2020 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 7 - Pretrial Proceedings
Article 3 - Indictments
§ 17-7-54. Form of Indictment by Grand Jury

1. Every indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct. The form of every indictment shall be substantially as follows:

   Georgia, ______________ County.

   The grand jurors selected, chosen, and sworn for the County of ______________, to wit: ______________, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse (name of the accused) of the county and state aforesaid with the offense of ______________; for that the said (name of the accused) (state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place of committing the same), contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.

2. If there should be more than one count, each additional count shall state:

   And the jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, further charge and accuse (name of the accused) with having committed the offense of ______________; for that the said (name of the accused) (state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place of committing the same) contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 833; Code 1863, § 4516; Code 1868, § 4535; Code 1873, § 4628; Code 1882, § 4628; Penal Code 1895, § 929; Penal Code 1910, § 954; Code 1933, § 27-701.)

- For article, "The Necessity of Negativing Exceptions in a Criminal Indictment," see 16 Ga. B.J. 25 (1953). For survey article on death penalty law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 123 (2007). For comment on Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959), see 11 Mercer L. Rev. 237 (1959).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Multiple Counts
• Pleading in the Alternative; More than One Way to Commit Offense
• Variance
• Particular Offenses

This section was not intended to dispense with the substance of good pleading. Braxley v. State, 143 Ga. 658, 85 S.E. 888 (1915).

- Under this section, an indictment was sufficient if the indictment stated the offense so plainly that a man of rational understanding cannot fail to understand the indictment. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930).

When the offense is stated in such language that the jury can easily understand the nature of the offense charged, the charge measures up to the rule expressed by this section. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930).

- True criterion as to the sufficiency of an indictment is the description of the crime charged rather than the description and number of the statute under the Code or the law. State v. Black, 149 Ga. App. 389, 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979).

Test is not whether the indictment could have been made more definite and certain, but whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what the defendant must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against the defendant for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent the defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction. State v. Black, 149 Ga. App. 389, 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979); Fletcher v. State, 157 Ga. App. 707, 278 S.E.2d 444 (1981).

This section required that the indictment should leave nothing to inference; or implication but that its statements should be so plain that a common man may without doubt or difficulty, from the language used, know what is the charge made against the accused. Moore v. State, 54 Ga. App. 218, 187 S.E. 595 (1936).

- Trial court erred in overruling the defendant's special demurrer with regard to portions of the indictment that contended that the Medicaid fraud and theft by taking crimes were committed over a range of 38 months because the specific dates were known to the state and the state should have listed those dates due to the number of alleged acts. Cole v. State, 334 Ga. App. 752, 780 S.E.2d 406 (2015).

- Indictment for criminal street gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) was sufficient to withstand 12 defendants' general and special demurrers. Although the indictment did not allege a date that the gang came into existence, the indictment sufficiently alleged that the gang existed at the time of each of the enumerated predicate offenses. State v. Hood, 307 Ga. App. 439, 706 S.E.2d 566 (2010).

- No latitude of intention can be allowed to include anything more than is expressed, and no argumentative inferences will supply the want of direct averments of material facts. Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131 (1936), aff'd, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937).

- Accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against the accused, to the end that the accused may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956); State v. Black, 149 Ga. App. 389, 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979).

Good indictment must state the offense charged in detail sufficient to give the defendant ample opportunity to prepare a defense. Morris v. State, 166 Ga. App. 137, 303 S.E.2d 492 (1983).

Indictment not framed with reasonable certainty is defective, although the indictment may follow the language of this section. Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

- Description should be definite so that the judgment may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Pharr v. State, 44 Ga. App. 363, 161 S.E. 643 (1931).

Indictment may be good in substance and sufficiently full to withstand a general demurrer or to support a conviction as against a motion in arrest of judgment, and yet be wanting in that degree of detail and definiteness which the accused may demand before going to trial on the merits. Mullen v. State, 51 Ga. App. 385, 180 S.E. 521 (1935).

Accused has the right to know enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable the accused to prepare for trial. Lee v. State, 117 Ga. App. 765, 162 S.E.2d 229 (1968).

Requisite of a good indictment, as to form, is that the offense with which the defendant is charged be so stated as to give defendant ample opportunity to prepare a defense. State v. Green, 135 Ga. App. 622, 218 S.E.2d 456 (1975).

As long as the defendant is informed of the charges against the defendant so that the defendant may present a defense at trial and not be surprised by the evidence against the defendant, as well as protect against prosecution for the same offense, the indictment is sufficient. Carter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 49, 270 S.E.2d 233 (1980).

- Demurrer raising special objections to an indictment should be strictly construed against the pleader. Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 450, 504 S.E.2d 290 (1998).

- If all the facts which the indictment charges can be admitted, and still the accused be innocent, the indictment is bad. Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 49 S.E. 258 (1904).

- If, taking the facts alleged in the indictment as premises, the guilt of the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good. Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 49 S.E. 258 (1904); Kidd v. State, 39 Ga. App. 30, 146 S.E. 35 (1928); Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

It is immaterial by what language an indictment styles the offense charged, if the indictment in fact charges an offense. Driver v. State, 60 Ga. App. 719, 4 S.E.2d 922 (1939).

Offense charged in an indictment is not determined by the name given it therein, but by the facts set forth in the indictment. Driver v. State, 60 Ga. App. 719, 4 S.E.2d 922 (1939).

- Description and not the name given to a criminal act characterizes the offense. Edwards v. State, 22 Ga. App. 796, 97 S.E. 205 (1918).

- Indictment which charges the offense defined by a legislative act in the language of the act, when the description of the acts alleged as constituting the offense is full enough to put the defendant on notice of the offense with which the defendant is charged, is sufficiently specific. Lowe v. State, 50 Ga. App. 369, 178 S.E. 203 (1934); Stone v. State, 76 Ga. App. 96, 45 S.E.2d 89 (1947); Gaines v. State, 80 Ga. App. 512, 56 S.E.2d 772 (1949).

Indictment conforming substantially to the requirements of section would be sufficient, but it was not designed to deny to the accused the right to know enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable the accused to prepare for trial. Moore v. State, 54 Ga. App. 218, 187 S.E. 595 (1936); Stone v. State, 76 Ga. App. 96, 45 S.E.2d 89 (1947); Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956); Cragg v. State, 117 Ga. App. 133, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968).

Under general principles of common-law pleading, it is sufficient to frame an indictment in the words of the statute, in all cases when the statute so far individuates the offense that the offender has proper notice, from the mere adoption of the statutory terms, what the offense the offender is to be tried for really is. Stone v. State, 76 Ga. App. 96, 45 S.E.2d 89 (1947).

Accusation which alleges the violation of the statute in the language of the statute, together with the other necessary allegations, is sufficient to put the defendant on notice as against what facts and charges defendant must contend as every essential ingredient of the offense charged is set forth in the accusation with sufficient clearness to enable the defendant to clearly understand the nature of the offense, and the accusation is exact enough to protect the defendant from a second jeopardy. Gaines v. State, 80 Ga. App. 512, 56 S.E.2d 772 (1949).

When two counts of an indictment allege the offense charged in the terms and language of this section upon which the indictments are predicated, and the allegations were sufficiently plain for the nature of the offenses to be easily understood by the jury, the indictments were sufficient. Pippin v. State, 205 Ga. 316, 53 S.E.2d 482 (1949).

Indictment substantially in the language of the Code is sufficient in form and substance. Schulman v. State, 94 Ga. App. 489, 95 S.E.2d 343 (1956).

For an indictment to meet the test of this section, the offense shall be described in the language of the statute and with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to be able to prepare for trial. Ingram v. State, 97 Ga. App. 468, 103 S.E.2d 666 (1958).

When the accusation was framed in the language of this section, the accusation sufficiently alleges and describes the nature of the crime so that the charge may be understood by the jury. Reddish v. State, 101 Ga. App. 759, 115 S.E.2d 736 (1960).

It is ordinarily sufficient to describe the offense in the language of the Code. Jones v. State, 101 Ga. App. 851, 115 S.E.2d 576 (1960).

