2020 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 16 - Discovery
Article 1 - Definitions; Felony Cases
§ 17-16-4. Disclosure Required by Prosecuting Attorney and Defendant; Inspections Allowed; Reducing Oral Reports to Writing; Continuing Duty to Disclose; Discovery Creating Threat of Physical or Economic Harm

1. 1. The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as the court orders, disclose to the defendant and make available for inspection, copying, or photographing any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and that portion of any written record containing the substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, whether before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a law enforcement officer or member of the prosecuting attorney's staff. The prosecuting attorney shall also disclose to the defendant the substance of any other relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by any person then known by the defendant to be a law enforcement officer or member of the prosecuting attorney's staff if the state intends to use that statement at trial. The prosecuting attorney shall also disclose to the defendant the substance of any other relevant written or oral statement made by the defendant while in custody, whether or not in response to interrogation. Statements of coconspirators that are attributable to the defendant and arguably admissible against the defendant at trial also shall be disclosed under this Code section. Where the defendant is a corporation, partnership, association, or labor union, the court may grant the defendant, upon its motion, discovery of any similar such statement of any witness who was:
      1. At the time of the statement, so situated as an officer or employee as to have been legally able to bind the defendant in respect to conduct constituting the offense; or
      2. At the time of the offense, personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or employee as to have been legally able to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which the witness was involved.
   2. The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, furnish to the defendant a copy of the defendant's Georgia Crime Information Center criminal history, if any, as is within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution. Nothing in this Code section shall affect the provisions of Code Section 17-10-2.
   3. 1. Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, the prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof and to inspect and photograph buildings or places which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. Evidence that is within the possession, custody, or control of the Forensic Sciences Division of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation or other laboratory for the purpose of testing and analysis may be examined, tested, and analyzed at the facility where the evidence is being held pursuant to reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the Forensic Sciences Division of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation or the laboratory where the evidence is being held.
      2. With respect to any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial of any violation of Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16, such evidence shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, be allowed to be inspected by the defendant but shall not be allowed to be copied.
   4. The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the state intends to introduce in evidence in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions no later than ten days prior to trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, note, or memorandum relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any victim or witness.
   5. The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as the court orders but in no event later than the beginning of the trial, provide the defendant with notice of any evidence in aggravation of punishment that the state intends to introduce in sentencing.
2. 1. The defendant within ten days of timely compliance by the prosecuting attorney but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, shall permit the prosecuting attorney at a time agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof and to inspect and photograph buildings or places, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in the defense's case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial.
   2. The defendant shall within ten days of timely compliance by the prosecuting attorney but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the prosecuting attorney at a time agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the defendant intends to introduce in evidence in the defense's case-in-chief or rebuttal the results of the physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the defendant shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions no later than five days prior to trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, note, or memorandum relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any defendant or witness.
   3. 1. The defendant shall, no later than the announcement of the verdict of the jury or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict is published by the court, serve upon the prosecuting attorney all books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof and to inspect and photograph buildings or places which are within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in the presentence hearing.
      2. The defendant shall, no later than the announcement of the verdict of the jury or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict is published by the court, serve upon the prosecuting attorney all reports of any physical or mental examinations and scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinions rendered in the reports, or copies thereof, if the defendant intends to introduce in evidence in the presentence hearing the results of the physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the defendant shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions.
      3. The defendant shall, no later than five days before the trial commences, serve upon the prosecuting attorney a list of witnesses that the defendant intends to call as a witness in the presentence hearing. No later than the announcement of the verdict of the jury or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict is published by the court, the defendant shall produce for the opposing party any statement of such witnesses that is in the possession, custody, or control of the defendants or the defendant's counsel that relates to the subject matter of the testimony of such witnesses unless such statement is protected from disclosure by the privilege contained in paragraph (5), (6), (7), or (8) of subsection (a) of Code Section 24-5-501.
3. If prior to or during trial a party discovers additional evidence or material previously requested or ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under this article, such party shall promptly notify the other party of the existence of the additional evidence or material and make this additional evidence or material available as provided in this article.
4. Upon a sufficient showing that a discovery required by this article would create a substantial threat of physical or economic harm to a witness, the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court subject to further order of the court and to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
5. Discovery with respect to alibi witnesses shall be as provided for in Code Section 17-16-5.

(Code 1981, §17-16-4, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895, § 4; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1250, § 2; Ga. L. 2003, p. 154, §§ 5, 6; Ga. L. 2005, p. 20, § 13/HB 170; Ga. L. 2008, p. 829, § 2/HB 1020; Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 34/HB 24.)

- Subpoenas for attendance of witnesses, § 24-13-20 et seq.

- Ga. L. 2005, p. 20, § 1/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Criminal Justice Act of 2005.'"

Ga. L. 2005, p. 20, § 17/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2005 amendment applies to all trials which commence on or after July 1, 2005.

Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101/HB 24, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act shall apply to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced on or after January 1, 2013.

- For article discussing available means of discovery for criminal cases in Georgia, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 134 (1976). For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For article, "Criminal Discovery: Disclosure of Police Internal Affairs Division Documents and Police Personnel Files," see 29 Ga. St. B.J. 34 (1992). For article, "Criminal Discovery: Disclosure of Police Internal Affairs Division Documents and Police Personnel Files," see 29 Ga. St. B.J. 34 (1992). For annual survey of death penalty decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (2006). For survey article on criminal law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2008). For survey article on death penalty law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 105 (2008). For article, "Evidence," see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2011). For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2011). For note, "Criminal Discovery: The Use of Notices to Produce," see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (1978). For note, "The Criminal Discovery Dilemma in Georgia," see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1113 (1983). For note and comment, "Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst: The Capital Defender's Guide to Reciprocal Discovery in the Sentencing Phase of Georgia Death Penalty Trials," see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 995 (2007).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• State's Duty to Comply
• Time of Receipt of Statements
• Time of Making Statement
• Scientific Reports
• Timely Request for Scientific Reports
• Request by Defense for Scientific Reports
• State's Duty to Comply with Request
• Waiver

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 27-313, former Code Sections 17-7-210 and 17-7-211, decided prior to their repeal by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Discovery requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, relating to the presentence hearing, did not violate a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel; counsel may freely investigate for mitigating evidence, knowing that the identity of any potentially harmful witness resulting from that investigation need only be produced to the state in reciprocal discovery should the defense decide to call that witness at the presentence hearing. Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007).

Requirement of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, part of the Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq., that a defendant disclose any mitigating evidence the defendant intended to introduce in the presentence hearing did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination; statements of witnesses a defendant intends to call to testify are not personal to the defendant, and although the disclosure of the list of witnesses a defendant intends to call is personal to the defendant, a trial court can exercise the court's discretion to specify the time, place, and manner of making the discovery and to enter such orders as seem just under the circumstances when self-incrimination concerns arise, such as a protective order or a continuance pending the completion of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007).

Defendant, who was charged with child pornography, did not suffer a due process violation due to the U.S. Attorney's office not responding to letters seeking assurance that the defendant's expert would not be prosecuted under federal pornography laws for examining the defendant's computer hard drive; the trial court ordered that the expert be provided with a copy of the defendant's computer hard drive, and the trial court's order requiring written assurances from United States Attorneys of nonprosecution of the expert for any potential violations of federal child pornography statutes exceeded the trial court's authority. The trial court's finding that O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3)(B) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant because the statute deprived the defendant of due process rights was not challenged by the state on appeal. Morris v. State, 324 Ga. App. 756, 751 S.E.2d 551 (2013).

Since a trial court found that there was no bad faith on the part of the state based on the failure of an expert's report to address testing done on a second bullet hole in the victim's shirt, exclusion of the evidence was not a viable option so trial counsel's decision to pursue a mistrial instead was reasonable. Bales v. State, 277 Ga. 713, 594 S.E.2d 644 (2004).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's claim that the destruction of blood samples constituted a failure by the state to comply with the reciprocal discovery requirements pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 since the defendant failed to show that the state acted in bad faith. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).

- This section protected an accused from introduction at trial of incriminating or inculpatory statements made by the accused while in custody unless the accused has been furnished with written copies of these statements prior to trial. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-313).

Former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 only applied to statements given by a defendant. The former statute did not apply to any comment which a witness may make with regard to the statement. Simpson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 558, 353 S.E.2d 55 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant had no standing to assert and rely on a codefendant's rights under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 regarding the admission into evidence of a statement made by the codefendant. Rogers v. State, 211 Ga. App. 67, 438 S.E.2d 140 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant, charged with child molestation involving the defendant's stepdaughter, was not denied a right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination by the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for production of the victim's statements. Defendant did not prove error by showing that the defendant actually asked for the statement as required by former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Standridge v. State, 196 Ga. App. 697, 396 S.E.2d 804 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 did not apply to authorize the grant of a request for a stay of grand jury proceedings until such time as the state provided the movant with copies of all statements from witnesses. Sauls v. State, 220 Ga. App. 115, 468 S.E.2d 771 (1996).

- O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 applies to felony cases; in misdemeanor cases, the state is only obligated to comply with the discovery requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-16-20 et seq. Bowen v. State, 237 Ga. App. 597, 516 S.E.2d 311 (1999).

Discovery provisions applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions are not the same as those applicable to felony prosecutions, and discovery requirements applicable to misdemeanors did not require the state to produce the items that the defendant claimed should have been produced, including police reports, copies of9-1-1 recordings, crime scene photographs, the victim's criminal history, witness statements, and repair records for the property the defendant damaged; the defendant admitted that the state provided the defendant with a copy of the accusation, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-21, as well as the state's witness list and a copy of the defendant's criminal record so under the circumstances the state complied with the state's discovery obligations. Brooks v. State, 267 Ga. App. 663, 600 S.E.2d 737 (2004).

- Intent of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 is to preclude the state from ignoring the discovery rights of an accused and to provide a penalty if the state ignores the state's responsibility. O'Kelley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 503, 333 S.E.2d 838 (1985); Dickey v. State, 179 Ga. App. 383, 346 S.E.2d 864 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Purpose of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 is to inform the defendant in writing of all relevant and material portions of the defendant's own statement that the state may rely upon to the defendant's disadvantage. Dickey v. State, 179 Ga. App. 383, 346 S.E.2d 864 (1986); Lands v. State, 189 Ga. App. 577, 376 S.E.2d 701 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Purpose of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 is not to insist upon a technical requirement for its own sake, but to ensure sufficient notice to defend against charges. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. App. 380, 511 S.E.2d 219, aff'd, 271 Ga. 780, 523 S.E.2d 14 (1999).

O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 requires only that the state make a defendant's statements available for inspection, copying, or photographing, not that such statements be served upon the defendant. Guild v. State, 234 Ga. App. 862, 508 S.E.2d 231 (1998).

- If a defendant fails to provide written notice to the prosecuting attorney that the defendant elects to have O.C.G.A. § 17-16-2(a) apply to the defendant's case, the discovery disclosure provisions of subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 do not apply. Miller v. State, 235 Ga. App. 724, 510 S.E.2d 560 (1999), appeal dismissed, 264 Ga. App. 801, 592 S.E.2d 450 (2003); Hammett v. State, 246 Ga. App. 287, 539 S.E.2d 193 (2000).

Because the state's written notice sufficiently notified the defendant of the state's intent to seek a recidivist sentence under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 upon conviction of felony obstruction of an officer, and during plea negotiations the state again referenced the defendant's prior criminal history and reiterated the state would seek recidivist punishment, no error occurred in imposing the sentence based on lack of notice. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (2008).

- Although the state did not provide the defendant with records showing the defendant previously threatened to kill the victim in a timely fashion, the defendant was not prejudiced as the defendant was aware that the state intended to present such evidence based on other documents provided earlier. Thompson v. State, 295 Ga. 96, 757 S.E.2d 846 (2014).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the defendant's trial counsel failing to object to the state failing to provide notice of the state's intent to use a prior conviction in aggravation of sentencing because the defendant could not show that the outcome of sentencing would have been different. Soler v. State, 354 Ga. App. 93, 840 S.E.2d 169 (2020).

- In an aggravated assault case, because there was no showing that the defense's discovery violation in failing to produce jail medical records showing the defendant's injuries were in bad faith as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6, the trial court erred in excluding the records, and the error was not harmless given the defendant's testimony that the shooting occurred during a physical confrontation with the defendant's boyfriend and the prosecutor's emphasis on the lack of evidence of the defendant's injuries. Phillips v. State, 347 Ga. App. 147, 817 S.E.2d 711 (2018).

- Because the trial court excluded the defendant's prior conviction based upon a belief that the court had no discretion based on the state's failure to give notice of the state's intent to use the prior conviction as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(5), the trial court could consider the court's options under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6 before re-sentencing. Kiser v. State, 327 Ga. App. 17, 755 S.E.2d 505 (2014).

- Defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because the prosecutor properly served under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(5) the state's notice of intent to seek recidivist punishment and introduce evidence of the defendant's prior convictions on defense counsel on the first day of trial; any defects or untimeliness in the notice were waived as certified copies of the convictions were admitted without objection. Howard v. State, 297 Ga. App. 316, 677 S.E.2d 375 (2009).

State timely filed the state's notice of intent to use the defendant's prior convictions in aggravation of punishment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because the state provided the notice four days before trial; the state served and filed the state's notice of intent on March 20, 2008, and trial commenced on March 24. Shindorf v. State, 303 Ga. App. 553, 694 S.E.2d 177 (2010).

Trial counsel did not err in failing to object to the state's notice of the state's intent to seek recidivist sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(5) because although the state did not give notice ten days before trial, the state did give the defendant notice before the beginning of the trial; trial counsel was aware of the defendant's criminal record, and the defendant made no showing that the prior convictions could have been rebutted or explained had counsel objected. Ross v. State, 313 Ga. App. 695, 722 S.E.2d 411 (2012).

Because the evidence showed that the state notified the defendant of the state's continuing intention to use the defendant's prior convictions in aggravation of punishment at the second trial, and the defendant was aware of that intention, the defendant's motion for new trial on the ground that the state had failed to provide new written notices of recidivism to the defendant after the first trial was denied. Thomas v. State, 324 Ga. App. 898, 752 S.E.2d 67 (2013).

