2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 1 - Homicide
§ 16-5-2. Voluntary Manslaughter

Universal Citation: GA Code § 16-5-2 (2020)
  1. A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person; however, if there should have been an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.
  2. A person who commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 783, 784; Ga. L. 1858, p. 99, § 1; Code 1863, §§ 4222, 4223; Code 1868, §§ 4259, 4260; Code 1873, §§ 4325, 4326; Code 1882, §§ 4325, 4326; Penal Code 1895, §§ 65, 66; Penal Code 1910, §§ 65, 66; Code 1933, §§ 26-1007, 26-1008; Code 1933, § 26-1102, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 189 (1969). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 103 (1983). For note, "Edge v. State: The Modified Merger Rule Comes Up Short," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 697 (1993). For comment on Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 Ga. App. 313, 167 S.E.2d 366 (1969), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1969).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Unlawfulness
  • Provocation
  • Mutual Combat
  • Defenses
  • Jury Charge
  • Application

General Consideration

Evidence was sufficient to prove charges of aggravated battery and voluntary manslaughter.

- Defendant admitted shooting the gun found at the crime scene, a firearms examiner testified that a bullet fired from that gun was consistent with the one that killed the victim, and the evidence showed that a metal jacket fragment removed from another victim's arm was fired from the same gun. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).

Evidence sufficient to support aggravated assault conviction.

- Because there was testimony that the codefendant struck a 66-year-old victim with a brick, and since the indictment against a defendant properly alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury, there was sufficient evidence to convict both defendants of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Anthony v. State, 275 Ga. App. 274, 620 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

O.C.G.A.

§ 16-5-2 constitutional. - Argument that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 is unconstitutionally vague is without merit as the words "sudden, violent, and irresistible passion" and "serious provocation" are capable of common understanding. Logue v. State, 251 Ga. 602, 308 S.E.2d 189 (1983).

Constitutional challenge must be raised before guilty verdict.

- Felony murder defendant's constitutional challenge to Georgia's homicide statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-2, could not be reviewed because the challenge was raised for the first time in the defendant's amended motion for new trial. Such challenges could not be raised after a guilty verdict. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 772, 683 S.E.2d 581 (2009), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

When homicide is neither justifiable nor malicious, it is manslaughter. Conley v. State, 21 Ga. App. 134, 94 S.E. 261 (1917).

Killing must be unlawful to constitute manslaughter. Darby v. State, 16 Ga. App. 171, 84 S.E. 724 (1915), later appeal, 22 Ga. App. 606, 96 S.E. 707 (1918).

Distinguishing feature of voluntary manslaughter is that it must be done in hot blood, without malice or deliberation. Goldsmith v. State, 54 Ga. App. 268, 187 S.E. 694 (1936).

It is absence of malice which differentiates manslaughter from murder. If at time of killing circumstances are such as to exclude malice, then homicide cannot be murder. Parker v. State, 218 Ga. 654, 129 S.E.2d 850 (1963).

Murder and manslaughter, both voluntary and involuntary, are grades of unlawful homicide. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948).

Verdicts of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder were not mutually exclusive. Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874, 536 S.E.2d 514 (2000).

Doctrine of reasonable fears has no application in manslaughter case. Jones v. State, 193 Ga. 449, 18 S.E.2d 844 (1942); Wilcox v. State, 77 Ga. App. 786, 50 S.E.2d 29 (1948).

Act actually committed is judged according to act intended.

- If a person shoots at another under circumstances that, if death had ensued, offense would be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter, and by accident the shot hits and kills another person standing by, for whom shot was not intended, offense would be voluntary manslaughter. McLendon v. State, 172 Ga. 267, 157 S.E. 475 (1931).

Substantive elements of voluntary manslaughter are: (1) intentional killing, which was; (2) unlawful; and (3) prompted solely by sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).

Homicide which is neither justifiable nor malicious, constitutes manslaughter, and if intentional, constitutes voluntary manslaughter. Cochran v. State, 146 Ga. App. 414, 246 S.E.2d 431 (1978); Shields v. State, 147 Ga. App. 96, 248 S.E.2d 171 (1978); Ward v. State, 151 Ga. App. 36, 258 S.E.2d 699 (1979); Tew v. State, 179 Ga. App. 369, 346 S.E.2d 833 (1986).

Crimes of voluntary manslaughter and malice murder require identical causation in that both sections speak of causing the death of another human being. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Difference between crimes of voluntary manslaughter and malice murder is that latter crime requires either express or implied malice, while voluntary manslaughter requires that killer has acted solely from a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Merger of conviction into felony murder.

- After the defendant was engaged in a shoot-out with another and accidentally struck and killed an innocent third party, the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter could be merged into a felony-murder conviction. Foster v. State, 264 Ga. 369, 444 S.E.2d 296 (1994).

Trial court properly refused to accept the jury's initial verdict finding the defendant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter because the same aggravated assault charge was both the predicate felony for the felony murder charge and the act underlying the voluntary manslaughter charge; therefore, the jury could not find the defendant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter because, as charged, the crimes were subject to the modified merger rule, and the first verdicts were ambiguous. Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 722 S.E.2d 714 (2012).

Merger of aggravated assault conviction into voluntary manslaughter conviction.

- Trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction against the defendant for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because that conviction should have been merged into the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); the defendant was charged in the indictment with voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault for the stabbing of the victim, and the undisputed evidence at trial showed that the victim was stabbed one time in the chest, causing the victim's death. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).

"Hot blood" requirement for voluntary manslaughter is inconsistent with malice. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Distinguishing characteristic between voluntary manslaughter and justifiable homicide is whether accused was so influenced and excited that the accused reacted passionately or whether defendant acted simply in self defense. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), aff'd, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Syms v. State, 175 Ga. App. 179, 332 S.E.2d 689 (1985).

Evidentiary circumstances necessary to show voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to circumstances showing justifiable homicide, relate to a situation which arouses sudden passion in person killing so that, rather than defending self, the person willfully kills the attacker, albeit without malice aforethought, when it was not necessary for the person to do so in order to protect self. Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203, 206 S.E.2d 37 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 239 Ga. 40, 235 S.E.2d 477 (1977).

Voluntary manslaughter by definition denotes one acting out of anger or passion; self-defense denotes one acting with a motive to prevent injury. Murff v. State, 251 Ga. 478, 306 S.E.2d 267 (1983).

Murder distinguished.

- Intent to kill is an essential element of both murder and voluntary manslaughter; provocation, or the lack thereof, is what distinguishes the two offenses. Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985).

Intent need not be directed toward person actually killed.

- Offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault do not require that the necessary element of intent, to kill or injure as the case may be, must have been directed toward the person who actually was killed or injured. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986).

This state does not have a reckless homicide statute; it has only voluntary and involuntary manslaughter statutes which create degrees of homicide less than murder. A history of punishing recklessly caused homicide as murder has nothing to do with deficiencies in felony murder scheme because it provides no category of homicide less culpable than murder. Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 232 S.E.2d 907 (1977).

To sustain voluntary manslaughter conviction, state must prove every element of offense beyond reasonable doubt. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).

State has burden of proof on issue of unlawfulness or absence of self-defense when raised by evidence. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).

Modified merger rule applies.

- When the evidence would support a conviction for either felony murder or voluntary manslaughter, and the jury finds the defendant guilty of each offense, the modified merger rule applies if the underlying felony is directed against the homicide victim and is not independent, but rather is an integral part of the killing; under such rule, the defendant cannot be convicted and sentenced for felony murder because the voluntary manslaughter verdict indicates that the underlying felony is mitigated by provocation and passion. Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 635 S.E.2d 772 (2006).

Double jeopardy did not bar retrial.

- Defendant's acquittal on felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 did not bar retrial on a voluntary manslaughter charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) as the collateral estoppel doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. 5, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, did not apply because voluntary manslaughter required proof of an element not found in felony murder or aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter were mutually exclusive. Roesser v. State, 316 Ga. App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012).

Reconciling verdicts.

- Verdicts finding the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of each count of felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, but not guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the alleged malice murder of the victim, were not repugnant and could be reconciled. Carter v. State, 298 Ga. 867, 785 S.E.2d 274 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 646, 196 L. Ed. 2d 542 (U.S. 2017).

Cited in Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 Ga. App. 313, 167 S.E.2d 366 (1969); Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); Kemp v. State, 227 Ga. 251, 179 S.E.2d 920 (1971); Brooks v. State, 227 Ga. 339, 180 S.E.2d 721 (1971); Nolen v. State, 124 Ga. App. 593, 184 S.E.2d 674 (1971); Witt v. State, 124 Ga. App. 535, 184 S.E.2d 517 (1971); Butts v. State, 126 Ga. App. 512, 191 S.E.2d 329 (1972); Green v. State, 230 Ga. 756, 199 S.E.2d 199 (1973); Cornog v. State, 130 Ga. App. 46, 202 S.E.2d 257 (1973); Powell v. State, 130 Ga. App. 588, 203 S.E.2d 893 (1974); Reynolds v. State, 131 Ga. App. 247, 205 S.E.2d 536 (1974); Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974); Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638, 212 S.E.2d 814 (1975); Beckman v. State, 134 Ga. App. 118, 213 S.E.2d 527 (1975); Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Cook v. State, 134 Ga. App. 357, 214 S.E.2d 423 (1975); Hobbs v. State, 134 Ga. App. 850, 216 S.E.2d 674 (1975); Lindsey v. State, 135 Ga. 122, 218 S.E.2d 30 (1975); Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976); Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976); Gillespie v. State, 236 Ga. 845, 225 S.E.2d 296 (1976); Colson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 366, 226 S.E.2d 154 (1976); Strickland v. State, 138 Ga. App. 842, 227 S.E.2d 396 (1976); Murray v. State, 138 Ga. App. 776, 227 S.E.2d 428 (1976); Anderson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 871, 227 S.E.2d 783 (1976); Copeland v. State, 139 Ga. App. 55, 227 S.E.2d 850 (1976); Brown v. State, 139 Ga. App. 846, 229 S.E.2d 798 (1976); Ramey v. State, 238 Ga. 111, 230 S.E.2d 891 (1976); Curtis v. State, 141 Ga. App. 36, 232 S.E.2d 382 (1977); Bailey v. State, 240 Ga. 112, 239 S.E.2d 521 (1977); Gaines v. Hopper, 430 F. Supp. 1173 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Bouttry v. State, 242 Ga. 60, 247 S.E.2d 859 (1978); Conley v. State, 146 Ga. App. 739, 247 S.E.2d 562 (1978); King v. State, 148 Ga. App. 310, 251 S.E.2d 161 (1978); Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1978); Curtis v. State, 243 Ga. 50, 252 S.E.2d 614 (1979); Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979); Ballard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 704, 258 S.E.2d 331 (1979); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 259 S.E.2d 133 (1979); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 263 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 264 S.E.2d 209 (1980); Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Lane v. State, 153 Ga. App. 622, 266 S.E.2d 298 (1980); Jones v. State, 246 Ga. 109, 269 S.E.2d 6 (1980); Jones v. State, 247 Ga. 268, 275 S.E.2d 67 (1981); Comer v. State, 247 Ga. 167, 275 S.E.2d 309 (1981); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80, 287 S.E.2d 531 (1982); Clay v. State, 162 Ga. App. 346, 291 S.E.2d 432 (1982); Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 759, 292 S.E.2d 481 (1982); Brooks v. State, 249 Ga. 583, 292 S.E.2d 694 (1982); Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. 621, 292 S.E.2d 696 (1982); Washington v. State, 249 Ga. 728, 292 S.E.2d 836 (1982); Perez v. State, 249 Ga. 767, 294 S.E.2d 498 (1982); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 801, 294 S.E.2d 525 (1982); Byrd v. State, 163 Ga. App. 718, 294 S.E.2d 686 (1982); Anderson v. State, 163 Ga. App. 571, 295 S.E.2d 748 (1982); Goins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 37, 296 S.E.2d 229 (1982); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir. 1982); Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1982); Maynor v. Green, 547 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Ga. 1982); McClain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 264, 299 S.E.2d 55 (1983); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 301 S.E.2d 280 (1983); Bryant v. State, 250 Ga. 874, 301 S.E.2d 881 (1983); Wesley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 28, 303 S.E.2d 124 (1983); Harper v. State, 251 Ga. 183, 304 S.E.2d 693 (1983); Heath v. McGuire, 167 Ga. App. 489, 306 S.E.2d 741 (1983); Dollar v. State, 168 Ga. App. 726, 310 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Wright v. State, 253 Ga. 1, 316 S.E.2d 445 (1984); Denson v. State, 253 Ga. 93, 316 S.E.2d 469 (1984); Brooks v. State, 170 Ga. App. 171, 316 S.E.2d 815 (1984); Childs v. State, 171 Ga. App. 398, 319 S.E.2d 549 (1984); Brennon v. State, 253 Ga. 240, 319 S.E.2d 841 (1984); Ross v. State, 255 Ga. 1, 334 S.E.2d 300 (1985); Swint v. State, 173 Ga. App. 762, 328 S.E.2d 373 (1985); White v. State, 179 Ga. App. 276, 346 S.E.2d 91 (1986); Huston v. State, 256 Ga. 276, 347 S.E.2d 556 (1986); Partridge v. State, 256 Ga. 602, 351 S.E.2d 635 (1987); McDonald v. State, 182 Ga. App. 509, 356 S.E.2d 264 (1987); Harris v. State, 183 Ga. App. 219, 358 S.E.2d 634 (1987); Brown v. State, 258 Ga. 152, 366 S.E.2d 668 (1988); Wadley v. State, 258 Ga. 465, 369 S.E.2d 734 (1988); Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1988); Griffin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 646, 405 S.E.2d 877 (1991); Scott v. State, 261 Ga. 611, 409 S.E.2d 511 (1991); Borders v. State, 201 Ga. App. 754, 412 S.E.2d 284 (1991); Barron v. State, 261 Ga. 814, 411 S.E.2d 494 (1992); Polley v. State, 203 Ga. App. 825, 418 S.E.2d 107 (1992); Nelson v. State, 262 Ga. 763, 426 S.E.2d 357 (1993); Duquette v. State, 265 Ga. 152, 454 S.E.2d 500 (1995); Willingham v. State, 268 Ga. 64, 485 S.E.2d 735 (1997); Hall v. State, 235 Ga. App. 44, 508 S.E.2d 703 (1998); Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000); Blackford v. State, 251 Ga. App. 324, 554 S.E.2d 290 (2001); Wigfall v. State, 274 Ga. 672, 558 S.E.2d 389 (2002); Anderson v. State, 274 Ga. 871, 560 S.E.2d 659 (2002); Ford v. Schofield, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110 (2011); Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013); DuBose v. State, 299 Ga. 652, 791 S.E.2d 9 (2016); Patterson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 105, 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018).

