2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 8 - Offenses Involving Theft
Article 2 - Robbery
§ 16-8-41. Armed Robbery; Robbery by Intimidation; Taking Controlled Substance From Pharmacy in Course of Committing Offense

1. A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.The offense of robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the offense of armed robbery.
2. A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.
3. 1. The preceding provisions of this Code section notwithstanding, in any case in which the defendant commits armed robbery and in the course of the commission of the offense such person unlawfully takes a controlled substance from a pharmacy or a wholesale druggist and intentionally inflicts bodily injury upon any person, such facts shall be charged in the indictment or accusation and, if found to be true by the court or if admitted by the defendant, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 15 years.
   2. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. "Controlled substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V of Code Sections 16-13-25 through 16-13-29.
      2. "Pharmacy" means any place licensed in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title 26 wherein the possessing, displaying, compounding, dispensing, or retailing of drugs may be conducted, including any and all portions of any building or structure leased, used, or controlled by the licensee in the conduct of the business licensed by the State Board of Pharmacy at the address for which the license was issued. The term pharmacy shall also include any building, warehouse, physician's office, or hospital used in whole or in part for the sale, storage, or dispensing of any controlled substance.
      3. "Wholesale druggist" means an individual, partnership, corporation, or association registered with the State Board of Pharmacy under Chapter 4 of Title 26.
4. Any person convicted under this Code section shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 791; Ga. L. 1858, p. 98, § 1; Code 1863, §§ 4287, 4288; Code 1868, §§ 4324, 4325; Code 1873, §§ 4390, 4391; Code 1882, §§ 4390, 4391; Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 83, § 1; Penal Code 1895, §§ 152, 153; Penal Code 1910, §§ 149, 150; Code 1933, §§ 26-2502, 26-2503; Ga. L. 1937, p. 490, § 1; Ga. L. 1957, p. 261, §§ 2, 3; Code 1933, § 26-1902, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 810, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1359, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1266, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1036, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 3; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 16.)

- Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over certain crimes, § 15-3-3.

Time limitation on prosecutions for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, § 17-3-1.

- Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977), held that imposition of the death penalty where the victim is not killed is in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 8. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977), held that the rationale of Coker must be applied also to armed robbery.

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994.'"

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The General Assembly declares and finds:

"(1) That persons who are convicted of certain serious violent felonies shall serve minimum terms of imprisonment which shall not be suspended, probated, stayed, deferred, or otherwise withheld by the sentencing judge; and

"(2) That sentences ordered by courts in cases of certain serious violent felonies shall be served in their entirety and shall not be reduced by parole or by any earned time, early release, work release, or other such sentence-reducing measures administered by the Department of Corrections."

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed on or after the effective date of this Act; provided, however, that any conviction occurring prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act shall be deemed a 'conviction' for the purposes of this Act and shall be counted in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act."

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "In the event any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Act shall be declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, such adjudication shall in no manner affect the other sections, subsections, sentences, clauses, or phrases of this Act, which shall remain of full force and effect as if the section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase so declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional were not originally a part hereof. The General Assembly declares that it would have passed the remaining parts of this Act if it had known that such part or parts hereof would be declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional."

Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The General Assembly declares and finds: (1) That the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994,' approved April 20, 1994 (Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959), provided that persons convicted of one of seven serious violent felonies shall serve minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment which shall not otherwise be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; (2) That in State v. Allmond, 225 Ga. App. 509 (1997), the Georgia Court of Appeals held, notwithstanding the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994,' that the provisions of the First Offender Act would still be available to the sentencing court, which would mean that a person who committed a serious violent felony could be sentenced to less than the minimum mandatory ten-year sentence; and (3) That, contrary to the decision in State v. Allmond, it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that persons who commit a serious violent felony specified in the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994' shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment."

- For article on recidivism and convictions based on nolo contendere pleas, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979). For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 159 (1994). For comment criticizing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S. Ct. 1977, 36 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1973), permitting imposition of increased sentence by jury after retrial, see 23 Emory L.J. 879 (1974).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Identification
• Indictment
• Use of Weapon
• Robbery by Intimidation
• Included Offenses
• Application
• Jury Charge
• Sentence
• Death Penalty

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similiarity of the statutory provisions, cases decided prior to the 1994 amendment of the sentencing provisions in this Code section are included in the annotations.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 allows the sentencing judge broad discretion, the statute does not provide two different maximum sentences and is not unconstitutionally vague. Corey v. State, 216 Ga. App. 180, 454 S.E.2d 154 (1995).

- State failed to prove venue for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle since the facts showed that the victim was forced at gunpoint into the victim's car in a parking lot in one county and then ordered the victim to drive into a second county (the place of trial) where the victim was taken from the car and shot; both offenses were complete in the first county and neither O.C.G.A. § 16-8-1 nor O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(d) were applicable to confer venue in the second county. Bradley v. State, 272 Ga. 740, 533 S.E.2d 727 (2000).

Evidence that an armed robbery occurred very near, within sight distance, of the intersection of two roads, and an officer's testimony that the officer was familiar with the area and that the intersection of the two roads was in DeKalb County was sufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt in DeKalb County. Alexis v. State, 313 Ga. App. 283, 721 S.E.2d 205 (2011).

- Defendant's prior conviction for attempted armed robbery pursuant to an Alford plea qualified as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924, because the record showed that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, and supported by a factual basis. United States v. Wade, 551 Fed. Appx. 546 (11th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds, Wade v. United States, Nos. 1:15-CV-1712-RWS-JSA, 1:11-CR-337-RWS-JSA-1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29169 (N.D. Ga. 2016)(Unpublished).

Relationship to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. - Even if armed robbery is considered a capital offense for the purposes of certain Georgia statutes, it is not excluded from the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c). To the contrary, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(d) specifically provides that a person convicted of armed robbery shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. Farmer v. State, 268 Ga. App. 831, 603 S.E.2d 16 (2004).

§ 15-11-28. - Superior court exceeded the court's authority in transferring the prosecution of two juveniles to juvenile court after the state elected to pursue the cases in superior court as O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(1) granted the court concurrent jurisdiction over the cases before the court, and the court was obligated to retain jurisdiction prior to indictment; moreover, armed robbery qualified as an act which would be considered a crime if tried in a superior court and for which the child may be punished by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal institution. State v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 623, 641 S.E.2d 515 (2007).

- There is not a fatal variance between allegation that accused took $1,034.00 and proof that all of the money at a motel was taken, since offense of armed robbery is committed merely by armed taking of property of another, regardless of whether its value is great or small. Bell v. State, 227 Ga. 800, 183 S.E.2d 357 (1971).

Crime of robbery requires only that property, regardless of value, be taken from the person of another, and a variance between the amount of money alleged in the indictment and the proof at trial cannot constitute a fatal variance. Bonds v. State, 203 Ga. App. 51, 416 S.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 329 (1992).

- Particular location of a robbery is not an element of the offense of armed robbery. Hindman v. State, 234 Ga. App. 758, 507 S.E.2d 862 (1998).

- To constitute robbery it is unnecessary that taking of property should be directly from one's person; it is sufficient if it is taken while in the person's possession and immediate presence. Fincher v. State, 211 Ga. 89, 84 S.E.2d 76 (1954).

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, and the state proved that the property was taken from the victims' persons or immediate presence despite the victims being in another room when the property was taken as, considering that the victims were held at gunpoint in the bedroom while property was taken from the living room, the theft was not too far afield to be outside the victims' immediate presence. Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the evidence sufficed to show that money was taken from the immediate presence of a restaurant employee; the defendant kept the employee from the cash register at gunpoint and commanded the employee not to move. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (2010).

Defendant was properly convicted of the armed robbery of a victim because the victim was held at gunpoint in the victim's living room while property was taken from the victim's bedroom; the theft was not too far afield to be outside the victim's "immediate presence" as required under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 692 S.E.2d 828 (2010), overruled in part by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018).

Evidence sufficiently established that the defendant took property from the person and immediate presence of the victim because the evidence established that the victim was being held at gunpoint in the kitchen while the defendant stole items from various rooms in the house. Patterson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 793, 720 S.E.2d 278 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0574, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2012).

Because the armed robbery count of the indictment sufficiently alleged the elements of armed robbery, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial as to the ineffective assistance claim; that the property was taken from the person or immediate presence of another is necessarily inferred from the allegation of a use of an offensive weapon to accomplish the taking, and the alleged offense of "armed robbery" can be accomplished only via a taking from the person or immediate presence of another. Patterson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 793, 720 S.E.2d 278 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0574, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2012).

Gravamen of the offense of armed robbery is the taking of items from the possession of another by use of an offensive weapon and not the identification of the specific owner of the item taken; it does not matter exactly whose property was taken so long as it was taken from a person or the immediate presence of another. Avila v. State, 322 Ga. App. 225, 744 S.E.2d 405 (2013).

- Word "theft" in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) is not, like "larceny," a technical word of art with a narrowly defined meaning, but a word of general and broad connotation, covering any criminal appropriation of another's property to the taker's use. Emmett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 650, 405 S.E.2d 707 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 405 S.E.2d 707 (1991).

- Slightest change of location whereby complete dominion of property is transferred from true owner to trespasser is sufficient asportation. It is not required that property taken be permanently appropriated. James v. State, 232 Ga. 834, 209 S.E.2d 176 (1974); Glidewell v. State, 169 Ga. App. 858, 314 S.E.2d 924 (1984); Sanders v. State, 242 Ga. App. 487, 530 S.E.2d 203 (2000).

Robbery is a crime against possession and is not affected by concepts of ownership. Carter v. State, 156 Ga. App. 633, 275 S.E.2d 716 (1980); Byse v. State, 169 Ga. App. 856, 315 S.E.2d 58 (1984); Kelly v. State, 234 Ga. App. 893, 508 S.E.2d 228 (1998).

- Where two of alleged victims of armed robbery were husband and wife, fact that stolen property may have been jointly owned does not preclude appellant from being convicted of two counts of armed robbery. Carter v. State, 156 Ga. App. 633, 275 S.E.2d 716 (1980).

Two armed robbery convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) did not merge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1) as: (1) a store's money was taken from the immediate presence of two employees, who were both responsible for and had possession of the store's receipts, regardless of which employee may actually have been counting the money when the robbery occurred; (2) each employee who was robbed was a victim, regardless of who owned the money; and (3) as two victims were robbed, the defendant could be charged with the robbery of each victim. Green v. State, 265 Ga. App. 126, 592 S.E.2d 901 (2004).

Taking two separate sums of money from same victim, at same time, constitutes one robbery. Creecy v. State, 235 Ga. 542, 221 S.E.2d 17 (1975); Randolph v. State, 246 Ga. App. 141, 538 S.E.2d 139 (2000).

- Based on the totality of the circumstances and the undisputed evidence, because the defendant's confession to a police detective was voluntary and admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824), not coerced or received as a result of promises made, and not subject to exclusion due to improper methods used by the police, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence; further, exclusion of the confession was not required based on a violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007).

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a)(2) and16-8-41(a) were appropriate because the defendant's own confessions to participating in the crimes were corroborated by the testimony of the victims, among other evidence. Likewise, the defendant's codefendants' statements and testimony implicating the defendant in the crimes were corroborated by the defendant's confessions and the victims' testimony. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (2009).

- When in single transaction, the defendant robs another of property belonging to two individuals, only one robbery is committed. Jackson v. State, 236 Ga. 98, 222 S.E.2d 380 (1976).

- Although the defendant had custody of a necklace pursuant to the victim's consent, possession of the necklace did not change to the defendant until the victim, by means of violence, had been dissuaded from seeking its return. That being so, it was the force which effected the taking, authorizing a conviction for robbery by force. Cantrell v. State, 184 Ga. App. 384, 361 S.E.2d 689 (1987).

Taking property is an essential element of crime of armed robbery. Woodall v. State, 235 Ga. 525, 221 S.E.2d 794 (1975).

When the appellants moved for a directed verdict of acquittal of armed robbery on grounds that a convenience store clerk fled the store before any property was actually taken, the trial court did not err by denying the appellants' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal since the victim fled the scene after the victim was threatened with a knife and the property was stolen before the victim could even drive away, which was sufficient to constitute a theft from the victim's immediate presence. Morgan v. State, 195 Ga. App. 732, 394 S.E.2d 639 (1990).

When the defendants' accomplice put a gun to the victim's head and ordered the victim to "drop the money on the floor" and, at the same time as the victim dropped the money, the victim pushed the gun away, drew a revolver and shot the accomplice, the facts were sufficient to support a finding of a "taking" within the meaning of the offense of armed robbery. State v. Watson, 239 Ga. App. 482, 520 S.E.2d 911 (1999).

- Upon the defendant's challenge to two armed robbery convictions, despite the fact that it was not explicitly stated in the indictment that the defendant intended to commit a theft, such intent was necessarily inferred from the allegation of the use of an offensive weapon to accomplish a taking. Thus, considering the allegations of the indictment as a whole, there was no failure to allege all of the elements of the crime of armed robbery, and there was no reasonable doubt that the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges and protected from the subsequent prosecution for the same crime. Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007).

- Count 1 in the indictment was not defective, and trial counsel was not deficient in failing to attack the count as the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges against the defendant and also protected from subsequent prosecution for the same crime because, although Count 1 did not track the criminal attempt statute exactly, read as a whole, Count 1 asserted that, with intent to commit armed robbery, the defendant committed a substantial step toward commission of the crime by pointing a gun at the victim and grabbing the victim's person; and, although Count 1 referenced an attempt to commit robbery, it clearly alleged use of a gun, and armed robbery occurred when a person committed a robbery by use of an offensive weapon. Wilson v. State, 344 Ga. App. 285, 810 S.E.2d 303 (2018).

- Even if there was a deviation between the allegations in the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial, there was no fatal variance because the defendant was sufficiently informed of the nature and substance of the charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and failed to show that the defendant was unable to present a viable defense. Brown v. State, 307 Ga. 24, 834 S.E.2d 40 (2019).

- Trial court did not err in replacing two jurors on the panel despite the fact that a transcription of the voir dire was absent from the record in a prosecution for burglary and armed robbery as the appellate court was able to decide, based upon a review of the arguments surrounding the state's motion, that the trial court did not err in replacing two jurors on the jury panel due to the defendant's racially motivated strikes; further, the defendant waived appellate review of the court's re-seating procedure. Pitts v. State, 278 Ga. App. 176, 628 S.E.2d 615 (2006).

- While the defendant made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding the state's use of three peremptory strikes, sufficient race-neutral reasons existed for those strikes; thus, given the court's jury charges and recharge to the jury, the court's responses to questions from the jury, and waiver of improper bolstering objection on appeal, the defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions were upheld on appeal as was the court's denial of motion for a new trial. LeMon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 527, 660 S.E.2d 11 (2008).

- Since the intent to commit theft is an essential element of the offense of armed robbery, the state must prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1282, 112 S. Ct. 38, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (1991).

- Armed robbery convictions are upheld where items are taken out of physical presence of victim if what was taken was under the victim's control or his responsibility. Mitchell v. State, 157 Ga. App. 146, 276 S.E.2d 658 (1981).

One's "immediate presence" in the context of armed robbery stretches fairly far, and robbery convictions are usually upheld as to taking even out of physical presence of victim, if what was taken was under the victim's control or the victim's responsibility and if the victim was not too far distant. Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975); Battle v. State, 155 Ga. App. 541, 271 S.E.2d 679 (1980); Waters v. State, 161 Ga. App. 555, 289 S.E.2d 21 (1982).

Evidence that employee was in charge of the cash drawer from which money was taken while the employee stepped away briefly to alert the manager was sufficient to show a taking from the employee's "immediate presence." Wilson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 528, 428 S.E.2d 433 (1993).

Even if the robbery victim succeeded in escaping from the store before the money was taken from the cash register, the "immediate presence" requirement was satisfied and a charge on simple robbery was not authorized. Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 493 S.E.2d 136 (1997).

Defendant was found to have used a weapon to take money from the victim's "immediate presence" under Georgia's armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, despite the fact that the victim was in the backroom when the defendant took the money because the money was under the victim's control until the defendant ordered the victim at gunpoint into the backroom. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. App. 25, 581 S.E.2d 673 (2003).

- See Wright v. State, 166 Ga. App. 295, 304 S.E.2d 105 (1983).

Even though store owner fled upon seeing the defendant enter the owner's store with a shotgun, the defendant's subsequent takings from store were within the store owner's "immediate presence." Maddox v. State, 174 Ga. App. 728, 330 S.E.2d 911 (1985).

Handbag was taken from "the person or immediate presence" of the victim where, even though the defendant took the handbag after forcing the victim to walk 150 feet away from the car where her handbag was located, the handbag was still under her control or responsibility, and she was not too far distant. Sypho v. State, 175 Ga. App. 833, 334 S.E.2d 878 (1985).

- Meaning of legal phrase "immediate presence" is not that taking must necessarily be from actual contact of the body, but if it is from under personal protection it will suffice. Within this doctrine, the person may be deemed to protect all things belonging to the individual, within a distance, not easily defined, over which influence of personal presence extends. Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975).

- Because the defendant's grandfather, as the head of household, possessed the authority over the entire house including the defendant's bedroom where the defendant lived rent-free, the trial court properly found that the consent given by the grandfather was properly granted, and hence served as the proper basis to deny the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized in that bedroom; as a result, the defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal. Rhone v. State, 283 Ga. App. 553, 642 S.E.2d 185 (2007).

That victim was incapacitated at time of taking cannot extricate the defendant's conduct from the definition of armed robbery in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Young v. State, 251 Ga. 153, 303 S.E.2d 431 (1983).

- When the evidence is sufficient to authorize a finding that the theft was completed after force was employed against the victim, a conviction for armed robbery is authorized, regardless of when the intent to take the victim's property arose, regardless of whether the victim was incapacitated, and even if the victim was killed instantly. Hudson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 895, 508 S.E.2d 682 (1998).

Identity of person alleged to have been robbed is not an essential element of offense and need not be proved by direct evidence. McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644, 234 S.E.2d 908 (1977); Rollins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 585, 269 S.E.2d 81 (1980); Page v. State, 191 Ga. App. 420, 382 S.E.2d 161 (1989).

Identity of the person alleged to have been robbed is not an essential element of the crime of armed robbery. Kelly v. State, 234 Ga. App. 893, 508 S.E.2d 228 (1998).

Term "serious bodily injury" is not unconstitutionally vague. Beck v. State, 254 Ga. 51, 326 S.E.2d 465 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 872, 106 S. Ct. 195, 88 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1985), 495 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 2194, 109 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1990).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 authorizes the ten-year incarceration based upon disfigurement amounting to serious bodily harm; thus, the judgment of the trial court who classified the injury as amounting to serious bodily injury where there is at least some evidence to support such a determination will be held. Timmons v. State, 166 Ga. App. 489, 304 S.E.2d 453 (1983).

- Notwithstanding that the death penalty can no longer be imposed, this punishment statute places the offense of armed robbery within the definition of a capital offense and the state was not required to try the defendant on the armed robbery charges by the end of the next term after the defendant's demand for trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170. White v. State, 202 Ga. App. 291, 414 S.E.2d 297 (1991).

- When a party has committed armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, an accomplice who is concerned in the commission of those crimes is likewise guilty of both offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the accomplice did not have actual possession of the firearm. Howze v. State, 201 Ga. App. 96, 410 S.E.2d 323 (1991).

- Trial court properly admitted the excited utterances of an armed robbery victim as part of the res gestae free from all suspicion of device or afterthought; moreover, Crawford did not apply, as the statements were not made to a police officer during a subsequent investigation of the crime, nor were the statements made to an officer or9-1-1 operator for the purpose of proving a fact regarding some past event. Fields v. State, 283 Ga. App. 208, 641 S.E.2d 218 (2007).

- Defendant's conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault was affirmed because given the overwhelming evidence, it was highly unlikely that the admission of the testimony concerning the subsequent burglary contributed to the verdict in this case, even if it was erroneous to allow such evidence. Hutchinson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 627, 733 S.E.2d 517 (2012).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, failure to obey a traffic control device, fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, reckless driving, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions as the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain bullets found in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest based on the state allegedly not providing a proper chain of custody; the bullets, unlike fungible articles, were distinct and recognizable physical objects that were identifiable by observation, eliminating the necessity of a chain-of-custody showing. Green v. State, 287 Ga. App. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant with armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, for a violation of the defendant's right to due process because the defendant failed to show that the defense was prejudiced by the six year delay between the commission of the crime and the defendant's arrest or that the state deliberately delayed the arrest to obtain a tactical advantage; the defendant was arrested and indicted for armed robbery, a noncapital felony, within the applicable seven-year statute of limitation, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and17-3-1(c), and the mere existence of the possibility that the latent prints could have established "the real perpetrator" if the prints had matched the prints of another offender in the government's database did not establish actual prejudice. Billingslea v. State, 311 Ga. App. 490, 716 S.E.2d 555 (2011).

- Defendant's attempt to invoke the plain error doctrine with regard to the state's closing argument allegedly eliciting sympathy for the victim in violation of the prohibition against asking the jurors to place themselves in the same position of the victim was misplaced where the plain error doctrine applied only to capital cases and criminal cases in which a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 occurred, and neither category applied to the defendant's trial for armed robbery. Foster v. State, 267 Ga. App. 363, 599 S.E.2d 309 (2004).

- Trial court abused the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to false imprisonment charges because the state conceded that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel as to the less serious armed robbery and kidnapping offenses that were part of the same negotiated plea agreement, that were included in the same indictment, and that involved the same codefendants; the defendant should have been permitted to withdraw the guilty plea in order to avoid a manifest injustice. Clue v. State, 273 Ga. App. 672, 615 S.E.2d 800 (2005).

- Because the reasoning behind the robbery by intimidation plea between the defendant and the DeKalb County prosecutor did not appear on the face of the document itself, and the defendant would not have been able to testify as to the prosecutor's reasons for accepting the defendant's plea, the evidence regarding the defendant's plea would not have made the defendant's desired inference that the defendant did not use a gun during the Gwinnett County robbery any more probable than it would have been without the evidence; thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of the plea. Johnson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 134, 770 S.E.2d 236 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 377 (Ga. 2015).

- In a case in which the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, armed robbery, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present character evidence in the form of the defendant's prior arrest for armed robbery because defense counsel's cross-examination of an accomplice did not amount to an offer of evidence of a pertinent character trait as it was an attempt to establish that the accomplice was afraid of someone other than the defendant. Blackwell v. State, 351 Ga. App. 302, 830 S.E.2d 782 (2019).

Cited in Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970); Smith v. State, 228 Ga. 293, 185 S.E.2d 381 (1971); Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 763, 187 S.E.2d 856 (1972); Evans v. State, 228 Ga. 867, 188 S.E.2d 861 (1972); Simmons v. State, 126 Ga. App. 401, 190 S.E.2d 835 (1972); Hill v. State, 229 Ga. 307, 191 S.E.2d 58 (1972); Ezzard v. State, 229 Ga. 465, 192 S.E.2d 374 (1972); United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Thomas v. State, 128 Ga. App. 538, 197 S.E.2d 452 (1973); Letbedder v. State, 129 Ga. App. 196, 199 S.E.2d 270 (1973); Bowman v. State, 231 Ga. 220, 200 S.E.2d 880 (1973); Ward v. State, 231 Ga. 484, 202 S.E.2d 421 (1973); Walker v. State, 130 Ga. App. 860, 205 S.E.2d 49 (1974); Brock v. State, 232 Ga. 47, 205 S.E.2d 272 (1974); Goughf v. State, 232 Ga. 178, 205 S.E.2d 844 (1974); Strong v. State, 232 Ga. 294, 206 S.E.2d 461 (1974); Keener v. MacDougall, 232 Ga. 273, 206 S.E.2d 519 (1974); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771, 208 S.E.2d 825 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Bailey v. State, 233 Ga. 452, 212 S.E.2d 1 (1975); Freeman v. State, 233 Ga. 678, 212 S.E.2d 847 (1975); Bell v. State, 234 Ga. 119, 214 S.E.2d 653 (1975); Bixby v. State, 234 Ga. 812, 218 S.E.2d 609 (1975); Lawrence v. State, 235 Ga. 216, 219 S.E.2d 101 (1975); Chumley v. State, 235 Ga. 540, 221 S.E.2d 13 (1975); Painter v. State, 237 Ga. 30, 226 S.E.2d 578 (1976); Sheats v. State, 237 Ga. 757, 229 S.E.2d 600 (1976); Byrd v. Hopper, 405 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Stewart v. State, 239 Ga. 588, 238 S.E.2d 540 (1977); Woods v. State, 240 Ga. 265, 239 S.E.2d 786 (1977); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977); Head v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 164, 243 S.E.2d 877 (1978); Thomas v. State, 146 Ga. App. 501, 246 S.E.2d 498 (1978); Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627, 255 S.E.2d 718 (1979); Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979); Gunn v. State, 244 Ga. 51, 257 S.E.2d 538 (1979); Hamilton v. State, 244 Ga. 145, 259 S.E.2d 81 (1979); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979); McCranie v. State, 151 Ga. App. 871, 261 S.E.2d 779 (1979); Curry v. State, 155 Ga. App. 829, 273 S.E.2d 411 (1980); Stuckey v. Stynchcombe, 614 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1980); Choate v. State, 158 Ga. App. 8, 279 S.E.2d 459 (1981); Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 702, 282 S.E.2d 181 (1981); Davis v. State, 159 Ga. App. 356, 283 S.E.2d 286 (1981); Wallace v. State, 159 Ga. App. 793, 285 S.E.2d 194 (1981); Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 285 S.E.2d 741 (1981); Richards v. State, 160 Ga. App. 489, 287 S.E.2d 394 (1981); Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897 (1982); Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 293 S.E.2d 395 (1982); Parrish v. State, 160 Ga. App. 601, 287 S.E.2d 603 (1981); Gainey v. State, 161 Ga. App. 343, 287 S.E.2d 785 (1982); Sherrell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 345, 294 S.E.2d 559 (1982); Carswell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 743, 295 S.E.2d 548 (1982); Hardigree v. State, 164 Ga. App. 591, 298 S.E.2d 585 (1982); Chappell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 77, 296 S.E.2d 629 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir. 1982); Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983); Green v. State, 165 Ga. App. 205, 300 S.E.2d 208 (1983); Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983); Johnson v. Balkcom, 695 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1983); Miller v. State, 169 Ga. App. 668, 314 S.E.2d 684 (1984); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Kemp, 766 F.2d 452 (11th Cir. 1985); Geter v. State, 174 Ga. App. 694, 331 S.E.2d 68 (1985); Wilson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 41, 332 S.E.2d 352 (1985); Wallace v. State, 175 Ga. App. 685, 333 S.E.2d 874 (1985); Beck v. State, 181 Ga. App. 681, 353 S.E.2d 610 (1987); Prince v. State, 257 Ga. 84, 355 S.E.2d 424 (1987); Commercial Plastics & Supply Corp. v. Molen, 182 Ga. App. 202, 355 S.E.2d 86 (1987); Blankenship v. Home Depot, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 358, 356 S.E.2d 61 (1987); Merritt v. State, 183 Ga. App. 135, 358 S.E.2d 293 (1987); Russell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 209, 358 S.E.2d 631 (1987); Peoples v. State, 184 Ga. App. 439, 361 S.E.2d 848 (1987); Eaton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 652, 362 S.E.2d 455 (1987); Studdard v. State, 185 Ga. App. 319, 363 S.E.2d 837 (1987); Dawson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 718, 368 S.E.2d 367 (1988); Stoe v. State, 187 Ga. App. 171, 369 S.E.2d 793 (1988); Mays v. State, 198 Ga. App. 402, 401 S.E.2d 597 (1991); Brown v. State, 199 Ga. App. 773, 406 S.E.2d 248 (1991); Dobbs v. State, 199 Ga. App. 793, 406 S.E.2d 252 (1991); Alford v. State, 204 Ga. App. 14, 418 S.E.2d 397 (1992); Sumlin v. State, 207 Ga. App. 408, 427 S.E.2d 868 (1993); Crawford v. State, 210 Ga. App. 36, 435 S.E.2d 64 (1993); Hogan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 122, 435 S.E.2d 494 (1993); Bradford v. State, 223 Ga. App. 424, 477 S.E.2d 859 (1996); Rogers v. State, 234 Ga. App. 507, 507 S.E.2d 25 (1998); Lemattey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 889, 508 S.E.2d 215 (1998); Busch v. State, 234 Ga. App. 766, 507 S.E.2d 868 (1998); Sanders v. State, 242 Ga. App. 487, 530 S.E.2d 203 (2000); Davis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 579, 548 S.E.2d 678 (2001); Kemper v. State, 251 Ga. App. 665, 555 S.E.2d 40 (2001); Guild v. State, 255 Ga. App. 285, 564 S.E.2d 862 (2002); Rogers v. State, 255 Ga. App. 416, 565 S.E.2d 583 (2002); Darnell v. State, 257 Ga. App. 555, 571 S.E.2d 547 (2002); Clark v. State, 258 Ga. App. 347, 574 S.E.2d 344 (2002); Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003); Fernandez v. State, 263 Ga. App. 750, 589 S.E.2d 309 (2003); Hunter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 276, 582 S.E.2d 228 (2003); Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003); Bennett v. State, 266 Ga. App. 502, 597 S.E.2d 565 (2004); Blake v. State, 272 Ga. App. 181, 612 S.E.2d 33 (2005); Holman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 890, 614 S.E.2d 124 (2005); Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006); Jaheni v. State, 285 Ga. App. 266, 645 S.E.2d 735 (2007); Ford v. Schofield, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (2008); Styles v. State, 291 Ga. App. 255, 661 S.E.2d 641 (2008); Hyde v. State, 291 Ga. App. 662, 662 S.E.2d 764 (2008); Sillah v. State, 291 Ga. App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (2008); Lemming v. State, 292 Ga. App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (2008); Baez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 893, 678 S.E.2d 583 (2009); Bonker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 867, 681 S.E.2d 256 (2009); Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga. App. 51, 684 S.E.2d 120 (2009); Souder v. State, 301 Ga. App. 348, 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009); Smith v. State, 304 Ga. App. 708, 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010); Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 24, 709 S.E.2d 44 (2011); Anthony v. State, 315 Ga. App. 701, 727 S.E.2d 528 (2012); Martinez v. State, 318 Ga. App. 254, 735 S.E.2d 785 (2012); Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797 (2012); Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013); Jones v. State, 322 Ga. App. 310, 744 S.E.2d 830 (2013); Young v. State, 329 Ga. App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (2014); Turner v. State, 331 Ga. App. 78, 769 S.E.2d 785 (2015); McGil v. State, 339 Ga. App. 130, 793 S.E.2d 442 (2016); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); Floyd v. State, 342 Ga. App. 438, 803 S.E.2d 597 (2017); Priester v. State, 350 Ga. App. 200, 828 S.E.2d 439 (2019); Benton v. Hines, 306 Ga. 722, 832 S.E.2d 801 (2019); Lamb v. State, 355 Ga. App. 65, 842 S.E.2d 514 (Apr. 28, 2020); Davenport v. State, Ga. , 846 S.E.2d 83 (2020).

Identification

Acne as factor in identification.

- There was sufficient evidence to support an armed robbery conviction when the defendant and another person entered a store and demanded money from the cashier; the defendant, who was wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt, held a silver-topped gun to the cashier's ribs; the owner's spouse saw the defendant leaving the store with a bank bag and noticed that the defendant had acne; a bank bag and a loaded handgun were found in the defendant's bedroom; police found photographs of the defendant with acne scars and wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt with a silver and black handgun resting on a chair; and the cashier identified the defendant in a photographic line-up and identified the defendant, the gun, and the bank bag at trial. Melendez v. State, 291 Ga. App. 402, 662 S.E.2d 183 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of murder, felony murder, and armed robbery when the defendant and the codefendant offered to give the victim a ride, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and told the victim to give the defendant the victim's money; the defendant became angry when the defendant saw that there was no money in the victim's wallet, and the defendant shot the victim in the neck, then dumped the victim's body and the wallet in a parking lot. Lockheart v. State, 284 Ga. 78, 663 S.E.2d 213 (2008).

Evidence was legally sufficient to convict a defendant on charges of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices, which implicated the defendant in the crimes, was corroborated by evidence that the defendant was captured with the two accomplices shortly after the robbery, that the defendant had a large amount of cash, a gun, and a roll of duct tape, and that the victim was able to identify all three men as the ones who robbed and assaulted the victim. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

Testimony by a victim that the defendant and an accomplice, armed with handguns, forcibly entered the victim's apartment, raped and sodomized the victim, struck the victim with a gun, stole jewelry, bound the victim, and escaped in a car owned by the victim's prospective spouse, and evidence that 24 fingerprints lifted from the apartment and car matched the defendant's, was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

Evidence supported a defendant's armed robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); the defendant's statements provided evidence that the robbery occurred, statements by an accomplice implicating the defendant were properly admitted under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and statements by additional witnesses provided corroboration of statements the accomplice made. Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 312, 665 S.E.2d 20 (2008).

Admission of similar transaction evidence in a defendant's criminal trial was not error as the defendant's prior armed robbery and a pending charge of armed robbery involved similar victims and similar actions by the defendant; further, as the defendant failed to object to the admission at trial, the issue was waived for purposes of appellate review. Garvin v. State, 292 Ga. App. 813, 665 S.E.2d 908 (2008).

Victim was raped and robbed at gunpoint, and then murdered; the defendant blamed an accomplice. Although DNA collected from the victim was consistent with the accomplice, not the defendant, the latter's admission that the defendant and the accomplice picked up the victim intending to rob her, and that the defendant had sex with the victim after the accomplice raped her, was sufficient evidence to justify the denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict on charges of kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, and the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime. Davis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (2008).