Defendant had sufficient notice of the state's decision to seek recidivist punishment when the state provided such notice several months before trial and attacked the defendant's Georgia Crime Information Center report. Barstad v. State, 329 Ga. App. 214, 764 S.E.2d 453 (2014).

Trial court did not err in finding that the state provided sufficient notice of the state's intent to seek recidivist punishment because the state first provided the defendant with notice of the state's intent to seek recidivist punishment in January 2014; and the amended notice from June 2016 was provided well before the February 10, 2017 hearing, at which the defendant ultimately pled guilty, and the state provided specific details regarding the defendant's previous three convictions that the state intended to use in aggravation of punishment, including the fact that those offenses were considered felonies in their respective jurisdictions and would similarly be considered felonies in Georgia. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018), aff'd, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019).

- Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain a copy of the recidivist notice filed against an accomplice because a recidivist notice indicated only possible sentences, and because the trial court ruled that no inquiry into such possible penalties was allowed in the accomplice's cross-examination, there was no likelihood of prejudice to the defendant as a result of counsel's failure to obtain the notice. Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 34, 751 S.E.2d 63 (2013).

- Trial court erred in admitting in violation of subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 the testimony of the arresting officer that the defendant had responded, when questioned about the key found in the defendant's pocket at the time of arrest, since no other evidence was presented to show how the officer knew the key fit the lock on the front door of the house. Because the statement at issue in this case could be interpreted as an admission of possession of the premises, the court was unable to say with reasonable certainty that no harm resulted from the state's failure to obey the statutory requirements. McKenny v. State, 204 Ga. App. 411, 419 S.E.2d 731 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

It was not error to admit defendant's statements into evidence since the defendant was not furnished a copy of the statement, as requested, prior to trial because the defendant's statements were neither incriminating or inculpatory. Furlow v. State, 172 Ga. App. 185, 322 S.E.2d 317 (1984); Holland v. State, 190 Ga. App. 169, 378 S.E.2d 513 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Since the state timely provided the defendant with written copies of two tape-recorded statements the defendant gave to police and allowed the defendant's attorney to listen to the tapes before trial, the trial court did not err in admitting the statements into evidence. Gadson v. State, 264 Ga. 280, 444 S.E.2d 305 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If the oral statement given to police by the defendant is not per se inculpatory or incriminating, the failure of the state to divulge the statement to the defendant prior to trial does not constitute reversible error. Dawson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 146, 416 S.E.2d 125, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 125 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant's statement that the defendant used but did not sell drugs was merely exculpatory or a mitigating statement not requiring additional disclosure by the state since the state had already disclosed the defendant's ownership of the seized drugs. Jackson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 190, 427 S.E.2d 566 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- After the defendant introduced the issue of the defendant's statements in the defendant's direct testimony, cross-examination on that issue was allowed, even if the cross-examination included references to evidence the state could not introduce in the state's case-in-chief or rebuttal. Keller v. State, 208 Ga. App. 589, 431 S.E.2d 411 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- To constitute a request for discovery under former Code 1933, § 27-1302, a pleading must either make specific reference to that Code section or make it clear that written copies of the defendant's own statements are to be furnished to the defense at least ten days prior to trial. McCarty v. State, 249 Ga. 618, 292 S.E.2d 700 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302) Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 351 S.E.2d 625 (1987); Delay v. State, 213 Ga. App. 199, 444 S.E.2d 140 (1994);.

Although the defendant's "motion for discovery" did not make reference to the applicable statute and did not make it clear that the statements sought by the defendant were to be furnished at least ten days prior to trial, the state could not complain on appeal that the motion was deficient after having treated the motion as a request. Ludy v. State, 177 Ga. App. 767, 341 S.E.2d 224 (1986) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

- To constitute a valid demand for discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, a specific written request must be made. Carter v. State, 181 Ga. App. 117, 351 S.E.2d 516 (1986); Matthews v. State, 221 Ga. App. 129, 470 S.E.2d 518 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Notice to produce under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-26 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-13-27) cannot be used as a discovery tool to circumvent discovery reciprocity under the discovery act. Farmer v. State, 222 Ga. App. 506, 474 S.E.2d 711 (1996).

Defendant's request that the officers suspend the officers' consensual search of the defendant's car was not a statement covered by subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 since the statement was not given by the defendant while in police custody and was, therefore, properly admitted into evidence. Merritt v. State, 165 Ga. App. 597, 302 S.E.2d 136 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant was not entitled, under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, to statements made by a codefendant. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Racial epithets uttered by defendant after the defendant was detained by a store security guard for shoplifting were not incriminating or inculpatory statements that the state was required to furnish to the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, even if the defendant's detention by the guard constituted "police custody" under the statute. Williamson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 307, 372 S.E.2d 685 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Written waiver statement was not within the purview of former § 17-7-211. Dean v. State, 168 Ga. App. 172, 308 S.E.2d 434 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Those parts of oral statements required to be furnished upon request under this section must be relevant, material, and of an inculpatory cast. Howell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 445, 295 S.E.2d 329 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Tape recording of a drug transaction was not discoverable pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-26 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-27) nor under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, since the recording was not of any taped statement given by the defendant while in police custody, nor under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 since the tape recording did not constitute a written scientific report. Weldon v. State, 204 Ga. App. 221, 419 S.E.2d 59 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

- In a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, there was no error in the trial court's ruling which allowed the playing of a video tape recording (without sound) of the defendant while the defendant was being given a breath test for alcohol following the defendant's arrest, although the defendant timely filed a motion for discovery of the defendant's in-custody statements pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 and the state failed to respond to this request, since, for discovery purposes, only the audio portion of a video tape recording was subject to the provisions of that section as it was written. Looney v. State, 180 Ga. App. 693, 350 S.E.2d 29 (1986); Orr v. State, 209 Ga. App. 832, 434 S.E.2d 723 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion finding no reciprocal discovery violation on the part of the state as to a witness interview because there was no evidence that a recording of the entire interview ever existed as the record showed that the state provided the defendant with a recording of a brief portion of the witness's interview and represented to the trial court that no other portion of that interview was recorded, apparently due to an equipment malfunction. Irving v. State, 351 Ga. App. 779, 833 S.E.2d 162 (2019).

Standardized form containing defendant's physical characteristics, recorded by police following the defendant's arrest, was a "written statement" within the meaning of subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Gilbert v. State, 193 Ga. App. 283, 388 S.E.2d 18 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Neither a generalized notice to produce statements seized from a defendant nor a demand for scientific reports would authorize the defendant to pursue at will the prosecutor's files to ascertain if there are any witness statements which might refer to the defendant or admissions made by the defendant to that witness. Griffin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 696, 310 S.E.2d 278 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

There is no Georgia procedure requiring the district attorney to open the district attorney's files to the accused, nor is the accused entitled as a matter of right to receive copies of police reports and investigation reports made in the course of preparing the case against the accused. O'Kelley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 503, 333 S.E.2d 838 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Because the defendant, who agreed to discovery under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-2, was supplied by the police with a number of police reports, including the defendant's in-custody statement, the defendant was not prejudiced by the court's requirement that the defendant provide the materials to the state. McWhorter v. State, 229 Ga. App. 875, 495 S.E.2d 139 (1997).

- Defense counsel was not required to provide the prosecution with a summary of an expert witness's opinion. Beck v. State, 250 Ga. App. 654, 551 S.E.2d 68 (2001).

- Admission of the defendant's statement concerning the defendant's telephone number, which statement was not supplied to counsel pursuant to a timely request, was harmless error since the statement was merely cumulative of other, properly admitted, statements concerning the defendant's residence address. Christopher v. State, 190 Ga. App. 393, 379 S.E.2d 205 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Former § 17-7-210 did not require the state to inform a defendant of the name of the person to whom the defendant made a statement while in custody and a failure to do so does not render the statement inadmissible. Roman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 32, 363 S.E.2d 329 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Although an inquiry as to why a certain statement was or was not made is not an impermissible comment on a defendant's right to remain silent, since the defendant in fact did not remain silent, a different situation may arise in a case where the defendant did not remain silent but the defendant's statement is nevertheless inadmissible for any purpose for failure of the state to produce under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. In such a case, generally, an inquiry into the making of or failure to make a certain statement runs a grave risk of enticing or tempting the appellant to confess the appellant's own statement, thereby getting in the back door what the state could not get in through the front. The question of error will depend upon the circumstances of the case. Bryan v. State, 168 Ga. App. 711, 310 S.E.2d 533 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Sanction for the state's failure to comply with a timely request for discovery of a defendant's custodial statement(s) is the exclusion and suppression of the statement from the state's use in the state's case-in-chief or in rebuttal. But if the statement enters the record as a response to a question posed to the arresting officer by the defendant's counsel on cross-examination, the trial court does not err in denying a motion for mistrial on this ground. Henson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 210, 308 S.E.2d 555 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- No reversible error occurred when during the defendant's interrogation by police the defendant denied being present in the vicinity of the crime or knowing the victim, but testified differently at trial; consequently, the state could not have anticipated the possibly incriminating effect of the statement at issue at the time the state furnished the summary. Dawson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 146, 416 S.E.2d 125, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 125 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If the prosecution fails to deliver a statement made to investigating police officers prior to trial, the statement must be excluded or suppressed even though the prosecution was not fully aware of the statement. Ludy v. State, 177 Ga. App. 767, 341 S.E.2d 224 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Motion for mistrial, based on failure to comply with former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, was properly denied since the trial court correctly instructed the jury to disregard the offending portion of a witness' testimony concerning the statements made to the witness by the defendant while in custody. McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210); Hanson v. State, 229 Ga. App. 205, 493 S.E.2d 605 (1997);.

Sanction of prohibiting the introduction of evidence improperly withheld from the defense applies only if there has been a showing of prejudice to the defense and bad faith by the state. Guild v. State, 236 Ga. App. 444, 512 S.E.2d 343 (1999); Reece v. State, 250 Ga. App. 1, 550 S.E.2d 414 (2001).

As the state did not attempt to impeach the defendant with the defendant's custodial statement that was first disclosed during the charge conference, the defendant was not harmed by the state's belated disclosure of the statement and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial based on the state's untimely disclosure of the defendant's custodial statement. Burton v. State, 330 Ga. App. 503, 767 S.E.2d 510 (2014).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's misconduct in failing to disclose the statement the defendant made to the first investigator until eliciting testimony about the statement from the first investigator at trial because the undisclosed statement that the defendant made to the first investigator was the same in substance as the defendant's longer, more detailed, and audio-recorded statement to the second investigator, which was properly disclosed to the defendant and was played for the jury at trial; and trial counsel admitted that the first investigator's testimony did not provide any information from the defendant that had not already been disclosed in discovery. Prince v. State, 295 Ga. 788, 764 S.E.2d 362 (2014).

- Theft by shoplifting conviction was upheld on appeal despite the defendant's claim that the state violated the reciprocal discovery requirements of the Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq., as the defendant conceded at trial that the state did not act in bad faith, and failed to request a continuance, but instead, communicated a readiness for trial to both the court and the prosecutor. Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 557, 636 S.E.2d 717 (2006).

Prosecutor did not commit discovery misconduct by delaying service of the gang-related evidence that the prosecutor received on the Friday before trial for six hours because the defendant did not show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or that the defense was demonstrably prejudiced, much less that any violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 rose to the level of a violation of constitutional due process. Cushenberry v. State, 300 Ga. 190, 794 S.E.2d 165 (2016).

- In the absence of bad faith on the part of the state, as well as prejudice to the defendant, the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a videotape and photographs of child pornographic images taken from the defendant's computer as a sanction for the state's failure to comply with a court-ordered discovery deadline. State v. Jones, 283 Ga. App. 539, 642 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

- When determining whether testimony concerning the defendant's inculpatory in-custody statement was improperly admitted, the appellate court must consider the statement in the context of the entire record. Christopher v. State, 190 Ga. App. 393, 379 S.E.2d 205 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Court of Appeals must reverse if the court is unable to say with reasonable certainty that no harm resulted from the state's failure to obey the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Ludy v. State, 177 Ga. App. 767, 341 S.E.2d 224 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If the evidence of the defendant's guilt, exclusive of the custodial statement, is overwhelming, the state's failure to provide the defendant with a complete in-custody statement was harmless error. Dickey v. State, 179 Ga. App. 383, 346 S.E.2d 864 (1986); Cook v. State, 199 Ga. App. 14, 404 S.E.2d 128, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 404 S.E.2d 128 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Even if a discovery violation occurred in the defendant's criminal trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1), as the defendant failed to show any harm by the state's alleged failure to timely produce recordings of jail telephone conversations by a codefendant, there was no reversible error; the state did not seek to introduce evidence of the recordings and the defendant's counsel received copies during the trial. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga. App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (2009).

- State was not obliged to provide the defendant with the criminal histories of prospective jurors since: (1) such information could be disclosed only with the jurors' consent or fingerprints, under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-34(a)(1)(A); and (2) it was discoverable only if the state planned to use it in the state's case in chief or in rebuttal, and the sole use the state had for this information was to disqualify venire members. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. App. 177, 564 S.E.2d 759 (2002).

- In introducing evidence that one of the defendant's parents was indicted for extortion and other offenses and pled guilty to obstruction and false statement, the state did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3); the indictment and guilty plea were public records that were accessible to all, including the defendant. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1765, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2008).

- Defendant failed to show that the defendant's trial counsel's failure to obtain a continuance to challenge fingerprint evidence was the result of deficient performance because the defendant could not show prejudice resulting from the lack of opportunity for expert review of the fingerprint report when no expert testified at the motion for new trial hearing, and without that testimony, the court of appeals could not evaluate whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding could have been different; the trial court noted in the new trial hearing that counsel's strategy was to contest the occurrence of any kidnapping offense and concede the lesser crimes, and further analyzing the fingerprint evidence was not material to the trial strategy. Thornton v. State, 305 Ga. App. 692, 700 S.E.2d 669 (2010).

- Defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to seek the exclusion of an expert's testimony as a sanction for the state's violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 because the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by excluding, as a remedy, any specific testimony about the three victims. Love v. State, 349 Ga. App. 741, 824 S.E.2d 745 (2019).