Unlawfulness

Phrase "under circumstances which would otherwise be murder" imports requirement of unlawfulness from definition of murder into definition of manslaughter. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Crime of voluntary manslaughter includes as an essential element the ingredient of unlawfulness. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Unlawfulness, in sense of absence of excuse or justification, is an essential element of voluntary manslaughter. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

Unlawfulness as absence of self-defense.

- Element of unlawfulness has been construed to mean absence of self-defense where self-defense is raised by evidence. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).

Unlawfulness, including absence of self-defense, is an essential element of offense of voluntary manslaughter and state bears burden of persuasion in seeking to negate presence of self-defense. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

State must prove unlawfulness in voluntary manslaughter prosecution.

- If state includes unlawfulness within its murder and manslaughter laws as an element of those crimes, while at the same time state courts require the defendant to prove lawfulness by virtue of self-defense, such construction makes the statutes' operation run contrary to Constitution in violation of due process. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

Unlawfulness requirement does not refer to acts that are unlawful under some other criminal statute, since O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(c) and16-5-3(a) deal with deaths caused during commission of felonies and other unlawful acts. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Lawfulness is proved by establishing self-defense. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

Provocation

An essential element of voluntary manslaughter is passion on part of slayer. Rentfrow v. State, 123 Ga. 539, 51 S.E. 596 (1905); Battle v. State, 133 Ga. 182, 65 S.E. 382 (1909); Deal v. State, 145 Ga. 33, 88 S.E. 573 (1916); Frazier v. State, 194 Ga. 657, 22 S.E.2d 404 (1942); Green v. State, 195 Ga. 759, 25 S.E.2d 502 (1943).

Defendant, who shot the victim in the abdomen, should not have been convicted of both voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 and felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c); there was one assault, and the jury found that the fatal assault was mitigated by provocation and passion, so only the voluntary manslaughter conviction was proper. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Provocation as element.

- Provocation is relevant, among other things, as an element of voluntary manslaughter. Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 331, 418 S.E.2d 39 (1992).

Mental state of accused, not that of deceased, is relevant in determining whether homicide is manslaughter. Rentfrow v. State, 123 Ga. 539, 51 S.E. 596 (1905).

Passion is not same as ill will. Brown v. State, 144 Ga. 216, 87 S.E. 4 (1915).

If killing was the result of passion, it is immaterial who provoked the difficulty or how justifiably passion may have been aroused on conviction of manslaughter. Anderson v. State, 14 Ga. App. 607, 81 S.E. 802 (1914).

Death caused by felony cannot constitute manslaughter unless done with passion.

- No death caused by a felony can possibly fall within either branch of involuntary manslaughter, and can only fall within voluntary manslaughter if done with passion. Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976).

Provocation must be such as to excite violent passion in a reasonable person.

- To warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter, evidence must not only show an act of violent passion, but also some serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Swett v. State, 242 Ga. 228, 248 S.E.2d 629 (1978); Isaac v. State, 263 Ga. 872, 440 S.E.2d 175 (1994).

When the evidence raises the offense of voluntary manslaughter, the question is whether defendant acted out of passion resulting from provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person, and it is of no moment whether the provocation was sufficient to raise the deadly passion in the particular defendant. Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997).

With regard to defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused the death of defendant's romantic friend by striking the friend with a brick as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion arising from defendant having seen the friend engaged in sexual contact with another. Gilstrap v. State, 291 Ga. App. 647, 662 S.E.2d 755 (2008).

After the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder, trial counsel was not ineffective for waiting until the eve of trial to file a motion for the assistance of a forensic psychologist at trial as the defendant did not show that the requested expert's proffered testimony would have led the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder because the trial court specifically stated that the court had considered the evidence and arguments about provocation and did not believe that killing the victim because the defendant was not able to get money to buy drugs fit within the objective reasonable person standard for voluntary manslaughter. Prothro v. State, 302 Ga. 769, 809 S.E.2d 787 (2018).

"Passion" referred to in O.C.G.A § 16-5-2(a) is not sexual desire. Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 313 S.E.2d 95 (1984).

Sudden, violent and irresistible passion.

- Evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter when defendant shot and killed the victim out of "a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person." Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 106, 528 S.E.2d 868 (2000).

Doctrine of reasonable fears may be relevant as regards provocation of accused.

- Doctrine of reasonable fears, as related to assault upon accused may be applicable in determining whether homicide was voluntary manslaughter. However, it has no connection with defense of voluntary manslaughter which would authorize acquittal of defendant. Gresham v. State, 70 Ga. App. 80, 27 S.E.2d 463 (1943).

Serious provocation includes fears of reasonable man of being in danger of offense less than felony. White v. State, 129 Ga. App. 353, 199 S.E.2d 624 (1973).

"Fear of danger" prompting attack as not requiring self-defense finding.

- Fear raised in assailant's mind by victim's menacing words, physical aggression by pushing, and gesturing toward assailant with a pistol did not, under the circumstances, require a finding that the assailant acted out of self-defense, since the fear of some danger can be sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter. Syms v. State, 175 Ga. App. 179, 332 S.E.2d 689 (1985).

Victim's conduct in beating defendant, engaging the defendant in a dangerous road race, threatening to kill the defendant, demanding that defendant get out of defendant's truck while forcibly striking the window two or three times, and taunting defendant to shoot the victim, supplied sufficient provocation for a finding of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2. The jury was free to reject defendant's argument that the defendant acted in self-defense against the unarmed victim. Crane v. State, 300 Ga. App. 450, 685 S.E.2d 314 (2009).

Provocation by words is inadequate to reduce murder to manslaughter. Aguilar v. State, 240 Ga. 830, 242 S.E.2d 620 (1978).

Trial court did not err when it declined to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, despite the defendant's claim of provocation by the victim's backtalk and lying; words alone were not as a matter of law sufficient provocation to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 555 S.E.2d 716 (2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 828, 123 S. Ct. 123, 154 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2002).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested charge on voluntary manslaughter because the record supported the trial court's conclusion that there was no evidence that the attack on the victim was solely as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person as the evidence showed that the defendant and the victim argued briefly after the defendant accused the victim of being a thief, and such angry words alone were insufficient to incite serious provocation. Dailey v. State, 297 Ga. 442, 774 S.E.2d 672 (2015).

Words alone, regardless of degree of their insulting nature, will not in any case justify excitement of passion so as to reduce crime from murder to manslaughter where killing is done solely on account of the indignation aroused by use of opprobrious words. Brooks v. State, 249 Ga. 583, 292 S.E.2d 694 (1982).

Testimony that defendant and another "had words" insufficient provocation.

- Defendant's testimony that defendant was backing up and trying to leave when defendant's friend was pushed into the defendant and that the friend tried to catch oneself by grabbing the defendant's arm, which caused the gun to discharge, killing the friend, did not authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 because the evidence did not show that the defendant was impassioned when the killing occurred. Although there was testimony that the defendant and another at the scene "had words," this was insufficient to establish that the defendant was seriously provoked. Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009).

Profane language not sufficient provocation.

- Where the defendant showed no provocative conduct on behalf of the intended victim of the defendant's shot except for a salvo of curse words directed at the appellant, this does not constitute provocation sufficient to demand a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Hunter v. State, 256 Ga. 372, 349 S.E.2d 389 (1986).

Homicide resulting solely from resentment of provoking threats constitutes murder.

- Provocation by threats will in no case be sufficient to free defendant from crime of murder, or reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter, when killing is done solely for purpose of resenting provocation thus given. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972).

In cases of provocation by threats, motive with which slayer acted is for jury determination, and if it be claimed that homicide was committed, not in a spirit of revenge, but under fears of a reasonable man, it is for jury to decide whether or not circumstances were sufficient to justify existence of such fear. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972).

Threat plus threatening movements.

- When the defendant said the victim told the defendant that the victim was "going to get [the defendant]," and then reached into the defendant's car and grabbed the defendant by the wrist, the statement by the victim, when connected to the victim's movement toward, and close proximity to, the defendant's car, could be sufficient provocation. Tew v. State, 179 Ga. App. 369, 346 S.E.2d 833 (1986).

Defendant's testimony regarding prior rape irrelevant.

- Defendant's testimony that the defendant was raped at age 11 was barred because it was not relevant to the jury's determination regarding voluntary manslaughter; to support a claim of justification or self-defense as the defendant did not contend that the victim sexually abused the defendant as a child, and the defendant withdrew the requested charges on justification and self-defense; or to show the defendant's alleged subjective mental state in the absence of an insanity defense, which was withdrawn from consideration by the jury. Furthermore, the jury heard the defendant's testimony that the defendant feared both for the defendant's life and that the defendant was about to be raped, and the trial court did instruct the jury on the definition of voluntary manslaughter. Riggs v. State, 306 Ga. 759, 833 S.E.2d 112 (2019).

Existence of passion is a jury question. Mattox v. State, 9 Ga. App. 292, 70 S.E. 1120 (1911).

Issue of cooling time between provocation and homicide is for jury determination. Ross v. State, 59 Ga. 248 (1877); White v. State, 118 Ga. 787, 45 S.E. 595 (1903); Robinson v. State, 128 Ga. 254, 57 S.E. 315 (1907); Barney v. State, 5 Ga. App. 301, 63 S.E. 28 (1908); Hightower v. State, 14 Ga. App. 246, 80 S.E. 684 (1914); Booker v. State, 16 Ga. App. 280, 85 S.E. 255 (1915); Burke v. State, 196 Ga. 702, 27 S.E.2d 313 (1943).

Cooling time and circumstances construed.

- What is said in section regarding cooling time is also reasonably referable to cooling circumstances, because one necessarily involves the other. Cooling time, in the very nature of things, must vary and be governed by circumstances in each case. Therefore it is proper in murder prosecution for jury to consider all conduct of defendant from time of first difficulty until fatal encounter, and construe that conduct in light of all attendant circumstances and conditions, with a view of ascertaining what impulses, motives or passions influenced defendant. Hamby v. State, 71 Ga. App. 817, 32 S.E.2d 546 (1944).

Sufficiency of provocation and question of cooling time are in all cases for jury. Ward v. State, 151 Ga. App. 36, 258 S.E.2d 699 (1979).

Beating one month earlier not provocation.

- Trial court properly refused to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter when the defendant shot the victim to death, but claimed provocation by a beating administered to the defendant by the victim, and others, one month earlier; the fact that the defendant had not seen the victim in the month since the beating was irrelevant. Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 627 S.E.2d 562 (2006).

When evidence insufficient to raise question for jury.

- Although the jury is the judge of whether there was an interval between the provocation and killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, it is a question of law for the courts to determine whether there is slight evidence that the defendant acted as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. The court could conclude as a matter of law that the incident did not constitute even slight evidence of provocation because of the three and a half day cooling off period between the incident and the killing. Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 365 S.E.2d 111 (1988).

In the defendant's murder trial, a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter was not required because there was no evidence that the defendant acted as a result of passion arising from serious provocation, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); there was no evidence that the victim (a family friend, unarmed and naked in the bathroom) said or did anything to provoke the defendant. Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 796 S.E.2d 704 (2017).

Beating and kicking is sufficient provocation to bring one's actions within the ambit of the definition of voluntary manslaughter. Ellis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 757, 309 S.E.2d 924 (1983).

"Boxing" or fighting prior to the homicide does not constitute the kind of provocation which would warrant a charge of voluntary manslaughter in a trial for murder. Byrd v. State, 257 Ga. 36, 354 S.E.2d 428 (1987).

Adulterous conduct deemed sufficient provocation.

- Fact that in their last conversation, the victim, defendant's wife, recounted her adulterous history in a nonprovocative manner is not determinative of the issue of whether there was sufficient provocation to require a charge of voluntary manslaughter. Her adulterous conduct, and the relating of it to the defendant under these circumstances, clearly authorized the trial court's implicit determination that sufficient provocation existed to warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987).

Adulterous conduct can serve as sufficient provocation authorizing a charge on voluntary manslaughter even though the parties to the relationship are not married to each other. Murray v. State, 247 Ga. App. 139, 543 S.E.2d 428 (2000).

In the defendant's murder trial, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the defendant's spouse was having two extramarital affairs; evidence that the spouse was having the affairs was relevant to prove that the spouse told the defendant about the affairs at the time of the murder and such a conversation might be sufficient provocation to reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Lynn v. State, 296 Ga. 109, 765 S.E.2d 322 (2014).

No adulterous conduct to provoke murder.

- Because none of the parties were married, an instruction regarding adultery as a provocation for voluntary manslaughter was not warranted. Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (2015).

Finding old girlfriend and her new boyfriend on sofa.

- Merely finding old girlfriend and her new boyfriend together on sofa is not evidence of anything approaching sufficient passion or provocation to warrant a charge on the law of voluntary manslaughter. Parks v. State, 234 Ga. 579, 216 S.E.2d 804 (1975).

Sexual jealousy.

- Because the defendant was not provoked by sexual jealousy at the time the defendant shot the victim, and because the defendant testified that the defendant shot at the victim because the defendant was afraid that the victim could have been reaching for a weapon, an instruction on sexual jealousy as a provocation for voluntary manslaughter would have been improper; furthermore, even if the woman the defendant had been seeing had told the defendant that the woman had gone out with the victim, it would not be sufficient to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person. Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (2015).

Victim's alleged statement that she was out with another man was not sufficient to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person. Mayweather v. State, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 597 (1985).

Victim's stated intention to attend a party at which victim expected to use illegal drugs was not sufficient provocation to reduce stepfather's murder count to voluntary manslaughter. Cole v. State, 254 Ga. 286, 329 S.E.2d 146 (1985).

Evidence of defendant's intoxication and determination to end it.

- Evidence that the defendant was intoxicated, agitated, and determined to "put a stop to it" (her husband's inebriation) is insufficient to support finding of sudden, violent and irresistible passion. Clay v. State, 160 Ga. App. 178, 286 S.E.2d 476 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 250, 290 S.E.2d 84 (1982).

Evidence of victim's cocaine use.

- Despite the fact that the defendant produced proper evidence of a causal connection between the presence of cocaine and alcohol in the victim's body and the victim's potential behavior, as that connection was relevant to the issue of provocation and should have been admitted, any error by the trial court was deemed harmless, given that the error did not contribute to the verdict. McWilliams v. State, 280 Ga. 724, 632 S.E.2d 127 (2006).

Victim's tossing cup toward defendant insufficient.

- In a prosecution for malice murder, there was no evidence to authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter, and the fact that the victim may have tossed a soft drink cup in the direction of the defendant was insufficient to create a serious provocation. Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1133, 115 S. Ct. 2559, 132 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1995).

