2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 2 - Assault and Battery
§ 16-5-23.1. Battery

1. A person commits the offense of battery when he or she intentionally causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another.
2. As used in this Code section, the term "visible bodily harm" means bodily harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts.
3. Except as provided in subsections (d) through (k) of this Code section, a person who commits the offense of battery is guilty of a misdemeanor.
4. Upon the second conviction for battery against the same victim, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than 12 months, by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00, or both. The minimum sentence of ten days for a second offense shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, stayed, or withheld; provided, however, that it is within the authority and discretion of the sentencing judge to:
   1. Allow the sentence to be served on weekends by weekend confinement or during the nonworking hours of the defendant. A weekend shall commence and shall end in the discretion of the sentencing judge, and the nonworking hours of the defendant shall be determined in the discretion of the sentencing judge; or
   2. Suspend, probate, defer, stay, or withhold the minimum sentence where there exists clear and convincing evidence that imposition of the minimum sentence would either create an undue hardship upon the defendant or result in a failure of justice.
5. Upon a third or subsequent conviction for battery against the same victim, the defendant shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years. The minimum sentence provisions contained in subsection (d) of this Code section shall apply to sentences imposed pursuant to this subsection.
6. 1. As used in this subsection, the term "household member" means past or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents and foster children, or other persons living or formerly living in the same household.
   2. If the offense of battery is committed between household members, it shall constitute the offense of family violence battery and shall be punished as follows:
      1. Upon a first conviction of family violence battery, the defendant shall be guilty of and punished for a misdemeanor; provided, however, that if the defendant has previously been convicted of a forcible felony committed between household members under the laws of this state, of the United States, including the laws of its territories, possessions, or dominions, or any of the several states, or of any foreign nation recognized by the United States, which if committed in this state would have constituted a forcible felony committed between household members, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years; and
      2. Upon a second or subsequent conviction of family violence battery against the same or another victim, the defendant shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.
   3. In no event shall this subsection be applicable to reasonable corporal punishment administered by parent to child.
7. Any person who commits the offense of battery in a public transit vehicle or station shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. For purposes of this Code section, "public transit vehicle" has the same meaning as in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-20.
8. Any person who commits the offense of battery against a female who is pregnant at the time of the offense shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.
9. Any person who commits the offense of battery against a teacher or other school personnel engaged in the performance of official duties or while on school property shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both. For purposes of this Code section, "school property" shall include public school buses and public school bus stops as designated by local school boards of education.
10. A person who is an employee, agent, or volunteer at any facility licensed or required to be licensed under Code Section 31-7-3, relating to long-term care facilities, or Code Section 31-7-12.2, relating to assisted living communities, or Code Section 31-7-12, relating to personal care homes, or who is required to be licensed pursuant to Code Section 31-7-151 or 31-7-173, relating to home health care and hospices, who commits the offense of battery against a person who is admitted to or receiving services from such facility, person, or entity shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
11. Any person who commits the offense of battery against a sports official while such sports official is officiating an amateur contest or while such sports official is on or exiting the property where he or she will officiate or has completed officiating an amateur contest shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. For purposes of this Code section, the term "sports official" means any person who officiates, umpires, or referees an amateur contest at the collegiate, elementary or secondary school, or recreational level.

(Code 1981, §16-5-23.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 1010, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 7, 8; Ga. L. 1996, p. 449, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 907, § 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1064, § 9; Ga. L. 1998, p. 128, § 16; Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 4; Ga. L. 2000, p. 16, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 621, § 3; Ga. L. 2011, p. 227, § 4/SB 178; Ga. L. 2016, p. 587, § 1/SB 193; Ga. L. 2019, p. 81, § 1/HB 424.)

The 2019 amendment, effective April 18, 2019, substituted "(k)" for "(l)" in subsection (c); deleted former subsection (j), which read: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) and paragraph (2) of subsection (f) of this Code section, any person who commits the offense of battery against a person who is 65 years of age or older shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature."; and redesignated former subsections (k) and (l) as present subsections (j) and (k), respectively.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, a comma was inserted following "stay" in paragraph (d)(2).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1997, subsection (h), which was added by Ga. L. 1997, p. 1064, was redesignated as subsection (i).

- Ga. L. 1997, p. 1064, § 12, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the provisions of that Act "shall not affect or abate the status of a crime or delinquent act or of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of this Act, nor shall the prosecution of such crime or delinquent act be abated as a result of the provisions of this Act."

Ga. L. 1997, p. 1064, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Juvenile Justice Act of 1997'."

Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Elderly Act of 1999'."

Ga. L. 2000, p. 16, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2000 amendment to this Code section is applicable to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2000.

Ga. L. 2004, p. 621, § 9(b), not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2004.

- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 69 (1997). For article, "Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B. J. (2001). For annual survey on evidence law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 101 (2017). For note on 2000 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, see 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 89 (2000). For comment, "The Abuse of Animals as a Method of Domestic Violence: The Need for Criminalization," see 63 Emory L.J. 1163 (2014).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Statute not an ex post facto law.