- Counsel's own statement in a written motion for a continuance that, without the continuance, counsel's representation would be ineffective did not equate to a finding that counsel was ineffective at trial. Sims v. State, 278 Ga. 587, 604 S.E.2d 799 (2004).

When defense counsel did not provide the prosecutor with timely notice of the defendant's expert witness or timely provide a copy of the witness's report, as required by O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-4(b)(2),17-16-7, and17-16-8(a), and the witness was excluded, the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; while counsel was deficient, it was not shown that the defendant was prejudiced as another expert testified to essentially the same facts and conclusions as the excluded witness, and referred to the excluded witness's findings, so the excluded witness's testimony would have been cumulative, and it was not shown that the outcome of the defendant's trial would have differed had counsel's performance not been deficient. Mann v. State, 276 Ga. App. 720, 624 S.E.2d 208 (2005).

Because any error in the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of the male victim's prior convictions was harmless, the defendant's trial counsel could not have been found ineffective due to an alleged failure to comply with reciprocal discovery. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 872, 652 S.E.2d 891 (2007).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the state's introduction of evidence in aggravation of punishment on the ground that the notice was untimely and that the state had failed to list specifically what convictions were to be introduced. By filing notice five days before trial, the state had given timely notice under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, and the state, counsel, and the trial court had discussed the prior convictions in detail at two pretrial hearings more than 60 days before trial. McClam v. State, 291 Ga. App. 697, 662 S.E.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1635, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 798 (Ga. 2008).

- Trial counsel was not deficient in failing to properly invoke sequestration because the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the state's expert to testify in rebuttal based in part on their review of the recorded testimony of the appellant's expert; accordingly, even if the appellant's counsel had invoked the rule of sequestration earlier in the trial, the court would not have abused the court's discretion in excepting the state's expert from the rule. Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 787 S.E.2d 221 (2016).

Cited in Hammitt v. State, 225 Ga. App. 21, 482 S.E.2d 437 (1997); Marshall v. State, 230 Ga. App. 116, 495 S.E.2d 585 (1998); Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 660, 544 S.E.2d 496 (2001); Hill v. Duncan, 249 Ga. App. 342, 548 S.E.2d 83 (2001); Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004); Ellis v. State, 279 Ga. App. 902, 633 S.E.2d 64 (2006); Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007); Brooks v. State, 286 Ga. App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (2007); Beck v. State, 292 Ga. App. 472, 665 S.E.2d 701 (2008); Taylor v. State, 295 Ga. App. 689, 673 S.E.2d 7 (2009); Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009); Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011); State v. Thompson, 334 Ga. App. 692, 780 S.E.2d 67 (2015).

Burden of compliance with requirements of this section was on the state. Tanner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 266, 287 S.E.2d 268 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

Upon proper application by a defendant, the burden of compliance with the requirements of this section is on the state, otherwise the statute would be " 'a toothless tiger,' 'a fish that cannot swim,' indeed, a law that it is not necessary to enforce." Garner v. State, 159 Ga. App. 244, 282 S.E.2d 909 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

In order for statements to be discoverable there must be sufficient notice to the state that discovery is being sought. This consists of either a request by the defendant specifically referring to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 or a request that statements must be furnished to the defendant ten days prior to trial. Huguley v. State, 253 Ga. 709, 324 S.E.2d 729 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- State was excused from complying with the ten day notice period in subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 since the record clearly established that the statement in issue was made after the defendant's request was filed and only six days prior to trial. Rife v. State, 203 Ga. App. 353, 416 S.E.2d 864 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Because the state did not gain possession of letters that were entered into evidence until after the beginning of the trial and because the letters were not relevant until the defendant testified, the state did not violate the criminal discovery statute by failing to give prior notice of the letters. Boykin v. State, 264 Ga. App. 836, 592 S.E.2d 426 (2003).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at a trial for rape and aggravated sodomy because there was no basis to request a continuance or disallowance of a colposcope printout, which showed the victim's anal bruising, based on the state's failure to produce the printout before trial because: (1) the defendant already had the assistant's examination report, which mentioned the picture; (2) the defendant's counsel was permitted to interview the assistant before the assistant's testimony; (3) the day of the trial was the first time that the prosecutor saw the picture; (4) there was no bad faith by the state; and (5) the printout was cumulative of other testimony. McMorris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 630, 588 S.E.2d 817 (2003).

General request for discovery directed to any and all evidence in the possession or control of the state which might be favorable to the defendant was insufficient to invoke the provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Dinkins v. State, 202 Ga. App. 403, 414 S.E.2d 545 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Even if the defendant's statement had been custodial, a "verbatim account" was not required since counsel was given a written summary of the statement prior to trial which included "all relevant and material portions of the defendant's statement." Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 705, 340 S.E.2d 662 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Although a 24-page transcript of the defendant's pretrial statement originally furnished the defendant contained some inaccuracies (which were corrected in a supplemental transcript furnished the defendant during the trial) it was sufficiently complete to satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 410 S.E.2d 725 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 117, 121 L. Ed. 2d 73, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 117, 121 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Summary of defendant's in-custody statement which was furnished by the state prior to trial in response to the defendant's request for discovery made pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was sufficiently complete to satisfy the requirements of that statute. Myers v. State, 196 Ga. App. 104, 395 S.E.2d 372 (1990).

- Language of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4(a)(1) requires only that the state make a defendant's statements available for inspection, copying, or photographing, not that such statements be served upon the defendant. Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 481 S.E.2d 856 (1997).

- Demand made pursuant to this section entitled the defendant to a written statement of all relevant and material portions of any statement made by the defendant while in police custody, including spontaneous statements made at the time of arrest which were not reduced to writings, and since the court was unable to say with reasonable certainty that no harm resulted from the state's failure to provide such statements to the defendant, reversal of the defendant's conviction was required. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. App. 364, 295 S.E.2d 108 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

Since the defendant made no showing that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the state's failure to make a custodial statement available to the defendant prior to trial or that the state acted in bad faith in failing to list a witness, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in permitting the witness to testify. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. App. 351, 532 S.E.2d 120 (2000).

State did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 when the state's witness began to testify about a police report as such was held to be newly-discovered evidence and the defendant made no showing of bad faith and prejudice. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 410, 582 S.E.2d 556 (2003).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting two police-made videotapes of the pursuit of the stolen vehicle, even though the tape was not provided to the defense ten days prior to trial, as the tape was provided to the defendant prior to the defendant's trial and the defendant expressly stated that no further time was required to review the tapes or to interview the officers who made the tapes. McCullough v. State, 268 Ga. App. 445, 602 S.E.2d 181 (2004).

Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1), failed to notify the trial counsel of the defendant's oral admission made in custody and then elicited testimony from the officer to whom the admission was made indicating that the officer testified about the admission at a pretrial hearing when the officer, in fact, had not so testified; the state acted in bad faith as the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about the admission and knew about the admission long before trial, the defense counsel was prejudiced by the misconduct as, had the misconduct not occurred, the defense counsel would have understood the importance of obtaining the officer's pretrial testimony, and the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure as the admission was central to the state's case and was not cumulative of other evidence. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 455, 636 S.E.2d 178 (2006).

While the state did not deliver a copy of a DNA report to defense counsel until five days prior to trial, despite the ten-day requirement in O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4), admission of the DNA evidence was not an abuse of discretion when the defendant did not articulate what prejudice the defendant suffered that would have been cured by having the report five days earlier. Leger v. State, 291 Ga. 584, 732 S.E.2d 53 (2012).

Murder defendant's claim that the defendant was prejudiced by being unable to prepare for the damaging evidence of a booking photograph showing the defendant wearing clothes that were later shown to have the deceased's blood on them was rejected because the photograph was cumulative of other evidence, including testimony regarding the defendant's clothing and the clothing itself. Carson v. State, 308 Ga. 761, 843 S.E.2d 421 (2020).

- Former Code 1933, § 27-1302 and O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 exclude from evidence any statements or scientific reports pertaining to a case if a defendant is not given copies of such at least ten days prior to trial after a proper request is made therefor. Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 530, 281 S.E.2d 252 (1981).

- Since, prior to trial and pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, the defendant requested copies of any custodial statements the defendant made which were in the state's possession, but the prosecutor only became aware of the defendant's statement at 11:30 the morning of the trial, sanctions for failing to supply the statement were not applicable since subsection (e) of that section exempted evidence discovered after the request was filed. Marlow v. State, 192 Ga. App. 670, 385 S.E.2d 759 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- State did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4) when the state disclosed x-rays to the defense during the trial since the state disclosed the x-rays as soon as the state acquired the x-rays. Thompson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 17, 585 S.E.2d 125 (2003).

- Statement by the defendant to a police officer which was not turned over to defense counsel pursuant to pretrial discovery proceedings should have been excluded and suppressed at trial and was not admissible as newly discovered evidence merely because the prosecutor was unaware of the statement. Talley v. State, 251 Ga. 42, 302 S.E.2d 355 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If prosecuting attorney and defense counsel discovered evidence at the same time, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4. Crawley v. State, 240 Ga. App. 891, 525 S.E.2d 739 (1999).

If omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Constitution requires that, upon request by the defendant, the state disclose all favorable evidence which is material either to guilt or to punishment. Implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Prosecutor failed to reveal to defense that the alleged victim had given a nonverbal denial of one of the acts charged. In applying the four factors making up the standard of review for a Brady violation, and considering that the alleged victim was the only witness, the suppression of the evidence was a Brady violation which required reversal of the defendant's conviction. Brownlow v. Schofield, 277 Ga. 237, 587 S.E.2d 647 (2003).

- Habeas petitioner alleged facts showing grounds for relief which could not reasonably have been raised in the petitioner's original habeas petition and which could not have been discovered by diligence, including a juror's misconduct in visiting the scene and the state's failure to disclose ballistic evidence, satisfying O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-42(c)(4) and9-14-51. Watkins v. Ballinger, 308 Ga. 387, 840 S.E.2d 378 (2020).

- Admission of a statement made by the defendant to the arresting officer which was not furnished to the defendant even though the defendant made a proper request was not error since the district attorney was not aware of the statement until the day of the officer's testimony, the statement was not directly inculpatory but was relevant only in rebuttal, and the statement in and of itself was neither inculpatory nor exculpatory. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If during the testimony of one of the state's witnesses, the defendant moved for a mistrial arguing that the state had used a statement at trial that the state had not included in the summary produced in response to the defendant's request pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, and the statement concerned the amount of money the defendant had in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial since the defendant's statement did not tend to prove or disprove the defendant's guilt of the crime with which the defendant was charged. Dixson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 410, 382 S.E.2d 357 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If a defendant asks for "anything exculpatory" such a request really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made. In such a case, the prosecutor will not have violated the prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure unless the prosecutor's omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial; the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

Statements about education and other personal data about defendant would not be in any way inculpatory so as to be subject to the objection that the defendant was improperly served with all inculpatory statements upon the defendant's request. Hilburn v. State, 166 Ga. App. 357, 304 S.E.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Discovery request pursuant to subsection (a) of this section was substantially complied with since the district attorney failed to furnish a statement only because there was no substantial difference in the testimony of the witnesses to be used on the second trial than at the first trial, a transcript of which was in the defendant's possession. Tyson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 22, 299 S.E.2d 69 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Defendant's in-custody statement was properly admitted since the state provided the defendant with a copy of the transcript of the defendant's taped statement well in advance of the trial and defense counsel was allowed to compare the tape to the transcript prior to the tape's being used at trial and pointed to no material changes or inconsistencies in the content of the statement. Sullivan v. State, 213 Ga. App. 308, 444 S.E.2d 392 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Summary of felony-murder defendant's taped statement was adequate since, although the summary omitted the exact number of blows, the summary showed that the defendant hit the victim a number of times over an extended period of time. Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. 236, 404 S.E.2d 108 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- It was not error to refuse to require production of original tape recordings of the defendant's statements after defense counsel listened to the tapes and received a transcript of all the statements made by the defendant. Hardin v. State, 252 Ga. 99, 311 S.E.2d 462 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- State did not fail to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1) in not producing videotaped interviews of a witness and a defendant until three days prior to trial in the defendant's prosecution for felony murder because due to an equipment malfunction both recordings were soundless; the defendant failed to show how the interviews had any exculpatory value. Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009).

Police surveillance videotape was not subject to discovery since there was no motion to produce and the tape was not needed for use as evidence on the defendant's behalf and was only introduced on re-direct examination to rehabilitate the testimony of a witness. Deal v. State, 199 Ga. App. 184, 404 S.E.2d 343 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If the defendant was not in police custody but was only detained pursuant to a traffic stop at the time the defendant made the voluntary statements, the statements need not have been disclosed pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 and the trial court committed no error in allowing the statement's admission. Conley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 375, 352 S.E.2d 394 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Former § 17-7-210 applied only when the statement was given while in custody. Banther v. State, 182 Ga. App. 333, 355 S.E.2d 709 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Since the defendant was not in police custody at the time the statements were made, the state's failure to produce the statements did not make the testimony inadmissible. Baker v. State, 193 Ga. App. 498, 388 S.E.2d 402 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Former § 17-7-210 required the state to provide a defendant with copies of any statements given while in police custody. Inasmuch as the statement of which the appellant complains was not made while in police custody and the appellant can point to no other statements made while in police custody which the state failed to produce, the trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion to suppress under that Code section or on the various assorted constitutional grounds asserted by the appellant relative to improper custodial interrogation. Mattarochia v. State, 200 Ga. App. 681, 409 S.E.2d 546 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

With regard to the defendant's convictions on one count of simple assault and two counts of battery resulting from a fight with a romantic friend (the victim), the trial court did not err by admitting testimony by an officer as to what the defendant said to the officer, when the state had failed to disclose the substance of the statement to the defendant until the first day of trial as, considering that the victim failed to answer the subpoena and to appear at trial, and the state being advised that the defendant was going to assert self-defense, the defendant did not show that the state acted in bad faith. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

- Presence of a uniformed sheriff's deputy during the interview of the defendant by a caseworker of the Department of Family and Children Services did not require the conclusion that the defendant was in custody. Banther v. State, 182 Ga. App. 333, 355 S.E.2d 709 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If the city clerk testified to statements elicited by the clerk when the defendant walked into the clerk's office to surrender, but the clerk testified to no statements given by the defendant "while in police custody," former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 did not apply. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Under subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, a defendant was entitled to a copy of any statement given by the defendant while in police custody. However, roadside questioning after a routine traffic stop does not constitute a custodial situation. Jones v. State, 196 Ga. App. 842, 397 S.E.2d 181 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Trial court did not err in determining that absent a showing by the defense that it was legally entitled to the discovery of handwritten notes by officers on some other basis, the state had no duty to provide the officers' notes under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4. Brannon v. State, 298 Ga. 601, 783 S.E.2d 642 (2016).