Serious act of provocation not shown.

- In a conviction based on the shooting death of a taxi driver, defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge because there was no evidence that the taxi driver, while unarmed and driving the cab, committed a serious act of provocation warranting such a charge. Keita v. State, 285 Ga. 767, 684 S.E.2d 233 (2009).

No evidence of fit of passion.

- Habeas court erred in granting relief to a petitioner on a malice murder conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel's defense theory of innocence was not unsupported by the evidence, and there was no evidence of sudden passion supporting a proposed theory of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Petitioner's intoxication and alleged mental retardation did not support a theory of voluntary manslaughter. Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 692 S.E.2d 580 (2010).

Sudden passion not shown given evidence of strained relationship.

- At the defendant's murder trial, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on evidence at trial that the defendant's relationship with the victim was strained and that the couple engaged in erratic behavior towards one another; such testimony was insufficient to show sudden passion. Cochran v. State, 305 Ga. 827, 828 S.E.2d 338 (2019).

Five to 15 minutes not sufficient "cooling off" as matter of law.

- Five to 15 minute period for "cooling off" does not render act of killing murder rather than voluntary manslaughter as a matter of law. Davis v. State, 140 Ga. App. 890, 232 S.E.2d 164 (1977).

Mutual Combat

Voluntary manslaughter includes killing in course of mutual combat. Cooper v. State, 212 Ga. 367, 92 S.E.2d 864 (1956).

Homicide pursuant to mutual combat generally constitutes manslaughter.

- When homicide is committed during mutual combat, since the defendant willingly engaged in an affray, the defendant is in equal fault with the deceased, and, under such circumstances, it is not justifiable for the defendant to slay adversary without more. Accordingly, a killing under such circumstances is voluntary manslaughter. Cribb v. State, 71 Ga. App. 539, 31 S.E.2d 248 (1944).

To reduce homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, on theory of mutual combat, it should affirmatively appear that at time of homicide both parties were in position and manifested intention to fight. Cornelious v. State, 193 Ga. 25, 17 S.E.2d 156 (1941); Cone v. State, 193 Ga. 420, 18 S.E.2d 850 (1942); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951).

Essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, a readiness, and intention upon part of both parties to fight. Mathis v. State, 196 Ga. 288, 26 S.E.2d 606 (1943); McDaniel v. State, 197 Ga. 757, 30 S.E.2d 612 (1944).

Mutual combat exists where there is a fight and both parties are willing to fight. Harris v. State, 184 Ga. 382, 191 S.E. 439 (1937).

It does not matter who strikes first blow in mutual combat.

- If upon a sudden quarrel, parties fight upon spot, or presently agree and fetch their weapons and fight, and one of them is killed, such killing constitutes voluntary manslaughter, no matter who strikes first blow. Cotton v. State, 201 Ga. 285, 39 S.E.2d 530 (1946); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951).

Principles of mutual combat, applied to voluntary manslaughter, do not require that both strike blows. Watson v. State, 66 Ga. App. 242, 17 S.E.2d 559 (1941).

There need not be mutual blows in order to constitute mutual combat; but when there exists intention on part of both parties to fight, mutual combat exists, although first blow kills or disables one of the parties. Mathis v. State, 196 Ga. 288, 26 S.E.2d 606 (1943).

Waiver on appeal when defendant requested charge.

- Because the defendant requested a jury charge on mutual combat, the defendant waived the right to appeal on this point. Gonzales v. State, 261 Ga. App. 366, 582 S.E.2d 524 (2003).

Theory of mutual combat inapplicable where victim had no desire to fight.

- Aggressor will not be allowed to mitigate crime on theory of mutual combat when it appears that the victim had no desire to fight, and intended to fight only to the extent that a defense of the victim's person against an unprovoked attack was necessary. Mathis v. State, 196 Ga. 288, 26 S.E.2d 606 (1943); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951).

Mutual intent to fight, where malice present.

- Although there is mutual intention to fight, if one disputant kills other with malice, it is murder, since in such case killing would not be result of sudden and violent heat of passion which by reason of its irresistibility would constitute voluntary manslaughter. Rivers v. State, 193 Ga. 133, 17 S.E.2d 726 (1941).

Words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures.

- Unlawful killing of one who has given slayer no provocation other than use of words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures cannot be graded to voluntary manslaughter, under doctrine of mutual combat. Cone v. State, 193 Ga. 420, 18 S.E.2d 850 (1942); Green v. State, 195 Ga. 759, 25 S.E.2d 502 (1943); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951).

Mere threats by one party to other prior to killing do not establish mutual combat. Cornelious v. State, 193 Ga. 25, 17 S.E.2d 156 (1941).

No charge on mutual combat authorized when defendant testified to acting in self-defense.

- In the defendant's trial for murder of another inmate, no evidence warranted instructions on voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat because the defendant testified the defendant acted in self-defense in the fight and did not intend to kill the victim, while eyewitnesses described the defendant as chasing the victim. Ruffin v. State, 296 Ga. 262, 765 S.E.2d 913 (2014).

Defenses

Defense of justification.

- When relying on the defense of justification in a homicide case, in order to introduce evidence of the violent nature of the deceased victim, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, was assailing the defendant, and the defendant was honestly seeking to defend self. Hagans v. State, 187 Ga. App. 216, 369 S.E.2d 536 (1988).

Self-defense distinguished.

- Provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will support a self-defense claim; the distinguishing characteristic between the two claims is whether the accused was so influenced and excited that the accused reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt at self defense. Worthem v. State, 270 Ga. 469, 509 S.E.2d 922 (1999).

Defenses of self-defense and accident are inconsistent. Wilkerson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 26, 357 S.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 357 S.E.2d 814 (1987).

Self-defense.

- When the defendant testified that the victim was shot because the defendant feared the victim was about to attack the defendant, the trial court properly charged the jury regarding self-defense; there was no evidence that the defendant shot the victim as the result of passion arising from a serious provocation, nor was there any evidence that the defendant was so influenced and excited that the defendant reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt at self-defense. Morgan v. State, 276 Ga. 72, 575 S.E.2d 468 (2003).

Self defense argument rejected when victim eating when murdered.

- Evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant shot the victim as a result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation for the voluntary manslaughter conviction. The evidence did not establish self-defense as the victim was significantly smaller than the defendant and the victim was eating a hamburger when the defendant shot the victim. Stanley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 656, 601 S.E.2d 141 (2004).

Continuing to strike victim after victim down impacted self defense.

- While the defendant contended that the act of repeatedly striking the victim with a piece of wood was done in self-defense, the jury could have found either that the defendant's actions were not justified because the defendant used excessive force or that the defendant did not act in self-defense after the first blow in light of testimony that the defendant continued to strike the victim after the victim had fallen to the ground and was no longer a threat. Linzy v. State, 277 Ga. App. 673, 627 S.E.2d 411 (2006).

Self defense argument rejected.

- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a voluntary manslaughter count predicated on the defendant's claim of self-defense, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) and to enable a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant's stabbing of the victim was not justified as an act of self-defense; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), a neighbor's eyewitness testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the aggressor, continued to use force after any imminent danger posed by the victim had passed, or used excessive force, and the jury also was entitled to rely upon evidence that the defendant lied to the police about the stabbing and hid the knife. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).

Self defense argument rejected.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's testimony that the initial shot to the victim's head was an accident and that the defendant kept shooting because the victim threatened to kill the defendant was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not justifiably use deadly force to protect oneself, after the victim already had been shot in the head, from the victim's assault pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); or the jury simply could have disbelieved the defendant's claim of self-defense, given the number of gunshots fired. Davis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 831, 711 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

Trial court did not err in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 because the evidence establishing that the defendant and the victims had engaged in a heated argument, which escalated to preparations for a physical altercation, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); given the heated exchange and the defendant's belief that the defendant was in serious danger, there was sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter, and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) and conclude that the defendant was so influenced and excited that the defendant reacted passionately, rather than simply in self defense, when the defendant shot an unarmed victim. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Validity of defense a jury question.

- When the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant intentionally shot the victim after the victim's actions earlier in the day provoked the defendant, and to reject the defendant's theory that the defendant feared being shot, the defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction was affirmed. Gonzales v. State, 261 Ga. App. 366, 582 S.E.2d 524 (2003).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2; there was conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense in shooting the victim, and it was for the jury to resolve the dispute between the defendant and the state's witnesses, who contradicted the defendant's testimony that the defendant had acted in self-defense. Parks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 679, 637 S.E.2d 46 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury's determination that the defendant's fatal shooting of a victim following the parties' altercation and the victim's subsequent punch in the defendant's face constituted voluntary manslaughter, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), as there was no evidence that the victim had a gun at the time of the shooting incident and the defendant gave conflicting versions of the incident; the jury acted within the jury's province in rejecting the defendant's claim of self-defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Thomas v. State, 296 Ga. App. 231, 674 S.E.2d 96 (2009).

Jury Charge

Charge based on 1933 law.

- Trial court did not err in instructing the jury that "in all cases of voluntary manslaughter there must be some actual assault upon the person killing or an attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing or other equivalent circumstances to justify the excitement of passion and to exclude all idea of deliberation or malice either express or implied," although the requirements concerning an actual assault upon the defendant, or an attempt on the part of the victim to commit a serious personal injury on the defendant, that were contained in § 26-1102 of the 1933 Code of Georgia were not adopted in the enactment of the Criminal Code of Georgia of 1968, as currently codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2. Cash v. State, 258 Ga. 460, 368 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

Charge placing burden of persuasion of self-defense on defendant violates due process.

- When absence of self-defense is an essential element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court's charge operates to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant on this issue, defendant's conviction violated the defendant's due process rights under the United States Constitution. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

An instruction which tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) was not unconstitutionally burden-shifting in that it required the jury to find defendant guilty of murder if it determined that a sufficient cooling-off period intervened between the provocation and the homicide. Parents Against Realignment v. Georgia High School Association, 271 Ga. 114, 515 S.E.2d 528 (1999).

Court should charge voluntary manslaughter whenever requested by defendant.

- Better practice on the part of trial courts would be to charge voluntary manslaughter in all instances when requested by the defendant. Such a charge, on request, cannot be reversible error, and, if routinely given, would vastly reduce the expense and delay involved on appeal of the sometimes difficult questions of whether there is sufficient evidence to support such a charge as a matter of law. Gooch v. State, 259 Ga. 301, 379 S.E.2d 522 (1989).

When there is doubt whether manslaughter is involved, trial judge must submit question to jury. Todd v. State, 75 Ga. App. 711, 44 S.E.2d 275 (1947).

Court should charge regarding both murder and manslaughter when doubt exists. If there exists any evidence to create doubt, however slight, as to whether offense is murder or voluntary manslaughter, instructions as to law of both of these offenses should be given. Thomas v. State, 47 Ga. App. 237, 170 S.E. 303 (1933); Thomas v. State, 51 Ga. App. 455, 180 S.E. 760 (1935); Hayes v. State, 51 Ga. App. 462, 180 S.E. 762 (1935); Dickey v. State, 60 Ga. App. 199, 3 S.E.2d 238 (1939); Harris v. State, 77 Ga. App. 842, 50 S.E.2d 152 (1948); McDaniel v. State, 91 Ga. App. 196, 85 S.E.2d 490 (1954).

When evidence, or defendant's statement, or portions of evidence and portions of statement combined, raise doubt, however slight, as to whether homicide was murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is not error for court to instruct jury upon law of voluntary manslaughter. Tucker v. State, 61 Ga. App. 661, 7 S.E.2d 193 (1940).

When there is evidence sufficient to raise doubt, however slight, upon point, whether crime is murder or manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, court should instruct jury upon these grades of manslaughter as well as murder. Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369, 123 S.E. 126 (1924); Goldsmith v. State, 54 Ga. App. 268, 187 S.E. 694 (1936).

Law of voluntary manslaughter may properly be given in charge to jury on trial of one indicted for murder, where, from evidence or from defendant's statement at trial, there is anything deducible which would tend to show that defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or which would be sufficient to raise a doubt as to which of these grades of homicide was committed. Sumner v. State, 109 Ga. 142, 34 S.E. 293 (1899); Futch v. State, 137 Ga. 75, 72 S.E. 911 (1911); Reeves v. State, 22 Ga. App. 628, 97 S.E. 115 (1918); Amerson v. State, 26 Ga. App. 628, 105 S.E. 378 (1920); Green v. State, 52 Ga. App. 290, 183 S.E. 204 (1935); Dickey v. State, 60 Ga. App. 199, 3 S.E.2d 238 (1939); Hamby v. State, 71 Ga. App. 817, 32 S.E.2d 546 (1944); Goings v. State, 91 Ga. App. 146, 85 S.E.2d 98 (1954).

When applicable, law of voluntary manslaughter should be charged, even absent request.

- When under one phase of evidence, law of voluntary manslaughter is involved in case, judge errs when the judge omits to charge upon that subject and this charge is required even without any request. Parker v. State, 218 Ga. 654, 129 S.E.2d 850 (1963).

When testimony as to voluntary manslaughter is sufficient, it is duty of court to charge thereon, whether or not request to charge thereon was made. Bell v. State, 130 Ga. 865, 61 S.E. 996 (1908); Andrews v. State, 134 Ga. 71, 67 S.E. 422 (1910); Hill v. State, 147 Ga. 650, 95 S.E. 213 (1918); Booker v. State, 153 Ga. 117, 111 S.E. 418 (1922).

Even in the face of an objection by the defendant, the court properly charged the jury with respect to voluntary manslaughter in a prosecution for murder where the evidence showed adulterous conduct of the defendant's wife with the victim. Boone v. State, 234 Ga. App. 373, 506 S.E.2d 884 (1998).

Absent request, failure to charge on manslaughter not error when raised only by defendant's statement. Taylor v. State, 199 Ga. 512, 34 S.E.2d 701 (1945).

Defense counsel was entitled to rely on defendant's claim that defendant was not present when a victim was killed, counsel acted reasonably when counsel decided to defend charges of malice murder and felony murder by attacking the credibility of defendant's co-conspirators and when counsel decided not to ask that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, and the trial court did not err because it did not give the jury an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, sua sponte. Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 586 S.E.2d 645 (2003).

At least some evidence must support charge of voluntary manslaughter. before the charge is required. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), aff'd, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).

Victim's suspected involvement in the death of a defendant's brother did not constitute even slight evidence of provocation to support a voluntary manslaughter jury charge since five months had passed between the brother's murder and the murder of the victim. Woodruff v. State, 281 Ga. 235, 637 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

Because the evidence presented showed that the defendant acted in a rational and calculating fashion in retrieving a car jack, breaking out the exterior light to darken the scene, and then quietly snuck into and through the victim's house in search of the victim, and did not show that the defendant's actions were the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter, and a malice murder conviction was upheld on appeal. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 651 S.E.2d 715 (2007).

