record did not support the second defendant's contention that the incident intimated to the jury that the second defendant's testimony was other than truthful and had to be taken by the jury as a derogatory remark on the second defendant's credibility. Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 805 S.E.2d 80 (2017), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Trial judge's comments during cross-examination of the victim, which arose during the colloquy between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the prosecution's objection to defense counsel's instruction to the victim not to assume, were the judge's explanations of the judge's reasons for rulings on evidentiary objections or concerned undisputed facts, so the comments did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Jenkins v. State, 354 Ga. App. 674, 839 S.E.2d 698 (2020).

- Although a trial court stated that a child witness would not testify at trial because the child kept crying, because the child was present and available to testify at trial, the child's hearsay statements did not occur pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820); the judge's comment that the witness would not testify was not an improper comment on the evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Brock v. State, 270 Ga. App. 250, 605 S.E.2d 907 (2004).

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to comments or questions made by the trial court judge in the defendant's criminal proceeding as the statements did not constitute improper judicial comment under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; the judge's remarks included a correction of the attorney's misstatement in cross-examination of a police officer, a clarification of a language communication problem, and a clarification of a term of art. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Trial court did not express an opinion in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, an inmate's rights to confrontation, or a fair and impartial jury when the court explained to those in the courtroom during jury deliberations that the court had received two notes from the jury describing a communication received by a juror that offered the juror a bribe in exchange for changing the juror's vote to not guilty; the trial court's comment did not suggest that the inmate had directed the bribery attempt because the court merely reviewed the jurors' notes and did not go beyond the notes, and it added nothing to that which the jurors already knew. Greer v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 419, 637 S.E.2d 698 (2006).

After a thorough review of the questioning by the trial court revealed that the court's efforts were directed toward keeping the judicial proceedings in compliance with evidentiary rules, no comment or question posed by the court reflected upon either the evidence or the defendant in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Meeker v. State, 282 Ga. App. 77, 637 S.E.2d 806 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to specifically cite to that part of the record relating to the trial judge's alleged improper comment on the cross-examination of a witness, and in the only instance where the appellate court could find anything close to a violation, such occurred after the verdict had already been rendered; thus, the defendant's claim that the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 lacked any factual basis. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).

A 27-year-old rape victim was mentally retarded and had the mind of a ten-year-old. The trial court's solicitous attitude and comments to the victim did not constitute an expression of the court's opinion as to the defendant's guilt under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, nor did the comment bolster the victim's credibility. Kent v. State, 294 Ga. App. 134, 668 S.E.2d 442 (2008).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court told the jury that the defendant's absence from the second day of trial was unexplained and that it would proceed in the defendant's absence. The statements did not express an opinion about whether the evidence had proven a material issue, whether a witness was credible, or whether the defendant was guilty; moreover, the statements were appropriate as the statements were intended to explain the defendant's absence. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 98, 679 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

Trial judge's comment to the jury while directing a verdict for a defendant on a count in the indictment that, "as the prosecutor explained in his opening statement, they were not going to bring a witness from Texas to testify as to that offense," did not improperly suggest to the jury that the trial judge believed the defendant to be guilty. Dixon v. State, 300 Ga. App. 183, 684 S.E.2d 679 (2009).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by commenting upon the intent and credibility of the state's witness in its curative instructions because the trial court's remarks did not express an opinion as to the credibility of the state's witness but were responsive to the defendant's objection to the witness's testimony and only served to explain the rationale for the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion for mistrial. Kohler v. State, 300 Ga. App. 692, 686 S.E.2d 328 (2009).

- Trial judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by improperly commenting on the evidence because the trial judge's actions or remarks did not amount to an expression of opinion with regard to the defendant's guilt or innocence or to what had or had not been proven at trial in violation of § 17-8-57; the statute does not prohibit the trial judge from taking such measures as necessary to ensure the orderly administration of the trial, and the trial judge may even propound questions to a witness to clarify testimony when necessary in order to enforce the court's duty to ensure a fair trial. Moore v. State, 301 Ga. App. 220, 687 S.E.2d 259 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0544, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 333 (Ga. 2010), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

- During the defendant's opening statement, the defendant in a DUI case, proceeding pro se, stated that the field sobriety tests had an accuracy rating of only 65 percent. The judge's comment interrupting the defendant and stating that the defendant would not have evidence to substantiate the statement was not an inadmissible judicial comment under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the opening statement was supposed to give the jury an outline of the evidence to be presented. Steed v. State, 309 Ga. App. 546, 710 S.E.2d 696 (2011).

Trial court's comments to a prosecution witness did not improperly bolster that witness's credibility because although some of the trial court's comments seemed to suggest approval of the witness and should have been avoided to prevent even the slightest intimation of partiality, the remarks did not undermine the integrity of the process or improperly enhance the credibility of the witness or comment upon what was proved or the defendant's guilt. Holland v. State, 310 Ga. App. 623, 714 S.E.2d 126 (2011).

Trial court did not impermissibly comment on the evidence when the court granted a directed verdict on the count of the indictment charging the defendant with felony murder based on the underlying crime of fleeing and attempting to elude police because during the court's main charge to the jury, the trial court emphasized to the jury that the court had no opinion as to what had or had not been proved regarding the defendant's guilt; the trial court's statement regarding the existence of a scrivener's error in the indictment referred only to the incomplete count and did not contain an expression or intimation regarding the remaining counts of the indictment. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 650, 715 S.E.2d 99 (2011).

- Trial court's single, isolated use of the term "swearing" was not impermissible under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because, in the context of the testimony, the term referred to the sworn trial testimony, not the trial court's opinion with regard to the facts at issue. Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012).

Trial court's statement that the state would introduce evidence in support of the charges contained in the indictment did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; judicial comments limited to a clarification of procedures and which do not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial do not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Foster v. State, 290 Ga. 599, 723 S.E.2d 663 (2012).

- Because the trial court did improperly comment on the defendant's credibility, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, but only directed the defendant to answer the questions being asked, and expressed no opinion as to the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony, whether responsive or not, those comments did not warrant a new trial. Anthony v. State, 282 Ga. App. 457, 638 S.E.2d 877 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge made comments which unduly highlighted and overemphasized the testimony of the DNA expert, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, as the comments were clearly directed at one juror to encourage that juror to stay awake and pay attention to the presentation of the evidence. Carruth v. State, 286 Ga. App. 431, 649 S.E.2d 557 (2007).

Trial court's statement that a trial was "like a jigsaw puzzle" and that "all of the pieces" were "not there" was not an improper comment on the evidence or an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof; the trial court did not indicate that certain things should be considered as facts or intimate to the jury what the trial court thought the evidence showed, and furthermore the statement was immediately followed by a comprehensive charge on the state's burden of proof. Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

Trial judge did not erroneously admonish the victim to tell the truth during a portion of the victim's testimony since: (1) the record showed that the victim was a reluctant witness; (2) the admonishment was made outside the presence of the jury; (3) the judge's comments were not improper and did not amount to the court leaving the court's position of impartiality during the trial or interfere with the factfinding process of the jury; and (4) it was clear from the record that the comments did not alter the victim's testimony as the victim's subsequent trial testimony was consistent with previously written statements to the police. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

Trial judge did not err in questioning the victim in the presence of the jury as the action did not imply, express, or intimate an opinion on the facts of the case or as the defendant's guilt, nor was the question argumentative; moreover, contrary to the defendant's argument, the question could not reasonably be construed as tending to discredit the victim or the victim's testimony, or as authorizing a reasonable inference by the jury that the trial court entertained an inference unfavorable to the defendant. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

Aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to reject the defendant's self-defense claim; (2) two photographs were properly admitted as innocuous demonstrative aids to show the scene of the crime and the defendant's location; and (3) the trial court did not improperly give the court's opinion about the evidence, but merely attempted to clarify the state's position; furthermore, with respect to the latter, the jury was properly instructed that no ruling or comment by the court was intended to express an opinion on the facts of the case, the credibility of witnesses, the evidence, or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Whitaker v. State, 287 Ga. App. 465, 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007).

Because the defendant conceded that the specific comment made by the trial judge that the defendant complained of on appeal was not made in the presence of or to the jury, the defendant's argument on appeal presented no basis for reversal of the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police office McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Trial court's admonishment, outside the presence of the jury, that the victim tell the truth, was certainly an appropriate exercise of discretion in controlling the trial and was not unfair or prejudicial to the defendant; moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the comments were not improper and did not amount to the court leaving its position of impartiality during the trial. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by expressing to two jurors an opinion that the defendant was guilty as the court merely sought to determine whether the two jurors should be excused from further service because of the jurors' relationship with the defendant's family and resolved the issue in the manner the defendant requested; moreover, the defendant's right to a public trial was not violated when the trial judge ordered the spectators out of the courtroom at this time as the judge was accommodating a request of one of the jurors for a more private setting. Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 651 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to a mistrial based on the trial judge's alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because even if the judge's reference to the victim as such was erroneous, the judge's curative instruction corrected any misstatement and clearly did not intimate to the jury what the court believed the evidence to be. Warner v. State, 287 Ga. App. 892, 652 S.E.2d 898 (2007).

When defense counsel attempted to impeach a witness about a statement in the witness's guilty plea that the witness was a first offender, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by stating that the witness had not sought first offender status and that the witness's attorney had described the witness as a first offender in a form completed by the attorney; the comments were limited in scope to a clarification of the procedure utilized by the trial court in accepting a guilty plea, and the comments did not address the witness's credibility in general or any fact at issue. John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007).

Trial court's references to the trial as a "murder case," an estimate of the time that would be required for the guilt/innocence phase, reference to the trial court and the parties collectively using the word "we," comments regarding the nature of cross-examination, and questions propounded by the trial court to a witness, were not improper under a plain error standard. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011).

Trial court's comment, in ruling on the admissibility of an item of evidence, on whether the item was identifiable without expert testimony as being a gun silencer was not improper; comments made in the course of ruling on objections are generally not the type of comments prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and the defendant had not requested that the objection be heard outside the jury's presence. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011).

While the trial court erred in expressly informing the jury, prior to the presentation of evidence, of the court's opinion of fact that fingerprint testimony was rarely presented at trial and that fingerprint evidence was very hard to get, the error did not necessitate reversal because the defendant could not show that the trial court's instruction affected the defendant's substantial rights given that the fingerprint evidence was not vital to placing the defendant at the scene of the crime. Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

- There is no reversible error when the court made a verbal error in a charge by substituting "is" for "if" and the error clearly could not have misled or confused the jury. Graham v. State, 242 Ga. App. 361, 529 S.E.2d 641 (2000).

Judge's reference to defendant as "criminal" defendant during voir dire did not place the defendant's character in issue and was not a comment on the defendant's guilt. Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000).

- Trial judge did not improperly comment on the evidence when the judge directed that the record would reflect that the victim and the witness had identified the defendant during their testimony because the jurors were present in the courtroom and able to determine for themselves whether someone in the courtroom matched the man identified by the victim and by the witness; and, in context, the trial judge's statement served to clarify the victim's and witness's words, as the words would later be transcribed, not to indicate to the jury whether the state had proved that the defendant was the man who visited the victim's home and, months later, broke in and attacked the victim. Crenshaw v. State, 341 Ga. App. 406, 801 S.E.2d 92 (2017).

- When, during pro-se defendant's brief cross-examination of his ex-girlfriend, the trial court was forced to admonish him three times not to argue with her about their children, the comments were appropriate and intimated no opinion with regard to the case or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Brooks v. State, 243 Ga. App. 246, 532 S.E.2d 763 (2000).

- Defendant's attempt to invoke the plain error doctrine with regard to the state's closing argument allegedly eliciting sympathy for the victim in violation of the prohibition against asking the jurors to place themselves in the same position of the victim was misplaced when the plain error doctrine applied only to capital cases and criminal cases in which a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 occurred, and neither category applied to the defendant's trial for armed robbery. Foster v. State, 267 Ga. App. 363, 599 S.E.2d 309 (2004).

Plain error doctrine had been limited to capital cases and to criminal cases in which the trial judge allegedly intimated an opinion of the defendant's guilt in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 and had no application to a defendant's claims that a child molestation victim's hearsay statements served to bolster the victim's credibility and lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 884, 635 S.E.2d 240 (2006).

- Plain error rule applies to death penalty cases and other criminal cases in which the trial court violates O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and thus any alleged violation of § 17-8-57 must be reviewed in accordance with the plain error rule; the Georgia Supreme Court disapproves Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 625 S.E.2d 397 (2006) and Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 560 S.E.2d 680 (2002), to the extent the analysis therein is inconsistent regarding review for plain error. Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007).

- Defendant was not entitled to a plain error review of a colloquy at trial, held outside the jury's presence, between the court and a witness called by the state who was reluctant to testify because the alleged error did not involve error in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty, in a trial judge's expression of opinion to the jury, or in the jury charge. Solomon v. State, 293 Ga. 605, 748 S.E.2d 865 (2013).

- Defendant was entitled to a new trial after a trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by stating, during defense counsel's opening, that venue in the defendant's prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2 was proper in Fayette County; the language prohibiting judicial comments of that type was mandatory and neither the fact that the trial court might not have meant to express an opinion, nor the fact that the trial court gave curative instructions after making the comment, could excuse or cure the violation. Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007).

It was reversible error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the trial court asked the prosecutor whether venue had been established and, after the prosecutor responded, stated, "I just wanted to make sure." In making these comments, the trial court improperly expressed the court's opinion as to what had been proven on a disputed issue of fact; the fact that the defendant did not object was immaterial because a violation of § 17-8-47 was plain error. Anderson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 733, 678 S.E.2d 498 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 159, 695 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 2010).

- Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial judge's comments were limited in scope, were for the purpose of controlling the trial conduct and ensuring a fair trial, did not involve the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and did not express an opinion on the evidence as to what was proved or not; comments by the trial judge during defense counsel's closing arguments were for the purpose of preventing misstatements to the jury concerning matters not in evidence and were not improper under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Mathis v. State, 276 Ga. App. 205, 622 S.E.2d 857 (2005).