- Trial court did not err in admitting an oral statement made by a defendant to a police officer which had not been delivered to the defendant more than ten days prior to trial and which had been demanded by an appropriate motion for discovery since the written statement the defendant executed contained the same material elements as the oral statement, the minor discrepancies as did appear were subject to exposure on cross-examination, and the defendant made no showing of surprise as to the contents of the oral statement or prejudice from the admission of the oral statement. Rhodes v. State, 170 Ga. App. 473, 317 S.E.2d 285 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Although the defendant was only given a copy of the summary of the defendant's statement to one detective and the similar statement the defendant gave to another detective was not mentioned, the purpose of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was satisfied as the defendant was clearly notified by the state of the substance of the statement the state anticipated using against the defendant. White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 317 S.E.2d 196 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Failure of the state to disclose pre-interview statements did not provide a basis for excluding a recorded statement that was provided to the defendant and found to be freely and voluntarily given. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. 72, 495 S.E.2d 280 (1998).

Filing of "Brady" motion failed to give state reasonable notice that the defendant sought discovery pursuant to the provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-1302. Williams v. State, 164 Ga. App. 148, 296 S.E.2d 739 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Request that "(a)ll written or recorded statements and all summaries or memoranda of any oral or written statements made by the named the defendant . . ." be produced "prior to . . . trial . . . at a time to be fixed by the court" was not sufficient to invoke the provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-1302. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- This section stated clearly that the defendant shall be entitled to a copy of any statement and if the defendant's statement was oral or partially oral, the prosecution shall furnish in writing all relevant and material portions of the defendant's statement. Ellison v. State, 158 Ga. App. 419, 280 S.E.2d 371 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Talley v. State, 251 Ga. 42, 302 S.E.2d 355 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Victim's testimony that the defendant threatened to kill the victim's family if the victim told anyone about the defendant's molestation of the victim did not have to be revealed before trial because it was not a custodial statement of the defendant. Frazier v. State, 252 Ga. App. 627, 557 S.E.2d 12 (2001).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the state's alleged failure to comply with the Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq., requirements as the plain terms of that law dictated that the defendant, who allegedly molested the defendant's daughter, was not entitled to the oral, unrecorded statement the daughter provided to a police investigator as the state was required to produce statements within the state's possession, custody, or control and the daughter's unrecorded, oral statement did not qualify. Downs v. State, 257 Ga. App. 696, 572 S.E.2d 54 (2002).

Newly discovered evidence of oral statements given by the defendant which were unintentionally omitted from a police report fall within the exception provided in subsection (e) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Jenkins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 840, 308 S.E.2d 14 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If evidence of in-custody statements was newly discovered and was revealed to defense counsel as soon as practicable after its discovery and defense counsel was then afforded an opportunity to question the witness outside the presence of the jury, the trial court's decision that the evidence was governed by subsection (e) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was not erroneous. Broomall v. State, 260 Ga. 220, 391 S.E.2d 918 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant's request for a mistrial after receiving new evidence five days before trial was properly denied as the state turned over the information as soon as the information was discovered, the defendant failed to request a continuance, and the evidence was part of the res gestae of the charged crime. Goggins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (2014).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a continuance based on the state untimely serving a portion of a witness's custodial interview three days prior to trial because the appellant's contention that proper cross-examination questioning was prevented was unsupported by the evidence and the appellant did not present the testimony of any potential witnesses or offer any other evidence to show that any prejudice resulted from the denial of the motion. Easley v. State, 352 Ga. App. 1, 833 S.E.2d 591 (2019).

- If a request for a statement has been timely made, production of that statement one day before trial is not production within a reasonable time. Smith v. State, 181 Ga. App. 595, 353 S.E.2d 35 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Since after a timely request by the defendant, the state failed to supply the defendant with a written copy of the defendant's in-custody confession at least ten days prior to trial, the defendant's motion in limine seeking to exclude the confession should have been granted. Livingston v. State, 222 Ga. App. 298, 474 S.E.2d 1 (1996).

It was reversible error for the state on the morning of the trial to provide defense counsel with notice regarding the introduction of the defendant's statement that contradicted counsel's planned defense. Baker v. State, 238 Ga. App. 285, 518 S.E.2d 455 (1999).

Rights of the accused to reasonable pretrial access to evidence are not subject to the vagaries of a police department "policy" not to develop evidentiary photographs until the day before trial. Thompson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 26, 521 S.E.2d 876 (1999).

Because it was apparent that the prosecutors acted in good faith by immediately mailing a copy of the report on a scientific test to the defendant once the prosecutors received the report themselves, absent any evidence of bad faith, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the test. Berry v. State, 246 Ga. App. 9, 539 S.E.2d 516 (2000).

Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's statement upon seeing the informant at the jail that the informant was the person "that busted him," even though the statement was supposed to be disclosed ten days prior to trial and was not disclosed to the defense until the trial was in progress as the statement was newly discovered evidence; the state disclosed the statement as soon as practicable after learning about the statement, and the defendant did not show that the state acted in bad faith regarding discovery and disclosure of the statement. Dixon v. State, 252 Ga. App. 385, 556 S.E.2d 480 (2001).

"Reasonable time" for making a request is to be determined by considering the facts and circumstances of each case. Smith v. State, 181 Ga. App. 595, 353 S.E.2d 35 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Because it was impossible for the defendant to submit a timely request in accordance with former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 because the defendant had no representation by counsel until a week before trial, the defendant's request six days before trial was within a reasonable time even though made within ten days of trial. Pealor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 387, 299 S.E.2d 904 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant's request for a statement, filed within five days of retaining defense counsel but less than ten days prior to trial, was a reasonable time in which to make the request. Smith v. State, 181 Ga. App. 595, 353 S.E.2d 35 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Purpose of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was satisfied when, even though there was no direct reference by the state that the defendant made an oral statement to a police officer and that the state intended to rely solely on the oral statement, the defendant was fully notified by the state of the substance of the oral statement the state indeed did use in the trial of the case. Lewis v. State, 183 Ga. App. 41, 357 S.E.2d 862 (1987).

- Penalty for failure of the prosecution to serve a defendant timely with a copy of inculpatory in custody statements is the exclusion and suppression of the statements from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief or in rebuttal, but if the state made no attempt to use the indicated statements as a result of cross-examination of an officer by defense counsel, although a police officer testified as to the defendant's age and education, the obvious purpose of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was satisfied. Hilburn v. State, 166 Ga. App. 357, 304 S.E.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Upon failure of the prosecution to comply with the defendant's timely written request for a copy of written or oral statement given by the defendant while in police custody, the statement is not used by the prosecution at all and the trial court gives the jury corrective instructions to disregard any question on this matter, the trial court need not grant a mistrial. Lee v. State, 166 Ga. App. 644, 305 S.E.2d 175 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- State was not required to take the initiative and "furnish" the defense with copies of photographs; the state's obligation was fulfilled by making the photographs available to the defense to inspect and copy. McSears v. State, 226 Ga. App. 90, 485 S.E.2d 589 (1997).

If the state failed to produce photographs ten days before trial, but the defendant rejected the trial court's offer of a continuance, and if the photographs were merely cumulative of other evidence, there was no prejudice to the defendant shown and no abuse of discretion in admitting the photographs. Brown v. State, 236 Ga. App. 478, 512 S.E.2d 369 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in reopening the evidence and allowing the state to introduce photographs as rebuttal evidence since the evidence did not become relevant until the defendant's defense was presented. Potter v. State, 272 Ga. 430, 530 S.E.2d 725 (2000).

State's failure to produce the photographs of the victim ten days before trial was not a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3) and the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs because the defendant did not present any evidence of bad faith on the part of the state and the photographs were no more than cumulative of the testimony of the victim to the effect that the defendant had beaten the victim in the head with a stick as well as the testimony of the other witnesses for the state. Davis v. State, 257 Ga. App. 500, 571 S.E.2d 497 (2002).

When the prosecution did not provide the defendant a photograph of the victim's injuries in pre-trial discovery, it was not error to admit the photograph at trial because, under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3), the prosecution was only required to allow the defendant to inspect and copy the photograph, and the defendant chose not to take advantage of an offer to inspect the photograph. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004).

With regard to the defendant's domestic violence convictions, the trial court did not err in denying the admission into evidence of a photograph detailing the defendant's injuries based on failing to provide inspection of the photograph because any error by the trial court in excluding the photograph was harmless since the photograph was cumulative of both the defendant's testimony that the wife scratched the defendant as well as the wife's testimony that the wife tried to scratch the defendant. Palmer v. State, 330 Ga. App. 679, 769 S.E.2d 107 (2015).

If the testimony to which defendant objected merely was cumulative of testimony to which the defendant did not object concerning other oral and written in-custody statements and was not significantly different in substance from the defendant's other oral and written statements, there was no error in the denial of the motion for mistrial. Gay v. State, 199 Ga. App. 80, 403 S.E.2d 895 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

State's failure to supply written copies of the defendants' video taped statements was not reversible error since the statements on the videotape were merely cumulative of other previously rendered testimony to which the defendants interposed no objection. Bowe v. State, 201 Ga. App. 127, 410 S.E.2d 765 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Watts v. State, 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Watts v. State, 261 Ga. App. 230, 582 S.E.2d 186 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Admission of a defendant's statement in violation of subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 did not require reversal unless it was highly probable that the error contributed to the verdict. Davis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 375, 401 S.E.2d 581 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant failed to show trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the state's notice of intent to seek punishment as a recidivist because there was no evidence in the record that the state failed to provide a copy of the criminal history report, nor was there any evidence that the defendant and counsel were unaware of the specific felony convictions listed in the criminal history record. Williams v. State, 326 Ga. App. 784, 757 S.E.2d 448 (2014).

- State-withheld signed Miranda-waiver form which could not be construed as incriminating did not fall within the ambit of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 and thus did not need to be furnished to a defendant. Brady v. State, 206 Ga. App. 497, 426 S.E.2d 15 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- State's failure to furnish a written copy of the defendant's oral, in-custody statement upon request at least ten days prior to trial was harmless error since the victim positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes and the defendant presented no evidence in the defendant's defense. Russell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 209, 358 S.E.2d 631 (1987).

State's failure to timely provide the defendant with a written copy of the defendant's in-custody statement was harmless error since the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. Coney v. State, 198 Ga. App. 272, 401 S.E.2d 304 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Failure of the state to provide the defendant with a knife before trial did not require the court to exclude the knife from evidence since the defendant made no showing that the defendant was prejudiced and since no continuance was requested to cure any prejudice which may have precipitated as a result of the state's failure to comply. Tucker v. State, 222 Ga. App. 517, 474 S.E.2d 696 (1996); Parrott v. State, 240 Ga. App. 173, 523 S.E.2d 29 (1999); Roberts v. State, 244 Ga. App. 330, 534 S.E.2d 526 (2000).

Trial court did not have authority, under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, to exercise discretion and exclude the defendant's incriminating statement from evidence. Defendant made no showing of prejudice by the state's failure to make the defendant's custodial statement available prior to the trial, and the defendant did not ask for a continuance. Bell v. State, 224 Ga. App. 191, 480 S.E.2d 241 (1997); Knight v. State, 239 Ga. App. 710, 521 S.E.2d 851 (1999).

Because the defendant made no showing at trial that the defendant was prejudiced by the state's failure to make a scientific report available before trial, the trial court did not err in allowing the state's use of the report. Aleman v. State, 224 Ga. App. 391, 480 S.E.2d 393 (1997).

Since defense counsel admitted at trial that the notice of intent to present similar transaction evidence informed the defendant that the defendant had been convicted of a similar transaction because the notice recited that the state intended to introduce certain documents, including "disposition, guilty by trial," the fact that a copy of the conviction was not included did not affect the adequacy of the notice because no prejudice to the defendant was shown, and harm as well as error must be shown to warrant reversal. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. App. 380, 511 S.E.2d 219, aff'd, 271 Ga. 780, 523 S.E.2d 14 (1999).

Although the state violated O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3) because discoverable evidence of a photographic line-up was in the state's possession but not disclosed within the applicable statutory time period, the defendant could not show that the defendant suffered harm as a result of the late disclosure; thus, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 728, 624 S.E.2d 275 (2005).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by refusing to exclude the medical examiner as a witness after the state failed to include the examiner's name on a witness list and provide the defense with the autopsy report as the defendant interviewed the examiner, the trial was continued to allow a gunshot residue test to be completed, and the defendant failed to show prejudice. Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 782 S.E.2d 642 (2016).

Defendant failed to show prejudice from the state's failure to provide timely notice of an expert's particular opinion as the expert was included on the state's witness list, the expert's report was provided to defense counsel prior to trial, and the defendant made no showing of what additional evidence the defendant would have presented or how the undisclosed opinion would have changed the defense strategy. Murphy v. State, 299 Ga. 238, 787 S.E.2d 721 (2016).

- Because defense counsel had the opportunity to listen to the tape before allowing the tape's admission into evidence, the trial court acted within the court's discretion in allowing the9-1-1 tape into evidence. Rooks v. State, 238 Ga. App. 177, 518 S.E.2d 179 (1999).

- Admission of a detective's testimony regarding the defendant's custodial statement in violation of subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was not harmless error and required reversal of the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving stolen property since the challenged statement directly contradicted the defendant's trial testimony that the defendant thought the property belonged to an acquaintance. Davis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 375, 401 S.E.2d 581 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Admission of evidence concerning an incriminating in-custody statement which a statutory rape the defendant made to police during their investigation of a prior rape was reversible error due to the state's failure to produce the statement in response to the defendant's request, notwithstanding the state's contention that the state was not required to provide the defendant with a copy of the statement because the statement did not concern the offense for which the defendant was on trial. Byars v. State, 198 Ga. App. 793, 403 S.E.2d 82 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Even though the state did not receive a scientific report until four days before trial, a continuance was warranted for the state's failure to provide the defendant with a copy ten days before trial, and denial of a motion therefor was reversible error. Brady v. State, 233 Ga. App. 287, 503 S.E.2d 906 (1998).