Trial court did not err by refusing to give a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that following arrival the appellant was taunted by the victim or subjected to any conduct that would excite the passions of a reasonable person; rather, the evidence showed that the prior altercation and fighting involving the appellant's relatives occurred some 30 or 40 minutes before the appellant arrived at the apartment complex. Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015).

Instruction requiring jury to consider malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter simultaneously.

- Defendant failed to establish plain error in the trial court's charge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58 because the trial court clearly instructed the jury that before it was authorized to return a verdict of guilty of malice murder or felony murder, it had to first determine whether mitigating circumstances would cause the offense to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter; the structure of the actual verdict form made it clear that, as to each victim, the jury was required to consider malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter simultaneously. Ortiz v. State, 291 Ga. 3, 727 S.E.2d 103 (2012).

Instruction on when exculpatory matter in defendant's statement cannot be rejected unwarranted.

- Trial court did not err when the court declined to give the defendant's requested charge as to when a jury could not reject exculpatory matter in the defendant's statement because anything in the defendant's statement that could support a defense of voluntary manslaughter was contradicted by other evidence that the defendant's attack on the victim was of significant length and involved a number of different deliberate and cruel actions; that the defendant's mind was changed about whether and how to kill the victim; and that the victim sustained numerous injuries. Rodriguez-Nova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698 (2014).

Whether charge warranted is question of law.

- It is a question of law for courts to determine whether there is slight evidence that defendant acted as result of sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975).

Absent evidence of requisite provocation, it is not error to refuse charge on voluntary manslaughter. Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978).

Exchange of gunfire.

- While being fired upon may be "serious provocation," it does not follow that a charge of voluntary manslaughter will be warranted in every case involving an exchange of gunfire. Worthem v. State, 270 Ga. 469, 509 S.E.2d 922 (1999).

Instruction that words alone did not constitute sufficient provocation to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter was not error since there was no evidence to support a finding that the victim had taunted defendant with the victim's extra-marital sexual exploits. Mack v. State, 272 Ga. 415, 529 S.E.2d 132 (2000).

Trial court's charge that provocation by words alone would not justify manslaughter was not erroneous because it was implicit in the statutory voluntary manslaughter instruction that was given pursuant to the defendant's request; and it was consistent with the defense theory that the defendant was provoked by the conduct of the victim, the defendant's girlfriend, with the customer from the dance club where the victim worked and not the victim's words alone. Rodriguez-Nova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698 (2014).

Nonthreatening words combined with harmless physical contact did not support a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Veal v. State, 250 Ga. 384, 297 S.E.2d 485 (1982).

Evidence held sufficient to authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter.

- See Dyer v. State, 167 Ga. App. 310, 306 S.E.2d 313 (1983); Washington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 490, 491 S.E.2d 925 (1997).

Trial court did not err in giving the state's requested charge on voluntary manslaughter in the defendant's trial, based on the defendant's fatal drive-by shooting into an occupied car, when there was some slight evidence to support such a charge; the fact that a defendant in a murder trial relied on self-defense did not preclude such instructions, and based on the fact that the defendant was goaded by the victim's sibling earlier in the day, as well as shot at by the victim's sibling, giving the instruction fit within the circumstances of the defendant then firing shots in the car as the victim drove by, based on the defendant's alleged belief that the defendant was going to be fired on by the car occupants. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. App. 271, 605 S.E.2d 913 (2004).

Voluntary manslaughter instruction was supported by evidence of sufficient provocation as there was evidence that the victim assaulted the defendant, but turned away to leave the scene; after the victim turned away, the defendant shot the victim in the back from two-and-one-half feet away. Nelloms v. State, 273 Ga. App. 448, 615 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) and in ruling that defendant could not introduce evidence relevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401 et seq.) based on the cumulative effect of the victim's alleged molestation of defendant's niece, defendant's discovery thereof, and the victim's taunt. Scott v. State, 291 Ga. 156, 728 S.E.2d 238 (2012).

Trial court erred when the court failed to give a requested charge on voluntary manslaughter as there was evidence the defendant acted out of irresistible passion when the defendant came upon the wife and paramour and stabbed the paramour while yelling "This is what you get for f***ing somebody's wife," after they had been married for 15 years, and the fact that the crime occurred at the wife's mother's house was of no consequence as there was no territorial restrictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Clough v. State, 298 Ga. 594, 783 S.E.2d 637 (2016).

Trial court erred in failing to merge both defendants' convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the indictments charged the defendants with felony murder by alleging that the defendants committed aggravated assault, but the court then charged the defendants with aggravated assault based on the exact same conduct; and, although the jury convicted the defendants of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of felony murder, it, nevertheless, followed that the defendants' convictions for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the defendants convictions for voluntary manslaughter. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).

Trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of felony murder because such instruction was applicable to both defendants as the state presented evidence that immediately following a fight, in which both defendants were involved and in which the victim cut the second defendant, both defendants fired handguns at the victim. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).

Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter not error.

- See Kitchens v. State, 251 Ga. 36, 302 S.E.2d 569 (1983); Elliott v. State, 253 Ga. 417, 320 S.E.2d 361 (1984).

Where there was no evidence beyond, perhaps, mere words, of provocation or of a mutual intent to fight, as a matter of law these facts did not present the necessary evidence of sufficient provocation to excite the passions of a reasonable person which would have entitled the defendant to a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Pace v. State, 258 Ga. 225, 367 S.E.2d 827 (1988).

Voluntary manslaughter charge is not warranted when the only alleged evidence of provocation is the victim resisting an armed robbery. Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 526 S.E.2d 560, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 950, 121 S. Ct. 353, 148 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2000); Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019).

Court in a murder prosecution did not err in refusing to charge voluntary manslaughter since there was no evidence of provocation or passion since the defendant did not testify that the defendant was angry when the defendant shot the victim but that the defendant was trying to calm the victim down by demonstrating that the defendant's gun would not fire, that the defendant pointed the gun at the windshield and pulled the trigger, thinking the gun would not fire until the trigger was pulled a second time, and that the victim jerked the defendant's hand toward the victim as the gun fired. Alexis v. State, 273 Ga. 423, 541 S.E.2d 636 (2001).

Trial court did not err by failing to give a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter as the evidence showed that the defendant initiated the conflict by aggressively assaulting the victims with deadly force, and that one victim only threw a radio at the defendant in an effort to protect the victim's nephew from threatened deadly harm. Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 630, 570 S.E.2d 309 (2002).

Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter in a case in which the defendant was dating someone who decided to end their relationship and date someone else, the murder victim, as the defendant did not show that the murder victim seriously provoked the defendant and that the defendant reacted passionately when the murder victim tried to escort the defendant from the apartment after the defendant went there after the breakup, and the defendant suddenly stabbed the murder victim to death. Daniels v. State, 276 Ga. 632, 580 S.E.2d 221 (2003).

When, in a murder prosecution, the trial court did not charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, this was not error because there was no evidence to show that the defendant acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Morgan v. State, 279 Ga. 6, 608 S.E.2d 619 (2005).

In a murder prosecution, a defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because testimony that the defendant shot the victim because the defendant panicked and was frightened showed, at best, that the defendant was attempting to repel an attack, not that there was sufficient anger to invoke passion. Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 629 S.E.2d 213 (2006).

In a murder prosecution, a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter, as a lesser-included offense, was unwarranted, as the evidence showed that the defendant had the chance to walk away from a heated argument with the victim, but instead calmly retrieved a knife, concealed it, and deliberately re-initiated the argument before plunging the knife into the victim's abdomen. Ballard v. State, 281 Ga. 232, 637 S.E.2d 401 (2006).

Trial court did not err by failing to give a defendant's requested jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and by rejecting the defendant's claim that the jury could have inferred that the defendant "snapped" emotionally and killed the victim in the heat of passion; the defendant testified that the shooting was an accident. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

Trial court's refusal to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder was not erroneous when evidence of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation was lacking. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 521, 640 S.E.2d 274 (2007).

Since there existed no evidence that, at the time the fatal shots were fired into a victim, the defendant was acting with the sort of anger or passion which would support the requested charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter to malice murder, the trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's request for the charge on the lesser included offense. Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 642 S.E.2d 668 (2007).

Since the state's evidence did not show a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person, and since the defendant's evidence that the defendant was not present when the victim was killed did not show a killing arising from such passion, a trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested charge on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Culmer v. State, 282 Ga. 330, 647 S.E.2d 30 (2007).

In a murder prosecution, the trial court properly refused to give jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, pointing a pistol at another, and accident as no evidence of provocation was presented and the evidence showed that the victim was killed during the defendant's effort to rob the victim at gunpoint. Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007).

In a murder trial, the trial court did not err in not giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; the state's evidence did not warrant such a charge, and the defendant's testimony that the defendant shot the victim in self-defense at best showed that the defendant was attempting to repel an attack, not that the defendant reacted passionately. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 651 S.E.2d 702 (2007).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for felony murder arising out of the stabbing death of the love interest of the defendant's spouse, the trial court properly refused the defendant's request for a jury instruction on adulterous conduct as provocation for voluntary manslaughter because the evidence in the case did not warrant the instruction in as much as there was no evidence that the defendant acted solely as the result of a serious provocation, adultery, or otherwise, that excited the defendant in a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion, so as to authorize a finding of voluntary manslaughter. In fact, the defendant testified that the defendant was angry with the victim because the victim owed the defendant money and that the defendant went to see the victim in order to reach an agreement about the money. Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 655 S.E.2d 806 (2008).

In a malice murder prosecution, as the evidence did not show the defendant was provoked seriously enough to cause a reasonable person to fatally stab the victim, the defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Boyd v. State, 284 Ga. 46, 663 S.E.2d 218 (2008).

In defendant's prosecution for malice murder, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as no sudden, violent, and irresistible passion under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) was shown because the divorce from the defendant's spouse, who was the victim, had been pending for over a year and the murder was the result of a carefully planned hit. Sullivan v. State, 284 Ga. 358, 667 S.E.2d 32 (2008).

Evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and thus trial counsel was not ineffective in requesting this instruction since the evidence demonstrated that the victim and defendant were in rival gangs; that the victim and others drove into an apartment complex to pick up a friend; that an occupant in the victim's vehicle poked a gun out of a window; and that defendant and the defendant's codefendant shot at the vehicle, killing the victim and wounding others. Hung v. State, 284 Ga. 796, 671 S.E.2d 811 (2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter in the defendant's criminal trial on a charge of, inter alia, malice murder as the evidence did not reflect that the defendant's use of a gun to fatally shoot the victim amounted to reckless conduct or another misdemeanor. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. 328, 676 S.E.2d 225 (2009).

Trial court did not err by refusing to give the defendant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because the record failed to reveal any evidence that would support a voluntary manslaughter charge; the evidence and testimony at trial revealed that although a gun was in the victim's car at the time of the murder, the victim did not say or do anything before the defendant shot the victim, let alone do anything that would constitute the "serious provocation" necessary to warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 690 S.E.2d 801 (2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included crime of malice murder because a charge on voluntary manslaughter was precluded by the evidence when there was no evidence to illustrate the existence of provocation before the fatal shots were fired; the defendant assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon and then fired the fatal shots into the victim's back, and there was no evidence that the defendant had any type of relationship with the friend who was arguing with the victim that would explain an impassioned attack. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 695 S.E.2d 195 (2010), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

Trial court did not err in ruling that because the court was instructing the jury on self-defense, the court would not give the defendant's requested charge on voluntary manslaughter since any evidence showing that the defendant was fearful that the victim or the defendant's friend had a gun and was about to draw the gun without more, did not show the serious provocation and the sudden, violent, and irresistible passion required to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. White v. State, 287 Ga. 208, 695 S.E.2d 222 (2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to charge a jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder because, as a matter of law, the defendant's former girlfriend's statement that she was out with another man was not sufficient to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2. Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (2010).

Trial court did not err by failing to give the defendant's requested charges on voluntary manslaughter because there was not even slight evidence of the passion or provocation needed to authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter since the victim was not intoxicated, and the victim's behavior was not belligerent or provocative; the victim was shot from a considerable distance as the victim was peacefully leaving a party. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010).

After the defendant killed the male victim during an altercation but then killed the male victim's female companion without provocation, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter regarding the murder of the female victim because there was no showing that the female victim was involved in the argument or the struggle between the male combatants; thus, the second murder could not be said to have resulted from a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite passion in a reasonable person. Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011).

Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter of officer not error.

- When the defendant was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as the evidence was insufficient to warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter because the defendant testified that, when the defendant heard the gunshots, the defendant fired the shots like a warning, and that, after hearing gunshots, the defendant removed the defendant's gun and fired two shots in the air; and, at best, that evidence showed that the defendant was attempting to repel an attack, not that the defendant was so angered that the defendant reacted passionately. Williams v. State, 306 Ga. 717, 832 S.E.2d 805 (2019).

When the evidence showed that after the deputies called out the defendant's name, the defendant stood up from a chair and immediately shot and killed a deputy and there was no evidence that the defendant knew the deputies, that they struggled or exchanged words, or that the deputies did anything to provoke the defendant, the evidence did not support an inference that the defendant was acting passionately in response to a serious provocation and, thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge on voluntary manslaughter. Calmer v. State, Ga. , 846 S.E.2d 40 (2020).

In an action for malice murder and a possession of a firearm during a felony, even if the defendant reacted as a result of a sudden and violent passion, any error in failing to give a voluntary manslaughter charge was harmless because there was substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt, and it was highly probable that a jury instructed on voluntary manslaughter nonetheless would have rejected such a claim in the light of the trial evidence other than the defendant's self-serving story. Heyward v. State, 308 Ga. 570, 842 S.E.2d 293 (2020).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because the only evidence that the defendant cited to support such a charge was that the defendant became very angry when the victim called the defendant a name and there was no evidence whatsoever of provocation sufficient to excite the passions of a reasonable person that would have entitled the defendant to a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 841 S.E.2d 696 (2020).

Voluntary manslaughter instruction rejected when committed during assault of female.

- In defendant's trial on charges of malice murder, three counts of aggravated battery, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated assault after the defendant grabbed a woman who was riding a bike, dragged her to a concealed area, and sexually assaulted, beat, and killed her, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of malice murder because there was not even slight evidence to suggest that the victim was killed for any reason other than she bit defendant's penis after he forced it into her mouth in an attempt to commit aggravated sodomy against her, facts that could not form the basis of a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1017, 132 S. Ct. 556, 181 L. Ed. 2d 401 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 394 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018).