When the charge is in the language of the statute, and the statute is upheld as against a charge of vagueness, the allegations are not insufficient to put the defendants on notice of the crime charged so as to render the indictment subject to dismissal. Flinchum v. State, 141 Ga. App. 59, 232 S.E.2d 396 (1977).

Indictment which charges a defendant with the commission of a crime in the language of a valid statute is sufficient to withstand a demurrer charging that the indictment is insufficient to charge the defendant with any offense under the laws of this state. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 268 S.E.2d 906 (1980).

Indictment in which the allegations track the language of the applicable Code section is good as against a general demurrer. Bentley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 862, 438 S.E.2d 110 (1993); Thomas v. State, 215 Ga. App. 522, 451 S.E.2d 516 (1994).

Indictment couched in the language of the statute is not subject to general demurrer. Smith v. State, 130 Ga. App. 390, 203 S.E.2d 375 (1973); Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 813, 341 S.E.2d 469 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Eason v. State, 260 Ga. 445, 396 S.E.2d 492 (1990), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (1999).

Indictment need not state the statute on which indictment is based. State v. Pettus, 133 Ga. App. 622, 212 S.E.2d 9 (1974).

In order to charge statutory offenses, indictments are not constitutionally required to cite or name the statute. Turner v. State, 233 Ga. 538, 212 S.E.2d 370 (1975).

- Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion to quash an indictment, based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because the face of the indictment did not contain the statutory aggravators for the death penalty; the state was not required to list the statutory aggravators in the indictment. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

- Although an indictment followed the statute, and is good in substance, if the indictment is wanting in that degree of detail and definiteness which the accused has a right to demand, a special demurrer thereto should be sustained. Bailey v. State, 65 Ga. 410 (1880); Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 16 S.E. 92 (1892); Dixon v. Mayor of Savannah, 20 Ga. App. 511, 93 S.E. 274, cert. denied, 20 Ga. App. 511 (1917).

If the indictment does not specify the section under which the indictment is drawn, the omission is immaterial. The offense charged is to be determined by the allegations. Turner v. State, 233 Ga. 538, 212 S.E.2d 370 (1975).

- Indictment drawn under a criminal statute, which defines and describes the acts alleged to constitute the crime, is not subject to demurrer on the ground that the indictment fails to quote literally the exact language of the statute. Farrar v. State, 187 Ga. 401, 200 S.E. 803 (1939).

- While an accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood, is generally sufficient; nevertheless, when the terms used in the Code section are generic, it is not sufficient that an indictment charge the offense in the same general terms as in the definition of the crime, but the indictment must state the particular offense intended to be charged. Ramsey v. State, 85 Ga. App. 245, 69 S.E.2d 98 (1952).

Indictment must state the species of act charged; the indictment must descend to particulars. Lee v. State, 117 Ga. App. 765, 162 S.E.2d 229 (1968).

- This section was not intended to dispense with the substance of good pleading, and there are many charges where the offense cannot be described in the terms and language of the Code. Such cases are covered by the additional words, "so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury." Moore v. State, 54 Ga. App. 218, 187 S.E. 595 (1936); Mell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 302, 25 S.E.2d 142 (1943).

Many offenses would not be sufficiently charged if stated merely in the language of the Code, such as murder, larceny, perjury, and others. A description of these latter offenses or a description of what the defendant did is necessary to make a legal charge, and to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

- Rule set forth in this section that an accusation or indictment substantially in the language of the Code is sufficient to withstand demurrer, has its limitations, is not of universal application, and does not cover all crimes. Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

- Trial court's decision overruling the defendant's special demurrer to an indictment charging the defendant with trafficking in methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(e) was authorized because the allegations of the indictment were sufficient to be easily understood by the jury, to allow the defendant to prepare the defendant's defense, and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy; the indictment sufficiently set forth the date of the offenses and tracked the material language of the statutes proscribing the charged offenses, and the language set forth in the counts against the codefendants separately designated the drugs upon which those charges were based and made clear that the defendant's drug charges were not based upon the drugs allegedly possessed by those individual codefendants. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010).

If the indictment is not stated in the language of the Code, the indictment must allege every essential element of the crime charged. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. State, 83 Ga. App. 303, 63 S.E.2d 451 (1951).

- Indictment clearly specified the predicate acts alleged against the defendants by specifying that the pattern of racketeering activity was unlawfully obtaining oxycodone, and it incorporated as predicate acts the remaining counts of the indictment charging the defendants with unlawfully obtaining oxycodone. Kimbrough v. State, 336 Ga. App. 381, 785 S.E.2d 54 (2016).

- Distinction is to be drawn between charges which are violations of purely statutory offenses and those cases which were penalized under the common law. Naturally, when the offense is statutory, the language of the accusation must follow more closely the language of the statute and be restricted by it more than when the charge relates to a common-law offense, in which the details must necessarily be amplified in order to cover the definition of the common-law offense. Dalton v. State, 176 Ga. 645, 169 S.E. 198 (1933); Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

When the offenses set forth in the indictment are violations of purely statutory offenses and not offenses penalized under the common law, the language of the indictment must follow more closely the language of the statute and be restricted by it more than a common-law offense. State v. Black, 149 Ga. App. 389, 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979).

- While after verdict the defendant will not be heard to complain of technical defects as to the form of the indictment under which the defendant was tried, every defendant in a criminal case is entitled to be tried under an indictment perfect in form and substance. Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

- Every defendant has the right to be tried upon an indictment or accusation perfect in form and substance, but this right, like every other, may be waived. Youmans v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 495 (1935).

Unless the defects appearing in an indictment or accusation are so great that the indictment or accusation is absolutely void, the right to a perfect indictment or accusation may be waived, and is waived by going to trial under a defective indictment or accusation without complaint. Moore v. State, 94 Ga. App. 210, 94 S.E.2d 80 (1956).

- One who waives one's right to be tried upon an indictment perfect in form as well as substance, and takes one's chances of acquittal, will not be heard, after conviction, to urge defects in the indictment, unless such defects are so great that the indictment is absolutely void. Goldstein v. State, 26 Ga. App. 651, 107 S.E. 176 (1921); Youmans v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 495 (1935); Tanner v. State, 90 Ga. App. 789, 84 S.E.2d 600 (1954).

If the defendant admitted the act as charged in the indictment, it was in the language of the statute, and so plainly stated as to be understood by the defendant and by the jury. Duncan v. State, 172 Ga. 186, 157 S.E. 670 (1931).

Intent must be alleged unless the law presumes intent from the act. Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 49 S.E. 258 (1904).

- There can be no conviction for the commission of a crime an essential element of which is not charged in the indictment. Steele v. State, 154 Ga. App. 59, 267 S.E.2d 500 (1980).

This section was obviously intended to sweep away all technical exceptions to indictments. Duncan v. State, 41 Ga. App. 655, 154 S.E. 197 (1930).

This section was not intended to dispense with the substance of good pleading, nor to deny to one accused of crime the right to know enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to be able to prepare for trial, nor to deprive the accused of the right to have an indictment perfect as to the essential elements of the crime charged. Pharr v. State, 44 Ga. App. 363, 161 S.E. 643 (1931); Statham v. State, 50 Ga. App. 165, 177 S.E. 522 (1934); Isom v. State, 71 Ga. App. 803, 32 S.E.2d 437 (1944).

- When the indictment charges only an attempt to commit a crime, the indictment must aver some act toward the commission of such crime. However, this rule is not applicable to cases where only the completed offense is charged. Arrington v. State, 48 Ga. App. 70, 171 S.E. 878 (1934).

- It is not necessary for the state to prove that a defendant's prior convictions are valid in order merely to allege the convictions in the indictment. Callahan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 555, 251 S.E.2d 790 (1978).

- It is not necessary for the state to spread out in an indictment the evidence on which the state relies for a conviction. Mell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 302, 25 S.E.2d 142 (1943).

- This section required only that the offense shall be stated, not the roles played by the several actors, for instance, as that of an accessory. Chambers v. State, 194 Ga. 773, 22 S.E.2d 487, answer conformed to, 68 Ga. App. 338, 23 S.E.2d 545 (1942).

Principal in the second degree may be convicted under an indictment charging the person as principal in the first degree. Morris v. State, 26 Ga. App. 60, 105 S.E. 380 (1920). See Hansford v. State, 54 Ga. 55 (1875).