Cited in Davis v. State, 91 Ga. 167, 17 S.E. 292 (1893); Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407, 37 S.E. 747 (1900); Alexander v. State, 114 Ga. 266, 40 S.E. 231 (1901); Hodge v. State, 116 Ga. 929, 43 S.E. 370 (1903); Battise v. State, 124 Ga. 866, 53 S.E. 678 (1906); Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 S.E. 67 (1907); Johnson v. State, 2 Ga. App. 405, 58 S.E. 684 (1907); Darby v. State, 16 Ga. App. 171, 84 S.E. 724 (1915); Peyton v. State, 18 Ga. App. 691, 90 S.E. 359 (1916); Peek v. State, 155 Ga. 49, 116 S.E. 629 (1923); Thompson v. State, 160 Ga. 520, 128 S.E. 756 (1925); Spivey v. State, 38 Ga. App. 213, 143 S.E. 450 (1928); Bailey v. State, 167 Ga. 318, 145 S.E. 456 (1928); Norris v. State, 40 Ga. App. 232, 149 S.E. 158 (1929); Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930); Holleman v. State, 171 Ga. 200, 154 S.E. 906 (1930); Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655, 156 S.E. 599 (1930); Smith v. State, 43 Ga. App. 213, 158 S.E. 447 (1931); Parker v. State, 174 Ga. 453, 162 S.E. 812 (1932); De Vere v. State, 45 Ga. App. 330, 164 S.E. 485 (1932); Belmont v. State, 175 Ga. 15, 165 S.E. 45 (1932); McKee v. State, 176 Ga. 717, 168 S.E. 862 (1933); McDow v. State, 176 Ga. 764, 168 S.E. 869 (1933); Fussell v. State, 48 Ga. App. 119, 172 S.E. 73 (1933); Kryder v. State, 57 Ga. App. 200, 194 S.E. 890 (1938); Morgan v. State, 59 Ga. App. 903, 2 S.E.2d 502 (1939); Corley v. State, 64 Ga. App. 841, 14 S.E.2d 121 (1941); Sanders v. State, 66 Ga. App. 128, 17 S.E.2d 251 (1941); Canady v. State, 68 Ga. App. 735, 23 S.E.2d 870 (1942); Elmore v. State, 70 Ga. App. 832, 29 S.E.2d 713 (1944); Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 39 S.E.2d 478 (1946); Williams v. State, 77 Ga. App. 51, 47 S.E.2d 782 (1948); Harris v. State, 207 Ga. 287, 61 S.E.2d 135 (1950); Robinson v. State, 207 Ga. 337, 61 S.E.2d 475 (1950); Osborne v. State, 209 Ga. 345, 72 S.E.2d 317 (1952); Frost v. State, 92 Ga. App. 614, 89 S.E.2d 524 (1955); Moultrie v. State, 93 Ga. App. 396, 92 S.E.2d 33 (1956); Scoggins v. State, 98 Ga. App. 360, 106 S.E.2d 39 (1958); Maddox v. State, 99 Ga. App. 438, 108 S.E.2d 758 (1959); Bedgood v. State, 100 Ga. App. 736, 112 S.E.2d 430 (1959); Williamson v. State, 217 Ga. 162, 121 S.E.2d 782 (1961); Parker v. State, 218 Ga. 654, 129 S.E.2d 850 (1963); Gaddis v. State, 107 Ga. App. 661, 131 S.E.2d 126 (1963); Gore v. State, 110 Ga. App. 344, 138 S.E.2d 471 (1964); Wheeler v. State, 220 Ga. 535, 140 S.E.2d 258 (1965); Seay v. State, 111 Ga. App. 22, 140 S.E.2d 283 (1965); Anthony v. State, 112 Ga. App. 444, 145 S.E.2d 657 (1965); Barnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 431, 154 S.E.2d 878 (1967); Rowell v. State, 122 Ga. App. 568, 177 S.E.2d 812 (1970); Tutt v. State, 122 Ga. App. 673, 178 S.E.2d 339 (1970); Sheffield v. State, 124 Ga. App. 295, 183 S.E.2d 525 (1971); Ezzard v. State, 229 Ga. 465, 192 S.E.2d 374 (1972); Karavos v. State, 128 Ga. App. 268, 196 S.E.2d 355 (1973); White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849 (1973); Knight v. State, 130 Ga. App. 551, 203 S.E.2d 911 (1974); Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 213, 205 S.E.2d 859 (1974); DeFreese v. State, 232 Ga. 739, 208 S.E.2d 832 (1974); Stone v. State, 132 Ga. App. 703, 209 S.E.2d 121 (1974); Davis v. State, 133 Ga. App. 452, 211 S.E.2d 406 (1974); Ross v. State, 135 Ga. App. 169, 217 S.E.2d 170 (1975); Evans v. State, 235 Ga. 396, 219 S.E.2d 725 (1975); Ray v. State, 235 Ga. 467, 219 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Hayes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 746, 222 S.E.2d 193 (1975); Moon v. State, 136 Ga. App. 905, 222 S.E.2d 635 (1975); Hughes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 927, 222 S.E.2d 645 (1975); McNeese v. State, 236 Ga. 26, 222 S.E.2d 318 (1976); Waters v. State, 237 Ga. 64, 226 S.E.2d 596 (1976); Campbell v. State, 237 Ga. 76, 226 S.E.2d 601 (1976); Copeland v. State, 139 Ga. App. 55, 227 S.E.2d 850 (1976); Powell v. State, 237 Ga. 490, 228 S.E.2d 875 (1976); Decker v. State, 139 Ga. App. 707, 229 S.E.2d 520 (1976); Bass v. State, 140 Ga. App. 788, 232 S.E.2d 98 (1976); Ansley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 314, 233 S.E.2d 272 (1977); Roberts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 550, 234 S.E.2d 138 (1977); Pitts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 845, 234 S.E.2d 682 (1977); Collins v. State, 143 Ga. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 232 (1977); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Griffin, 240 Ga. 470, 241 S.E.2d 230 (1978); Clempson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 625, 241 S.E.2d 495 (1978); Aufderheide v. State, 144 Ga. App. 877, 242 S.E.2d 758 (1978); Foushi v. State, 144 Ga. App. 608, 244 S.E.2d 14 (1978); Perdue v. State, 147 Ga. App. 648, 249 S.E.2d 657 (1978); Thomas v. State, 242 Ga. 712, 251 S.E.2d 294 (1978); Patterson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 438, 254 S.E.2d 445 (1979); Boatright v. State, 150 Ga. App. 283, 257 S.E.2d 314 (1979); Schuh v. State, 150 Ga. App. 700, 258 S.E.2d 328 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 263 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5, 268 S.E.2d 635 (1980); Chapman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 532, 268 S.E.2d 797 (1980); Bissell v. State, 157 Ga. App. 711, 278 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Brady v. State, 159 Ga. App. 389, 283 S.E.2d 617 (1981); Laney v. State, 159 Ga. App. 609, 284 S.E.2d 114 (1981); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Gibson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 615, 287 S.E.2d 595 (1981); Ferry v. State, 161 Ga. App. 795, 287 S.E.2d 732 (1982); Buford v. State, 162 Ga. App. 498, 291 S.E.2d 256 (1982); Suddeth v. State, 162 Ga. App. 460, 291 S.E.2d 430 (1982); Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 320, 292 S.E.2d 77 (1982); McKenzie v. State, 162 Ga. App. 522, 292 S.E.2d 722 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Johnson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 7, 296 S.E.2d 202 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Johnson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 773, 302 S.E.2d 626 (1983); Millwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. 292, 304 S.E.2d 103 (1983); Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983); Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. App. 104, 311 S.E.2d 528 (1983); Magsby v. State, 169 Ga. App. 637, 314 S.E.2d 473 (1984); Kelley v. State, 169 Ga. App. 917, 315 S.E.2d 916 (1984); Davis v. State, 170 Ga. App. 126, 316 S.E.2d 573 (1984); In re Crane, 171 Ga. App. 31, 318 S.E.2d 709 (1984); McDonald v. State, 170 Ga. App. 884, 318 S.E.2d 749 (1984); Hufstetler v. State, 171 Ga. App. 106, 319 S.E.2d 869 (1984); Buffington v. State, 171 Ga. App. 919, 321 S.E.2d 418 (1984); 134 Baker St., Inc. v. State, 172 Ga. App. 738, 324 S.E.2d 575 (1984); Frankum v. State, 174 Ga. App. 660, 331 S.E.2d 52 (1985); Johnson v. State, 254 Ga. 591, 331 S.E.2d 578 (1985); Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 863, 341 S.E.2d 324 (1986); Worth v. State, 179 Ga. App. 207, 346 S.E.2d 82 (1986); Dixon v. State, 179 Ga. App. 278, 346 S.E.2d 93 (1986); Price v. State, 179 Ga. App. 691, 347 S.E.2d 365 (1986); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. 724, 347 S.E.2d 692 (1986); Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986); Lobdell v. State, 256 Ga. 769, 353 S.E.2d 799 (1987); Russell v. State, 184 Ga. App. 657, 362 S.E.2d 392 (1987); House v. State, 184 Ga. App. 724, 362 S.E.2d 429 (1987); Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988); Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988); Pless v. State, 187 Ga. App. 772, 371 S.E.2d 406 (1988); Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. 856, 376 S.E.2d 356 (1989); Barker v. State, 191 Ga. App. 451, 382 S.E.2d 115 (1989); Stephen v. State, 259 Ga. 820, 388 S.E.2d 519 (1990); Newton v. State, 259 Ga. 853, 388 S.E.2d 698 (1990); Mullen v. State, 197 Ga. App. 26, 397 S.E.2d 487 (1990); Kelly v. State, 197 Ga. App. 811, 399 S.E.2d 568 (1990); Lewallen v. State, 199 Ga. App. 798, 406 S.E.2d 255 (1991); Anderson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 29, 406 S.E.2d 791 (1991); Ledbetter v. State, 262 Ga. 370, 418 S.E.2d 57 (1992); Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 153, 430 S.E.2d 42 (1993); Jordan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 627, 470 S.E.2d 242 (1996); Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 445, 481 S.E.2d 238 (1997); Griffin v. State, 267 Ga. 586, 481 S.E.2d 223 (1997); Bryant v. State, 226 Ga. App. 135, 486 S.E.2d 374 (1997)

Crews v. State, 226 Ga. App. 232, 486 S.E.2d 61 (1997); Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997); Parker v. State, 229 Ga. App. 217, 493 S.E.2d 558 (1997); Mullins v. State, 269 Ga. 157, 496 S.E.2d 252 (1998); Richards v. State, 232 Ga. App. 584, 502 S.E.2d 519 (1998); Scroggins v. State, 237 Ga. App. 122, 514 S.E.2d 252 (1999); Murphy v. State, 270 Ga. 72, 508 S.E.2d 399 (1998); Thomas v. State, 238 Ga. App. 42, 517 S.E.2d 585 (1999); Hudson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 218, 529 S.E.2d 218 (2000); Humphrey v. State, 249 Ga. App. 805, 549 S.E.2d 144 (2001); Mitchell v. State, 275 Ga. 42, 561 S.E.2d 803 (2002); Coggins v. State, 275 Ga. 479, 569 S.E.2d 505 (2002); Bates v. State, 275 Ga. 862, 572 S.E.2d 550 (2002); Anderson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 362, 590 S.E.2d 729 (2003); Reedman v. State, 265 Ga. App. 162, 593 S.E.2d 46 (2003); Cheek v. State, 265 Ga. App. 15, 593 S.E.2d 55 (2003); Smith v. State, 265 Ga. App. 236, 593 S.E.2d 695 (2004); Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598, 581 S.E.2d 7 (2003); Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 642 S.E.2d 37 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020); Boyt v. State, 286 Ga. App. 460, 649 S.E.2d 589 (2007); Delgado v. State, 287 Ga. App. 273, 651 S.E.2d 201 (2007); Dasher v. Dasher, 283 Ga. 436, 658 S.E.2d 571 (2008); Connelly v. State, 295 Ga. App. 765, 673 S.E.2d 274 (2009); Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (2010), overruled on other grounds, White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 823 S.E.2d 794, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 66 (2019); Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Martinez v. State, 325 Ga. App. 267, 750 S.E.2d 504 (2013); Anderson v. State, 350 Ga. App. 369, 829 S.E.2d 453 (2019); Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 842 S.E.2d 275 (2020); Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 842 S.E.2d 22 (2020); Miller v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 10, 2020); Hill v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020); Marshall v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020).

Inquiries by the Judge

Judge has right to propound questions to develop the truth of the case.

- Trial judge has the right to propound a question or a series of questions to any witness for the purpose of developing fully the truth of the case. The extent to which the examination conducted by the court shall go is a matter within the judge's discretion. Smith v. State, 52 Ga. App. 88, 182 S.E. 816 (1935); Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974); Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 914, 98 S. Ct. 2255, 56 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1978); Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41 (1978); Calloway v. State, 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burns, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. 2019); Sanders v. State, 211 Ga. App. 859, 440 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

Because the defendant did not allege that the trial judge exhibited discriminatory behavior applicable to any of the prohibited categories in O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 and because there was no jury in defendant's juvenile case, the trial judge did not violate Ga. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B)(5) by asking a witness questions concerning the pry marks and the defendant's fingerprints on a window to fully develop the truth in the defendant's burglary case. In the Interest of J.D., 275 Ga. App. 147, 619 S.E.2d 818 (2005).

Trial judge was allowed to propound questions to a witness to develop the truth of the case, to clarify testimony, to comment on pertinent evidentiary rules, and to exercise the court's discretion when controlling the conduct of counsel or witnesses in order to enforce the court's duty to ensure a fair trial to both sides; a trial judge's questions, remarks, and directions during the defense examination of a witness did not amount to an expression of opinion with regard to the defendant's guilt or innocence or to what had or had not been proven. Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 627 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by questioning a state's witness regarding a prior statement the witness gave to police and the statement's conflict with the witness's trial testimony, nor in repeating to the jury the state's contention as to what crime had been committed, nor in responding to jury questions without indicating what the trial court believed the evidence to be. Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by questioning an emergency room worker as to whether the worker had seen fresh or dried blood on the victim in a child cruelty case. Once the witness's testimony had been clarified on this relevant point, the trial court expressed no opinion as to what had been proved or the testimony's significance as to the defendant's guilt. Chambers v. State, 313 Ga. App. 39, 720 S.E.2d 358 (2011).

- There is nothing per se erroneous in a trial judge propounding questions to witnesses on the stand. The only limitation on the judge's right in this connection is not to express or intimate any opinion as to what has or has not been proved. Parker v. State, 51 Ga. App. 295, 180 S.E. 390 (1935).

Trial court did not err by soliciting the jury for questions to ask the witnesses because the court followed the proper procedure for juror questions; the questions were then shared with counsel, who were given an opportunity to object before the court posed any questions the court found proper to the witness; the questions the court asked on behalf of the jury did not improperly intimate the court's opinion about the evidence or the defendant's guilt or innocence; the parties were allowed to ask follow-up questions to the witness; and the defendant did not identify in the defendant's brief a single jury question asked by the court that was improper, much less harmful. Hernandez v. State, 299 Ga. 796, 792 S.E.2d 373 (2016).

Trial judge may, in order to elicit the truth, propound to a witness a leading question, provided in so doing the judge does not violate the provisions of this section, forbidding the judge to express or intimate any opinion as to what has or has not been proved. Deese v. State, 137 Ga. App. 476, 224 S.E.2d 124 (1976).

Trial judge did not err in questioning the victim in the presence of the jury as the single question to the victim did not express or intimate an opinion as to proof or as to guilt, nor was the question argumentative; moreover, contrary to the defendant's argument, the question could not reasonably be construed as tending to discredit the victim or the victim's testimony or as authorizing a reasonable inference by the jury that the trial court entertained an inference unfavorable to the defendant. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

Trial judge's review and approval of the questions by the jurors and posing the questions in the manner that the judge believed to be most appropriate for developing the truth of the case and clarifying the witness' testimony consistent with the jurors' requests was proper as the trial court fulfilled the court's duty to ensure a fair trial for both sides and did not inappropriately intimate or express an opinion as to the matters proved at trial or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Benton v. State, 301 Ga. 100, 799 S.E.2d 743 (2017).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court judge's question to a witness because the trial court's question did not constitute plain error since the court's questioning of the neighbor was asked for the purpose of developing the truth of the case, and the court did not express or intimate an opinion as to proof or as to guilt, or bolster the credibility of the neighbor or victim. Bradley v. State, 342 Ga. App. 486, 804 S.E.2d 144 (2017).

- Trial court's straightforward inquiries regarding sleeping arrangements and why young girls who were molested were required to sleep outside in a truck with the defendant were not an improper expression of the trial court's opinion of the case and did not constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 171, 554 S.E.2d 202 (2001).

- Trial judge's questioning as to clarification of expert witness's title as a doctor, viewing the trial court's statement in the proper context, could not reasonably be construed as commenting upon the expert's credibility. Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 832 S.E.2d 354 (2019).