- Even though a statute, passed after a conviction, uses the conviction as an element of a future offense, this is not an ex post facto law, because the defendant's punishment for the earlier conviction is not increased, since the statute punishes only for a future offense, and that punishment is rationally enhanced by the prior conviction. State v. Dean, 235 Ga. App. 847, 510 S.E.2d 605 (1998).

- Passage of this 1996 Code section, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, did not create a new offense but rather a separate category of an existing offense, enhancing the penalty for the already prohibited act of battery when such involved family members. State v. Dean, 235 Ga. App. 847, 510 S.E.2d 605 (1998).

In increasing to a felony the punishment of repeat convictions for battery against family members, the legislature recognized that repetition itself increased the severity and reprehensibility of the act. State v. Dean, 235 Ga. App. 847, 510 S.E.2d 605 (1998).

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's two separate convictions for family violence battery, one for striking and kicking a woman with whom defendant was living in the same apartment and one for striking the woman on a different occasion, as it showed defendant committed a battery upon a person living in the same household that defendant was living in. Alvarado v. State, 257 Ga. App. 746, 572 S.E.2d 18 (2002).

Victim's affirmative testimony that the defendant and the victim lived together was sufficient to a support a finding that they were persons living or formerly living in the same household for purposes of the defendant's convictions for family violence battery and aggravated stalking. Butler v. State, 354 Ga. App. 473, 841 S.E.2d 162 (2020).

- When the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant repeatedly struck the defendant's nine-year-old child on the back, buttocks, and legs with defendant's hand, leaving several visible, handprint-shaped bruises, battery was a lesser included offense of cruelty to children. Bennett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 149, 534 S.E.2d 881 (2000).

Trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on battery since, based on the evidence, defendant was either guilty of cruelty to children or no crime. Allen v. State, 247 Ga. App. 10, 543 S.E.2d 45 (2000).

- Battery count against a defendant required merger with a kidnapping with bodily injury count since the only allegation of bodily injury in connection with the kidnapping count was the evidence that the defendant held the victim against the victim's will resulting in bruising to the victim's head; since that same evidence was the only evidence used to show a bodily injury described in the kidnapping charge, the battery charge required merger with the kidnapping with bodily injury count. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 114, 645 S.E.2d 602 (2007).

- After defendant was indicted for aggravated assault upon the person of another "with a bottle, an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury," simple battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, and the jury was properly instructed as to the lesser included offense. Haun v. State, 189 Ga. App. 884, 377 S.E.2d 878, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 878 (1989).

Although the element of physical or bodily harm is a requisite for battery, where the physical or bodily harm is committed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife, simple battery is not a lesser included offense. Scott v. State, 208 Ga. App. 561, 430 S.E.2d 879 (1993).

Aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 with fists only and family violence battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f) with fists and a bottle upon the defendant's then live-in love interest were not required to be merged under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a) because there were two separate incidents separated by the love interest's visit to a store and because the aggravated assault did not require the use of a bottle. Collins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 381, 626 S.E.2d 513 (2006).

- Trial court correctly ruled that the defendant's conviction for battery merged into the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the felony of aggravated assault did not merge into the misdemeanor battery. Gross v. State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 S.E.2d 581 (2011).

Simple battery could be a lesser included offense of battery, when the defendant is charged with intentionally causing visible bodily harm and the state does not prove that the harm was visible. Ross v. State, 214 Ga. App. 385, 448 S.E.2d 52 (1994).

- Convictions under both O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and (h) (aggravated battery, family violence) and O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a), (b), and (f) (family violence battery, substantial physical and visible bodily harm), which were not based on actions at different times or places or different injuries, violated a defendant's double jeopardy rights under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for simple assault and battery because the convictions were based upon different conduct as the first cut to the victim's forehead caused reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury supporting the simple assault conviction, and the victim's remaining injuries caused by the knife wounds that followed supported a finding of visible bodily harm to support the battery conviction and each crime required proof of a fact that the other did not. Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289, 739 S.E.2d 129 (2013).

- It is the act, intent and results of the defendant's act which constitute the crimes as charged; the attitude of the victim is not called into issue by these elements. Ramey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 650, 417 S.E.2d 699 (1992).

- Whether or not a victim of intentional injury by another heals from the injury is not the test of whether the victim suffered substantial bodily harm. Richards v. State, 222 Ga. App. 853, 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996).

District court did not err when the court used the defendant's battery conviction to apply sentencing enhancement under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1 because the battery conviction qualified as "crime of violence" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16 and, therefore, constituted an "aggravated felony" under the sentencing enhancement. United States v. Yanes-Cruz, 634 Fed. Appx. 247 (11th Cir. 2015)(Unpublished).

- Trial court did not err in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on the defense of property defense as the defendant's sole defense as the defendant claimed that the defendant did not cause the victim's injuries, defense counsel attempted to establish that the victim's recollection of the events was impaired by the victim's fading in and out of consciousness and by the victim's consumption of alcohol, and the jury was adequately instructed on witness credibility, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence. Strickland v. State, 267 Ga. App. 610, 600 S.E.2d 693 (2004).