Voluntary manslaughter charge rejected in absence of romantic relationship.

- During the defendant's trial for murder, the trial court did not err by refusing the defendant's request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter because in the absence of any evidence of a romantic relationship between the defendant and the teenaged victim, there could be no serious provocation created by the victim's call to her ex-boyfriend that could have aroused passion in a reasonable person pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (2011).

Trial court did not err in failing to give the codefendant's requested charge on voluntary manslaughter because the threat against the defendant did not rise to the level of a serious provocation of the codefendant sufficient to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person that would require a charge on voluntary manslaughter; although more than mere words were used against the defendant, the codefendant was not present during the alleged provocation, but instead, the evidence showed, at most, that the incident was subsequently communicated to the codefendant and, thus, objectively, the codefendant's response to the provoking incident was unreasonable. Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (2011).

Voluntary manslaughter instruction rejected when defendant claimed to "snap".

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter charge because the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); the defendant testified that the defendant and the victim were having an argument about money, the defendant was getting agitated and angry, the victim stated "remember what happened to your ass the last time and I will do it again," and the defendant snapped. Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 709 S.E.2d 780 (2011).

Absence of "serious provocation" meant no voluntary manslaughter charge.

- Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's testimony that the defendant was not upset but fired a gun out of fear, in self-defense, and in defense of the defendant's parent showed that the defendant did not shoot a child in the heat of passion, and the other evidence was not to the contrary; rather, the testimony of the neighbors, who were the child's parents and the only other trial witnesses present during the shooting demonstrated, at most, that the defendant could have opened fire in response to the neighbors' heated or angry statements, which, as a matter of law, could not constitute "serious provocation" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Davidson v. State, 289 Ga. 194, 709 S.E.2d 814 (2011).

Trial court's failure to instruct a jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter was not error since there was no evidence that the defendant acted in response to a sudden, violent passion resulting from serious provocation. The victim's death was either the cold, calculated method by which defendant intended to profit or, at best, the unfortunate result of resisting an armed robbery. McNeal v. State, 289 Ga. 711, 715 S.E.2d 95 (2011).

Acting out of fear not justification for voluntary manslaughter charge.

- During the defendant's murder trial, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request to charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, since the defendant testified that the defendant fired a pistol because the defendant was "just scared," and acting out of fear was not the same as acting in the heat of a sudden irresistible passion. Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (2011).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because, while the testimony provided some evidence that the defendant might have acted in self-defense, there was no evidence that the defendant acted passionately. Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 723 S.E.2d 684 (2012).

Trial court did not give the jury an incomplete charge regarding the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter because the instruction did not prevent the jury from fully considering voluntary manslaughter and was adequate to inform the jury that, before the jury could convict defendant of malice or felony murder, the jury had to first consider whether there was sufficient evidence of passion or provocation to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Kendrick v. State, 290 Ga. 873, 725 S.E.2d 296 (2012).

Habeas court erred in granting a petitioner relief on the ground that the trial court erred when the court refused to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) when appellate counsel failed to present the question on direct appeal, and neither the petitioner's nor the state's evidence tended to show a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

In a case in which the defendant was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery, the trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter when the defendant took the victim's bicycle at gunpoint, and when the defendant saw the victim on the telephone, the defendant began chasing the victim and shot the victim in the throat; this evidence did not show the sudden, violent, and irresistible passion required to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Milford v. State, 291 Ga. 347, 729 S.E.2d 352 (2012).

Evidence did not support a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as the evidence showed, at most, that the defendant and the victim, the defendant's wife, argued about the defendant's infidelity and that the defendant choked the victim the next morning. It appeared that a few hours had passed between the argument and the killing. Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 737 S.E.2d 673 (2013).

In an action charging the defendant with felony murder, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter and there was no evidence of provocative conduct by the victim sufficient to warrant such an instruction. Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013).

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder because there was no serious provocation that would have elicited a violent and irresistible passion in a reasonable person. Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 740 S.E.2d 115 (2013).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as there was no evidence of irresistible passion of provocation or any factual basis to support a finding of voluntary manslaughter given that the defendant shot into an unsuspecting crowd of strangers. Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 754 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

Trial court's failure to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not error, because the mere fact that the defendant and the victim argued before the defendant left the house, retrieved an axe, and began the attack did not support such an instruction, and there was no evidence that the victim had recently engaged in sexual relations with the victim's out-of-state spouse or taunted the defendant with such conduct. Brown v. State, 294 Ga. 677, 755 S.E.2d 699 (2014).

Evidence did not support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter as there was no evidence that the defendant killed the victim as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion or that the victims provoked the defendant, who shot unarmed victims from behind and chased the victims as the victims tried to flee. Moore v. State, 295 Ga. 709, 763 S.E.2d 670 (2014).

In defendant's trial for the murder of the defendant's estranged spouse and housemate, the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because, although the defendant and the spouse had ongoing difficulties, there was no evidence of any specific provocation at the time of the murders to generate a sudden and irresistible passion. Russell v. State, 295 Ga. 899, 764 S.E.2d 812 (2014).

Trial court's failure to charge on voluntary manslaughter was not plain error because there was no evidence that the other gang members had guns or shot at the appellant and the only shell casings at the scene were found where appellant was seen firing a gun, plus, even if words were exchanged prior to the event, as a matter of law, angry statements alone ordinarily did not amount to serious provocation within the meaning of a voluntary manslaughter charge. Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 663, 769 S.E.2d 901 (2015), overruled in part by Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

In a felony murder conviction, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter because no plain error existed as the evidence showed that the defendant had substantial time to cool down after the defendant learned that the victim was not going to procure the cigarettes for the defendant and before the defendant intentionally sought out the victim because the fact that the defendant discussed the matter with a cellmate, procured the shank, and then later went in search of the victim was evidence that the defendant acted in a rational and calculated fashion rather than solely as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706, 777 S.E.2d 435 (2015).

There was no evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter charge because the defendant's antagonistic relationship with the victim, the family's financial problems, and the victim's laughter when the defendant arrived home on the evening of the shooting were not the sorts of provocations that were sufficiently serious to provoke a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion that would compel a reasonable person to kill; and the defendant's anger was not triggered by an immediate argument and instead of just pulling out a gun and shooting, the defendant had to go to the defendant's bedroom to get a gun, unlock the hammer, load the gun, return with the gun to the living room, and shoot the unarmed, television-watching victim in the back of head. Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. 839, 778 S.E.2d 769 (2015).

Defendant was convicted of malice murder in connection with the fatal shooting of the defendant's spouse; the trial court did not err when the court refused to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter because, although the defendant pointed to some proof of potential provocation, the defendant's case presented not even a pretense of passion, much less that the defendant acted solely as the result of a passion that was sudden and irresistible. Harris v. State, 299 Ga. 642, 791 S.E.2d 32 (2016).

Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, because there was no evidence presented that the defendant shot the victim due to an irresistible passion. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. 185, 794 S.E.2d 105 (2016).

When the defendant was convicted of the murder of the defendant's sister, the victim, the defendant's request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter was properly denied because the defendant's testimony did not provide evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim due to a sudden, irresistible passion as the defendant stated repeatedly that the defendant stabbed the victim because the defendant believed that the victim had stolen the defendant's Social Security check; about an hour before the murder, the defendant stated the defendant's intention to kill the victim; and the defendant testified that the defendant was not angry with the victim when the defendant confronted the victim. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 804 S.E.2d 357 (2017).

Trial court did not commit plain error by limiting the jury's consideration of voluntary manslaughter such that the jury could find it a lesser-included offense of only malice murder, and not felony murder, as a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted at all because, although the defendant was distraught and angry on the night of the shooting for various reasons, including the death of the defendant's ex-wife and the defendant's argument with the ex-girlfriend, the victim's angry statements alone did not amount to serious provocation; and the defendant's acting out of fear of bodily harm from the victim was not the same as acting in the heat of passion, and only evidence of the latter supported a voluntary manslaughter conviction. Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 809 S.E.2d 765 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 294, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4842, 202 L. Ed. 2d 194 (U.S. 2018).

No jury charge on voluntary manslaughter was required as there was no evidence of sufficient provocation to excite the passions of a reasonable person because the victim's statements that the victim was in love with someone else and that the victim did not love the defendant any more were not sufficiently provocative to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter as the statements did not disclose adulterous, sexual conduct; and there was no evidence that the victim taunted the defendant with, bragged about, or even recounted to the defendant any sexual relations with another man. Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 815 S.E.2d 837 (2018).

When the defendant allegedly rejected a plea offer on voluntary manslaughter based on counsel's alleged advice to the defendant that the trial court would definitely charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, counsel was not ineffective because, even if an instruction on voluntary manslaughter had been given at trial as counsel requested, there was no guarantee and no allegation that counsel promised that the jury would return a verdict on the lesser included offense; and the defendant failed to show there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer but for counsel's advice. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. 475, 826 S.E.2d 89 (2019).

Trial court need not charge on involuntary manslaughter in course of lawful act, where the defense is based upon self-defense, which is fully charged to the jury. King v. State, 177 Ga. App. 788, 341 S.E.2d 307 (1986).

Instruction on involuntary manslaughter unwarranted.

- In a trial for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and battery, it was not error to refuse to charge on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a). Such a charge required an unlawful act that was not a felony, and the only such act supported by the evidence was the striking of the victim with a gun, which constituted the felony of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Moon v. State, 291 Ga. App. 499, 662 S.E.2d 283 (2008).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3, because a charge on involuntary manslaughter was not generally allowed when the defendant alleged self-defense as the defendant did regarding the shots the defendant fired at the victim after the first shot, and under the facts, the defense of accident as to the first shot did not require such a charge; a charge on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony was not required, given that the evidence relied upon by the defendant established either that the pistol discharged accidentally when the victim wrestled for the pistol's control or that the defendant intentionally fired the weapon. Davis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 831, 711 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

At defendant's trial for the murder of the defendant's spouse, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not required because words alone generally were not sufficient provocation, and several hours had passed between the spouse's confrontation and the shooting. Francis v. State, 296 Ga. 190, 766 S.E.2d 52 (2014).

Instruction on voluntary manslaughter unwarranted.

- Defendant, convicted of felony murder in the beating death of defendant's girlfriend's 17-month-old daughter, was not entitled to a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) because the defendant denied inflicting any injury on the child, much less the fatal harm. Bowie v. State, 286 Ga. 880, 692 S.E.2d 371 (2010).

Evidence did not support a charge on voluntary manslaughter as the defendant was admittedly upset after the defendant's dog died in the victim's care, but rather than acting on the news suddenly, the defendant sat around for a day drinking and making threats and, thus, the shooting was more akin to an act of revenge than an act of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. Brett v. State, 294 Ga. 30, 751 S.E.2d 59 (2013).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter because the defendant testified adamantly that the defendant shot the victim in self-defense; and there was no evidence that the defendant acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 538, 832 S.E.2d 402 (2019).

When killing is either murder or justifiable homicide, voluntary manslaughter should not be charged. McDaniel v. State, 209 Ga. 827, 76 S.E.2d 500 (1953).

When evidence of state would demand finding that homicide constituted murder, and evidence of defendant would demand finding that it constituted justifiable homicide, it is error for trial court to charge on subject of voluntary manslaughter. Landers v. State, 87 Ga. App. 446, 74 S.E.2d 383 (1953).

Trial court properly granted the state's requested charge on revenge for a past wrong based on the contention that defendant was motivated to shoot the victim as a result of the earlier altercations with the victim, and that such a shooting would lack justification and constitute murder; no harm resulted from the charge since the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. Gonzales v. State, 261 Ga. App. 366, 582 S.E.2d 524 (2003).

Justifiable homicide need not be charged in immediate connection with voluntary manslaughter.

- When law of voluntary manslaughter and law of justifiable homicide is involved, and instructions are given as to these legal rules, it is not error to fail to charge law of justifiable homicide in immediate connection with charge on general law of voluntary manslaughter. Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 368, 23 S.E.2d 399 (1942).

Failure to charge jury on justification and duty to retreat.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and two related counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime required reversal because the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the principle of no duty to retreat since the defense of justification was raised by the evidence, via defendant's testimony that the victim tried to stab defendant, and the state placed the issue of retreat before the jury. As a result of defendant making out a prima facie case of justification, the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1869, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 885 (Ga. 2008).

Cooling off period.

- In defendant's trial for felony murder in relation to the stabbing death of the victim during an altercation, the trial court adequately instructed the jury on "cooling time" in connection with its charge on voluntary manslaughter where it instructed the jury that the killing could be attributed to murder if there was an interval between the provocation and the killing "sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard"; the trial court was not required to charge the precise language of defendant's request as long as the charge that was given adequately covered the legal principle in question. Salyers v. State, 276 Ga. 568, 580 S.E.2d 240 (2003).

Conviction of voluntary manslaughter constitutes acquittal of murder.

- When one is charged with murder, in which malice must exist express or implied, but is convicted of voluntary manslaughter, in which malice is not an element, an erroneous charge on the question of malice is prima facie harmless to the accused and a new trial will not be granted therefor unless it is plainly shown that the erroneous charge wrongfully led to or influenced the verdict rendered. Jones v. State, 52 Ga. App. 83, 182 S.E. 527 (1935).

Refusal to charge upon principle of law which is solely applicable to crime of murder cannot be ground for reversing judgment where conviction is of voluntary manslaughter, which is tantamount to an acquittal of charge of murder. Goldsmith v. State, 54 Ga. App. 268, 187 S.E. 694 (1936).

Having been indicted for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter, verdict was an acquittal of charge of murder and defendant cannot complain of alleged errors in court's instructions upon law of murder. Cook v. State, 56 Ga. App. 375, 192 S.E. 631 (1937).

Lack of proper jury instruction resulted in improper conviction.

- When the original indictment charged the defendant with murder and with possessing a firearm during the commission of that murder, but the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, defendant was improperly convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as there was no instruction identifying voluntary manslaughter as a felony. Prather v. State, 259 Ga. App. 441, 576 S.E.2d 904 (2003).

It is not error to charge entire section even though part of the section may be inapplicable. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

Evidence of good character alone does not require charge on voluntary manslaughter in murder case, although good character may of itself constitute a defense in behalf of an accused so as to generate reasonable doubt of guilt. Swett v. State, 242 Ga. 228, 248 S.E.2d 629 (1978).

Unwarranted charge on manslaughter not ground for new trial unless evidence authorizes acquittal. Linder v. State, 132 Ga. App. 624, 208 S.E.2d 630 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901, 218 S.E.2d 629 (1975).

New trial cannot be for offense greater than convicted offense.