- This section gave a form for every indictment or accusation, and it was there pointed out that each indictment or accusation must set out the offense and allege the time and place of the offense's commission with sufficient certainty. Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959).

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's special demurrer to an indictment for child molestation and rape alleging that the offenses were committed "between the dates of January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1998, the exact date(s) not being known to the Grand Jury and said date not being alleged to be a material allegation of the Indictment" as the indictment did not specify the specific date or time frame in which the offenses occurred. Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga. App. 854, 614 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Trial court erred in denying the defendant's special demurrer to an indictment as the state did not meet the state's burden to show that the state could not more specifically identify the dates of the offenses as the state failed to present evidence that the victim was a young child who was incapable of adequately articulating exactly when the offenses occurred; the defendant was entitled to an indictment perfect in form and substance as the defendant had filed a timely special demurrer and the indictment failed to allege a specific date on which the crime was committed and was not perfect in form. Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga. App. 854, 614 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Accusation that alleged contributing to the delinquency of a minor and electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor within a two and a half month time frame was subject to a demurrer because the state gave no explanation as to why an investigating officer was unable to ascertain the dates of the offenses from the victim's computer. State v. Meeks, 309 Ga. App. 855, 711 S.E.2d 403 (2011).

Trial court erred by overruling the defendant's special demurrer to one count each of incest and child molestation as those counts were subject to a special demurrer since the evidence showed that the state reasonably could narrow the range of dates alleged in those counts of the indictment to a single date only. Herring v. State, 334 Ga. App. 50, 778 S.E.2d 57 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea in abatement because the state was unable either to identify a specific date on which an offense of child molestation occurred or to narrow the range of possible dates as the evidence produced during the hearing only concerned the date of the defendant's arrival in the victim's neighborhood, that the molestation began thereafter, and the date upon which the victim disclosed the molestation. Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 784 S.E.2d 11 (2016).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's special demurrer to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment charging incest based on the state failing to have narrowed the ranges of dates because the evidence showed that the defendant had engaged in at least 50 individual acts of incest with an older daughter throughout the two-year time period alleged in the indictment, not just during the months the defendant identified in the defendant's brief. Blanton v. State, 324 Ga. App. 610, 751 S.E.2d 431 (2013).

- Unless the character of the place is an essential element of the offense, an indictment that charges the crime to have been committed in a particular county is sufficiently certain as to place. Gentry v. State, 235 Ga. App. 328, 508 S.E.2d 671 (1998).

When a penal statute or regulation contains an exception or exemption, the rule in regard to the necessity of alleging in the indictment that the defendant does not fall within such exception is a rule of construction. That is, if the first sentence or part of the penal law describes a penal offense applicable to all persons, and the second merely describes a class to which the law shall not apply, or simply limits the operation of the law as defined in the first sentence, then such latter portion is merely a matter of defense, and it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that the defendant falls within such exemption. However, a contrary rule prevails when the penal offense as defined is not directed against all persons generally, but only against a certain class of persons. Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

- If the grand jury is uncertain which of the several names is the real name of the person, the grand jury may indict the accused under an alias dictus. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

When a defendant is indicted under two names, alleged by an alias dictus, it is necessary only that the defendant is commonly known by either of the names. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

When the accused is known by different names, or the grand jury is uncertain as to which of a number of names is the accused's true name, it is lawful for the indictment to identify the accused by all such names as alias dictus. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

- See Anderson v. State, 196 Ga. 468, 26 S.E.2d 755 (1943).

- See Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

- Although the form of the indictment prescribed in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54 contains an averment of residence of the defendant, the omission of such averment in the indictment will not be grounds for quashing the indictment. Smith v. State, 161 Ga. App. 240, 288 S.E.2d 304 (1982).

- When an indictment refers to a named county and no other county is mentioned, a subsequent allegation that the crime was committed "in the county aforesaid," sufficiently states the venue. Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44 (1883).

- Indictment should be "in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia." If these words are omitted on exceptions taken at the proper time, the indictment will be quashed. Such exception is not good in arrest of judgment. Horne v. State, 37 Ga. 80, 92 Am. Dec. 49 (1867).

Omission in charge and accusation against the defendant by the grand jurors of the words "in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia" was not grounds for demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Deason v. State, 63 Ga. App. 359, 11 S.E.2d 74 (1940).

- Indictment from which there has been entirely omitted the words prescribed in the form "contrary to the laws of said state, good order, peace and dignity thereof" is defective and subject to a special demurrer. Horne v. State, 37 Ga. 80, 92 Am. Dec. 49 (1867); Hardin v. State, 106 Ga. 384, 32 S.E. 365, 71 Am. St. R. 269 (1899).

Printed words "special presentment" is a sufficient endorsement to show that the grand jury found such special presentment. Barlow v. State, 127 Ga. 58, 56 S.E. 131 (1906).

- When, through inadvertence, the indictment is signed by the foreperson but does not contain the names of the jurors who acted on the true bill, the defect is one of form only and cannot be raised after the verdict. Hopper v. Kemp, 236 Ga. 615, 225 S.E.2d 15 (1976).

- Indictment that failed to show the names of the grand jurors who found the indictment is defective. Willerson v. State, 14 Ga. App. 451, 81 S.E. 391 (1914).

Indictment would have been defective had the indictment failed to show the names of the grand jurors who returned the indictment. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).

- Trial court did not err by including the names of the grand jurors when the court read the indictment to the jury; although the trial court was not required by law to read the names of the grand jurors, it was not error to do so when the trial court properly instructed the jury that the indictment did not constitute any evidence of guilt. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

Defendant may expressly waive defect in indictment. Williams v. State, 107 Ga. 721, 33 S.E. 648 (1899).

- There is no statute in this state requiring the foreperson to sign their name on the back of the bill of indictment or special presentment under the words "true bill," but it is a practice for the foreperson to do so and the practice so adopted is advisable. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).

Foreperson's signature may appear on any part of the indictment. Taylor v. State, 121 Ga. 362, 49 S.E. 317 (1904).

- When the indictment is otherwise good, an obvious clerical error will not vitiate the indictment. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968).

- When the indictment in a case is otherwise good, the clerical error of writing inadvertently the word "accused" for the word "prosecutor" does not vitiate the indictment. Since the word which is changed does not so obscure the sense that a juror or person of ordinary intelligence cannot with certainty ascertain the meaning, the defendant will not be permitted after the verdict to take advantage of this mere clerical error which is corrected by the necessary intendment of the indictment. Lewis v. State, 55 Ga. App. 743, 191 S.E. 278 (1937).

- When the defendant is tried on an accusation which charges the defendant with the commission of a misdemeanor, and before the trial the defendant waives formal arraignment, a copy of the accusation, and a list of the witnesses, and enters a formal plea of not guilty, the defendant is held to have waived the irregularity of the clerk's failure to file the accusation in the office of the clerk of the trial court. Youmans v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 495 (1935).

- Indictment conforming substantially to the requirements of this section would be sufficient, but it was not designed to deny to the accused the right to know enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable the accused to prepare for trial. Moore v. State, 54 Ga. App. 218, 187 S.E. 595 (1936); Stone v. State, 76 Ga. App. 96, 45 S.E.2d 89 (1947); Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956); Cragg v. State, 117 Ga. App. 133, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968).

- If each count in an indictment contained the elements of the offense charged and the defendants could not claim the charges were so insufficient that the defendants were surprised by evidence introduced at trial or were unable to prepare a defense, the indictment was sufficient even though each count was not specifically individualized to each person named in the count. Jordan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 627, 470 S.E.2d 242 (1996).

- Indictment charged the defendant with child molestation using the language found in the relevant statute and described the acts constituting the offense sufficiently to put the defendant on notice of the offense with which the defendant was charged; accordingly, the defendant's claim that the indictment was invalid was without merit. Golden v. State, 299 Ga. App. 407, 683 S.E.2d 618 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1904, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 56 (Ga.), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 941, 130 S. Ct. 3358, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1250 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of an indictment because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54 the indictment showed that it was a "True Bill," was signed by the grand jury foreperson, and was filed with the clerk's office with the clerk of the court's name prior to the defendant's arraignment, since the defendant and counsel signed the indictment; there is no express requirement that the indictment contain a written statement that the indictment was received in "open court," or that the indictment be signed. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a demurrer after finding that the indictment was completely accurate to give the defendant notice of the charges. Andemical v. State, 336 Ga. App. 661, 786 S.E.2d 238 (2016).