- Defendant's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the record was replete with evidence corroborating the testimony of defendant's accomplice which identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators of an armed robbery. The fact that there was no claim that a store clerk's opinion as to the identity of the perpetrators was unfounded, the clerk's undisputed res gestae testimony that the clerk heard a customer identify one of the perpetrators as the defendant, and the clerk's testimony that the clerk had been sprayed in the face with mace corroborated this aspect of the accomplice's testimony as well. Carter v. State, 266 Ga. App. 691, 598 S.E.2d 76 (2004).

- Determination of witness credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury. Evidence that the defendant wielded, and attempted to use, a gun during the robbery of a pool hall owner was sufficient to convict the defendant for armed robbery where the question of eyewitness identification of the defendant was a jury matter. Bartley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 367, 599 S.E.2d 318 (2004).

Because a burglary victim recognized the defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, the defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2),16-7-1(a),16-8-41(a),16-11-37(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).

- Fact that witnesses said the witnesses were less than 100 percent certain of their identification of the defendant in robberies did not render the evidence insufficient to support the convictions for armed robbery; one witness identified the defendant as one of the robbers of a shoe store, a second witness identified the defendant as one of the robbers of a restaurant, the defendant's love interest's vehicle was used as the getaway car in both robberies, the evidence showed that the defendant's girlfriend called a phone registered to a name used by the defendant as an alias during the time of each robbery, and there was proper admission of similar transaction evidence. Walker v. State, 280 Ga. App. 457, 634 S.E.2d 93 (2006).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime, and carrying a concealed weapon were supported by sufficient evidence including guns, money, and a knife stolen from a robbery victim found in a car in which the defendant was passenger, the fact that the defendant, when arrested, was wearing a sweatshirt identified by the victims as the sweatshirt worn by one of the perpetrators, and the testimony of another of the perpetrators, who stated that the defendant was one of the participants in the robbery. Callahan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 323, 634 S.E.2d 102 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, fleeing to elude a police officer, and reckless driving were all upheld on appeal, given the sufficiency of the identification evidence supplied by the victim, an investigating officer, and the arresting officer, as well as observations made by the latter in apprehending the defendant; moreover, the defendant's failure to object to the admission of a photographic lineup and show-up as impermissibly suggestive precluded appellate review of those issues. Newton v. State, 280 Ga. App. 709, 634 S.E.2d 839 (2006).

Evidence is sufficient for conviction for murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony based on sufficient evidence describing the defendant's encounter with the victim, an eyewitness's identification, and similar transaction evidence used to show identity and a course of conduct. Clark v. State, 280 Ga. 899, 635 S.E.2d 116 (2006).

Based on the defendant's admission to two armed robberies, and identification evidence linking the defendant to commission of a third robbery offense: (1) convictions for the offenses were upheld; and (2) no inconsistency with the indictment existed regarding the second robbery charge as the victim therein testified to also using the last name stated in the indictment. Monfort v. State, 281 Ga. App. 29, 635 S.E.2d 336 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; the victims of both armed robberies, who testified as to the defendant's conduct of holding them up with a gun and taking cash, identified the defendant as the perpetrator, and when the officers apprehended the defendant, the defendant had a gun. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

Because each of the three defendants made statements implicating themselves in the crimes of malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and because money and electronic equipment were stolen from the home, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants of the crimes. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1215, 127 S. Ct. 1266, 167 L. Ed. 2d 91 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

Appeals court rejected a contention that the defendant lacked any prior knowledge that the defendant's vehicle was being used to commit armed robberies, and that at most, the evidence could only characterize the defendant as an accessory after the fact and not a party to the crime, given that the state's evidence tended to show that the codefendant informed the defendant for the first time that the codefendant had just committed an armed robbery using the car and convinced the defendant to call the police and lie about the car being stolen, all within three minutes after the robbery occurred; further, an additional robbery was committed using the car after the defendant reported the car stolen. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).

Armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions were upheld on appeal based on sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's guilt, specifically, a security surveillance videotape, eyewitness testimony, and the defendant's voluntary admission to police. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 587, 636 S.E.2d 748 (2006).

Because: (1) the testimony of the defendant's two accomplices adequately described the defendant's involvement in an armed robbery of a restaurant; (2) the defendant later told one cohort not to speak if caught; (3) the same handgun that the defendant used in the prior and subsequent robberies was used to rob the restaurant; and (4) all three robberies were performed in the same manner and on the same day, sufficient evidence was presented to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction as a party to the crime. Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67, 637 S.E.2d 795 (2006).

Given that all three victims identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes of armed robbery and false imprisonment, the defendant's theft of the father's money at gunpoint, as well as duct-taping the parents and detaining all three victims in the basement, the evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction for one count of armed robbery and three counts of false imprisonment; moreover, conflicts in the testimony, even between the state's witnesses, went to the credibility of the witnesses, which was a matter for the jury to resolve. Feldman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 390, 638 S.E.2d 822 (2006).

Because conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses, including the state's witness, were a matter of credibility for the jury to decide, and because the defendant cited no authority suggesting that the instructions in question were incorrect statements of the law, and did not explain an assertion that they were confusing, convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence. Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga. App. 435, 638 S.E.2d 848 (2006).

- Because the person who stole the victim's vehicle had a distinctive hairstyle, and the defendant, who had the same hairstyle, was apprehended while in possession of the vehicle soon after the crime was committed, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault with intent to rob in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possessing a firearm during commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Hall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 413, 626 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support both an armed robbery and a burglary conviction as: (1) the defendant admitted to possessing a gun stolen in the robbery and other items used in commission of the crimes; (2) the defendant fled when confronted by police; and (3) the defendant asked another person in the courthouse why that person snitched on the defendant; the state's failure to produce or ever locate the weapon used by the defendant was immaterial as was the fact that the defendant was acquitted of the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Roberts v. State, 277 Ga. App. 730, 627 S.E.2d 446 (2006).

Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault when using the defendant's mother's telephone number, the defendant contacted the victim and arranged a meeting to buy shoes, when the victim identified the car the defendant was driving, which was registered to the defendant's mother, since the victim identified the defendant from a pretrial police photo array and at trial, and since, at the meeting arranged by the defendant, the victim was shot in the face and the defendant then rummaged through the victim's car where the victim kept the shoes. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 549 U.S. 1081, 166 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2006).

- Evidence supported defendant two's conviction for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault as, notwithstanding the absence of an in-court identification of the defendant and the state's failure to present fingerprint evidence, a victim's testimony concerning the victim's on-the-scene identification supported the finding that the defendant perpetrated the crimes; there was also sufficient evidence that the cash seized from the defendant's love interest's house had been put there by defendant two. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as: (1) the victims had the opportunity and the ability to identify the defendant; (2) there was sufficient evidence that the gun taken from the defendant's house was the gun that the defendant carried during the robbery; and (3) fingerprint evidence was not essential to the state's case. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005).

Evidence, including a gun and penny wrappers and a green coin basket found in the defendant's bedroom, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery and kidnapping after a restaurant was robbed; the basket matched a basket used by the restaurant and the pennies had been exchanged by the same bank that supplied the restaurant. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 66, 619 S.E.2d 759 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and kidnapping with bodily injury, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41 and16-5-40, respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant robbed a restaurant manager at gunpoint, forced the manager and others into the restaurant freezer, and the defendant caused injury and made threats to the victims; the defendant's claim that the defendant was forced against the defendant's will to participate in the crime, which was also committed by three codefendants, was not found credible, and several victims testified that the defendant not only held a gun, but that the defendant also threatened the victims with bodily harm if the victims did not cooperate. Isaac v. State, 275 Ga. App. 254, 620 S.E.2d 483 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty of all four counts of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt as the two sets of two victims each from the two different robberies identified the defendant as the perpetrator and the defendant had the victims' property at the time the defendant was apprehended. Blunt v. State, 275 Ga. App. 409, 620 S.E.2d 572 (2005).

- Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions after one of the victims opened the door to the victim's home when the victim recognized one of the defendant's accomplices, when the defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and when the defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim's head, took money from the second victim's wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed the accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified the defendant as the gunman from a police photo array and made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims' testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman's arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on the defendant's arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the suplastifficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004).

In addition to the second codefendant's testimony, the state showed that, shortly after the murder, the defendant was in possession of the victim's cab, that the victim's blood was found in the vehicle and on the defendant, and that the defendant made incriminating admissions to others; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004).

- Evidence that a store employee recognized one of the robbers' voices as belonging to the defendant, that the defendant's car was found behind the store with proceeds of the robbery and a loaded pistol, and that the defendant was found in a dumpster behind the store was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment and armed robbery. Woods v. State, 266 Ga. App. 53, 596 S.E.2d 203 (2004).

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of armed robbery even though the victim's identifications of the defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial were uncorroborated; the victim testified that defendant held a handgun to the victim's head while an accomplice took the victim's money and wallet, which authorized the jury to convict the defendant. Eady v. State, 273 Ga. App. 261, 614 S.E.2d 868 (2005).

Expert testimony that a shell casing at the crime scene came from a pistol found in the defendant's apartment, along with two witnesses' identifications of the defendant, and expert testimony that a bullet extracted from a victim's head possibly came from the defendant's pistol, although it was too damaged to say with complete certainty, sufficiently supported the defendant's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Escobar v. State, 279 Ga. 727, 620 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

- Defendant's conviction for two counts of armed robbery was upheld on appeal because the evidence showed that the defendant was identified by one of the victims shortly after the robbery spree of a dry cleaners and a beauty shop and, while another victim was not able to identify the defendant, the victim was able to identify the gun used, which was the same gun found in the defendant's vehicle after the robberies, as was a mask and other criminal tools. Butler v. State, 276 Ga. App. 161, 623 S.E.2d 132 (2005).

- As a robber's unique shirt was recorded by a convenience store security camera, and the defendant's love interest identified it as the defendant's shirt, and as the defendant could not say exactly where the defendant was that evening, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 169, 626 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony where, upon pulling into an apartment complex to turn around and ask for directions, the victims were approached by the defendant and another person, the defendant pulled out a gun and told the victims to "give it up," when one of the victims hesitated, the defendant shot the victim, the defendant then stole that victim's money and jewelry, and later, the gunshot victim died; the second victim described the defendant, who was wearing a specific jersey at the time of the crimes, and two witnesses who knew the defendant testified that the defendant robbed and shot the victim while wearing that jersey. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, false imprisonment, and hijacking a motor vehicle were supported by sufficient evidence since a perpetrator identified as the defendant robbed a pizza restaurant at gunpoint, ordered everyone into a cooler, and took the restaurant manager's vehicle, after which an officer discovered the defendant the next day driving the manager's vehicle and wearing a hat identical to that worn by the perpetrator, and since a customer at the restaurant identified the defendant as the robber in a photo line-up and at trial; while three of the four crimes arising out of the incident were committed after the customer, who was the only witness to identify the defendant, was ordered into the cooler, only one robber entered the restaurant and the jury was authorized to infer that the person identified by the customer also committed the crimes committed after the customer was in the cooler. Head v. State, 279 Ga. App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (2006).

While the trial court's act of including "level of certainty" language in the court's pattern jury charge on eyewitness identification was erroneous, the error was harmless, given that the victim was able to describe the physical characteristics of the armed robber, and there was evidence other than the victim's identification connecting the defendant to the crime, specifically, the victim's description of the car the armed robber used to get away and the defendant's presence at a nearby store shortly after the robbery; hence, it was highly probable that the "level of certainty" jury charge did not contribute to the judgment. Pasco v. State, 281 Ga. App. 5, 635 S.E.2d 269 (2006).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the victim gave a detailed description of the defendant, the victim identified the defendant in a photographic array and in court, and the defendant admitted to the robbery. White v. State, 250 Ga. App. 783, 552 S.E.2d 927 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's two armed robbery conviction as defendant's challenge to those convictions was meritless; the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient had to be rejected because it was premised on the argument that the victims' identification of the defendant as a perpetrator was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup and the photographic lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Evans v. State, 261 Ga. App. 22, 581 S.E.2d 676 (2003).

When the defendant's victim identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim's limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004).

Because the defendant admitted to knowing about a robbery beforehand, to being present at the robbery, and to telling one of the victims to get on the floor, all three of the defendant's accomplices put the defendant inside the home where the robbery occurred during the commission of the crime, and the defendant's car was driven to and from the scene, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 368, 606 S.E.2d 592 (2004).

Testimony provided by two accomplices, together with inside information which the defendant learned about the location of the robbery, the security camera on the premises, the people that worked there, how many people worked there, who was in the back area, and about the safe, when coupled with the fact that the gunman was not captured on the security camera, provided some evidence, though slight, that the robber had such inside information; under the circumstances, the accomplices' testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty. Ziegler v. State, 270 Ga. App. 787, 608 S.E.2d 230 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1019, 126 S. Ct. 656, 163 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2005).

Defendant's multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury were supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, the defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that the defendant beat; only one store owner's testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

In a prosecution for armed robbery and offenses related thereto, the trial court did not improperly allow hearsay evidence of identification, and hence, it was not error to allow a police officer to testify as to who the victims identified in the photo arrays as a law enforcement officer could testify to a pre-trial identification if the person who actually made the identification testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Monfort v. State, 281 Ga. App. 29, 635 S.E.2d 336 (2006).

As a cashier was only two feet from two robbers during the crime, which lasted about a minute, and the cashier looked at their faces, the fact that the cashier identified the defendant twice from photo arrays, and once at trial as the robber who had held the gun was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Shabazz v. State, 293 Ga. App. 560, 667 S.E.2d 414 (2008).

Armed robbery convictions entered against both the first and second defendants were upheld on appeal, given sufficient identification evidence, making an erroneous "level of certainty" instruction harmless error, and because counsel for the first defendant was not ineffective. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. App. 469, 638 S.E.2d 869 (2006), cert. dismissed, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 135 (Ga. 2007).

Evidence, which included uncontroverted testimony from an eyewitness who saw a defendant order a store employee into the street shortly before the employee was shot, the testimony of two other eyewitnesses, and the fact that calls had been made from the employee's stolen cellular phone to the defendant's mother, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and a number of other associated crimes. Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659 (2007).

Because sufficient evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of an armed robbery was presented by: (1) the convenience store clerk that was robbed at knife point; (2) the store's owner, who testified to seeing the defendant in the store at least ten times in the year prior to the robbery; and (3) the store's surveillance videotape, which matched the owner's description, the defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal. Clark v. State, 283 Ga. App. 884, 642 S.E.2d 900 (2007).

- Defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) issues related to the identity of the perpetrator were for the trier of fact, not the Court of Appeals of Georgia; and (2) identification testimony by a witness the defendant challenged was relevant, and thus admissible, and was not rendered inadmissible merely because such placed the defendant's character in issue. Buice v. State, 289 Ga. App. 415, 657 S.E.2d 326 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the state met the state's burden of proving that the defendant took the property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon; the state offered the testimony of the bus counter clerk as to the facts of the robbery and as to the identification of the defendant as the gunman. That testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Range v. State, 289 Ga. App. 727, 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008).

- Because: (1) victim's identification of defendant was based upon independent memory which victim fairly accurately recalled in developing the composite sketch; (2) there was an independent basis for the victim's identifications; and (3) there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the identification evidence and the trial court's finding that there was no likelihood of misidentification was supported by the record. Price v. State, 289 Ga. App. 763, 658 S.E.2d 382 (2008).

Trial court properly convicted the defendant of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle because: (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish the defendant committed the crimes based on the testimony of the victim, who identified the defendant as the individual who approached the victim's vehicle, pointed a gun, and demanded the vehicle; (2) two officers testified as to observing the defendant driving the stolen vehicle the same night; and (3) the victim's cell phone was found on the defendant's person when the defendant was arrested. Culver v. State, 290 Ga. App. 321, 659 S.E.2d 390 (2008).

Because the evidence showed that the victim sufficiently identified the defendant as the perpetrator of an aggravated assault and armed robbery (1) to officers at the scene, (2) by means of a photographic lineup, and (3) at trial, the appeals court rejected the defendant's sufficiency challenge as to that element. Wallace v. State, 289 Ga. App. 497, 657 S.E.2d 874 (2008).

- There was no merit to a defendant's argument that the evidence did not support an armed robbery conviction because the victims' identifications were unreliable. The victims' encounter with the defendant lasted up to three minutes and took place at a well-lit tennis court; the victims had a clear view of the defendant's face; one victim was close enough to the defendant to hand the defendant the victim's wallet; the descriptions the victims gave matched the defendant's height, build, age, and hairstyle; and the victims identified the defendant the same evening as the incident. Olive v. State, 291 Ga. App. 538, 662 S.E.2d 308 (2008).

While the state failed to produce a weapon, fingerprints, or other physical evidence tying the defendant to the crimes, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the jury was authorized to accept the cashier's identification testimony; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Clowers v. State, 299 Ga. App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46 (2009).

- Sufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the victim, a taxi driver, identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators based, inter alia, on the victim's knowledge of the defendant from living in the same townhome complex; a single witness's testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Troutman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), aggravated sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b), kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), and aggravated sodomy, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a)(2), involving four different victims on three separate dates; both the husband and the wife, the victims in the first criminal incident, identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crimes. Two separate DNA analyses testified to by two forensic biologists showed that the defendant's sperm was present in the vaginas of the other two female victims. Robins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 70, 679 S.E.2d 92 (2009).

- Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim's identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009).

Testimony of an armed robbery victim and the victim's love interest, who were eyewitnesses to the defendant's crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault, and who separately identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and assault, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because sufficient evidence corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery; the driver corroborated that the driver picked the defendant up and dropped the defendant and the accomplice off at the defendant's residence near the restaurant about two-and-one-half hours before the robbery, the driver overheard the defendant speaking to the accomplice about committing a robbery, and two more witnesses confirmed that the two were together that evening. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to exclude the in-court identification by each of the armed robbery victims because each of the victims' identification of the defendant had an independent origin; each of the victims observed the defendant face to face in full daylight and identified the defendant's photograph within days of being robbed, and the first victim identified the defendant as the victim drove by in a car. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) of the victim, a restaurant employee, who was pressure washing the exterior of the restaurant in a lit parking lot. The employee testified that the employee observed the defendant's face the entire time that the defendant held a gun to the employee's chest. Battise v. State, 309 Ga. App. 835, 711 S.E.2d 390 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

- Victim's testimony that the defendant was one of the two men who came into the victim's house, beat the victim with fists and a flashlight, and demanded the victim's keys and money authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary, aggravated battery, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Garmon v. State, 317 Ga. App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (2012).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the victims' testimony that guns were used in the commission of the crimes, the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend, and the presence of a cell phone found near the scene of the crimes, and the victims identifying the defendant's accent was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was an armed participant in the crimes. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for two counts of armed robbery with respect to two victims at the first residence, attempt to commit armed robbery with respect to one of the victims at the first residence, and two counts of burglary with respect to the two residences because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by one of the witnesses, who identified the defendant. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (2013).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the testimony of the employee, who identified the defendant and the codefendants, and a surveillance video, which showed them in the same clothing witnesses had seen them wearing; plus, the defendant's cell phone records placed the defendant in the area of the robbery at the time the robbery occurred, despite the defendant claiming to be in another city at the time. Carter v. State, 326 Ga. App. 144, 756 S.E.2d 232 (2014), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018).

- Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony based on the witnesses' positive identification of the defendant's distinctive speech; the ski mask and salad bag found in the defendant's vehicle from the restaurant robbed; and the sudden, labored, and sweaty appearance of the defendant immediately after the robbery and high speed chase. Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 765 S.E.2d 599 (2014), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heath, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 362 (Ga. 2020).

Since the admission of the victim's identification of the defendant was not improper, the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on that identification failed and the jury was authorized, based on the identification and the existence of the defendant's fingerprints on the victim's van, to find that the defendant committed both armed robbery and aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 500, 782 S.E.2d 287 (2016).

- Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the armed robbery was sufficient; the defendant's spouse admitted to helping to plan the robbery, driving the defendant to the bank, waiting for the defendant, driving away after the defendant jumped in the open trunk and spending the money, the defendant's parent testified that defendant told the defendant's parent the defendant committed the robbery and the defendant's fingerprints were on the envelope containing the note the defendant gave the teller demanding the money. Keller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 546, 499 S.E.2d 713 (1998).

When the victim identified the defendant less than 15 minutes after a robbery, had been face-to-face with the robber for three or four seconds, gave the police a substantially correct description of the defendant's person, and demonstrated a high degree of certainty in the identification, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, even though no physical evidence tied the defendant to the robbery; the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during the "showup" identification did not make the identification unreasonably or unfairly conducted, and the credibility of the victim was a jury question. Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga. App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's armed robbery conviction when an accomplice, who was wearing a mask and holding a gun when the accomplice entered the victim's bedroom, testified that the defendant had given the accomplice the mask and the gun and that the accomplice had shouted downstairs to the defendant during the robbery; the testimony was corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the victim's recognition of the defendant's voice from the shouted conversation during the robbery and by the defendant's resistance and flight when police arrived. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007).

Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the absence of reversible error in excepting the lead detective from sequestration, instructing the jury, admitting similar transaction evidence, and admitting the defendant's custodial statement, the defendant's armed robbery and possession of a firearm convictions were upheld on appeal. Morgan v. State, 287 Ga. App. 569, 651 S.E.2d 833 (2007).

Indictment

Contents of indictment not fatal to conviction.

- An over-inclusive list of items alleged to have been taken in an indictment for armed robbery is not fatal to the validity of a conviction. Booker v. State, 242 Ga. App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (2000).

Despite the defendant's contention on appeal that two armed robbery convictions were void because the indictment failed to allege the essential element of intent to commit a theft because the defendant's contention amounted to a motion in arrest of judgment, the claim lacked merit as the indictment was not absolutely void. Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007).

Whether the misnomer of an armed robbery victim constituted a defect in the indictment was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant filed no demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment contending that the indictment was void, nor did the defendant interpose any objection to the victim testifying; even if the alleged error had been preserved, the misnomer of the victim in the indictment was not a fatal error because the defendant's cross-examination of the victim revealed that the defendant was aware of the victim's identity as one of the robbery victims and was prepared to cross-examine the victim. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010).

- In a prosecution for felony murder by aiding and abetting in an armed robbery, an indictment alleging that the defendant acted in concert with the perpetrator and relinquished control over money pursuant to their prearranged agreement negated an essential element of robbery - that the relinquishment of possession was the result of force or intimidation. State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996).

- An overinclusive list of items alleged to have been stolen in an indictment for armed robbery did not result in a variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial so severe that it affected defendant's substantial rights, prejudiced the preparation of defendant's defense, or exposed defendant to the possibility of subsequently having to stand trial for the same charge. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994).

Because the indictment filed against the defendant set out all the essential elements of the offense of armed robbery, and the defendant could not admit to those allegations without being guilty of a crime, the indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer; moreover, to the extent the defendant's attack on the indictment could be considered a special demurrer, seeking greater specificity, that demurrer was waived by the failure to interpose it prior to pleading to the indictment. Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007).

- Fact that armed robbery indictment alleged that the money taken by the defendant was the property of one person, when the evidence showed that it was the property of that person's daughter, did not deny the defendant's right to be definitely informed as to the charges against the defendant to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense. Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 300 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S. Ct. 199, 78 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1983).

Defendant could be convicted of robbing each of two bank tellers during a single incident; each employee who was robbed was a victim, regardless of who owned the money. McCluskey v. State, 211 Ga. App. 205, 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993).

- When the defendant was accused of committing armed robbery on or about September 15, 2001, the defendant was tried in August 2002, and the defendant testified that the robbery occurred "last fall," the evidence supported a finding that the crime was committed during the fall of 2001, which was within the seven-year statute of limitations for armed robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(b) and17-3-1(b); as the exact date of the commission of the crime was not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense could be proved to have occurred any time within the limitations period. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004).

- Indictment which stated that the defendant took property of another from the person and immediate presence was merely the use of an inappropriate conjunction and not a fatal variance. Dobbs v. State, 204 Ga. App. 83, 418 S.E.2d 443 (1992).

Use of Weapon

Scissors.

- Evidence that the defendant took money from the second victim while holding scissors, without evidence that the second victim owed the defendant money, supported the armed robbery conviction. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

- Evidence the defendant took a purse and a car from a woman after telling the woman to drive or die while pointing a sock covered rock at the woman supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the victim identifying the defendant as the person who hit the victim on the head, an accomplice's testimony, the victim's car keys were found in a bag that the defendant had been holding when stopped by an officer, and the defendant fled from the officers when the officers attempted to arrest the defendant. Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013).

- Evidence the defendant entered the gift shop wielding a meat cleaver, made repeated demands for money, and the two victims were present and held in fear when the money was taken from the cash register and a video poker machine was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery convictions as to those two victims. Bradford v. State, 327 Ga. App. 621, 760 S.E.2d 630 (2014).

Evidence from a victim that the defendant robbed the victim of cash, cell phones, and a GPS unit at knifepoint was sufficient pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8 to establish that the defendant committed armed robbery with a knife in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-11-106(b)(1), although the defendant testified that the victim gave the defendant these items for drugs. Sanders v. State, 324 Ga. App. 4, 749 S.E.2d 14 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the evidence showing that the defendant was found by police hiding after a high speed chase, was in a car with two men who fit the description of the two men who robbed the restaurant, and the car contained a deposit slip identified by a restaurant worker. Martin v. State, 324 Ga. App. 252, 749 S.E.2d 815 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and burglary because three black males robbed the store, one of whom pointed a gun at the store manager; after the defendant was apprehended, the defendant made incriminating statements that the defendant took the stuff to pay bills and that the defendant did not know where the other two individuals were; and the bags found in the defendant's vicinity consisted of six cooler totes containing approximately $700 in merchandise from the store and a plastic bag containing money and the deposit slip from the store's safe. Brooks v. State, 324 Ga. App. 352, 750 S.E.2d 423 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the state presented evidence that the defendant used force against the victim before taking the victim's money as the theft was completed after the defendant stabbed the victim to death with a knife. Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 750 S.E.2d 323 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed the defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as the codefendant since the evidence showed that the defendant drove the codefendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the two passengers of the car committed the actual armed robbery, there was evidence that the defendant, the driver of the car, knew that the two passengers were armed and that the defendant "kind of sort of" knew what they were going to do, which supported a finding that the defendant participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the four armed robberies as a party as the accomplice testified that the robberies were executed pursuant to a plan orchestrated and aided by the defendant; the accomplice never pointed the weapon at the defendant, nor demanded the defendant's property; and, although the defendant had successfully fled the property, the defendant circled back to the residence - while the accomplice was still there - and attempted to steal electronic equipment. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

Victim's testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, gave the gun to an accomplice, and took the victim's possessions, and that the victim was 100% sure the defendant was one of the robbers was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery. Hogan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 596, 768 S.E.2d 779 (2015), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-41,16-8-41, and16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, defendant's clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant's accomplice, and the defandant's accomplice's testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015).

Evidence that the defendant took a laptop during the burglary, including a codefendant's statement that the codefendant saw the defendant emerge from the victim's home with the laptop under the defendant's arm, and the fact that the defendant appeared with a camcorder taken from the victim the day after the murder and the gun used in the murder was found in defendant's home was sufficient to support an armed robbery conviction. Pitchford v. State, 294 Ga. 230, 751 S.E.2d 785 (2013), overruled on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the victim arranged to purchase a car from the defendant for $4000; the victim met the defendant and got into the defendant's car to go see the car for sale; when the defendant pulled into a driveway and unlocked the car doors, eight or nine masked people dressed in black with handguns and shotguns grabbed the victim, pulled the victim out of the car, beat the victim, and then robbed the victim of the $4000 cash the victim had to purchase the car, another $300 in cash the victim had, the victim's cell phone, and the victim's flip-flops; and the defendant told one of the men holding a gun to the victim's head not to shoot the victim. Logan-Goodlaw v. State, 331 Ga. App. 671, 770 S.E.2d 899 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape, aggravated sodomy, and two counts of armed robbery because the co-defendant, the defendant, and a third man rushed into the apartment and secured the arms and legs of the male victims with duct tape while they ransacked the apartment looking for money and drugs; as the victim entered the bathroom and sat on the toilet, the defendant followed the victim in, stood in front of the victim, and forced the victim at gunpoint to perform oral sex on the defendant; the defendant later bent the victim over a sofa, and had sexual intercourse with the victim; and the victim identified the defendant as the man who sexually assaulted the victim. Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 773 S.E.2d 403 (2015).

Testimony of the victim identifying the defendant as the person who robbed the victim and identifying the handgun, and the testimony of the security guard and the bystander which aligned with the victim's account of the robbery was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Murphy v. State, 333 Ga. App. 722, 776 S.E.2d 657 (2015).

- Sufficient evidence supported convictions of malice murder and armed robbery when during an argument with a 79-year-old victim, the defendant struck the victim in the head several times with the victim's cane, causing the cane to break and an edge of the cane to cut the victim's neck, after which the defendant took the victim's wallet and car and drove to Atlanta. Harvey v. State, 284 Ga. 8, 660 S.E.2d 528 (2008).

In defendant's convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault in connection with robbery of a fast food restaurant, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions based on a restaurant employee identifying the defendant as one of two perpetrators who confronted that employee and manager at gunpoint and threatened to shoot if the victims did not comply with the defendant's demand for money; also, evidence showed that the defendant forced the manager out of the manager's car at gunpoint, ordered the manager back across the parking lot and into the restaurant, and stole over $300.00 from the restaurant's safe as well as a cellular phone before fleeing. Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions. Two masked persons entered a restaurant, pointed a gun at the employees, forced the manager to give the individuals money, including rolls of change, ordered everyone to get on the floor, and then fled; an officer saw two people running, including the defendant, who were wearing the type of boots worn by the robbers; the defendant had a BB gun and $201 in cash, including several rolls of quarters; two restaurant employees identified the gun as the weapon used in the robbery; and a detective testified that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant was wearing the jacket and boots depicted on the surveillance videotape played for the jury. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. App. 279, 661 S.E.2d 658 (2008).

- State's evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant had been in the victim's store twice on the night of the alleged robbery; (2) the victim identified the masked perpetrator as a Caucasian male wielding a crowbar; (3) trained police dogs followed a scent from a trail immediately behind the store to the residence where the defendant was located; (4) the defendant was the only Caucasian person at that location; (5) in the backyard of that residence, police officers found a crow bar with the victim's blood on it and a jacket whose pocket contained a receipt evidencing the purchase of a crowbar; (6) surveillance videotape from the location where the purchase of the crowbar was made supported the conclusion that the defendant was the person who purchased the crowbar; and (7) the defendant made a voluntary statement to the police that the jury could easily have interpreted as a confession. Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga. App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (2008).

- "Appearance of such weapon" in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) is not impermissibly vague, and the statute is therefore constitutional. Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

To support conviction of armed robbery, offensive weapon must be used to effectuate robbery. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).

- See Fann v. State, 153 Ga. App. 634, 266 S.E.2d 307 (1980); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Clark v. State, 221 Ga. App. 273, 470 S.E.2d 816 (1996).

Term "offensive weapon" is not one that requires definition absent a request. Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982), vacated, 163 Ga. App. 338, 295 S.E.2d 235 (1982).

Trial counsel's failure to request a charge on the definition of "offensive weapon" under the armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The charge given advised the jury of the applicable law, and the trial court was not required to instruct on the meaning of all words used, particularly words of common understanding. Collier v. State, 303 Ga. App. 31, 692 S.E.2d 697 (2010).

- Defendant's hands and feet do not constitute offensive weapons for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Wright v. State, 228 Ga. App. 779, 492 S.E.2d 680 (1997); Haugland v. State, 253 Ga. App. 423, 560 S.E.2d 50 (2002).

- Under the plain words of the statute, it is not necessary to prove the offensive weapon involved was in fact a gun. Montgomery v. State, 208 Ga. App. 763, 432 S.E.2d 120 (1993).

- When allegation that shotgun used by accused in effecting robbery was "loaded" related to no element which was a necessary ingredient of offense charged, the word "loaded" can therefore be properly treated as surplusage so that proof thereof was not necessary. Moody v. State, 216 Ga. 192, 115 S.E.2d 526 (1960).

- Armed robbery is committed if the weapon has been used as an instrument of constructive, as well as actual, force. Maddox v. State, 174 Ga. App. 728, 330 S.E.2d 911 (1985).

- Manner in which a weapon is used may determine whether that weapon is an offensive weapon for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984).

- An armed robber need not use an offensive weapon in a menacing or threatening manner to accomplish the robbery. The element of "use" of an offensive weapon is satisfied whenever the victim is aware of the weapon, and it has the desired forceful effect of assisting to accomplish the robbery. Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. App. 7, 545 S.E.2d 148 (2001).

Toy pistol can be an offensive or deadly weapon under certain circumstances but is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Butts v. State, 153 Ga. App. 464, 265 S.E.2d 370 (1980).

Starter pistol used by the defendant had the appearance of an actual handgun, which most assuredly is an offensive weapon. Morgan v. State, 191 Ga. App. 226, 381 S.E.2d 402 (1989); Ledford v. State, 207 Ga. App. 705, 429 S.E.2d 124 (1993).

Armed robbery can be committed either with a real weapon or with a toy or replica weapon having appearance of being real. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Where the evidence was that the defendant robbed the victim using a replica, article, or device having the appearance of an offensive weapon, so as to create a reasonable apprehension that it was an offensive weapon, the conviction was upheld. Jones v. State, 236 Ga. App. 330, 511 S.E.2d 882 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery when the defendant walked into a restaurant, opened the defendant's jacket and showed what appeared to be a gun, and demanded money. Gardner v. State, 261 Ga. App. 188, 582 S.E.2d 167 (2003).

- Set of nunchucks constituted an offensive weapon and, therefore, supported a conviction for armed robbery. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (1998).