- If, in trial for murder, evidence does not involve voluntary manslaughter, but trial judge instructs on voluntary manslaughter and jury convicts on voluntary manslaughter, it is not cause for new trial if evidence demanded verdict of murder. If there is evidence, however, which would authorize acquittal, defendant is entitled to a new trial but only for offense of degree or lesser than that for which defendant stands convicted. Varnum v. State, 125 Ga. App. 57, 186 S.E.2d 485 (1971).

Voluntary manslaughter instruction unwarranted.

- When there is no evidence of appellant being in heat of passion, and there is evidence of self-defense which would authorize acquittal, it is reversible error to instruct jury in murder trial on law of voluntary manslaughter. Parham v. State, 135 Ga. App. 315, 217 S.E.2d 493 (1975).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as the defendant was not entitled to the jury's consideration of a voluntary manslaughter verdict at all because there was no evidence that the victim ever engaged in or recounted to the defendant any sexual conduct with others, and the victim's statement that the victim wanted to end the victim's relationship with the defendant was insufficient provocation to support a voluntary manslaughter charge. Rigsby v. State, 306 Ga. 38, 829 S.E.2d 93 (2019).

Jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter was inappropriate as the defendant was not entitled to the jury's consideration of a voluntary manslaughter verdict at all because, even accepting the defendant's dubious assertion that slight evidence indicated that the victim attempted suicide, and even assuming that witnessing someone's suicide attempt could - under some exceptional circumstances - provoke a reasonable person to kill the victim (rather than render the victim aid), there was no evidence that the circumstances in the defendant's case would have provoked a reasonable person to kill the victim. Rigsby v. State, 306 Ga. 38, 829 S.E.2d 93 (2019).

Voluntary manslaughter charge not erroneous.

- Trial court did not err in charging the jury that words alone were insufficient provocation to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter and that the jury had to find that words were accompanied by menaces in order to sustain a manslaughter verdict because there was no evidence that the victim recounted, taunted, or bragged about sexual involvement with other men; therefore, the circumstances regarding the victim's alleged adulterous conduct did not suffice to replace the requirement of menaces. Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 421, 721 S.E.2d 886 (2012).

Instruction allowed consideration of voluntary manslaughter.

- Trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury because, per the instructions, the jury could not find defendant guilty of murder without considering evidence of provocation or passion which might authorize a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Aeger v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 11, 2020).

Court should charge regarding both murder and voluntary manslaughter where doubt exists.

- On trial of murder case, if there is any evidence, however slight as to whether offense is murder or voluntary manslaughter, instruction as to law of both offenses should be given to jury. Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975); Birdsong v. State, 140 Ga. App. 719, 231 S.E.2d 813 (1976); Cochran v. State, 146 Ga. App. 414, 246 S.E.2d 431 (1978); Swett v. State, 242 Ga. 228, 248 S.E.2d 629 (1978); Powell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 674, 270 S.E.2d 6 (1980); Raines v. State, 247 Ga. 504, 277 S.E.2d 47 (1981); Tew v. State, 179 Ga. App. 369, 346 S.E.2d 833 (1986); Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 306, 348 S.E.2d 632 (1986); Wright v. State, 182 Ga. App. 570, 356 S.E.2d 531 (1987).

Charging both murder and manslaughter.

- Since the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, error in charge of an essential element of murder was harmless. Reid v. Green, 549 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

Jury was properly charged that the jury could not find the defendant guilty of felony murder if the jury concluded the underlying felony of aggravated assault was the result of passion and provocation, but it would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).

Charging that provocation by words alone will not excuse a person from the crime of murder did not confuse jury and was not improper, since the crime of murder is by statute part of the explanation of what constitutes voluntary manslaughter, where the court clearly explained that defendant was not charged with murder and gave a separate instruction on self-defense. Syms v. State, 175 Ga. App. 179, 332 S.E.2d 689 (1985).

Charging that homicidal act was "uncivilized" and constituted "murder."

- Jury charge on murder which incorporated language of a judicial decision to the effect that killing to prevent adultery "is uncivilized - this is murder" would have been harmful error only had jury been led thereby to believe that adultery could not be a factor in reducing the offense to voluntary manslaughter, which was the eventual verdict. Gibbs v. State, 174 Ga. App. 19, 329 S.E.2d 224 (1985).

Charge on physical disparity of defendant and victim properly refused.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to charge, as requested, on the physical disparity between the victim and the defendant as physical disparity would not generally be relevant when a defendant relies upon a defense of accident, and when self-defense was not placed in issue. Tew v. State, 179 Ga. App. 369, 346 S.E.2d 833 (1986).

Battered person syndrome.

- Because evidence established that defendant suffered from battered person syndrome, she was entitled to a requested instruction to explain to the jury the relevancy of such evidence as it related to the reasonableness of her belief that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary to defend herself against her husband's imminent use of unlawful force, and failure to give the instruction was reversible error. Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 486 S.E.2d 819 (1997), reversing Smith v. State, 222 Ga. App. 412, 474 S.E.2d 291 (1996).

Erroneous charge on murder is harmless where jury does not find murder.

- Even if it was error to explain "murder" for jury's better understanding when defendant was indicted only for voluntary manslaughter, it was harmless, since jury did not find murder. McMillan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 694, 278 S.E.2d 478 (1981).

Instructions as to malice murder and felony murder.

- It is permissible for the court to instruct the jury that it might consider voluntary manslaughter if it did not believe that the defendant was guilty of malice murder and if it did not believe that defendant was guilty of felony murder. This is not a "sequential" charge of the type disallowed by the holding in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992). Shaw v. State, 263 Ga. 88, 428 S.E.2d 566 (1993).

In a prosecution for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, although no error resulted from the trial court's issuance of a sequential jury charge, because the jury found in the defendant's favor on the defense of justification as to the malice murder count, the finding also applied to the felony murder charge. Thus, the trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of both felony murder and the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17, 655 S.E.2d 589 (2008).

Trial court did not plainly err as the trial court was not required to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter after each count of felony murder because, in the defendant's case, there was no evidence of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. Dent v. State, 303 Ga. 110, 810 S.E.2d 527 (2018).

Defendant could not challenge murder conviction where jury charge also included voluntary manslaughter.

- When the defendant requested a charge on voluntary manslaughter and when any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant could not successfully contend that evidence did not support the defendant's conviction, inasmuch as the defendant affirmatively offered the alternative theory of voluntary manslaughter to the jury. Speights v. State, 163 Ga. App. 738, 294 S.E.2d 650 (1982).

Spouse's confession of adultery is insufficient to authorize charge on voluntary manslaughter.

- When the wife had been suspected by her husband of infidelity, and stated to him she had been guilty of adultery, and expressed an intention to see her paramour again, and if thereupon her husband seized a gun and killed her, such facts are not sufficient to authorize submission to jury of theory of voluntary manslaughter, though charge on that subject was requested. Humphreys v. State, 175 Ga. 705, 165 S.E. 733 (1932).

Commission of homicide to prevent nonfelonious assault upon self.

- Facts and circumstances surrounding accused at time of homicide such as would excite fears of a reasonable man that some bodily harm, less than a felony, was imminent and impending, do not establish defense to voluntary manslaughter; but, on contrary, tend to establish fact that offense committed was voluntary manslaughter. Gresham v. State, 70 Ga. App. 80, 27 S.E.2d 463 (1943).

Harmless error.

- Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 was proper; although the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon, the evidence of malice in the instant case was not weak and it was highly probable that the error the trial judge committed in charging the jury did not contribute to the judgment, and therefore the error was harmless. Shirley v. State, 259 Ga. App. 503, 578 S.E.2d 163 (2003).

Since the defendant was convicted of malice murder, any error in charging the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only after finding a reasonable doubt as to the existence of malice murder was harmless. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).

Even if the evidence warranted a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, any error in failing to give the requested instruction was harmless because, even if the jury had found that the victim's conduct in the shower area was enough to provoke a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person, the evidence presented, including the defendant's own statements, showed that a significant period of time elapsed between the alleged provocation and the beating. Hatney v. State, 308 Ga. 438, 841 S.E.2d 702 (2020).

Sequential charge held reversible error.

- Because trial court's recharge improperly emphasized malice murder and felony murder, preventing the jury from giving full consideration to voluntary manslaughter, this amounted to reversible error; thus, defendant's felony murder conviction had to be reversed. Lewis v. State, 283 Ga. 191, 657 S.E.2d 854 (2008).

Application of forcible felony instruction.

- On appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of malice murder, the appeals court found that no error or prejudice resulted from the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an aggravated battery charge as a forcible felony in support of the defendant's justification claim, and affirmed the trial court's choice to charge on aggravated assault and rape, as the defendant failed to present evidence of any reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent the commission of an aggravated battery. Wicker v. State, 285 Ga. App. 294, 645 S.E.2d 712 (2007).

Charge should cover mutual combat where supported by any facts or circumstances. Harris v. State, 184 Ga. 382, 191 S.E. 439 (1937).

Failure to charge regarding mutual combat where warranted by testimony.

- When there is testimony as to facts and circumstances tending to show mutual combat, or mutual intention to fight, the court should charge law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. A failure so to charge will require the grant of the new trial. Cotton v. State, 201 Ga. 285, 39 S.E.2d 530 (1946).

Defendant's claim of error in mutual combat charge was rejected, as the charge redounded to the defendant's advantage as the charge enabled the jury to find a criminal defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Charge on mutual combat improper when sole defense was self-defense.

- When evidence supports defense that accused shot in self-defense, under fears of a reasonable man, but does not support theory of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat, and defense is based largely, if not exclusively, upon principle of killing under fears of a reasonable man, charge on law of mutual combat would be reversible error. Dudley v. State, 67 Ga. App. 256, 19 S.E.2d 833 (1942).

Distinction between mutual combat and self-defense.

- Essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, readiness, and intention upon part of both parties to fight. Reluctance, or fighting to repel unprovoked attack, is self-defense, and is authorized by law, and should not be confused with mutual combat. Odom v. State, 106 Ga. App. 60, 126 S.E.2d 472 (1962).

No error in failing to charge on mutual combat.

- When a murder defendant specifically requested the trial court not to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, the defendant could not be heard to complain on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to charge on mutual combat. Savior v. State, 284 Ga. 488, 668 S.E.2d 695 (2008).

Because the homeowner's testimony supported an instruction on defense of self or others, not an instruction on mutual combat or voluntary manslaughter, trial counsel was not ineffective in declining to pursue instructions on mutual combat or voluntary manslaughter. Bannister v. State, 306 Ga. 289, 830 S.E.2d 79 (2019).

Charge requested by defendant properly given.

- When a defendant was charged with felony murder, the trial court properly gave a charge on voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); the defendant had requested the charge, and the evidence supported the charge in that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant shot the victim in a fit of jealousy stemming from the defendant's romantic relationship with the victim's friend. Hayles v. State, 287 Ga. App. 601, 651 S.E.2d 860 (2007).

Whether evidence showed voluntary manslaughter and not murder is question for jury.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as well as the felony murder counts of the indictment because a witness saw the victim's empty hands in the air just as the defendant shot the victim; the jury was not required to find that the defendant acted in self-defense; and, although the defendant argued that the evidence showed that the defendant feared for the defendant's safety, and that such fear could be a circumstance sufficient to show voluntary manslaughter even if the jury rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense, the jury was instructed on voluntary manslaughter, and whether the evidence showed only voluntary manslaughter and not murder was a question for the jury. Dupree v. State, 295 Ga. 655, 763 S.E.2d 459 (2014).

Failure to charge jury on accident.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were reversed because the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defense of accident as requested when that defense was raised by the evidence, and the Court of Appeals could not find that it was highly probable that the failure to give the requested charge did not contribute to the verdict; at least slight evidence supported the theory that the defendant armed oneself with a knife in order to fend off the victim's attack with a pipe wrench and that although the defendant was prepared to intentionally stab the victim in self-defense, the defendant did not do so, but the victim lunged at the defendant and impaled oneself on the knife. Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210, 684 S.E.2d 356 (2009).

Failure to sua sponte charge self-defense and justification not error.

- Failure to sua sponte charge self-defense and justification was not error because the evidence established that the defendant shot the victim repeatedly after initially wounding the victim and while the victim begged for the victim's life. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Application

Mere words, however vile, will not justify taking of human life. Vun Cannon v. State, 208 Ga. 608, 68 S.E.2d 586 (1952).

Mere words will not authorize use of deadly weapon, nor reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Brown v. State, 175 Ga. 329, 165 S.E. 252 (1932).

Words, threats, menaces or contemptuous gestures of themselves will not reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter. Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 Am. Dec. 166 (1858); Ross v. State, 59 Ga. 248 (1877); Robinson v. State, 118 Ga. 198, 44 S.E. 985 (1903); Bird v. State, 128 Ga. 253, 57 S.E. 320 (1907); Slocumb v. State, 157 Ga. 131, 121 S.E. 116 (1923); Cotton v. State, 201 Ga. 285, 39 S.E.2d 530 (1946); Yearwood v. State, 201 Ga. 247, 39 S.E.2d 684 (1946); Vun Cannon v. State, 208 Ga. 608, 68 S.E.2d 586 (1952).

That killing is done in passion is not sufficient to make offense voluntary manslaughter; existence of passion must be justified. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938).

When the killing was not the result of sudden and irresistible passion, but rather was attributable to a deliberate act of aggression committed after a sufficient "cooling off" period, the jury was authorized to convict defendant of murder. Walden v. State, 268 Ga. 440, 491 S.E.2d 64 (1997).

Simply proving that accused was drunk, and killed another in passion, cannot reduce murder to manslaughter. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938).

Passion enough for voluntary manslaughter.

- To be entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 the evidence had to support the jury's finding that defendant was so influenced and excited that defendant reacted passionately in killing the victim. Oliver v. State, 274 Ga. 539, 554 S.E.2d 474 (2001).

Whether homicide was done with or without malice depends upon weapon used. Smith v. State, 73 Ga. 31 (1884).

Intent to kill presumed where defendant stabbed deceased in neck with pocketknife.

- While there can be neither murder nor voluntary manslaughter without intent to kill, where weapon used was a pocketknife, and defendant stabbed deceased in neck with it, intent to kill may be presumed. Wims v. State, 60 Ga. App. 551, 4 S.E.2d 418 (1939).

Stabbing a robber.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), and simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), were supported by evidence that the defendant and others chased down a robber in an unsavory part of town and the defendant stabbed the robber with a knife while the robbery victim shot the robber; under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of the defendant's accomplices about the defendant's participation in the crimes was adequately corroborated by each other's testimony and another eye witness. Woods v. State, 342 Ga. App. 301, 802 S.E.2d 822 (2017).