- Lengthy examination by the court of a witness called by either party is not cause for a new trial, even though some of the questions propounded by the court were leading in character, unless the court, during the examination of the witness, expresses or intimates an opinion on the facts of the case, or as to what has or has not been proved, or the examination takes such course as to become argumentative in character. Smith v. State, 52 Ga. App. 88, 182 S.E. 816 (1935); Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974); Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 914, 98 S. Ct. 2255, 56 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1978).

- Although the court has the right, even the duty, to question witnesses, and may even ask leading questions, the trial judge must not express or intimate the judge's opinion in any way, and it is difficult for the court to conduct extensive questioning of a witness without becoming an advocate. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979).

- Trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence because the trial court's interruption of defense counsel to inquire regarding the admissibility of testimony or the direction which counsel was going with a particular line of questioning did not constitute an opinion as to the proof or the guilt of the accused; and the trial court gave two curative instructions to the jury, admonishing the jury that the court had no opinion about the proof in the case or about the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 800 S.E.2d 353 (2017).

- Court may properly propound questions to a witness on the stand with a view to elicit the truth of the case. If in such examination the court does not express or intimate an opinion as to the credibility of the witness, or as to what has or has not been proved, the mere fact that competent testimony of the witness so elicited may be detrimental to the interest of a party will not be cause for granting that party a new trial. Fraser v. State, 52 Ga. App. 92, 182 S.E. 418 (1935).

- Although the trial judge has the right to examine witnesses, the utmost caution should be used to avoid impressing the jury by the examination, and when in a criminal case it appears that there is a probability that the circumstances, or the form of the examination, has conveyed to the jury an intimation of the court's belief in the guilt of the accused, a new trial should be granted. Nobles v. State, 13 Ga. App. 710, 79 S.E. 861 (1913).

Trial court committed plain error when the trial court judge improperly bolstered the victims' credibility when the court asked a witness specific questions regarding the victims, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and the error was compounded when the trial court denied the defendant the right to cross-examine the witness, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611), in an attempt to rebut the bolstering of the victims' credibility that was performed by the trial court. Craft v. State, 274 Ga. App. 410, 618 S.E.2d 104 (2005).

- When the solicitor general (now district attorney) stated to the court that the solicitor had been entrapped by the witness then on the stand, and requested and was granted leave to cross-examine the witness, the action of the judge in thereafter asking the witness during such examination, if the witness realized the witness was under oath, did not per se amount to an expression or intimation of opinion within the meaning of this section and when it appears that the examination continued, and the testimony of the witness was neither favorable nor unfavorable to the state or the accused, a new trial will not be granted. Benton v. State, 58 Ga. App. 633, 199 S.E. 561 (1938).

- Trial court's questions to a witness in a forged/unauthorized prescription case, which consisted of asking the witness whether the witness was lying or being truthful, clearly intimated the court's opinion regarding the credibility of the witness's testimony and were therefore patently improper under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, necessitating a new trial. Price v. State, 310 Ga. App. 132, 712 S.E.2d 135 (2011).

- Trial court may, after the jury indicates that it is unable to agree on a verdict, inquire how the jury stands numerically. Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979).

- For a judge to ask the jurors how the jurors stand is of doubtful propriety, and when, in response to the query, the information is given that the jurors stand "11 to one," to state that "usually, where the jury stands 11 to one, the one juror comes to the 11," is presumptively hurtful although the judge adds to the statement that the question is one of individual conscience, as the 11 might be wrong and the one right. Unless the verdict is demanded by the evidence, the error disclosed by such suggestive colloquy requires the grant of a new trial. Ball v. State, 9 Ga. App. 162, 70 S.E. 888 (1911).

- Judge does not become an advocate for the state or in any way express or intimate an opinion to the jury that something has not been proven when the judge makes an inquiry of counsel out of the jury's presence, as what a judge can do directly the judge can do indirectly. The trial judge has the right to propound a question or a series of questions to any witness for the purpose of developing fully the truth of the case and the extent to which the examination conducted by the court shall go is a matter within the judge's discretion. Hall v. State, 151 Ga. App. 700, 261 S.E.2d 442 (1979).

Trial court's statement, "If the State needs a material witness warrant, they need to get it to me right now. . .. Get people out looking. Otherwise call the rest of your witnesses in early," did not violate the trial court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by advising the prosecution how to proceed with the prosecution's case; the comments were made outside the presence of the jury. Carson v. State, 308 Ga. 761, 843 S.E.2d 421 (2020).

- Question by the trial court to the witness regarding the effects of the reversal medication and defendant's resulting level of coherence was proper because it was not an expression of an opinion but a means to determine whether admission of the nurse's statement would be permitted. Shields v. State, 272 Ga. 32, 526 S.E.2d 845 (2000).

- Denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial was proper as the trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object and to move for a mistrial on the basis of the trial court's comments during a discussion of whether and why the trial counsel should be allowed to continue a line of questioning of the defendant's housemate regarding the defendant's crying after the defendant's arrest; there was nothing to support the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court discussed whether and why the court should allow the line of questioning to continue. Temples v. State, 280 Ga. App. 874, 635 S.E.2d 249 (2006).

- When the trial court asked a witness a question to clarify the witness's testimony, the court did not make an improper comment on the testimony. Middlebrooks v. State, 255 Ga. App. 541, 566 S.E.2d 350 (2002).

Defendant's claim that the defendant's rights to due process under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I and to effective assistance of counsel under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV were violated by the trial court's comments on the evidence allegedly in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 failed; three of the comments were permissible because the comments were merely reflecting grounds for sustaining objections, another comment was not erroneous because the witness was permitted to answer the question over the state's objection, the trial court's questioning of victims was permissible because the questions were attempts to clarify the children's testimony, and any error by the expert in bolstering the testimony of certain witnesses was a self-induced error. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga. App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Because the presiding judge's questions about how the defendant shot backwards and how many shots the defendant fired were interposed to clarify the defendant's testimony and to develop the truth in the defendant's case, the superior court erred in finding that the questions constituted a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, and the defendant was not entitled to a new trial on that basis. State v. Nickerson, 324 Ga. App. 576, 749 S.E.2d 768 (2013).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court questioned a witness at trial about a prior statement to police because the question only asked for clarification of whom the witness was referring to when the witness used a plural pronoun and did not express or intimate an opinion regarding the credibility of the evidence being offered or the guilt of the accused. Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408 (2013).

Trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence during the defendant's cross-examination because the trial court attempted to clarify the defendant's testimony as to whether the defendant, an attorney, had a duty to correct a client's misstatement and, in so doing, did not express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or credibility; and the trial court cautioned the jury explicitly that no ruling or comment which the trial court made during the trial was intended to express any opinion upon the facts of the case, upon the credibility of the witnesses, upon the evidence, or upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 199, 193 L. Ed. 2d 128 (U.S. 2015).

- In asking a witness the time and date events occurred, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; the court simply asked two clarifying questions and did not express an opinion on the evidence or comment on an issue of fact. Griffith v. State, 286 Ga. App. 859, 650 S.E.2d 413 (2007).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court questioned the victim's wife because the wife's testimony concerning prior statements in which she did not identify the defendant as the shooter of the victim was, at times, confusing and unclear, and the trial court's questions were posed for the purpose of clarifying her testimony and fully developing the truth of the case; questions posed merely for the purpose of clarifying certain testimony does not violate § 17-8-57. Callaham v. State, 305 Ga. App. 626, 700 S.E.2d 624 (2010).

Questions posed by a trial judge to a defendant's cousin, defendant's alibi witness, were aimed at clarifying the cousin's testimony and were not an expression or intimation regarding the evidence or the defendant's guilt, and were therefore not prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Sims v. State, 306 Ga. App. 68, 701 S.E.2d 534 (2010).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 did not prohibit a trial judge from taking such measures as necessary to ensure the orderly administration of a trial, and the court was permitted to propound questions to a witness to clarify testimony when necessary to enforce the court's duty to ensure a fair trial. Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by asking a prosecution witness if the witness told a judge before whom the witness pled guilty to robbery that the witness was forced to commit the crime because the question was intended to clarify the witness's testimony explaining why the witness pled guilty when the witness claimed the witness was threatened, and did not express or intimate an opinion as to the witness's credibility. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

- Trial court's examination of a witness called by either side is not cause for a new trial unless the court, during the court's examination of the witness, expresses or intimates an opinion on the facts of the case or as to what has or has not been proved, or the questioning becomes argumentative. Shields v. State, 272 Ga. 32, 526 S.E.2d 845 (2000).

If nothing about the questions posed by the trial court constituted the expression or intimation of an opinion as to what was or was not proven regarding the guilt of the accused, and when, despite the defendant's complaint that the court interrupted defendant's re-cross examination and took the questioning from the defendant, the transcript showed that defense counsel was not prevented from continuing the examination of the witness and that the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Walker v. State, 267 Ga. App. 155, 598 S.E.2d 875 (2004).

Although bordering on adversarial, a trial court's questioning of a defendant did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the trial; therefore, reversal under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was not required. Milner v. State, 270 Ga. App. 80, 606 S.E.2d 91 (2004).

When the judge in a criminal trial questioned witnesses called by both the defendant and the state about facts that could have been considered both beneficial and detrimental to each side's case, the judge's actions did not constitute statements of the judge's opinion, argumentative questioning by the judge, or extreme anxiety on the part of the judge to develop the truth as to facts which, if proved, would have been peculiarly beneficial to one of the parties in the case and correspondingly detrimental to the other, from which the jury could have inferred the court's opinion. Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court merely asked a witness questions about the locations of events and did not refer to whether venue had been proven. Rawls v. State, 315 Ga. App. 891, 730 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

- When the trial court propounds certain questions to a witness, which examination, it is insisted, is conducted in such manner as to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff in error, such action by the court will not cause a reversal in the absence of any objection raised thereto at the time. Almond v. State, 128 Ga. App. 758, 197 S.E.2d 836 (1973).

- When questions by the court to clarify the state's inquiry did not contain any expressions or intimations and were addressed to relevant issues so as to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth, this did not entitle the defendant to a mistrial. Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987).

Trial judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the questions the judge propounded to a witness did not contain any expressions or intimations of opinion and were addressed to relevant issues so as to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth. Mathis v. State, 194 Ga. App. 498, 391 S.E.2d 130 (1990); Eagle v. State, 264 Ga. 1, 440 S.E.2d 2 (1994); Denny v. State, 226 Ga. App. 432, 486 S.E.2d 417 (1997).

Judge's questions in a shoplifting trial regarding whether the department store was located in Coweta County and whether the value of the items taken had been stated were proper questions to develop the case. Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012).

- Trial court may address a leading question to a witness in order to elicit the truth or clarify an issue, provided that the judge does not violate the statutory prohibition set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 against expressions or intimations of opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Cannon v. State, 179 Ga. App. 142, 345 S.E.2d 623 (1986).

Trial judge's inquiry of defense counsel about where defense counsel was going with a line of questioning about a pool party the victim attended out of which none of the charges against the defendant arose was not improper as the trial court did not comment on what the evidence did or did not show, or comment on the guilt of the defendant, and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Creed v. State, 255 Ga. App. 425, 565 S.E.2d 480 (2002).

- At a defendant's trial for violating a county junk vehicle ordinance, a trial court's questions to a code inspector as to whether the vehicles were "junk vehicles" and whether the vehicles were properly licensed, and the court's question to the defendant as to whether the defendant had moved the vehicles so that the vehicles were no longer in the defendant's backyard or whether the defendant had merely moved the vehicles from one part of the defendant's backyard to another, were not so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice or seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Litman v. State, 304 Ga. App. 690, 697 S.E.2d 855 (2010).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when, during the witness's cross-examination, the court became concerned about how upset the witness was and stopped the proceedings to briefly question the witness about the witness's well-being and by informing the jury of the source of the witness's discomfort, the court did not express a favorable opinion on the witness's abilities, did not give an opinion of the witness, and did not intimate an opinion as to the believability of the testimony. Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 268, 773 S.E.2d 269 (2015).

- During a defendant's trial for charges arising out of a road rage incident, the trial court did not express an improper opinion in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by interrupting defense counsel's cross-examination to point out that the defendant was being tried on the charges because a grand jury had indicted the defendant on the charges: the comments did not amount to plain error because the comments demonstrated authorized attempts to control the conduct of the trial and to guide the defense attorney to ensure a fair trial and the orderly administration of justice, and the comments were limited in scope, did not involve the defendant's guilt or innocence, and did not express an opinion on what had or had not been proved. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

- Trial judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by interrupting defense counsel's closing argument because the judge's comment was not an improper expression of the judge's opinion of the case; rather, it was an accurate statement of the law. The judge simply interjected to instruct the jury on the applicable law as charged in the indictment, but did not comment on the evidence or the guilt of the defendant. Klausen v. State, 294 Ga. App. 463, 669 S.E.2d 460 (2008).

- When, during trial, the judge in effect dared the appellant to take a polygraph test on the central issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence, it was inferable that the court did not believe the appellant, and such statement constituted a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Crane v. State, 164 Ga. App. 638, 298 S.E.2d 619 (1982).

- There was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 with regard to the defendant's assertion that the defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced when a trial judge questioned the defendant in a "prosecutorial" manner, since the allegedly improper questions were asked at a time when the jury was not present in the courtroom. Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 498, 299 S.E.2d 549 (1983).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in propounding questions to a forensic chemist when the court was trying to clarify an issue as to whether the defendant's blood sample had putrefied, and the court did not intimate or express an opinion as to what had or had not been proved, or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Thurman v. State, 172 Ga. App. 16, 321 S.E.2d 780 (1984).

- Defendant was not denied a fair trial by a colloquy that took place between the trial court and the State of Georgia's expert witness regarding the witness's qualifications, wherein the court referred to the witness as the "God Father" of the medical examiners in the witness's department of an investigative agency of the State of Georgia as the statement was not an impermissible comment on the witness's credibility. McKee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 646, 621 S.E.2d 611 (2005).

- Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by making comments about the reliability of an expert witness and of one-on-one show-ups because when the trial court interrupted defense counsel to make inquiry concerning the admissibility of testimony or the direction that counsel was going with a particular line of questioning, the trial court's comments did not constitute an opinion as to the proof or the guilt of the accused; the trial court promptly gave curative instructions disclaiming any intent by any ruling or comment to express an opinion on the facts of the case, on the credibility of any witness, or on the guilt or innocence of either defendant, stating that the questions in the case had to be decided by the jury, and expressing the trial court's absence of any inclination in the case. Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 721 S.E.2d 876 (2012).

- Trial judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 after referring to a special agent as a very thorough investigator because the reference to the witness being a very thorough investigator was solely in the context of explaining the court's concern for the orderly and efficient presentation of testimony to ensure that the state would not require the witness to testify about everything learned during the investigation, and the court's comment was limited in scope, did not involve defendant's guilt or innocence, and did not express an opinion on what had or had not been proved. Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 588, 740 S.E.2d 129 (2013).

- Trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in commenting to the jury that it was "quite all right" for detectives to provide false information to a suspect during a custodial interview to "test" the suspects; the trial court went beyond ruling that defense counsel's question was argumentative to gratuitously commenting on the propriety of the lead detective's technique. Haymer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 874, 747 S.E.2d 512 (2013).

- In a child enticement case under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5(a), a trial court's comment to a juror that the juror did not look the juror's age during voir dire did not constitute improper comments on the defendant's credibility under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 based on the defendant's claim that the defendant believed the child was older than the child said because the comment did not express an opinion as to what had or had not been proved. Adams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 570, 718 S.E.2d 899 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0500, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 263 (Ga. 2012).