County's practice of strip searching all detainees placed in the general jail population was unlawful, but as the plaintiff was charged with family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, a dispatcher had reasonable suspicion for a strip search; the dispatcher and the dispatcher's superiors were thus entitled to qualified immunity in the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violation of the plaintiff's U.S. Const., amend. 4 rights. Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005).

- Trial court properly held that the defendant, who was charged with family violence battery and simple battery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-23.1(f) and16-5-23, was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. The testimony of the defendant's friend that the defendant restrained the friend after the friend broke the defendant's windshield and kicked a car seat, knocking the defendant into the steering wheel, provided some evidence that the defendant's actions were justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (2009).

- Three counts of an indictment charging defendant with "family violence battery (felony)" in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(f),16-5-23(f), and16-5-23.1(f)(2), respectively, were sufficient as the indictment informed defendant of the charges and protected against double jeopardy; mere surplusage did not vitiate an otherwise sufficient indictment, and since the indictment did not reference the sentencing for the offense charged, it did not inject the issue of punishment and was not subject to demurrer. State v. Barnett, 268 Ga. App. 900, 602 S.E.2d 899 (2004).

Discrepancy between an averment in the indictment that the defendant "intentionally caused visible bodily harm to (the victim)" and the jury charge that "a person commit(ed) the offense of battery when (the defendant) intentionally cause(d) substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another" had nothing to do with the manner in which the crime was committed and did not present the jury with an alternative basis for finding the defendant guilty of family violence battery not charged in the indictment since the evidence presented at trial supported two alternative theories: (1) that the defendant committed no offense at all, or (2) that the defendant committed family violence battery as alleged in the indictment; this was not a case where there was evidence that the crime itself was committed by two different, alternative methods, only one of which was charged in the indictment. Buice v. State, 281 Ga. App. 595, 636 S.E.2d 676 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 93 (Ga. 2007).

- Trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to quash a count alleging misdemeanor battery because the allegations of the count were not too vague, uncertain, or unclear, as contended by defendant where they met the language of the statute and were sufficiently technical and correct; further, the specific bodily harm did not have to be alleged. State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

- Accusation for battery, family violence, and criminal trespass that alleged the defendant injured the victim by striking the victim, causing a visibly bloody lip, and that the defendant knocked a hole in the victim's closet door, was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-71(c). There was no requirement that the accusation state the instrumentality used by the defendant because the instrumentality was not an element of any of the charged crimes. State v. Leatherwood, 326 Ga. App. 730, 757 S.E.2d 434 (2014).

Trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on simple battery, where defendant denied committing sodomy. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 339, 416 S.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 416 S.E.2d 755 (1992).

- Victim of defendant's battery was the defendant's parent, and there was testimony as to the victim's statements that the defendant beat the victim and photographs of the victim's wounds; this was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of family violence battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f). Meeks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 334, 636 S.E.2d 77 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for family violence battery and simple battery were supported by evidence from the victim that the defendant had slapped the victim and choked the victim, an officer's observation of red marks around the victim's neck, and evidence of the defendant's two prior guilty pleas to batteries against the defendant's spouse. Evidence of the victim's fear of retrieving the victim's children from the house and the defendant's threats to spread the victim's brains on the wall supported the simple assault conviction. Cuzzort v. State, 307 Ga. App. 52, 703 S.E.2d 713 (2010).

Because there was evidence to support each fact necessary to make out the state's case, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, and abuse of an elder person, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8; the victim's recollection of what occurred on the night at issue was contradicted by the victim's contemporaneous statements to neighbors and the police, as well as the victim's statements to the daughter the next morning that the defendant had grabbed the victim by the arm and twisted the arm, thereby causing the wound and other bruises. Laster v. State, 311 Ga. App. 360, 715 S.E.2d 768 (2011).

Evidence was insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f), because the state failed to establish the severity of harm required for the offense of battery under § 16-5-23.1(a); the victim's testimony that the defendant "put his hand" on the victim's neck fell short of the evidence required to permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the victim suffered substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm. Futch v. State, 316 Ga. App. 376, 730 S.E.2d 14 (2012).

Victim's testimony that the defendant struck the victim across the side of the face, a nurse's testimony that there was visible bruising and redness to the victim's cheek, an emergency room doctor's testimony that those visible injuries would be consistent with being struck by a hand, and photographs of the injuries were introduced at trial was sufficient to convict the defendant of battery (family violence). Moore v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 21, 2020).

- While state presented sufficient evidence of the victim's age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because the trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, defendant's aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008).

- In a prosecution on two counts of second-degree cruelty to children and family violence battery, the trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence against the defendant for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's course of conduct and bent of mind, as identity was not an issue and the similar transaction and the charged offense were the same, except for the fact that the offenses were committed against different family members. Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga. App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (2008).

Trial court acted within the court's discretion in finding that a sufficient similarity existed between a prior transaction and family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f), so that proof of the former tended to prove the latter because in both instances the defendant became enraged and reacted impulsively and aggressively in response to a perceived challenge from a woman, and the prior transaction tended to disprove the defendant's claim of self-defense. Jones v. State, 316 Ga. App. 442, 729 S.E.2d 578 (2012).