- As the trial court found no due process violation in the release of the defendant's pickup truck, allegedly involved in a murder, to the lienholder, due to a lack of bad faith on the part of the state and a lack of exculpatory value in the truck, and for the same reasons, the trial court also determined that the state did not violate the state's discovery obligations, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss or to exclude evidence. Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 561 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1021, 123 S. Ct. 541, 154 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2002).

Because: (1) the defendant did not object to the admissibility of three cash invoices on the ground that the state failed to produce the invoices during discovery; and (2) the state produced a jail inventory list as soon as was practicable, the defendant denied an offer for a continuance, and never presented any evidence of prejudice based on its admission, no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 occurred requiring sanctions against the state under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6. Bennett v. State, 289 Ga. App. 110, 657 S.E.2d 6 (2008).

Four boxes of documents were properly admitted into evidence despite the defendant's claim that the documents had not been made available during discovery because the documents had been provided to previous trial counsel and counsel and an associate were given a break during trial to review the documents. Raymond v. State, 322 Ga. App. 404, 745 S.E.2d 689 (2013).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on the prosecution's failure to disclose the existence of certain documents because the prosecutor gave notice to the defendant that the physical objects were available for inspection, copying, or photographing and O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3)(A) did not require the state to take the initiative and furnish the defense with copies of physical evidence. Ananaba v. State, 325 Ga. App. 829, 755 S.E.2d 225 (2014).

Plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3)(A) does not require the state to take the initiative and furnish the defense with copies of physical evidence; the state fulfills the state's obligation by making the evidence available to the defense to inspect and copy. Ananaba v. State, 325 Ga. App. 829, 755 S.E.2d 225 (2014).

Trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial based on the state's failure to disclose a therapist's notes until just before trial began as the state shared the notes shortly after receiving the notes, the defendant asserted no bad faith on the part of the state, the defendant was granted a short continuance to review the materials, and the defendant had notice that the therapist might testify two weeks before trial and could have retained an expert to counter the therapist's testimony. Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga. App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (2015).

Because there was no evidence the emergency room doctor who treated the defendant made an oral or partially oral report, the state was under no duty to reduce to writing a non-existent oral report. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 807 S.E.2d 350 (2017).

Time of Receipt of Statements

Waiver of ten-day period.

- Since the defendant gave no indication that the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's statements at the crime scene was intended to encompass the time limitations of this section, nor did the defendant make any attempt to explain why the motion was not filed in time to allow ten days for compliance, the ten-day time limitation must be considered waived. Thomas v. State, 163 Ga. App. 151, 293 S.E.2d 540 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

Since the defendant made a proper and timely request for production of the defendant's pretrial statement but was not served with a copy of such statement until the scheduled trial date, after the jury was selected but not sworn, any error in admission of the statement was waived since the defendant refused the offer of another jury more than ten days after receiving the statement. Todd v. State, 163 Ga. App. 814, 294 S.E.2d 714 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Late disclosure of Facebook messages sent by the defendant did not necessitate reversal as no bad faith or prejudice was shown. Hawkins v. State, 304 Ga. 299, 818 S.E.2d 513 (2018).

- Fact that the defendant's first taped interview, in which the defendant admitted furnishing a gun to a minor, was not provided to the defendant until nine days before trial was harmless error because nothing in the material surprised the defendant as the defendant testified to the same information at the minor's trial. Rollinson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 375, 623 S.E.2d 211 (2005).

- Because defense counsel succeeded prior defense counsel five days before trial and requested statements under this section three days before trial, and because the statements were received the day before trial, the trial court did not err in overruling the defense's objection to the introduction of the defendant's pretrial statements on the ground that the statements had not been furnished ten days before trial. McCannon v. State, 161 Ga. App. 685, 288 S.E.2d 663 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- Failure to provide the defendant with a copy of the defendant's statement in Spanish at least ten days prior to trial did not require suppression of an English transcription of the statement which had been timely provided to the defendant since the defendant was clearly notified by the state of the substance of the statement the state anticipated using against the defendant. Windelberg v. State, 257 Ga. 289, 357 S.E.2d 583 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Due to interpretation difficulties, the state did not know that the defendant held a knife during an armed robbery until the Thursday before trial. As the state's disclosure to the defendant of this newly discovered evidence by at least the following Monday complied with O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(c), the state did not act in bad faith, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the late disclosure; thus, evidence of the knife was properly admitted. Herieia v. State, 297 Ga. App. 872, 678 S.E.2d 548 (2009).

Trial court did not err by refusing to exclude evidence of the state's expert witness due to the state failing to provide a written summary of the expert's findings no later than ten days before trial, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4), because the defendant failed to show either prejudice or bad faith on the part of the state, and the defendant did not seek a recess or continuance or request any other remedy authorized by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6, except to object to the expert's qualifications. Hodges v. State, 319 Ga. App. 657, 738 S.E.2d 111 (2013).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions on two counts of cruelty to children, the trial court did not err by allowing a caseworker to testify to additional recollections the caseworker realized were not contained in the report that was prepared following an interview with the defendant as the information that the defendant asserted that the defendant should have received before trial did not involve a written statement, a written summary of a statement, or a contemporaneous recording of a statement by the caseworker; therefore, the recollections did not constitute a "statement of a witness" under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1(2), and the state was not obligated to produce the information prior to trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-7. Hinds v. State, 296 Ga. App. 80, 673 S.E.2d 598 (2009).

- Defendant was not entitled to relief based on an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 and failure to remedy the violation under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6 because the state turned over the subject records immediately after receiving the records and counsel did not move for a continuance, but the trial court gave counsel additional time to review the records. Hambrick v. State, 353 Ga. App. 666, 839 S.E.2d 664 (2020).

Time of Making Statement

Statement by defendant after pat-down search and before arrest.

- Statement was noncustodial and not subject to discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 since the oral statement by the defendant as to ownership of and license for a derringer was given to the officer when the officer had probable cause to conduct a pat-down weapon search and the burden of proving that the defendant had a valid license for carrying the pistol was upon the defendant. The defendant was arrested only after the defendant admitted to not having a license. Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Former § 17-7-210 related only to those statements made by the defendant while in police custody. Shelton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 163, 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burns, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. 2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Statement made by the defendant to another while both were in jail constituted a statement while in police custody requiring disclosure upon the defendant's request. Walraven v. State, 250 Ga. 401, 297 S.E.2d 278 (1982), aff'd, 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798 (1985) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- See Yeargin v. State, 164 Ga. App. 835, 298 S.E.2d 606 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998); Mason v. State, 177 Ga. App. 184, 338 S.E.2d 706 (1985) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302), but see (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Because a party suspected of drunk driving was stopped by a police officer and asked to recite the alphabet that party was not in custody and therefore there was no requirement under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 that the state provide a written summary of the attempted recitation. Wilson v. State, 173 Ga. App. 805, 328 S.E.2d 418 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Only a custodial statement is required to be supplied pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 705, 340 S.E.2d 662 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant's statement to a police officer which is made at a time when the defendant is not in custody is not subject to discovery pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Webb v. State, 179 Ga. App. 101, 345 S.E.2d 648 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant was not entitled to receive summaries of statements that the defendant made in a recorded telephone conversation which occurred while the defendant was free on bond and not in custody. Martin v. State, 179 Ga. App. 551, 347 S.E.2d 247 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant's statements are not custodial and therefore not subject to discovery pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210, when, although the object of the police officers' visit to the defendant's residence was for the defendant's arrest, the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the defendant's spontaneous statements to the officers. That Code section related only to those statements made by the defendant while in police custody. Hudgins v. State, 186 Ga. App. 883, 369 S.E.2d 54 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Only a custodial statement is required to be supplied pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4, and an accused is not in custody when an accused is out on bond. Newsome v. State, 192 Ga. App. 111, 385 S.E.2d 794 (1989).

- When statement occurred at a time when the defendant believed the defendant was not free to leave and both officers also agreed that the defendant was not free to leave, although the decision to formally arrest came later, the lower court was in error in concluding that former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 did not apply. D'Anna v. State, 201 Ga. App. 731, 412 S.E.2d 857 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Person testifying before a magistrate or other judicial officer in open court at a preliminary hearing was not in police custody within the contemplation of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210. Maddox v. State, 210 Ga. App. 526, 436 S.E.2d 730 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Statement made by defendant to victim during commission of offense was not a statement as was required to be produced under this section. Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 69, 299 S.E.2d 402 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

Utterances made by appellant during commission of, or in connection with, crime charged do not constitute statements given "while in custody." Holbrook v. State, 162 Ga. App. 400, 291 S.E.2d 729 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- State had no duty to provide a driver with statements made to an officer in response to preliminary questions after the driver was stopped but before the driver was arrested for driving under the influence. Hudgins v. State, 176 Ga. App. 719, 337 S.E.2d 378 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110).

- State had no duty to provide a driver with statements made to and officer after a driving under the influence arrest and Miranda warning as the statements were made voluntarily and were neither incriminating nor exculpatory. Hudgins v. State, 176 Ga. App. 719, 337 S.E.2d 378 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Incriminating letter written by a defendant while the defendant was out on bond to the child whom the defendant was accused of molesting was not discoverable pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 and was not erroneously admitted into evidence. McCoy v. State, 174 Ga. App. 621, 330 S.E.2d 746 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- If the state did not supply the defendant with a statement through pretrial discovery, the defendant waived this ground of appeal by failing to make a timely objection to the testimony as the statement was being presented into evidence. Cloud v. State, 169 Ga. App. 51, 311 S.E.2d 491 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If the defendant makes a motion for discovery of all statements made while in police custody, and of all scientific tests to be introduced at trial, the denial of such information to the defendant, and the subsequent use of the information by the prosecutor at trial, will not be grounds for an appeal unless a proper objection or motion for mistrial is made at the trial court level. Huguley v. State, 253 Ga. 709, 324 S.E.2d 729 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

If an objection pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 was not made at the time the testimony was offered, the objection is waived. Johnson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 845, 383 S.E.2d 346 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Letter voluntarily written to a party other than the state or law enforcement officers is prima facie not a statement given by the defendant while in policy custody and therefore the defendant is not allowed to receive a copy of the letter as a statement made by the defendant while in police custody. Williams v. State, 202 Ga. App. 728, 415 S.E.2d 327 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

This section was an extension of defendant's right to pretrial discovery by making scientific reports available to a the defendant upon proper and timely written demand if such information was in the possession of or available to the district attorney. Hartley v. State, 159 Ga. App. 157, 282 S.E.2d 684 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

- O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4) does not require the state to have the state's expert prepare a report; rather, it requires that if such a report exists the report be made available to the defendant. Garey v. State, 273 Ga. 133, 539 S.E.2d 123 (2000).

- Former § 17-7-211 did not apply to the testimony of mental health therapists and psychologists, even if such testimony was based on written notes or reports. Horne v. State, 192 Ga. App. 528, 385 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989), 494 U.S. 1006, 110 S. Ct. 1302, 108 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Former § 17-7-211 does not provide an independent statutory basis for discovery of "scientific records" of child abuse maintained by institutions listed in O.C.G.A. § 49-5-40. In the absence of obtaining a statutory exception by compliance with O.C.G.A. § 49-5-41 or O.C.G.A. § 49-5-41.1, as applicable, such child abuse records remain protected. Horne v. State, 192 Ga. App. 528, 385 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989), 494 U.S. 1006, 110 S. Ct. 1302, 108 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211), cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989); 494 U.S. 1006, 110 S. Ct. 1302, 108 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Inasmuch as a scientific report that was not made available to defense counsel was not introduced into evidence by the state in the state's case-in-chief or in rebuttal, the state did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3) by failing to disclose the report to a defendant with regard to the defendant's trial for murder and related offenses. Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 642 S.E.2d 8 (2007).

- This section was not violated since the physician's handwriting was illegible but the state allowed the defense to confer with the physician and the parties during trial and agreed to a recess to decipher the physician's handwriting. Brown v. State, 161 Ga. App. 544, 288 S.E.2d 882 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1302).

- If the state was planning to put into evidence the results of comparison tests of material not collected from the defendant, the victim, or the crime scene, but which tests were performed as part of the investigation of the crime, and the results of the test have been reduced to the form of a written report, then former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 required the prosecution to provide the defendant with a copy of that report within the statutory period. State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Former § 17-7-211 did not prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence of scientific tests performed immediately prior to or during the trial absent a showing that the prosecution attempted to circumvent the discovery process. Wellborn v. State, 258 Ga. 570, 372 S.E.2d 220 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Defendant is not entitled to internal documents and work products of crime lab, such as a computer printout. Walker v. State, 168 Ga. App. 130, 308 S.E.2d 404 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

State is not entitled to discover from defendant that which defendant would not be entitled to discover from state. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- State is entitled to obtain a copy of a written scientific report by a defendant's expert. Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If the defendant makes a motion for discovery of all statements made while in police custody, and of all scientific tests to be introduced at trial, the denial of such information to the defendant, and the subsequent use of the information by the prosecutor at trial, will not be grounds for an appeal unless a proper objection or motion for mistrial is made at the trial court level. Huguley v. State, 253 Ga. 709, 324 S.E.2d 729 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Any error on the part of the prosecution in failing to produce a document cannot be classified as prosecutorial misconduct barring retrial unless the prosecutor's action was intended to subvert the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause. Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 369 S.E.2d 232, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S. Ct. 225, 102 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1988) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

Prosecution did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 by failing to turn over the recordings of the defendant's conversations because the prosecutor did not access the jail's telephone monitoring system, which was under the dominion of the county jail and, thus, there was nothing in the prosecutor's possession, custody, or control to turn over to the defendant. Kitchens v. State, 289 Ga. 242, 710 S.E.2d 551 (2011).