- Defects or irregularities in an indictment or accusation cannot be complained of in a ground of a motion for a new trial, but the objections to the indictment or accusation must be made by demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment. Youmans v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 495 (1935).

Defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment challenging the wording of the indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, were properly denied because the defendant could not have admitted the allegations of the indictment without admitting that the defendant was guilty of a crime and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, having failed to file a timely special demurrer, the defendant waived the right to a perfect indictment. McDaniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 558, 680 S.E.2d 593 (2009).

- Trial court's order dismissing an indictment charging the defendant with rape, incest, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation on grounds that the state improperly failed to preserve lab samples taken from the victim was reversed because the defendant failed to show that the failure was the result of bad faith on the part of the state or the police, and the value of the sample to the defendant was only potentially exculpatory. State v. Brady, 287 Ga. App. 626, 653 S.E.2d 72 (2007).

- When an indictment is not on the indictment's face so defective that a motion in arrest of judgment would lie, an objection to the indictment must be in writing. An oral objection, being ineffective for its purpose, is the equivalent of none at all and if no other action be taken, a waiver results. Curtis v. State, 102 Ga. App. 790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1960).

- All exceptions to the indictment for form, or for matters that may arise by special demurrer, or by plea in abatement or in bar, must be made in writing preliminary to the trial, and if not made at the proper time are to be held as waived in contemplation of law. Youmans v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 495 (1935).

Defendant waived all exceptions to the mere form of an indictment by failing to urge the exceptions in a timely, written, pretrial special demurrer. Bentley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 862, 438 S.E.2d 110 (1993).

For distinction between exceptions to the indictment before trial, and motion after verdict in arrest of judgment, see Lampkin v. State, 87 Ga. 516, 13 S.E. 523 (1891); Phillips v. State, 95 Ga. 478, 20 S.E. 270 (1894).

- When every essential ingredient of the offense charged is set forth with sufficient clearness to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and the jury clearly to understand the nature of the offense, the accusation is not demurrable. De Vere v. State, 45 Ga. App. 330, 164 S.E. 485 (1932).

When every essential ingredient of the offense charged is set forth with sufficient clearness to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and the jury clearly to understand the nature of the offense, and the indictment is exact enough to protect the defendant from a second jeopardy, the indictment is not demurrable. Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409 (1940).

True test of the sufficiency of an indictment to withstand a general demurrer is that if all the facts which the indictment charges can be admitted, and still the accused is innocent, the indictment is bad, but if, taking the facts alleged as premises, the guilt of the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good. Gower v. State, 71 Ga. App. 127, 30 S.E.2d 298 (1944).

Indictment which sets out the essential elements of the crime charged with such particularity as will fully apprise the accused of the exact nature of the offense and the manner in which the offense was committed is sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1937); Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

- Demurrer raising special objections to an indictment should be strictly construed against the pleader. De Vere v. State, 45 Ga. App. 330, 164 S.E. 485 (1932).

When trial has been had before the appellate court reviews the merits of a special demurrer, based upon alleged failure to comply with the form of indictment set out by this section and when no prejudice to defendant has occurred, reversal is a mere windfall to the defendant and contributes nothing to the administration of justice. Bill v. State, 153 Ga. App. 131, 264 S.E.2d 582 (1980).

- Oral motion to quash an indictment which is made after the issue has been joined raises only the question of whether the indictment is so defective that a motion in arrest of judgment would lie. Curtis v. State, 102 Ga. App. 790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1960).

- This section did not apply to accusations in city courts. Flanders v. State, 9 Ga. App. 820, 72 S.E. 286 (1910).

Former Code 1933, §§ 27-701.1, 27-703 and 27-704 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-51,17-7-54, and17-7-70) have no applicability to accusations in city courts when, under special legislation establishing the various city courts, it was provided that the accusation must be founded upon the affidavit of the prosecutor, and the affidavit was made a substitute for the formal finding of the grand jury as to the misdemeanors triable in the city courts in question. The affidavit which was the basis for the issuance of a warrant to arrest is not to be confused with the affidavit which formed the basis of the accusation in many of the city courts. Brown v. State, 82 Ga. App. 673, 62 S.E.2d 732 (1950).

Probate judge who is solicitor pro tem may prepare and sign the indictment. Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11 (1882).

Cited in Martin v. State, 95 Ga. 478, 20 S.E. 271 (1894); Gibson v. State, 118 Ga. 29, 44 S.E. 811 (1903); Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 46 S.E. 876 (1904); Snell v. State, 13 Ga. App. 158, 79 S.E. 71 (1913); Baker v. State, 19 Ga. App. 84, 90 S.E. 983 (1916); Cook v. State, 22 Ga. App. 770, 97 S.E. 264 (1918); Barnes v. State, 24 Ga. App. 372, 100 S.E. 788 (1919); Davis v. State, 25 Ga. App. 532, 103 S.E. 819 (1920); DeWitt v. State, 27 Ga. App. 644, 109 S.E. 681 (1921); Moore v. State, 27 Ga. App. 781, 110 S.E. 55 (1921); Slicer v. State, 172 Ga. 445, 157 S.E. 664 (1931); Norman v. State, 44 Ga. App. 92, 160 S.E. 522 (1931); Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933); Hall v. State, 47 Ga. App. 833, 171 S.E. 727 (1933); Rutherford v. State, 183 Ga. 301, 188 S.E. 442 (1936); Darden v. State, 55 Ga. App. 699, 191 S.E. 176 (1937); Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824, 10 S.E.2d 861 (1940); Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 12 S.E.2d 64 (1941); Watson v. State, 192 Ga. 679, 16 S.E.2d 426 (1941); Price v. State, 76 Ga. App. 105, 45 S.E.2d 96 (1947); Manry v. State, 77 Ga. App. 43, 47 S.E.2d 817 (1948); Wellborn v. State, 78 Ga. App. 520, 51 S.E.2d 588 (1949); Kitchens v. State, 78 Ga. App. 795, 52 S.E.2d 564 (1949); Brusnighan v. State, 86 Ga. App. 340, 71 S.E.2d 698 (1952); Ramsey v. State, 212 Ga. 381, 92 S.E.2d 866 (1956); Hodges v. State, 98 Ga. App. 97, 104 S.E.2d 704 (1958); Curtis v. State, 99 Ga. App. 732, 109 S.E.2d 868 (1959); Pasley v. State, 215 Ga. 768, 113 S.E.2d 454 (1960); Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. 180, 115 S.E.2d 338 (1960); Freeman v. State, 106 Ga. App. 640, 127 S.E.2d 823 (1962); Pitts v. State, 219 Ga. 222, 132 S.E.2d 649 (1963); Nix v. State, 108 Ga. App. 704, 134 S.E.2d 551 (1963); Anderson v. State, 113 Ga. App. 670, 149 S.E.2d 398 (1966); Dye v. State, 114 Ga. App. 299, 151 S.E.2d 164 (1966); Jones v. State, 114 Ga. App. 448, 151 S.E.2d 839 (1966); Bell v. State, 118 Ga. App. 291, 163 S.E.2d 323 (1968); Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968); Kendrick v. State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 182 S.E.2d 525 (1971); Davis v. State, 129 Ga. App. 796, 201 S.E.2d 345 (1973); Richardson v. State, 231 Ga. 295, 201 S.E.2d 398 (1973); Welborn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 207, 207 S.E.2d 688 (1974); Lee v. Hopper, 499 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1974); Chenault v. State, 234 Ga. 216, 215 S.E.2d 223 (1975); Mealor v. State, 135 Ga. App. 682, 218 S.E.2d 683 (1975); Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975); Barnes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 626, 222 S.E.2d 143 (1975); Guy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 11, 225 S.E.2d 492 (1976); Brooks v. State, 141 Ga. App. 725, 234 S.E.2d 541 (1977); Hampton v. State, 141 Ga. App. 866, 234 S.E.2d 698 (1977); State v. Holmes, 142 Ga. App. 847, 237 S.E.2d 406 (1977); State v. Jackson, 143 Ga. App. 88, 237 S.E.2d 533 (1977); Megar v. State, 144 Ga. App. 564, 241 S.E.2d 447 (1978); McDonald v. State, 241 Ga. 112, 243 S.E.2d 53 (1978); Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 252 S.E.2d 397 (1979); Mahomet v. State, 151 Ga. App. 462, 260 S.E.2d 363 (1979); Rollins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 585, 269 S.E.2d 81 (1980); Knowles v. State, 159 Ga. App. 239, 283 S.E.2d 51 (1981); Arrington v. State, 160 Ga. App. 645, 288 S.E.2d 97 (1981); Dotson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 898, 288 S.E.2d 608 (1982); Rentz v. State, 162 Ga. App. 357, 291 S.E.2d 434 (1982); Mobley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 154, 296 S.E.2d 617 (1982); Staton v. State, 165 Ga. App. 572, 302 S.E.2d 126 (1983); Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19 (1983); Simmons v. State, 174 Ga. App. 171, 329 S.E.2d 312 (1985); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986); Watson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 778, 344 S.E.2d 667 (1986); Sullivan v. State, 178 Ga. App. 769, 344 S.E.2d 737 (1986); Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70, 365 S.E.2d 421 (1988); Murphy v. State, 195 Ga. App. 878, 395 S.E.2d 76 (1990); Allen v. State, 197 Ga. App. 3, 397 S.E.2d 472 (1990); State v. Stamey, 211 Ga. App. 837, 440 S.E.2d 725 (1994); State v. Schuman, 212 Ga. App. 231, 441 S.E.2d 466 (1994); Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 475 S.E.2d 580 (1996); Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 206, 570 S.E.2d 645 (2002); State v. Godfrey, 309 Ga. App. 234, 709 S.E.2d 572 (2011);.