Trial court acted within the court's discretion in finding that a sufficient similarity existed between prior transactions and family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f), so that proof of the former tended to prove the latter because the prior transactions involved a female victim who had an intimate relationship with the defendant; both prior transactions involved the defendant reacting violently and disproportionately in response to little or no provocation. Jones v. State, 316 Ga. App. 442, 729 S.E.2d 578 (2012).

- There was sufficient evidence of disfigurement to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated battery with regard to the abuse inflicted upon the defendant's two year old child based on the numerous visible injuries inflicted on the child, and a CT scan that showed a skull fracture, which required a long period of hospitalization. Yearwood v. State, 297 Ga. App. 633, 678 S.E.2d 114 (2009).

- Officer's second-tier Terry frisk of the defendant did not constitute an illegal detention considering all of the circumstances including the defendant's repeated refusal to keep the defendant's hands away from the pockets of the defendant's baggy clothes at the officer's request, the defendant's nervous demeanor, the presence of two companions, and the officer's knowledge of violent crime in the area. Therefore, the defendant was not justified in elbowing the officer and resisting arrest. Santos v. State, 306 Ga. App. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (2010).

- Evidence that the defendant and accomplices committed battery by kicking down the door to the victim's apartment and causing injury to the victim's head was sufficient to support the battery conviction. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find defendant guilty of the offense of battery, where an investigating officer observed red scuff marks on the victim's head, arms, and legs, and the scuff marks turned into substantial bruises - as evidenced by photographs of the victim taken ten days after the victim was beaten and kicked. Danzis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 136, 400 S.E.2d 671 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 400 S.E.2d 671 (1991).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of battery beyond a reasonable doubt, although the appellant and the victim's testimony was contradictory, in part because the appellant was nine inches taller and 70 pounds heavier than the victim. Hussey v. State, 206 Ga. App. 122, 424 S.E.2d 374 (1992).

Convictions of cruelty to children and battery were supported by evidence that defendant caused eight-year-old son to suffer severe burns by forcing the son to sit in a bathtub filled with hot water and caustic chemicals. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ga. App. 92, 503 S.E.2d 293 (1998).

Conviction of defendant for family violence battery was authorized by the testimony of eye-witnesses who refuted testimony of the victim that the victim provoked defendant's violence and that defendant did not strike the victim. Holland v. State, 239 Ga. App. 436, 521 S.E.2d 255 (1999).

Defendant's admission to striking son in the face and photographic evidence revealing visible bodily harm were sufficient to support defendant's conviction for family violence battery. Bowers v. State, 241 Ga. App. 122, 526 S.E.2d 163 (1999).

Defendant's admission that during an argument defendant hit the victim in the face with defendant's fist, coupled with proof that the victim's face and eye were swollen and bruised was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of battery by intentionally causing visible bodily harm. Etheridge v. State, 249 Ga. App. 111, 547 S.E.2d 744 (2001).

Evidence that defendant beat the victim, who had a child with defendant, so badly that the victim had to go to the hospital was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for family violence battery as such evidence consisted of eyewitness testimony and statements of the victim, later murdered by defendant, that were admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. Hayes v. State, 275 Ga. 173, 562 S.E.2d 498 (2002).

After the defendant threw a set of keys at a parent, which hit the parent in the face and shoulder, spat in the parent's face, violently grabbed and pulled out the parent's hair, which left the parent's head bloody, the evidence was sufficient to show lack of justification and to sustain the defendant's conviction for family battery. Cobble v. State, 259 Ga. App. 236, 576 S.E.2d 623 (2003).

There was ample evidence that the defendant committed battery against the victim, the defendant's spouse by intentionally causing substantial physical harm; the victim had scrapes and bruises on the neck consistent with being choked, and the defendant had thrown the victim against a wall. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

When the evidence revealed that defendant and others returned to a parking lot with the specific intent of ambushing a group of people who had earlier told defendant not to speed and had thrown a beer bottle at defendant's car, and when defendant was found to be an accomplice of one who possessed a gun and fatally shot someone, there was sufficient evidence pursuant to the "party to a crime" law under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 to convict defendant of felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and simple battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1. Smith v. State, 277 Ga. 95, 586 S.E.2d 629 (2003).

When an accomplice testified that the accomplice drove defendant to the robberies, and the victims testified that the victims were robbed at gunpoint and hit with a gun or that the robbers banged one victim's head on the dashboard of that victim's vehicle and was then locked in the truck of the victim's vehicle, and defendant admitted that defendant was one of the persons videotaped while using the victims' automatic teller cards shortly after the robberies and was wearing sunglasses in the videotape, and even though the victims could not identify defendant, both victims recalled that one of the robbers had something metallic on the robber's face, identified by one victim as glasses, the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of kidnapping, battery, and two counts of armed robbery. Ross v. State, 264 Ga. App. 830, 592 S.E.2d 479 (2003).