- Offensive weapon for purposes of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) includes not only weapons which are offensive per se, such as firearms loaded with live ammunition, but also embraces other instrumentalities not normally considered to be offensive weapons in and of themselves but which may be found by a jury to be likely to produce death or great bodily injury depending on the manner and means of their use; the jury was entitled to conclude that vise grips carried by defendant were a weapon for purposes of armed robbery under § 16-8-41(a) after a victim testified that the vise grips were heavy and that the victim was afraid that defendant would knock the victim out. Phillips v. State, 259 Ga. App. 331, 577 S.E.2d 25 (2003).

Ceramic vase is not per se an offensive or deadly weapon. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984).

- Jury may find an electric cord to be an "offensive weapon" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, depending upon the manner and means of its use. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 340 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 245, 93 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1986).

Tire tool stuck in the waistband of defendant's pants constitutes an offensive weapon. Cook v. State, 179 Ga. App. 610, 347 S.E.2d 664 (1986).

- Evidence was sufficient to show that theft occurred after force was employed where defendant, who had concealed self in the victim's van, attempted to stab the victim in the neck with a screwdriver and then drove away with the van a few moments after the victim escaped therefrom. Wynn v. State, 228 Ga. App. 124, 491 S.E.2d 149 (1997).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), where defendant went into a store, demanded money from the cash register, showed the clerk a screwdriver, which the clerk thought at the time was an ice pick, and defendant took money and fled; whether defendant pointed the screwdriver at the store clerk was immaterial, as it was found that defendant used the screwdriver to persuade the clerk to comply with defendant's demand and the robbery was accomplished while the victim was under a reasonable apprehension that defendant was using an offensive weapon. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004).

Pellet gun constituted an offensive weapon. Fleming v. State, 233 Ga. App. 483, 504 S.E.2d 542 (1998).

Stun gun can constitute an offensive weapon authorizing an armed robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). James v. State, 239 Ga. App. 541, 521 S.E.2d 465 (1999).

- Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), there was no error in the trial court's denial of the motion for directed verdict; although it was impossible to see on the videotape what the defendant held in the defendant's hand or what exactly was removed from the register, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude that the defendant displayed the plastic gun when the defendant removed a hand from the defendant's pocket and demanded money, consistent with the pattern from the defendant's earlier robberies in which the defendant either pointed the pocketed hand toward the victim or displayed the plastic gun. Rutledge v. State, 276 Ga. App. 580, 623 S.E.2d 762 (2005).

Lit cigarette constituted an offensive weapon when, after the defendant doused the victim, a store clerk, with gasoline, the defendant profanely insisted that the clerk give the defendant "the money" or the defendant would burn the clerk with the cigarette. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (2000).

- When the defendants each raped the victim while keeping a pillow over her face, causing her difficulty in breathing, and after the assault and while still keeping the pillow on her face, the men bound her by rolling her up in a sheet and rummaged through the house, taking her purse and its contents and approximately $300, it could not be said as a matter of law that the way the pillow and sheets were used could not make them into deadly weapons. Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of armed robbery since defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a skillet, and robbed the victim's cash while the victim was unconscious. Lord v. State, 259 Ga. App. 449, 577 S.E.2d 103 (2003).

- Convictions against the defendant for malice murder, burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault were supported by evidence that the defendant entered the victim's home, hit the victim multiple times about the head and face with a tree limb with a metal piece on it, and wrote a check in defendant's name from the victim's checkbook; evidence included witness testimony from the bank where the defendant cashed the check, the defendant's confession to police, and physical evidence. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of armed robbery after the victim indicated that the taller of the victim's two assailants had a gun during the robbery and testimony at trial established that the defendant was taller than the codefendant. Killings v. State, 296 Ga. App. 869, 676 S.E.2d 31 (2009).

- When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-5-21(a), respectively. Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794 (2003).

- When a gun, though present and used to threaten another, was not used to take the victim's property as required under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, an armed robbery has not been perpetrated. Dixon v. Hopper, 407 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Ga. 1976), overruled on other grounds, Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir. 1984).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery when the defendant was found hiding in a utility closet in victim's home after the defendant's two accomplices fled, a rifle was recovered adjacent to the closet, and a police officer testified the rifle was the same weapon the officer had seen through the window. Edwards v. State, 209 Ga. App. 304, 433 S.E.2d 619 (1993).

- Defendant committed armed robbery by stealing the victim's pistol and then stealing her pocketbook. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994).

- Defendant's argument that defendant's "hands" did not constitute an offensive weapon and, therefore, defendant could not have been convicted of armed robbery, was rejected, as the cashier perceived that defendant, who kept one hand in defendant's coat pocket during the robbery, had a gun; thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Martin v. State, 264 Ga. App. 813, 592 S.E.2d 483 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery even though the teller involved in the bank holdup did not actually see a gun because the note defendant handed to the teller stated that there was a gun and that the defendant would shoot everyone in the bank if the teller did not give up the money, and where the defendant's hand was concealed under a shirt. Marlin v. State, 273 Ga. App. 856, 616 S.E.2d 176 (2005).

Record showed that the two armed robbery victims were in reasonable apprehension that there was a gun; thus, satisfying the statutory element of apprehension concerning a weapon. Smith v. State, 274 Ga. App. 568, 618 S.E.2d 182 (2005).

Because the defendant claimed to have a gun, threatened to blow the victim's head off, and the victim saw a bulge in the defendant's clothing where the gun was allegedly hidden, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Forde v. State, 277 Ga. App. 410, 626 S.E.2d 606 (2006).

When a victim testified that the victim believed the defendant had a gun because of the way the defendant held the defendant's hand inside a jacket, which the victim demonstrated for the jury, and the victim said the victim was frightened because the victim believed the defendant might have a gun, and gave the defendant the drawer from a cash register, the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade the victim to comply with the defendant's demand and that the defendant's acts created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that the defendant was threatening the victim with a gun so the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery. Joyner v. State, 278 Ga. App. 60, 628 S.E.2d 186 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal regarding an armed robbery with respect to the defendant's assertion that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was armed because the two victims of that robbery testified that the defendant was poking something into the side of one of the victims and that the victim testified that the victim thought the object was a gun. That testimony was sufficient to send to the jury the question of whether the defendant had committed armed robbery. Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery based on the robbery of a Gwinnett County bank by use of a gun, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon because the Gwinnett County bank teller testified that the defendant threatened to shoot the teller, and the defendant's stance, with a hand at the defendant's hip, made the teller believe that the defendant would follow through on that threat; and a bank teller in another county testified that, three days later, the defendant's gestures, including patting a hip, made that teller believe that the defendant had a gun when the defendant robbed that bank. Johnson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 134, 770 S.E.2d 236 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 377 (Ga. 2015).

Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery and felony murder convictions because only the codefendant used a gun was rejected because the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and the defendant also pretended that the defendant's cellphone was a gun, satisfying O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)'s language of "device having the appearance of such weapon." Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a taxi driver under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was supported by video evidence that the defendant reached from the backseat to shove an object into the driver's back while the defendant demanded that the driver hand over the driver's money or else the defendant would shoot the driver; the driver testified that although the driver believed that the defendant may have threatened the driver with the defendant's finger, nevertheless, the driver complied with the defendant's orders because the driver was not positive that the defendant did not have a gun. Rice v. State, 351 Ga. App. 96, 830 S.E.2d 429 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1434, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 66 (Ga. 2020).

- Presence of a weapon during the commission of a robbery, necessary to a conviction for armed robbery, may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for armed robbery may be sustained even though the weapon itself is neither seen nor accurately described by the victim. Some physical manifestation of a weapon is required, however, or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Hughes v. State, 185 Ga. App. 40, 363 S.E.2d 336 (1987); Tate v. State, 191 Ga. App. 727, 382 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 688 (1989).

Evidence that the defendant merely approached the victim with the defendant's hand in the defendant's jacket pocket was insufficient to support a conviction of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Tate v. State, 191 Ga. App. 727, 382 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 688 (1989).

It is not essential that a weapon be seen or be accurately described by the victim to support a conviction of armed robbery as long as there was some physical manifestation of a weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Millis v. State, 196 Ga. App. 799, 397 S.E.2d 71 (1990).

Use of concealed offensive weapons "or other devices," may constitute armed robbery, but the evidence must at least show that there was an offensive weapon or an article having the appearance of one. Talbot v. State, 198 Ga. App. 636, 402 S.E.2d 366 (1991).

O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 includes concealed offensive weapons provided there is either a physical manifestation of the weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Nicholson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 413, 408 S.E.2d 487 (1991).

Evidence showed use of an offensive weapon, where the victim could see "something" underneath defendant's shirt in the shape of a gun, even though the victim did not actually see it at the moment the victim was robbed. Howard v. State, 201 Ga. App. 164, 410 S.E.2d 782 (1991).

Evidence that defendant entered a pharmacy with a black plastic bag over defendant's hand and told the victim "I have a gun" was sufficient to establish the use of an offensive weapon in contravention of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Brabham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 506, 524 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented authorizing the jury to conclude that the victim reasonably believed defendant had a gun because, even though defendant may not have physically displayed a weapon in view of the victim, defendant's note to the victim clearly and boldly recited that defendant had a gun and would kill defendant, and evidence was presented that one of defendant's hands was not visible to the victim during the robbery. Prins v. State, 246 Ga. App. 585, 539 S.E.2d 236 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the victims' testimony that the victim's saw the shape of a gun during the robbery supported the conclusion that the victims were under a reasonable apprehension that the defendant was armed. Colkitt v. State, 251 Ga. App. 749, 555 S.E.2d 121 (2001).

Ample evidence supported defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (2), where defendant was identified by defendant's companions in statements to the police, and also by two victims at trial, as the person who drove with the three companions to a store and, while pointing a gun at the various victims, robbed one person of money and lottery tickets, demanded and obtained money from a second person and shot that person, demanded money from the second person's spouse, and then fled with the three companions. Bates v. State, 259 Ga. App. 232, 576 S.E.2d 619 (2003).

Although defendant did not point a gun at restaurant employees when defendant took money from a cash register, the employees' testimony that defendant produced a gun and that they did not resist because defendant had a gun was enough to sustain defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Pritchett v. State, 265 Ga. App. 462, 594 S.E.2d 377 (2004).

Sufficient evidence existed to sustain the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) when the victim identified the defendant shortly after the victim's purse was taken from the victim by gunpoint at a payphone, some of the victim's personal belongings were discovered in the defendant's possession, and the defendant led the victim and a police officer to the remainder of the victim's belongings hidden in the woods and the defendant's car. Foster v. State, 267 Ga. App. 363, 599 S.E.2d 309 (2004).

- Since the purpose of using any weapon or device having the "appearance of such weapon" is to create a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon is being used, it is immaterial whether such apprehension is created by use of the sense of vision or by any other sense, provided that the apprehension is reasonable under the circumstances. Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989); Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 392 S.E.2d 280 (1990); Ramey v. State, 206 Ga. App. 308, 425 S.E.2d 385 (1992); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. App. 173, 543 S.E.2d 434 (2000).

Trial court properly instructed the jury that "the appearance of such weapon", within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), means "any concept that is obtained through the use of any of the senses." Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Victim's testimony that the victim believed the robber had a gun, and that the robber told the victim to "do as I say or I'll blow your head off", satisfied the statutory requirement that the robbery had been accomplished "by use of an offensive weapon." Nicholson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 413, 408 S.E.2d 487 (1991).

Presence of an offensive weapon or the appearance of such may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for armed robbery may be sustained even though the weapon was neither seen nor accurately described by the victim. McCluskey v. State, 211 Ga. App. 205, 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993); Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App. 157, 480 S.E.2d 193 (1996); Mangum v. State, 228 Ga. App. 545, 492 S.E.2d 300 (1997).

When the defendant pointed the defendant's hand, which was covered by a sack, toward the victim and demanded money, such conduct would cause apprehension that the defendant had a gun in any reasonable person. Turner v. State, 237 Ga. App. 642, 516 S.E.2d 343 (1999).

- Defendant's use of an article or device - wrapping defendant's hand in a shirt - which had the appearance of an offensive weapon and defendant's temporary control of store register cash drawer were sufficient evidence to convict on charge of armed robbery. Miller v. State, 223 Ga. App. 453, 477 S.E.2d 878 (1996).

- Despite defendant's assertion that defendant only pretended to have a weapon while robbing a restaurant, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, as the victims testified that defendant used something that felt and looked like a gun, and one victim, the night manager, testified that defendant threatened to "blow" that victim's head off if the victim did not open the safe; such testimony sufficiently showed that defendant's actions created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victims that an offensive weapon was being used. White v. State, 258 Ga. App. 546, 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002).

Defendant's conviction of armed robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was supported by sufficient evidence; defendant admitted that during the robbery defendant used a pipe covered by a sock to make it appear that defendant had a gun, and the evidence authorized a finding that defendant used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade the employee to comply with the defendant's demand and that defendant's acts created a reasonable apprehension on the employee's part that defendant was threatening the employee with a gun. Faulkner v. State, 260 Ga. App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365 (2003).

- Evidence was sufficient for armed robbery conviction where the defendant first shot his sister and then, several minutes later, took her money, with the rifle still in his possession; without the shooting, which left the sister in fear of being shot again, defendant's taking of his sister's money could not have been accomplished and the relatively brief passage of time between the shooting and the taking did not sever that connection between the two acts. Lowery v. State, 209 Ga. App. 5, 432 S.E.2d 576 (1993).

When an armed robbery count was broadly drafted so as to include an averment that the offense of armed robbery was accomplished by the taking of specified property both by means of intimidation and by use of an offensive weapon, it needed to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was accomplished by concomitant use of an offensive weapon; accordingly, in the absence of such a showing, while the circumstances of the taking would have supported a conviction for the lesser included offense of robbery, it would not have supported conviction of the greater offense of armed robbery. Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 430 S.E.2d 105 (1993), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000).

- Former Code 1933, § 26-1902 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41) clearly contemplated that an offensive weapon be used as a concomitant to a taking which involves use of actual force or intimidation (constructive force) against another person. It was not sufficient that force was used against a person subsequent to taking, although it may be part of the same "continuing transaction." Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974).

Evidence showing that defendant took a vehicle without displaying or using a hatchet in defendant's possession and that the defendant did not use the weapon to maintain possession was insufficient to sustain the defendant's armed robbery conviction. Nelson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 385, 503 S.E.2d 335 (1998).

- When it is undisputed that the victim was killed with a handgun, the jury is entitled to infer from the evidence that the defendant, with intent to commit theft, took property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, whether the victim was shot before the taking or after the taking. Lipham v. State, 257 Ga. 808, 364 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 873, 109 S. Ct. 191, 102 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1988).

- Defendant cannot be convicted of armed robbery where the offensive weapon used to perpetrate the armed robbery is also the only fruit of the armed robbery itself. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982).

- While defendant's crime may have begun as attempted robbery by intimidation or attempted robbery by sudden snatching, defendant's use of a gun to effectuate the taking upgraded the offense to armed robbery. McKissic v. State, 178 Ga. App. 23, 341 S.E.2d 903 (1986).

Whether instrument used constitutes a deadly weapon is properly for jury's determination. Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982), vacated, 163 Ga. App. 338, 295 S.E.2d 235 (1982).

- Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant separately on the separate conviction for terroristic threats and armed robbery since the evidence was sufficient to show the robbery was complete, when the money from the cash register was in the defendant's possession before the defendant made the alleged threat to the victim that the defendant would kill the victim if the victim moved. Thus, the threat was not part of the armed robbery, but the evidence was sufficient to show that the threat was made with the purpose of terrorizing the victim. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 588, 420 S.E.2d 96 (1992).

Proof was insufficient to sustain a conviction for armed robbery, where defendant initially snatched money from a store cash register but did not use a weapon to obtain it, the money was retrieved by the store manager, defendant sought to re-acquire it by using defendant's weapon, the manager refused to yield to defendant's threat, and nothing of value was obtained by use of an offensive weapon. Gatlin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 500, 405 S.E.2d 118 (1991).

Defendant's conviction for robbery had to be vacated because, pretermitting whether the state established that the defendant was in recent possession of the stolen jewelry, there had to be more evidence than the defendant was short and another suspects' testimony about recently possessed stolen property to support such a conviction. Robinson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 285, 822 S.E.2d 35 (2018).

- There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, where there were positive identifications from three robbery victims as well as bystander witnesses, defendant's clothing and gun matched the description of the robber, defendant was seen standing near the robbery getaway car, and the results of defendant's polygraph test supported the finding of guilt. Anderson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 428, 594 S.E.2d 669 (2004).

Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because the defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that the defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same victim's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified the defendant as the user of the shotgun, and the defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and the defendant's fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).

Despite the defendant's contention on appeal that the state's evidence was insufficient, specifically, regarding the presence of a gun, given that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon was being used in an armed robbery, when coupled with the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the robbery, the defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld; thus, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Fluellen v. State, 284 Ga. App. 584, 644 S.E.2d 486 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 when the state presented testimony that a codefendant took property from the immediate presence of the victims by use of an offensive weapon, that the defendant encouraged the codefendant, that the defendant was present during the robbery, and that the defendant shared in the proceeds of the crime. Rasheed v. Smith, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007)(Unpublished).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery as the defendant shot the victim twice in the head from behind, took the victim's money and marijuana, and divided the money and shared the marijuana with others. Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (2008).

Denial of a directed verdict on an armed robbery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was appropriate based on the testimony that the defendant brandished a handgun and threatened to kill the victim before taking several of the victim's belongings, including a videocassette recorder; the defendant used a weapon, and what was in the victim's immediate presence could be out of the victim's physical presence if it was under the victim's control and the victim was not too far distant. Wesley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 559, 669 S.E.2d 511 (2008).

Based on the victim's testimony that three individuals were walking together before the robbery occurred, positioned themselves around the victim during the robbery, and walked away together, the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Whether the defendant was a party to the crime was a question for the jury, which the jury chose to resolve against the defendant. Scott v. State, 297 Ga. App. 577, 677 S.E.2d 755 (2009).

Since the victim was cut and hit by a shotgun during a struggle with defendant in defendant's attempt to obtain money for drugs, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-8-41(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).

Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice's testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict and new trial because the jury could have determined that a witness's testimony provided corroboration for the codefendant's identification of the defendant; further corroboration for the testimony of the witness and the codefendant was provided by a neighbors' description of the robbery and shooting, by the description of the codefendant's wife of the codefendant's demeanor and behavior that day, and by physical evidence found at the scene. Williamson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 473, 708 S.E.2d 57 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, when the defendant planned the robbery, drove the robbers to the scene, supplied the weapon, functioned as a lookout, drove the getaway vehicle, and inquired about the proceeds of the crime. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012).

- In a prosecution for armed robbery, defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on lesser included offenses of theft by taking or robbery by intimidation where robberies were perpetrated by the use of a weapon in the possession of defendant's accomplice. Jones v. State, 233 Ga. App. 362, 504 S.E.2d 259 (1998).

- There was no need to reverse the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 after the jury acquitted the defendant of possession of a firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-123 as Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule with respect to criminal cases. Oliver v. State, 270 Ga. App. 429, 606 S.E.2d 874 (2004).

Intimidation involves use of violence or threats to influence conduct or compel consent of another. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148).

Intimidation is constructive force. Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 72, 70 S.E.2d 713 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2501).

Robbery by intimidation is the same as "putting in fear" at common law, and is constructive force, as when one through fear is induced to part with one's property. Rivers v. State, 46 Ga. App. 778, 169 S.E. 260 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148).

Intimidation consists in putting one in fear in some way. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148).

Intimidation is that act by the perpetrator which puts the person robbed in fear sufficient to suspend the free exercise of the person's will or prevent resistance to the taking, and a threat by a perpetrator to inflict harm constitutes the requisite force of intimidation if that threat of harm induces the victim/possessor of property to relinquish possession. Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003).

Intimidation involves creating apprehension which induces one to part with property for safety of person. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293 (1852) (decided prior to codification of this principle); Jordan v. State, 135 Ga. 434, 69 S.E. 562 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 151).

There can be no legal consent given in face of intimidation. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148).

Threats by word or gestures are the most usual means of intimidation and of themselves are sufficient to imply violence. Edenfield v. State, 41 Ga. App. 252, 152 S.E. 615 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148).

- When the defendant during a robbery had defendant's hand in a jacket pocket and pointed at the victim as though the defendant did have a weapon concealed in the pocket so that the victim thought the defendant had one, and that the victim was "scared" the testimony concerning the defendant's gestures and demands was sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 392 S.E.2d 280 (1990).

When the defendant approached the cashier with defendant's hand under the defendant's sweater and demanded money without employment of verbal threats or violence, the evidence was nonetheless sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Brown v. State, 210 Ga. App. 59, 435 S.E.2d 274 (1993).

Victim's testimony concerning defendant's gestures and demands at the time defendant approached, and stole, defendant's vehicle, was sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Hogan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 122, 435 S.E.2d 494 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation, as it showed defendant: entered a convenience store; gave the clerk a slip of paper that stated defendant had a gun and wanted money; emphasized that defendant was not playing games and that defendant would shoot the clerk; fled after defendant was given money from the store's register; and was identified by several witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime. Ferguson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 28, 584 S.E.2d 618 (2003).

- Because the sequential crimes of false imprisonment and robbery by intimidation were complete and independent of each other, each proven by different facts, the crimes did not merge. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

- Defendant was properly convicted of criminal intent to commit robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2) since the evidence showed that the defendant repeated the request for money, became more aggressive, and banged on the restroom door in order to get an employee out of the bathroom so that the defendant could get money. Brogdon v. State, 262 Ga. App. 673, 586 S.E.2d 344 (2003).

Evidence supported the defendant's robbery by intimidation and false imprisonment convictions and the codefendant's armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury convictions as the defendant lured the victim to the defendant's apartment where the codefendant struck the victim in the back of the head and robbed the victim at gunpoint. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004).

- When armed robbery count was broadly drafted so as to include an averment that the offense of armed robbery was accomplished by the taking of specified property both by means of intimidation and by use of an offensive weapon, it needed to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was accomplished by concomitant use of an offensive weapon; accordingly, in the absence of such a showing, while the circumstances of the taking would have supported a conviction for the lesser included offense of robbery, it would not have supported conviction of the greater offense of armed robbery. Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 430 S.E.2d 105 (1993), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000).

Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, was proper as there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for kidnapping, rape, and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40,16-6-1, and16-8-41, respectively, because the victim positively identified the defendant upon the defendant's arrest and at trial, there was similar transaction evidence from another victim who was approached and threatened in the same manner, and there was also corroborative physical evidence; the defendant threatened the victim, who was at a bus stop, with a gun and robbed the victim, forced the victim to a storage area in a garage, and raped the victim. Sims v. State, 275 Ga. App. 836, 621 S.E.2d 869 (2005).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as: (1) the defendant demanded that the victim give the defendant the victim's purse and then threatened the victim with a gun and told the victim that the defendant would use the gun; (2) feeling that the victim's life was in danger, the victim ran; (3) the defendant chased the victim and snatched the victim's purse; (4) two witnesses chased the defendant to an abandoned house, where the victim's purse was later found; (5) a witness obtained the tag number of the defendant's vehicle and police traced the vehicle to the defendant's mother; even assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the in-court identifications by a witness and the victim were admissible as the identifications were based on independent recollections. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006).

From the defendant's words, demeanor, companionship, and conduct before and after an armed robbery, a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the state established the requisite intent; the evidence authorized the jury to find that before an armed robbery, the defendant had planned to take money from a convenience store, the defendant's accomplice went into the store, took the money from the clerk at gunpoint, and then joined the defendant with the money, and that when the cohorts realized moments later that the police suspected the pair of the armed robbery, the defendant disobeyed police commands to stop, acted as the getaway driver in a high speed chase, and then tried to flee the police on foot. Espinosa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 69, 645 S.E.2d 529 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1281, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. 2007).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of robbery by intimidation. An accomplice's testimony, which included a detailed account of the defendant's participation in both the planning and execution of the crime, was corroborated by the victim, the actions of the defendant and others when police arrived at an apartment, evidence found inside the apartment, the defendant's appearance when the defendant encountered police, and, to a certain extent, another witness's testimony. Clark v. State, 294 Ga. App. 331, 670 S.E.2d 131 (2008).

Evidence that defendant and another person burst into a home after they had lured the victim brandishing an automatic gun and wearing black t-shirts that said "Sheriff," handcuffed the victim, took the victim's money, and forced the victim to write a bill of sale for the victim's motorcycle was sufficient to support convictions for robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and impersonating a peace officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-23. Powers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because despite the defendant's trial testimony claiming a friend took the defendant to pick up pizza while the robbery was in progress, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury was authorized to disbelieve the alibi defense the defendant proffered. Gordon v. State, 329 Ga. App. 2, 763 S.E.2d 357 (2014).

Included Offenses

Merger with aggravated assault.

- Conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged with the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the convictions both required proof of the same elements. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (2013).

Aggravated assault count merged into the conviction for armed robbery because the trial court failed to recognize that both charges arose from the same conduct, that of threatening the victim at gunpoint to make the victim open the cash register so the assailants could take cash and checks inside. Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 825 S.E.2d 162 (2019), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5561, 205 L. Ed. 2d 174 (U.S. 2019).

Trial court erred by failing to merge all of the aggravated assault convictions into the armed robbery conviction because all of the aggravated assault convictions were based on the defendant's commission of an assault with a deadly weapon. Irving v. State, 351 Ga. App. 779, 833 S.E.2d 162 (2019).

- As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Due to the entry of a guilty plea over 20 years before the filing of a motion to correct alleged illegal sentences, the defendant's merger claim was waived, and since the sentences imposed were not void, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over said motion for correction. Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge aggravated battery and armed robbery convictions. The evidence needed to prove each charge was entirely different as one charge demanded evidence that the defendant shot and seriously disfigured the victim, while the other required proof that the defendant took money from the victim at gunpoint. Smashum v. State, 293 Ga. App. 41, 666 S.E.2d 549 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 952 (Ga. 2008).

- Defendant's aggravated assault convictions were to be merged with armed robbery and kidnapping convictions as the same set of facts were used to prove the offenses. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

When a defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, the offense of criminal attempt armed robbery was complete, and the defendant's subsequent acts, including striking the driver on the head, were not necessary to prove that offense; thus, the attempt offense did not merge with aggravated assault offenses for sentencing purposes. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault merged into the defendant's conviction for attempted armed robbery because the relevant aggravated assault provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the attempted armed robbery as that offense could have been proved under the indictment in the case. Garland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 7, 714 S.E.2d 707 (2011).

- When the defendant was indicted in Fulton County on charges of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle, but the defendant had been previously convicted in Clayton County of theft by receiving stolen property by retaining the same car on the same day, the defendant's plea in bar and motion to dismiss the Fulton County indictment was improperly denied as the charges in the Fulton County case were mutually exclusive of the defendant's prior conviction for theft by receiving because the theft by receiving conviction contained an implicit and necessary finding that the defendant did not steal the car, and the charges of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle each required proof that the defendant actually took the car. Bonner v. State, 339 Ga. App. 539, 794 S.E.2d 186 (2016).

Robbery by intimidation is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Griffeth v. State, 154 Ga. App. 643, 269 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Mickle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 206, 300 S.E.2d 210 (1983).

Evidence authorizing conviction of robbery by use of offensive weapon authorizes conviction of robbery by intimidation. Holcomb v. State, 230 Ga. 525, 198 S.E.2d 179 (1973); Brown v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 677, 203 S.E.2d 542 (1974).

Trial court did not err by charging the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation when defendant was only indicted for armed robbery. Mills v. State, 244 Ga. App. 28, 535 S.E.2d 1 (2000).

Trial court properly charged the jury as to the lesser-included offense of robbery by intimidation as O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 unequivocally provided that robbery by intimidation was a lesser-included offense of the offense of armed robbery; thus, in light of the evidence that the defendant robbed the victim by use of a firearm as an offensive weapon, which would authorize a conviction of armed robbery, the robbery by intimidation jury charge and conviction were authorized. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

Robbery by intimidation did not have to be considered as a lesser included offense in defendant's trial for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because, even though defendant denied pointing a gun at the victim while demanding the victim's car, armed robbery only required use of an offensive weapon in committing the robbery and, since defendant did not actually deny having the gun and the victim testified that the victim was persuaded to give up the car because of the gun, there was no evidence that the robbery was committed without the use of a gun. Carter v. State, 257 Ga. App. 620, 571 S.E.2d 831 (2002).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury a lesser included instruction on robbery by intimidation in defendant's armed robbery trial, as the evidence showed the completed offense of armed robbery where defendant displayed a screwdriver during the robbery to a store clerk, and defendant admitted that defendant carried the screwdriver during the robbery. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004).

When both robbery victims testified that the defendant wielded a gun during the robbery, and the defendant's accomplice, in a pretrial statement and in letters to the prosecutor, stated that the defendant used a gun to perpetrate the robbery, and when, even at trial, the accomplice did not deny that a gun was used during the robbery, the defendant in a trial for armed robbery was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Jordan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 126, 628 S.E.2d 221 (2006).

Offenses of robbery and armed robbery did not merge as a matter of law, where separate incidents (the simple taking of the pistol and the taking of the other items at gunpoint) involved different actions, different specific objectives or intents, and different victims. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988).

- Because armed robbery was punishable by life imprisonment, it was not a transferable offense, and a trial court was without authority to transfer the armed robbery case from superior court to juvenile court. State v. Harper, 271 Ga. App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699 (2005).

- When a state's evidence clearly warranted jury instruction on armed robbery, which was given, and there was no evidence of the lesser offense of theft by taking, there was no error in failing to give the requested jury instruction. Shepherd v. State, 234 Ga. 75, 214 S.E.2d 535 (1975).

It is not error to fail to charge defendant with theft by taking, as lesser offense included in charge of armed robbery or robbery by intimidation, unless evidence authorizes finding of lesser offense. Sanders v. State, 135 Ga. App. 436, 218 S.E.2d 140 (1975).

Evidence showed that the defendant committed robbery either by use of a replica of a handgun or by intimidation and no evidence was presented that intimidation was not used in the robbery; therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and robbery by intimidation. Espinoza v. State, 243 Ga. App. 665, 534 S.E.2d 127 (2000).

When the same evidence that was used to prove the armed robbery charges against the defendant was also used to prove the theft by taking charges and the property in question was taken from the victims' possession in the same incident in a store and constituted a single crime, the theft by taking offenses were lesser included offenses of the armed robbery offenses as a matter of fact pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) and should have merged into those convictions for sentencing purposes. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the crimes of armed robbery and theft by taking, and expressly stated that in the event that the jury did not believe that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could convict on the lesser offense of theft by taking, given that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of guilt on the armed robbery charge, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim that the victim knowingly assisted in the planning and perpetration of the crime. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007).

In a trial for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, a charge on the lesser included offense of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 was not warranted under circumstances in which the defendant used force to take the victim's purse and then the victim's money; the fact that the purse was not in the victim's hands during the second taking did not preclude an armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008).

Because theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, a defendant charged with two counts of party to the crime of armed robbery was not entitled to a jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property. Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

- Although armed robbery requires proof of the use of an offensive weapon and proof that the property was taken from the presence of a person, whereas theft by taking does not, theft by taking does not require proof of any facts separate from those required for armed robbery. Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008).

Theft by taking charge did not merge with an armed robbery charge because under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 theft by taking requires the intent to deprive the owner of property, while armed robbery is a completely separate offense, which under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 is complete once the property is taken. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985).

When the armed robbery involved the taking of currency at gunpoint from the immediate possession of a convenience store cashier who was attempting to make a nightly bank deposit, while the theft conviction involved the subsequent taking of the cashier's automobile, the evidence establishing the commission of the one crime is not the same as the evidence which established commission of the other crime, and the defendant's contention that the theft conviction should have merged with the armed robbery conviction is without merit. Miller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 563, 359 S.E.2d 359 (1987).

- Elements and the culpable mental state required of burglary and attempted armed robbery are different; a trial court did not err in refusing to merge defendant's burglary and attempted armed robbery convictions because the facts which proved each crime were different and because neither of those crimes was included in the other. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 248, 596 S.E.2d 743 (2004).

Merger of armed robbery and burglary charges was not required because not only are the elements and the culpable mental state required of these crimes different, but the facts which proved each crime were different. Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 523 S.E.2d 103 (1999).

Defendant's burglary conviction was upheld on appeal, and not subject to reversal merely because of a jury's acquittal of an armed robbery charge, as: (1) the verdict was inconsistent, not mutually exclusive; and (2) the inconsistent verdict rule was abolished in Georgia two decades ago; furthermore, the rule was not implicated when verdicts of guilty and not guilty were returned. Einglett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 497, 642 S.E.2d 160 (2007).

- Because attempted burglary and conspiracy to commit armed robbery each required different statutory elements and, thus, required proof of a fact the other did not, the crimes did not merge. Owens v. State, 353 Ga. App. 616, 838 S.E.2d 909 (2020).

- Defendant's separate convictions for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy as O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d) provided that hijacking a motor vehicle was a separate offense and did not merge and it therefore superseded the state statutory double jeopardy provision; further, the Georgia Constitution did not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense that the Georgia legislature had deemed to warrant a separate sanction; the defendant failed to show how the hijacking statute violated the federal double jeopardy clause. Mullins v. State, 280 Ga. App. 689, 634 S.E.2d 850 (2006).

- Offense of false imprisonment requires proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of armed robbery does not. Consequently, under the "required evidence" test, a defendant's false imprisonment conviction did not merge into the defendant's armed robbery conviction. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008).

Counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and armed robbery did not merge. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

- Court of appeals erred in reversing the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft by taking since there was no evidence that the included crime was committed in the county in which the defendant was being tried; although the state was unwilling to allow the defendant to waive venue or stipulate that what occurred was a theft by taking that happened entirely in Clayton County, the defendant was free to present evidence and argue to the jury that while the defendant was guilty of committing theft by taking in Clayton County, the defendant was not guilty of armed robbery in DeKalb County. But the defendant could not require the state to agree that the defendant committed theft by taking in Clayton County or require the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense over which the court lacked venue. State v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 706, 691 S.E.2d 207 (2010).