Multiple Counts

Joinder of charges as separate counts generally.

- Kindred offenses may be charged in separate counts of the same indictment. Sewell v. State, 23 Ga. App. 765, 99 S.E. 320 (1919).

Different counts charging offenses of the same nature may be joined in one indictment. Gaulden v. State, 41 Ga. App. 635, 154 S.E. 209 (1930).

Two or more counts, charging the defendant with the same species of felony, may be joined in the same indictment. Webb v. State, 177 Ga. 414, 170 S.E. 252, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 505, 170 S.E. 827 (1933).

Two or more felonies may properly be charged in separate counts in one indictment, though the offenses are committed at different times and places, and involve transactions with different persons, when the crimes charged, though differing in degree and varying in the punishment to be inflicted for their perpetration, are of the same general nature, and the mode of trial is the same. Webb v. State, 47 Ga. App. 505, 170 S.E. 827 (1933); Ivester v. State, 75 Ga. App. 600, 44 S.E.2d 61 (1947).

Felonies of the same general nature, when the mode of trial is the same, may be joined in separate counts of the same indictment. Askea v. State, 153 Ga. App. 849, 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980).

- There is no statute in this state which prohibits the joinder of several offenses of the same class or species in different counts of the same indictment. Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 184 S.E. 309 (1935).

If all of the offenses charged in an indictment are of the same species, it is unnecessary to allege that the separate offenses had a continuity of purpose or intent so as to make the offenses a part of a general plan or scheme. Webb v. State, 177 Ga. 414, 170 S.E. 252, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 505, 170 S.E. 827 (1933).

- It is fundamental that when an indictment is in more than one count, each count must be complete within itself and plainly, fully, and distinctly set out the crime alleged. Lee v. State, 81 Ga. App. 829, 60 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

- Rule of law that each count must be complete within itself and must contain every essential allegation to constitute a crime applies to the offense rather than to the form. Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 294, 60 S.E.2d 517 (1950).

Express reference from one count to another is allowable. Lee v. State, 81 Ga. App. 829, 60 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

One count may refer to another to prevent repetition. Braxley v. State, 143 Ga. 658, 85 S.E. 888, rev'd on other grounds, 17 Ga. App. 196, 86 S.E. 425 (1915); Durden v. State, 29 Ga. App. 548, 116 S.E. 41, aff'd, 31 Ga. App. 295, 121 S.E. 840 (1923).

- In stating the form of an indictment which shall be sufficiently technical and correct, this section did not require that the counts shall be numbered, and while it was preferable to consecutively number the counts, failure to do so would not render the indictment demurrable. Wright v. State, 53 Ga. App. 371, 186 S.E. 149 (1936).

- While a defendant cannot be charged with separate and distinct offenses in one count of an indictment, offenses of the same nature and differing only in degree may be joined in one count of the same indictment. Offenses not of the same nature, but blended together by concurrent acts so that the offenses constitute but one transaction, may likewise be so joined. The test is whether the acts charged in the indictment relate to but one transaction. Bennings v. State, 53 Ga. App. 218, 185 S.E. 370 (1936).

- If the phrase "contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace and dignity thereof" is a necessary part of an indictment at all, the requirement is met when the indictment consists of more than one count and, although the phrase does not appear at the conclusion of each count, it does appear at the conclusion of the indictment. Lee v. State, 81 Ga. App. 829, 60 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

It is true that every count of an indictment must be complete within itself and plainly, fully, and distinctly set out the offense charged. However, when there is an indictment in three counts, the first two counts of which do not contain the contra pacem clause, such a defect is one of technical formality only, and, is not such as to vitiate the proceedings. Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 294, 60 S.E.2d 517 (1950).

Indictment was not fatally defective but was in substantial compliance with the provisions of this section, when the contra pacem clause "contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof" follows the last and second count thereof, although immediately following the first count there was no such clause. Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 297, 60 S.E.2d 519 (1950).

- It is within the sound discretion of the court to require, or not to require, the solicitor general (now district attorney) to elect upon which count the solicitor general will proceed. Webb v. State, 47 Ga. App. 505, 170 S.E. 827 (1933); Ivester v. State, 75 Ga. App. 600, 44 S.E.2d 61 (1947).

- When an indictment containing several counts is read to the jury in the indictment's entirety by the judge, and the solicitor general (now district attorney) states that the solicitor general is trying defendant on all counts, the fact that the solicitor read only one count to the jurors when qualifying the jurors on the jurors' voir dire does not constitute sufficient grounds on which to bar the admission of evidence on the other counts and to charge the jury to disregard all other counts. Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 184 S.E. 309 (1935).

Verdict need not specify the count upon which the verdict is founded. Dohme v. State, 68 Ga. 339 (1882).

- When an indictment contains several counts, all charging the commission of the same felony, but in different ways, a general verdict of guilty is not contrary to the evidence if any one of the counts be supported by proof. Bowen v. State, 47 Ga. App. 9, 170 S.E. 104 (1933).

- When distinct offenses are charged in separate counts there may be an acquittal on some counts and a conviction or disagreement on others. O'Brien v. State, 22 Ga. App. 249, 95 S.E. 938 (1918).

- Unless otherwise provided by statute, a defendant convicted under an indictment charging two or more distinct offenses may be punished for both or all, if each offense requires proof of some fact or element not required to establish the other offense. Playmate Cinema, Inc. v. State, 154 Ga. App. 871, 269 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

- When a demurrer is based upon improper joinder or dissimilar offenses, these must be pointed out. Boatwright v. State, 26 Ga. App. 67, 105 S.E. 381 (1920).

Indictment charging two or more felonies in separate counts is not subject to general demurrer. Webb v. State, 47 Ga. App. 505, 170 S.E. 827 (1933).

- Trial court erred in quashing an indictment for counts of residential mortgage fraud, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-102, and counts of felony theft by deception, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3, because: (1) certain allegations between counts in the indictment were mere surplusage and did not invalidate the indictment; (2) the indictment was not duplicitous under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(2); (3) the indictment was sufficient pursuant to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) to withstand general and special demurrers as each count sufficiently stated the offense; and (4) each count was sufficient to charge each of the named defendants as either the actual perpetrator or as a party to the crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(a) and16-2-21. State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 700 S.E.2d 912 (2010).

Misjoinder of offenses is not ground for a motion in arrest of judgment. Lampkin v. State, 87 Ga. 516, 13 S.E. 523 (1891).