In the defendant's murder trial, the trial court's question during voir dire, asking jurors to raise their hands if the jurors were impartial, and then, when no one raised a hand, the trial court rephrased the question, did not constitute an expression of opinion as to what had been proved as to the guilt of the accused in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. There was no plain error because the potential jurors freely expressed the jurors' biases in response to defense counsel's more specific questions. Mitchell v. State, 304 Ga. 56, 816 S.E.2d 9 (2018).

- Defendant's conviction was affirmed because the trial court's comments to the juror whether the man who attempted to contact the juror at lunch was in the courtroom, and the directions for the bailiff to accompany the jurors to the parking deck and for the defendant's family members to remain in the courtroom did not "express or intimate" the trial court's opinion regarding the evidence or the defendant's guilt. Perkins v. State, 319 Ga. App. 651, 738 S.E.2d 106 (2013), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

- Trial judge's statement to the jury that "you now have a pretty good idea where things happened," was not an impermissible comment on the evidence requiring a new trial, but was made in the context of telling jurors not to do their own investigation. Graham v. State, 337 Ga. App. 193, 786 S.E.2d 857 (2016).

- When the trial court made the court's comments regarding the history of the Intoxilyzer, defense counsel expressly agreed with the comments and then went on to clarify counsel's question about the history of the Intoxilyzer to the patrol officer. As such, the statement by the trial court concerning a fact that was uncontested or was not in dispute did not constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Rolland v. State, 321 Ga. App. 661, 742 S.E.2d 482 (2013).

- Trial court erred by commenting on the similarity and probative value of the similar transaction evidence, particularly since the defendant never conceded the similarity of the prior and present offenses and the trial court's statement that the other crime was similar and, therefore, probative of the defendant's guilt was damaging to the defendant's theory of defense, that the state's proof was insufficient and the state was using the defendant's prior guilty plea to improperly bolster the state's weak evidence. Huff v. State, 334 Ga. App. 254, 779 S.E.2d 29 (2015).

Ruling by the court on a point of law is not an expression of opinion. Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 514, 268 S.E.2d 784 (1980).

When an informant pled the Fifth Amendment during the informant's testimony, and the state asked the trial court to tell the informant that the informant had use immunity, the trial court did not express or intimate the court's opinion as to what had or had not been proved so as to violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court stated, "You need to answer the question. What the DA says is true." Winn v. State, 345 Ga. App. 359, 813 S.E.2d 400 (2018).

Trial court's simple statement sustaining an objection did not in any way implicate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Leggon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 467, 549 S.E.2d 137 (2001).

- Recognizing the rule that the expression of an opinion by the trial court prohibited by this section is reversible even though harmless, that rule does not apply when counsel makes a motion which invokes a ruling on the part of the trial court and which ruling necessarily is based on some opinion which the trial court holds relative to the evidence. Poole v. State, 100 Ga. App. 380, 111 S.E.2d 265 (1959).

Remarks of a judge assigning a reason for the judge's ruling are neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. 126, 269 S.E.2d 18 (1980); Goode v. State, 171 Ga. App. 901, 321 S.E.2d 410 (1984); Colsson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 840, 341 S.E.2d 318 (1986); Faulkner v. State, 186 Ga. App. 879, 368 S.E.2d 820 (1988); Adams v. State, 260 Ga. 298, 392 S.E.2d 866 (1990); Mitchell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 146, 407 S.E.2d 115 (1991); Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996); Young v. State, 269 Ga. 490, 500 S.E.2d 583 (1998); Johnson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 58, 506 S.E.2d 212 (1998); Gillman v. State, 239 Ga. App. 880, 522 S.E.2d 284 (1999); Dickerson v. State, 241 Ga. App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (1999); Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 517, 541 S.E.2d 112 (2000); Pena v. State, 247 Ga. App. 211, 542 S.E.2d 630 (2000).

Remarks of a trial judge which inform the jury of the reason for a ruling excluding evidence generally constitute neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 371 S.E.2d 428 (1988); Wigley v. State, 194 Ga. App. 7, 389 S.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 913, S.E.2d (1989).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 is not violated by the remarks of the trial court when giving reasons for a ruling. Dixon v. State, 196 Ga. App. 15, 395 S.E.2d 577 (1990).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 under the plain error standard of review, based on defendant's failure to have objected or to have sought a mistrial during the trial, when comments were made by the judge during a motion in limine hearing which was held outside of the presence of the jury; further, the trial court's explanation for ruling on objections did not express opinions on what had or had not been proved and did not constitute an expression of opinion or amount to a comment on the evidence. Lockaby v. State, 265 Ga. App. 527, 594 S.E.2d 729 (2004).

Defense counsel cross-examined a witness, who admitted talking to another witness in the hallway; the trial court instructed the witness not to discuss the witness's testimony with anyone, and stated that as the conversation took place before any witnesses had been sworn, the rule of sequestration had not been violated. The trial court did not violate O.C.G.A § 17-8-57 by expressing an opinion on the witness's credibility; the trial court was giving the reasons for the court's ruling, which did not violate § 17-8-57. Rogers v. State, 294 Ga. App. 195, 670 S.E.2d 106 (2008).

Because O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was not violated by the trial court's remarks when giving reasons for a ruling, any objection to that comment by the defendant's trial counsel would have been without merit. Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 682 S.E.2d 375 (2009).

Appellate court rejected a DUI defendant's claim that the trial court erred in commenting on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; the trial court merely gave the court's reasons for refusing the jury's request to rehear the officer's testimony regarding the officer's observation of the defendant prior to administering the breathalyzer test. The trial court did not give an expression or intimation regarding the court's opinion as to the matters proved or the defendant's guilt. Jacobson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 815, 703 S.E.2d 376 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0498, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 582 (Ga. 2011).

Trial court did not express or intimate the court's opinion with regard to the defendant's guilt or make a statement with respect to what had been proven but was announcing the court's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence and the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence. Person v. State, 340 Ga. App. 252, 797 S.E.2d 172 (2017), overruled on other grounds by Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020).

Trial court's comments, which provided a reason for an evidentiary ruling, did not amount to comments on the veracity of the witness or the defendant's guilt and, thus, were not in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Sessions v. State, 304 Ga. 343, 818 S.E.2d 615 (2018).

§ 17-8-57 for post-verdict comment. - Trial court's comment on the legal effect of the verdicts that had already been returned obviously could have had no influence on the jury's determination as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Baker v. State, 263 Ga. 79, 428 S.E.2d 340 (1993).

- In the defendant's joint kidnapping trial with the defendant's brother, the defendant's statement was admitted, redacted to remove references to the defendant's brother; after the defendant testified, the trial court's act of reopening the evidence to allow an unredacted statement into evidence did not constitute an expression of opinion by the trial court regarding the veracity of the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Hunsberger v. State, 348 Ga. App. 898, 825 S.E.2d 391 (2019).

- When an objection is made to evidence offered, the judge has a right, if the judge deems proper, to give the reasons for the judge's decision on the objections. Such reasons so given, if pertinent to the objections made, do not constitute an expression of opinion. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, 135 S.E. 748 (1926).

Trial judge may, without violating the principles of this section, give the judge's reasons for a ruling on objections to testimony, though these reasons may state somewhat of the facts that have been shown in the case. Brown v. State, 40 Ga. App. 546, 150 S.E. 460 (1929); Wooten v. State, 47 Ga. App. 301, 170 S.E. 392 (1933).

Statements of the court in rulings on objections to testimony do not usually amount to expressions of opinion, nor are statements made during argument of such objections in colloquy between court and counsel. Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843 (1954).

Trial court's commenting on the nine-year-old victim's competency to testify in connection with defense counsel's "leading questions" objection was not an expression of opinion or a comment on the evidence. Norris v. State, 240 Ga. App. 231, 523 S.E.2d 80 (1999).

When the veracity of a witness is in issue, a prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence, and it is well settled that remarks of a judge assigning a reason for the judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence are neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence. Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 529 S.E.2d 650 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Although a defendant failed to object to certain judicial commentary, the remarks were not in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the defendant failed to show plain error since the comments were made by the trial judge when ruling on objections by the state, assigned reasons for the rulings, and neither expressed an opinion nor a comment regarding the evidence. Walker v. State, 308 Ga. App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122 (2011).

- Generally, what the court says in stating to counsel the reason for denying a motion to exclude or rule out evidence is, if pertinent to the question raised by counsel, not error, although the reason given involves a statement as to certain testimony which is already in, or as to there being nothing in evidence showing that the circumstances are as counsel claim. Brown v. State, 40 Ga. App. 546, 150 S.E. 460 (1929).

Under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, a judge is allowed to state the judge's reasons for admission or exclusion of evidence, when the judge does not judicially approve any of the testimony or go out of the legitimate sphere of discussion. Forbes v. State, 51 Ga. App. 465, 180 S.E. 914 (1935).

Statement made by a judge in ruling on the admissibility of certain testimony, that a witness has testified to certain facts stated and that the evidence is admissible on the question thus raised by this evidence, is not an intimation or expression of opinion as to what has been proved, but is an explanation to counsel of the judge's ruling on the evidence. Garcia v. State, 52 Ga. App. 80, 182 S.E. 526 (1935).

Trial judge may state the judge's reasons for admitting or excluding evidence, if the reasons are pertinent to the evidence and the ruling made thereon, and such a statement will not violate the rule that the court should not intimate or express an opinion to the jury upon the facts of the case. Fraser v. State, 52 Ga. App. 92, 182 S.E. 418 (1935).

Judge has a right to state the judge's view of the law as to why testimony is admissible. Peters v. State, 72 Ga. App. 157, 33 S.E.2d 454 (1945).

Judge's statement: "as to the photograph, I don't know that I officially ruled on that, but I will allow that to be introduced as evidence" did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Hutson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 100, 453 S.E.2d 130 (1995).

Trial court did not make improper comments in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by ruling that exhibits reflecting the defendant's pretrial statements would be admitted and published though the defendant objected. Pertinent remarks made by a trial court in discussing the admissibility of evidence or explaining the court's rulings do not constitute prohibited expressions of opinion. Boyd v. State, 286 Ga. 166, 686 S.E.2d 109 (2009).

In discussing the admissibility question with counsel, the judge never expressed any opinion about the veracity of the evidence itself and during the colloquy, considered as a whole, it was clear that the trial court was leaving it up to the jury to decide what the evidence did or did not show. Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 784 S.E.2d 759 (2016).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the trial court was not suggesting the court's opinion as to the appellant's presence at the crime scene or indeed as to where any particular person was, or even who the people were, rather, the court was explaining that the detective need not repeat what was learned from eyewitnesses to the crimes. Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 792 S.E.2d 354 (2016).

- In ruling on a motion for a continuance, the trial judge may, in the statement of the judge's reasons, refer to the evidence without violating the provisions of this section. Cochran v. State, 136 Ga. App. 125, 220 S.E.2d 477 (1975).

- Trial judge may give the judge's reasons for ruling on the admissibility of testimony, though these reasons may intimate somewhat of the facts that have been shown in the case. Brown v. State, 119 Ga. 572, 46 S.E. 833 (1904); Hall v. State, 7 Ga. App. 115, 66 S.E. 390 (1909).

- If in giving reasons for ruling on admissibility the court makes a statement prejudicial to the accused, the accused must make a timely motion for a mistrial based upon the statement if the accused wishes to take advantage of the error. Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33, 113 S.E. 94 (1922).

- Comments of the trial court, in response to an objection by the state's attorney during the opening statement of defense counsel, who commented that a former boyfriend of a state's witness was presently in prison, which the court refused to permit, stating ". . . what somebody's husband is doing . . . is far beyond what will be admissible . . .," did not constitute an improper expression or intimation of opinion. Mathis v. State, 171 Ga. App. 620, 320 S.E.2d 861 (1984).

- Trial court properly sustained the prosecution's objection to defense counsel's allegation in closing argument that police officers, in general, routinely shaded the officers' testimony and violated police rules as counsel was unable to show any evidence to support this allegation; the trial court did not, in so ruling, comment on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003).

- Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by reminding defense counsel that counsel was supposed to confine counsel's arguments to facts in evidence after the prosecutor objected to defense counsel's argument that a codefendant testified to get a lighter sentence, and the appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court violated § 17-8-57. Fernandez v. State, 263 Ga. App. 750, 589 S.E.2d 309 (2003).

Trial court's ruling on an objection did not clearly refer to the court's earlier ruling on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement so as to constitute a judicial comment that was plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(b). Priester v. State, 350 Ga. App. 200, 828 S.E.2d 439 (2019).

- Once the preliminary issue of voluntariness has been determined by the trial judge outside of the jury's presence, the ultimate question of the voluntary character of a statement and the statement's truthfulness is for the jury, and the jury is bound by the trial court's earlier determination on this issue. The trial judge's comments concerning the judge's prior ruling should not express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 313 S.E.2d 475 (1984).

Trial court's statements regarding the location of the shooting did not improperly express the court's opinion about whether venue and the shooting had been proven and the defendant did not show plain error because the trial court framed the court's statement in terms of allegations and never mentioned the venue for the charge; and the defendant did not show that the court's statement orienting the prospective jurors to the case had any effect on the outcome of the defendant's trial as the state presented evidence that the victim was shot, including the surveillance recording showing the shooting and expert testimony from a medical examiner; and the prosecutor elicited undisputed testimony from several witnesses that the crimes occurred in Fulton County. Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 816 S.E.2d 646 (2018).

- When, on cross- examination, a witness is asked the same question several times, to which an objection is raised and, to this objection, the trial court responds that the witness has "consistently testified a number of times," the trial court's comment does not relate to the overall credibility of the witness but is explanatory of the trial court's subsequent ruling that the question could be posed to the witness only once more. Saladine v. State, 169 Ga. App. 425, 313 S.E.2d 714 (1984).

Trial court's comments did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings and were not reversible error when, in responses to objections, the trial court: (1) stated that a witness had answered consistently; (2) noted that an officer had testified that the defendant had consented to a search of the vehicle and that the officer conducted a pat-down search of the defendant to protect the officer during the vehicle search; (3) stated that the officer had not changed the officer's testimony; and (4) noted that the officer did not testify that the officer was trying to shoot the defendant, but that the officer was trying to keep the defendant from removing the officer's firearm from the firearm's holster; the trial court's statements were not likely to confuse or prejudice the jurors and the jury was explicitly instructed that none of the rulings or comments should be interpreted to express any opinion upon the facts, the credibility of witnesses, the evidence, or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Bolden v. State, 281 Ga. App. 258, 636 S.E.2d 29 (2006).

- When the judge responded to the witness' statement by informing the witness that the judge had not made a deal with the defendant, the trial judge's comments were limited in their scope and did not in fact disparage the witness' credibility in general or the witness's credibility with regard to any fact at issue in the trial or with regard to the guilt or innocence of defendant, nor did they tend to leave the jury with the impression that the witness supporting defendant's story had lied under oath. Nance v. State, 204 Ga. App. 653, 420 S.E.2d 348 (1992).

Trial court did not display judicial bias against the defendant in certain rulings the court rendered and statements the court made during closing arguments since the ruling and statements all pertained to the jury's duty to determine the evidence based on arguments made by counsel. Seidenfaden v. State, 249 Ga. App. 314, 547 S.E.2d 578 (2001).

- Trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence during the state's opening statement because the trial court's statement that the prosecutor was talking about what was evidence and what was not evidence was not an improper expression of the trial court's opinion as the trial court did not express or intimate an opinion as to any issue of fact, as to the veracity of any witness, as to the weight of any evidence, or as to the guilt of any of the defendants; instead, the trial court merely explained the reason for the court's ruling. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

- Inhibition against an expression or intimation of opinion by the trial judge as to the facts of the case does not extend to colloquies between the judge and counsel as to the admissibility of certain evidence, especially when the judge is ruling upon a point made by counsel for the accused. Pratt v. State, 167 Ga. App. 819, 307 S.E.2d 714 (1983); McGinnis v. State, 258 Ga. 673, 372 S.E.2d 804 (1988); McGarity v. State, 190 Ga. App. 139, 378 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

Rule which prohibits an expression or intimation of opinion by the trial court as to what has or has not been proved does not generally extend to colloquies between the judge and counsel regarding the admissibility of evidence. Kinsman v. State, 259 Ga. 89, 376 S.E.2d 845, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S. Ct. 210, 107 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1989); Kitchens v. State, 198 Ga. App. 284, 401 S.E.2d 552 (1991); Ivory v. State, 199 Ga. App. 283, 405 S.E.2d 90 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 90 (1991).

At a trial in which after defense counsel asked the defendant if the defendant had received a bronze star, the trial court stated in front of the jury that if defense counsel asked that question the court would consider that the defendant put the defendant's character into evidence, there was not plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because that statement, and interruptions of defense counsel during voir dire, did not intimate an opinion as to the defendant's guilt. Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga. App. 614, 624 S.E.2d 166 (2005); Edvalson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 348, 793 S.E.2d 545 (2016).

Trial judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by stating "I think it is admissible as a prior consistent," after the defendant objected to the prosecutor's attempt to admit a document because the statement was made in the context of a colloquy and did not amount to an expression of an opinion on the proof or the guilt of the accused. Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Trial court's comments to counsel regarding the admissibility of evidence and the formation of counsel's questions did not constitute comments on disputed issues of fact contrary to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Scott v. State, 332 Ga. App. 559, 774 S.E.2d 137 (2015).

Trial court was admonishing defense counsel to correct what the court believed to be a misleading question to the victim, which did not rise to the level of an expression or intimation of opinion by the judge and did not warrant a mistrial as the trial court did not express the court's belief that the defendant's sex with the victim was in fact without the victim's consent, but rather the court was preventing defense counsel from misrepresenting the victim's prior statement to the investigator. Durham v. State, 355 Ga. App. 426, 844 S.E.2d 499 (2020).

- Judge's expression of opinion and in response to defense objection to testimony in the presence of the jury that the defendant's character had not been placed in evidence was not an expression of what had or had not been proved, nor was it an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Smith v. State, 165 Ga. App. 669, 302 S.E.2d 414 (1983).

- Trial court's comment, in the presence of the jury, that the court was ruling that the defendant's incriminating statement "was freely and voluntarily made" was reversible error since the issue of voluntariness was one which ultimately had to be decided by the jury. Ray v. State, 181 Ga. App. 42, 351 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

When the defendant was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the death of the victim, a new trial was necessary because, when the state sought to introduce a recording of the second interview with the defendant, the trial court improperly commented on the evidence by stating that the court had already ruled that the defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given. Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820, 764 S.E.2d 390 (2014).

- Trial court's comments, adding the influence of the court's personal opinion on the expert status of a witness and identifying the witness in common with the court as a state-paid employee, were prejudicial comments on the evidence during a competency trial. Jones v. State, 189 Ga. App. 232, 375 S.E.2d 648 (1988).

- In a prosecution for felony murder, the court did not violate the proscriptions of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court ruled that a medical examiner and micro-analyst were experts in their respective fields. Marshall v. State, 266 Ga. 304, 466 S.E.2d 567 (1996).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by stating, after hearing a pathologist recite the pathologist's qualifications and after the state tendered the pathologist as an expert, that "the court will receive him as an expert." Williams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 30, 521 S.E.2d 27 (1999).

Trial court's request simply clarified the basis for the witness' testimony by identifying the exhibits the witness was discussing and did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, which provides that it is error for a trial court in a criminal case to express or intimate the court's opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Whitehead v. State, 258 Ga. App. 271, 574 S.E.2d 351 (2002).

- Trial court's statement that the court was directing a verdict of not guilty for one codefendant based on insufficient evidence was not an improper comment suggesting sufficient evidence towards other defendants. Holmes v. State, 210 Ga. App. 118, 435 S.E.2d 492 (1993).

- Overall import of the judge's comment was an explanation of the ruling on the state's hearsay objection; while the judge's brief musing about defense counsel's strategy was unnecessary, and such comments should be avoided, the judge's comment in no way constituted the type of direct comment on the substance or weight of the evidence that had been held to violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Dailey v. State, 297 Ga. 442, 774 S.E.2d 672 (2015).

- Because the defendant did not file either a cross-appeal to the state's appeal or a separate notice of appeal regarding the superior court's adverse rulings on the other alleged violations of the statute regarding the presiding judge's allegedly improper questioning of the defendant, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's allegations of error arising from the superior court's adverse rulings. State v. Nickerson, 324 Ga. App. 576, 749 S.E.2d 768 (2013).

- Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of riot in a penal institution under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-56 because the question of whether a county jail qualified as a penal institution under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-56 was properly for the jury, and the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in determining the issue as a matter of law; whether the jail constituted a penal institution was an element of the offense, and the trial court's direction went beyond clarifying the law on a particular issue because the direction involved applying the law to the evidence to draw a conclusion on an element of the state's case. Paul v. State, 308 Ga. App. 275, 707 S.E.2d 171 (2011).

Jury Charges and Curative Instructions

Expression or intimation of opinion in jury charge as to what has been proved.

- It is error for the judge, in the judge's charge to the jury, to express or intimate an opinion as to what has or has not been proved, and it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial when such error is committed, whether, in the court's opinion, substantial justice has or has not been done by the verdict. This section, which is imperative and must be obeyed, denies to the Supreme Court discretion in this matter in sustaining a verdict rendered in accordance with the justice of the case. Cook v. State, 40 Ga. App. 125, 149 S.E. 79 (1929).

Because the trial court's charge to the jury regarding the defendant's inculpatory statement amounted to plain error in expressing an opinion as to what had been proven, thereby violating O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, a new trial was ordered on remand. Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 655 S.E.2d 813 (2008).

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in a trial court's final charge because: (1) the jury instructions given on accomplice testimony tracked the standard pattern jury instruction; (2) the complained-of language adequately instructed the jurors that each of the defendants had been charged with multiple counts and the jurors were to consider each count independently in assessing whether evidence corroborating the testimony of a single witness was required; and (3) assuming that the cited language, in isolation, could be viewed as a "technical violation," it was clear that the charge did not otherwise assume things as facts and intimate to the jury what the judge believed the evidence to be, so the court's additional instructions concerning accomplice testimony corrected any error. Garland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 7, 714 S.E.2d 707 (2011).

- Trial court's instruction that "this is not a case in which you'll be sequestered or have to consider any issues in regard to sentencing in the event that it were to go that far" and "you are only concerned with the guilt or innocence of this accused. You're not to concern yourselves with punishment" did not constitute an expression of opinion. Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 42, 485 S.E.2d 189 (1997).

Trial court's instruction: "The evidence in this case was the witness was asked did you conspire with another person, weren't you the one behind all of this. The answer to that question was, no. And until evidence is produced to change your opinion about that, the evidence is no" was not an improper expression of opinion as to what had been proved because it restated only what the testimony was, absent the improper inferences, and there was no evidence to the contrary. Caldwell v. State, 247 Ga. App. 191, 542 S.E.2d 564 (2000).

- Trial court did not impermissibly comment on the evidence when the court explained to the jury that the co-defendant's video recorded interview with the police had been redacted so that it included only the relevant portions because the trial court did not express or suggest any opinion the court had regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence or about what had or had not been proved as the trial court's challenged comment was meant simply to explain to the jury that the reduced length and the discernable interruptions in the video the jury saw were due to the agreed-upon redactions to leave what was relevant to the case. Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 807 S.E.2d 369 (2017).

§ 17-8-57 violated only when charge intimates opinion of judge as to evidence. - It is only when the charge of the court assumes certain things as facts, and is in such shape as to intimate to the jury what the judge believes the evidence to be, that the rule of this section is infringed. Mitchell v. State, 190 Ga. 571, 9 S.E.2d 892 (1940).

When the court intimated no opinion whatsoever, assured an elimination from jury consideration of the whole impermissibly introduced subject of the defendant's lack of bond, and not merely what might have prompted a judge to deny bond, and emphasized to the jury in the court's final charge that no comments or rulings of the court were intended to express an opinion upon the facts of the case, no incursion of the strict rule of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 transpired. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court instructed the jury on how to consider evidence of any custodial statements made by the defendant as the instruction, taken as a whole, did not assume facts or intimate an opinion relating to defendant's custodial statements. Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 703 S.E.2d 1 (2010).

Trial court's comments did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the comments amounted to no more than an explanation that clarified the trial court's charge applicable to an alco-sensor field test. The trial court's explanation was a correct statement of the law pertaining to alco-sensor test results and did not express or intimate an opinion regarding the evidence. Black v. State, 309 Ga. App. 880, 711 S.E.2d 428 (2011).

Trial court's instruction on a statement by a child describing sexual contact or physical abuse was erroneous as the jurors could have reasonably taken the instruction to be an expression or intimation of the trial court's opinion that the child's statements were reliable or true. Palmer v. State, 330 Ga. App. 870, 769 S.E.2d 600 (2015).

Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court charged the jury on intent given that the court explained to the jury that intent was only one of the elements of the crimes charged and that the jury could not find the defendant guilty of any crime unless the state proved every element beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, there was no likelihood that the jury considered the reference to "the defendants' intentions" as an indication of the trial court's beliefs about what the state had proven at trial. Scudder v. State, 298 Ga. 438, 782 S.E.2d 638 (2016).

Jury charge on an inference of the recent possession of stolen property was proper and was not an improper comment on the defendant's guilt by the trial judge in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the trial court's comments did not constitute a comment before the jury on a disputed issue of fact or intimate an opinion about the defendant's guilt, but merely instructed the jury on the permissible inference of possession. Cooper v. State, 342 Ga. App. 351, 801 S.E.2d 589 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C2017, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 7 (Ga. 2018), cert. dismissed, No. S17C2022, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 10 (Ga. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2039, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3176, 201 L. Ed. 2d 288 (U.S. 2018).

- Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in presenting the court's reasons for denying the juror's request to see the cell phone used to facilitate drug trafficking since the court's comment was limited to a clarification of procedures and did not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial. Ferrell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (2011).

Charge to the jury must be viewed as a whole and not taken as single instructions in artificial isolation. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993).

- In passing upon the question of whether a particular part of a charge excepted to as expressing an opinion on the fact is fairly liable to such exception, the whole charge, written and in the record, may be considered. Driggers v. State, 51 Ga. App. 370, 180 S.E. 619 (1935); Mitchell v. State, 190 Ga. 571, 9 S.E.2d 892 (1940).

- To determine whether an expression in the charge of the court intimates the opinion of the trial judge as to what has or has not been proved, it is proper, in a doubtful case, to construe the expression in connection with the entire charge, and when the trial judge elsewhere in the judge's charge, in ample and unmistakable language, tells the jury that the particular matter about which it is claimed the judge has expressed an opinion as to its having been proved is an issue in the case, such expression will not be construed as an expression or intimation of opinion on the facts. Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612 (1882); Moon v. State, 68 Ga. 687 (1882); Washington v. State, 24 Ga. App. 65, 100 S.E. 31 (1919).

- Whether or not an excerpt from a charge constitutes an expression of opinion must be determined from the charge as a whole. Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843 (1954).

Jury charge as a whole, and not isolated segments thereof, is to be looked to in determining whether or not the trial court fully and fairly covered the points contained in the refused instructions. Amerson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 97, 338 S.E.2d 528 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Watts v. State, 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Watts v. State, 261 Ga. App. 230, 582 S.E.2d 186 (2003).

In order to determine whether a trial court has improperly expressed an opinion in the court's charge as to what has or has not been proved, the whole charge may be considered. Mullinax v. State, 255 Ga. 442, 339 S.E.2d 704 (1986).

Slip of the tongue as to a single word did not amount to a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when considered in light of the entire charge. Dukes v. State, 224 Ga. App. 305, 480 S.E.2d 340 (1997).

While it is error for a judge to express the judge's opinion as to the guilt of the accused, a mere verbal inaccuracy in a charge, which results from a palpable slip of the tongue, and clearly could not have misled or confused the jury, is not reversible error; when the trial court gave curative instructions following the court's slip of the tongue in giving the instructions, there was no error. Sutton v. State, 263 Ga. App. 188, 587 S.E.2d 379 (2003).

When a trial judge gave an extensive pattern charge on self-defense, and in one sentence of the charge, the judge stated that "for the use of force to be justified under the law, the accused must have acted, really acted under the influence of the fears of a reasonable person and not in the spirit of revenge," and when defense counsel conceded that the trial court's second mention of the word "acted" in one sentence of the jury charge stemmed from a mere slip of the tongue, and when, reviewing the charge as a whole, the sentence appeared not to have been an improper comment by the trial judge on the evidence, but rather a slip of the tongue as to a single word, and that the charge as a whole revealed that the trial judge gave sufficient context to the circumstances under which the jury could have found that the defendant acted in self-defense, no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 occurred. Robinson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 634, 600 S.E.2d 729 (2004).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for aggravated sodomy and kidnapping, the misreading of the word "in" instead of "and" when the indictment was read to the jury regarding the aggravated sodomy count did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence. Considering the charge as a whole, the appellate court was satisfied that the jury could not have been misled or confused by the trial court's minor slip of the tongue since the singular use of "in" instead of "and" constituted harmless error. Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 692, 670 S.E.2d 191 (2008).

By charging the jury in the language of the indictment as to the physical acts of the defendant which amounted to the crimes charged, the court did not express an opinion as to the evidence. Weaver v. State, 137 Ga. App. 470, 224 S.E.2d 110 (1976).

- Judge should refer to the evidence only so far as is necessary to present the leading issues in the cause, leaving the minor contentions of opposing counsel to the consideration of the jury under appropriate general intimation. It should contain no such summary of the evidence as might, to a jury, either seem to be an argument, or amount to the expression or intimation of an opinion thereon. Gallman v. State, 127 Ga. App. 849, 195 S.E.2d 187 (1973).

For instruction held to invade province of jury, see Johns v. State, 178 Ga. 676, 173 S.E. 917 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Corbin v. State, 211 Ga. 400, 86 S.E.2d 221 (1955).

- When, in charging the jury, the court correctly states the law governing the case, but exception is taken to an illustration used by the court explanatory of a legal principle, this court will not narrowly scrutinize the illustration if satisfied that, whether right or wrong, the illustration was not calculated to mislead, and did not in fact mislead the jury. Hamilton v. State, 169 Ga. 613, 151 S.E. 17 (1929).

When a trial court correctly instructs the jury on the law but an exception is made to a hypothetical illustration offered by way of explanation, unless a showing is made that the illustration confused or misled the jury, the court of appeals will not narrowly scrutinize that illustration. Grimes v. State, 245 Ga. App. 277, 537 S.E.2d 720 (2000).

- During a defendant's trial for charges arising out of a road rage incident, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by repeating the jury instruction on self-defense twice; given that the charge was repeated solely for the purpose of correcting an unintended omission, and that the corrected charge was an accurate statement of law, the trial court's repetition of the instruction did not amount to an improper expression of opinion or a comment on the evidence. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

- Trial court, by answering a hypothetical question from the jury by stating that it would not have been illegal for the victim to express a desire to drop the charges, was not impermissibly expressing an opinion on the defendant's guilt or on what facts had been proven during the trial. Simmons v. State, 251 Ga. App. 682, 555 S.E.2d 59 (2001).