- Neither a demand for scientific reports nor a generalized notice to produce statements seized from a defendant would authorize the defendant to pursue at will the prosecutor's files to ascertain if there are any witness statements which might refer to the defendant or admissions made by the defendant to that witness. Griffin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 696, 310 S.E.2d 278 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If the trial court allowed evidence regarding a polygraph test over the objection that no report of the results had been furnished pursuant to a timely request and then permitted defense counsel five minutes to read such report, the time permitted was unreasonable and was tantamount to failing altogether to furnish a report thus making admission of the evidence error. Taylor v. State, 172 Ga. App. 408, 323 S.E.2d 212 (1984) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

Machine printout of numerals or letters, which required interpretation by the machine's operator to attain significance, was not a "scientific report" and was thus not discoverable under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Dunn v. State, 178 Ga. App. 6, 341 S.E.2d 877 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- In a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, the trial court's allowing certain testimony in evidence concerning a breath test given the defendant following the defendant's arrest was not erroneous since the test was ultimately unsuccessful due to the defendant's inability to provide a sufficient sample to be tested and the evidence complained of was the testimony of the intoximeter operator relating to the steps the operator took to prepare the breath-testing device for the test to be conducted on the defendant's breath. Looney v. State, 180 Ga. App. 693, 350 S.E.2d 29 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Exclusionary portion of former O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211 applied only if the state sought to admit scientific reports the state had not timely provided to the defendant; those sections did not prevent a codefendant from cross-examining a witness with regard to the contents of a scientific report. Shearer v. State, 259 Ga. 51, 376 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 922, 109 S. Ct. 3251, 106 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1989) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

- With regard to scientific reports, the state is entitled to only those discovery rights specifically granted to the defendant by former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211, overruling in part, Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 282 S.E.2d 61 (1981). Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994); Johnson v. State, 265 Ga. 833, 463 S.E.2d 123 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

State may discover only those written reports generated by defense experts which the defense intends to introduce at trial. Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 449 S.E.2d 98 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- When the defendant was told of the information or knew as much as the prosecution did and had an equal opportunity to obtain the document from a nonaffiliated witness, it was not a violation of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 for the state to fail to produce the document in response to a demand for scientific reports. Kosal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 708, 420 S.E.2d 621 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Motion to produce pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-26 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-13-27) which included a demand for production of all reports of any scientific tests, experiments, or studies made in connection with the defendant's case was not adequate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 for production of scientific reports. Murray v. State, 203 Ga. App. 858, 418 S.E.2d 624 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Language of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4) requires only that the state make reports of scientific tests available for inspection and copying, not that such reports be served upon the defendant. Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 481 S.E.2d 856 (1997).

With regard to a defendant's trial on various drug charges, the trial court did not err by refusing to exclude the evidence of a crime lab report for the methamphetamine allegedly sold based upon defense counsel not receiving a copy of the report as the record showed that the prosecution provided the defense with a certificate of service showing that the state served defense counsel with the crime lab results and the certificate of service also included the handwritten note that defense counsel was free to inspect the report at any time. The prosecution was not obligated to serve a copy of the lab report upon the defense and the defendant failed to prove bad faith on the part of the state and prejudice to the defense. Rogers v. State, 298 Ga. App. 895, 681 S.E.2d 693 (2009).

Trial court did not err in admitting testimony and evidence relating to the second and third reports of an investigator who compared the latent fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime with the defendant's fingerprints and confirmed a match of the defendant's fingers because the state did not act in bad faith by failing to provide the second and third reports to the defendant prior to trial; the second report was provided to the defendant in discovery from the state, and the third report revealed newly discovered evidence, which the state did not discover until the investigator enlarged the defendant's fingerprint on charts in the investigator's preparation for trial, and as soon as the state received the third report from the state's investigator, the state provided the report to the defendant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(c). Mallory v. State, 306 Ga. App. 684, 703 S.E.2d 120 (2010).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed based on defense counsel failing to object to the testimony of a firearms examiner concerning the results of the examiners' ballistics examination because the testimony complained of was elicited by the co-defendant during cross-examination and not by the state so the state had no obligation to provide the defendant with notice of the firearms examiner's opinion and the defendant also failed to show any prejudice or bad faith. Bryant v. State, 296 Ga. 456, 769 S.E.2d 57 (2015).

- Blood testing conducted by the American Red Cross was not the type of investigation-generated written scientific report subject to the discovery provision of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Death certificate was not a scientific report that the state must furnish to the defense upon the state's timely written request pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 331 S.E.2d 532, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1038, 106 S. Ct. 606, 88 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Defendant was entitled to a copy of a scientific report even though the prosecutor orally informed defense counsel prior to trial of the information the defendant received from the crime lab. Alexander v. State, 203 Ga. App. 375, 416 S.E.2d 762, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 762 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

State was not required to explain testing procedures used by the FBI in a scientific report furnished to the state by the FBI and requested by the defendant. Moody v. State, 210 Ga. App. 431, 436 S.E.2d 545 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Operating record for a photo-electric intoximeter was a pre-printed form which was essentially a checklist of steps to insure proper operation of the machine; this was essentially the recording of an officer's working notes, not a scientific report within the ambit of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Johnson v. State, 174 Ga. App. 579, 330 S.E.2d 791 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Intoximeter breath test results printout was a written scientific report for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Ratliff v. State, 207 Ga. App. 112, 427 S.E.2d 85 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Tape recording of a drug transaction was not discoverable pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-26 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-13-27) nor under § 17-7-210 [repealed], since the recording was not of any taped statement given by the defendant while in police custody, nor under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 since the tape recording did not constitute a written scientific report. Weldon v. State, 204 Ga. App. 221, 419 S.E.2d 59 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

Photograph depicting defendant, printed from negative taken from stolen camera was not a "written scientific report" under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Gosdin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 381, 336 S.E.2d 261 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Photograph depicting fingerprint smudges on windowsill of victim's apartment was not a written scientific report, and, therefore, not subject to discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Thomas v. State, 176 Ga. App. 53, 335 S.E.2d 135 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Enlargements of fingerprints, which were prepared as jury aids, were not written scientific reports within the meaning of this section. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Latent fingerprint card which had to be interpreted by a testifying police officer in order to attain significance was not a "scientific report" discoverable under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 386, 358 S.E.2d 917 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Report of the officer who lifted the fingerprint was not a "scientific report" discoverable under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211; the trial court did not err in allowing the officer to testify that a latent print had been lifted or in allowing an expert to testify that, in the officer's opinion, that print had been made by the defendant. Wester v. State, 205 Ga. App. 336, 422 S.E.2d 433 (1992).

Written waiver of rights signed by the defendant is not a scientific report. Dean v. State, 168 Ga. App. 172, 308 S.E.2d 434 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Emergency room record is a "written scientific report" although not specifically included in the statutory language. Paggett v. State, 188 Ga. App. 174, 372 S.E.2d 504 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Hospital emergency room record containing a physician's notes of the defendant's inculpatory statement did not constitute a scientific report subject to discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Conyers v. State, 260 Ga. 506, 397 S.E.2d 423 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Chief medical investigator's notes compiled solely upon the investigator's observation of the scene of a homicide were not a "scientific report" for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. App. 366, 433 S.E.2d 641 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Handwritten notes and experiments of state's experts were not scientific reports for purposes of discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Graphs from an instrument known as a micro spectro photometer were not scientific reports for the purposes of discovery under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 because the graphs did not contain the conclusions of the microanalyst from the crime laboratory, but had to be interpreted by a microanalyst in order to attain the significance of the graphs. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-211 did not mandate that notes, graphs, preliminary tests, and work product be furnished because those items did not constitute scientific reports. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. App. 790, 397 S.E.2d 63 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- In an action for arson, any reports prepared by the county and state arson investigators did not constitute "scientific reports" within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 because the investigators' analyses of the fire scene was based upon the investigators' general knowledge gleaned from experience and training rather than on any tests performed on material taken from the scene. Kosal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 708, 420 S.E.2d 621 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Autopsist's photographs were not "written scientific reports" discoverable under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Taylor v. State, 261 Ga. 287, 404 S.E.2d 255, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 947, 112 S. Ct. 393, 116 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Experiment of forensic serologist to determine whether serological testing could show the presence of blood in a bloodprint impressed on plastic after the print had gone through fingerprint processing, when neither the experiment nor the experiment's results were reduced to writing, was not subject to exclusion under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 436 S.E.2d 485 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Dental impressions, x-rays, and photographs were not discoverable as written scientific reports inasmuch as those items did not contain the dentist's conclusions and findings but had to be interpreted by the dentist to attain significance. Harris v. State, 260 Ga. 860, 401 S.E.2d 263 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Court would reject the contention that the state violated the statute by failing to provide sufficient discovery regarding the ballistics examination since: (1) the record showed that the defendant was provided before trial with the report of the state firearms expert listing the expert's conclusions, which were based on the expert's microscopic examination of bullets and shell casings for each weapon tested in the case; and (2) the defendant was not entitled to the internal documents and work product of the crime lab. Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 974, 120 S. Ct. 419, 145 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1999).

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective because there was no evidence that the state acted in bad faith with respect to the time within which the state provided the ballistics testing report to trial counsel as the record revealed that the state provided the test results to defense counsel as soon as the results became available; and, to the extent that the defendant claimed that the defendant's trial counsel should have objected to the state expert's testimony at trial based on having received the ballistics report less than ten days prior to trial, the admission of that testimony could not have created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Crump v. State, 301 Ga. 871, 804 S.E.2d 364 (2017).

- Testimony by two expert witnesses that, in the witnesses' knowledge and experience, a drug was a hallucinogenic which also caused certain physical effects in those who used the drug was properly admitted. The expert witnesses were not testifying as to any undisclosed scientific test results of appellant's own bodily fluids. Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 424 S.E.2d 638 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Trial court did not err by ordering the defendant's psychologist to provide the state with a copy of the interview notes upon which the psychologist was relying as the basis for the expert opinions because the defendant had not otherwise provided an updated "summary" of the basis for those opinions; during the psychologist's testimony, it became apparent that the psychologist was basing the expert testimony in part on additional interviews that the psychologist had conducted since the defendant had served the state with discovery. Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011, 131 S. Ct. 522, 178 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2010).

In an action for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, the trial court abused the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance after the state failed to provide the defendant, no later than ten days prior to trial, a written summary of an oral report by a gang expert. Williams v. State, Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 190 (2020).

- In a capital murder case in which the defendant was granted ex parte orders for mental health experts to examine the defendant, the trial court erred in revealing to the state the identities of the experts, their areas of practice, and the bases for the examinations; remand was required to assess the likelihood of prejudice and take curative measures. Putnal v. State, 303 Ga. 569, 814 S.E.2d 307 (2018).

- Since the record showed that there were no scientific reports to be provided ten days before trial and that the prosecution advised the defendant of the results of the test concerning the presence of semen on the rape kit slides when learned, the report itself was not excludable under the statute since there was no written report available before the trial. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 420 S.E.2d 349 (1992) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

Since the indictment charged the defendant with possession of cocaine and marijuana, the cocaine field-tested positive, the witness who performed the test was timely included in the state's witness list and the transcript contained no evidence that the admission of the test report impaired the defendant's trial strategy in any way, the fact that the state did not provide the defense with the report pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 did not necessitate the report's exclusion, particularly as the defendant did not argue that the defendant was surprised by the results and had declined a continuance. Guild v. State, 236 Ga. App. 444, 512 S.E.2d 343 (1999).

For a request for disclosure of scientific reports to be timely, whether it be made "at arraignment" or at some other time, the request must precede the tenth day before trial of the case. State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303); Randall v. State, 195 Ga. App. 755, 395 S.E.2d 2 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Five-day span between the demand and trial precludes a finding of timeliness under subsection (b) of this section. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

- Only when the prosecutor fails altogether to furnish a written scientific report does the exclusionary rule apply; when a written scientific report is furnished late, the appropriate remedy "perhaps" is to grant a continuance or recess upon timely request by the defendant. Wilburn v. State, 199 Ga. App. 667, 405 S.E.2d 889 (1991)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Shannon v. State, 205 Ga. App. 831, 424 S.E.2d 51, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 424 S.E.2d 51 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by failing, sua sponte, to allow the defendant more than a 15-minute recess to examine medical records which were not provided to the defendant until the day of trial since the defendant never requested a continuance or a recess. Wilburn v. State, 199 Ga. App. 667, 405 S.E.2d 889 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Request by Defense for Scientific Reports

Brady motion insufficient to invoke discovery.