Indictment must not state any essential of the offense in the alternative, for pleadings which are in the alternative are defective in form, and this defect must be taken advantage of by special demurrer. Isom v. State, 71 Ga. App. 803, 32 S.E.2d 437 (1944).

Single count may charge the commission of the offense in different ways. Cody v. State, 118 Ga. 784, 45 S.E. 622 (1903), aff'd, 119 Ga. 418, 46 S.E. 647 (1904).

In an indictment charging a crime capable of being committed in more than one way, failure to charge the manner in which the crime was committed subjects the indictment to a proper special demurrer, but not to an oral motion to quash in the nature of a general demurrer when the indictment has charged the crime in the substantial language of former Code 1933, § 27-910 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54). Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380, 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949).

- When a defendant is charged with the violation of a penal statute containing disjunctively several ways or methods a crime may be committed, proof of any one of which is sufficient to constitute the crime, the indictment, in order to be good as against a special demurrer, must charge such ways or methods conjunctively if the indictment charges more than one of them. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 44 S.E.2d 174 (1947); Vann v. State, 153 Ga. App. 710, 266 S.E.2d 349 (1980).

- On the trial of a defendant under an indictment so charging, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove all of such separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment, but the state makes a prima facie case upon its establishment by proof of any one of them. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 44 S.E.2d 174 (1947).

- When under a penal statute an offense may be committed by the doing of any one of several forbidden acts, a conviction may be had upon an indictment which in a single count charges the accused with the commission of two or more of the acts, if there is satisfactory proof that the accused committed at least one of the acts therein specified. Mitchell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 399, 268 S.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011, 101 S. Ct. 567, 66 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1980).

- Notwithstanding this section, an indictment or accusation charging a crime in the alternative when the offense may be committed in more than one way is subject to special demurrer. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 44 S.E.2d 174 (1947).

Variance

Basis for rule that allegations and proof must correspond.

- General rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements: (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against the accused, so that the accused may be enabled to present a defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that the accused may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense. McHugh v. State, 136 Ga. App. 57, 220 S.E.2d 69 (1975); Caldwell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 279, 228 S.E.2d 219 (1976); Hunter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 561, 271 S.E.2d 694 (1980).

- Variance is fatal if the variance fails to definitely inform the defendant of the charges against the defendant or leaves the defendant open to a subsequent prosecution for that offense. Lewis v. State, 149 Ga. App. 181, 254 S.E.2d 142 (1979).

- If the variation is technical or trivial, or if the allegations and the proof substantially correspond, so that it cannot be said that the defendant was misled or prejudiced, the variance will not be fatal. Lewis v. State, 149 Ga. App. 181, 254 S.E.2d 142 (1979).

Allegation in an indictment that is wholly unnecessary to constitute the offense charged is mere surplusage. Smith v. State, 130 Ga. App. 390, 203 S.E.2d 375 (1973).

Mere surplusage will not vitiate an indictment, and need not be established in proof. The material facts which constitute the offense charged must be stated, and it must be proved in evidence, but allegations not essential to such purpose, which might be entirely omitted without affecting the charge and without detriment to the indictment, are considered as mere surplusage, and may be disregarded in evidence. Robinson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 313, 45 S.E.2d 717 (1947).

- No allegation in an indictment, whether it be necessary or unnecessary, whether it be more or less particular, which is descriptive of the identity of that which is legally essential to the charge in the indictment, can ever be rejected as surplusage. Robinson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 313, 45 S.E.2d 717 (1947).

Unnecessarily minute description of a necessary fact must be proved as charged. Simmons v. State, 98 Ga. App. 159, 105 S.E.2d 356 (1958); McHugh v. State, 136 Ga. App. 57, 220 S.E.2d 69 (1975).

- If the indictment sets out the offense as done in a particular way, the proof must show it so, or there will be a variance. When there is a necessary allegation which cannot be rejected, yet the pleader makes it unnecessarily minute in the way of description, the proof must satisfy the description as well as the main part, since the one is essential to the identity of the other. Youngblood v. State, 40 Ga. App. 514, 150 S.E. 457 (1929).

Unnecessarily minute description of an unnecessary fact alleged in an indictment need not be proved. Simmons v. State, 98 Ga. App. 159, 105 S.E.2d 356 (1958); McHugh v. State, 136 Ga. App. 57, 220 S.E.2d 69 (1975).

- In proving the time of the commission of an offense the state is not, as a general rule, restricted to proof of the date alleged in the indictment, but is permitted to prove its commission on any date within the statute of limitations. Grayson v. State, 39 Ga. App. 673, 148 S.E. 309 (1929).

Though a day and year must be alleged in every indictment, time is not material, and a different day from the one laid may generally be proved, provided it is within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations. Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935).

- Indictment or accusation which fails to allege some specific date on which the offense was committed is defective as to form and, therefore, subject to a timely interposed special demurrer pointing out such defect. Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959).

- This section did not require the exact time of day or the specific location in the county to be given. It is sufficient to state the date the alleged offense was committed and the county within the state in which the same allegedly occurred. Lyle v. State, 131 Ga. App. 8, 205 S.E.2d 126 (1974).

- Unless time is an essential element of the offense charged, the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the indictment, presentment, accusation, information, or affidavit is immaterial. Proof of the commission of the offense at any time prior to the finding of the indictment or presentment, the filing of the accusation or information, or the swearing of the affidavit which made the foundation of the accusation, will sustain a conviction if the proof also establishes the commission of the offense within the statute of limitations. Brown v. State, 82 Ga. App. 673, 62 S.E.2d 732 (1950); Learmont v. State, 89 Ga. App. 648, 80 S.E.2d 716 (1954).

- Alleging one date in the indictment and proving another at trial when a defense of alibi as to the date alleged is relied upon violates the requirement that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against the accused, so that the accused may be enabled to present a defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial. Caldwell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 279, 228 S.E.2d 219 (1976).

- If defendant, relying upon an alibi defense for the time alleged in the indictment, is surprised and prejudiced by a time variance, upon defendant's motion therefor the defendant will be afforded sufficient time to prepare a defense to meet the new date. Caldwell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 279, 228 S.E.2d 219 (1976).

Defendant must make a motion for continuance, postponement, or recess if the defendant is surprised by a time variance in an alibi case. Caldwell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 279, 228 S.E.2d 219 (1976).

- When the date of the offense alleged in the indictment coincides with both the date proved by the state and the date proved by the defense in support of the alibi, and the trial court properly charges the jury that the state has the burden of proving the accused's presence at the scene at the time of the commission of the offense, such a charge does not constitute reversible error. The better practice would be to refrain from giving such a charge unless: (1) the defendant has not developed an alibi defense in reliance upon the date alleged in the indictment; and (2) the evidence would authorize the jury to conclude that the offense was actually committed on a date different from that alleged in the indictment. Thomas v. State, 158 Ga. App. 97, 279 S.E.2d 335 (1981).

It is not necessary to allege the location of a theft within the county. State v. Ramos, 145 Ga. App. 301, 243 S.E.2d 693 (1978).

- No fatal variance between the pleading and the proof exists when one weapon is charged in the indictment and a weapon of a similar nature capable of inflicting the same character of injury is shown by the evidence, but this rule does not apply when the evidence shows the deceased met death at the hands of the defendant in a manner vastly different from that alleged in the indictment. Habersham v. State, 79 Ga. App. 244, 53 S.E.2d 578 (1949).

For sufficiency of indictment charging assault and battery, see Wood v. State, 69 Ga. App. 450, 26 S.E.2d 140 (1943).

- When the facts in an indictment set forth the offense of assault and battery, the language in part of the indictment which charged an attempt to commit an injury was mere surplusage. Wood v. State, 69 Ga. App. 450, 26 S.E.2d 140 (1943).

- Count nine in an indictment charging a defendant, allegedly an oral surgeon, with aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) because the general intent required under § 16-5-21(a)(2) did not need to be expressly alleged and the use of the phrase "serious bodily harm" was substantially the same as the statutory language; additional pleading was not required simply because the case involved a doctor and a patient. State v. Austin, 297 Ga. App. 478, 677 S.E.2d 706 (2009).