- In a trial for murder, when the evidence involves the offense of voluntary manslaughter, it is not an expression of an opinion by the court as to what verdict the jury should return, to define voluntary manslaughter, give the jury the penalty, and to give several illustrations as to what their verdict could be as to the minimum and maximum term of years they might wish to impose, and the effect of such verdict in regard to serving the minimum and maximum of the years fixed by the verdict, when the court also gives a correct and proper charge as to murder and justifiable homicide, also involved under the evidence. Harrell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 482, 26 S.E.2d 151 (1943).

- When the trial court charges the jury that if the jury believes the contentions of the defendant, it is the jury's duty to acquit, the court does not lead the jury to believe that the jury does not have to find proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when the trial judge further instructs the jury that if the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense for which the defendant is charged, the jury would be authorized to find the defendant guilty. White v. State, 151 Ga. App. 559, 260 S.E.2d 554 (1979).

- It is reversible error for the trial judge in the judge's charge to classify the evidence as to the weight or consideration, or to intimate any opinion thereon. Watson v. State, 227 Ga. 698, 182 S.E.2d 446 (1971).

- Trial court's instruction that it was not essential for the state to locate physical evidence of gunfire to establish the crime of aggravated assault was not an impermissible comment on the evidence; it simply charged a point of law. Willis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 479, 448 S.E.2d 223 (1994); Salahuddin v. State, 241 Ga. App. 168, 525 S.E.2d 422 (1999).

Because the court's instruction to the jury, made in overruling a defense objection during the cross-examination of a witness, was not an improper expression of the court's opinion of the case, but was an accurate statement of the law of implied consent, there was no violation. Hunt v. State, 247 Ga. App. 464, 542 S.E.2d 591 (2000).

Judge's reference in jury instructions to "the deadly weapon used by the defendant" was not an improper opinion that the gun used was a "deadly weapon" and that the defendant was the person who used the gun to kill the victim; rather, the statement was drawn verbatim from a case holding that it was not necessary for the state to admit into evidence the deadly weapon used by the defendant, and referred to "defendant" generically. Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 758 S.E.2d 598 (2014).

- Trial court's instruction that "you must not base your verdict on inferences or speculation or anything that is not supported by the evidence" was a correct statement of the law and was not plain error on the basis of a claim that such instruction interfered with the jury's function as sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. Caldwell v. State, 247 Ga. App. 191, 542 S.E.2d 564 (2000).

- There was no violation when the court merely stated the contents of the indictment and properly instructed that the court does not express an opinion as to whether the accused has been involved in any offenses. Jones v. State, 268 Ga. 12, 483 S.E.2d 871 (1997); Anderson v. State, 244 Ga. App. 643, 536 S.E.2d 540 (2000).

- Instruction that "when witnesses appear and testify they are presumed to speak the truth and are to be believed" does not erroneously shift the burden of proof to the defendant, requiring the defendant to produce evidence that would be sufficient to overcome such presumption, when the quote and context of the charge is relevant and actually beneficial to the defendant. Ivie v. State, 151 Ga. App. 496, 260 S.E.2d 543 (1979).

- In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence when the court charged the jury that "any statement during the course of this trial which would suggest that [the defense expert's] testing procedures or methods have been approved by the appellate courts of this state shall be disregarded by you," since, considered in context, the charge was in the nature of a curative instruction necessitated by the plaintiff's inappropriate attempt to bolster the credibility of the witness. Campbell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 162, 545 S.E.2d 6 (2001).

- Trial court's statement that information that a police officer receives from another is presumed to be reliable was not an improper comment on the evidence since the statement was offered to explain the correct proposition of law that officer A may act on information received from a reliable source, even if the reliable source spoke to officer B, who then communicated the information to officer A. Ellis v. State, 216 Ga. App. 232, 453 S.E.2d 810 (1995).

- In charging upon a statement made by one on trial for crime, it is erroneous to use language calculated to impress the jury that the jury ought to be cautious in giving credit to what the defendant said. Alexander v. State, 114 Ga. 266, 40 S.E. 231 (1901).

While under former Code 1933, § 81-1104 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57) a trial judge should not, in charging upon a statement made by one on trial for a criminal offense, use language calculated to impress the jury that the jury should be cautious in giving credit to what the accused says, or in any manner to use language which might disparage the statement of the accused, it was not error for the trial judge, in charging upon the statement of the accused under former Code 1933, §§ 38-415 and 38-416 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506), to remind the jury of the circumstances which may impair the force of such statement, or which should enable the jury to give the accused's statement the weight to which the statement was entitled. Henderson v. State, 50 Ga. App. 16, 176 S.E. 811 (1934).

- Trial court's instructions informing the jury that the defendant contended to be not guilty of the crime charged in the indictment was not an expression of the court's opinion that the state's case was true when other parts of the instructions informed the jury that the defendant was clothed with a presumption of innocence that could be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant was not required to prove the defendant's innocence. Beam v. State, 265 Ga. 853, 463 S.E.2d 347 (1995).

- Trial court did not commit plain error in the court's charge to the jury on good character evidence because the defendant used the idea that the defendant did not have a reputation for violence as a means of attempting to show the defendant's good character, and the trial court merely reflected that in the court's charge to the jury; and the jury was properly left to determine whether the defendant would have acted consistently with the defendant's purported character with respect to violence, which was to not act violently towards anyone, including the victim; further, giving that proper charge did not amount to the trial court commenting on the evidence. Jacobs v. State, 303 Ga. 245, 811 S.E.2d 372 (2018).

- It is not error as an expression of opinion by the court to charge, in a criminal case, that if the jury were convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was the jury's duty to convict the defendant. Caraway v. State, 72 Ga. App. 504, 34 S.E.2d 303 (1945).

In a prosecution on multiple counts of public indecency, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction that it was for the jury to determine whether the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was "the perpetrator of the alleged crimes," because when read as a whole, the charge adequately instructed the jury on the jury's duty to consider each count separately. Callahan v. State, 249 Ga. App. 108, 547 S.E.2d 741 (2001).

- It is not error for the court to charge the jury: "therefore the law presumes that every act which in itself is unlawful was criminally intended until the contrary is made to appear, but the question of intention rests finally with you," as such instruction does not constitute an expression of opinion by the trial judge that the defendant committed an unlawful act. Van Pelt v. State, 87 Ga. App. 103, 73 S.E.2d 115 (1952).

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault arising out of a melee involving the amount owed the defendants for construction work, the trial court correctly charged that civil remedies were available to resolve the controversy. Powell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 56, 491 S.E.2d 135 (1997).

- When the state's evidence is wholly circumstantial, a charge that the state has introduced evidence tending to establish the fact that the defendant is guilty of the charge is clearly, though inadvertently, an intimation of the court's opinion as to what has been proved in the case and constitutes reversible error. Rowland v. State, 71 Ga. App. 154, 30 S.E.2d 368 (1944).

- If there is evidence in the case from which the jury could find that the acts of the defendant were lawful, and the charge given eliminates this phase of the case from the consideration of the jury, the charge amounts to an expression of an opinion that the acts of the defendant are unlawful and constitutes error by the court. Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 184 S.E. 309 (1936).

- Trial court erred by not adjusting a charge regarding statements by the defendant to private persons to omit the court's reference to the situation in which such a statement was made while the defendant was in custody because there was no evidence in the defendant's case to show that the defendant had made any such statements while in custody, but it was highly probable that the charge, although not properly adjusted to the evidence actually presented at trial, did not contribute to the jury's guilt/innocence phase or sentencing phase verdicts; the charge simply provided the law governing the admissibility of certain types of statements without implying that any such statements existed. Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011, 131 S. Ct. 522, 178 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2010).

- In a prosecution for burglary, use of the phrase "apparent purpose" in an instruction stating "That the defendant did not accomplish his apparent purpose would not necessarily prevent a finding of guilt of the offense of burglary" was not an improper comment on the evidence. Batchelor v. State, 229 Ga. App. 563, 494 S.E.2d 357 (1997).

- Trial court's use of "consistent" in the court's curative instructions following the defendant's motion for mistrial did not assume certain things as fact and did not intimate to the jury what the judge believed the evidence to be. Instead, the trial court, using a term to which the defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor informed the court of the extent of the prosecutor's expert's testimony, attempted to inform the jury of the limited nature of the expert testimony inaccurately summarized by the prosecutor in the prosecutor's opening statement. Jones v. State, 277 Ga. 36, 586 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

- Trial court's correct instruction to the jury during the evidentiary phase of a criminal proceeding did not constitute an improper comment on the defendant's guilt, although it might have been the better practice for the court to give the instruction during the jury charge at the close of the evidence. Polizzotto v. State, 248 Ga. App. 814, 547 S.E.2d 390 (2001).

- During a defendant's trial for charges arising out of a road rage incident, the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction regarding immunity or leniency granted to witnesses did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 or the defendant's due process rights; although the trial court began to give the instruction and stopped after a few words, the failure to provide the entire charge was not error because there was no evidence that any witness who testified at trial had been granted immunity or leniency. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Although the judge had two ex parte discussions with the prosecutor, no curative instruction was required because the court made no comments to the jury; however, the better practice would be to avoid all such ex parte conversations. Chambers v. State, 224 Ga. App. 245, 480 S.E.2d 288 (1997).

- Court's substitution of "the court" for "the State" amounted to a slip of the tongue that clearly could not have misled or confused the jury. Mitchell v. State, 242 Ga. App. 694, 531 S.E.2d 143 (2000).

Referring to the deceased as the "victim" in the charge on aggravated assault did not amount to an improper expression of the accused's guilt under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 529 S.E.2d 121 (2000).

In the defendant's vehicular homicide trial, the trial court's use of the word "victim" in referring to the deceased did not amount to an improper comment on the guilt of the accused. Hartzler v. State, 332 Ga. App. 674, 774 S.E.2d 738 (2015).

- In a prosecution for malice murder, evidence that the victim struggled with the defendant when the defendant announced the defendant's intent to kill the victim and brandished a gun was not evidence of provocation which justified the giving of a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Beam v. State, 265 Ga. 853, 463 S.E.2d 347 (1995).

- When the court charges the jury on the law of flight, and there is no evidence of flight on the part of the accused, the court has erred and a new trial should be granted. Griffin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 188, 170 S.E. 106 (1933).

- Trial court errs in charging a theory of criminal culpability supported by testimony but not advanced during the trial. Gallman v. State, 127 Ga. App. 849, 195 S.E.2d 187 (1973).

- Charge "the only grade of manslaughter involved in this case and the only one I charge you upon is voluntary manslaughter," does not violate the rule against expression by the judge of an opinion on the proof or the guilt of the accused, when the judge has just charged the general laws on manslaughter, which have to do with both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. McMullen v. State, 199 Ga. 521, 34 S.E.2d 892 (1945).

- Trial judge's statement that the judge would "get reversed probably" if the judge failed to read the jury charge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(1) because the statement was not made in connection with any evidence against the defendant or in a context that would have implied that the judge believed the defendant would be found guilty. The clear import of the judge's statement was that jury instructions are so important that the judge's failure to read the instruction would be a violation of the judge's duty. DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga. 283, 840 S.E.2d 396 (2020).

- When the evidence did not warrant the submission to the jury of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection, it cannot be said that the trial judge, by reason of having charged the higher grade of involuntary manslaughter and not the lower, intimated and expressed an opinion that the defendant was guilty of the higher grade. Swearingen v. State, 63 Ga. App. 605, 11 S.E.2d 423 (1940).

- When there is nothing in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to dispute the fact that the alleged crime was committed and the defendant's defense rests solely upon the contention that the defendant did not participate in the offense, the court, in charging the jury, does not violate this section in assuming that a crime has been committed. Driggers v. State, 51 Ga. App. 370, 180 S.E. 619 (1935).

- When a fact is established by the disputed evidence, it is not error for the judge in the judge's charge to assume or intimate that the fact has been proved. Lastinger v. State, 58 Ga. App. 376, 198 S.E. 559 (1938).

- In a prosecution for armed robbery, the trial court was entitled to charge the jury that "a replica having the appearance of an offensive weapon means any reasonable belief on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon is present, which is obtained by the victim through the use of his senses." Smith v. State, 209 Ga. App. 540, 433 S.E.2d 694 (1993).

- In charging the jury in a criminal case, it is error for the court to assume or seem to assume that a transaction was a crime. Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216, 169 S.E. 732 (1933).

- Charge of the trial judge in a prosecution for subornation of perjury, wherein the judge refers to perjury and subornation of perjury as "crimes," is not erroneous as expressing or intimating an opinion that a crime has been committed, nor is it erroneous as assuming or seeming to assume that any transaction involved under the evidence is a crime. Taylor v. State, 59 Ga. App. 1, 200 S.E. 237 (1938).

- Charge that if the jury should find the defendant guilty, the jury can, if the jury sees fit, recommend that the defendant be punished by imprisonment for life, "and, in that event, he would be sent to the penitentiary to serve the rest of his life for his crime," does not, when construed in context, violate the rule that the judge shall not express or intimate any opinion as to what has or has not been proved, or as to the guilt of the accused. McMullen v. State, 199 Ga. 521, 34 S.E.2d 892 (1945).

- In defendant's trial on charges of operating a motor vehicle after receiving notice that the defendant's license was revoked as an habitual violator, driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol while transporting a child under the age of 14 years, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by telling the jury that the state had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for "all criminals who come into criminal court" and then correcting itself by telling the jury that the court meant to say "all defendants who come into criminal court." Floyd v. State, 263 Ga. App. 3, 587 S.E.2d 166 (2003).

- See Fowler v. State, 187 Ga. 406, 1 S.E.2d 18 (1939).

When the court uses the article "the" instead of the article "a" preceding the word "defendant" in charging the jury on admissions, the court does not express an opinion that the defendant has made an admission when the defendant had not. Nelson v. State, 187 Ga. 576, 1 S.E.2d 641 (1939).

- Motion for new trial complaining that the court erred in unduly stressing throughout the charge the contentions of the state, stating the contentions repeatedly, and in unduly stressing, by repetition all through the charge, under what circumstances the jury would be authorized to find the defendant guilty, all of which amounts to an expression of opinion on the part of the court, and is prejudicial to the defendant, affords no cause for new trial. Jillson v. State, 187 Ga. 119, 200 S.E. 707 (1938).

- Charge should contain no such summary of the evidence as might to a jury either seem to be an argument or amount to the expression or intimation of an opinion thereon. It is therefore error for the presiding judge to repeat the substance of the testimony of the state's witnesses as detailed from the stand, and submit this with the argumentative deductions drawn therefrom by the state's counsel as the issues in the case. Rouse v. State, 2 Ga. App. 184, 58 S.E. 416 (1907).

- Judge should not in the judge's charge take up and recapitulate in detail the testimony of the witnesses as the testimony was delivered from the stand, in such a way as is calculated to leave the impression upon the minds of the jury that the testimony of such witnesses has established the fact contended for by one of the parties, or that such testimony is of a nature that it is entitled to more consideration than other testimony in the case. Ryan v. State, 46 Ga. App. 347, 167 S.E. 720 (1933).

If the charge of the court is argumentative and so strongly stated the contentions of one of the parties as to weaken and disparage those of the opposite party, and thus is liable to impress the jury that the court is of the opinion that the defendant is guilty, a new trial should be granted. Ryan v. State, 46 Ga. App. 347, 167 S.E. 720 (1933).

- See Adams v. State, 55 Ga. App. 729, 191 S.E. 280 (1937).