- Brady motion requesting to have disclosed and produced "the results of reports of any scientific or other tests, analysis, experiments, or studies made in connection with this case" was insufficient to invoke the disclosure requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Massey v. State, 251 Ga. 515, 307 S.E.2d 489 (1983); McCutchen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 719, 341 S.E.2d 260 (1986); Johnson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 803, 371 S.E.2d 419 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Since the defendant contended that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of scientific reports to which the defendant objected because the prosecution allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211, and since the record showed that the defendant made no written request pursuant to that Code section and the defendant's Brady motion failed to make reference to that Code section or to specifically invoke the ten-day time frame of that Code section, the trial court's ruling admitting the evidence was not error. Cassie v. State, 192 Ga. App. 484, 385 S.E.2d 129, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 901, 385 S.E.2d 129 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Notice under this section is adequate if the defense specifically referred to that Code section or if it makes clear that scientific reports, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, should be furnished prior to the ten-day limit. State v. Madigan, 249 Ga. 571, 292 S.E.2d 406 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303); State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Court did not err in admitting certain scientific reports which were not provided to the defendant at least ten days prior to trial pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 since the request made was a general "Brady" motion without reference to scientific reports. Harden v. State, 166 Ga. App. 279, 304 S.E.2d 456 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Pretrial motion demanding a copy of any written scientific reports in the possession of the prosecution and to be introduced against the defendant but which did not mention former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 as authority for such demand and did not request that the scientific reports be produced ten days prior to trial did not constitute a valid request for discovery under that section. Lariscey v. State, 254 Ga. 241, 328 S.E.2d 213 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- For a request to be timely, whether it was made at arraignment or at some other time, the request must precede the tenth day before trial as otherwise it would be impossible for the state to comply with former Code 1933, § 27-1303. State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Motion for discovery of scientific reports filed at arraignment held ten days prior to trial was untimely. Abrams v. State, 164 Ga. App. 553, 297 S.E.2d 324 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If the trial transcript revealed that the defendant's demand for scientific reports was made after arraignment and seven days prior to trial and that the defendant's trial attorney received a copy of the relevant scientific report seven days prior to trial, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to exclude the laboratory expert's testimony identifying the substance the defendant sold to an undercover officer as cocaine. Rolling v. State, 204 Ga. App. 13, 418 S.E.2d 396 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Defendant was not entitled to a continuance pending receipt of the results of government laboratory testing which had not been requested by the state since the defendant had no right to seek, and the trial court had no authority to order, such a test for the defendant in the first place. Kendrix v. State, 206 Ga. App. 627, 426 S.E.2d 251 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Complete disclosure of all work materials used in compiling a scientific report was not contemplated under this section. The denial of such information did not unnecessarily prejudice the defendant or curtail the defendant's attorney in the presentation of the defendant's defense. Hartley v. State, 159 Ga. App. 157, 282 S.E.2d 684 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303); Ledford v. State, 264 Ga. 60, 439 S.E.2d 917 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1085, 115 S. Ct. 740, 130 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-211 applied only to "written scientific reports." If there was no writing, there was nothing to which the statute attaches. Law v. State, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-211 applied only when there was a writing. Faircloth v. State, 253 Ga. 67, 316 S.E.2d 457 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-211 applied to scientific reports in writing and not oral reports of experts relaying the results of tests. Perry v. State, 255 Ga. 490, 339 S.E.2d 922 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Herndon v. State, 187 Ga. App. 77, 369 S.E.2d 264 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Beck v. State, 196 Ga. App. 269, 396 S.E.2d 59 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Fulmer v. State, 205 Ga. App. 679, 423 S.E.2d 300 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Crumpton v. State, 213 Ga. App. 358, 444 S.E.2d 847 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Martin v. State, 214 Ga. App. 614, 448 S.E.2d 471 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Odom v. State, 214 Ga. App. 354, 447 S.E.2d 704 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-210 did not attempt to mandate the furnishing of written scientific reports that did not in fact exist. Givens v. State, 214 Ga. App. 774, 449 S.E.2d 149 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211); Gay v. State, 228 Ga. App. 248, 491 S.E.2d 469 (1997);.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion in imposing the extreme sanction of evidence exclusion for the state's failure to produce the investigator's notes because the record did not show that the investigator's informal notes, which the state could not produce, were subject to discovery under any of the provisions of Georgia's Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq. State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (2015).

- "Luminal" test which was performed on the suspect vehicle at the scene of the crime and never reduced to writing was not required to be provided to the defendant. Harley v. State, 263 Ga. 875, 440 S.E.2d 178 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 did not require the state to produce the actual physical evidence upon which the purported scientific report was based. Mercer v. State, 169 Ga. App. 723, 314 S.E.2d 729 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Photo developer's cropping procedure eliminated one the defendant's cap from a photo; the state had the photo developed again, but the newly-developed photo, which showed the cap, was not provided to the defendants until the first day of jury selection. As the state did not act in bad faith, and alerted both the defendants and the court as soon as the state became aware of the problem, the trial court did not err by admitting the photo. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004).

When, in an aggravated assault case, a police officer's report notified defense counsel that photographs had been taken of the crime scene, the prosecution was not obligated by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3) to further notify counsel that those photographs had been developed as counsel was on notice of the distinct possibility that the photographs were part of the state's file, and counsel was given full access to that file and chose not to exercise that privilege, so the photographs were admissible even though the defendant had not seen the photographs. Monroe v. State, 273 Ga. App. 14, 614 S.E.2d 172 (2005).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault with intent to rape, the fact that the state failed to produce photos of the victim's injuries ten days before trial, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3), was not grounds for reversal since the defendant did not ask for a continuance, did not show prejudice, and did not show that the state acted in bad faith. Murray v. State, 293 Ga. App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (2008).

Defendant did not show that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the admission of photographs on the ground that the defense was not informed of the photographs in a timely manner, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4, because counsel did object on that ground, the objection was overruled, and that ruling was not appealed. Taylor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 145, 679 S.E.2d 371 (2009).

Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to autopsy photographs solely on the ground that the photographs were not provided to the defense ten days before trial lacked merit as the defendant failed to show counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way by objecting on several grounds and made no showing the outcome would have been different. Sloans v. State, 304 Ga. 363, 818 S.E.2d 596 (2018).

- Any defect in compliance with former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 was not harmful error when the document produced pursuant to the defendants' request was not the official lab report itself, but was only a summary and differed from the official report produced at trial, and since the defendants had full right of cross-examination. Moon v. State, 194 Ga. App. 777, 392 S.E.2d 19 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- When a county police officer testified that two persons previously charged with the crime had been released on bond after the results of polygraph examination showed that one "was being honest in her statement", the results of this polygraph examination should have been turned over to the defense under the defendant's request for copies of scientific reports. Ford v. State, 256 Ga. 375, 349 S.E.2d 361 (1986) (decided under former §§ 17-7-210 and17-7-211).

- If the trial court heard the parties and ruled as a factual matter that the state's attorney had properly mailed fingerprint reports to defense counsel and had done all the attorney reasonably could do to furnish the defendant with a copy and if, in fact, defense counsel knew of the report and was not surprised by the report's admission at trial, the defendant's rights under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 were not violated. Pridgett v. State, 173 Ga. App. 409, 326 S.E.2d 581 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Former § 17-7-211 did not serve to exclude testimony if no written scientific report was in the possession of the state and there was no evidence suggesting the state deliberately instructed witnesses not to prepare reports otherwise discoverable. McDaniel v. State, 169 Ga. App. 254, 312 S.E.2d 363 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Since there was no written report of tests analyzing marijuana until the date of trial, no evidence of prosecutorial discovery circumvention, the test results were furnished as soon as the results became available, and the defendant did not request a continuance but did speak with the witness, the trial court did not err in admitting the analysis results. Hand v. State, 206 Ga. App. 501, 426 S.E.2d 18 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Right of pretrial discovery was intended by the legislature to allow a defendant to receive a complete written copy of the results of any scientific analysis, but the term "written report" as used in this section does not encompass the written work materials upon which the conclusions contained in the report were based. Hartley v. State, 159 Ga. App. 157, 282 S.E.2d 684 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Defendant's rights in pretrial discovery do not extend to a complete and detailed accounting of all police investigatory work on a case or to a detailed description of all analytical work performed by the crime laboratory. Sears v. State, 161 Ga. App. 515, 288 S.E.2d 757 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

- State is not required to furnish the defendant with the state's expert's notes, work product, recordation of data, internal documents, or graphs. Roberts v. State, 196 Ga. App. 450, 396 S.E.2d 81 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- State crime laboratory forensic drug chemist's testimony as to scientific tests conducted on alleged cocaine was properly admitted since the individual test results did not include any expression of the expert's conclusions or opinion so as to amount to a "written scientific report." Roberts v. State, 196 Ga. App. 450, 396 S.E.2d 81 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Former Code 1933, §§ 27-1302 and 27-1303 excluded from evidence any statements or scientific reports pertaining to a case if the defendant was not given copies of such at least ten days prior to trial after a proper request was made therefor. Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 530, 281 S.E.2d 252 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-1302 and 27-1303).

- Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a death certificate because the prosecution failed to furnish the defendant a copy of the certificate prior to trial since the discovery motion failed to invoke the provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Dunn v. State, 251 Ga. 731, 309 S.E.2d 370 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Defendant is entitled to have a scientific report at least ten days prior to trial. If ten days are not available, the defendant is entitled to the document within a reasonable time and may be entitled to a continuance or recess as the trial judge shall determine. Only if the prosecuting attorney fails altogether to furnish the document does the exclusionary rule apply. Law v. State, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983) (overruling State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982)) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Record revealed that the defendant was given complete access to the state's file on at least three occasions, and the state's file included copies of the experts' scientific reports; O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4) did not require the state to serve the defendant with copies of scientific reports, but only to make such reports available for inspection and copying. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304 (2003).

Former § 17-7-211 did not provide for personal service on defense counsel. Hodge v. State, 262 Ga. 242, 416 S.E.2d 518 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Since the state showed without contradiction that the materials were delivered to defense counsel's office more than ten days before trial and defense counsel did not assert at trial any actual prejudice to the preparation of the defense, the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 have clearly been served. Hodge v. State, 262 Ga. 242, 416 S.E.2d 518 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Defendant did not meet the defendant's burden of showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the state's failure to provide timely notice of the two recordings taken at defendant's home. Although the state conceded at trial that the investigator's report did not mention the two interviews, the defendant did not contest the state's assertion or the trial court's conclusion that the recordings were consistent with the narrative in the investigator's report. Clarke v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020).

- Evidence not admitted at trial was not statutorily required to be provided to the defense. Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 731 S.E.2d 658 (2012).

Delivery to counsel of copy of coroner's report four days prior to trial was not unreasonable under all of the circumstances, including the fact that the defendant was given fair warning of what the coroner's testimony would be not only by the coroner's report, but also by the autopsy report submitted to the defendant on the very day the appellant filed the appellant's request for scientific reports. Biddy v. State, 253 Ga. 289, 319 S.E.2d 842 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- One-hour continuance by trial court sufficed to compensate the state's provision of intoximeter results to the defendant only two days prior to trial since the defendant had not shown how additional time would have benefited the defendant or how the lack of time harmed the defendant. Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 395, 433 S.E.2d 638 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Since it appears from the transcript that a microanalyst's report was made available to defense counsel on the same day the report was prepared and furnished to the state's attorney, and it further appears that the witness did not actually testify until several days later, and, further, since former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 did not require that scientific reports be made available to the defense until the reports are "in the possession of or available to the prosecuting attorney", there was no violation of the defendant's discovery rights under the statute. Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 179, 348 S.E.2d 720 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Omission of actual figures regarding quantity of alcohol or other drugs found in the defendant's blood and urine after a laboratory test rendered the test results in noncompliance with former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 and was fatal to the prosecution's case. Camarata v. State, 188 Ga. App. 41, 371 S.E.2d 885, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 371 S.E.2d 885 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If a scientific report is furnished on demand and timely, albeit the wrong report, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the error was other than an innocent mistake, and no harm results to the defendant, the rule of exclusion should not automatically apply. White v. State, 181 Ga. App. 170, 351 S.E.2d 536 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Remedy under this section for the state's failure to furnish a defendant with a copy of any written scientific report when a proper and timely demand had been made therefor was the exclusion and suppression of such reports from evidence in the state's case-in-chief or in rebuttal. Tanner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 266, 287 S.E.2d 268 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Since the state had not provided the state crime lab's report when requested by the defendant under this section, testimony and evidence arising from the report must be suppressed as well as the report itself. Luck v. State, 163 Ga. App. 657, 295 S.E.2d 584 (1982) (overruling Blackmon v. State, 158 Ga. App. 665, 281 S.E.2d 634 (1981)) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Even if there has been a violation by the state, the remedy is exclusion of the evidence rather than a mistrial. Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 304 S.E.2d 570 (1983); Pontoon v. State, 177 Ga. App. 868, 341 S.E.2d 505 (1986); Burton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 822, 383 S.E.2d 187 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Remedy for a violation of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 is not the grant of a motion for mistrial, but the suppression of the evidence. Curtis v. State, 183 Ga. App. 6, 357 S.E.2d 849 (1987); Burton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 822, 383 S.E.2d 187 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Remedy for a violation of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 is the exclusion of the evidence rather than the grant of a mistrial. Green v. State, 194 Ga. App. 343, 390 S.E.2d 285, aff'd, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 935, 111 S. Ct. 2059, 114 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

If the state did not provide the defendant with the fingerprint examination report demanded pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211, it was error to exclude the report itself, but allow the expert to testify about the fingerprint examination and the examination's results. Wester v. State, 260 Ga. 228, 391 S.E.2d 765 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Defendant's remedy for a violation of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 was to request a continuance or to make a motion to strike the contested testimony, and as neither of these remedies was sought, the court's refusal to grant the defendant's mistrial motion was proper. Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411, 433 S.E.2d 628 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Scientific report in the possession of the FBI laboratory was available to the state prosecutor, and it was error to deny the defendant's motion for a continuance when the defendant sought to prepare a defense to the report which was provided to the defendant by the state only seven days before the trial. Moody v. State, 210 Ga. App. 431, 436 S.E.2d 545 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Proper remedy for the state's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(4) was to postpone the testimony of the state's blood spatter expert until late in the trial as the trial court did, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6. Further, by failing to ask for more time to prepare for the expert, the defendant waived any claim of error. Valentine v. State, 293 Ga. 533, 748 S.E.2d 437 (2013).

- If the defendant is told of the requested information or knows as much as the prosecution does and has an equal opportunity to obtain the pertinent document from a nonaffiliated witness, it is not a violation of the statute for the state to fail to produce the document in response to a demand for scientific reports. Worth v. State, 183 Ga. App. 68, 358 S.E.2d 251, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 358 S.E.2d 251 (1987); Paggett v. State, 188 Ga. App. 174, 372 S.E.2d 504 (1988); Morris v. State, 196 Ga. App. 811, 397 S.E.2d 159 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

In a prosecution for drug possession, the state did not violate the defendant's discovery requests by failing to give the defendant the result of a negative urine test. There was no indication that the defendant was unable to obtain the test report personally. Defendant could not simply neglect to compel production of the report before trial and then complain after trial that the report's absence prejudiced the defendant. Sanders v. State, 199 Ga. App. 671, 405 S.E.2d 727 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Statement the defendant made while attempting to elude police was not required to be disclosed under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1); trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the statement on the grounds that the state failed to disclose the statement during discovery. Usher v. State, 258 Ga. App. 459, 574 S.E.2d 580 (2002).