Simple battery is not a lesser offense of armed robbery. Jackson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 487, 297 S.E.2d 502 (1982).

Offenses of aggravated battery and armed robbery merged as a matter of fact, where the aggravated battery indictment was drawn to charge the same serious bodily harm inflicted by a knife in the course of an armed robbery, and thus the same facts necessary to prove the aggravated battery charge were used upon proving the armed robbery charge. Whitner v. State, 198 Ga. App. 300, 401 S.E.2d 318 (1991).

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated battery conviction into the defendant's armed robbery conviction because the taking of the victim's property was not a fact required to establish the aggravated battery offense, and depriving the victim of a member of the victim's body was not a fact required to establish the armed robbery offense; and, while the aggravated battery and armed robbery were based on the same criminal transaction, aggravated battery, and armed robbery did not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibited entirely different categories of injury - depriving the victim of a member of the victim's body versus depriving the victim of property. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

- Because: (1) evidence presented against the second of two defendants, jointly charged, that the victim was beaten over the head with a pistol showed a completed aggravated assault prior to the armed robbery, and (2) possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery, as there was an expressed legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes, the offenses did not merge. Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga. App. 450, 629 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Defendant-B's punches to the victim's face upon defendant-A's demand for the victim's property amounted to an assault with attempt to rob, which justified one of defendant-B's convictions for aggravated assault, the formulation of a plan to rob someone at a convenience store with defendant-A and defendant-A's aggravated assault in pointing a gun at the victim constituted a second aggravated assault, and an armed robbery of the victim's property constituted the armed robbery; as each of the three crimes was proven by three different sets of facts, there was no error in the trial court's failure to have merged defendant-B's aggravated assault convictions, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, into the armed robbery conviction, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Trial court's decision not to merge the conviction of kidnapping, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, with defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-41, was proper under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), as the facts that supported the kidnapping were not the same as those that supported the convictions for the other offenses; the kidnapping occurred when defendant forced three store employees into an office, the aggravated assaults occurred when defendant pointed a gun at one employee's head and hit another employee with it, and the armed robbery occurred when defendant took money from the store safe. Hill v. State, 279 Ga. App. 666, 632 S.E.2d 443 (2006).

Because the trial court set aside the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, a claim that the trial court erred in failing to merge the aggravated assault with an armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes lacked merit. Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga. App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (2008).

As the offense of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), required proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), did not, under the "required evidence" test of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge into the defendant's robbery by intimidation conviction. Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591, 667 S.E.2d 439 (2008).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge counts of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the assault was completed before the armed robbery; the evidence showed that the defendant confronted the victim by entering the room with a pistol and threatening the victim, at which point, the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was completed. The evidence further showed that after threatening the victim, presumably to prevent the victim from retaliating against the defendant for a prior altercation, the defendant ordered the victim to empty the victim's pockets at gunpoint and took $200 from the victim, which comprised the armed robbery. Ransom v. State, 298 Ga. App. 360, 680 S.E.2d 200 (2009).

As the armed robberies and aggravated assaults the defendant was charged with were committed against the different victims, the crimes did not merge as a matter of law or fact. Verdree v. State, 299 Ga. App. 673, 683 S.E.2d 632 (2009).

Defendant's sentence for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), was not void as a result of the trial court's failure to merge the convictions because the convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes since the crimes did not involve the same conduct; the crime of armed robbery was complete when the defendant entered a restaurant and, with the use of a handgun, demanded and took money from a waitress, and, after completion of the armed robbery, the defendant pushed the gun against the waitress's neck and asked whether the waitress wanted to die, which formed the basis of the aggravated assault conviction. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Because defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) for armed robbery could be sustained based upon defendant's conduct with a shotgun, and because defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) for aggravated assault could be sustained based upon defendant's conduct with a knife, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), the two convictions did not merge. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault did not merge because each crime required proof of conduct that the other did not; the armed robbery as charged in the indictment required proof of an intent to rob and that the victim's wallet was taken, while the aggravated assaults required proof that the victim's neck was slashed with a sharp weapon. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).

Trial court was correct not to merge the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault because although the defendant's conviction for the armed robbery of the victim resulted from a holdup, the conviction for aggravated assault was based on the defendant's forcing the shotgun down the victim's throat later in a bathroom. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).

Trial court did not err when the court refused to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions because the armed robbery and aggravated assault were separate and distinct acts; the victim's testimony showed that the armed robbery was complete before the commission of the aggravated assault. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

- Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator who stole a victim's car and purse at gunpoint, coupled with evidence of the defendant's flight from police, possession of the stolen car, and possession of the revolver used in the crimes was sufficient to support convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; however, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the armed robbery conviction and sentence. Doublette v. State, 278 Ga. App. 746, 629 S.E.2d 602 (2006).

Merger of an aggravated assault count into an armed robbery count was required when the only evidence was that the defendant used a gun to rob the victim. There was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began; thus, there having been no additional violence used against the victim, it followed that the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the armed robbery. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 98, 679 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

Trial court erred in failing to merge aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, counts because the state relied on the same act of assault to establish the defendant's guilt of aggravated assault and armed robbery, and although the state would have been able to indict the defendant for aggravated assault based on conduct separate and distinct from the defendant's act of hitting the victim in the head with a baseball bat, the indictment specifically charged the defendant with the offense of aggravated assault; while armed robbery requires proof of additional facts, like aggravated assault with intent to rob, aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require proof of a fact not required to establish armed robbery. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 395, 696 S.E.2d 686 (2010).

Defendant's aggravated assault convictions merged into the defendant's armed robbery convictions because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), that was not contained in armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of a fact that armed robbery does not, and because the assault requirement of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "use of an offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery, the "deadly weapon" requirement of this form of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery. Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 700 S.E.2d 399 (2010).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction should have merged into defendant's armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes because the defendant's use of the defendant's handgun against the victim was the same conduct in both offenses, designed to immobilize the victim while the victim was robbed. The aggravated assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the armed robbery. Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 702 S.E.2d 731 (2010).

Plea counsel performed deficiently in failing to argue for the merger of the defendant's convictions and sentences for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charges did not require proof of a fact that the armed robbery charges did not likewise require, and the defendant's aggravated assault convictions unquestionably merged into the defendant's armed-robbery convictions; the armed robbery counts in the indictment provided that the defendant unlawfully, with intent to commit theft, did take property from the person of the victim, by use of an offensive weapon, and the aggravated assault counts provided that the defendant did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of the victim with a steel rod, a deadly weapon, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury, by beating the victim about the head and face with the steel rod. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Trial court's failure to merge the defendant's aggravated assault conviction with the defendant's armed robbery conviction in imposing the sentence was erroneous because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that was not contained in armed robbery; both crimes required proof of an intent to rob because the elements of the defendant's armed robbery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) included an intent to rob, the use of an offensive weapon, and the taking of property from the person or presence of another, and the elements of the defendant's aggravated assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) included an assault upon the victim, an intent to rob, and the use of a deadly weapon. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Because the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault arose from the same act or transaction, the defendant's taking money from the victim at gunpoint, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction against that victim merged with the armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).

Trial court erred by failing to merge an aggravated assault charge into an armed robbery charge because the victim testified repeatedly that the defendant was in the victim's apartment when the defendant shot the victim and that the victim fired a gun as soon as the victim saw the defendant point a gun at the victim while forcing the defendant's way in; both crimes were complete when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim while simultaneously entering the apartment, and there was no separate aggravated assault before the armed robbery began. Davis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (2011).

Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), into the defendant's conviction for armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because the act of using an offensive weapon for the purposes of committing an armed robbery was the legal equivalent of assault for the purposes of committing an aggravated assault; it is not determinative under the merger analysis that the desired object of a defendant's armed robbery was something other than that which he or she actually took, but instead, what dictates merger is the fact that both crimes for which the defendant was convicted were predicated upon the same conduct. Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 66, 720 S.E.2d 181 (2011).

Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly or offensive weapon and armed robbery convictions for sentencing purposes because hitting a victim in the head with a handgun while demanding money were not separate and distinct acts but one uninterrupted criminal transaction. Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 743 S.E.2d 617 (2013).

After the trial court merged the defendant's aggravated assault conviction into the defendant's armed robbery conviction, and then sentenced the defendant for armed robbery and aggravated battery, even if the trial court should have merged the defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions, the end result would have been the same as the defendant would have been sentenced for aggravated battery rather than aggravated assault, given that the aggravated assault constituted the included offense; thus, any error by the trial court in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions was harmless and provided no basis for vacating the defendant's sentence. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

- Because the assault element of a defendant's aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) was contained within the "use of an offensive weapon" element of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, and both crimes shared the "intent to rob" element, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction. Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010).

Trial court erred in not merging a defendant's aggravated assault with attempt to rob conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-21(a), into the defendant's armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. The offense of armed robbery contained a requirement, the taking of property, that aggravated assault did not, but aggravated assault with intent to rob did not require proof of a fact which armed robbery did not. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 541, 713 S.E.2d 689 (2011).

- There was no merit to a defendant's argument that a guilty verdict on an aggravated assault charge as to one of the victims was inconsistent with a not guilty verdict on an armed robbery charge as to that victim. The inconsistent verdict rule was abolished; moreover, since the crimes had different elements, the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty of assaulting both victims but robbing only one of the victims. Bethune v. State, 291 Ga. App. 674, 662 S.E.2d 774 (2008).

- When a defendant had been convicted of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes, the trial court did not err by failing to merge the armed robbery counts into the felony murder count predicated on the underlying felony of armed robbery as the felony murder count was vacated by operation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7, and the defendant could be sentenced for the felony conviction so long as the felony was not included in the murder as a matter of fact or law; here, the armed robbery was not included in the malice murder charge as a matter of fact or law; evidence showing the defendant's intent to rob the victim was not used in proving the murder, and evidence that the defendant shot the victim was not used to prove the armed robbery. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery was properly not merged into a malice murder conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1), based on the "required evidence" test, as each offense required proof of an element that the other did not. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).

Count of possession of firearm by convicted felon does not merge with a related armed robbery charge. Smallwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. 247, 304 S.E.2d 95 (1983); McGee v. State, 173 Ga. App. 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985).

Armed robbery is not a lesser included offense of malice murder. Chafin v. State, 246 Ga. 709, 273 S.E.2d 147 (1980).

Armed robbery is not a lesser included offense of malice murder when the defendant was a party to both armed robbery and the codefendant's murder of the victim. Hoerner v. State, 246 Ga. 374, 271 S.E.2d 458 (1980).

When proof of the armed robbery is essential to the conviction for felony murder, the armed robbery is a lesser included offense in the felony murder. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983).

Armed robbery and kidnapping are clearly not included offenses as a matter of law. Nor are they included offenses as a matter of fact where the two offenses are based on separate acts. Emmett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 650, 405 S.E.2d 707 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 405 S.E.2d 707 (1991); Jordan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 408, 530 S.E.2d 42 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Shields v. State, 276 Ga. 669, 581 S.E.2d 536 (2003).

Kidnapping was completed when defendant seized the women and forcibly moved them from one location in the store to another, and then defendant committed the armed robbery; accordingly, convictions for both offenses did not amount to two punishments for the same conduct, nor was one offense included in the other as a matter of fact. Phillips v. State, 259 Ga. App. 331, 577 S.E.2d 25 (2003).

Since the sentences imposed upon an inmate upon the inmate's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping were within the statutory guidelines under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40(b) and16-8-41(b), they were upheld; further, because armed robbery and kidnapping did not merge, the inmate was properly sentenced separately for those different crimes. Benjamin v. State, 269 Ga. App. 232, 603 S.E.2d 733 (2004).

Armed robbery and aggravated assault with deadly weapon are separate crimes; one is not included in the other and neither prohibits a designated kind of conduct generally while the other prohibits specific instance of such conduct. Roberts v. State, 228 Ga. 298, 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971).

- Aggravated assault and armed robbery are different crimes as a matter of law. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merge as a matter of fact. Lowery v. State, 209 Ga. App. 5, 432 S.E.2d 576 (1993).

Aggravated assault and armed robbery are not always different crimes as a matter of fact. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

When an indictment alleged that an aggravated assault was committed with a firearm by shooting the victims, and an armed robbery alleged the use of an offensive weapon, the aggravated assault charge was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merged as a matter of fact. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Offense of aggravated assault merged with offense of armed robbery, where the aggravated assault alleged separately in the indictment was the same assault alleged to have been committed in the course of the armed robbery. Cherry v. State, 178 Ga. App. 483, 343 S.E.2d 510 (1986).

Defendant's five convictions of aggravated assault merged with defendant's conviction on five counts of attempted armed robbery, where defendant's act of pointing a pistol at bank employees when defendant announced an intent to rob the bank was the act underlying both the convictions for attempted armed robbery and for aggravated assault. Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986).

Aggravated assault was included in armed robbery as a matter of fact, where it was not the initial pointing of a pistol at the victim which prompted the victim to open a cash drawer but the subsequent cocking of the weapon by the assailant after the victim told the assailant there was no money and the actual firing of the weapon occurred virtually at the same moment, as the victim was hitting the button to open the drawer. Moreland v. State, 183 Ga. App. 113, 358 S.E.2d 276 (1987).

When the defendant's offense of attempted armed robbery was included in offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob a restaurant manager, only one sentence should have been imposed in connection with the two charges. Redding v. State, 193 Ga. App. 50, 386 S.E.2d 907 (1989).

Aggravated assault count merged into robbery count since the only aggravated assault (committed by the defendant) shown by the evidence was that by which the commission of the robbery was effectuated. Since there was no additional, gratuitous violence employed against the victim, the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the robbery. Head v. State, 202 Ga. App. 209, 413 S.E.2d 533 (1991).

Where the indictment was inartfully drawn so that the same shooting was used to prove both offenses under the indictment as drawn, the aggravated assault merged with the armed robbery, requiring vacating the conviction for aggravated assault. Lowery v. State, 209 Ga. App. 5, 432 S.E.2d 576 (1993).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction should have merged with defendant's armed robbery conviction as the two convictions were based on the same conduct in sticking a gun to a victim's head with the intent to rob the victim. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).

Defendants' aggravated assault convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as simultaneous with showing the gun, defendants made clear that they intended to rob the victims, which they proceeded to do; there was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Defendants' aggravated assault by striking a victim with a gun convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as the robbery was not complete until the gunman struck the victim with the gun, thereby allowing defendant one to take the victim's money. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to ask at sentencing that defendant's convictions for aggravated assault be merged into the armed robbery convictions was rejected as the convictions were merged at the motion for a new trial hearing. Buchanan v. State, 273 Ga. App. 174, 614 S.E.2d 786 (2005).

Because all of the facts used to prove the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob were used up in proving the armed robbery, merger was required. Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (2008).

Aggravated assault charge did not merge with an armed robbery charge because separate facts were used to prove each crime and the elements of each crime were separate. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985).

Conviction for aggravated assault did not merge with conviction for armed robbery since the evidence showed that the defendant had completed the armed robbery at the time the defendant assaulted the security guard. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).

Aggravated assaults did not merge with the robbery of two victims, where the robberies were completed, both victims having been deprived of their property, when they were marched off for another criminal purpose and the aggravated assaults on each victim occurred. Glass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 530, 405 S.E.2d 522 (1991).

Aggravated assault conviction did not merge with armed robbery offenses for sentencing purposes because each crime required proof of an additional fact as the robbery required proof that the defendant took the property of another, which was not required to prove aggravated assault, and assault required proof that the victim was placed in reasonable fear of immediately receiving a violent injury, which armed robbery did not require. Nava v. State, 301 Ga. App. 497, 687 S.E.2d 901 (2009).

Aggravated assault did not merge with kidnapping and armed robbery charges because each count relied on separate facts. Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).

- There was no violation of defendant's protection from double jeopardy in defendant's having been convicted of and punished for both the aggravated assault and armed robbery of the victim when the indictment charged armed robbery with the specific intent to commit a theft and the two acts were in fact separate though in close succession. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986).

Aggravated assault is not included in attempted armed robbery as a matter of law, although these two offenses may as a matter of fact merge if the same facts are used to prove both offenses. However, when the underlying facts show that one crime was completed prior to the second crime, so that the crimes are separate as a matter of law, there is no merger. Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557, 372 S.E.2d 429 (1988).

Convictions and sentences for both armed robbery and aggravated assault were proper since each offense charged was clearly supported by its own set of facts. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988).

- There was no merger of robbery by force and armed robbery when the evidence showed that the theft of the victim's pistol was accomplished by force and, subsequently, the defendant used the pistol to strike the victim's head and shoulders prior to stealing her pocketbook. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994).

Conviction for attempt to commit armed robbery did not merge with conviction for armed robbery since, although both offenses occurred at the same place and at the same time and under the same circumstances, the object of the offenses was different and the victims were different. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).

- Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge with an attempted armed robbery conviction because the crime of possession of a firearm is considered to be a separate offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) and (e). McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).

When uncontradicted evidence shows completion of greater offense, charge on robbery by force not required. Jordan v. State, 239 Ga. 526, 238 S.E.2d 69 (1977).

When all the evidence proved the greater offense of armed robbery, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Mallory v. State, 166 Ga. App. 812, 305 S.E.2d 656 (1983).

When the evidence showed clearly an armed robbery by use of an offensive weapon, and there was no evidence of robbery by intimidation or theft by taking, a charge on those lesser offenses was not required. Echols v. State, 172 Ga. App. 431, 323 S.E.2d 289 (1984).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request to charge on robbery by force as a lesser included offense of armed robbery since the person from whom the bank deposit was taken testified that the defendant was armed with a silver colored, stainless steel revolver. Regardless of whether a gun was ever recovered by law enforcement officers or placed in evidence, the evidence proved the greater offense or none at all. Coker v. State, 207 Ga. App. 482, 428 S.E.2d 578 (1993).

Even if defendant decided to take victim's money only after twice shooting the victim, the jury was authorized to find that the offense of murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of the offense of armed robbery. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 340 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 243, 93 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1986).

Acquittal of lesser crime bars conviction on greater. State v. Rowe, 138 Ga. App. 904, 228 S.E.2d 3 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Cleary v. State, 258 Ga. 203, 366 S.E.2d 677 (1988).

Application

Theft of automobile may constitute armed robbery.

- While theft of an automobile may be committed without committing armed robbery, theft of an automobile may constitute armed robbery. Roberts v. State, 228 Ga. 298, 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971); Ferguson v. State, 221 Ga. App. 415, 471 S.E.2d 528 (1996).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict with regard to the convictions of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle because the evidence supported the jury's finding that the defendant took the victim's car after pointing a gun at the victim and the fact that the victim fled to a nearby hiding place from where the police were called did not negate that the victim's vehicle was taken from the victim's presence by force and violence. Merritt v. State, 353 Ga. App. 374, 837 S.E.2d 521 (2020).

Force or intimidation essential to robbery must either precede or be contemporaneous with taking rather than subsequent to taking. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d 829 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3222, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1976), execution of death sentence stayed pending action on rehearing petition, 497 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 11, 111 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1990).

In order to establish armed robbery a showing is required that the defendant took property by force and that the force was exerted prior to or contemporaneous with the taking. Lobosco v. Thomas, 928 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1991).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41, because: (1) defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the love interest saw defendant and defendant showed the love interest a stack of cash, and defendant told the love interest it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with defendant and defendant told the informant that defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that defendant got the layout of the house from the love interest. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because, in the second robbery: (1) defendant robbed the second bank using a replica of a bomb; (2) there were identifications by the victim, the driver of the car, and the driver's companion; (3) there were fingerprints linking defendant to the get-away car and the materials used to assemble the fake bomb; and (4) there was the driver's testimony, and because, in the first robbery, although the evidence was not as strong, a reasonable jury could have found that defendant also robbed the first bank using a replica bomb based on defendant's identification as the individual who entered another bank, the similarities between that individual and the first bank robber, and the shoes worn by defendant at the time of defendant's arrest. Jones v. State, 266 Ga. App. 679, 598 S.E.2d 65 (2004).

Evidence which showed that a victim died from a gunshot wound to the chest, that police found the victim's property on defendant when defendant was arrested, and that witnesses heard the shots and saw defendant running away from the scene of the shooting was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and the trial court did not err when it gave the jury an Allen charge during defendant's trial or because it did not instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Johnson v. State, 278 Ga. 136, 598 S.E.2d 502 (2004).

Because the defendant was identified by the victim as the robber and none of the proffered testimony related to an immediate threat, it was highly unlikely that the defendant was misidentified; consequently, because the trial court properly excluded defendant's coercion defense, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that defense. Treadwell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 508, 613 S.E.2d 3 (2005).

Because the victim was present at the time the victim's shotgun was being stolen in a nearby room, the force essential to an armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was contemporaneous with the taking. McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 669 S.E.2d 466 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery because during the confrontation, the defendant stated to one of the victims that the defendant had shot a person the day before; shooting the victims when the defendant was frustrated in the robbery attempts was consistent with the defendant's behavior toward the other victims. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Gun lying in front of the defendant, coupled with threats, satisfies armed robbery elements. Store clerk's observation of the gun lying on a counter in front of the defendant, coupled with the defendant's threats to "blow her brains out" if the clerk failed to give the defendant money, satisfied elements of armed robbery even though the clerk did not see the gun in the defendant's hands. Doby v. State, 173 Ga. App. 348, 326 S.E.2d 506 (1985).

- Offense of armed robbery is committed merely by armed taking of "property of another," regardless of whether the property's value is great or small. Maxey v. State, 159 Ga. App. 503, 284 S.E.2d 23 (1981).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the defendant's testimony affirmed that the front-seat passenger pulled a gun on the victim, but never addressed whether or not money was taken; O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) presents no requirement of proof of value. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).

- Trial court did not err in admitting a copy of the defendant's fingerprint card, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-14 and24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803 and24-10-1003), despite the defendant's claim that the testifying witness lacked personal knowledge with regard to the circumstances or time of the creation or transmission of the same as the card itself showed that it was created and transmitted at the time of the defendant's arrest, and was handled in the gathering agency's regular and routine course of business. Tubbs v. State, 283 Ga. App. 578, 642 S.E.2d 205 (2007).

- Testimony of two witnesses that the defendant took the money of one witness at gunpoint was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, despite the defendant's argument that the conviction should not stand because no money was recovered from either the defendant or the scene of the crime. Singleton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 184, 577 S.E.2d 6 (2003).

- Failure to include particular value of stolen goods in indictment offered no obstacle to defendant preparing a defense; it did not prejudice defendant nor establish a fatal variance where ample proof of amount, type, and ownership of such property was introduced by state. Stephens v. State, 239 Ga. 446, 238 S.E.2d 29 (1977).

When the defendant shoots the victim immediately before taking the victim's personal belongings, the victim's actions fall within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Brown v. State, 251 Ga. 598, 308 S.E.2d 182 (1983).

- That victim died from force used either immediately, or subsequent to taking, does not make the offense any less a robbery. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d 829 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3222, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1976), execution of death sentence stayed pending action on rehearing petition, 497 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 11, 111 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1990).

Conviction for armed robbery was authorized even though the property was taken from the victim only after the victim had been killed. Francis v. State, 266 Ga. 69, 463 S.E.2d 859 (1995).

- Fact that accused and accomplices gained possession of article taken from victim by snatching same from the victim's possession does not operate to reduce offense to robbery by intimidation or robbery by sudden snatching where at time snatching took place, victim and the victim's companion were under restraint of offensive weapons. Geter v. State, 226 Ga. 236, 173 S.E.2d 680 (1970).

- Defendant's claim that the defendant did not have the mens rea to commit armed robbery because the defendant's conduct demonstrated the defendant never intended to take the victim's phone for the defendant's own use was unavailing as the jury could have found that breaking the phone was putting it to the defendant's use by preventing the victim from using the phone to call police. McCullough v. State, 351 Ga. App. 385, 830 S.E.2d 745 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1617, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 153 (2020).

- When the defendant was in escape phase of crime, which is as essential to execution of armed robbery as theft itself because purpose of armed robbery is to get away with contraband, it makes no difference whether the appellant was armed or not during the appellant's escape as an armed robbery does not by implication require an armed escape; therefore, the armed robbery was not abandoned. Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1346, 63 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 285 S.E.2d 3 (1981); Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993), overruled on other grounds, McClellan v. State, 274 Ga. 819, 561 S.E.2d 82 (2002).

- When the defendant, on appeal, conceded to being present and participating in the armed robbery and the assault that occurred along with the robbery, but contended (as defendant did at trial) that the defendant was not a voluntary participant in the crimes but acted only out of fear for the defendant's own life through the coercion of other participants in the crimes, it was held that the jury was presented sufficient admissible evidence to establish to the satisfaction of a rational trier of fact that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. August v. State, 180 Ga. App. 510, 349 S.E.2d 532 (1986).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial since the state disproved the defendant's coercion defense that the defendant was forced to participate in the robbery of a restaurant because the defendant's cohorts had threatened to take the defendant's children away as the defendant never drove away from the scene of the crime while waiting outside of the restaurant, the defendant actually entered the restaurant during the crime, and the defendant never indicated a need for protection for the children once apprehended. Engrisch v. State, 293 Ga. App. 810, 668 S.E.2d 319 (2008).

- When the defendant testified that the codefendant conceived of the robbery without the defendant's knowledge or participation and that only the codefendant was armed, the defendant did acknowledge pretending to have a gun and giving orders to the store occupants, the defendant's own testimony was sufficient to authorize a conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault, and insufficient to support a defense of coercion. House v. State, 203 Ga. App. 55, 416 S.E.2d 108, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 108 (1992).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies because the only evidence of coercion came from defendant personally. To disprove the coercion defense, the victim testified that defendant did not appear nervous, that the robbery occurred very quickly, with no "fumbling" or "bumbling" on defendant's part, and that defendant commented that defendant was robbing the victim because defendant needed a place to stay. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions arising from the defendant's participation in a robbery which resulted in the death of a store clerk since, knowing that the cousin was going to commit a robbery, the defendant voluntarily went with the cousin, saw that the cousin had a gun, agreed to "stand over" the scene, and joined the cousin in using the victim's credit cards afterwards; contrary to the defendant's assertions, testimony showed that the defendant was not intimidated by the cousin. Scott v. State, 280 Ga. 466, 629 S.E.2d 211 (2006).

In a bench trial for armed robbery and aggravated assault, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the state had sufficiently disproved the defendant's defense that the defendant had been coerced by one of the defendant's companions into committing the crimes; the defendant had not mentioned coercion in either of the defendant's two statements to police, one in which the defendant had admitted to committing the crimes, and it was not until trial that the defendant claimed coercion. Edwards v. State, 285 Ga. App. 227, 645 S.E.2d 699 (2007).

Trial court erred in denying a codefendant's motion to sever the trial from the defendant's trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant's antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant's9-1-1 calls or custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant's vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant's defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for robbery, burglary, and other related crimes, the testimony of a codefendant that implicated the defendant was sufficiently corroborated by other testimony and evidence at trial. Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 668 S.E.2d 306 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and sexual battery because there was at least slight evidence from sources extraneous to a coconspirator as to the defendant's identity and participation in a home invasion and robbery; the coconspirator testified that the coconspirator attended a meeting to plan the robbery and that the meeting occurred at the apartment where the defendant resided, and extraneous evidence connected the defendant to at least two home invasions that employed the same modus operandi. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant's conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).

Codefendant's testimony constituted direct evidence that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the codefendants in committing the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and intentionally advised, encouraged, and counseled them to commit the crimes, and there was sufficient corroboration of the codefendant's testimony, including a recorded telephone call between the defendant and a second codefendant, the defendant's own testimony at trial, and the defendant's statements to law enforcement. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017).

Testimony by the victim that the defendant led the victim to the location where the accomplice was waiting with a gun to rob the victim, that the defendant simply walked away when the accomplice appeared with a gun, and that the accomplice did not pursue the defendant or attempt to hinder the defendant's exit from the scene, and the accomplice's testimony that the two planned to rob the victim was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Harp v. State, 347 Ga. App. 610, 820 S.E.2d 449 (2018).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony implicating the defendant in the robbery because the testimony of the victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator and was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony. Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013).

- In indictment for robbery, ownership of property taken may be laid in person having actual lawful possession of the property, although the person may be holding the property merely as agent of another; and it is not necessary to set forth in indictment fact that person in whom ownership is laid is holding the property merely as agent of real owner. Cline v. State, 153 Ga. App. 576, 266 S.E.2d 266 (1980).

- Trial court charge that one commits armed robbery by use of an offensive weapon or any replica was not error where the defendant was indicted for armed robbery by use of a pistol. Booker v. State, 164 Ga. App. 176, 296 S.E.2d 752 (1982).

Variances between property descriptions will not be fatal at trial when armed taking is proved. Maxey v. State, 159 Ga. App. 503, 284 S.E.2d 23 (1981).

- When the indictment charged that the crime was committed by use of "an offensive weapon, to-wit: a gun," and the proof showed that the gun was but a starter's pistol which could not fire live rounds, since armed robbery can be committed with a real weapon or with a toy or replica having the appearance of a real weapon, the indictment put the defendant on notice definitely of the charge against the defendant and protected the defendant from further prosecution for the same offense, and there was no fatal variance. Hamilton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 197, 348 S.E.2d 735 (1986).

There was no fatal variance between the indictment that alleged that the defendant committed armed robbery by use of a pellet pistol and evidence that showed that the weapon used was a BB gun. Jones v. State, 312 Ga. App. 15, 717 S.E.2d 526 (2011).

- Indictment alleging that defendants "with the intent to commit a theft, did take automobile by use of a knife, an offensive weapon" alleged all the essential elements of armed robbery. Campbell v. State, 223 Ga. App. 484, 477 S.E.2d 905 (1996).

- When the indictment charged the taking of "one 1976 Ford LN 700 truck, bearing Georgia Registration Plate PJ 1343," whereas the truck was a 1977 model, the variance was not fatal as being one which misinformed or misled the defendant to defendant's prejudice or leaves the defendant subject to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Graves v. State, 180 Ga. App. 446, 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986).

There was no fatal variance where the indictment alleged that the victim's driver's license was taken, although it was actually the victim's Georgia identification card which was taken, where the proof of defendant's actions, that is, the manner of gaining the misdescribed document, did not vary from the charge. Glass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 530, 405 S.E.2d 522 (1991).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery was affirmed as the evidence that the defendant agreed to commit the robbery and to share the proceeds and that the defendant held the knife and acted as a "lookout" as a co-conspirator took money from the occupants at gunpoint did not fatally vary from the indictment, which alleged that the defendant committed an armed robbery by taking property from the immediate presence of the victims, by use of a knife. Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0168, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal because a variance in the indictment and the proof at trial was not fatal: (1) the names subject to the alleged variance in fact referred to the same person; and (2) the testimony of a codefendant, when combined with the defendant's post-arrest admissions, sufficiently proved the defendant's commission of an armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to the crimes. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 421, 657 S.E.2d 322 (2008).

In an armed robbery case, there was no fatal variance between the indictment, which described a stolen weapon as a .25 caliber handgun, and the evidence, which showed that the weapon was a .45 caliber pistol; there was no fatal variance between pleading and proof when one weapon was charged in the indictment and a weapon of a similar nature capable of inflicting the same character of injury was shown by the evidence, and it did not appear that the defendant was misled or prejudiced by the distinction between the caliber of the weapon as alleged and proved. Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 69, 661 S.E.2d 221 (2008).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever two offenses as: (1) the two armed robberies occurred within a short time, were of hotels in the same county, and had hotel clerks as victims; (2) both victims gave the same general description of the robber and the robber's disguise; and (3) there was nothing complex about the two robberies and either crime could have been introduced at a trial of the other, which minimized any prejudice from the joint trial. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126 (2005).

Trial counsel's defense strategy in failing to move for severance of the defendant's armed robbery trial from that of a codefendant did not amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel as such was reasonable, even if it wasn't successful, given that: (1) the jury was unlikely to confuse the evidence applicable to either defendants; (2) the defenses were not mutually antagonistic; and (3) the defendant might have actually benefitted from being able to point to the codefendant as being the controlling figure in the robberies. Thus, denial of the motion for severance was not erroneous. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).

Attempted armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal as severance from a separate charge of armed robbery was not required, given that the two crimes were part of a series of connected acts, committed within a short period of time, in the same area, with the same weapon, and involved a similar modus operandi. Fields v. State, 283 Ga. App. 208, 641 S.E.2d 218 (2007).

As two armed robberies were committed within five days of each other, were perpetrated against the same chain stores in the same city, and the same method - a ruse about needing to use the bathroom - was used to distract store employees in both robberies, the defendant's motion to sever the offenses was properly denied. Savage v. State, 298 Ga. App. 350, 679 S.E.2d 734 (2009).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the respective motions to sever filed by two of three defendants convicted of armed robbery as antagonism between the defendants was not enough to require a severance and the defendants failed to demonstrate how the defendants were harmed by the failure to sever. Mathis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (May 20, 2009).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever armed robbery offenses because the three robberies took place in a limited geographical area within four weeks of each other, each involved a man approaching a lone pedestrian during the daytime, pointing a revolver at the victim, and demanding that the victim throw the victim's money and property on the ground, and then fleeing on foot; the modus operandi of the robberies was strikingly similar, allowing the trial court the discretion to deny the motion to sever, and the evidence was far from complex and posed no significant risk of jury confusion. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

- Even though all the crimes were alleged to have been perpetrated by members of the same family, a sibling acting individually as to the theft by taking and jointly with the sibling's brother as to armed robberies, severance was warranted since the three crimes were not part of a common scheme or plan and there was no viable "common scheme or plan" connecting the theft by taking with the armed robberies. Hayes v. State, 182 Ga. App. 26, 354 S.E.2d 655 (1987).