Conviction for family violence battery was supported by sufficient evidence where, during an argument with a love interest, the defendant shoved the love interest into kitchen cabinets and then head-butted the love interest in the face, causing the love interest to drop to the floor with a nose bleed, facial, knee, and arm bruises, a lip cut, and loosened teeth; the battery was seen by the love interest's child, and although the defendant claimed that the defendant collided with the love interest's nose only in an effort to avoid the love interest's blows, the jury was authorized to disregard the claims of accident and self-defense in light of the evidence, including the defendant's demeanor after the incident, and the defendant's flight. Kuykendoll v. State, 278 Ga. App. 369, 629 S.E.2d 32 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, where the victim's sibling saw defendant strike the victim, the defendant admitted striking the victim, and the trial court found the victim's reddened face to have been harm capable of being perceived by a person, a police officer, other than the victim. Gilbert v. State, 278 Ga. App. 765, 629 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for robbery, battery, false imprisonment, and obstruction of an emergency telephone call were all upheld on appeal, as no error flowed from: (1) the trial court's admission of an audio recording of the attack on the victim and order granting the state two hearings regarding the admissibility of said recording; (2) the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor injected a personal experience with domestic violence into the closing argument; (3) the trial court's failure to strike the testimony of similar transaction witnesses and issue a curative instruction; and (4) the trial court's order restricting the counsel's closing argument. Ellis v. State, 279 Ga. App. 902, 633 S.E.2d 64 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for family violence battery as: (1) although the victim recanted the earlier allegations and denied that the victim had been living with the defendant, an officer testified as to the victim's statements that the defendant had pushed, hit, kicked, and spat on the victim, and that in an effort to force the defendant away, the victim struck the defendant in the head with a chair; (2) the officer testified that, at the scene, the victim had visible injuries and was distraught; (3) the officer testified that the defendant told the officer that the defendant lived with the victim; and (4) the state presented evidence of two previous incidents in which the defendant had physically injured the victim. Buice v. State, 281 Ga. App. 595, 636 S.E.2d 676 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 93 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's family violence battery conviction was affirmed on appeal as testimony from the victim, standing alone, describing the defendant's attack, when coupled with testimony regarding two prior incidents, sufficiently supported the convictions; moreover, the jury was authorized to: (1) rely upon the victim's prior statement to the responding officer as substantive evidence supporting the conviction; and (2) consider the prior difficulties evidence presented by the state, which most certainly demonstrated the status of the relationship between the defendant and the victim, and was highly relevant to show the defendant's abusive bent of mind towards the victim. Simmons v. State, 285 Ga. App. 129, 645 S.E.2d 622 (2007).

Legally sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1 because the victim suffered a bruised lip and the victim's wrists were red when the victim was found; photographic evidence of the injuries was presented by the state. Austin v. State, 286 Ga. App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, No. SO7C1698, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 687 (Ga. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support battery conviction for intentionally causing defendant's spouse visible bodily harm after defendant admitted that defendant had punched the defendant's spouse in the face, the spouse and one of the parties' children testified that defendant struck the spouse in the face, another child saw the spouse covered with blood, an officer testified about the spouse's injuries and photographs of which were admitted into evidence, and a doctor testified to performing surgery on the spouse's nose. Holmes v. State, 291 Ga. App. 196, 661 S.E.2d 603 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions on one count of simple assault and two counts of battery, which arose from a fight with a romantic friend, as it was within the jury's province to consider defendant's self-defense theory and reject that defense; the jury heard witnesses and observed testimony and was more capable of determining the reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by the evidence or the lack of evidence than the appellate court. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of misdemeanor battery when the victim testified that on the day after the victim told the defendant that the victim no longer wanted to be in a relationship with the defendant, the defendant punched the victim in the eye, after which they fought, and when the victim identified photographs depicting the victim's injuries. Although the defendant claimed that the victim started the altercation, the jury was authorized to believe the victim instead of the defendant. Watkins v. State, 291 Ga. App. 343, 662 S.E.2d 544 (2008).

Evidence authorized a battery conviction after the victim testified that the defendant hit the victim and dragged the victim through the victim's house, leaving various marks on the victim's body, including bruises on the victim's arms and neck; furthermore, the state presented photographs of the bruises and other marks suffered by the victim. Mack v. State, 294 Ga. App. 518, 669 S.E.2d 487 (2008).

In a prosecution for battery, eyewitness testimony that the defendant struck the victim in the face and photographs of the victim's injuries provided sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for a directed verdict. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make such a motion. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (2008).

Testimony of the victim that the victim was beaten and kicked by a former romantic companion and another person, and that the defendant later joined these two in battering the victim, and the companion's testimony corroborating the defendant's role in the attack, was sufficient to convict the defendant of battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1. Frasier v. State, 295 Ga. App. 596, 672 S.E.2d 668 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant smashed the victim's head into the trunk of a car, and choked and kicked the victim was sufficient to convict the defendant of battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

Evidence plainly was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) because the state presented more than ample evidence that the defendant's use of force was not justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); based upon the victim's testimony and the victim's prior statement to the responding officer, the jury clearly was authorized to find that the defendant's acts of grabbing the victim by the hair, throwing the victim to the ground, and choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness constituted excessive force, and the prior and subsequent difficulties evidence and the similar transaction evidence the state presented supported the jury's decision to give little credence to the defendant's self-defense claim. Whitley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 553, 707 S.E.2d 375 (2011).