If the defendant has already been provided with a copy of test results by the police, the defendant cannot be harmed by the state's failure to provide the results. Henson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 210, 308 S.E.2d 555 (1983); Johnson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 501, 391 S.E.2d 132 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

If the defendant already had been provided with a copy of intoximeter test results, the defendant was not harmed by the state's failure to provide the results pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Starnes v. State, 196 Ga. App. 262, 395 S.E.2d 603 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Trial court did not commit reversible error by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance and allowing crime reports and testimony concerning those reports to be admitted at trial since an assistant district attorney's certificate of service established prima facie proof that a scientific report had been furnished. Williams v. State, 201 Ga. App. 384, 411 S.E.2d 316 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- State cannot establish the substance of a scientific crime laboratory report through oral testimony if failure of the state to comply with this section rendered the report itself inadmissible. Madigan v. State, 160 Ga. App. 656, 288 S.E.2d 34 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 571, 292 S.E.2d 406 (1982); Osborn v. State, 161 Ga. App. 132, 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

In a prosecution for violation of the Controlled Substances Act, the state failed to produce to appellant the crime lab analysis of suspect plants until the morning of trial, and since the appellant asked for a continuance and was denied one, the trial court erred in permitting the crime lab expert to testify concerning the expert's analysis of the plants since the expert's testimony was the chief and conclusive proof that the suspect plants were marijuana, and it was highly probable that the error of the trial court in admitting such testimony contributed to the guilty verdict and required reversal. Asbell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 514, 295 S.E.2d 182 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

If scientific reports are not provided, the testimony of witnesses based upon the reports is also excluded. Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If appellant was already aware of the testimony the physician would offer, the appellant could not have been harmed by the state's failure to disclose the substance of the medical report pursuant to this section. Mackler v. State, 164 Ga. App. 874, 298 S.E.2d 589 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Notes an FBI employee prepared to assist the employee in testifying did not constitute a "scientific report." Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Letter of transmittal from an FBI employee, which stated that two enhanced copies of an original tape were made, one reel and one cassette, and that in order to obtain maximum intelligibility the enhanced reel copy should be played on a good tape player and reviewed using quality headphones, does not qualify as a "scientific report." Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- State cannot avoid discovery of documentary recording of test results by calling instead the actual experts who performed the tests and thereafter contending that the defense was not entitled to documentation of the test results because the state did not use the results. Metts v. State, 162 Ga. App. 641, 291 S.E.2d 405 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Former § 17-7-211(c) did not serve to exclude other testimony since no report was in the possession of the state. Olson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 104, 303 S.E.2d 309 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If a forensic scientist testifying for the state performed tests after the trial began so as to rebut evidence presented by the defendant at trial, the results of such test were not "in the possession of or available to the prosecuting attorney" when the defendant sought discovery and thus were admissible. Billings v. State, 161 Ga. App. 500, 288 S.E.2d 622 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Document from health department showing that defendant had been treated for herpes constituted report required to be provided by state. Bramlett v. State, 162 Ga. App. 584, 291 S.E.2d 739 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

- Since none of a state fire marshal investigator's testimony was derived from any scientific analysis, as the testimony only related to what the investigator had seen and done at the fire site and in connection with an informant's activities, and the investigator offered no opinions or conclusions based upon any scientific examinations, the investigator's testimony was not excludable under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Report available to but not received by the district attorney is discoverable, and if the report is not provided to the defendant upon request, it is error to admit testimony based on the report. Luck v. State, 163 Ga. App. 657, 295 S.E.2d 584 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

- Trial court properly admitted testimony of a forensic chemist with the Georgia State Crime Lab, describing the results of the laboratory analysis of the substance found in the motel room, since there was no written scientific report and the record revealed no apparent effort by the state to circumvent subsection (b) of former Code 1933, § 27-1303 nor even a hint of prosecutorial "sandbagging," but, on the contrary, there was testimony that the substance was tested by an independent analyst on behalf of the defense with the cooperation of the state. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

State is not required to furnish the defendant a "scientific report" showing the results of the comparison between prints taken at the scene of the crime and those taken from the defendant at the jail if the crime lab expert who makes the comparison does not see the prints obtained from the defendant at the jail until they are shown to the expert at trial and, consequently, has no opportunity to prepare a report on the expert's findings. Lemons v. State, 167 Ga. App. 863, 307 S.E.2d 747 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Providing the defendant with a notation of the test results in writing on the Uniform Traffic Citation given to the defendant constituted sufficient notice of the test results for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211. Ratliff v. State, 207 Ga. App. 112, 427 S.E.2d 85 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Results of chemical tests administered to the defendant are inadmissible when the crime laboratory report on the tests does not state on the report's face the exact numerical quantity of the drugs found in the defendant's blood and urine. Box v. State, 187 Ga. App. 260, 370 S.E.2d 28 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Former § 17-7-211 did not require the creation of a report if none exists. Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Allowing a pathologist to testify from the pathologist's recollection, or from the pathologist's recollection as refreshed by an autopsy report otherwise excluded from evidence because the defendant was denied a copy of the report contrary to provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-1303, rendered meaningless the exclusionary remedy provided by that section. Tanner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 266, 287 S.E.2d 268 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-1303).

Evidence lost by state. See Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 304 S.E.2d 570 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- If the prosecuting attorney furnished a copy of a scientific report but not in the time frame specified, there was nothing in former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 to require exclusion of the document from evidence. Only if the prosecuting attorney failed altogether to furnish the document did the exclusionary rule apply. Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060, 112 S. Ct. 941, 117 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence was reversed since the state's failure to produce evidence of marijuana usage in a "written scientific report" left the defense counsel at a huge disadvantage in trying to cross-examine the state's witness as to the implications of the test results and the formation of the defense counsel's opinion based upon the results. Durden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 154, 369 S.E.2d 764 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

Waiver

Failure to request continuance.

- Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the CDs retrieved from inside a CD changer seized from the defendant's home since: (1) the state timely disclosed the CD changer, which contained the CDs, and the prosecutor asserted that the prosecutor told defense counsel prior to trial that the CDs might be inside; (2) even if there was a discovery violation, the defendant failed to show bad faith by the prosecutor and prejudice; and (3) the defendant failed to request a continuance to cure any prejudice that might have resulted from the state's failure to comply with the reciprocal discovery requirements under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4. Mullins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 393, 599 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

- Defendant's claim of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3) was rejected as the defendant failed to identify any harm resulting from the alleged error. Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

- When a witness made reference to the results of a polygraph examination, defense counsel made no objection, thus, the defendant's objection under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 with respect to the admission of the results of the polygraph examination was waived. Ford v. State, 256 Ga. 375, 349 S.E.2d 361 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

- Defendant waived any objection that the defendant might have had to service of a laboratory report only nine days prior to trial by agreeing, after the trial court had granted the state's motion for a one-day continuance, to stipulate that the case was tried one day later than the case was actually tried. Campbell v. State, 191 Ga. App. 390, 381 S.E.2d 599 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Defendant's demand for a mistrial after a fire scene investigator testified that the investigator had prepared a report regarding the defendant's arson case was rejected since the defendant had not objected to the fire scene investigator's testimony nor had the defendant made a motion to strike the testimony offered by the fire scene investigator. Owens v. State, 204 Ga. App. 5, 418 S.E.2d 631 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Trial court did not err in admitting undisclosed scientific evidence from an expert witness since no objection or motion for mistrial was made when the testimony was given. Strawder v. State, 207 Ga. App. 365, 427 S.E.2d 792 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211).

- Failure of defense counsel to object to the evidence of the defendant's in-custody statements when the statement was proffered at trial constituted a waiver of the state's noncompliance with counsel's request for a copy of the defendant's in-custody statement. Parrish v. State, 194 Ga. App. 760, 391 S.E.2d 797 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Defendant waived error based on the prosecutor's failure to provide the defendant with a complete copy of the defendant's in-custody statement by failing to object or move for a mistrial until after the defendant cross-examined the investigating officer concerning the omitted portion of the statement. Al-Beti v. State, 210 Ga. App. 312, 436 S.E.2d 50 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

When the prosecutor responded that the prosecutor did not have a copy of the9-1-1 tapes, and the defense did not object or seek relief, the defendant waived the issue of whether the state violated the discovery rules by failing to turn over a copy of the tapes. Smith v. State, 250 Ga. App. 465, 552 S.E.2d 468 (2001).

Statement in the possession of an investigating officer is deemed to be in the possession of the state, whether or not the statement is in the state's file, and the state is obliged to notify the defense of the statement's existence. However, the defendant waived the right to object to testimony based on this statement by failing to object to the testimony during direct examination, or even earlier at the Jackson-Denno hearing. Finally, even if the defendant's objection had been properly preserved, any error from the investigative officer's testimony was harmless because the evidence was cumulative. Smiley v. State, 260 Ga. App. 283, 581 S.E.2d 310 (2003).

Because an inmate never argued that the state failed to comply with the discovery provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, nor did the inmate request a Jackson/Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of a prior statement given in an administrative hearing, the inmate was precluded from making these arguments for the first time on appeal. Pugh v. State, 280 Ga. App. 137, 633 S.E.2d 439 (2006).

With regard to a defendant's challenges to the admission of the defendant's self-incriminating statements that were not timely disclosed to the defense by the state, the defendant waived the right to appeal the state's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq., by both failing to specifically object on the grounds that the defendant's statements were not properly disclosed to the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, and by failing to seek a continuance to cure any prejudice which may have resulted from the state's failure to comply with the statute. Jaheni v. State, 285 Ga. App. 266, 645 S.E.2d 735 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing a witness to be called as an expert because the defendant's trial counsel agreed to the trial court's suggestion that the state's witness be treated as a rebuttal witness testifying out of order; trial counsel's affirmative withdrawal of an objection previously made returned the situation to one in which no objection was made, and the failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of the defendant's ability to raise the issue on appeal. Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1124, 133 S. Ct. 941, 184 L. Ed. 2d 726 (2013).

- Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claimed discovery violation as the defendant could not complain that discovery materials were not made available to counsel before trial since the defendant failed to show an election to proceed under the reciprocal discovery statute and could not show what materials were withheld, or how the availability of the materials might have changed the outcome of the trial. Hall v. State, 282 Ga. App. 562, 639 S.E.2d 341 (2006).

- Pretermitting whether the state upheld the state's reciprocal discovery obligations, the defendant's failure during trial to assert a discovery violation deprived the trial court of an opportunity to formulate appropriate relief, if any. Garrett v. State, 285 Ga. App. 282, 645 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

- In a child molestation conviction, after the defendant determined during trial that the state had not informed the defendant of an additional interview conducted by the victim's counselor, the state did not violate the Georgia Reciprocal Discovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(3)(a), by failing to provide this material because the defendant had not requested an in camera inspection of the confidential therapist's records as required by O.C.G.A. § 49-5-41. Waters v. State, 303 Ga. App. 187, 692 S.E.2d 802 (2010).

- Although the defendant argued that a neurosurgeon's opinion should have been excluded because the state failed to provide notice of the neurosurgeon's opinion regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome ten days prior to trial as required by the reciprocal discovery statute, the defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the state's non-disclosure of the neurosurgeon's opinion, warranting an exclusion of the testimony as two of the state's expert witnesses had already testified regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome, defense counsel was on notice that the Shaken Baby Syndrome theory could be put forward by the state through those experts, and the defense presented its own expert at trial as rebuttal expert testimony. Wyatt v. State, 300 Ga. 509, 796 S.E.2d 701 (2017).

- When expert's testimony would have been independent of any scientific tests of experiments and would have been based on the expert's opinion derived from information available to both parties and which did not require the results and scientific tests or experiments, it was not subject to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(b)(2) Green v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Oct. 31, 2019).

- Defendant's counsel visited the defendant in jail prior to the trial and expressed counsel's belief that the trial court would grant the defendant a continuance based upon the short period of time between counsel's receipt of the state's discovery and the scheduled trial date under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4 since the state must disclose and make available certain discoverable materials no later than ten days prior to trial. Defendant and defense counsel came to the mutual decision to move forward with the trial as scheduled and the fact that the defendant later regretted making that choice did not afford the defendant the right to a new trial. Hubert v. State, 297 Ga. App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (2009).

State's violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1) by failing to timely to disclose the defendant's in-custody offer to bribe the victim not to testify did not mandate reversal as the defendant waived the right to assert this error by not requesting relief at trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 because the notice of the state's intent to seek recidivist sentencing was served on defense counsel on the first day of trial prior to the jury being sworn, and certified copies of the convictions were admitted without objection; therefore, any defects or untimeliness in the notice under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(5) were waived. Ross v. State, 313 Ga. App. 695, 722 S.E.2d 411 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code Section 17-7-210, decided prior to its repeal by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Defendant in probate court is entitled to the discovery rights under former O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-110 and17-7-211. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-13(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210).

Reliability of Polygraph Examination, 14 POF2d 1.

- Right of state in criminal contempt case to obtain data from the defendant by interrogatories or pretrial discovery as permitted in civil actions, 72 A.L.R.2d 431.

Right of accused in state courts to inspection or disclosure of evidence in possession of prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8.

Right of the defendant in criminal case to inspection of statement of prosecution's witness for purposes of cross-examination or impeachment, 7 A.L.R.3d 181.

Right of defense in criminal prosecution to disclosure of prosecution information regarding prospective jurors, 86 A.L.R.3d 571.

Accused's right to discovery or inspection of records of prior complaints against, or similar personnel records of, peace officer involved in the case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Accused's right to discovery or inspection of "rap sheets" or similar police records about prosecution witnesses, 95 A.L.R.3d 832.

Sanctions against defense in criminal case for failure to comply with discovery requirements, 9 A.L.R.4th 837.

Right of accused in state courts to inspection or disclosure of tape recording of his own statements, 10 A.L.R.4th 1092.

Accused's right to production of composite drawing of suspect, 13 A.L.R.4th 1360.

Exclusion of evidence in state criminal action for failure of prosecution to comply with discovery requirements as to statements made by the defendants or other nonexpert witnesses - modern cases, 33 A.L.R.4th 301.

What is accused's "statement" subject to state court criminal discovery, 57 A.L.R.4th 827.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory photographic evidence as violating due process, 93 A.L.R.5th 527.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory physical evidence as violating due process - weapons, 53 A.L.R.6th 81.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory physical evidence as violating due process - personal items other than weapons, 55 A.L.R.6th 391.

Absolute immunity for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 following Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), 63 A.L.R.6th 255.

Constitutional duty of federal prosecutor to disclose Brady evidence favorable to accused, 158 A.L.R. Fed. 401.