- Evidence that the defendants entered a restaurant, ordered the victim to lie on the floor and sing at gun point, and took money from the store provided a sufficient factual basis to support the defendants' guilty pleas to armed robbery. Bess v. State, 235 Ga. App. 372, 508 S.E.2d 664 (1998).

Sufficient factual basis was established for a defendant's guilty plea to armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the prosecutor stated that the defendant and an accomplice entered the victims' apartment, forced the victims into rooms at gunpoint, tied the victims up, and stole some items; the prosecutor also noted that much of the crime had been recorded by a9-1-1 operator; defense counsel stated that counsel had discussed the facts with the defendant; and the defendant conceded guilt. Therefore, it was not necessary that the indictment be read into the record. Leary v. State, 291 Ga. App. 754, 662 S.E.2d 733 (2008).

Defendant was not entitled to an out-of-time appeal based on the defendant's guilty plea to armed robbery and other crimes; the state proffered a detailed factual basis for the armed robbery count, including the defendant's confession that the defendant and the defendant's accomplice planned to steal the victim's car; forced their way into the victim's apartment, with the defendant carrying a pistol; took the victim's car keys from the victim's apartment; and drove away in the victim's car. Frisby v. State, 304 Ga. 271, 818 S.E.2d 543 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 834 S.E.2d 769 (2019).

- Evidence of the defendant's subsequent arrest on other charges while driving the same vehicle defendant had been driving on the night of the robbery and of the seizure from that vehicle of a pistol which was similar in appearance to the one alleged to have been used by defendant during the robbery was clearly relevant in that it connected defendant both to the vehicle and to the weapon. Where evidence is otherwise relevant and material to the issues being tried, it is not rendered inadmissible merely because it may incidentally place the defendant's character in issue. Worthy v. State, 180 Ga. App. 506, 349 S.E.2d 529 (1986).

- When one defendant contended that the testimony concerning the use of a tracking dog should not have been admitted because the evidence failed to establish that the dog was upon a track which the circumstances indicate to have been made by the accused, this contention was without merit, as the Dodge Colt automobile was identified as the get-away car, and there was evidence that the two defendants had left a trailer in it shortly before the robbery occurred, the other defendant was positively identified as the gunman, and there was testimony that the accused had returned to the trailer after the robbery with a "handful of money," and the track dog led the officers directly to this trailer from the automobile, the circumstances clearly support the inference that the track followed by the dog had been made by the accused. Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 493, 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

- Jury is entitled to reject defendant's statement as to intent to rob victim in favor of circumstantial evidence to the contrary. Young v. State, 251 Ga. 153, 303 S.E.2d 431 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 despite the defendant's alibi; the jury was permitted to reject the alibi testimony, and the jury could have found that the circumstantial evidence, which included the defendant's fingerprints and footprints at the scene and a car that defendant was known to drive at the scene, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt. Daniels v. State, 281 Ga. 226, 637 S.E.2d 403 (2006).

Fact that one of the victims was told that the first defendant had a gun, believed such, became frightened as a result, and hurriedly gave the first defendant the cash demanded, amounted to sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find that the victim reasonably believed an offensive weapon was being used in the robbery; hence, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the armed robbery convictions of both defendants and uphold the denial of their motion for a new trial on this ground. Richard v. State, 287 Ga. App. 399, 651 S.E.2d 514 (2007).

Circumstantial evidence that a defendant was found walking not far from the scene of a robbery, with money in similar denominations to that which was stolen, clothing (including ski gloves) as described by the victim, and a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Rankin v. State, 309 Ga. App. 817, 711 S.E.2d 377 (2011).

Evidence of the circumstances was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator and the defendant's guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant's person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction because the evidence showed the defendant actively aided and abetted the defendant's codefendant by: (1) driving the codefendant to a crime scene; (2) waiting during the crimes with an intent to use the defendant's car as a getaway car; (3) fleeing the scene with the codefendant; (4) waiting while the codefendant broke into a house; (5) fleeing the house with the codefendant; and (6) having a gunshot wound. Jones v. State, 315 Ga. App. 427, 727 S.E.2d 216 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as the state presented the requisite corroboration to the codefendant's testimony; the getaway driver's testimony about the height of the defendant and the codefendant was consistent with the gas station clerk's comparison of their heights, and there was evidence that the defendant, who had no job, was spending significant amounts of money on cars and expensive clothing. Harrell v. State, 322 Ga. App. 115, 744 S.E.2d 105 (2013).

- Trial court did not err, in an armed robbery trial, in overruling an objection to the state's closing argument remark about the defendant's prior arrests because the arrests had been mentioned during the impeachment of the defendant's character witness. Moye v. State, 277 Ga. App. 262, 626 S.E.2d 234 (2006).

- Evidence authorized the jury to find that the money found in defendant's personal possessions in the apartment from which defendant leaped was within the defendant's "immediate presence" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Booker v. State, 242 Ga. App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (2000).

- When the defendant contended the only evidence against the defendant was defendant's extra-judicial statement and since there was no evidence of intent and no evidence that a weapon was involved or that a theft occurred, the defendant's conviction could not stand. But it was established that the victim was murdered by means of gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen, and that one of the victim's two billfolds was taken, this was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, i.e., that an armed robbery occurred, and the fact that the defendant discussed robbing the victim prior to the murder and robbery, together with evidence that the defendant needed a large amount of money for a court appearance three days after the offenses were committed, was circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent to rob the victim of the victim's money, so the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of armed robbery. Nation v. State, 180 Ga. App. 460, 349 S.E.2d 479 (1986).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; defendant and two others waited at a vacant house for a pizza delivery person, and upon defendant's arrival, defendant held up a revolver and demanded the pizza. Oliver v. State, 270 Ga. App. 429, 606 S.E.2d 874 (2004).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in the armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 and hijacking a motor vehicle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1 case; after the victim's car was stolen, the defendant used the victim's cell phone, a search of the defendant's residence uncovered the victim's and the victim's spouse's keys, and prints in the car matched the defendant's prints. Huff v. State, 281 Ga. App. 573, 636 S.E.2d 738 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and two counts of possession of a firearm because the evidence showed that the defendant was identified by the victim, the defendant was arrested about an hour and a half after the crimes occurred in the Lincoln Town car used during the commission of the crimes, which the defendant admitted belonged to the defendant, and the cell phone that the victim had reported stolen was found in the car in addition to guns matching the victim's description of the weapons used. Hinton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 445, 740 S.E.2d 394 (2013).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, based on the state showing that a victim was forcibly detained in a bathroom while various property was taken by the defendant and codefendants, with some being retrieved from the get-away car and it did not matter whose property was taken. Avila v. State, 322 Ga. App. 225, 744 S.E.2d 405 (2013).

- When circumstantial evidence failed to establish whether the defendant first took property and then killed the victim and ransacked the house, or first killed the victim and then took the property and ransacked the house, the evidence was insufficient to meet the standard of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) and, moreover, was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Miles v. State, 261 Ga. 232, 403 S.E.2d 794 (1991).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction had to be overturned because the evidence failed to establish that the victim's debit card was taken with force before or contemporaneous with the taking, and the evidence failed to establish whether the defendant first took the debit card and then killed the victim or whether the defendant killed the victim and then took the debit card; the evidence incriminating the defendant of armed robbery was wholly circumstantial, and both scenarios were equally reasonable. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92 (2011).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the evidence supported two equally reasonable hypotheses, which did not meet the standard of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); there was no direct evidence regarding where the victim was when the defendant entered the victim's kitchen, and there was no evidence, like signs of forced entry, from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the victim heard and confronted the defendant before the defendant could take anything or that the victim usually kept the victim's wallet on the victim's person or in the victim's bedroom, which could support an inference that the defendant had to confront the victim before taking the wallet. Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 709 S.E.2d 202 (2011).

Several counts of the defendant's robbery and burglary convictions were reversed as was one count of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the finding of the proceeds of some of the robberies at an apartment did not show that the defendant was in possession of the property taken and no witness testified connecting the defendant with some of the home invasions; thus, the evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that the defendant did not participate in some of the crimes. Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga. App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (2015), aff'd, 792 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 2016).

- When a defendant contends that an offensive weapon was not used to take the victim's property as required under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 but two employees of a restaurant testified that the defendant pointed a gun at the employees while the defendant removed the contents of the cash register, this evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Roberts v. State, 186 Ga. App. 824, 368 S.E.2d 522 (1988).

Victim testified that when the defendant approached with the defendant's hand under a T-shirt, the victim was able to see silver metal which looked like a gun through a hole in the defendant's T-shirt and that the defendant told the victim "not to touch nothing or I'll shoot," this testimony is sufficient evidence of the defendant's employment of "an offensive weapon . . . or device having the appearance of such weapon." Mincey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 839, 368 S.E.2d 796 (1988).

Circumstantial evidence authorized a finding that defendant used a gun to commit a robbery; wife testified they owned a .44 magnum and that defendant showed her the note he was going to give to the teller saying he had a .44 magnum and teller testified the note said he had a .44 magnum and would shoot her and she never doubted whether he had a gun even though she never saw one. Keller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 546, 499 S.E.2d 713 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery where a cashier testified to defendant's manifestation of an object that could have been a weapon and to multiple threats by defendant to shoot the cashier if the cashier did not give defendant money. Martin v. State, 260 Ga. App. 1, 578 S.E.2d 584 (2003).

When defendant used a stick to take a victim's property from the victim's person, testimony about the size and shape of the stick allowed the jury to find it was used as an offensive weapon which, when used offensively, was likely to result in serious bodily harm or injury, supporting defendant's armed robbery conviction. Hernandez v. State, 274 Ga. App. 390, 617 S.E.2d 630 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery, despite the victim testifying to not personally seeing the gun used by the defendant as four other witnesses all saw the defendant bearing the gun; the defendant told the victim that the defendant had a gun and would shoot the victim if the victim did not comply with the defendant's demands; and the other victim saw the gun in either the defendant's hands or a compatriot's hands during the encounter. Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

Force sufficient to establish armed robbery was shown by evidence that the defendant forced the victim to surrender her purse by pointing a gun at her chest. Cole v. State, 232 Ga. App. 795, 502 S.E.2d 742 (1998).

Evidence that defendant and a cohort approached a man and a woman and demanded, at gun point, money and jewelry, and that the woman threw down her cosmetic case and ran away, supported defendant's conviction of armed robbery as to the woman and her cosmetic case even though defendant received loot other than what was demanded and even though defendant did not touch the cosmetic case. Robinson v. State, 255 Ga. App. 138, 564 S.E.2d 543 (2002).

Acquittal of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime did not compel acquittal on the charge of armed robbery because the jury was free to compromise on the verdict. Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998).

- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on an armed robbery charge when the defendant first held a knife to the victim and took the victim's purse, then, following a struggle, used the knife and a pair of shears against the victim just moments before taking money from the victim's purse; the fact that the victim managed to get the knife out of the defendant's hand during the fight that occurred before the second taking did not inure to the defendant's benefit. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing a store manager to testify regarding the manager's observation of the store's video-surveillance-system recording, which showed the defendant just before the defendant entered the store, because the testimony was not hearsay since it did not ask the jury to assume the truth of out-of-court statements made by others, and instead the value of the testimony rested on the store manager's own veracity and competence; the store manager did not testify about what another person said or wrote outside of court, but rather, the store manager testified as to the manager's personal observations of the defendant's conduct that appeared on the video-surveillance-system recording. McClain v. State, 311 Ga. App. 750, 716 S.E.2d 829 (2011).

- Juvenile court, as factfinder, had sufficient circumstantial and direct evidence to support its adjudication of defendant, a juvenile, as a delinquent for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted two counts of armed robbery and one count of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-10-24; two women were robbed at knifepoint and had their purses taken, and the description of the perpetrator, including the clothing that he wore, matched that of the juvenile, who was found three blocks from where the incident occurred and who attempted to flee when ordered to stop by police. In the Interest of R.J.S., 277 Ga. App. 74, 625 S.E.2d 485 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support two juveniles' adjudications of delinquency for the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the victim identifying the juveniles and the evidence that one of the juveniles used a gun to intimidate the victim into handing over the cash from the register of a gas station, shot the victim in the face causing severe injuries, and possessed a firearm during the commission of the crimes. In the Interest of R. S., 295 Ga. App. 772, 673 S.E.2d 280 (2009).

Evidence that a juvenile hit a victim with a gun, held the victim in a choke hold, demanded the victim's money, and then took keys, some change, and a few novelty coins from the victim's pockets was sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile as delinquent for commission of acts that would have constituted armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. In the Interest of M.D.P., 301 Ga. App. 153, 687 S.E.2d 178 (2009).

- Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant's claim that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-4-9, the defendant renounced and abandoned the conspiracy and that a co-conspirator fatally shot the victims was contradicted by the physical evidence at trial; shell casings from two guns were found at the murder scene and in positions indicating that there were two weapons fired by different individuals. Bailey v. State, 291 Ga. 144, 728 S.E.2d 214 (2012).

State did not have to prove the defendant had knowledge of the weapon to be convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during a felony, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit hijacking a motor vehicle. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that the defendant conspired to rob the victims and murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (2014).

Given that the defendant was accompanied by two other people, one masked, who had guns and who stood outside the door's line of sight, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant intended to commit armed robbery and that the defendant had conspired with the other people to do so. Owens v. State, 353 Ga. App. 616, 838 S.E.2d 909 (2020).

- Evidence that the defendant drove the car and remained there while the defendant's boyfriend took the victim's backpack at gunpoint was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Teele v. State, Ga. App. , 733 S.E.2d 395 (2012).

- See Scott v. State, 166 Ga. App. 240, 304 S.E.2d 89 (1983); Fredericks v. State, 172 Ga. App. 379, 323 S.E.2d 265 (1984); Moore v. State, 176 Ga. App. 882, 339 S.E.2d 271 (1985); Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 340 S.E.2d 862 (1986); Lewis v. State, 255 Ga. 681, 341 S.E.2d 434 (1986); Byrd v. State, 255 Ga. 674, 341 S.E.2d 453 (1986); Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. 703, 342 S.E.2d 312 (1986); Cain v. State, 178 Ga. App. 247, 342 S.E.2d 742 (1986); Boswell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 250, 342 S.E.2d 744 (1986); King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986); Bradley v. State, 178 Ga. App. 894, 344 S.E.2d 772 (1986); Munn v. State, 179 Ga. App. 357, 346 S.E.2d 128 (1986); Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 197, 348 S.E.2d 735 (1986); Jackson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 270, 349 S.E.2d 20 (1986); Ford v. State, 256 Ga. 375, 349 S.E.2d 361 (1986); Barnes v. State, 256 Ga. 370, 349 S.E.2d 387 (1986); Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 493, 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986); Worthy v. State, 180 Ga. App. 506, 349 S.E.2d 529 (1986); Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020); Bradford v. State, 182 Ga. App. 337, 355 S.E.2d 735 (1987); Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 386, 359 S.E.2d 664 (1987); Williams v. State, 184 Ga. App. 480, 361 S.E.2d 713 (1987); Rigsby v. State, 184 Ga. App. 330, 361 S.E.2d 694 (1987); Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 421, 367 S.E.2d 586 (1988); Johnson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 801, 368 S.E.2d 562 (1988); Bennett v. State, 186 Ga. App. 832, 368 S.E.2d 789 (1988); Mincey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 839, 368 S.E.2d 796 (1988); Hamm v. State, 187 Ga. App. 318, 370 S.E.2d 158 (1988); Webb v. State, 187 Ga. App. 348, 370 S.E.2d 204 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988), cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Morgan v. State, 191 Ga. App. 226, 381 S.E.2d 402 (1989); Larkin v. State, 191 Ga. App. 269, 381 S.E.2d 421 (1989); Roundtree v. State, 192 Ga. App. 803, 386 S.E.2d 548 (1989); Glover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 798, 386 S.E.2d 699 (1989); Gordon v. State, 193 Ga. App. 94, 387 S.E.2d 40 (1989); Spivey v. State, 193 Ga. App. 127, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989), cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 911, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989); Scott v. State, 193 Ga. App. 577, 388 S.E.2d 416 (1989); Pledger v. State, 193 Ga. App. 588, 388 S.E.2d 425 (1989); Sharp v. State, 196 Ga. App. 848, 397 S.E.2d 186 (1990); Pope v. State, 201 Ga. App. 537, 411 S.E.2d 557 (1991); Hargrove v. State, 202 Ga. App. 854, 415 S.E.2d 708 (1992); Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992), cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992); Vick v. State, 211 Ga. App. 735, 440 S.E.2d 508 (1994); Ellis v. State, 211 Ga. App. 605, 440 S.E.2d 235 (1994); Gee v. State, 212 Ga. App. 422, 442 S.E.2d 290 (1994); Harris v. State, 218 Ga. App. 472, 462 S.E.2d 425 (1995); Kinsey v. State, 219 Ga. App. 204, 464 S.E.2d 648 (1995); McRae v. State, 221 Ga. App. 414, 471 S.E.2d 532 (1996); Brown v. State, 222 Ga. App. 648, 475 S.E.2d 688 (1996); Igle v. State, 223 Ga. App. 498, 478 S.E.2d 622 (1996); Tanksley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 505, 487 S.E.2d 98 (1997); McGhee v. State, 229 Ga. App. 10, 492 S.E.2d 904 (1997); Abrams v. State, 229 Ga. App. 152, 493 S.E.2d 561 (1997); Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60, 495 S.E.2d 282 (1998); Horne v. State, 231 Ga. App. 864, 501 S.E.2d 47 (1998); Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998); Anderson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 866, 519 S.E.2d 463 (1999); King v. State, 238 Ga. App. 575, 519 S.E.2d 500 (1999); Montijo v. State, 238 Ga. App. 696, 520 S.E.2d 24 (1999); Gould v. State, 239 Ga. App. 312, 521 S.E.2d 365 (1999); Shelley v. State, 239 Ga. App. 841, 521 S.E.2d 855 (1999), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009); Hardy v. State, 240 Ga. App. 115, 522 S.E.2d 704 (1999); Gilbert v. State, 241 Ga. App. 57, 526 S.E.2d 88 (1999); Sims v. State, 242 Ga. App. 460, 530 S.E.2d 212 (2000); Willingham v. State, 242 Ga. App. 472, 530 S.E.2d 224 (2000); Espinoza v. State, 243 Ga. App. 665, 534 S.E.2d 127 (2000); Cox v. State, 243 Ga. App. 790, 534 S.E.2d 464 (2000); Brinson v. State, 244 Ga. App. 40, 537 S.E.2d 370 (2000); Solomon v. State, 244 Ga. App. 289, 534 S.E.2d 915 (2000); Parker v. State, 244 Ga. App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (2000); Hemidi v. State, 245 Ga. App. 417, 537 S.E.2d 804 (2000); Cockrell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 359, 545 S.E.2d 600 (2001); Young v. State, 245 Ga. App. 684, 538 S.E.2d 760 (2000); King v. State, 246 Ga. App. 100, 539 S.E.2d 614 (2000); Anderson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 189, 539 S.E.2d 879 (2000); Meyers v. State, 249 Ga. App. 248, 547 S.E.2d 781 (2001); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 488, 548 S.E.2d 457 (2001); Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 576 S.E.2d 886 (2003); Jackson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 727, 578 S.E.2d 298 (2003); Duckett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 814, 578 S.E.2d 524 (2003); Chinn v. State, 276 Ga. 387, 578 S.E.2d 856 (2003); Ross v. State, 264 Ga. App. 830, 592 S.E.2d 479 (2003); Justice v. State, 263 Ga. App. 858, 589 S.E.2d 624 (2003); Rust v. State, 264 Ga. App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003); LaCount v. State, 265 Ga. App. 352, 593 S.E.2d 885 (2004); Dorsey v. State, 265 Ga. App. 597, 595 S.E.2d 106 (2004).

When a defendant, in the defendant's statement to police and the defendant's testimony at trial, admitted that after striking the victim and knocking the victim to the floor, the defendant bound and gagged the victim (who was still conscious), went through the victim's pockets, and took all of the victim's money, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a conviction of armed robbery as it was clearly a taking of property from the person of another by use of an offensive weapon. Thomas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 560, 330 S.E.2d 777 (1985).

Evidence that about an hour before armed robbery and burglary occurred the defendant was seen sitting in a vehicle near the scene of the crime, the assailant broke into the victim's home and took cash and a Cadillac, the victim identified the defendant as the assailant, and the Cadillac was found on the property where the defendant lived was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact of guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 176 Ga. App. 378, 336 S.E.2d 257 (1985).

When the victim testified the defendant approached her pointing a shotgun, threatened to kill her, took her purse and a baby bag, and left, the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 248, 348 S.E.2d 761 (1986).

When the evidence showed that the defendant both held the victim at gunpoint while in a motel room and took possession of the victim's wallet and car keys after they had been removed from the victim's person, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. Spencer v. State, 180 Ga. App. 498, 349 S.E.2d 513 (1986).

Evidence was amply sufficient to authorize a reasonable trier of fact to rationally find therefrom proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to the direct commission of the crime of armed robbery by defendant and as to the intentional aiding and abetting of it under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Graves v. State, 180 Ga. App. 446, 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986).

Testimony from the codefendants that the defendant actively participated in planning in implementation of the robbery, corroborated by testimony from a victim that the victim was sure the defendant was the woman who kissed the victim and later came into the house with the codefendants was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Porter v. State, 341 Ga. App. 632, 802 S.E.2d 259 (2017).

Evidence that the defendant admitted to police that the defendant had stolen items from the apartment and evidence that the defendant was in possession of a handgun and held the victim at gunpoint was sufficient to support the conviction for armed robbery. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of two counts of armed robbery because the first defendant was in possession of a firearm when the first defendant entered the pizzeria; and the first defendant used that weapon to demand cash from one employee and the cell phone of a second employee, both of which were then taken; and because the second defendant was a party to those offenses as the second defendant directed the getaway driver to purchase the Halloween mask that was used during the robbery; the second defendant participated in demanding money from the employees and took the cell phone of one of the employees; and the second defendant admitted to the driver moments later that the defendants had robbed the pizzeria. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Victim's testimony that the defendant was with the gunman and another man when all three men approached the victim and said to give them the victim's wallet and that the defendant and the other man told the gunman to make the victim empty the victim's pockets and get everything the victim had was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Anthony v. State, 348 Ga. App. 417, 823 S.E.2d 92 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C0720, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 661 (Ga. 2019).

Because the trial court properly permitted a victim to identify the defendant, coupled with other evidence at trial, including the defendant's text message to a buyer of the stolen wheels and the recovery of two guns from the car in which the defendant was stopped, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict the defendant for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Redding v. State, 354 Ga. App. 525, 841 S.E.2d 192 (2020).

Video showing the defendant bursting into the store and holding a gun on the clerk while the defendant stole cash and lottery tickets was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony. Beamon v. State, 348 Ga. App. 732, 824 S.E.2d 624 (2019).

Since the victim remained on the property during the robbery and the items that were stolen were taken from the victim's residence, which was under the victim's control, the defendant, who pistol whipped the victim and demanded to know the location of property, could not be resolved of armed robbery simply because the defendant forcibly removed the victim from the residence during the course of the theft. Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 824 S.E.2d 322 (2019).

Evidence that the defendant and another went to the victim's house, held the victim at gunpoint, removed various items from the home, and the defendant then sold the victim's cell phone at a kiosk in a grocery store was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Rogers v. State, 350 Ga. App. 163, 828 S.E.2d 398 (2019).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder was supported by evidence that the defendant agreed to sell methamphetamine and possessed a handgun, which the defendant gave to the defendant's cohort on the way to the drug sale; the two then robbed the two victims and shot at both victims, killing one; the two left the scene together, telephoned a senior gang member, and traveled to a gang safe house in Atlanta together. Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 830 S.E.2d 160 (2019).

Evidence that the victim had three dollars in a wallet just prior to the shooting, no wallet was found with the victim, the defendant gave a friend three dollars in gas money after the shooting, had a firearm, and took the victim's money after killing the victim authorized the jury to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Johnson v. State, 307 Ga. 44, 834 S.E.2d 83 (2019).

Evidence supported a finding that the defendant took the money from the store manager's presence by using a weapon and was sufficient for the jury to have found the defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Powell v. State, 352 Ga. App. 14, 833 S.E.2d 602 (2019).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and other crimes based on evidence that three taxi drivers were robbed and the number used to call the taxis was registered to the defendant's mother, who allowed the defendant to use the phone, and an accomplice identified the defendant as the person with a gun. Gay v. State, 351 Ga. App. 811, 833 S.E.2d 305 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0264, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2020).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict on the armed robbery charge underlying the defendant's felony murder conviction and the defendant's felony murder conviction because a rational jury could conclude that on the night of the shooting, the defendant went to the co-defendant's residence; told the co-defendant that the defendant was about to rob the victim; approached the victim's SUV, where the victim was selling crack cocaine; shot the victim in the face; took cash from the victim, leaving only a ten-dollar bill; and then fled on foot. Holmes v. State, 307 Ga. 441, 836 S.E.2d 97 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery as a party to the offense and to find that the defendant did not abandon the defendant's effort to commit the crime prior to the crime's completion because, although the defendant told police that the defendant begged off from the robbery at the last moment, the defendant helped plan the robbery of the bank, provided the guns used in the robbery, dropped the accomplices off near the bank so that the accomplices could rob the bank, waited at the gas station knowing the robbery was taking place, and then followed the accomplices as the accomplices fled after taking the money. Birdsong v. State, 353 Ga. App. 316, 836 S.E.2d 232 (2019).

Evidence that the victim was in the basement at the time of the incident, which was where the victim was shot and, thus, the place from which the laptop was taken was under the victim's control was sufficient for the state to prove that the defendant took the laptop from the victim's immediate presence and, thus, to support the conviction for armed robbery. Dozier v. State, 307 Ga. 583, 837 S.E.2d 294 (2019).

Evidence that the co-indictee had a gun when the co-indictee and the defendant walked the husband to the minivan to retrieve money was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime even though the wife did not see the gun because the wife testified that the wife noticed something that appeared to be a knife or a pistol, making the wife fearful. Parker v. State, 353 Ga. App. 493, 838 S.E.2d 150 (2020).

Victim's testimony that the defendant grabbed the victim's necklaces, the jewelry fell to the ground and the victim secured the necklaces by stepping on the items, and then the defendant pulled out a gun and shot the victim in the chest was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Williams v. State, 353 Ga. App. 821, 840 S.E.2d 32 (2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict as to armed robbery and felony murder predicated on armed robbery since the evidence showed that an exterior door was kicked in and four armed men rushed inside to the basement where the defendant's bedroom was located and where the defendant was at the time, allowing the jury to infer that the perpetrators fired multiple gunshots, eventually hitting the defendant with a single, fatal gunshot. Lumpkin v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020).

Evidence that the defendant approached the victim with a handgun, pointed the gun at the victim while demanding money, and ultimately shot the victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Cooke v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 15, 2020).

- There was ample evidence to find defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant admitting having stabbed the victim but did not admit taking a bag containing cash and mail from the victim. Jester v. State, 204 Ga. App. 665, 420 S.E.2d 357 (1992).

- Evidence was sufficient to show a theft from the immediate presence of the victims, and was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for armed robbery where the evidence showed the victims were not present when the car was stolen because the victims were forced to flee into the woods after the defendant fired shots and wounded the victim. Heard v. State, 204 Ga. App. 757, 420 S.E.2d 639 (1992).

There was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt since the defendant admitted to being present while a third person accosted the victim and robbed the victim at gunpoint in a parking lot and further conceded that when instructed by that third person to pick up the money the victim had thrown down, the victim did so. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 95, 432 S.E.2d 827 (1993).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of armed robbery where police stopped vehicle that matched description of vehicle given by victim that victim saw robber leave in, defendant was only occupant of the car wearing a sweat shirt as described by victim and victim's purse and gun were found in the car. Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 499 S.E.2d 351 (1998).

Voice identification testimony, along with circumstantial evidence showing invaders were familiar with the internal operations and layout of the store, allowed the jury to reach the conclusion defendant was guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. 140, 499 S.E.2d 922 (1998).

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for armed robbery where the defendant shot and killed the victim after a heated argument, and defendant and codefendants took the victim's car after they could not find the keys to their vehicle. Hudson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 895, 508 S.E.2d 682 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping since defendant grabbed the store clerk by the arm at gunpoint, forced the clerk behind the check out counter, emptied the store's cash register, took money from the safe, forced the clerk into a storeroom located at the rear of the store, and then, after the clerk escaped, chased the clerk with a vehicle. Duncan v. State, 253 Ga. App. 239, 558 S.E.2d 783 (2002).

Defendant's possession of a recently stolen vehicle within minutes of its hijacking; defendant's flight from the police when they attempted to stop the vehicle; the presence of a gun, which did not belong to the victim, in the victim's vehicle after defendant's arrest; and the victim's positive identification of defendant at the arrest scene not long after the hijacking, was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and hijacking a motor vehicle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b). Lane v. State, 255 Ga. App. 274, 564 S.E.2d 857 (2002).

Since the victim had just pulled into the parking lot of the victim's employer when the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and demanded the victim's wallet, the defendant's confession to the crime, the defendant's presence near the crime scene, and the defendant's possession of the victim's credit card were evidence of guilt and therefore sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Parks v. State, 257 Ga. App. 25, 570 S.E.2d 350 (2002).

- Evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of the armed robbery of a pizza delivery person when five accomplices testified that the defendant was involved, at least one testified that the defendant called for the pizza to be delivered, all five testified that they saw the defendant with a bat, two testified that they saw the defendant strike the victim with the bat and flee with a second accomplice who had the pizza, and the victim testified that two individuals ran away with the pizza after the victim was struck with a bat; each accomplice's testimony corroborated the testimony of the other accomplices and was further corroborated by the victim's testimony. Mullins v. State, 257 Ga. App. 40, 570 S.E.2d 357 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a robbery since the victim testified that the defendant robbed the victim of a wallet and car keys at gunpoint, the state introduced similar transaction evidence, and one of defendant's fellow inmates testified that the defendant bragged to the fellow inmate that the defendant had indeed robbed the victim. Cordy v. State, 257 Ga. App. 726, 572 S.E.2d 73 (2002).

- Evidence that the defendant approached the victim from behind and struck the victim after the victim received cash in payment for delivering pizza and that the defendant attempted to use an automotive water pump to hit the victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Simmons v. State, 342 Ga. App. 853, 805 S.E.2d 615 (2017).

- There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), although the victim testified at trial that the victim did not fear the defendant when the defendant held a knife and asked for money; the jury was permitted to believe the officer's testimony that the victim told the officer previously that the victim was afraid. Young v. State, 258 Ga. App. 238, 573 S.E.2d 487 (2002).

Armed robbery conviction was upheld, despite defendant's contention that defendant could only be found guilty of no more than a theft by taking, because defendant participated in the crime upon the codefendant's representation that the victim was among those who planned such events and was an active participant therein; an accomplice's testimony to the contrary, corroborated by the victim, thus supported the state's theory. Turner v. State, 258 Ga. App. 867, 575 S.E.2d 727 (2002).

- Eyewitness testimony that the defendant approached the drive-in window of a restaurant on two separate occasions, that the defendant took money from the restaurant cash register on each occasion, and that the defendant was able to do so by displaying a handgun on each occasion was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of committing two armed robberies. Hurst v. State, 260 Ga. App. 708, 580 S.E.2d 666 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that the defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun to bind the victims and drag the victims to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) the defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) the defendant's confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim's initial inability to identify the defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury's resolution and did not require reversal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

- Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, where defendant directed victim at gunpoint to walk toward a cash machine that could be used with the cash card in the victim's wallet, and where both the victim and a bystander had opportunities to view defendant. Wade v. State, 261 Ga. App. 587, 583 S.E.2d 251 (2003).

- Evidence that defendant was sent into a pawn shop as a "decoy" to lure the victim from behind the counter where a weapon was kept, that the armed codefendants entered the shop right after that, that defendant was allowed to leave the shop during the armed robbery without any interference from the armed men, that defendant did not notify the authorities or render aid to the victim while the robbery was in progress, and that defendant was present at the wooded location where the stolen items were discovered immediately after the robbery was sufficient to support defendant's armed robbery conviction. Mason v. State, 262 Ga. App. 383, 585 S.E.2d 673 (2003).

When the defendant confessed to robbing a store, but denied using a handgun, but the store cashier identified the defendant as the robber and reaffirmed that the defendant used a gun, a videotape showed the robbery with the defendant as the robber, the defendant's footprints matched those at the scene, the defendant's grandparent said that the defendant owned the gun found nearby which was missing from the grandparent's home at the time of the robbery, and the defendant was living with the grandparent at the time of the robbery, the evidence was sufficient to sustain an armed robbery conviction. Fuller v. State, 262 Ga. App. 656, 586 S.E.2d 359 (2003).

- After the defendant took a cab driver's fare money, a gold coin, and the cab and was apprehended after a chase, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and obstruction of a police officer. Frazier v. State, 263 Ga. App. 12, 587 S.E.2d 173 (2003).

Even without taking into account the other evidence admitted, the victim's testimony that the defendant took money from the victim at gunpoint was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions. Cecil v. State, 263 Ga. App. 48, 587 S.E.2d 197 (2003).

When the defendant participated in a carjacking, drove the victim's car from the scene of a murder, asked the defendant's love interest to lie about the defendant's whereabouts, and lied repeatedly to the police about what happened, a jury was free to conclude that the defendant participated in an armed robbery and kidnapping as an accomplice under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(a),16-5-40(a), and16-8-41(a); thus, the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict. Owens v. State, 263 Ga. App. 478, 588 S.E.2d 265 (2003).

Evidence that the defendant held a pistol on the victim while the victim's jacket, wallet, and paycheck stub were taken was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of armed robbery of the victim. Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003).