Under indictment for murder, jury may find prisoner guilty of lesser offense of manslaughter, either voluntary or involuntary, and verdict will be legal, although there is no count for manslaughter in indictment. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948).

Commission of homicide to avoid unlawful arrest constitutes manslaughter.

- Generally, to slay a person who without authority of law seeks to make an arrest for a misdemeanor, when motive of slayer is merely to avoid arrest, constitutes manslaughter and not murder. Plemmons v. State, 43 Ga. App. 344, 158 S.E. 630 (1931).

An illegal arrest is in law an assault by arresting officer upon person arrested, and constitutes legal justification for employment by person arrested of force sufficient in amount to avoid arrest and repel assault. If force employed in resisting such illegal arrest is in excess of that necessary, accused is accountable under the law for the excess; and if death results therefrom, the accused is guilty of manslaughter, unless there was an interval between officer's assault and application of excessive force which caused death sufficient for voice of reason and humanity to be heard, of which jury in all cases shall be the judges, in which latter case the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and be punished as murder. Napier v. State, 200 Ga. 626, 38 S.E.2d 269 (1946).

Commission of homicide to prevent nonfelonious assault upon self.

- If circumstances were such as to excite fear of a reasonable man that a nonfelonious assault was being made on that person, offense would be manslaughter. Johnson v. State, 72 Ga. 679 (1884).

Facts and circumstances surrounding accused at time of homicide such as would excite fears of a reasonable man that some bodily harm, less than a felony, was imminent and impending, do not establish defense to voluntary manslaughter; but, on contrary, tend to establish fact that offense committed was voluntary manslaughter. Gresham v. State, 70 Ga. App. 80, 27 S.E.2d 463 (1943).

If facts and circumstances at time accused killed deceased were such only as would excite fears of a reasonable man that some bodily harm, less than a felony, was imminent and impending, offense would be voluntary manslaughter. Henry v. State, 76 Ga. App. 139, 45 S.E.2d 230 (1947).

If one kills another under fears of reasonable man that deceased was manifestly intending to commit personal injury upon that person, amounting to felony, killing is justifiable homicide; if prisoner is under similar fears of some injury less than a felony, offense is manslaughter, and not murder. McDaniel v. State, 209 Ga. 827, 76 S.E.2d 500 (1953).

Admission of adultery coupled with conduct, or conduct alone may reduce homicide to manslaughter. Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 49 S.E.2d 867 (1948).

Admission of adulterous conduct, without more, will not reduce homicide to manslaughter. Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 49 S.E.2d 867 (1948).

Admission of prejudicial hearsay testimony held harmless error.

- Because the trial court's admission of prejudicial hearsay testimony regarding the victim's ministry ordination certificates was harmless error, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, a voluntary manslaughter conviction, as a lesser-included offense of murder, was upheld on appeal. Smith v. State, 283 Ga. App. 722, 642 S.E.2d 399 (2007).

Refusal to give charge on provocation caused by the victim's adulterous conduct was not error because defendant and the victim were not married and, in order to prove adultery, a marriage must be shown. Somchith v. State, 272 Ga. 261, 527 S.E.2d 546 (2000).

Circumstantial evidence.

- When the testimony was that the defendant fired the fatal shot after an argument with the man with whom the defendant was living, even assuming that the verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter was based solely on circumstantial evidence, the jury was authorized by the evidence presented to exclude other possible hypotheses as unreasonable. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 61, 510 S.E.2d 918 (1999), overruled on other grounds by Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Jury entitled to consider facts tending to establish voluntary manslaughter.

- In prosecution for murder it is the right of the jury to consider all of facts and circumstances, including those brought out solely in defendant's statement, in determining whether there would have been sufficient justification for excitement of passion as to reduce crime to voluntary manslaughter. Jackson v. State, 192 Ga. 373, 15 S.E.2d 484 (1941).

Questions of witness credibility are for the jury to decide.

- Whether defendant shot the victim with malice aforethought, out of passion, or out of justification in self-defense depended heavily on the credibility of the witnesses and decisions regarding credibility are exclusively for the jury. Lee v. State, 202 Ga. App. 708, 415 S.E.2d 290, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 906, 415 S.E.2d 290 (1992).

Verdict of voluntary manslaughter authorized if supported.

- Whenever in trial of one charged with murder there is any evidence, or anything in defendant's statement to jury, tending to show that homicide is voluntary manslaughter, a verdict finding defendant guilty of that offense is authorized. Plemmons v. State, 43 Ga. App. 344, 158 S.E. 630 (1931).

On trial of one indicted for murder, verdict finding accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter is authorized where, from evidence or from defendant's statement to jury, there is anything deducible which would tend to show that defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or which would be sufficient to raise doubt as to whether homicide was murder or voluntary manslaughter. Cobb v. State, 60 Ga. App. 194, 3 S.E.2d 212 (1939); Jones v. State, 71 Ga. App. 56, 30 S.E.2d 284 (1944); Culverson v. State, 73 Ga. App. 93, 35 S.E.2d 583 (1945).

Testimony of a witness that the defendant picked up a cinder block and threw it at the victim who was talking, but not fighting, with the defendant's parent, along with evidence that the victim died as a result of the block hitting the victim in the head was sufficient to support conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. App. 781, 584 S.E.2d 29 (2003).

There was sufficient credible evidence to support a jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of committing voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-2 and16-5-21, respectively, because there was testimony from three surviving witnesses that the defendant shot at their car as they drove by, killing one of the occupants; there was further testimony that the parties had a history of disputes between themselves, that the victim's sibling had fired a shot at the defendant earlier in the day, and the defendant's claim that the defendant thought that as the car drove by, the victim was reaching for a gun, was not found credible. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. App. 271, 605 S.E.2d 913 (2004).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter because: (1) the defendant and the victim had threatened to kill each other; (2) the victim died from a gunshot wound inflicted when the victim "stepped in" to a fight between the defendant and another person; (3) the victim did not have a gun or own a gun; and (4) the fatal head wound was inflicted from at least two-and-a-half to three feet away and rendered the victim unconscious. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter as: (1) the defendant, who was worried that the victim might cause trouble, got out a gun and set the gun in the bathroom stall; (2) when the victim returned, the defendant told the victim to leave; (3) eventually, the defendant told the victim to go away or the defendant would shoot the victim; (4) the defendant then got the gun, and when the victim opened the door and began to enter, the defendant shot the victim in the stomach; and (5) the victim fell to the ground, and the defendant shot the victim two more times; the jury was free to reject the defendant's claim that the defendant was merely protecting the defendant from the victim and that the use of deadly force was authorized. Lott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 373, 636 S.E.2d 102 (2006).

Reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter based on victim's alcohol use.

- With regard to the defendant's murder conviction for killing his wife, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's alcohol use to show the provocation necessary to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter because the defendant failed to present any evidence of the effect the victim's alcohol consumption had on her behavior on the day she was stabbed. Dunn v. State, 292 Ga. 359, 736 S.E.2d 392 (2013).

Voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense of felony murder.

- Verdict was not legally repugnant and the defendant's acquittal for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder did not bar the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder as the jury could have determined that the defendant fired at the codefendants as the result of sudden passion resulting from the codefendants' provocative act of shooting at the defendant and that the defendant was not guilty of malice murder because the defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Carter v. State, 331 Ga. App. 212, 770 S.E.2d 295 (2015), aff'd, 298 Ga. 867, 785 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 2016).

Voluntary manslaughter conviction valid despite jurors knowledge that victim was minister.

- Defendant's conviction of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder and felony murder, strongly supported the appellate court's conclusion that the jury was not unduly prejudiced by knowledge that the victim was a minister. Smith v. State, 283 Ga. App. 722, 642 S.E.2d 399 (2007).

Verdict of guilty of manslaughter means voluntary manslaughter.

- When upon trial on indictment for offense of murder, jury returns verdict of manslaughter, legal effect of such verdict is to find defendant guilty of highest grade of manslaughter, to-wit: voluntary manslaughter. Welch v. State, 50 Ga. 128, 15 Am. R. 690 (1873).

Verdict of voluntary manslaughter in murder trial is tantamount to acquittal of charge of murder. Cribb v. State, 71 Ga. App. 539, 31 S.E.2d 248 (1944).

Mutual combat.

- When participants engage with mutual intention to fight, offense may be voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. If evidence authorizes inference that killing occurred in such circumstances, it is the duty of the judge, even without request, to give in charge the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972).

The "sudden, violent and irresistible passion" referred to in statute is often discussed as a theory of mutual combat in situations involving physical confrontations between defendant and deceased. The essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, readiness, and intention by both parties to fight. Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203, 206 S.E.2d 37 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 239 Ga. 40, 235 S.E.2d 477 (1977).

Theory of mutual combat inapplicable when defendant had no desire to fight.

- Because the defendant testified that the defendant did not want to fight, and the defendant testified that the defendant acted in self-defense in the fight and did not intend to kill the victim, the evidence did not warrant an instruction regarding the law of mutual combat as a basis for finding the defendant committed only voluntary manslaughter. Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (2015).

Killing adulterous spouse or illicit lover.

- Spouse is never justified in taking life of adulterous spouse or illicit lover. This is murder and an instruction on justifiable homicide may not be given. Such homicides stand on the same footing as any other homicides. However, peculiar facts of given case may suggest passion and provocation within meaning of the voluntary manslaughter statute. Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171, 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977); Gibbs v. State, 174 Ga. App. 19, 329 S.E.2d 224 (1985).

Intentionally shooting towards another.

- Notion that when one intentionally fires a gun at another and kills the other, defendant's contention that defendant did not aim at victim and did not intend to kill, or to shoot the victim, makes killing involuntary manslaughter is rejected. McMillan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 694, 278 S.E.2d 478 (1981).

Defendant's assertion that defendant did not appreciate or remember what defendant did.

- Defendant's contention that defendant did not appreciate what defendant was doing and does not remember doing it does not expiate the act when evidence shows the defendant intentionally fired a gun at or towards defendant's spouse. McMillan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 694, 278 S.E.2d 478 (1981).

When the entire thrust of defendant's defense was that of accident and defendant testified that defendant did not want to fight, defendant's claim that defendant was engaged in mutual combat was rejected. Gladson v. State, 253 Ga. 489, 322 S.E.2d 45 (1984).

Manslaughter does not invoke felony-murder rule.

- Voluntary manslaughter, and felony of involuntary manslaughter where it applies, are not themselves felonies which will invoke felony murder rule as to death of main victim. Therefore, if a jury finds felonious manslaughter, they should not go on to reason that this offense, being itself a felony, turns the killing into a felony murder. The jury should be instructed in accordance with this principle. Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 232 S.E.2d 907 (1977).

Voluntary manslaughter is lesser included offense of felony murder. Young v. State, 141 Ga. App. 261, 233 S.E.2d 221 (1977).

With respect to jury instructions, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of felony murder under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1101 and 26-505 because an act done in passion involves a less culpable mental state than the state of real or imputed malice which is the foundation of the felony murder rule. Therefore, where facts warrant it, a charge on voluntary manslaughter may indeed be given in a felony-murder trial. Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 232 S.E.2d 907 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6 and16-5-1(c)).

Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 was improper as the defendant was also convicted of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) for the same transaction, and this would have subjected the defendant to multiple convictions and punishments for one crime, which would have placed the defendant in double jeopardy in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 did not require reversal of the defendant's conviction of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) when the underlying felony was possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as those offenses did not merge. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Burglary and voluntary manslaughter are not included within each other within the meaning of the former Code 1933, § 26-1601. Oglesby v. State, 243 Ga. 690, 256 S.E.2d 371 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1)).

Finding defendant guilty of manslaughter has legal effect of finding accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Demps v. State, 140 Ga. App. 90, 230 S.E.2d 97 (1976).

Denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal not error where there was evidence from which the jury could determine that defendant, while acting in the heat of passion, shot and killed a woman. Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983).

Evidence sufficient for voluntary manslaughter conviction.

- See Miller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 639, 305 S.E.2d 172 (1983); Rogers v. State, 251 Ga. 408, 306 S.E.2d 652 (1983); Shackelford v. State, 172 Ga. App. 577, 323 S.E.2d 874 (1984); King v. State, 177 Ga. App. 788, 341 S.E.2d 307 (1986); Luther v. State, 255 Ga. 706, 342 S.E.2d 316 (1986); Trenor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 351, 343 S.E.2d 408 (1986); Tew v. State, 179 Ga. App. 369, 346 S.E.2d 833 (1986); Mims v. State, 180 Ga. App. 3, 348 S.E.2d 498 (1986); Thompkins v. State, 180 Ga. App. 473, 349 S.E.2d 768 (1986); Hardeman v. State, 180 Ga. App. 632, 349 S.E.2d 839 (1986); Wright v. State, 182 Ga. App. 580, 356 S.E.2d 681 (1987); Yarborough v. State, 183 Ga. App. 198, 358 S.E.2d 484 (1987); Beal v. State, 186 Ga. App. 806, 368 S.E.2d 567 (1988); Jackson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 847, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Swailes v. State, 188 Ga. App. 553, 373 S.E.2d 825 (1988); Gerald v. State, 189 Ga. App. 155, 375 S.E.2d 134 (1988); Thomas v. State, 189 Ga. App. 774, 377 S.E.2d 539 (1989); Watkins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 325, 382 S.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 107 (1989); Nelson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 641, 445 S.E.2d 543 (1994). Miller v. State, 223 Ga. App. 311, 477 S.E.2d 430 (1996); Brown v. State, 225 Ga. App. 218, 483 S.E.2d 633 (1997); Young v. State, 229 Ga. App. 497, 494 S.E.2d 226 (1997); Johnson v. State, 229 Ga. App. 586, 494 S.E.2d 382 (1997); Smith v. State, 231 Ga. App. 677, 499 S.E.2d 663 (1998); Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 523 S.E.2d 868 (1999); McGuire v. State, 243 Ga. App. 899, 534 S.E.2d 549 (2000); Williams v. State, 245 Ga. App. 670, 538 S.E.2d 544 (2000); Leggon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 467, 549 S.E.2d 137 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter where eyewitness testimony showed that deceased had beaten defendant to the point where defendant twice begged for defendant's life. In addition, although the fatal shooting occurred after deceased had retreated, it nonetheless occurred within seconds of the fight and was sufficiently within the nexus of the altercation that it cannot be concluded a reasonable "cooling off" period had occurred. Woody v. State, 262 Ga. 327, 418 S.E.2d 35 (1992).

Evidence that armed defendant stood ground to engage in mutual combat supported defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a party to the crime where the actual homicide resulted when a shot fired by someone other than defendant strayed and killed a bystander. Coker v. State, 209 Ga. App. 142, 433 S.E.2d 637 (1993).