Defendant's battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(b) was supported by evidence that the defendant struck the victim in the eye with the defendant's hand, causing the eye to swell. A charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b), was not warranted because there was no evidence that the defendant fired a gun negligently; the only evidence was that the defendant fired several shots at the victim. Tiller v. State, 314 Ga. App. 472, 724 S.E.2d 397 (2012).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f), battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a), and disorderly conduct because the prior inconsistent statements of the defendant's wife constituted substantive evidence upon which the jury could rely in reaching a verdict; the wife had told officers that she had attempted to leave but that the defendant would not let her, and that he had hit her. Kemp v. State, 314 Ga. App. 730, 726 S.E.2d 447 (2012).

Victim's testimony that the defendant was the aggressor and that the victim sustained visible injuries was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for battery. Fleming v. State, 324 Ga. App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (2013).

- Court found that the evidence that the defendant punched the defendant's spouse in the ear, knocking the spouse out of bed and causing the spouse harm, i.e., redness and swelling, that was observed by both the spouse's father and the responding officer, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for family violence battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f)(1). Walker v. State, 315 Ga. App. 821, 728 S.E.2d 334 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment, theft by taking, and three counts of battery because the defendant locked the victim in the victim's room, struck the victim in the face, hit the victim in the back of the head with a blunt object, threw the victim to the floor when the victim tried to escape, and took the victim's cellphone. Pierre v. State, 330 Ga. App. 782, 769 S.E.2d 533 (2015), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

Victim's testimony that the defendant punched the victim in the nose and repeatedly struck the victim, along with physical evidence of blood and other injuries to the victim's body, provided sufficient evidence to support the defendant's battery conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. State, 354 Ga. App. 568, 841 S.E.2d 112 (2020).

- Victim's statement that the defendant hit the victim on both sides of the victim's face with the defendant's hand following a verbal argument, causing the victim's earring to puncture the skin behind the victim's left ear, the officer's testimony regarding the victim's injuries, and the photographs of the injuries were sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict as to family violence battery. Porter v. State, 324 Ga. App. 399, 750 S.E.2d 713 (2013).

- In a juvenile proceeding wherein a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent as a result of an assault of a schoolmate on a school bus, sufficient evidence existed to support the juvenile's delinquency adjudication because the conflicting evidence, which the trial court as the trier of fact chose to resolve against the juvenile, established that the juvenile hit the schoolmate several times as a result of an insult made, causing the victim to have a nose bleed, a bruise over the eye, and a raised bruise on the forehead. In the Interest of E.J., 283 Ga. App. 648, 642 S.E.2d 179 (2007).

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of the offense of family violence battery when the evidence showed only that some beer was splashed on the defendant's wife's clothes. Cox v. State, 243 Ga. App. 582, 532 S.E.2d 697 (2000).

- District court did not err in applying an eight-level enhancement to the defendant's sentence for illegal re-entry by a previously deported alien because the defendant's prior family violence battery was a crime of violence, which made it an aggravated felony, and the causing-physical-harm element required actual physical contact that inflicted pain or injury. United States v. Parra-Guzman, 648 Fed. Appx. 974 (11th Cir. 2016)(Unpublished).

- Since the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to try defendant pursuant to a Uniform Traffic Citation charging defendant with "simple battery" in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23, prosecution of the offense before such court was void; accordingly, trial of defendant for simple battery in the state court was not barred on the ground of double jeopardy or prior prosecution. Rangel v. State, 217 Ga. App. 152, 456 S.E.2d 739 (1995).

- Where defendant was tried on two counts of battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) in relation to an altercation in a movie theater, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, which was based on defendant's claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), even though defendant presented the testimony of two witnesses who said that defendant only struck the victim after the victim grabbed defendant's throat, as the victim denied choking defendant and defendant had earlier entered into a written restitution agreement with the victim in which defendant had admitted that defendant approached and struck the seated victim, inflicting a forehead laceration; the conflicting testimony on the justification defense presented credibility issues for the jury to resolve and there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Tahantan v. State, 260 Ga. App. 861, 581 S.E.2d 373 (2003).

- Error was deemed waived as defendant's silence, after the trial court ruled that it would not instruct the jury on simple battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(b) as a lesser included offense of battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(c), essentially amounted to acquiescence and induced the error. McPetrie v. State, 263 Ga. App. 85, 587 S.E.2d 233 (2003), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

- After the jury requested written copies of the definitions of certain offenses in defendant's criminal trial, and the trial court recharged the jury on those offenses, and the court sua sponte charged the jury on the issue of voluntary intoxication, such was not error because defendant had not requested the opportunity to reargue to the jury and hence, the trial court did not absolutely deny that right. Cochran v. State, 276 Ga. App. 840, 625 S.E.2d 92 (2005).

- Trial court charged the jury on the entire battery code section, including the requirement that the defendant commit substantial physical harm, even though the defendant was only charged with committing visible bodily harm; this was not error because the charge as a whole limited the jury to considering the crime as charged in the indictment. Tiller v. State, 314 Ga. App. 472, 724 S.E.2d 397 (2012).