When the victim alleged the defendant robbed and raped the victim at knifepoint, identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial, DNA on the victim's clothes matched that of the defendant, the defendant testified the defendant had consensual sex with the victim for money, and the detective who first interviewed the defendant testified that the defendant never told the detective that the defendant had consensual sex, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Munn v. State, 263 Ga. App. 821, 589 S.E.2d 596 (2003).

Evidence supported finding the defendant guilty under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 since the defendant's conviction was not based solely on fingerprints as the fingerprint evidence was corroborated by the additional evidence that the defendant's appearance was virtually an identical match of the victim's physical description of the robber and that the defendant was found wearing pants similar to those worn by the robber; the defendant offered no explanation of how the defendant's fingerprints came to be on the note used during the robbery. Filix v. State, 264 Ga. App. 580, 591 S.E.2d 468 (2003).

Evidence that the defendant, a convicted felon, accompanied the victim to a store with the codefendant; shot the victim in the head with a handgun that the defendant had in defendant's possession; thereby, causing a wound in which the victim lost one eye; and along with the codefendant took all the victim's money was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Furthermore, the evidence of the codefendant's participation in the robbery was sufficient to sustain the codefendant's conviction for armed robbery. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003).

When the defendant robbed the victims at gunpoint with two accomplices, the testimony of one accomplice that the defendant was involved in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate testimony to the same effect from the defendant's other accomplice and sustain the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-41. Gallimore v. State, 264 Ga. App. 629, 591 S.E.2d 485 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery after: (1) the defendant affirmatively lied by denying that the defendant knew one accomplice in the defendant's initial statement to the police; (2) the defendant was driving the getaway car when the car was stopped by the police; and (3) the defendant was in possession of the handgun used in the armed robbery and the money stolen in the armed robbery. The sufficiency of the corroboration of the accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the planning of the robbery as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) was a matter for the jury to determine. Clemons v. State, 265 Ga. App. 825, 595 S.E.2d 530 (2004).

Eyewitness testimony placing the defendant at the scene in conjunction with physical evidence found in the defendant's room, including the victim's car keys and clothing that the defendant was described as wearing at the time of the second robbery, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the armed robberies. Johnson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 777, 595 S.E.2d 625 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction even though the victim could not identify the defendant since the defendant admitted taking the victim's black jacket and disclosed the jacket's location, the victim's personal papers were found in the defendant's apartment, the victim identified the pistol found in the defendant's car as similar to the gun used against the victim, and when the defendant abducted another victim, the defendant used a black jacket to cover the victim's face. Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 596 S.E.2d 205 (2004).

Evidence that the defendant, wielding a gun, barged into the victim's hotel room, demanded money, pistol whipped the victim, and took the victim's wallet, sufficed to sustain the victim's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary. Bay v. State, 266 Ga. App. 91, 596 S.E.2d 229 (2004).

Evidence that the defendants entered the victim's apartment, took the victim by the hands and demanded money, shoved a gun into the victim's side and removed the victim's ring, watch, and money, and then forced the victim into a closet blocked with a heavy table with instructions not to come out until the defendants had left was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pinson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Evidence of the defendant's voluntary and willing participation in the crimes, through providing the use of defendant's car to transport the other three named in the indictment to and from the scene and waiting in the vehicle while two of them committed aggravated assault, burglary, murder, and aggravated robbery, supported the defendant's convictions for the crimes as a coconspirator. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions on two counts of felony murder, predicated on the underlying felony of aggravated assault, one count of armed robbery, and two counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime as the evidence showed that the defendant brandished a handgun and forced the two victims to give the defendant money and that the defendant then fatally shot the victims after one victim argued with other people the defendant was with regarding the purity of a drug purchase the one victim had just made. Harden v. State, 278 Ga. 40, 597 S.E.2d 380 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction for the theft of a victim's wallet and another victim's sunglasses by gunpoint under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) including: (1) testimony as to the gunman's size; (2) testimony that the car's rims were found at the defendant's home; (3) testimony that a victim's cell phone made calls to the defendant's home; (4) an accomplice's reference to the gunman as "B"; and (5) similar transaction evidence of another carjacking, involving a car of the make and color as a car used in the hijacking of the victims' car; the victim whose sunglasses were stolen did not have to testify to show that the sunglasses were taken by force as another victim testified that the gunman pointed a gun at the victim's head and removed the sunglasses. Mullins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 393, 599 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

- Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a gas station convenience store, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), since the testimony of the clerk indicated that the clerk had seen the defendant in the store many times before, the defendant took cigarettes and attempted to only pay for one pack, and the defendant beat the clerk with a baseball bat and took money. The fact that the clerk ran to save the clerk's life did not prevent the crime from having been committed. Lester v. State, 267 Ga. App. 795, 600 S.E.2d 787 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), was supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant and two other people, with their faces covered and while wielding a gun and a box cutter, entered a convenience store, made the two employees sit on the floor, and took the employees' jewelry as well as other property and cash; although the defendant claimed that the defendant participated under duress because the defendant was threatened at gunpoint, it was up to the jury to determine the believability of a claim, and the defendant was found to have participated in the crime as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Spradley v. State, 276 Ga. App. 842, 625 S.E.2d 106 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction since: (1) the victim testified that within days of the armed robbery, the victim saw the second gunman and learned the gunman's identity; (2) the victim identified the defendant from a photo array; (3) at trial, the victim expressed certainty that the defendant was the second robber; and (4) the victim also identified the small pistol found inside a nearby residence as the one used by the defendant during the crime. Lee v. State, 267 Ga. App. 834, 600 S.E.2d 825 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery, based upon the defendant and an accomplice robbing a store at gunpoint, was affirmed because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as latent fingerprints, which belonged to the defendant, that were found in the car used in the armed robbery sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice who identified the defendant as the driver of the car before the accomplice recanted the accomplice's custodial statement at trial. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal, despite defendant's claims: (1) that the evidence presented by the state was insufficient as sufficient evidence was, in fact, received through the victim's testimony about being robbed at gun point by the defendant while the victim was working inside the convenience store as the victim knew defendant as a customer for two years, and the victim's positive identification of defendant, both after the arrest and during trial, was more than sufficient to support the armed robbery charge; and (2) of ineffective assistance of counsel since defendant failed to show that counsel inadequately prepared for trial, and defendant's failure to be up front with counsel deprived defendant of an opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness, and counsel's decision not to file a suppression motion was part of counsel's trial strategy, and thus was not to be second-guessed on appeal. Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 881, 614 S.E.2d 128 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2), because evidence was seen in one of the defendant's vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant's homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to allow a rational finder of fact to convict defendant of kidnapping, three counts of armed robbery, and two firearms offenses beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant committed the crimes at a restaurant where defendant was a regular customer, so the victims were able to identify defendant to police, a neutral witness saw defendant hurrying away from the direction of the restaurant right after the time of the robbery, and, when defendant was arrested, new clothes and receipts dated after the robbery were discovered. Strahan v. State, 273 Ga. App. 116, 614 S.E.2d 227 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, robbery by intimidation, and criminal damage to property in the second degree were supported by sufficient evidence because, inter alia, defendant's brother let defendant and two others into a restaurant after hours, defendant pointed a gun at the brother's co-worker, and then beat on a safe and pried open the cash registers looking for money; all four co-conspirators involved, including defendant, gave statements to police implicating themselves and their codefendants, and a bill was introduced showing that repair of the safe damaged during the robbery attempt cost $1,000.00. Polite v. State, 273 Ga. App. 235, 614 S.E.2d 849 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery as a participant as the security camera recorded defendant near the safe with codefendant standing beside the defendant; a clerk testified that the clerk could hear the beeps of the safe buttons being pressed while the clerk was in the back of the store and the trial court could conclude that defendant was entering the code. Hall v. State, 274 Ga. App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, third-degree arson, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the evidence showed that the defendant made the defendant's accomplice shoot a convenience store clerk after the defendant forced the clerk at gunpoint into a wooded area, took money from a cash register in the store, and started a fire in the store. The accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the defendant's admission that the defendant owned the shotgun that was used in the shooting, the defendant's admission that the defendant had given the shotgun to the accomplice, the testimony of a third person that the accomplice had given the third person the shotgun after the robbery, and the fact that shotgun shells found in the defendant's home matched shells taken from the clerk's body. Judkins v. State, 282 Ga. 580, 652 S.E.2d 537 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; in addition to testimony by a codefendant and eyewitness testimony by the victim's spouse, the victim's blood was on the defendant's clothes, the defendant had the victim's keys, and the knife used to kill the victim and a pistol were discovered near the site of the defendant's arrest in some woods near the scene of the crime. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011).

Given the defendant's confession, the victim's identification of the defendant as the person who robbed the victim, testimony by the victim and others that the robber had a gun, and testimony that the defendant was not at the nightclub where the defendant claimed to be, the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-41. Burns v. State, 288 Ga. App. 507, 654 S.E.2d 405 (2007).

Evidence that the defendant took money from a convenience-store clerk while brandishing a knife was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt and it was of no merit that the indictment alleged that the money belonged to the convenience store as opposed to an individual. Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 32, 666 S.E.2d 452 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); the testimony of the victim, that the victim was robbed at gunpoint, corroborated by the testimony of three codefendants linking the defendant to the crime, supported the defendant's identification as the robber and contradicted the defendant's argument that no evidence showed the defendant was the suspect. Roberts v. State, 293 Ga. App. 348, 667 S.E.2d 138 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for armed robbery, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's identification of the defendant, the defendant's admission that the defendant was one of three persons who exited a car at the crime scene, and the discovery of the victim's personal belongings at the home the defendant and the other perpetrators had retreated to. The issue of whether the defendant was armed or not was within the jury's province to resolve. Morris v. State, 293 Ga. App. 354, 667 S.E.2d 145 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant, who was brandishing a handgun, and the defendant's sibling entered a victim's home demanding money, and that the victim, after being shot, gave cash to the sibling was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).

Victim's testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence, entered, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give the defendant money was sufficient in itself to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Since the evidence established the defendant shot three men and took money from one of them, and two of the men survived and identified the defendant as the shooter, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008).

Two intruders entered a house through a window, threatened the occupants with handguns, and stole items from the house. As circumstantial evidence established that the defendant drove the get-away vehicle, the defendant was properly convicted as a party to armed robbery. Olds v. State, 293 Ga. App. 884, 668 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery since the testimony of a 14-year-old accomplice was corroborated by testimony from a clerk in the store that was robbed by the defendant and others, and the state presented physical evidence - clothing worn by the robbers - that linked the defendant to the robbery. Sellers v. State, 294 Ga. App. 536, 669 S.E.2d 544 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery after a convenience store clerk was robbed at gunpoint by a perpetrator who was wearing a nylon stocking over the perpetrator's head because: (1) the clerk recognized the defendant as the perpetrator by the defendant's voice and physical build when the defendant returned to the store three days later as a customer; (2) the clerk later identified defendant as the perpetrator in a picture lineup; and (3) the state presented the testimony of an expert polygraph examiner, who stated that defendant showed deception to questions concerning the armed robbery. Jones v. State, 309 Ga. App. 886, 714 S.E.2d 590 (2011).

Because the defendant admitted entry into a home, the defendant's statement to a witness, and the victim's in-court identification of the defendant supported the defendant's conviction of armed robbery and burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-8-41(a), the jury could find that a conspiracy existed without regard to a coconspirator's statements under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801 et seq.). Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. App. 54, 714 S.E.2d 732 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of armed robbery, armed robbery, and conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., through a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1), because: (1) the defendant and another buyer met with the victim and another seller where the defendant and the other buyer inspected marijuana which the victim and the other seller had for sale; (2) after some discussion about price, the victim told the defendant what the price was and that the defendant could take it or leave it; (3) the defendant said that the defendant would take it, pulled a gun from the defendant's waistband, and fatally shot the victim; and (4) there was conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant took the marijuana and ran away with the marijuana after shooting the victim. Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and malice murder were based on sufficient evidence when a victim in an apartment next to the defendant's was fatally stabbed multiple times, there was physical evidence that tied the defendant to the criminal incident, and the defendant confessed to committing the crimes. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).

Trial court had sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to those crimes by aiding and abetting, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given evidence that the defendant helped plan the robberies of two game rooms, drove the getaway vehicle, and participated in the division of the proceeds. Norman v. State, 311 Ga. App. 721, 716 S.E.2d 805 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee's car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told them what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer's gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer's blood was found on the defendant's chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes, or as a coconspirator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). The evidence presented was that: (1) when two people walked past the victim's parked vehicle, one of the people held a knife to the victim's stomach and ordered the victim to give the person the victim's wallet and keys; (2) the victim complied; (3) the person with the knife got into the driver's seat and the defendant, who had stood nearby during the incident, got into the passenger seat; (3) the victim identified the defendant as the person who got into the passenger seat; (4) the people drove away, but were apprehended; (5) the victim's wallet was recovered, on the ground to the rear of the vehicle, on the passenger side; and (6) the defendant wanted to leave the area because there was a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (2011).

Defendant's forcible removal of a victim's pajama top from the victim's body at gunpoint, and the fact that the top was found with other stolen items at the home of the defendant's accomplice was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

While a defendant was assaulting and raping a victim at gunpoint, the defendant's accomplice was robbing the residence. As the defendant was legally responsible for the acts of the accomplice under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery when: (1) a codefendant testified that the defendant assisted in the robbery; (2) a store clerk testified that after the robbery, the defendant asked the clerk which way the codefendant went, and went in the same direction; (3) a videotape showed the defendant's actions during the robbery; and (4) the defendant and the codefendant were discovered in the getaway car with the robbery proceeds in the defendant's pocket. Dinkins v. State, 295 Ga. App. 289, 671 S.E.2d 299 (2008).

Testimony by two victims that the defendant grabbed a purse from one of them and pointed a gun at both of them, and testimony from an eyewitness that the defendant fled from the police was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).

In an armed robbery prosecution, as the victim identified the defendant as the driver of a car and the codefendant as the passenger who robbed the victim at gunpoint, and the pistol used in the robbery was found in the car's locked glove compartment, to which only the defendant had the key, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the codefendant in the robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and sufficiently corroborated the codefendant's accomplice testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Bailey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 480, 672 S.E.2d 450 (2009).

Following evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery: (1) two armed persons robbed a sandwich shop; (2) shortly thereafter, a witness saw the defendant and two others dividing cash among themselves, and heard one of them state they had just robbed the shop; and (3) shop employees, the other witness, and the defendant's accomplice all identified the defendant as one of the robbers. Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga. App. 486, 672 S.E.2d 459 (2009).

Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion for a new trial with regard to the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm based on the trial court erroneously admitting the testimony of a witness, who was a long-time acquaintance of the co-indictee that the co-indictee had bragged about committing the robbery with the defendant as, although the state failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, the admission was harmless in view of the victims' consistent eyewitness testimony implicating the defendant in the robbery and the defendant's admission of the intention to rob the store. Fisher v. State, 295 Ga. App. 501, 672 S.E.2d 476 (2009).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes. An informant told police that the defendant bragged about one of the robberies; the informant correctly identified the manner in which the robbery was committed, the types of items stolen, and the getaway car; police found the getaway car, which had been captured on surveillance tape, at the defendant's apartment complex; the car was registered to one of the defendant's parents; a search of the defendant's apartment turned up clothing and a bag matching that of the robbers and drug paraphernalia stolen during the robberies; and the defendant's DNA matched that found on broken glass at one of the crime scenes. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849, 672 S.E.2d 619 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery based on both victims' identification of the defendant; the defendant being found in a nearby location to the truck stop where the attacks occurred walking rapidly away; and the defendant being found with exactly the amount of cash taken from one victim. Burden v. State, 296 Ga. App. 441, 674 S.E.2d 668 (2009).

Sufficient evidence was presented to convict a defendant of armed robbery based on the identification of the defendant by the victims of the first robbery and the defendant's admission to committing a second, similar robbery. Robinson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 43, 676 S.E.2d 770 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported a defendant's convictions for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) as a knife was found at the scene and the defendant made a statement to the victim that the defendant also had a gun; the victim also made a positive identification of the defendant at a one-on-one showup. Crawford v. State, 297 Ga. App. 187, 676 S.E.2d 843 (2009).

Sufficient evidence was presented to convict a defendant of armed robbery based on evidence that the defendant and a codefendant approached the victims' rental car and brandished guns; while pistol whipping the victims and robbing the victims of the victims' property, the defendant's gun went off and fatally wounded the first victim; and a gun matching the caliber of bullet recovered from the first victim during the autopsy was found during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel where the defendant had visited a guest on three occasions. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

- Victim's testimony showed that the defendant and the codefendant acted in concert to demand money from the victim at gunpoint and that the victim "threw" $15.00 at the codefendant; at that point, the armed robbery was completed and sufficient evidence supported the armed robbery conviction. Daniel v. State, 271 Ga. App. 539, 610 S.E.2d 90 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and three counts of kidnapping arising from an incident in which the defendant and a companion robbed the victim at gunpoint, then forced the victim and the victim's children into their house and tied the victim up with duct tape; the victim identified the defendant from a photo line-up, the defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene, a store video showed the defendant buying the duct tape which was used, and the store manager identified the defendant as the buyer of the duct tape. Brownlee v. State, 271 Ga. App. 475, 610 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the defendant told the victim that the defendant forgot the defendant's wallet, left a store, returned, showed the victim the handle of a gun, the victim ran, and the defendant took the goods. Garrett v. State, 271 Ga. App. 646, 610 S.E.2d 595 (2005).

- Evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction as the defendant picked up a coin bag from a table, twice pointed a gun at the victim's neck, ordered the victim to kneel, demanded the victim's wallet and keys, and left with the coin bag and the victim's keys. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the first defendant and the second defendant's convictions for murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary, as the evidence showed that they were involved in a scheme to rob someone who they believed to be selling large amounts of marijuana from the apartment, that they burst into the apartment brandishing guns, that one of the defendants fatally shot the person, and that the other defendant forced two people present to lie on the ground and divulge the location of a safe in the apartment that held money and marijuana. Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 611 S.E.2d 3 (2005).

Although defendant's firearm was used by an accomplice with defendant's consent during the course of robbery, the threatened use of that firearm and the fatal use of defendant's shotgun was sufficient to convict defendant of armed robbery; moreover, evidence that defendant pointed the shotgun at the victim during the robbery established defendant's guilt as a party to armed robbery. Weldon v. State, 279 Ga. 185, 611 S.E.2d 36 (2005).

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery as the robbery was completed as defendant approached the clerk with DVDs in hand just before the codefendant held the clerk at gunpoint; DVDs were later seen near the store where defendant and codefendant were apprehended, barefoot; police also found a handgun, a roll of red duct tape similar to the one used to restrain the clerk, and two pairs of shoes. Hall v. State, 274 Ga. App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344 (2005).

Evidence that defendant took money from the one victim, beat the victim while doing so, that defendant was armed at the time, that defendant had the victim removed from defendant's house by the codefendant's so that the one victim could be murdered elsewhere, and that the second victim was removed from defendant's house by another codefendant, all after the one victim and the second victim were suspected of plotting to rob defendant, who was selling illegal drugs from defendant's home, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Mason v. State, 279 Ga. 636, 619 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, burglary, and one firearms offense because: (1) defendant confessed to the crimes; (2) a companion wore distinctive shoes that matched those of an armed robber; (3) two dust-free ski masks, similar to those worn by the armed robbers, were found in defendant's very dusty utility closet; and (4) a small red car was parked near a restaurant that was robbed, officers stopped defendant two hours later, and defendant drove the same car to the police station when defendant came for voluntary questioning. Ray v. State, 273 Ga. App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, because the defendant entered a convenience store, the defendant approached the cashier and demanded the money, and the defendant then pointed a knife at the cashier and again demanded the money; the defendant was identified by the cashier, items of the perpetrator's clothing were seen on the defendant and then found near where the defendant was arrested, and the knife was discarded in close proximity to where the defendant was found. Todd v. State, 275 Ga. App. 459, 620 S.E.2d 666 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of burglary, armed robbery, and malice murder, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a),16-8-41, and16-5-1, respectively, because the defendant and a friend decided to rob the victim and they entered the apartment unlawfully with that intent, they stabbed and bludgeoned the victim, and they took a lock-box and left; although the evidence as to whether the defendant was let into the apartment by the victim willingly was conflicting, forced entry was not an element of burglary and accordingly, resolution of that fact did not change the sufficiency of the evidence for the burglary conviction. Redwine v. State, 280 Ga. 58, 623 S.E.2d 485 (2005).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1,16-8-41,16-5-21,16-7-1, and16-11-106, respectively, when the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim's home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim's apartment, took some of the victim's belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

- Police investigator's testimony that the defendant held a three-inch knife to the investigator's throat amply supported a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Wallace v. State, 277 Ga. App. 280, 626 S.E.2d 229 (2006).

- Armed robbery convictions were supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence since: (1) the defendant acted as the "getaway" driver for the two codefendants, and thus, was a party to the crimes; (2) the trial court properly substituted the court's charge for the defendant's requested charge because the court's charge included pattern charges on parties to a crime, knowledge, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and mere association with others committing a crime, and substantially covered the same legal principles as the requested charge; and (3) the trial counsel's strategy did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant and others approached two separate victims while the defendant brandished a shotgun, that the defendant threatened the victims with the gun, and that the defendant and the compatriots stole both of the victims' cars, sufficed to sustain convictions of two counts of hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the jury was free to disbelieve the defendant's testimony that the defendant was coerced into threatening the victims at gunpoint and participating in the car thefts. Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500, 629 S.E.2d 485 (2006).

As the state presented direct, and not circumstantial, evidence from the victims supporting the jury's finding of guilt, when this testimony was coupled with that from the police officers involved, substantial and sufficient evidence supported a conviction for armed robbery and related offenses; the fact that the defendant offered another explanation for the defendant's presence at the scene did not render the other evidence insufficient or circumstantial. Bakyayita v. State, 278 Ga. App. 624, 629 S.E.2d 539 (2006).

Armed robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence which showed that both victims identified the defendant as one of the persons who robbed the victims at gunpoint, that, shortly after the robberies, police located the defendant near the crime scene wearing clothes matching the description given by the victims, and that, although the defendant presented evidence that the defendant was at work until 10:00 P.M. on the night of the robberies, the work supervisor admitted to not seeing the defendant that night. Sorrells v. State, 279 Ga. App. 18, 630 S.E.2d 171 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of an armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary were supported by sufficient evidence that, the day before the three murder victims were found shot in the head, the defendant borrowed the defendant's sibling's car to visit one of the victims, who owed the defendant money, the defendant admitted going to the victims' home twice on the day of the murders, but stated that the victims were not home during either visit, neighbors heard gunshots around the home at approximately 7:30 P.M., near the last time that the two younger victims were heard from, and again at 10:00 P.M. that evening, when the older victim returned home for the day, a number of items stolen from the victims' home at the time of the murders were subsequently found in a dumpster next to a storage locker the defendant shared with a love interest, the items were contained in plastic bags that had the defendant's fingerprints on them, and the plastic bags came from a roll of trash bags found in the trunk of the car which the defendant borrowed on the day of the murders. Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (2006).

- Pictures of a defendant withdrawing money from a victim's ATM account and evidence that the defendant repeatedly asked the victim for the PIN number for the victim's ATM card, held a knife to the victim's neck, cut the cord used to tie the victim, and had cash, an ATM receipt, and the victim's car keys when the defendant was arrested were sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and two counts of possessing a knife during the commission of a crime. Wright v. State, 282 Ga. App. 649, 639 S.E.2d 581 (2006).

When the victim was killed during the theft of the victim's vehicle, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery; the defendant told others where the vehicle was, then stripped the vehicle; a call had been placed from the victim's cell phone to the house of one of the defendant's grandparents; police had found some of the victim's belongings at the home of the defendant's cousin; and a witness and two cousins of the defendant had stated that the defendant had admitted shooting the victim. Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions for a total of 20 counts of armed robbery, possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, terroristic threats and acts, kidnapping, and aggravated assault arising out of four separate robberies because the victims' testimony, the physical evidence, and one victim's identification of the defendant as the robber provided sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the defendant's accomplice. Metoyer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 810, 640 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

There existed sufficient evidence to uphold the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the evidence established that the victim, an airline pilot, was robbed at gunpoint at approximately 4 A.M., with the perpetrator taking the victim's luggage and fleeing in a Ford Ranger pickup truck and that, within two to three minutes after calling9-1-1, an officer stopped the speeding Ford Ranger and apprehended the defendant, who was wearing clothing as described by the victim and the luggage was found in the back of the pickup truck. Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (2007).

Defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by the evidence, which included use of the murder weapon during a later robbery by the defendant's accomplices, a video that provided a corroborating account of the shooting, and the defendant's spontaneous inculpatory statements while being transported from Maryland to Georgia. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

- As the evidence provided by the state at defendants' criminal trial demonstrated that based on information from defendant-B regarding a large quantity of marijuana possessed by a victim, defendant-A and another man forcibly entered the victim's residence while defendant-A was armed, pushed the victim to the ground, demanded to know where the marijuana was, and a physical struggle resulted, the evidence supported defendants' convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault; defendant-B was convicted as a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(4). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder predicated on armed robbery, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because the evidence showed that the defendant and the codefendant, after discussing the idea of stealing marijuana and whatever cash the victim had on the victim, arranged to meet with the victim to buy marijuana from the victim. When the victim got into the back seat of the defendant's vehicle and pulled out a bag of marijuana, the codefendant drew a gun and shot the victim, fatally wounding the victim. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because: (1) the defendant participated in the armed robbery of three people, including the shooting victim, who were sitting in a car on a neighborhood street; (2) during the encounter, the co-indictee fatally shot the victim in the head with a shot gun; (3) one of the two other people in the car testified that, after the shooting, the defendant, with the defendant's hand in the defendant's pocket simulating that the defendant had a gun, took money and drugs from the witness; (4) the co-indictee also took money from the other person; and (5) the defendant and the co-indictee then fled the scene. Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800, 708 S.E.2d 329 (2011).

Court rejected the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the evidence failed to show that anything of value was taken from the victim's person or immediate presence by use of a deadly weapon; contrary to the defendant's argument, the evidence established that one of the defendant's accomplices forced the victim at gunpoint through the victim's home and into the back bedroom closet during which time the robber demanded money and the contents of a box, that the victim struggled with the armed robber, that the victim's blood was found on the closet floor, and that the robber took a bag of cash and cocaine from the victim's closet. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for kidnapping, hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a weapon on school property were authorized because pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony alone established the essential elements of the offenses. Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant owned a firearm, gunshots were heard in the area of the shooting, the fatal attack occurred after a drug deal which the defendant was brokering for the victim went bad, the victim obtained a large sum of money to accomplish the drug buy, and the defendant or one of the defendant's cohorts was seen retrieving a bag of money. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 734 S.E.2d 23 (2012).

Testimony of the female victim and the accomplice that the defendant held a pistol on both victims and demanded and took cash from the male victim, along with the DNA evidence on the floor at the scene of the rape, was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury (by rape) and rape against a female victim, and kidnapping and armed robbery against a male victim. Brinkley v. State, 320 Ga. App. 275, 739 S.E.2d 703 (2013).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for aiding and abetting armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment based on the evidence that the defendant was a party to the crimes, including evidence that the defendant drove the codefendants to the house just before the crimes were committed; that the defendant was in the vehicle when plans to commit the crimes were discussed; that the defendant waited in the victim's driveway when the codefendants entered the front door of the house, wearing masks and carrying guns; and that the defendant drove the perpetrators away from the scene after the crimes were committed - speeding, driving erratically, and not stopping when the police, with sirens and lights activated, began following the vehicle. Simon v. State, 320 Ga. App. 15, 739 S.E.2d 34 (2013).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence in that, even absent fingerprint evidence, there was the identifications of two eyewitnesses as well as a bottle bearing the store's logo and the amount of cash and same denomination reported stolen found on the defendant's person. Hamlin v. State, 320 Ga. App. 29, 739 S.E.2d 46 (2013).

Victim's testimony that the defendant approached the victim, thrust a gun about six inches from the victim's face, took the victim's cell phone and keys, and told the victim to "get out of here", while waving a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim's head, a victim's wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant's house was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

- Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the defendant had gone to the victim's laundromat and waited until the victim opened a change machine, pointed a gun at the victim's head and ordered the victim to put the money in a bag, told the victim, "Hell, yeah, I'll kill you," and shot the victim multiple times; eyewitnesses, including two who knew the defendant, had identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 642 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, and aggravated battery since: the defendant had been seen fleeing the victim's home in a car registered to the defendant; the defendant told the defendant's spouse to discard the defendant's bloody clothing; the defendant sought treatment at a hospital after being shot during the crimes; and the defendant had initiated conversations in which the defendant described the actions of the defendant's companions in discarding guns used in the crimes and offered to reveal the names of the companions in exchange for not being charged with murder. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of armed robbery and of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime when: (1) the defendant's codefendants testified that the defendant participated in the armed robberies of which the defendant was convicted; (2) one victim identified the defendant as the victim's assailant; (3) two victims identified a gun that was recovered from the vehicle of the defendant's girlfriend as the gun used to rob the victims; (4) a victim's purse was recovered from the residence where the defendant was arrested; and (5) police found a sweatshirt and a ski mask in the girlfriend's car that matched a victim's description of the items worn by one robber. Cartledge v. State, 285 Ga. App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (2007).

Given that the testimony of the defendant's codefendants was sufficient to support convictions on four counts of armed robbery and four counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, the convictions were not subject to reversal. Cartledge v. State, 285 Ga. App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, and aggravated assault when the defendant shot and killed the first victim while the victim was making a night deposit at a bank and robbed the second victim, a bartender, at gunpoint a month later; the defendant and an accomplice fully confessed to both crimes, the confession to the bank crime was corroborated by a bank surveillance tape showing the murder in progress, and a bouncer witnessed the robbery of the bartender and grappled with the defendant at the scene. Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 646 S.E.2d 55 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of cocaine after: a driver carrying a gun and a bag ran out of a car that had been dragging the body of the car's owner and that had another dead victim in the passenger seat; bags of cocaine were on the lap of the victim in the passenger seat; one victim had been shot with a .44 caliber weapon; a canine unit located a .44 caliber revolver, cash, a man's clothes with cocaine in them, and a shoulder bag in the woods into which the driver had fled; the defendant came out of the woods wearing only underwear; and the defendant admitted to shooting the victims. Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and criminal trespass; the evidence included a custodial statement in which the defendant admitted participating in the crimes and testimony by a witness as to the preparations for the robbery, the clothing worn by the defendant and by the accomplice, and the defendant's disposal of a gun. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

Because: (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain identification evidence alleged to be hearsay as testimony relative to the identification was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; (2) the defendant's requested instruction was not tailored to the facts and was potentially confusing; and (3) the defendant's character was not placed in issue, convictions of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and obstruction were all upheld. Jennings v. State, 285 Ga. App. 774, 648 S.E.2d 105 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1576, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 667 (Ga. 2007).

Because the state presented sufficient evidence supporting the convictions entered against the first two defendants, a letter one of the defendants wrote was admissible against all as a statement of a coconspirator, no error resulted from the admission of a red baseball bat, and the first defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective, the first defendant's convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and the second defendants' convictions of the lesser included offense of robbery were upheld on appeal. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007).

- In a case where four persons riding in a stolen car robbed a cab driver at gunpoint, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime; the defendant led a detective to the gun the defendant possessed and admitted being in the stolen vehicle on the date in question, and a witness testified that the witness saw the defendant holding a gun and approaching the cab driver. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in a case where the defendant and the defendant's accomplices used a weapon to forcibly keep the victim away from the victim's property, including the victim's wallet, while the property was being taken. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (2007).

Because contradictions and uncertainties in the testimony did not render the evidence against the defendant insufficient but were ultimately for the jury to decide, and the victim's testimony that the gun used to commit the crime was not actually pointed at the victim did not mean that the intruders, including the defendant, did not commit an armed robbery, the evidence presented, which authorized the jury to find that the defendant participated in the committed crimes, was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction. Sheely v. State, 287 Ga. App. 92, 650 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

- Because the defendant's display of a gun handle created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that the defendant intended on using an offensive weapon to cause that victim to comply with a demand for money, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction; moreover, the fact that the offensive weapon might have ultimately been proven to only be a toy gun was inconsequential. Price v. State, 289 Ga. App. 763, 658 S.E.2d 382 (2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The four victims were found dead in two hotel rooms from gunshot wounds to the back of their heads; identification documents belonging to the four victims were found in the defendant's car; there was expert testimony that the defendant's gun had been used to kill the victims; the defendant's baseball cap contained one victim's deoxyribonucleic acid; there was evidence that the defendant and two friends used three victims' tickets to attend a football game after the victims were murdered; the defendant was identified as being in an elevator with one victim; the defendant was seen leaving the hotel with one victim's cooler; and a duffle bag belonging to one victim was in the defendant's car when the defendant was arrested on weapons charges. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of armed robbery and of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Both of the defendant's codefendants testified as to the defendant's participation in the events in question, which was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty; furthermore, the codefendants' testimony was corroborated by that of the victims. Hill v. State, 290 Ga. App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 405, 172 L. Ed. 2d 287 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault when the defendant demanded that the victim "break bread", hit the victim three times with a metal flashlight, and rummaged through the victim's pockets after the victim refused, hit the victim again after the victim refused to turn over a ring, and then took the ring. Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377, 659 S.E.2d 372 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-8-41, and16-11-106 as: (1) a robber ordered two store employees at gunpoint to give the robber money, then ordered the employees to go into a back room; (2) the employees described the robber and the robber's vehicle in detail; (3) the employees positively identified the defendant as the robber 15 to 20 minutes after the crime following a pursuit during which the defendant fled from police first in the defendant's vehicle, then on foot; and (4) the defendant had $281 in a pocket at the time of arrest. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

- Evidence was sufficient to support armed robbery conviction when the victim testified that the defendant took the victim's cell phone while the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and threatened to shoot the victim; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Burden v. State, 290 Ga. App. 734, 660 S.E.2d 481 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery because the evidence fully authorized the jury to find that the defendant borrowed the cell phone of one of the victims, intending never to return the phone due to the defendant's concern that the phone could be used to connect the defendant to the victims' murders; nothing in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) limits a conviction for armed robbery to the particular item a defendant originally intended to take by means of the use of an offensive weapon. Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194, 695 S.E.2d 215 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 because although the defendant did not actually use a weapon, the defendant's accomplice's use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant because under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, one who intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime by another was a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal; the defendant aided and abetted the accomplice by telling the accomplice to pull into an apartment complex after they saw the potential victims, giving the accomplice the defendant's gun, and then taking the victims' wallets from the victims while the accomplice pointed the gun at the victims. Barber v. State, 304 Ga. App. 453, 696 S.E.2d 433 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed three armed robberies because there was evidence that items were taken from at least three men by use of a gun; there was evidence that the items were taken from the men or "them," as well as evidence that there were four men in the immediate area at the time. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Combined direct and circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because at trial, the employees, a manager, and a customer of the two finance companies that were robbed testified to the events and identified defendant as the perpetrator of the respective robberies, and the state presented evidence that the six eyewitnesses previously identified the defendant in a lineup as the perpetrator; the state introduced into evidence fictitious loan applications that were associated with the two robberies and testimony from the landlord, a human resources director, and the county detectives linking defendant to information contained in those applications, and the state also introduced into evidence the handgun, clothing items, and sticky note seized during the search of defendant's residence. Walker v. State, 305 Ga. App. 607, 699 S.E.2d 902 (2010).