Evidence that defendant argued with the victim and followed the victim from the bar, that the victim's body was found near the bar, that defendant owned knives whose dimensions were consistent with the fatal stab wound, and that the victim's blood was found on defendant's clothes was sufficient to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Barrera-Palamin v. State, 250 Ga. App. 580, 551 S.E.2d 76 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), where defendant and the victim argued, the victim moved toward defendant and motioned as if the victim was going to throw a can of ravioli, and defendant then shot the victim in the neck; the jury was not required to believe defendant's self-serving testimony that the gun discharged accidentally. Gibbs v. State, 257 Ga. App. 38, 570 S.E.2d 360 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support voluntary manslaughter conviction after four witnesses testified: (1) defendant became angry when his brother approached him about mud defendant splattered on a truck his brother was going to drive; (2) defendant threatened his brother; and defendant shot his brother. Also the medical examiner testified that two gunshot wounds caused the brother's death, and that the bullets recovered from the body were of .22 to .25 caliber, defendant admitted firing his .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle while his brother was in the vicinity, defendant's rifle was not recovered after he admittedly disposed of it in the woods near his residence, and one of the witnesses denied having fired first at defendant. Lamar v. State, 256 Ga. App. 567, 568 S.E.2d 837 (2002).

Evidence that the defendant loaded the defendant's gun, approached the victim as the defendant arrived home, and shot the victim after stating "bye, bye" was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Carter v. State, 265 Ga. App. 44, 593 S.E.2d 69 (2004).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter as: (1) the victim assaulted the defendant, but turned away to leave the scene; (2) after the victim turned away, the defendant shot the victim in the back from two and one-half feet away; (3) the jury could reject the defendant's justification defense; (4) the defendant was identified as the assailant on the night of the shooting; and (5) the defendant admitted firing a gun at the victim. Nelloms v. State, 273 Ga. App. 448, 615 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter; evidence that the victim's love interest pointed a rifle toward the defendant's vehicle, as well as that the victim earlier acted aggressively toward the codefendants, could be considered sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter. Morris v. State, 276 Ga. App. 775, 624 S.E.2d 281 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, as an eyewitness testified that the defendant was the only person to pull out a weapon in a confrontation at a nightclub, that the defendant fired a weapon at the victim, who had previously struck the defendant's love interest, and at two other victims who were attempting to leave. Rodriguez v. State, 274 Ga. App. 549, 618 S.E.2d 177 (2005).

Defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction, as a lesser included offense of malice murder, was upheld on appeal, as: (1) the evidence presented supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; (2) the defendant waived any objection to the expert's testimony, and no inquiry into the number of jurisdictions recognizing the scientific principles on which such testimony was based was required; (3) by denying the defendant a new trial, the trial court implicitly concluded that no agreement existed with the defendant's cell mate; (4) the alleged hearsay challenged was not hearsay because it did not rely mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons; (5) any issue as to the erroneous admission of the victim's bones into evidence was waived on appeal; and (6) the trial court properly instructed the jury as to venue, and the jury was authorized to find, that if it could not determine where the crime was committed, proper venue was Jones County, Georgia, because the evidence showed that the crime might have been committed there. Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant was provoked by an attack on a sibling, and that the defendant had a history of abusive relationships with several men, the defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction of the male victim was supported by the evidence; moreover, the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's self-defense claim given evidence that the defendant chased and stabbed the victim after the victim fell. Breland v. State, 285 Ga. App. 251, 648 S.E.2d 389 (2007).

When the defendant engaged in a five-minute gun battle in an occupied apartment complex, resulting in the victim's death after a bullet passed through a wall and struck the victim, the defendant was properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder; the battle was clearly dangerous and life-threatening and connected to the homicide, and because Georgia has abolished the inconsistent verdict rule, the defendant's acquittal of aggravated assault charges did not require reversal. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. App. 845, 644 S.E.2d 913 (2007).

Evidence supported a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The defendant received a call from defendant's cousin's friend, who said that the victim had sexually harassed the friend and stolen clothing and other items; the defendant shot the victim after seeing the victim wearing some of the friend's clothing and confronting the victim; an eyewitness identified the shooter as "Dee," the defendant's street name; the friend identified defendant as the shooter; a bullet found in the defendant's apartment matched the bullet removed from the victim's body; and that type of bullet had not been made since 1998 and was no longer available for purchase. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 725, 662 S.E.2d 817 (2008).

Testimony of a defendant's child that the child saw the defendant stab the child's step-parent in the chest with a knife was sufficient to support the defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction. McKenzie v. State, 294 Ga. App. 376, 670 S.E.2d 158 (2008).

Evidence did not support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter as opposed to voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) because whether the defendant intended to kill the victim was a question for the jury and the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter based on the defendant's agitation when the victim would not return the defendant's money. Hamilton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 47, 676 S.E.2d 773 (2009).

Voluntary manslaughter conviction was supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which the defendant shot the victim seven times; among other things, there was evidence of the defendant's threats, and a witness testified that the victim walked away from the defendant and sat down in a car, and that the defendant shot into the car. Based on the location of the bullet holes in the car and the shell casings in the street, a police sergeant testified that the investigation revealed that the shooter was either standing at the window firing down or that the driver's door was open when the shooting occurred. Harris v. State, 298 Ga. App. 708, 680 S.E.2d 693 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. After the defendant and the victim got into a fight, the victim assaulted the defendant and stole the defendant's watch; the defendant left the scene and returned with a hidden screwdriver; and when the victim hit the defendant with a stick and a rake, the defendant stabbed the victim with the screwdriver in the neck, then chased the victim until the victim collapsed and died. Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (voluntary manslaughter), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (aggravated assault), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant's explanation of the killing was inconsistent with and not explanatory of the other direct and circumstantial evidence, and, therefore, the jury was permitted to reject such explanation and convict on the remaining evidence; the defendant's son testified on direct that the defendant told the son that the defendant shot the victim once, that the victim ran, that the defendant pursued, and that although the victim begged for the victim's life, the defendant shot the victim again, and there also was forensic evidence indicating that the defendant fired three more rounds into the victim's body. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter in that the defendant shot and killed the victim out of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Davis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 831, 711 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

Although a witness testified at trial that the defendant fired the first shot and that statement was contradicted by the statement the witness gave to police shortly after the incident, in which the witness stated that the victim attempted to sneak up on the defendant and fired the first shot at the defendant, who then fired back, evidence that the defendant pursued the victim and then laid in wait for the victim supported a voluntary manslaughter conviction. Mingledolph v. State, 324 Ga. App. 157, 749 S.E.2d 757 (2013).

Witness's testimony that the witness and the defendant had been smoking crack cocaine down the street from the victim's apartment, the defendant left the house to get more drugs, and the defendant returned agitated and told the witness an old man stole the defendant's crack but the defendant "took care of him," and testimony the victim went head first through a window after being burned supported convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Haymer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 874, 747 S.E.2d 512 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant supplied a car stocked with ammunition, accompanied others to the apartment in another car, remained parked outside while maintaining phone contact with the others after they went inside, and served as the getaway driver for a wounded individual was sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Platt v. State, 335 Ga. App. 49, 778 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

Evidence that the defendant admitted shooting a gun on the night in question in the area of the fight, witnesses observed the defendant shooting the gun, and the defendant was the only person identified as shooting a gun near the ballistic evidence matching the fatal bullet was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Nixon v. State, 349 Ga. App. 277, 826 S.E.2d 150 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault because the second defendant, the first defendant, and some of their friends engaged in a heated argument with the victim that escalated into a physical altercation, in which the defendants knocked the victim to the ground; the victim escaped from the fight by pulling a knife and cutting the second defendant; and the second defendant and the first defendant pulled handguns and fired at the victim as the victim tried to walk away with three bullets striking and ultimately killing the victim. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter because the jury was authorized to conclude from the evidence that the defendant was not justified in using deadly force to protect the defendant from the victim, who was intoxicated, unarmed, and outside of the locked bedroom. Aeger v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 11, 2020).

Adequate factual basis for guilty plea.

- Evidence that a defendant and the defendant's spouse had a violent relationship; that shortly before the spouse's death, the defendant told a witness the defendant was going to kill the spouse; that the defendant admitted being in the spouse's home on the day of the spouse's death; and that the defendant fled the state after the slaying, supported a finding under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 33.9 of an adequate factual basis for the defendant's Alford plea to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Tomlin v. State, 295 Ga. App. 369, 671 S.E.2d 865 (2008).

Edge rule did not apply to possession of firearm.

- Although the defendant was found guilty of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, the rule in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992) did not require that the defendant be convicted only of voluntary manslaughter because the defendant was also found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, and although the defendant acquired the gun several days before the murder for self defense against the victim, there was no evidence that the defendant possessed the gun as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. Griggs v. State, 304 Ga. 806, 822 S.E.2d 246 (2018).

Sentence vacated and resentencing ordered when the trial court erred by increasing a juvenile defendant's voluntary manslaughter sentence after the defendant had already begun serving the same, because the original sentence was final at the time it was imposed, and the defendant had no reason to believe otherwise; hence, the trial court's increased sentence constituted double jeopardy and could not stand. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 42, 614 S.E.2d 146 (2005).

While the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the three felony murder counts, the same act resulted in commission of all three of the underlying felonies and caused the victim's death, and the same evidence used to prove those felonies was also used to prove voluntary manslaughter; hence, because each underlying felony was integral to the killing and, indeed, could be merged into the voluntary manslaughter, the felony murder convictions had to be reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing on the voluntary manslaughter count. Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 635 S.E.2d 772 (2006).

Jury found voluntary manslaughter, guilty verdict for felony murder should have been vacated.

- In the defendant's trial for voluntary manslaughter, felony murder, and a firearm charge, in light of the jury's verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court should have vacated the jury's guilty verdict on the felony murder charge; the court directed various officials, offices, and organizations to come up with a plan addressing the long delays in appeals (in this case 20 years); here, the defendant had already served the maximum sentence for voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(b). Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 811 S.E.2d 420 (2018).

Because there was no reason to believe that the jury actually found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on distinct conduct causing the victim's death, the trial court did not err in applying the case law to vacate the felony murder count and to sentence the defendant for voluntary manslaughter. Gardhigh v. State, Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 821 (2020).

Evidence sufficient for malice murder, not voluntary manslaughter.

- Despite the defendant's contention that a voluntary manslaughter verdict should have been returned, given that the victim invited a violent confrontation, eyewitness testimony which established that the defendant was driving recklessly before confronting the victim with a knife, which led to the fatal stabbing, supported a malice murder conviction. Lonergan v. State, 281 Ga. 637, 641 S.E.2d 792 (2007).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for malice murder as the jury was instructed on malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter and the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant retrieved a pistol from the defendant's car and secreted the gun under the defendant's shirt; when the gun was pointed at the victim, the victim retreated, but the defendant shot the victim anyway; and when the victim was lying on the ground, the defendant walked to the victim and shot the victim until the pistol was empty. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 693, 653 S.E.2d 477 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's malice murder conviction. The jury was free to reject the defendant's claim that one of the victims fired the first shot, and evidence of a struggle between the defendant and one victim over control of a handgun did not require that there be a finding of voluntary manslaughter. As for intent, malice murder could be shown by evidence that the defendant acted when no considerable provocation appeared and when all the circumstances of the killing showed an abandoned and malignant heart. Allen v. State, 284 Ga. 310, 667 S.E.2d 54 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, instead of voluntary manslaughter, because, after the victim helped the victim's niece escape a fight with the defendant and tried to leave with the victim's niece, the defendant chased after the victim and the victim's fiance; the defendant used a bolt-action rifle to fire four shots into the victim from close range, killing the victim; the defendant was not acting solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person; and there was an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard. Sears v. State, 298 Ga. 400, 782 S.E.2d 259 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant told the victim that the defendant did not have any drugs to sell; the victim hit the defendant in the head with a brick; when the defendant and the defendant's cohorts later caught the victim, they took turns hitting, kicking, and stomping on the victim; the defendant pistol-whipped the victim before shooting the victim in the back; and there was an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, requiring that the killing be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as murder. Robinson v. State, 299 Ga. 648, 791 S.E.2d 13 (2016).

Evidence insufficient to support convictions.

- Defendant was entitled to reversal of the convictions for voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence of sudden provocation by the baby, nor was there evidence to support the inference that the defendant was so angry at the baby's father that the defendant acted out of an irresistible passion and killed the baby, permitting conviction based on the doctrine of transferred intent. Graham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 714, 740 S.E.2d 649 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 48 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 40 C.J.S., Homicide, § 112 et seq.

ALR.

- Acquittal on charge as to one as bar to charge as to the other, where one person is killed or assaulted by acts directed at another, 2 A.L.R. 606.

Homicide by wanton or reckless use of firearm without express intent to inflict injury, 5 A.L.R. 603; 23 A.L.R. 1554.

Drunkenness as affecting existence of elements essential to murder in second degree, 8 A.L.R. 1052.

Homicide by unlawful act aimed at another, 18 A.L.R. 917.

Homicide as affected by humanitarian motives, 25 A.L.R. 1007.

Absence of evidence supporting charge of lesser degree of homicide as affecting duty of court to instruct as to, or right of jury to convict of, lesser degree, 102 A.L.R. 1019.

Corpus delicti in prosecution for killing of newborn child, 159 A.L.R. 523.

Test or criterion of term "culpable negligence," "criminal negligence," or "gross negligence," appearing in statute defining or governing manslaughter, 161 A.L.R. 10.

Homicide: causing one, by threats or fright, to leap or fall to his death, 25 A.L.R.2d 1186.

Who other than actor is liable for manslaughter, 95 A.L.R.2d 175.

Homicide based on killing of unborn child, 40 A.L.R.3d 444, 64 A.L.R.5th 671.

Homicide predicated on improper treatment of disease or injury, 45 A.L.R.3d 114.

Homicide by withholding food, clothing, or shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.

Spouse's confession of adultery as affecting degree of homicide involved in killing spouse or his or her paramour, 93 A.L.R.3d 925.

Judicial abrogation of felony-murder doctrine, 13 A.L.R.4th 1226.

Accused's right, in homicide case, to have jury instructed as to both unintentional shooting and self-defense, 15 A.L.R.4th 983.

Propriety of manslaughter conviction in prosecution for murder, absent proof of necessary elements of manslaughter, 19 A.L.R.4th 861.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge of voluntary manslaughter to jury in state murder prosecution - Twenty-first century cases, 3 A.L.R.6th 543.

Sufficiency of evidence to support homicide conviction where no body was produced, 65 A.L.R.6th 359.

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