- Because the defendant was charged with committing the offense of family violence battery by causing visible bodily injury, the court misspoke when the court instructed the jury that the defendant was charged with committing the offense by causing physical bodily injury, but the flaw was ameliorated by the fact that the jury was instructed the jury could find the defendant guilty only if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed the offense as charged and sent both the indictment and the instructions out with the jury. Walker v. State, 348 Ga. App. 273, 821 S.E.2d 567 (2018).

- Trial court gave the jury the option to find defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery or of felony aggravated battery as indicted, but since the jury rejected the misdemeanor battery offense and found the additional aggravating elements to warrant felony conviction, the idea that the jury might have reached a different result had the jury also been charged on the even less culpable misdemeanor of simple battery is not reasonable. Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000).

It was unnecessary for the trial court to charge on the lesser offenses of battery and simple battery because the indictment charged defendant and others with malice murder by stabbing the victim to death, and there was no evidence whatsoever that defendant's beating of the victim was a separate act. Lamb v. State, 273 Ga. 729, 546 S.E.2d 465 (2001).

Trial court did not err in failing to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple battery because the defendant failed to request such an instruction. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Although the trial court should have given the defendant's requested charge on battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, since the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant intentionally caused substantial physical harm and visible bodily harm to the victims by beating the victims with a bat and a belt, the failure to give the battery charge was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of the commission of the greater offense, cruelty to children, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70; the indictment alleged that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously caused the victims cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by striking the victims about the body with a belt and wooden bat. Dinkler v. State, 305 Ga. App. 444, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 734 S.E.2d 814 (2012).

- There was not reversible error as a jury charge that "if the offense of battery (was) committed between persons living or formerly living in the same household then that offense constitute(d) the offense of family violence battery" did not permit the state to prove that the crime was committed in a wholly different manner than that specifically alleged in the indictment, which alleged that the defendant "did live in the same household as the victim," since "did" was a phraseology that did not distinguish between whether a defendant currently or formerly lived with the victim at the time of the battery and could reasonably be construed as encompassing both factual scenarios; the indictment was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant could be convicted for family violence battery if the defendant lived with the victim at some point in time. Buice v. State, 281 Ga. App. 595, 636 S.E.2d 676 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 93 (Ga. 2007).

- Trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior domestic offenses in defendant's trial for simple battery and battery of defendant's children as the prior offenses were sufficiently similar to the crimes charged in that they all involved family members and grabbing the necks of or hitting the faces of defendant's children or former spouse; the prior transaction jury instruction was not erroneous merely because course of conduct was not one of the purposes set forth by the trial court when it decided to admit the evidence, as defendant's course of conduct in repeatedly abusing members of defendant's family was a legitimate purpose for the similar transaction evidence. Morrell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 288, 585 S.E.2d 204 (2003).

- Trial court did not err by failing to give a limiting instruction before admitting evidence of prior difficulties because the defendant's trial counsel did not request a limiting instruction on the prior difficulties, and the trial court instructed the jury on prior difficulties evidence in the final jury charge. Kemp v. State, 314 Ga. App. 730, 726 S.E.2d 447 (2012).

- Trial court properly refused to charge the jury on justification as either: (1) as a police officer testified, the victim stated that the defendant had pushed, hit, kicked, and spat on the victim and that the victim had reacted by hitting the defendant in the head with a chair, which did not support a justification defense since the evidence presented the defendant as the aggressor, or (2) as the victim testified, the victim hit the defendant in the head with a chair during the course of their argument, and the defendant never pushed, hit, or kicked the victim in response, which did not support a justification defense since there was no evidence that the defendant tried to defend the defendant or otherwise acted in any manner to protect the defendant's person. Buice v. State, 281 Ga. App. 595, 636 S.E.2d 676 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 93 (Ga. 2007).

With regard to defendant's conviction for aggravated battery of a taxi driver, defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of battery based on defendant's argument that the jury could have found under the facts of the case that the gun was not used as a deadly weapon as the evidence showed without conflict that defendant's physical assault upon the taxi driver with the handgun caused the taxi driver to bleed from the head and the entire right side of the face, and the taxi driver testified that, during the attack, the taxi driver was very afraid of being killed. Thus, the pistol in the case, if used in the manner testified to by the taxi driver, was per se a deadly weapon, and the offense was either aggravated assault or no offense at all. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to the defendant's domestic violence convictions, because the defendant acquiesced to the trial court's decision not to charge on justification, the issue of the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge was waived on appeal. Palmer v. State, 330 Ga. App. 679, 769 S.E.2d 107 (2015).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, and battery, the trial court did not err in failing to give jury charges on the affirmative defense of justification because the evidence was insufficient to support such a defense as the defendant admitted that in the time it took the defendant to rip an air conditioning unit from the window and break in, the allegedly pursuing assailants had stopped chasing the defendant and had gone home. Miller v. State, 335 Ga. App. 58, 778 S.E.2d 424 (2015).