- Trial court did not make an improper comment on the evidence while instructing the jury on similar transaction evidence because the statement notified the jury that the prosecutor was about to present certain evidence mentioned in an opening statement regarding other acts, but, it did not express or intimate the trial court's opinion as to whether any fact had been or had not been proved; and, before making the statement, the trial court told the jury that, by giving the instruction, the trial court in no way suggested to the jury that the defendant had or had not committed any other acts, nor whether such acts, if committed, proved anything. Ashley v. State, 340 Ga. App. 539, 798 S.E.2d 235 (2017).

- Trial counsel was not effective for failing to object to an instruction regarding impeachment of a witness by proof of prior contradictory statements because the charge did not constitute an expression of opinion as to the guilt of the accused in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; the charge stated the law accurately and was mere surplusage that did not mislead the jury. Bellamy v. State, 312 Ga. App. 899, 720 S.E.2d 323 (2011).

Trial judge's charge to a jury on impeachment of a witness by a prior conviction did not amount to an improper comment on the evidence as the prior conviction was undisputed and the charge did not require the jury to disbelieve the defendant's testimony based on the prior conviction. Coleman v. State, 325 Ga. App. 700, 753 S.E.2d 449 (2014).

- Trial court's sua sponte instruction that the witness's answers, rather than the questions put to the witness, were evidence, was not error, after conflicting testimony about the author of the witness's report to the police. Hardwick v. State, 250 Ga. App. 390, 551 S.E.2d 789 (2001).

- See Edwards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 187, 189 S.E. 678 (1937).

- An expression of opinion by the court with regard to what has or has not been proved cannot be eradicated by an instruction to the effect that anything the court said or did during trial was not intended to suggest which party should prevail. Brundage v. State, 143 Ga. App. 1, 237 S.E.2d 473 (1977).

- See Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 228 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

- For the trial court to repeat objectionable evidence ruled out by the court in order to identify the evidence for the jury, in connection with the court's instructions to the jury to disregard the evidence, is not improper or prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843 (1954).

- Failure to instruct the jury in the formal charge not to consider evidence which has been ruled out of the case in the absence of a timely request to do so is not error, nor is it error to instruct the jury not to consider excluded evidence. Such a charge is not an expression of opinion as to what has been proved on the trial of the case. Pritchard v. State, 225 Ga. 690, 171 S.E.2d 130 (1969).

- Charge: "I charge you as a matter of law that the codefendant, a witness for the state, is an accomplice so far as your consideration of his testimony is concerned," amounts to an expression of the trial court's opinion that the evidence demands a finding that the codefendant and some other person or persons have committed the offense charged, and is calculated to mislead the jury into believing that the court believes that the defendant is implicated. Middleton v. State, 72 Ga. App. 817, 35 S.E.2d 317 (1945).

In two defendants' joint trial for murder, the trial court's justification charge (requested by one defendant but not the other) did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by suggesting that the non-requesting defendant had been one of the shooters. Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 815 S.E.2d 38 (2018).

- To be accomplices of each other, both the defendant and the state's witness must have been involved in the criminal enterprise. One cannot be the accomplice of an innocent man. It therefore constitutes an expression of opinion by the court as to the guilt of the accused to instruct the jury that a witness who testified as to the defendant's guilt and admitted the witness's participation in the crime would be an accomplice of the accused. Millwood v. State, 102 Ga. App. 180, 115 S.E.2d 829 (1960).

- Court's charge, "the state has offered the testimony of an accomplice," which declares the witness to be an accomplice instead of leaving it to the jury to decide from the evidence whether or not this had been proved, is a violation of the inhibition expressed in this section against an expression by the trial court as to what has been proved in the case. Brock v. State, 91 Ga. App. 141, 85 S.E.2d 177 (1954), commented on in 17 Ga. B.J. 501 (1955).

When the trial court simply charged the jury that a defendant cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but did not point to either of the codefendants as an accomplice, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Isaac v. State, 269 Ga. 875, 505 S.E.2d 480 (1998).

- In the trial of one accused of murder, it is reversible error for the court in charging the jury to assume or intimate that the accused had "assaulted" the deceased, since the evidence and the defendant's statement did not demand a finding that an assault had been made. Tyner v. State, 70 Ga. App. 56, 27 S.E.2d 351 (1943).

- See Felts v. State, 244 Ga. 503, 260 S.E.2d 887 (1979).

- See Kennedy v. State, 191 Ga. 22, 11 S.E.2d 179 (1940).

- In a prosecution for murder, a charge regarding malice did not improperly comment on the evidence and was permissible under the statute since the charge did not attempt to tell the jury what had been shown by the evidence but, instead, made clear that the jury was the ultimate arbiter of fact and specifically instructed that if the jury found that the defendant drew a deadly weapon and thereby escalated the argument, then the jury was entitled, but not obligated, to infer malice therefrom. Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 891, 506 S.E.2d 124 (1998).

- In prosecution for assault with intent to rape, charge to the jury on the lesser offense of assault and battery, which used the words "which was by the laying on of hands of the defendant upon her," does not involve an intimation or expression of opinion by the court considering the charge as a whole. Watkins v. State, 63 Ga. App. 282, 11 S.E.2d 62 (1940).

Instruction that "the evidence shows that there was a robbery and a robbery by force" is clearly the expression of an opinion by the trial judge as to what had been proved, even though the judge's purpose was to eliminate from the consideration of the jury the charges of robbery by intimidation and robbery by sudden snatching, which offenses were also charged in the indictment but not supported by the evidence. Coleman v. State, 211 Ga. 704, 88 S.E.2d 381 (1955).

- Trial court did not unlawfully comment on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the court instructed the jury that an armed robbery could be committed by killing the victim first and then taking the property because the challenged charge neither assumed certain things as facts nor intimated to the jury what the trial court believed the evidence to be; it appeared that the defendant was arguing that the trial court gave an incorrect statement of law but couched the defendant's enumeration using § 17-8-57 because the defendant failed to object to the charge at defendant's trial, but parties cannot circumvent the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58 with such a maneuver. Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194, 695 S.E.2d 215 (2010).

- Trial court's jury charge in an armed robbery trial suggested facts that were not supported by any evidence, specifically, that the assailant held the assailant's hand underneath the assailant's shirt during the robbery. The erroneous charge was an impermissible comment on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 and constituted plain error, entitling the defendant to a new trial. Gonzalez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 887, 703 S.E.2d 433 (2010).

- When charge gives to the jury a correct statement of the law upon the responsibility of a conspirator for acts of coconspirators, it does not intimate an opinion that a crime has been committed, or that a conspiracy existed, because the charge refers to crime as "the crime" and to conspiracy as "the conspiracy." Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 11 S.E.2d 23 (1940).

- State supreme court rejected the defendant's claim that a trial court improperly commented on the evidence, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, when the court told the jury that the offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute was a felony while instructing the jury before the jury deliberated to determine if the defendant was guilty as charged of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Trigger v. State, 275 Ga. 512, 570 S.E.2d 323 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 195, 586 S.E.2d 669 (2003).

- If the court charges the jury "that this case that you have heard and that you are deliberating now is a misdemeanor," the language is calculated to impress upon the jury that the court is of the opinion that the state has proved that the defendant committed a misdemeanor and is error in violation of this section. Hendricks v. State, 108 Ga. App. 259, 132 S.E.2d 845 (1963), overruled on other grounds, State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500, 411 S.E.2d 546 (1991).

- Even if the judge made an improper comment during trial, there was no plain error because the judge gave a sufficient curative instruction. Franklin v. State, 351 Ga. App. 539, 831 S.E.2d 186 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1590, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 107 (Ga. 2020).

- Portion of charge on the defense of insanity, the burden of proof, and the consideration of the evidence of insanity in connection with other evidence in the event the burden of establishing insanity has not been carried by the accused, is not an expression of opinion by the judge. Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944).

- In prosecution for homicide, part of charge upon delusional insanity, wherein the court uses the expression, "connected with the criminal act," when considered with the charge as a whole, is not an expression of opinion that the homicide is a criminal act. Carroll v. State, 204 Ga. 510, 50 S.E.2d 330 (1948).

- If the court has fully instructed the jury as to verdict forms applicable to both acquittal and conviction, it is not error, in connection with the latter form, to instruct that, "when" or "after" the jury finds such verdict of guilty, the jury may go further and recommend misdemeanor punishment. Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843 (1954).

- Statute was not violated since the trial court did not indicate that it thought some form of sentence was necessary for the defendant's actions; the court's instruction only informed the jury that the jury was not to be concerned with sentencing if sentencing became necessary. Moore v. State, 274 Ga. 229, 552 S.E.2d 832 (2001).

- There is no impermissible expression of opinion when the trial court instructs the jury that the defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless the jury finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and recommends that the death penalty be imposed. Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 582, 250 S.E.2d 388 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 916, 99 S. Ct. 2017, 60 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1979).

If the judge instructs the jury to write the jury's verdicts at the top of the indictments, because later the jury will have to write the sentencing feature at the bottom, such charge is error within the meaning of this section. Gaither v. State, 234 Ga. 465, 216 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

- In murder trial, charge on voluntary manslaughter which directed the jury that, if the jury should convict the defendant of this offense, the jury should fix the defendant's sentence within the minimum and maximum fixed by law, and that, upon serving the minimum sentence fixed by the jury under the rules of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, the accused will be eligible for parole, is not error on grounds that the charge intimated that the judge desired a verdict convicting the defendant of the offense of murder, and sought to take away from the board the power vested in the board by law. Thompson v. State, 204 Ga. 407, 50 S.E.2d 74 (1948).

- Trial judge's misstatement of defendant's not guilty plea as "the plea of guilty" in a jury charge was not reversible error because the judge immediately before referred to the plea as not guilty and the mistake was a palpable slip of the tongue. Edwards v. State, 169 Ga. App. 958, 315 S.E.2d 675 (1984).

- When the court charged the jury, in pertinent part: "Now, the state concedes and the court recognizes that there is no evidence in this case whatsoever that the defendant was ever in jail other than as a result of being arrested for the particular offenses involved in and named in this indictment. You will not consider his being in jail as referring to anything other than his being in jail as a result of an arrest made for the particular offenses listed in this indictment and you will not consider that evidence that the defendant has been in jail as in any way hurtful to the defendant in this case," the court's instruction was not an expression of opinion by the court, but was a statement of facts in evidence, namely, that the defendant was in jail for the offenses charged, and that there was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant was ever in jail for any other reason. Lee v. State, 186 Ga. App. 849, 368 S.E.2d 804 (1988).

When the defendant argued that certain portions of the trial court's instructions to the jury violated the statutory prohibition against expression or intimation by a judge of the judge's opinion as to what has or has not been proven or as to the guilt of the accused, and in responding to the jury's request for additional instruction, the trial judge attempted to distinguish circumstantial evidence from direct evidence and, by way of example, stated that the testimony of two eyewitnesses in the case was direct testimony, there was no error in the court's instruction to the jury since the direct testimony of the eyewitnesses was sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thornton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 801, 383 S.E.2d 181 (1989).

Fact that the judge intimated the opinion that the lineup was non-suggestive was not cause for a new trial because the defendant never claimed that the lineup was suggestive. Brown v. State, 251 Ga. App. 343, 554 S.E.2d 321 (2001).

Trial court's failure to make a requested change to the pattern jury charge on mere presence did not result in an expression of the trial court's opinion as to what had been proved in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the trial court's charge did not vary materially from the pattern charge or make any implication about what the evidence in the case showed, but the instruction merely reflected an accurate statement of law; the trial court explicitly instructed the jury that no ruling or comment by the trial court was intended to express any opinion about the facts of the case or credibility of the witnesses or the guilt of the defendant. Arnold v. State, 305 Ga. App. 45, 699 S.E.2d 77 (2010).

- Court's action in instructing the jury at the close of the trial on the insanity plea regarding the consequences of the jury's possible verdicts on the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial did not constitute an impermissible expression of opinion as to the appellant's guilt or innocence or as to what had or had not been proved so as to require reversal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Ross v. State, 173 Ga. App. 313, 325 S.E.2d 919 (1985).

- There is no error in a judge instructing a jury that, if the jurybelieves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which the defendant was accused, the jury "ought to" convict the defendant. Cothran v. State, 177 Ga. App. 58, 338 S.E.2d 513 (1985).

- Trial court's jury instruction on justification was not erroneous for containing improper commentary because the statement in the charge neither intimated the trial court's opinion on what had or had not been proven nor intimated the trial court's opinion on the defendant's guilt or innocence. Hall v. State, 286 Ga. 358, 687 S.E.2d 819 (2010).

Court may explain to jurors that "auto-intoximeter" or similar device is considered accurate if properly operated and such explanation does not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Henson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 210, 308 S.E.2d 555 (1983).

Charge on the scientific efficacy of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test in a prosecution for driving under the influence was not an erroneous expression of the court's opinion in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 501 S.E.2d 870 (1998).

- Court, in ruling upon the issue of whether or not the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights were given to the defendant prior to the defendant's statement, errs in advising the jury that the officer complied with the Constitution and the statute with reference to notices required by law or warnings required by law and, thus, expresses an opinion as to the evidence with reference to voluntariness, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Such a violation is a mandatory cause for a new trial. Dean v. State, 168 Ga. App. 172, 308 S.E.2d 434 (1983).

- Charge to the jury that "this so-called Miranda right does not exist in a case of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs," was an incorrect statement of the law, but under the circumstances, the error was harmless. Stanfield v. State, 176 Ga. App. 424, 336 S.E.2d 337 (1985).

- When the court charged in terms of inferences allowed to be made by the jury, if it so chose, from the evidence of flight, the flight charge, either standing alone or taken in the context of the whole charge, could not have been taken by the jury as an expression or intimation of the court's opinion. Alexander v. State, 180 Ga. App. 640, 350 S.E.2d 284 (1986).

- When the trial court charged the jury: "Jurors, in regard to the photographs that have been entered into the evidence in the case, I charge you that it is difficult and often impossible to obtain a photograph of a scene of an alleged occurrence with precise exactness prevailing," the charge did not instruct the jury to excuse or overlook any failure by the state to produce a photograph of a relevant piece of evidence for the case. The plain language of that part of the charge merely reminded the jury of what common sense under the circumstances would dictate, the statement related to photographs admitted in evidence and not to any omission or absence of photographs and the caveat related equally to the state's and defendant's evidence, as both relied on photographs, so that there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Laymac v. State, 181 Ga. App. 737, 353 S.E.2d 559 (1987).

- Charge that "a legal presumption of intoxication exists if you find the chemical analysis shows defendant's breath, urine, or blood contained .11 percent of alcohol" did not improperly intimate any conclusion on the part of the trial court regarding what the evidence had shown with respect to the alcohol content of the defendant's blood at the time of the defendant's arrest. Freeman v. State, 183 Ga. App. 264, 358 S.E.2d 623, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 358 S.E.2d 623 (1987).

- When the defendant takes exception to the judge's charge to the jury "that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any criminal act or omission," because no evidence was presented to the jury concerning the defendant's intoxication or consumption of alcohol, it was held that the extraneous instruction was harmless. Thurston v. State, 186 Ga. App. 881, 368 S.E.2d 822 (1988).

Trial court's charge on voluntary intoxication in a child molestation case was not an improper comment on the evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, given evidence from all three complainants that the defendant was drinking Wild Turkey bourbon and the victim's testimony that the victim believed the defendant was drunk. Bright v. State, 301 Ga. App. 204, 687 S.E.2d 208 (2009).