Because defendant admitted to police that defendant had planned the robbery that led to the victim's death, defendant was a willing participant in the robbery and shooting; consequently, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Branchfield v. State, 287 Ga. 869, 700 S.E.2d 576 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find all defendants guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim testified that one of the defendants had a knife during the attack and that all three defendants struck and kicked the victim while taking the victim's necklaces and money. Cruz v. State, 305 Ga. App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (2010).

Testimony of an accomplice that the defendant was with the others during the robbery of the first victim and ran off and ate pizza with everyone afterward and the testimony of the second victim identifying the defendant at trial as the man the second victim spoke to about selling a Blackberry while an accomplice put a gun to the second victim's neck, searched the second victim's pockets, and took the second victim's Blackberry and wallet, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Fuller v. State, 320 Ga. App. 620, 740 S.E.2d 346 (2013).

Evidence that the victims were robbed by individuals driving a Honda Civic who were armed with a gun; that the defendant admitted to distracting the victims while the other participants robbed the victims; that the defendant was wearing a plaid shirt when arrested, like the first victim testified one assailant was wearing; that the defendant and the other participants ran from the Civic shortly after an officer attempted to stop the car for driving without headlights; and that the first victim's purse and the second victim's checkbook were found in the Civic, from which the defendant was seen exiting and fleeing was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Lindsey v. State, 321 Ga. App. 808, 743 S.E.2d 481 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant and an accomplice were both tied to robberies just before and just after the robberies of the second and third victims, an officer observed the defendant and the accomplices exit a car registered to the defendant's mother shortly after the robberies, and items stolen from the second and third victims were found in that car, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for the second and third robberies. Wickerson v. State, 321 Ga. App. 844, 743 S.E.2d 509 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant was found in the laundry room of the home that was the subject of the home invasion; police found masks, gloves, money, a gun, and some of the victim's jewelry in or near the laundry room; and the defendant's DNA was found on one of masks recovered supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Rudison v. State, 322 Ga. App. 248, 744 S.E.2d 444 (2013).

Evidence that the victim identified the defendant as the robber with a gun and to whom the victim was forced to give money and a recording from a device the victim wore where a male was saying to get out of the car before he shot someone in the face was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Biggins v. State, 322 Ga. App. 286, 744 S.E.2d 811 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and aggravated assault based on the state showing that the defendant held the four boys at gunpoint, forced the boys into the pool to restrict their ability to flee, and stole two cell phones and money from the boys before fleeing. Smith v. State, 342 Ga. App. 656, 805 S.E.2d 251 (2017).

- When the victim complied with the defendant's demand by taking off three of the victim's rings, but then refused to comply with the defendant's demand that the victim remove the rest, the evidence supported a conviction of armed robbery. The jury was entitled to find that the defendant obtained physical possession of the three rings in response to the first demand; it was irrelevant how long the defendant retained possession of those rings. Brown v. State, 297 Ga. App. 631, 678 S.E.2d 101 (2009).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, kidnapping, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and financial transaction card fraud. Shortly after a man called the store where the victim worked to see if the store was open, a masked man with a gun came into the store, ordered the victim to the back, and then robbed the store and took the victim's credit cards; soon afterward that same morning, the defendant bought sneakers with the victim's credit card; the clerk who sold the defendant the sneakers identified the defendant at trial and in a photographic lineup and testified that the clerk knew the defendant because the defendant was a regular customer; and the defendant's cell phone records showed that just before the robbery, the defendant called the victim's store and blocked the defendant's number. Anderson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 733, 678 S.E.2d 498 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 159, 695 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery. The evidence, including testimony from the victim and an accomplice witness, indicated that the defendant and a third accomplice put a gun to the victim's head and demanded that the victim give the perpetrators the victim's money and that the perpetrators, while carrying a gun, accompanied the victim to a check-cashing store and to automatic teller machines so that the victim could get money. Varner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 799, 678 S.E.2d 515 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant pulled a gun on the victim, hit the victim in the face and the head with the gun, and snatched the victim's necklace from the victim's neck and carried the necklace 30 yards away before dropping the necklace was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Harris v. State, 334 Ga. App. 299, 779 S.E.2d 83 (2015).

Testimony from a victim that one of the three gunmen pointed a gun at the armed robbery victim and took money from the victim was sufficient to support the first defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Ray v. State, 338 Ga. App. 822, 792 S.E.2d 421 (2016).

While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

- Convictions of felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, inter alia, the defendant acted as a lookout and deterred two potential customers while a codefendant entered the victim's restaurant, shot the victim to death, robbed the cash register, and stole the victim's wallet; after the shooting, the defendant and the codefendant fled the scene together and went to a friend's apartment, where the defendant changed the defendant's shirt to disguise the defendant's identity. Proof of the defendant's direct commission of the crimes was not required because the jury could infer the defendant's participation from conduct before, during, and after the crime. Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

Restaurant was robbed, the restaurant's manager was fatally shot, and the manager's car was stolen. As the defendant's accomplice, the defendant's cellmate, and an officer testified that the defendant admitted committing the murder, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, armed robbery, and theft by taking. Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010).

Evidence that the defendant committed an armed robbery was not based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant's accomplice. A store employee corroborated the accomplice's testimony, and items similar to those taken during the robbery, as well as items taken during a later robbery, were recovered from the defendant's car, which was occupied by the defendant and the accomplice. Savage v. State, 298 Ga. App. 350, 679 S.E.2d 734 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). It was undisputed that the defendant's sibling committed the acts in question, and the evidence showed that the defendant drove with the sibling to the place the sibling planned to rob, waited for the sibling at the sibling's instructions until the sibling returned with the fruits of the crime and the weapon, and then tried to drive away. McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-11-106(b)(1), as a victim who was robbed at gunpoint by two assailants identified the defendant as one of the assailants; the victim had been walking on a college campus when the two assailants approached, held a gun on the victim, and searched the victim's backpack before fleeing with the victim's wallet. Ware v. State, 298 Ga. App. 232, 679 S.E.2d 797 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery because three other participants in the robbery testified and confirmed that the defendant planned and participated in the robbery and shared in the money taken from the victims; further, the defendant gave a statement to an officer in which the defendant admitted to being at the scene at the time of the crime, but alleged the defendant was only there to sell drugs to the other participants in the armed robbery and was unaware that the others intended to commit a robbery. Brown v. State, 298 Ga. App. 226, 679 S.E.2d 808 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions because the victim recognized the defendant as one of the men who, while armed with a gun, pushed their way into the victim's home, pushed the victim down, and demanded money when a mask the defendant was wearing fell down; the victim also identified the defendant from earlier occasions when the defendant was visiting the victim's neighborhood. Dubose v. State, 298 Ga. App. 335, 680 S.E.2d 193 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and kidnapping as a store clerk testified that the defendant, brandishing a knife, ordered the clerk to open the cash register; that the defendant took money from the register; that the defendant forced the clerk into a bathroom, blocked the door with boxes, and fled. Further, both the clerk and a customer identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial. Hill v. State, 298 Ga. App. 677, 680 S.E.2d 702 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The victims' in-court identifications of the defendant and the codefendant were buttressed by the evidence that a cell phone in their possession matched that taken from the victims, that a car of the type used by the robbers contained guns similar to those used in the robbery, and the fact that the codefendant had a key to that car. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. App. 32, 684 S.E.2d 102 (2009).

Evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault for attacking six people in a home because one of the victims stated that the victim saw the defendant in the doorway after shots had been fired; whether the deal a codefendant made with the state rendered the codefendant's testimony biased to a degree that left the codefendant less creditworthy was a determination to be made by the jury. Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286, overruled on other grounds, Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of armed robbery against victim one because the victim testified that the robbers took $47 from the victim's pocket and that a restaurant bank bag contained both the money for the day and the checks for the day; the jury chose to believe the victim's testimony. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010).

- Since an armed robbery was completed when control of the money in a cash register was ceded to defendant and the other four robbers, the facts were sufficient to indict defendant, who was 16 years old, for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); therefore, the superior court lacked authority under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) to transfer the case to a juvenile court. Gutierrez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 371, 702 S.E.2d 642 (2010).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld based on the defendant's accomplice's testimony that the defendant pointed a shotgun at a resident during a robbery and evidence that a shotgun and items taken during the robbery were found in the defendant's bedroom. Mays v. State, 306 Ga. App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21 (2010).

Evidence at trial was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for two counts of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), because the evidence showed that the defendant admitted to being present at the scene of the armed robberies, a victim identified the defendant in court as the person who robbed the victim at gunpoint, several items belonging to the victims were found in the defendant's home, the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend owned vehicles similar to those used in the robberies, and each victim testified that the robber worked in cooperation with an accomplice. Baker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 884, 706 S.E.2d 214 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0940, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) because even though the defendant was found near a car similar to that involved in the robbery, with a shotgun similar to that used in the attack, and the defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (2011).

Evidence from the victim and two eyewitnesses to the armed robbery of the night manager of a shoe store was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, along with DNA evidence and the amount of cash recovered from one of the defendants. Flint v. State, 308 Ga. App. 532, 707 S.E.2d 498 (2011).

Because there was independent evidence sufficient to corroborate the testimony given by a codefendant, the cumulative evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery; accordingly, counsel's failure to request a charge on accomplice testimony did not constitute deficient performance. Harris v. State, 308 Ga. App. 456, 707 S.E.2d 878 (2011).

- Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of using a handgun to rob each of the victims because on three separate occasions within a three week period, the defendant used a revolver to rob a solitary pedestrian during daylight hours, all in the same part of the city, and at trial, each of the victims identified the defendant as the person who robbed them; after arresting the defendant, officers inventoried the contents of the defendant's vehicle and found a loaded .38 caliber revolver and a cell phone, and an officer determined that the cell phone belonged to the third victim. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery based on the victim's testimony that the defendant and the defendant's codefendant approached the victim, asked for cigarettes, pulled a gun on the victim and stuck a gun in the victim's stomach, then relieved the victim of the victim's cigarettes and the victim's wallet with $300 that the victim had just been paid. Scruggs v. State, 309 Ga. App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (2011).

- Evidence that a defendant concealed a designer handbag and four wallets under a shopping bag and started to leave a department store, and that the defendant then, seeing a security guard had been alerted, concealed the items under a clothing rack, was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony shoplifting in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14(a)(1). Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012).

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), because the victim testified about the assault and identified the defendant as the person who committed the assault; the competent testimony of even a single witness can be enough to sustain a conviction. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the phone and cash register taken from the immediate presence of the victim was the property of another in that the property belonged to the phone business of the victim's family. Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 806, 726 S.E.2d 63 (2012).

Sufficient evidence showed the defendant committed armed robbery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because the defendant accompanied a codefendant to a crime scene, acted as a lookout, and shared in the proceeds. Campbell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 299, 724 S.E.2d 24 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because an accomplice testified to committing a series of armed robberies and that the defendant had participated by selecting the stores to rob, supplying the gun, acting as the getaway driver, and receiving part of the stolen money; law enforcement officers testified that the accomplice implicated the defendant during an interrogation, and officers found items of clothing matching those worn by the armed robber in the defendant's hotel room. Williams v. State, 314 Ga. App. 840, 726 S.E.2d 66 (2012).

As the first defendant aided and abetted in effecting a plan to steal the victim's car, and as the second defendant took the victim's money, the evidence was sufficient to convict both of them of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-44.1,16-8-41(a),16-11-106. Copeny v. State, 316 Ga. App. 347, 729 S.E.2d 487 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the evidence showed that the defendant either directly committed or was a party to the armed robberies of both victims at a rest area. A custodian present at the scene identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators who had participated in the crimes, and the defendant's flight from the rest area, flight from the officers, act of driving the getaway car, and possession of one victim's driver's license and clothing items linked the defendant to the crimes. Bryson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 512, 729 S.E.2d 631 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim, because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the count of armed robbery of the victim whose purse and money were returned, as the purse was forcibly taken, by use of a gun, while the victim was immobilized, and complete dominion of the property was transferred from the victim to the robbers, which was sufficient asportation to meet the statutory criteria. Holder v. State, 319 Ga. App. 239, 736 S.E.2d 449 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault when, in addition to accomplice testimony implicating the defendant, the descriptions of the defendant's clothing at the time of offenses offered by the accomplice and one of the victims were the same, and the driver of the vehicle the defendant left the area in testified that on the day of the robbery, the driver drove the defendant and the accomplice to an area near the location of the offenses, left the car and upon the driver's return the defendant and the accomplice were gone, another passenger told the driver to meet the defendant and the accomplice at a gas station across from the scene of the offenses, and the defendant and the accomplice returned to the car at the gas station with a box full of change. Love v. State, 318 Ga. App. 387, 734 S.E.2d 95 (2012).

State's physical evidence, including the victim's blood on the defendant's shirt, the defendant's unexplained possession of the victim's truck, watch, and other personal property, and the fact that the defendant was seen near the victim's residence and farm not long before the crimes were committed, supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder and armed robbery. Blevins v. State, 291 Ga. 814, 733 S.E.2d 744 (2012).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a gun during a crime, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions to suppress the evidence found in the defendant's bedroom and in the vehicle that the defendant operated as the defendant's parents had authority to give consent to the police to search the defendant's unlocked bedroom since the defendant did not pay rent and was only home for the summer from college. As to the vehicle, the parents asked the police to locate their vehicle and the police properly seized the vehicle, impounded the vehicle, and obtained a search warrant; thus, the rifle used during the robberies that was found in the trunk of the vehicle was not the product of an illegal search. Warner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1952, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 35 (Ga. 2010).

- See Walker v. State, 193 Ga. App. 446, 388 S.E.2d 44 (1989); Jackson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 273, 543 S.E.2d 770 (2000).

Evidence including testimony as to the gang's criminal activities, corroborating the defendant's participation in the armed robberies; the defendant's admission to participating in two murders; and a gun the defendant used in the attempted armed robbery of the first victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for criminal street gang activity, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 682, 746 S.E.2d 162 (2013).

Evidence that men ultimately identified as the defendant and the codefendant broke into the victims' home, held all three victims at gunpoint while demanding drugs and money, and began loading electronics and other valuables from the home into the victims' vehicle before fleeing the premises was sufficient to support the defendant's three attempted armed robbery convictions. Issa v. State, 340 Ga. App. 327, 796 S.E.2d 725 (2017).

Jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant used a firearm to attempt to take money from the victim given the victim's testimony that the defendant pulled out a gun and asked the victim what the victim had in the victim's pockets. Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 818 S.E.2d 535 (2018).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder predicated on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the victim was found dead from gunshot wounds; the victim's wallet was missing when the victim was found; the suspect fled the scene in a small, silver sedan; the defendant's co-indictee was driving a vehicle matching that description in the area at the time of the murder; and the defendant stated in a jailhouse telephone conversation that the defendant was involved in the week-long crime spree. Perdomo v. State, 307 Ga. 670, 837 S.E.2d 762 (2020).

- Since the victim testified that while threatening the victim with a loaded gun and after telling the victim that defendant wouldn't hesitate to kill the victim, defendant asked, "do you got any money in here?", the evidence provided a sufficient basis for the jury's determination that defendant was guilty of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Green v. State, 249 Ga. App. 546, 547 S.E.2d 569 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because defendant surreptitiously watched others at a fast food restaurant, wore a mask, and drew a BB handgun that resembled a semi-automatic weapon when defendant was confronted by a police officer. New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341, 606 S.E.2d 865 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, even though the defendant never said the defendant was going to rob a store or demanded money, as the jury was authorized to find that, having spent all of the defendant's money, the defendant took the substantial step of entering the store with a knife with the intent to commit robbery. Boyd v. State, 284 Ga. 46, 663 S.E.2d 218 (2008).

- See Vincent v. State, 210 Ga. App. 6, 435 S.E.2d 222 (1993), aff'd, 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

- Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).

Given the testimony provided by both the codefendant and the codefendant's former wife, to whom the defendant admitted to firing the fatal shots killing the victim, which netted the victim's cellular phone and pager and evidence describing how the defendant participated in the events that happened before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, sufficient evidence was presented to uphold the defendant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery as a party to the crimes. Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 644 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Evidence that a defendant discussed robbing a store, drove two robbers there, drove the getaway car evasively while being chased by police, fled after crashing the car, and took a share of the stolen money was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Dorsey v. State, 297 Ga. App. 268, 676 S.E.2d 890 (2009).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, hijacking a motor vehicle, and armed robbery because there was ample evidence, based upon the defendant's actions and presence, companionship, conduct, and demeanor before, during, and after the commission of the crime, to conclude that the defendant was more than "merely present" during the commission of the crimes and was a party to the crimes pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; while in a car with the victim and companions, the front-seat passenger pulled out a gun and shot the victim, and during the incident, the defendant did not say or do anything to intervene. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).

Evidence authorized the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the defendant was a party to the crime of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because at trial, the victim identified the defendant as matching the description of one of the men who attacked the victim, and the defendant admitted to being with the codefendant on the night of the offense. Kirkland v. State, 315 Ga. App. 143, 726 S.E.2d 644 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant drove to the robbery scene, supplied the weapon, functioned as the lookout, and drove the getaway vehicle was sufficient to show that the defendant was a party to an armed robbery. Windhom v. State, 326 Ga. App. 212, 756 S.E.2d 296 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the crimes because a codefendant pointed a gun at the victim's side and demanded money; the codefendant told the defendant that they were going to kill the victim; the codefendant took the victim's cell phone, ordered the victim to disrobe, and raped the victim in the front seat of the car; during the rape, the victim could not escape from the car as the defendant was standing in front of the driver's door; and, after the victim transferred the victim's number to a new cell phone, the victim received calls for the defendant. Carter v. State, 339 Ga. App. 140, 793 S.E.2d 459 (2016).

- Because defendant's four accomplices in commission of multiple armed robberies and aggravated assaults corroborated each other as to the defendant's participation in the crimes, convictions on those offenses were upheld on appeal. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 686, 660 S.E.2d 474 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant participated in an armed robbery because an accomplice's testimony, which implicated the defendant as a party to the crimes, was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony and evidence at trial when the testimony of a second accomplice regarding the circumstances surrounding the planned robbery, the defendant's participation in the planning of the robbery, and the party's actions before and after the robbery sufficiently corroborated the first accomplice's testimony; the first accomplice's testimony was further corroborated by the victims' descriptions of the events surrounding the robbery, and the police chief testified at trial that police found two sets of shoe prints at the scene of the robbery, but only one set where the second accomplice waited with the car, which also corroborated the accomplice's testimony about what happened after the robbery. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010).

There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate a coconspirator's testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) and for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), and kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a); the state presented the testimony of numerous witnesses and other evidence that sufficiently corroborated the co-conspirator's testimony about the defendant's participation in the crimes. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict after the defendant was convicted of armed robbery because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) since there was evidence from which a jury could find sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony to support the defendant's conviction; the testimony of the victims corroborated the accomplice's testimony because the victims physical description of the perpetrator was consistent with the accomplice's testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the robbery. Harris v. State, 311 Ga. App. 336, 715 S.E.2d 757 (2011).

Defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and other crimes were not based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) as: 1) a victim testified that intruders took a wallet that police later found in the defendant's home; and 2) cell phone tower records established that the defendant and the accomplice were exchanging phone calls during the times when the crimes were committed and within the vicinity of the crime sites. Jackson v. State, 289 Ga. 798, 716 S.E.2d 188 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as the evidence authorized the jury to find that the robber's acts created for the bank teller reasonable apprehension that the robber was threatening the teller with a grenade to force the teller to comply with the robber's demand for money. Whitmire v. State, 343 Ga. App. 282, 807 S.E.2d 46 (2017).

Testimony that defendant pointed a sawed-off shotgun at arresting officers would tend to show the commission of a separate crime (aggravated assault on a police officer); however, such evidence was nonetheless admissible in defendant's trial for armed robbery. Bradford v. State, 182 Ga. App. 337, 355 S.E.2d 735 (1987).

- See Jackson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 737, 302 S.E.2d 611 (1983).

- Since there was no evidence that a taking or a theft occurred at the time of the murder, the state failed to carry the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the underlying felony of armed robbery. Prater v. State, 273 Ga. 477, 541 S.E.2d 351 (2001).

- Although defendant was not the triggerman, where there was evidence which authorized findings that defendant was present with the triggerman for over two hours prior to the murder; that defendant drove the triggerman to the victim's house; that defendant was present in the room when the victim was shot; that the victim was shot with a gun of the same model and caliber that defendant owned; and that defendant destroyed evidence, assisted in the disposal of the decedent's body, fled from the jurisdiction where the crimes were committed, reaped benefits from the armed robbery, and at no time made any attempt to disassociate self from the criminal enterprise; a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crimes of murder and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Tho Van Huynh v. State, 257 Ga. 375, 359 S.E.2d 667 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to support convictions of murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Baty v. State, 275 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 655 (1987).

Evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault (with intent to rob). Conway v. State, 183 Ga. 573, 359 S.E.2d 438 (1987).

Evidence insufficient to support an armed robbery charge when the crime of burglary was completed before the victim was threatened with a weapon and only an attempted armed robbery was then committed. Gould v. State, 168 Ga. App. 605, 309 S.E.2d 888 (1983); Brazle v. State, 223 Ga. App. 504, 478 S.E.2d 412 (1996).

Trial court erroneously admitted an officer's testimony regarding a statement made by one of the victims who died of natural causes prior to trial as the admission violated the defendant's right to confrontation; moreover, because there was no other evidence to support this armed robbery count, the defendant could not be retried for it. Gifford v. State, 287 Ga. App. 725, 652 S.E.2d 610 (2007).

Evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery as to the third victim as the record lacked any evidence of a taking of property belonging to the third victim or over which the victim exercised some level of control. Bradford v. State, 327 Ga. App. 621, 760 S.E.2d 630 (2014).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because, although the evidence presented supported a finding that the defendant performed certain acts in preparation for an armed robbery, the defendant's acts were merely preparatory acts and did not amount to an attempt to commit the crime of armed robbery as the defendant was not in possession of a weapon or device having the appearance of a weapon; furthermore, there was no evidence that the defendant gave the robbery notes to anyone or concealed the defendant's hands in any way as if to hide a weapon. Rainey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 413, 790 S.E.2d 106 (2016).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the indictment alleged that the defendant took a chain and charm pendant from the victim, but the chain was found with the victim's clothing at the hospital, and the necklace's pendant was found on the ground at the shooting site; thus, there was no evidence that the defendant ever moved the chain or exercised control over the chain; and, while the movement of the pendant from the chain around the victim's neck to the ground might have satisfied the slight change of location requirement, there was no evidence that the defendant ever had complete dominion over the pendant. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 404, 807 S.E.2d 418 (2017).

- Because no eyewitnesses saw a third defendant participate in an armed robbery, a kidnapping, an aggravated assault, or possess a firearm during the commission of the crimes, and because the third defendant was not implicated by the other defendants, did not confess to the crimes, and did not flee the jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the third defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 499, 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006).

- Any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), hoax devices, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-85(a), and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because although circumstantial, the evidence authorized the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the defendant engaged in the acts that constituted the crimes; even though the defendant was apprehended while wearing clothing that did not match that described by the victims, an officer familiar with the habits of bank robbers testified that bank robbers like to wear multi-layer clothing and then shed clothes after the crime. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 22, 717 S.E.2d 532 (2011).

- Fact that the victim was not aware until police arrived that the victim's gun had been taken did not mean that defendant's armed robbery conviction could not stand, as a jury could find that the victim, who was bound and forcibly held at gunpoint while the victim's house was ransacked, was aware that items were being taken from the victim's home. Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 69, 661 S.E.2d 221 (2008).

- Evidence that the defendant, who did not "directly commit" the offense and was not present at the crime, accepted stolen coins and attempted to hide the robbery participants was constitutionally insufficient to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Tenner v. Wallace, 615 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ga. 1985).

- Ultimate issue in determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes is not mere similarity but relevance to the issues of the case being tried; when in addition to the use of the gun and similar obscene language, the victim of the instant incident and the charged crime was the grocery store chain from which the defendant had been fired and told not to come on the premises; therefore, the evidence was admissible. Cain v. State, 212 Ga. App. 531, 442 S.E.2d 279 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to show that the defendants committed an armed robbery of a convenience store when two employees of the store and a customer present at the time of the robbery were each able to identify the defendants as the perpetrators, despite the coverings over defendants' faces, by recognizing their voices. Shannon v. State, 275 Ga. App. 550, 621 S.E.2d 540 (2005).

Trial court did not err in admitting a virtually identical robbery as a similar transaction against the defendant as the incident was relevant to show that the defendant knew of the crimes and intended to allow two individuals to use the defendant's car to commit the crime. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).

State was properly allowed to introduce evidence that the defendant committed another armed robbery two days after the crimes charged as: (1) the trial court found that the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's course of conduct or bent of mind; (2) the subsequent offense was similar; (3) the defendant used a drawn gun to demand money and, when the victim protested or resisted, the defendant threatened to shoot; (4) the state was only required to show that the other crime was similar, not identical, to the offenses for which the defendant was being tried. Simpson v. State, 282 Ga. 508, 651 S.E.2d 732 (2007).

Similar transaction evidence of an eight-year-old incident in which the defendant robbed two victims at gunpoint was not too remote in time or dissimilar to the armed robbery and aggravated assault charges the defendant was being tried for, and was thus properly admitted to show course of conduct, bent of mind, motive, and identity. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).

In a prosecution for the armed robbery of a cell phone store, evidence that the defendant robbed another cell phone store 20 minutes earlier was properly admitted to show the defendant's bent of mind and course of conduct, and to rebut the defendant's alibi defense because the victim of the earlier robbery identified the defendant from a photographic line-up and at trial, and the modus operandi of the perpetrator of both crimes was nearly identical. Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0749, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2009).

Defendant was charged with robbing a store clerk at knife-point. Evidence presented at a Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3(B) hearing that, on the day after this robbery, the defendant robbed a second clerk at knife-point was properly admitted as similar transaction evidence; the fact that the trial on the second robbery was pending afforded no basis to exclude the evidence. Hill v. State, 298 Ga. App. 677, 680 S.E.2d 702 (2009).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the state to introduce the evidence of a similar robbery to show the defendant's intent and modus operandi or course of conduct, which were legitimate purposes at the time of trial, because the state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the other robbery, which involved robbing a restaurant night manager at closing time while concealing the defendant's face with clothing. Martin v. State, 324 Ga. App. 252, 749 S.E.2d 815 (2013).

- The posture of such a case is that defendant has been validly convicted but has had a void sentence imposed which in law amounts to no sentence at all. State v. Stuckey, 145 Ga. App. 434, 243 S.E.2d 627 (1978).

Applicability of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41 and 17-10-7. - When armed robbery indictment contains recidivist count which specifically invokes general recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, rather than the specific recidivist sentencing statute for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b), the trial court errs when the court sets the final sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b). Under such an indictment and a guilty verdict, the trial court is required to sentence the defendant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), to "the longest period of time prescribed" for armed robbery, that sentence being life imprisonment. State v. Baldwin, 167 Ga. App. 737, 307 S.E.2d 679 (1983); Stone v. State, 218 Ga. App. 350, 461 S.E.2d 548 (1995).

- Jury may find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and find that the armed robbery is a statutory aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty for the victim's murder regardless of whether the defendant's intent to take the victim's property arose before or after the murder. Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93 (1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S. Ct. 1912, 95 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1987).

- Court's reliance for sentencing purposes upon out-of-state conviction challenged as an involuntary, unwitting guilty plea was reversible error when imposing life sentence. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 95, 432 S.E.2d 827 (1993).

- Error in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior arrest for armed robbery was not harmless as the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming because none of the people in the bank during the robbery identified the defendant as one of the robbers; and the only witness connecting the defendant to the robbery was an accomplice, whose testimony, standing alone, would not support the defendant's conviction as corroboration of the accomplice's testimony was required. Blackwell v. State, 351 Ga. App. 302, 830 S.E.2d 782 (2019).

When the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, armed robbery, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present character evidence in the form of the defendant's prior arrest for armed robbery as the defendant's references to mentoring children did not open the door to rebuttal evidence from the state because neither the defendant's counsel nor the state questioned the defendant about the references or attempted to tie the defendant's mentoring to any character trait; and even if the references to being a mentor did open the door to rebuttal testimony, the evidence of the defendant's prior arrest for armed robbery was not tailored to rebut evidence of any pertinent character trait offered by the defendant's testimony. Blackwell v. State, 351 Ga. App. 302, 830 S.E.2d 782 (2019).

- Although eleven years separated defendant's earlier robbery from this armed robbery, part of that time defendant was in prison, and it is the similarity of the offenses within the meaning of Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) that determines the admissibility of such evidence, not whether the span of time between offenses is brief. Nelson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 63, 528 S.E.2d 844 (2000).

- Because an accomplice testified against defendant only after court threatened to hold defendant in contempt, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on leniency and immunity offered to a witness, and because the jury was not confused by the absence of alternatives on a verdict form, defendant was properly convicted of armed robbery. Arvinger v. State, 276 Ga. App. 127, 622 S.E.2d 476 (2005).

Trial court did not err by granting the state's request to charge the jury on robbery by sudden snatching, and the defendant's due process rights were not violated as: (1) the indictment alleging armed robbery gave the defendant sufficient notice; (2) the essential elements of both armed robbery and robbery by sudden snatching were contained within the indictment; (3) robbery by sudden snatching was a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law; and (4) the defendant conceded that the trial evidence supported such a charge. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).

- Defendant's claim that the defendant's attempted armed robbery verdict and three armed robbery verdicts should have been vacated as the defendant was acquitted of the firearms offenses related to those crimes was rejected; although the defendant claimed to argue that the verdicts were mutually exclusive, the defendant in fact argued that the verdicts were inconsistent and Georgia had abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. Ray v. State, 273 Ga. App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

- Defendant's two armed robbery convictions did not merge with one another for sentencing purposes where evidence was introduced authorizing convictions on each count and the counts involved different victims and different weapons. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

- Trial court erred by not merging two armed robbery counts; when a single victim was robbed of multiple items in a single transaction, there was only one robbery. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007).

- Trial court did not unfairly enhance defendant's sentence for armed robbery based on a previous aggravated child molestation conviction, committed when defendant was 13 years old, as: (1) under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-1, the legislature made the age of 13 the age of criminal responsibility in Georgia; (2) the legislature did not elect to carve out an exception that would exempt youthful offenders from the sentencing provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)(2); and (3) the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the "two violent felonies" statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)(2). Lee v. State, 267 Ga. App. 834, 600 S.E.2d 825 (2004).

Imposition of life sentence for armed robbery was within the range of punishment prescribed therefor and did not violate the mandate that sentences be for a determinate period. Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 421, 447 S.E.2d 714 (1994); Hill v. State, 250 Ga. App. 9, 550 S.E.2d 422 (2001).

Even though O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1 (prior to the 1993 amendment) did not mandate a life sentence, a life sentence on an armed robbery conviction was proper under the specific provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 453 S.E.2d 110 (1995).

O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1 authorizes the imposition of a life sentence or a determinate sentence at the discretion of the trial judge. Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995); Echols v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 474, 458 S.E.2d 100 (1995).

Life sentence was properly imposed since the statute permitted such a sentence, even without consideration of a recidivist count. Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 213, 505 S.E.2d 858 (1998).

Life in prison for armed robbery was a sentence within the statutory guidelines, even if the conviction was for a first offense; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the convicted criminal's motion to vacate the convicted criminal's sentence on the ground that the convicted criminal was improperly sentenced as a recidivist as the sentence was authorized by law even without regard to recidivism. Kinsey v. State, 259 Ga. App. 653, 578 S.E.2d 269 (2003).

Evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction when the victim testified that the defendant brought candy to the cash register, held a silver gun to the victim's side, and took $59 from the victim's cash register, when the victim identified the defendant as the person who robbed the victim, when the store's videotape recorder made a tape of what happened, since, when the defendant was arrested shortly thereafter, the defendant was in possession of the candy, a gun, and $59 in cash, and when, after the defendant's apprehension, the defendant admitted to the police that the defendant committed the robbery to get drug money; for the purpose of punishment, armed robbery was not a capital felony, but the general recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), included, for purpose of punishment, armed robbery, and a sentence of life without parole for defendant's armed robbery conviction was proper and was affirmed. Dixon v. State, 267 Ga. App. 479, 600 S.E.2d 415 (2004).