- Indictment for bribery which fails to set out in what respect the official behavior of the accused was to be influenced by the payment of the money alleged to have been given the accused, and what official act was to be performed or not to be performed by the accused as a result of the payment of that sum, is not fatally defective. Saunders v. State, 43 Ga. App. 59, 158 S.E. 433 (1931).

Indictment for bribery is not defective as regards statute of limitations for failure to allege to whom the offense was unknown until after a given date. Saunders v. State, 43 Ga. App. 59, 158 S.E. 433 (1931).

- Indictment, which described a scheme of fraudulent borrowing from the parishioners of one defendant, a pastor, to benefit the pastor and the other defendant, a banker, sufficiently described the RICO crimes and predicate acts under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a) and (c) so as to inform the defendants of the charges against the defendants and protect the defendants against another prosecution for the same offense. State v. Pittman, 302 Ga. App. 531, 690 S.E.2d 661 (2010).

- Indictment charging the defendants with violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., did not give the defendants enough information about the RICO charge to prepare their defense intelligently because the sparse allegations in the indictment, which said nothing about the nature of the connection between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity, were insufficient to enable the defendants to prepare for trial; and the nature of that connection was not apparent from the identification of the enterprise, the general description of the racketeering activity in Count 1, or the subsequent counts charging more particularly the predicate acts of racketeering. Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 799 S.E.2d 229 (2017).

- When the defendant is charged with burglary, the indictment must specify the location of the burglary, and contain some allegation regarding ownership of the burglarized premises. Morris v. State, 166 Ga. App. 137, 303 S.E.2d 492 (1983).

It is sufficient to allege legal control of the premises in an indictment for burglary rather than "ownership" as that term is used in property law. Morris v. State, 166 Ga. App. 137, 303 S.E.2d 492 (1983).

For case in which allegations and proof of burglary were fatally variant, see Hunter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 561, 271 S.E.2d 694 (1980).

- Offenses of burglary and of carrying a pistol without a license come within the general rule that the state is not restricted to the date alleged in the indictment in proving the case as laid, but may prove the alleged offense to have been committed at any time within the statute of limitations applicable to the case. Taylor v. State, 44 Ga. App. 821, 163 S.E. 271 (1931).

- Indictment alleging a felony count of burglary and a felony count of receiving stolen goods is not subject to demurrer on the grounds of misjoinder of the offenses of burglary and receiving stolen goods knowing the goods to be the fruit of the burglary from the person committing the burglary. Ivester v. State, 75 Ga. App. 600, 44 S.E.2d 61 (1947).

- If an indictment for burglary alleged, as the purpose of the breaking, the intent to commit a larceny, and if the indictment further alleged, for the purpose of illustrating the intent to steal at the time of the breaking and entering, an actual stealing after the breaking and entering, no description, value, or ownership of any goods intended to be stolen, or actually stolen after the breaking and entering, had to be alleged. Harris v. State, 46 Ga. App. 319, 167 S.E. 609 (1933).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the indictment was defective for failing to allege the essential element of intent to commit a theft because the indictment clearly charged that the defendant attempted to commit a burglary, not that the defendant completed the crime. Coleman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 478, 735 S.E.2d 788 (2012), recons. denied; overruled on other grounds by State v. Heath, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 362 (Ga. 2020).

- See Whitener v. State, 34 Ga. App. 697, 131 S.E. 301 (1925).

Indictment for attempted child molestation was sufficient without alleging the specific intent of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 332, 503 S.E.2d 914 (1998).

Indictment for attempted child molestation alleging that the defendant took a substantial step toward commission of the crime of child molestation by: (1) engaging in sexually explicit conversations over the Internet; and (2) driving to an arranged meeting place was not fatally defective in that the indictment failed to allege the commission of a crime. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).

- Because sufficient similarities between two indicted charges of child molestation were presented to show a common motive, plan, scheme, or bent of mind pattern, and, the number of offenses charged or the complexity of the evidence offered did not render the factfinder unable to parse the evidence to apply the law fairly and intelligently to each charge, both offenses were properly joined for trial. Milton v. State, 280 Ga. App. 179, 633 S.E.2d 606 (2006).

- Indictment alleging that the defendant attempted to commit the crime of statutory rape by taking the substantial step of discussing engaging in sexual intercourse via computer and driving to an arranged meeting place for the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse was not fatally defective for failure to allege the commission of a crime. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).

- Although an indictment for attempting to commit the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes did not allege actual asportation, the indictment did allege that the defendant arranged to meet the victim for the purpose of committing indecent acts and, accordingly, did not fail to allege the taking of a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).

- Indictment charging the defendant with attempted sexual exploitation of children properly alleged that the defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of the crime by making arrangements to meet the victim for the purpose of violating the statute and by proceeding to the meeting place. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).

For sufficiency of indictment for false swearing, see Darnell v. State, 63 Ga. App. 582, 11 S.E.2d 692 (1940).

- Trial court properly granted a defendant's special demurrer as to one count of a two count indictment charging the defendant with influencing a witness as the use of the term "intimidation," without specifying the way the defendant allegedly did so, was generic and did not adequately inform the defendant of the facts constituting the offense. State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723, 681 S.E.2d 645 (2009).

For sufficiency of indictment for murder, see Green v. State, 172 Ga. 635, 158 S.E. 285 (1931); Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980).

Fatal variance in murder indictment, etc. see Habersham v. State, 79 Ga. App. 244, 53 S.E.2d 578 (1949).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment charging malice murder and felony murder as unconstitutionally vague because the defendant's counsel reviewed the indictment and believed that the indictment was not vague, overbroad, or subject to dismissal; each of the murder counts tracked the language of the applicable statute and alleged the essential elements of the offense charged; and the indictment provided the date and county of the offense and the identity of the victim, and, in terms clear enough to be easily understood by the jury and by the accused, charged the defendant with acting in concert with the co-defendant to kill the victim by beating and stabbing the victim to death. Smith v. State, 303 Ga. 643, 814 S.E.2d 411 (2018).

- See Isom v. State, 71 Ga. App. 803, 32 S.E.2d 437 (1944).

- There was no basis to grant the defendant a special demurrer on the counts for aggravated assault and felony murder based on assault as the indictment informed the defendant that the state intended to prove that on a day when the defendant admitted the victim was in the defendant's custody, the defendant used an object that was likely to result in serious bodily injury to fatally injure the victim by causing damage to the victim's brain, which was sufficient notice for the defendant to prepare a defense. State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 759 S.E.2d 500 (2014).

In larceny (now theft) cases, ownership of the property should be alleged, and may not be inferred. Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131 (1936), aff'd, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937).

- In indictment for larceny, description of stolen property should be set forth such as will affirmatively show the accused to be guilty, will reasonably inform the accused of transaction charged, and will put the accused in a position to make the needful preparations for the accused's defense. The marks, quality, or kind of property must be incorporated in the description, or the transaction in some way individualized. Pharr v. State, 44 Ga. App. 363, 161 S.E. 643 (1931).

For sufficiency of indictment charging larceny (now theft), see Ellis v. State, 67 Ga. App. 821, 21 S.E.2d 316 (1942); Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 94 S.E.2d 429 (1956).

- See Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 450, 504 S.E.2d 290 (1998).

- Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's general and special demurrers to an indictment charging the defendant with theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 because the indictment tracked the language of theft by taking and sufficiently placed the defendant on notice of the charges against the defendant, and the indictment also provided some factual detail to support the crimes alleged; in each count of theft by taking, the indictment alleged that the defendant took U.S. currency in excess of $500 from a grocery store owner with the intention of depriving the owner of those funds on a specific date, and if the defendant admitted the conduct alleged in the indictment, the defendant would not be innocent of the crime. Falagian v. State, 300 Ga. App. 187, 684 S.E.2d 340 (2009), overruled on other grounds, McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (2013).

Accusation that alleged that the defendant took "drugs the property of Dr. Bob Lanier having a value of less than $500 with the intention of depriving said owner of said property" was sufficient to allege theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. State v. Meeks, 309 Ga. App. 855, 711 S.E.2d 403 (2011).

For sufficiency of indictment for robbery, see Lacey v. State, 44 Ga. App. 791, 163 S.E. 292 (1931).