Trial court's charge to the jury on voluntary intoxication did not constitute an improper expression of opinion evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because there was circumstantial evidence to support the giving of the charge, namely, testimony that alcohol was served at the party and that the defendant went to the liquor store to make a purchase; one witness testified that although the witness did not see the defendant consume alcohol, the witness "knew" that the defendant had in fact done so. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

Trial court's use of the word "slayer" in an instruction did not constitute an opinion that the defendant acted with malice, when the term "slayer," fairly construed, did not refer to the defendant but back to the abstract word "person," thus instructing the jury as to what circumstances would, if this "person" had caused another's death, justify a finding of voluntary manslaughter. Mullinax v. State, 255 Ga. 442, 339 S.E.2d 704 (1986).

- In responding to an inquiry from the jury, the judge's recharge fully and accurately informed the jury of the elements of the defense of entrapment and there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. Jordan v. State, 211 Ga. App. 86, 438 S.E.2d 371 (1993).

- Trial court's accurate statements of the law involving the charges at issue, burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, did not involve improper comments on the evidence and, thus, the trial court did not improperly instruct the jury. Haney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 136, 581 S.E.2d 626 (2003).

- Sequestration charge given after the defendant's sister testified was not a comment on the sister's credibility nor a suggestion that the sister violated the sequestration rule; remarks made by the trial court as to the admissibility of evidence or explaining the court's rulings were not a comment or an opinion as to what had or had not been proven. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

- Trial court judge did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by expressing an opinion in providing the explanation of the rule of sequestration because it was not a prohibited expression of opinion, was not a comment on the credibility of any of the witnesses, and was a neutral explanation of the rule of sequestration that did not favor either party. Booker v. State, 322 Ga. App. 257, 744 S.E.2d 429 (2013).

- Trial court's jury instructions did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 because the instructions limiting the evidence that the jury could consider from a detective's testimony did not express or intimate the trial court's opinion with regard to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Graves v. State, 322 Ga. App. 24, 743 S.E.2d 582 (2013).

- Because whether a tire store where a victim was found was the scene of the victim's rape and murder was a contested fact, the trial court's instructions regarding a statement defendant made "at the scene of the crime" violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57; however, under the plain error standard of § 17-8-57(b), which was applied retroactively as procedural, the error did not likely affect the outcome given the strong evidence of guilt. Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 122, 816 S.E.2d 656 (2018).

Necessity for Objection or Motion

Necessity for objection or motion for mistrial.

- Prejudicial remarks of the judge in the presence and hearing of the jury are not cause for a new trial when there is no motion for a mistrial on account of the remarks. Williams v. State, 42 Ga. App. 225, 155 S.E. 511 (1930).

In order to take advantage of the conduct of the trial judge in propounding questions to witnesses as an expression or intimation of an opinion, it is necessary that counsel make a motion for mistrial or other valid objections. Parker v. State, 51 Ga. App. 295, 180 S.E. 390 (1935).

Prejudicial questions or statements purportedly in violation of this section are not reversible error in the absence of a motion for mistrial or other objection. Miller v. State, 122 Ga. App. 553, 177 S.E.2d 838 (1970); Nelson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 861, 222 S.E.2d 677 (1975).

Question of whether this section has been violated is not reached unless an objection or motion for mistrial is made. Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 259 S.E.2d 133 (1979); Turnbow v. State, 153 Ga. App. 479, 265 S.E.2d 832 (1980); Anglin v. State, 173 Ga. App. 648, 327 S.E.2d 776 (1985); Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 652, 327 S.E.2d 781 (1985); Coney v. State, 198 Ga. App. 272, 401 S.E.2d 304 (1991); Butts v. State, 198 Ga. App. 368, 401 S.E.2d 763 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 467 S.E.2d 574 (1996); Cornelius v. State, 213 Ga. App. 766, 445 S.E.2d 800 (1994); Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996); Brown v. State, 221 Ga. App. 454, 471 S.E.2d 527 (1996); Pickren v. State, 272 Ga. 421, 530 S.E.2d 464 (2000); Conger v. State, 245 Ga. App. 399, 537 S.E.2d 798 (2000); Hudson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 335, 539 S.E.2d 860 (2000).

If the trial judge is alleged to have made a prejudicial remark or to have asked a prejudicial question during the course of trial in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, an objection or motion for mistrial must be made in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Thomas v. State, 158 Ga. App. 97, 279 S.E.2d 335 (1981); Lucas v. State, 197 Ga. App. 347, 398 S.E.2d 417 (1990); Gann v. State, 245 Ga. App. 448, 538 S.E.2d 97 (2000).

When on appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 but the defendant made no motion for mistrial, that enumeration of error was without merit. Miller v. State, 180 Ga. App. 525, 349 S.E.2d 495 (1986).

When a criminal defendant did not object at trial to the manner in which the court conducted the court's competency examination of a five-year old child nor indicate how the defendant was harmed, and the defendant failed to object to the court's conduct during the child's testimony before the jury, review was precluded. Hunter v. State, 194 Ga. App. 711, 391 S.E.2d 695 (1990); Herrington v. State, 243 Ga. App. 265, 533 S.E.2d 133 (2000), appeal dismissed, 265 Ga. App. 454, 594 S.E.2d 682 (2004).

Although the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by taking an active role in the defendant's criminal trial, arising from an incident wherein the defendant was observed in a drug transaction, any potential error arising from the court's conduct which involved the questioning of several witnesses was waived by the defendant's failure to have either objected or sought a mistrial. Collins v. State, 263 Ga. App. 601, 588 S.E.2d 799 (2003).

Defendant's conviction of trafficking in more than 200 grams of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) was affirmed because the defendant waived any issue as to the judge's violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by failing to object or move for a mistrial, but even if the defendant had objected, the transcript failed to show that the judge made an improper comment or gave the judge's opinion regarding the evidence. Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 589 S.E.2d 325 (2003).

Defendants' claimed violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was not addressed on appeal as neither defendant objected to the court's alleged improper comments or moved for a mistrial. Graham v. State, 282 Ga. App. 576, 639 S.E.2d 384 (2006).

Trial court's statement during voir dire that the crimes allegedly took place near the intersection of Peachtree Road and Pharr Road in the Buckhead section of Atlanta was not objected to by the defendant, and therefore the defendant's claim that the statement improperly relieved the state of the state's obligation to establish venue, violating O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, was not preserved. Green v. State, 300 Ga. App. 688, 686 S.E.2d 271 (2009).

- General reservation of the right to later object to a jury charge preserves for review an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 which occurs during the charge, overruling Butts v. State, 198 Ga. App. 368, 401 S.E.2d 763 (1991); Payne v. State, 207 Ga. App. 312, 428 S.E.2d 103 (1993). Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 467 S.E.2d 574 (1996).

- While an argument not raised before the trial court is not generally considered by the appellate court for the first time, an exception exists for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 which results in "plain error." Simmons v. State, 251 Ga. App. 682, 555 S.E.2d 59 (2001).

Defendant's alleged errors were not reviewed for plain error because the defendant failed to object at trial as the Georgia Supreme Court limited the application of the plain error doctrine to either capital cases or cases in which there was an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, which prohibited a trial judge from intimating an opinion as to the guilt of an accused. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550 (2005).

Violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 will always constitute "plain error," meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal, and on appeal, the issue is simply whether there was such a violation, and, if so, the statutory language is mandatory, and a violation of § 17-8-57 requires a new trial; to the extent the "plain error rule" has been articulated otherwise in the context of an alleged violation of § 17-8-57, such cases are disapproved. State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).

Murder defendant failed to object and failed to show plain error in a trial judge's comments in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(1); rather, the trial court intervened to prevent witnesses from giving improper testimony; questioned witnesses to clarify testimony; and cautioned counsel. Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340, 839 S.E.2d 640 (2020).

Trial judge did not commit plain error when purportedly violating O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by commenting on the surveillance video evidence that was played for the jury because even if the commentary was error, the defendant ignored the context in which the comments were made as the comments did not pertain to the substance of the video; the comments pertained to the process the judge intended to use with respect to that piece of evidence. Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 824 S.E.2d 326 (2019).

- When a judge during the progress of the trial or in charge to the jury, expresses or intimates the judge's opinion as to what has or has not been proved, or as to the guilt of the accused, such error may be taken advantage of for the first time in a motion for new trial. Allen v. State, 67 Ga. App. 607, 21 S.E.2d 280 (1942).

- It is not necessary for the aggrieved party to allege in the motion for new trial that any sort of motion was made at the time of the alleged error, or to allege injury resulting from such violation of the statute, since the law conclusively presumes injury on account of the error, and the mandatory provisions of this section require reversal of the judgment of the trial court on proper assignment of error. Allen v. State, 67 Ga. App. 607, 21 S.E.2d 280 (1942).

- When the defendant fails to properly except by motion for mistrial to allegedly improper remarks of judge and solicitor general (now district attorney) during examination of witnesses, the allegedly improper remarks were insufficient to support a motion for new trial. Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761, 184 S.E. 291 (1936).

Failure of the aggrieved party to move for a mistrial, or to register a proper objection, because of prejudicial remarks of the judge in this connection, will preclude the party prejudiced thereby from complaining thereof after the verdict. Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139 (1943); Garrett v. State, 173 Ga. App. 292, 325 S.E.2d 911 (1985).

If the accused did not object to questions at the time the questions were propounded to witnesses by the trial judge and did not move for mistrial or to rule out the evidence that had been elicited as the result of the examination, the accused could not complain that the manner in which the judge conducted the examination was a prohibited expression of opinion upon the facts. Dyer v. State, 71 Ga. App. 41, 29 S.E.2d 922 (1944).

If no motion for mistrial is made, but error is complained of for the first time in an amended motion for new trial, asserting that the trial judge expressed an opinion as to what had been proved, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, such ground of motion for new trial is not meritorious. Shepherd v. State, 203 Ga. 635, 47 S.E.2d 860 (1948).

In the absence of any objection or motion for mistrial in the trial court, the appellant may not raise the issue of the trial judge's expression of opinion for the first time on appeal. Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737 (1976).

If no motion for mistrial is made when the judge asks questions complained of, the enumeration must be rejected on appeal. Beddington v. State, 149 Ga. App. 386, 254 S.E.2d 504 (1979).

If the defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error while charging the jury in expressing the court's opinion that the defendant fled the scene of the crime, but there was no objection at trial or request for mistrial, the defendant is estopped from raising the issue on appeal. McDaniel v. State, 169 Ga. App. 254, 312 S.E.2d 363 (1983); Barber v. State, 176 Ga. App. 103, 335 S.E.2d 594 (1985).

Defendant waived the right to contend that the court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 since the defendant did not contemporaneously object or move for a mistrial on this ground. Walker v. State, 258 Ga. 443, 370 S.E.2d 149 (1988); Wilson v. State, 268 Ga. 527, 491 S.E.2d 47 (1997).

Defendant failed to preserve for appeal the defendant's claim that the trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by improperly commenting on the evidence as the defendant did not make an objection or a motion for a mistrial. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 178, 598 S.E.2d 898 (2004).

Appellate court refused to consider the defendant's claim that the trial judge violated O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 when the judge commented on evidence that was introduced during the defendant's trial on charges of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant did not object to the comments or move for a mistrial. Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 601 S.E.2d 793 (2004).

In a first degree forgery prosecution, the trial court should not have instructed the jury that the jury was not bound to believe testimony as to facts incredible, impossible, or inherently improbable, but the defendant did not object; the defendant's failure to object, under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, waived the error given the strength of the evidence against the defendant and the trial court's charge in its entirety. Overton v. State, 277 Ga. App. 819, 627 S.E.2d 875 (2006).

- Because there was no contemporaneous objection, the right to urge a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was waived. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).

- Under the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845 (2000), the failure to object to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 in a criminal trial does not waive the right to assert error on appeal in the case of plain error. Patterson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 630, 577 S.E.2d 850 (2003).

Although the state argued that because the defendant failed to object to any of the first three comments of which the defendant complained, the defendant waived any error, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 always constituted plain error, meaning that the failure to object at trial would not waive the issue on appeal. On appeal, the issue was simply whether there was such a violation; if so, it was well established that the statutory language was mandatory and that a violation of § 17-8-57 required a new trial. Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010).

- Defendant in criminal case may appeal and enumerate error on erroneous charge or erroneous failure to charge without first raising issue in trial court. Arnold v. State, 157 Ga. App. 714, 278 S.E.2d 418 (1981).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 89 C.J.S. (Rev), Trial, § 610 et seq.

- Propriety of instructions as to the significance of evidence concerning the defendant's good character as an element bearing upon the question of reasonable doubt, 10 A.L.R. 8; 68 A.L.R. 1068.

Remark of judge during trial of criminal case as comment on weight of evidence, 10 A.L.R. 1116.

Right to and propriety of instruction as to credibility of defendant in criminal case as a witness, 85 A.L.R. 523.

Comments and conduct of judge calculated to coerce or influence jury to reach verdict in criminal case, 85 A.L.R. 1420.

Propriety and correctness of instructions regarding maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," 90 A.L.R. 74.

Scope and application of rule which permits judge in criminal case to comment on weight or significance of evidence, 113 A.L.R. 1308.

Propriety and effect of instruction or requested instruction which either affirms or denies jury's right to draw unfavorable inference against a party because he invokes privilege against testimony of person offered as witness by the other party or because he fails to call such person as a witness, 131 A.L.R. 693.

Instructions disparaging defense of alibi, 146 A.L.R. 1377.

Comments in judge's charge to jury disparaging expert testimony, 156 A.L.R. 530.

Propriety and effect of court's indication to jury that court would suspend sentence, 8 A.L.R.2d 1001.

Remarks or acts of trial judge criticizing, rebuking, or punishing defense counsel in criminal case, as requiring new trial or reversal, 62 A.L.R.2d 166.

Right to withdraw motion for mistrial, 100 A.L.R.2d 375.

Propriety of specific jury instructions as to credibility of accomplices, 4 A.L.R.3d 351.

Prejudicial effect of statement of court that if jury makes mistake in convicting it can be corrected by other authorities, 5 A.L.R.3d 974.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or instruction by court with respect to party's refusal to permit introduction of privileged testimony, 34 A.L.R.3d 775.

Prejudicial effect of trial judge's remarks, during criminal trial, disparaging accused, 34 A.L.R.3d 1313.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions on credibility of alibi witnesses, 72 A.L.R.3d 617.

Instructions to jury: sympathy to accused as appropriate factor in jury consideration, 72 A.L.R.3d 842.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial court's inquiry as to numerical division of jury, 77 A.L.R.3d 769.

Double jeopardy as bar to retrial after grant of defendant's motion of mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 997.

Propriety of jury instruction regarding credibility of witness who has been convicted of a crime, 9 A.L.R.4th 897.

Modern status of law regarding cure of error, in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of higher or lesser offense, 15 A.L.R.4th 118.

Post-retirement out-of-court communications between jurors and trial judge as grounds for new trial or reversal in criminal case, 43 A.L.R.4th 410.

Disqualification from criminal proceedings of trial judge who earlier presided over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72 A.L.R.4th 651.

Gestures, facial expressions, or other nonverbal communication of trial judge in criminal case as ground for relief, 45 A.L.R.5th 531.

Disqualification or recusal of judge due to comments at Continuing Legal Education (CLE) seminar or other educational meetings, 49 A.L.R.6th 93.

Justification and correction of remarks or acts of state trial judge criticizing, rebuking, or punishing defense counsel in criminal case as otherwise requiring new trial or reversal, 54 A.L.R.6th 429.

What constitutes accused's consent to court's discharge of jury or to grant of motion for mistrial which will constitute waiver of former jeopardy plea - silence or failure to object or protest, 103 A.L.R.6th 137.