Sentence of life in prison plus years consecutive for convictions of felony murder and armed robbery did not exceed the statutorily authorized maximum and did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment; the felony murder statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, authorized a sentence of life in prison on conviction for felony murder, and the armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, authorized a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than 10 nor more than 20 years. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction plus two 20-year terms, running concurrent to each other but consecutive to the felony murder sentence, for the two convictions for armed robbery, and thus the statutory maximum was not exceeded. Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

- There was no error in the trial court's failure to convict the defendant of kidnapping and armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40 and16-8-41, respectively, under the First Offender Act as O.C.G.A. § 42-8-66 specifically stated that the Act did not apply to sentences for violent felonies outlined in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, and those two crimes were listed as serious violent felonies. Isaac v. State, 275 Ga. App. 254, 620 S.E.2d 483 (2005).

- Trial court was authorized to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment for armed robbery, even when the defendant was not a recidivist; defendant was not eligible to be sentenced as a first offender, because such treatment was not available for a conviction for armed robbery. Johnson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 848, 619 S.E.2d 488 (2005).

- When a defendant convicted of armed robbery asserted the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence without hearing mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals found no error in this regard as there was no indication in the record that the defendant sought an opportunity to present mitigating evidence or that the defendant objected to going forward with the sentencing proceeding. Wright v. State, 187 Ga. App. 311, 370 S.E.2d 160, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 909, 370 S.E.2d 160 (1988).

- Case was remanded for resentencing where trial court had imposed a sentence of imprisonment for at least 10 years, although neither of the two statutory aggravating factors were present. Flagg v. State, 187 Ga. App. 297, 370 S.E.2d 46 (1988).

Case was remanded for resentencing after the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment beyond the 20 year maximum sentence. Tesfaye v. State, 275 Ga. 439, 569 S.E.2d 849 (2002).

- Denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was affirmed as defendant's fingerprint was on the robbery note, the victim eliminated all but defendant's and one other's photos from a photo lineup, the victim's description matched the defendant's appearance, and the victim in a similar robbery positively identified the defendant as the robber; a defense witness' testimony that the witness saw the defendant playing with cards in the hotel lobby a few days before the robbery did not exonerate the defendant as the witness did not see the defendant playing with cards similar to the one on which the robbery note was written. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126 (2005).

- In defendant's trial on a charge of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, an investigating officer's testimony that, based on defendant's conduct, the victim believed that the robbers and defendant had acted in concert, should not have been admitted; as there was no limiting instruction, and it was the only direct evidence of defendant's participation, the error was not harmless, such that a mistrial should have been granted. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012).

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (4) as a codefendant testified that defendant had provided the gun used in the crime, which was corroborated by defendant's admission that defendant provided the shooter with the gun and that defendant knew that they intended to use the gun to rob a place on the interstate. Terrell v. State, 268 Ga. App. 173, 601 S.E.2d 500 (2004).

- Defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea was properly denied as withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice since: (1) the defense counsel was not ineffective; (2) the state showed that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) the trial court was entitled to discredit contradictory testimony given by the defendant at the motion to withdraw the plea hearing; and (4) the defendant's claim that the defendant had nothing to gain by entering a "blind" plea failed as even assuming, that an aggravated assault conviction would have merged with an armed robbery conviction and that five convictions of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime would have merged with each other for sentencing purposes, the defendant still would have faced an additional five years' to serve if the defendant had not pled guilty. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (2006).

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were reversed as the defendant established that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to object to the inadmissible hearsay statements of two witnesses, and the admission of improper impeachment evidence against the defendant regarding a crime for which the defendant was never adjudicated guilty for as a result of being a first offender at the time. Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga. App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (2008).

- Although the transcript failed to show that the investigator was qualified as an expert in the meaning of cell phone records, there was direct evidence that the defendant was at the scene of the robbery, thus, the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel's failure to object, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Young v. State, 328 Ga. App. 857, 763 S.E.2d 137 (2014), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

- Counsel was not ineffective by conceding the defendant's guilt on a fleeing and eluding charge in order to build credibility and avoid conviction on the more serious charges; the fleeing charge carried a five-year maximum sentence, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(b)(5)(A), whereas the defendant faced a sentence of life without parole were the defendant convicted of armed robbery. Payne v. State, 338 Ga. App. 677, 791 S.E.2d 451 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

Jury charge which created an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption as to intent was harmless error since the defendant's defense was alibi and misidentification, and in the alternative, insanity, and such defenses did not put into issue criminal intent. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 893, 350 S.E.2d 768 (1986).

- Although charge of armed robbery includes lesser offenses, when the defendant was not charged with any other crime, nor did charge to jury adequately instruct on elements of such lesser included offenses, the jury's general verdict of guilty must be construed as finding the defendant guilty of the gravest possible offense, armed robbery, therefore requiring that there be evidence of an armed robbery. Dixon v. Hopper, 407 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Ga. 1976), overruled on other grounds, Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir. 1984).

- While robbery by intimidation is an offense included within armed robbery, a charge on the included offense is not required where the uncontradicted evidence shows completion of the offense of armed robbery. Millis v. State, 196 Ga. App. 799, 397 S.E.2d 71 (1990).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a taxi driver, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching as, although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant took the money from the taxi driver's pocket by snatching the money rather than through use of the gun, the evidence further showed without dispute that, by the time defendant completed the robbery, the defendant had taken additional money from the taxi meter after brandishing the handgun and hitting the taxi driver with the gun. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court did not err in failing to give a jury charge on robbery or conspiracy as a lesser offense of armed robbery because the evidence was uncontradicted that a video store was robbed at gunpoint, the gun was brandished throughout the incident, and the defendant participated in the robbery while the gun was being used to accomplish the robbery; in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, it was highly probable that the failure to give the lesser charge did not contribute to the verdicts. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010).

- In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting jury charges on the law of abandonment and accessory after-the-fact as there was no evidence that the defendant abandoned the crime before an overt act occurred or that the defendant was an accessory after the fact rather than a party to the robbery. Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga. App. 486, 672 S.E.2d 459 (2009).

- When the victim testified that the defendant was one of three assailants who robbed the victim, the trial court did not err in charging on parties to a crime. Webb v. State, 187 Ga. App. 348, 370 S.E.2d 204 (1988).

Charge to jury setting forth entire text of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), including last sentence on "robbery by intimidation," was not error even though the portion of the charge on intimidation was unnecessary based on the allegations and evidence in the case. Cottingham v. State, 206 Ga. App. 197, 424 S.E.2d 794 (1992).

- Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by both the defendants as to a charge of armed robbery, but properly gave the pattern jury charge instead as the charge given covered the principle of law in the requested charge. Richard v. State, 287 Ga. App. 399, 651 S.E.2d 514 (2007).

- Trial court properly charged the jury in the defendant's prosecution for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); taken as a whole the jury charge would not have mislead the jury into concluding that no offensive weapon or appearance of an offensive weapon had to be proved. Durham v. State, 259 Ga. App. 829, 578 S.E.2d 514 (2003).

In a prosecution for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and obstruction, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on allegations that trial counsel was ineffective, as: (1) a jury charge on the testimony of an accomplice was not required; and (2) in light of trial counsel's cross-examination of the accomplice, the court's credibility charge, as well as the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, a leniency instruction was unnecessary. Hayes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 749, 637 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

There was no merit to the defendant's argument that because the indictment alleged that the defendant had used a gun including the full definition of "offensive weapon" in the instruction allowed the jury to convict the defendant for committing an armed robbery in a manner other than as alleged in the indictment; viewed in its entirety, the charge was not misleading, and the trial court had specifically tailored the instruction to fit the allegations in the indictment, and the jury was told that it could convict only if it found that the defendant committed the offense as alleged in the indictment, which went out with the jury. Montgomery v. State, 287 Ga. App. 382, 651 S.E.2d 491 (2007).

- Trial court's jury charge in an armed robbery trial suggested facts that were not supported by any evidence, specifically, that the assailant held the assailant's hand underneath the assailant's shirt during the robbery. The erroneous charge was an impermissible comment on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 and constituted plain error, entitling the defendant to a new trial. Gonzalez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 887, 703 S.E.2d 433 (2010).

- Jury instructions did not constitute reversible error as the instructions did not require the jury to unanimously agree on the greater offense of armed robbery before reaching the lesser offense of robbery by intimidation. Garrett v. State, 271 Ga. App. 646, 610 S.E.2d 595 (2005).

Charging conspiracy to commit armed robbery as "lesser included crime" was reversible error, where the jury acquitted defendant of the object of the conspiracy (armed robbery) and the alleged conspiracy was a separate crime but was not charged in the indictment. Brockington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 533, 343 S.E.2d 708 (1986).

Failure to charge on included offenses of robbery and theft by taking was not error since there was no evidentiary alternative crime to armed robbery. Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998).

Trial court did not err in failing to give a requested jury instruction on a lesser offense of theft by receiving stolen property as theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, theft by taking, or hijacking a motor vehicle. Mullins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 393, 599 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

- In a prosecution for armed robbery, even though defendant may have intended simple robbery, defendant was not entitled to charge on lesser included offense where evidence showed defendant's accomplices committed armed robbery. Martin v. State, 213 Ga. App. 146, 444 S.E.2d 103 (1994).

Since the evidence established all the elements of armed robbery, including defendant's confession on the witness stand that the theft was committed with the use of a gun, albeit unloaded, the trial court did not err in failing to give defendant's requested charge on robbery. Worthy v. State, 237 Ga. App. 565, 515 S.E.2d 869 (1999).

- Defendant's oral request for a jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property was properly denied because it is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Hawkins v. State, 242 Ga. App. 603, 528 S.E.2d 853 (2000).

- While robbery by intimidation is an offense included within armed robbery, a charge on the included offense was not required where the uncontradicted evidence showed completion of the offense of armed robbery. Kirkland v. State, 173 Ga. App. 687, 327 S.E.2d 808 (1985).

- When the court's jury charge and re-charge on armed robbery and robbery by intimidation came directly from the pattern jury instructions, and the charge was both a complete and an accurate statement of the principles of law involved, no error was committed by the trial court, and the trial court need not have charged the jury more thoroughly on robbery by intimidation to make it clear to the jury that even if the jury found that a weapon was present at the time of the robbery, the jury would have to further find that it was used in the commission of the crime to conclude that an armed robbery had taken place. Harris v. State, 204 Ga. App. 11, 418 S.E.2d 394 (1992).

- Trial court's charging of the entire armed robbery provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) did not erroneously instruct the jury as to other means by which the offense of armed robbery could have been committed where the indictment specifically alleged "by use of a handgun; the same being an offensive weapon", since, considering the charge in its entirety in connection with the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could not have been misled into convicting defendant of armed robbery by any means other than as charged in the indictment. Daniels v. State, 207 Ga. App. 689, 428 S.E.2d 820 (1993).

Jury charge which instructed the jury that a person committed the offense of armed robbery "by use of an offensive weapon or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon," could not have misled the jury into convicting the defendant of armed robbery by any means other than as charged in the indictment, which alleged armed robbery "by use of a handgun," since all the eyewitnesses testified that the robber was holding a handgun and because two bullets found in the defendant's pocket were not evidence of a replica having the appearance of an offensive weapon. Head v. State, 279 Ga. App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (2006).

- Trial court's failure to instruct a jury on the burden of proof required to convict the defendant of armed robbery with circumstantial evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, which included a videotape of the robbery, the defendant's parent's identification of the defendant as the person on the videotape with a gun, and the defendant's accomplice's confession and implication of the defendant in the crime. Bradwell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 651, 586 S.E.2d 355 (2003).

- Trial court did not err in giving the jury the pattern instruction on armed robbery and in refusing to give the armed robbery charge requested by the defendant, which stated that the force used to commit the robbery had to be contemporaneous with the taking; the pattern charge covered the principle of law stated in the requested charge. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).

- In defendant's trial on a charge of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, the trial court should have provided the jury with a requested instruction on mistake of fact pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5, as the defendant's knowledge of a plan or intent to rob was a material element of the charge and there was evidence that might have supported the defendant's version of events. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012).

- With regard to the defendant's trial for armed robbery and possession of a firearm, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give the jury limiting instructions for evidence presented against the co-defendant concerning charges that were unique to the co-defendant because the defendant failed to make such a request. McNair v. State, 330 Ga. App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (2014).

- Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in using the "offensive weapon" definition of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) as armed robbery was not one of the charged offenses because the defendant did not object to the charge and expressly declined the trial court's offer to recharge the jury. The charge did not constitute plain error because the definition of "offensive weapon" applicable to armed robbery mirrored very closely the definition of aggravated assault set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and an "offensive weapon" under the armed robbery statute necessarily would fall within the category of weapons described in § 16-5-21(a)(2), and therefore the defendant could not show that the instruction affected the outcome of the proceedings. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

Omission of the element of "taking" from a jury charge definition of "robbery" by sudden snatching was harmless error since the omission apparently was inadvertent and the jury otherwise was in fact clearly informed of all the elements of the offense. Whitehead v. State, 177 Ga. App. 259, 339 S.E.2d 365 (1985).

- Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's requested instruction that, in order to convict, the state must show affirmatively an intention to aid and abet or an active involvement in the two crimes charged since the charge given covered fully (even to overflowing) each and every applicable principle of law concerning the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and the law of principals as well as intent and participation only under coercion. August v. State, 180 Ga. App. 510, 349 S.E.2d 532 (1986).

In the defendant's trial on a charge of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, there was no error in the trial court's failure to provide the jury with certain instructions requested by the defendant, as the charges given either adequately and substantially covered the principles contained in the requested charge, or there was no evidence that supported the requested charge. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012).

- In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, trial of the charges together was not required since defendant made no motion to sever and, in view of the limiting instructions given and the weight of the testimony of the victim and a corroborating witness, proof of a prior conviction did not place defendant's character in issue to such an extent as to affect the verdict on the armed robbery and firearm charges. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

- In a trial for armed robbery and kidnapping, the trial court does not err in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy although conspiracy was not charged in the indictment, where the conspiracy instruction was properly adjusted to the evidence. Spencer v. State, 180 Ga. App. 498, 349 S.E.2d 513 (1986).

- In the defendant's trial on a charge of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with a requested instruction on hindering the apprehension of a criminal as a lesser included offense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-50, as the hindering offense was the equivalent of being an accessory after the fact; moreover, it was not a lesser included offense of the principal crime, but a separate offense. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012).

- When the jury specifically expressed confusion about the issue of tracking dog evidence and asked that the applicable law be recharged, the trial court erred in failing to reinstruct the jury on this issue. However, because the evidence against both defendants, exclusive of the track dog evidence, overwhelmingly identified the defendants as the perpetrators of the robbery, the error was harmless. Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 493, 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

- Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for requesting the pattern jury instruction that included a witness's degree of certainty as a factor the jury could consider in assessing the reliability of a witness's identification testimony because the defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the request, given the other evidence linking the defendant to the crimes, including the defendant's possession of a victim's cell phone and a revolver matching the description of the one used in all three robberies. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a discrepancy between the armed robberies as alleged in the indictment and the manner in which the jury was charged on the armed robbery offenses because the evidence uniformly showed that the article used in the robbery was a handgun; there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted the defendant of robbing the victims with a replica, which was mentioned in the trial court's charge to the jury, because each victim referred to the weapon only as a handgun and explicitly referred to the victims' fear of being shot. Green v. State, 310 Ga. App. 874, 714 S.E.2d 646 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1766, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 232 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the armed robbery of the victim who called for help as the victim's cell phone was under the victim's control and responsibility when the phone was taken off of the victim's bed because, although the victim was not in the room when the cell phone was taken, the victim was nearby as the evidence showed that the victim had been in the bedroom and was struck by splintered wood when the shots were fired by the intruders; the victim then escaped and ran to an adjacent building to call for help; as the victim was calling for help, and within five minutes of the shooting, the intruders fled in a vehicle; and when the victim returned to the bedroom shortly thereafter the victim's cell phone was gone. Jackson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 70, 783 S.E.2d 672 (2016).

- Jury's return of not guilty verdicts on all 12 counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not demonstrate that, had the jury been instructed on robbery by intimidation, it would have convicted the defendant of that lesser included offense, rather than of armed robbery; thus, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to charge the jury on robbery by intimidation as a lesser-included offense of armed robbery. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

Jury instruction on theft by taking not required, since the evidence clearly indicated armed robbery. Shepherd v. State, 234 Ga. 75, 214 S.E.2d 535 (1975).

Although theft by taking has been held to be a lesser included offense of armed robbery, no charge on the lesser included offense is necessary when the evidence, as here, shows completion of the greater offense. Widner v. State, 203 Ga. App. 823, 418 S.E.2d 105 (1992).

- Failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery was not error since, if the jury believed any combination of defendant's statements, defendant either was party to the completed crime of armed robbery or defendant lacked any intent to be a party to the crime. Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (2000).

- Although robbery by intimidation is a lesser included offense of armed robbery, it is not error in an armed robbery case to fail to charge on robbery by intimidation where there is evidence of robbery by use of an offensive weapon, but no evidence of robbery by intimidation. Hill v. State, 228 Ga. App. 362, 492 S.E.2d 5 (1997).

Because the evidence showed the completed offense of armed robbery, and because the defendant did not deny that accomplices were armed, defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Brinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 411, 537 S.E.2d 795 (2000).

Trial court did not err in not charging on robbery by intimidation as a lesser included offense of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 since there was no evidence that the defendant did not have a gun; thus, the evidence did not support a charge of robbery by intimidation even if the defendant had requested such a charge. Burden v. State, 290 Ga. App. 734, 660 S.E.2d 481 (2008).

Because the evidence showed a completed act of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2). Waters v. State, 294 Ga. App. 442, 669 S.E.2d 450 (2008).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's request to charge the jury on robbery by intimidation because when there was no evidence that the robbery was committed without the use of a gun, the defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010).

Trial court did not commit plain error in failing to charge the jury on robbery by intimidation as a lesser-included offense of armed robbery because the defendant denied committing any offense; and the evidence relied upon by the defendant did not show robbery by intimidation as there was no evidence that a robbery was committed without the use of a gun. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

- Jury instructions were not incomplete and confusing as the jury was given the statutory definition of armed robbery and the pattern jury instruction on the lesser offense of robbery by intimidation; defendant failed to include the jury's questions in the record on appeal, so the judgment was assumed to be correct; further, there was no evidence that the jury's questions went unanswered. Garrett v. State, 271 Ga. App. 646, 610 S.E.2d 595 (2005).

- Where evidence on behalf of defendant denied charge of armed robbery, and was such that it would have authorized jury to find defendant guilty of either robbery by intimidation or theft by taking, failure of trial court to charge on robbery by intimidation and theft by taking requires grant of new trial. Hensley v. State, 228 Ga. 501, 186 S.E.2d 729 (1972).

- In a prosecution for armed robbery and burglary, where evidence showed that a gun was used, that defendant at one point had possession of the gun, and that defendant disposed of the gun, defendant was guilty of armed robbery, and the court did not err in failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of robbery and theft by taking. Hopkins v. State, 227 Ga. App. 567, 489 S.E.2d 368 (1997).

- When case contained some evidence that the defendant did not use a weapon to take property from the victim, defendant was therefore entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of burglary; however, in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, it was highly probable that the failure to give this charge did not contribute to the verdict, thus the conviction was affirmed. Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 442 S.E.2d 444 (1994).

Sentence

Merged counts for sentencing.

- Counts 1 and 3 should have been merged for sentencing purposes because defendant did not commit separate armed robberies against restaurant manager, but instead committed a single armed robbery in which property belonging to restaurant manager and the restaurant was taken. Deans v. State, 212 Ga. App. 571, 443 S.E.2d 6 (1994).

Trial court did not err by failing to merge the defendants' convictions on counts one through five into one conviction for armed robbery because the aggravated assaults and armed robbery (none of which could have been proven by the same or less than all the facts required to prove another) occurred later and the facts required to prove those offenses were separate from the burglary. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Trial court had to vacate defendant's conviction and sentence for armed robbery given that armed robbery was charged as the felony underlying defendant's conviction for felony murder; a separate conviction and sentence for armed robbery was not authorized under such circumstances. Joyner v. State, 280 Ga. 37, 622 S.E.2d 319 (2005).

Although an armed robbery served as the predicate felony for one count of felony murder, there was a separate felony murder count predicated on aggravated assault; hence, when the jury found the defendant guilty of both counts, it was within the trial court's discretion to choose to merge the aggravated assault rather than the armed robbery into the felony murder count for which appellant was sentenced. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007).

Although offenses related to the getaway car were part of the same criminal episode, the essential elements of armed robbery, theft by receiving, fleeing, or attempting to elude a police officer, and reckless driving were completely separate and distinct. As a result, the trial court did not err in failing to merge these offenses. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

Offense of armed robbery did not merge with two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as the expressed legislative intent was to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

Because: (1) different facts were used to prove an aggravated assault and an armed robbery, specifically, that the armed robbery was complete after the defendant laid a handgun on the counter in the convenience store, demanded that the victim open the register, and a codefendant took money from the a register; and (2) the separate offense of aggravated assault occurred when the defendant struck the victim in the head with the gun, the offenses did not merge as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate sentences imposed for each offense were upheld, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

Because a defendant's convictions for armed robbery (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)) and aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)) were based on the same conduct - the defendant's pointing a gun at the victim with the intent to rob the victim - merger was required. Therefore, the sentence for the aggravated assault was vacated. Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Two counts of armed robbery and two counts of theft by taking should have been merged into one armed robbery conviction. When a single victim was robbed of multiple items in a single transaction, there was only one robbery, and the same evidence was used to prove both the theft and the armed robbery charges. Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008).

Two defendants committed armed robbery against each member of a family in a home invasion by taking property from the presence of each of them with the intent to commit theft by the use of a handgun. Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of ownership; therefore, the convictions on the robbery counts against each family member did not merge. Kollie v. State, 301 Ga. App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault should have been merged for sentencing, as a codefendants' actions, which occurred either concurrently or in rapid succession, were committed as part of one uninterrupted criminal transaction and in pursuit of a specific, predetermined goal: the armed robbery of a single victim. Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault as the armed robbery conviction was based on evidence that the defendant took the victim's necklace after hitting the victim in the head and face with a gun, while the aggravated assault conviction was based on the defendant having shot the victim in the arm. Harris v. State, 334 Ga. App. 299, 779 S.E.2d 83 (2015).

- Defendant was entitled to resentencing with regard to the defendant's convictions on one count of aggravated assault and one count of armed robbery arising from the robbery of a restaurant because the two counts were based upon the same conduct, namely pointing a handgun at the restaurant's manager in order to commit a robbery. Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007).

- Upon convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by taking, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to vacate an illegal sentence, despite the claim that the defendant was improperly punished as a recidivist, as nothing supported the argument that the defendant received an enhanced punishment based on an uncertified, non-final disposition from the State of Louisiana; moreover, a trial court was authorized to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment for armed robbery, even when that defendant was not a recidivist. Jefferson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 97, 630 S.E.2d 528 (2006).

Trial court did not err by imposing the maximum sentence, which was life imprisonment, upon the defendant's conviction for armed robbery given the defendant's recidivist status as the court lacked the authority to probate or suspend any part of that sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 based on the defendant's prior felony conviction. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) and (c) because the defendant had been convicted of at least three prior felonies, and thus, the defendant was required to be sentenced to the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subsequent armed robbery offense and was required to serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the trial court based upon the defendant's conviction of armed robbery and would not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence had been served; because life imprisonment was an authorized punishment for a conviction of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b), and because the defendant was sentenced as a recidivist under § 17-10-7(a) and (c), the trial court lacked the discretion to sentence the defendant to a lesser sentence, and it was presumed that the trial court exercised the court's discretion in sentencing the defendant to a period of incarceration, rather than probation, when no evidence to the contrary appeared. Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (2011).

Trial court did not err in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole after the defendant was convicted of armed robbery because the record did not support the defendant's assertion that the conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel; the state offered evidence that the defendant's prior case was tried before a jury, that the defendant exercised the constitutional right to self representation, and that appointed standby counsel was available to assist the defendant at trial. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist because the trial court committed no error in using the defendant's 1991 Michigan armed robbery conviction as a predicate offense for recidivist punishment as the state met the state's burden of proving that the defendant's Michigan conviction was for conduct that would have been considered a felony under Georgia law because, if the defendant had committed the offense of armed robbery in Georgia as a juvenile in 1991, a superior court would have had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and the defendant could have been convicted of the felony offense of armed robbery. Anderson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 739, 788 S.E.2d 831 (2016).

- Unlawful participation by trial judge in plea negotiation rendered the defendant's plea of guilty to two counts of armed robbery involuntary; advising the defendant that the judge would not give the same sentence considerations if the defendant proceeded to trial substantially influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Gibson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 607, 636 S.E.2d 767 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's petition to correct a void sentence, which alleged that he sentence was illegal because the crime of armed robbery merged with the crime of voluntary manslaughter as the sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement with the state in which the defendant waived any objection to the sentence by entering a guilty plea to the charges and specifically agreeing to separate, concurrent sentences for each charge, in exchange for the dismissal of five other charges; hence, the defendant waived any complaint on appeal that the sentence was void or illegal. Carr v. State, 282 Ga. App. 134, 637 S.E.2d 835 (2006).

- Although the record did not reveal that the defendant was advised of the mandatory minimum sentences on the charges to which the defendant pled guilty, as contemplated by Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 33.8(C)(4), given that the defendant received the sentence the defendant bargained for, the defendant could not establish that the defendant suffered adverse consequences from not knowing the mandatory minimum sentences for armed robbery and kidnapping. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).

- Juvenile defendant was sentenced as an adult to 10 years' imprisonment after being convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery in a criminal episode in which a person was killed. As the 10-year sentence was within the limits set by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-8-41(b), and there was no showing that the sentence was overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense, the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga. App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0426, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. 2009).

Sentence of life in prison plus years consecutive for convictions of felony murder and armed robbery did not exceed the statutorily authorized maximum; the felony murder statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, authorized a sentence of life in prison on conviction for felony murder, and the armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, authorized a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than 10 nor more than 20 years. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction plus two 20-year terms, running concurrent to each other but consecutive to the felony murder sentence, for the two convictions for armed robbery, and thus the statutory maximum was not exceeded. Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

Defendant's sentence of 20 years to serve for armed robbery, 20 years probation for aggravated assault, and 5 years probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, each to run consecutively, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the trial court's sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b),16-8-41(b), and16-11-106(b); under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10(a), it was within the trial court's discretion to order that the defendant's sentences on armed robbery and aggravated assault run consecutively. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Defendant's life sentence for armed robbery was within the statutory limits, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b), and the 20-year sentences imposed for the defendant's aggravated assaults were within the statutory range of punishment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b). Therefore, the sentences were not void, and the court had no basis for disturbing the sentences. Gillespie v. State, 311 Ga. App. 442, 715 S.E.2d 832 (2011).

Sentence of ten years to serve for felony shoplifting was upheld; contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court did not sentence the defendant as a recidivist pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. The trial court's imposition of a sentence within the statutory limits would not be disturbed. Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012).

Twenty-year sentence imposed for armed robbery did not violate the United States or Georgia Constitutions as the sentence was within the statutory range for armed robbery and was not grossly disproportionate to the crime. Windhom v. State, 326 Ga. App. 212, 756 S.E.2d 296 (2014).

Because O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) is not ambiguous in its provision for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and because the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment fell within the statutory range of punishment, the defendant's sentence was not void. Hudson v. State, 334 Ga. App. 166, 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015).

Magistrate determined that the defendant's sentence was properly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because the defendant's Georgia robbery convictions remained predicate offenses while armed robbery and robbery by intimidation constituted separate offenses when armed robbery clearly had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, robbery by intimidation occurred when a person, by the use of threat or coercion, placed a person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to oneself or to another, and the defendant had one conviction for armed robbery and two convictions for robbery by intimidation. Green v. United States, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2017), aff'd in part and rejected in part, Nos. CV416-153, CR405-139, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96676 (S.D. Ga. June 22, 2017).

- Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to 20 years to serve 10 in prison pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) and (d) because, although the defendant was only 13 years old, the defendant participated in an armed robbery; the legislature's determination that the superior court has jurisdiction over minors 13 to 17 years of age who are alleged to have committed certain serious offenses is founded on a rational basis, including the need for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders and the safety of students and citizens of Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A). Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (2010).

- Trial court's imposition of a 30-year term of imprisonment on the defendant for the defendant's conviction of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 was error because the allowable sentences were either life imprisonment or a term between 10 and 20 years of imprisonment. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

- Defendant's re-sentencing without court-appointed counsel to represent the defendant was affirmed as the trial court was simply instructed to merge the defendant's armed robbery conviction into the defendant's felony murder conviction; as the trial court had no discretion in the matter and the court's re-sentencing of the defendant was a ministerial act, the re-sentencing was proper. Robertson v. State, 280 Ga. 885, 635 S.E.2d 138 (2006).

- Trial court did not err in resentencing the defendant to a probated sentence of ten years for a theft by receiving conviction, upon filing a motion under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12, with such sentence to commence ten years after the beginning of a term of imprisonment for an armed robbery conviction as: (1) the revised sentence did not impermissibly increase the original sentence imposed; (2) the revised probated sentence effected no change in the probation term to be served following the confinement for armed robbery as both the original and revised sentences provided for five years of probation, consecutive to the defendant's confinement; and (3) the defendant failed to show fulfillment of the maximum legal term for the theft by receiving conviction, or that any of the probation requirements had been satisfied. Fair v. State, 281 Ga. App. 518, 636 S.E.2d 712 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0125, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. 2007).

- Defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to correct a void sentence as the motion was filed in 2007, more than 12 years after the defendant's conviction for armed robbery was affirmed in 1994 and outside the statutory period in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(f), and the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment was not void as the sentence was within the range set out in former O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b). Brown v. State, 295 Ga. App. 66, 670 S.E.2d 867 (2008).

- Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault into the defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Armed robbery counts did not merge into malice murder counts because the evidence was sufficient to show both victims were subjected to the defendant's exercise of actual force by the use of an offensive weapon so as to induce the relinquishment of another's property. Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2358, 192 L. Ed. 2d 153 (U.S. 2015).

Because the victim was still being pistol whipped while the men asked the victim what the victim had and took the victim's wallet and cell phone, the robbery by use of a handgun was completed at the same place and approximately the same time as the aggravated assault with a handgun; thus, the timing of the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated assault with intent to rob did not preclude their merger. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015).

Because the "assault" element of aggravated assault with intent to rob is contained within the "use of an offensive weapon" element of armed robbery and both crimes share the "intent to rob" element, there is no element of aggravated assault with intent to rob that is not contained in armed robbery, and the offenses merge. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have merged with the conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because those acts were predicated upon the same act, the defendant's use of a handgun to overpower and intimidate the victim for the purpose of attempting to rob the victim of the victim's belongings. Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 797 S.E.2d 207 (2017).

Because an attempted armed robbery began when the defendant kicked down the victim's door, entered the victim's home with a firearm, and demanded that the victim give it up, and continued as the victim and a codefendant struggled outside; after the victim was able to run away, the codefendant shot the victim twice; the robbery and aggravated assault were separate offenses and did not merge. Cuyler v. State, 344 Ga. App. 532, 811 S.E.2d 42 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0874, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 482 (Ga. 2018).

- Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault because the aggravated assault charge did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the attempted armed robbery as that offense could have been proved under the indictment in the current case; and the conduct involved in the attempted armed robbery count and aggravated assault count arose out of the same act or transaction as both counts alleged that the defendant pointed the gun at the victim, and the victim indicated that the gun was directed at the victim one time. Wilson v. State, 344 Ga. App. 285, 810 S.E.2d 303 (2018).

Death Penalty

Constitutionality.

- See Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 216 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

Punishment of death does not invariably violate Constitution. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).

- While for appellate jurisdictional purposes armed robbery is no longer a capital felony, notwithstanding the above, armed robbery is still considered a capital offense under the aggravating circumstances provision of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30. Simmons v. State, 149 Ga. App. 830, 256 S.E.2d 79 (1979).

- Petitioner, a death row inmate, in a federal habeas petition argued the death sentence was unconstitutionally imposed because there was insufficient evidence to establish that the murder occurred during the commission of an armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2); however, the argument was rejected because while the victim's wallet was never found, the wallet was missing, the petitioner had not yet cashed the petitioner's paycheck but nevertheless was in possession of a large sum of cash the night the murder occurred, the petitioner was in possession of an ATM card later determined to belong to the victim, and the petitioner attempted to use the ATM card to withdraw money while wearing a straw hat and sunglasses. Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009).

- Before convicted defendant may be sentenced to death, jury or trial judge, in cases tried without a jury, must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the ten aggravating circumstances specified in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).

There was no merit in appellant's contention that armed robbery is no longer a capital felony for purpose of applying the aggravating circumstances provision of O.C.G.A § 17-10-30. Solomon v. State, 247 Ga. 27, 277 S.E.2d 1 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S. Ct. 2348, 68 L. Ed. 2d 863 (1981).

As to sentences for armed robbery imposed after July 1, 1976 for less than five years, see 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-71.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Robbery, § 7 et seq.

- 77 C.J.S., Robbery, §§ 1 et seq., 81.

- Threat to arrest or prosecute and acts in connection therewith as force or putting in fear for purposes of robbery, 27 A.L.R. 1299.

What constitutes larceny "from a person,", 74 A.L.R.3d 271.

Retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny, 77 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 660.

Stationary object or attached fixture as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Robbery: Identification of victim as person named in indictment or information, 4 A.L.R.6th 577.

Parts of human body, other than feet, as deadly or dangerous weapons or instrumentalities for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 67 A.L.R.6th 103.

"Intimidation" as element of bank robbery under 18 USCA § 2113(a), 163 A.L.R. Fed. 225.