- In an indictment for robbery, the ownership of the personal property stolen may be laid in the person having actual lawful possession of such property, although the person may be holding the property merely as the agent or bailee of another. It is not necessary to set forth in the indictment the fact that the person in whom the ownership is laid is holding the property merely as the agent or bailee of the real owner. Jones v. State, 42 Ga. App. 290, 155 S.E. 797 (1931); Estes v. State, 44 Ga. App. 239, 161 S.E. 165 (1931).

"Fraudulently," when used in an indictment for robbery, implies an intent to steal. Lacey v. State, 44 Ga. App. 791, 163 S.E. 292 (1931).

When the gist of the offense is the fraudulent conversion of money, a special demurrer to the indictment on the grounds that the terms of the contract on account of which the payment is alleged to have been made are not set forth, and also the amount of money to be received under the contract is not set forth, is without merit. Ramer v. State, 76 Ga. App. 678, 47 S.E.2d 174 (1948).

Indictments under § 16-8-3. - While, in an indictment under former Code 1933, § 26-1803 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3), it was necessary to allege the ownership of the moneys obtained, yet if, from the allegations of the indictment as a whole, it was clearly inferable to whom the money belonged, the absence of an express allegation to that effect was no reason for quashing the indictment. Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131 (1936), aff'd, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937).

- Essential elements of an indictment for the offense of cheating and swindling by false representations are that the representations were made; that the representations were knowingly and designedly false; that the representations were made with the intent to deceive and defraud; that the representations did deceive and defraud; that the representations related to an existing fact or past event; that the party to whom the false statements were made, relying upon their truth, was thereby induced to part with that person's property. Fischer v. State, 46 Ga. App. 207, 167 S.E. 200 (1933).

If an indictment for cheating and swindling and not a presentment is being considered, it is not necessary that the very words of the pretense be set out. It is sufficient to state the effect of the pretense correctly. Hence, the indictment need not allege whether the pretense was spoken or written. Turnipseed v. State, 53 Ga. App. 194, 185 S.E. 403 (1936).

In a case of cheating and swindling it is essential to the legality of a conviction that the person alleged to have been defrauded sustained some pecuniary loss. Turnipseed v. State, 53 Ga. App. 194, 185 S.E. 403 (1936).

If the allegation is that a corporation was defrauded, or attempted to be defrauded, it is sufficient to set out the name of such corporation, without designating any particular individual, officer, or agent of such corporation to whom the representations or false pretenses were made. Turnipseed v. State, 53 Ga. App. 194, 185 S.E. 403 (1936).

- There was not a fatal variance in the evidence because the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for insurance fraud and was consistent with the allegations in the indictment as the evidence showed that the defendant, an attorney, assisted the client in making an affirmative fraudulent representation when the client signed the sworn proof of loss statement claiming that the client suffered a loss, when in fact the client had not. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 199, 193 L. Ed. 2d 128 (U.S. 2015).

- See Clinkscales v. State, 102 Ga. App. 670, 117 S.E.2d 229 (1960).

- See Rollins v. State, 215 Ga. 437, 111 S.E.2d 63 (1959).

- Indictment for criminal racketeering alleged the offense with sufficient specificity as it set forth specific timber transactions involving specific persons, places, acreage, deals, and owners. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 88, 488 S.E.2d 79 (1997); Adams v. State, 231 Ga. App. 279, 499 S.E.2d 105 (1998).

Fatal variance in paternity warrant, see Simmons v. State, 98 Ga. App. 159, 105 S.E.2d 356 (1958).

- See Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-8).

- See Roberts v. State, 54 Ga. App. 704, 188 S.E. 844 (1936).

- See Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

- See Crowe v. State, 44 Ga. App. 719, 162 S.E. 849 (1931), overruled on other grounds, Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Jones, 263 Ga. 228, 430 S.E.2d 352 (1993) (see O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18).

- See Hooks v. State, 97 Ga. App. 897, 104 S.E.2d 623 (1958) (see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391).

- See State v. Black, 149 Ga. App. 389, 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979).

- General demurrer to charges of serious injury by vehicle against the defendant was properly denied because whether broken bones constituted serious disfigurement under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-394 depended on the facts of the case; further, the indictment tracked the language of the statute and sufficiently advised defendant of the charges against him. Harris v. State, 272 Ga. App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (2005).

- Allegations in the indictment for child molestation that the defendant molested one child from January 1, 1995, to June 5, 1995, and another child from January 1, 1991, until June 5, 1995, sufficiently informed the defendant of the time of the charges against the defendant. Gentry v. State, 235 Ga. App. 328, 508 S.E.2d 671 (1998).

Accusation for abandonment of dependent child, pursuant to former Code 1933, § 74-9902 (see O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1), which failed to allege the abandonment of a "minor" child was sufficient. Heard v. State, 79 Ga. App. 601, 54 S.E.2d 495 (1949).

- Objection raised by demurrer to an accusation returned for soliciting for purposes of prostitution, that the accusation does not name the person allegedly solicited and did not put the defendant on notice of any particular charge sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare a defense, is insufficient. Bennefield v. State, 86 Ga. App. 285, 71 S.E.2d 760 (1952).

§ 26-2012 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-6-9). - See Anderson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 460, 254 S.E.2d 459 (1979); Hicks v. State, 149 Ga. App. 459, 254 S.E.2d 461 (1979).

- See Capitol Distrib. Co. v. State, 83 Ga. App. 303, 63 S.E.2d 451 (1951).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment accusing the defendant of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-13-31(a)(1); purity did not have to be alleged in an attempt case, particularly since there was no cocaine involved in the instant case, the indictment satisfied O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) by tracking the applicable statutes in a manner that was easily understood and by apprising the defendant of both the crime and the manner in which the crime was alleged to have been committed, and if the defendant admitted the allegations precisely as set forth in the indictment, the defendant would have been guilty of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0408, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Variance between name in bail bond and in judgment of forfeiture, 20 A.L.R. 411.

Necessity of naming owner of building in indictment or information for burglary, 20 A.L.R. 510; 169 A.L.R. 887.

Description in indictment for perjury of proceeding in which perjury was committed, 24 A.L.R. 1137.

Power of court to pass on competency, legality, or sufficiency of evidence on which indictment is based, 31 A.L.R. 1479.

Quashing indictment for lack or insufficiency of evidence before grand jury, 59 A.L.R. 567.

Statutes regarding form or substance of indictment as violation of constitutional requirement of "indictment," 69 A.L.R. 1392.

Sufficiency of general averment in indictment or information for perjury that the false statement was material, 80 A.L.R. 1443.

Necessity in indictment charging violation of statute regarding wages, or hours, of naming particular employees, 81 A.L.R. 76.

Joinder in same indictment of defendant charged singly with one offense and codefendant charged jointly with him with another offense, 82 A.L.R. 484.

Necessity of alleging specific facts or means in indictment or information charging one as accessory before or after the fact, 116 A.L.R. 1104.

Error in naming the offense covered by allegations of specific facts in complaint, indictment, or information, 121 A.L.R. 1088.

Necessity of alleging in information or indictment that act was "unlawful," 169 A.L.R. 166.

Necessity and materiality of statement of place of death in indictment or information charging homicide, 59 A.L.R.2d 901.

Sufficiency of description of stolen property in indictment or information for receiving it, 99 A.L.R.2d 813.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to time, 14 A.L.R.3d 1297.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to place, 14 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to name, status, or description of persons or organizations, 14 A.L.R.3d 1358.

Sufficiency of indictment, information, or other form of criminal complaint, omitting or misstating middle name or initial of person named therein, 15 A.L.R.3d 968.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to property, objects, or instruments, other than money, 15 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment, 17 A.L.R.3d 1181.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to prior convictions, 17 A.L.R.3d 1265.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to nature of activity, happening, or circumstances, 17 A.L.R.3d 1285.

Grand jury: admission of hearsay evidence incompetent at trial as affecting, in absence of statutory regulation, validity of indictment or conviction, 37 A.L.R.3d 612.

Necessity of alleging in indictment or information limitation-tolling facts, 52 A.L.R.3d 922.

Use of abbreviation in indictment or information, 92 A.L.R.3d 494.