- Defendant could not challenge a sentence for family violence battery on appeal, claiming that the sentence was erroneously enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f)(2) based on a previous conviction arising from a guilty plea to the same offense that was based on a defective indictment, because since the defendant failed to challenge the indictment at the time the defendant pled guilty, the proper remedy was a motion in arrest of judgment under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-61(b) or habeas corpus. Grogan v. State, 297 Ga. App. 251, 676 S.E.2d 764 (2009).

Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury that malice was an essential element of either second-degree cruelty to children or family violence battery, as malice, prior to a 2004 amendment, was not an element of cruelty to children, and was not an element to the offense of family violence battery. Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga. App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (2008).

- By omitting the statutory definition of "visible bodily harm" contained in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(b), the trial court failed to give the jury the proper framework for evaluating whether a laceration to the victim's nose was severe enough to merit a finding of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 or whether only a finding of battery was merited. Thus, the charge was fatally insufficient. Carroll v. State, 293 Ga. App. 721, 667 S.E.2d 708 (2008).

- Verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent where the defendant was acquitted of family violence battery but convicted of third-degree cruelty to children because: (1) the appellate court could not know, and should not speculate, why a jury acquitted a defendant on a predicate offense, but convicted on the compound offense; (2) the jury was authorized to believe an officer's testimony about a red mark under the victim's right eye that was caused by an altercation between the victim and the defendant which occurred in the presence of the victim's children; and (3) the victim's prior inconsistent statement was admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Amis v. State, 277 Ga. App. 223, 626 S.E.2d 192 (2006).

In a shaken baby death, an involuntary manslaughter verdict was not mutually exclusive of a guilty verdict for felony murder/cruelty to children because, consistent with the jury's guilty verdict on the felony murder charge, an offense requiring criminal intent, the jury predicated the jury's involuntary manslaughter verdict on a misdemeanor involving criminal intent, battery, or simple battery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-23(a) and16-5-23.1(a), although the jury was also instructed on reckless conduct, a misdemeanor committed by criminal negligence, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b). Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131, 702 S.E.2d 161 (2010).

In a felony murder case involving cruelty to a child, the defendant's convictions for involuntary manslaughter based on simple battery were affirmed because the predicate offense for involuntary manslaughter was simple battery and the intent element of simple battery was not at all logically inconsistent with the mens rea required for the greater offense of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, or cruelty to children; therefore, the verdicts were not inconsistent. Griffin v. State, 296 Ga. 415, 768 S.E.2d 515 (2015).

- Because: (1) the facts of the case as narrated by the prosecutor presented a sufficient factual basis for the defendant's pleas to both aggravated assault and two battery counts; (2) the trial court informed the defendant of the consequences of the guilty pleas, waiver of certain constitutional and statutory rights, and the minimum and maximum possible sentences for the crimes charged; and (3) the defendant admitted guilt and to entering the guilty plea freely and voluntarily, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal of said pleas. Foster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 584, 636 S.E.2d 759 (2006).

- Trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant to three consecutive 12-month sentences on probation with the first 12 months to be served on house arrest following the defendant's guilty plea to the offenses of statutory rape, fornication, and battery because the sentence was within the statutory limits and whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses was within the trial court's discretion. Osborne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 59 (2012).

Cited in Givens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 845, 406 S.E.2d 272 (1991); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992); Ogletree v. State, 211 Ga. App. 845, 440 S.E.2d 732 (1994); Allen v. State, 213 Ga. App. 290, 444 S.E.2d 385 (1994); McCracken v. State, 224 Ga. App. 356, 480 S.E.2d 361 (1997); Vaughn v. State, 226 Ga. App. 318, 486 S.E.2d 607 (1997); Meja v. State, 232 Ga. App. 548, 502 S.E.2d 484 (1998); Dunn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 623, 507 S.E.2d 170 (1998); Seritt v. State, 237 Ga. App. 665, 516 S.E.2d 366 (1999); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. App. 578, 565 S.E.2d 896 (2002); Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 678, 572 S.E.2d 38 (2002); Martin v. State, 278 Ga. App. 465, 629 S.E.2d 134 (2006); Glanton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 232, 641 S.E.2d 234 (2007); Northington v. State, 287 Ga. App. 96, 650 S.E.2d 760 (2007); Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171 (2008); Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 S.E.2d 242 (2008); Mazza v. State, 292 Ga. App. 168, 664 S.E.2d 548 (2008); Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008); Hight v. State, 293 Ga. App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678 (2008); Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (2009); In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011); Young v. State, 329 Ga. App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (2014); In the Interest of D. D., 335 Ga. App. 676, 782 S.E.2d 728 (2016); Parks v. State, 304 Ga. 313, 818 S.E.2d 502 (2018); Ledbetter v. State, 349 Ga. App. 154, 825 S.E.2d 530 (2019); Robinson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 420, 838 S.E.2d 92 (2020); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020);.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fingerprintable offense.

- Violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1 is an offense for which those charged with a violation are to be fingerprinted. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-21.

- Offenses arising from a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1 are offenses for which fingerprinting is required. 2019 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 19-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Construction and application of "crime of violence" provision of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 pertaining to unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States after commission of felony offense, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 55.