2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 4 - Criminal Attempt, Conspiracy, and Solicitation
§ 16-4-8. Conspiracy to Commit a Crime

A person commits the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy. A person convicted of the offense of criminal conspiracy to commit a felony shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than one-half the maximum period of time for which he could have been sentenced if he had been convicted of the crime conspired to have been committed, by one-half the maximum fine to which he could have been subjected if he had been convicted of such crime, or both. A person convicted of the offense of criminal conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor shall be punished as for a misdemeanor. A person convicted of the offense of criminal conspiracy to commit a crime punishable by death or by life imprisonment shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 808; Code 1863, § 4387; Code 1868, § 4425; Code 1873, § 4497; Code 1882, § 4497; Penal Code 1895, § 118; Penal Code 1910, § 120; Code 1933, § 26-1901; Code 1933, § 26-3201, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 857, § 14; Ga. L. 1977, p. 601, § 2.)

- For article, "A comprehensive analysis of Georgia RICO," see 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev 537 (1993). For annual survey of real property law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2005).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• What Constitutes Conspiracy
• Indictment
• Venue
• Jury Charge

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions rendered prior to codification of this principle by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Conspiracy statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8, is not unconstitutionally vague because the statute's term "overt act" unambiguously refers to a specific type of open or manifest act made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a crime. Bradford v. State, 285 Ga. 1, 673 S.E.2d 201 (2009).

Conspiracy to defraud the state, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-21(a), is distinct from O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8, which is the general conspiracy statute. Gordon v. State, 181 Ga. App. 391, 352 S.E.2d 582 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 257 Ga. 335, 359 S.E.2d 634 (1987).

Offense of conspiracy to defraud a state or political subdivision does not merge with the underlying offense of theft by taking. English v. State, 202 Ga. App. 751, 415 S.E.2d 659 (1992).

Crime of conspiracy, or of criminal attempt, can only be defined in conjunction with a second criminal section. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).

Crime of conspiracy can be defined only in conjunction with substantive crime involved in it. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).

- It was intent of the legislature to make conspiracy itself a separate crime only in cases where crime conspired to be committed had not in fact been committed. Scott v. State, 229 Ga. 541, 192 S.E.2d 367 (1972); Rowe v. State, 166 Ga. App. 836, 305 S.E.2d 624 (1983).

It was intent of legislature to make conspiracy itself a separate crime only in cases where crime conspired to be committed had not in fact been committed, that is, where conspiracy had been "nipped in the bud." Crosby v. State, 232 Ga. 599, 207 S.E.2d 515 (1974); Roberts v. State, 242 Ga. 634, 250 S.E.2d 482 (1978).

One cannot be tried for conspiracy when the object of the conspiracy is completed. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983).

Law of conspiracy can apply only to subjects capable of entertaining a criminal intent. Sweat v. State, 119 Ga. App. 646, 168 S.E.2d 654 (1969).

Each participant in a conspiracy is responsible for acts of the others. Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980).

When a conspiracy is shown, the act of one becomes the act of all, insofar as furtherance of conspiracy is concerned; and each is as fully responsible for acts of the others in carrying out common purpose as if that one personally had committed the acts. Thrift-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 154 Ga. App. 344, 268 S.E.2d 397 (1980).

Once common design is shown by evidence tending to indicate that individuals have associated themselves together to do an unlawful act, any act done in pursuance of that association by any one of the associates, would, in legal contemplation, be the act of each of them. Greene v. State, 155 Ga. App. 222, 270 S.E.2d 386 (1980).

Act of one conspirator is considered to be act of all conspirators. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981).

- After conspiracy is formed, if a party joins therein, knowing of its existence and purpose, that party becomes as much a party thereto as if the person had been an original member. Willson v. Appalachian Oak Flooring & Hdwe. Co., 220 Ga. 599, 140 S.E.2d 830 (1965) (decided under prior law).

- Conspiring with another to commit an offense may be an element in the guilt of one charged as an accessory, or in misdemeanors, even of a principal. Crow v. State, 52 Ga. App. 192, 182 S.E. 685 (1935) (decided under prior law).

One who conspires to commit murder does so with malice aforethought. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).

- If during commission of crime a coconspirator commits murder, it is not necessary that the murder be part of original design, but it is enough if it is an incidental, probable consequence of the execution of conspirators' design and should appear at the moment to one of the participants to be expedient for the common purpose, and intent of actual slayer is imputable to the coconspirators. Lumpkin v. State, 176 Ga. 446, 168 S.E. 241 (1933) (decided under prior law).

Evidence of a subsequent successful conspiracy by defendant to murder her husband had a logical connection to the crime for which she was being tried, a separate conspiracy to murder him. Such evidence tends to show intent and state of mind, and certainly tends to establish conspiracy to murder the same victim. Buffington v. State, 171 Ga. App. 919, 321 S.E.2d 418 (1984).

- Evidence that the defendant sent the co-conspirator e-mails entreating the co-conspirator to help the defendant out of the hell the defendant was living in, that the defendant made specific references to shooting and killing the victim, and the co-conspirator had access to a drug found in the victim's blood that had never been prescribed to the victim supported the convictions and denial of a directed verdict. Thornton v. State, 331 Ga. App. 191, 770 S.E.2d 279 (2015), aff'd, 298 Ga. 709, 784 S.E.2d 417 (2016).

- Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's conviction for a conspiracy offense that served as a predicate for conviction for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., based on the appellant's rank in the gang, statements to fellow gang members about killing violators of gang rules, communications with gang members who were critical of the victim, coupled with statements that somebody's got to die, and the appellant's trip to meet with gang members about the victim. Chavers v. State, 304 Ga. 887, 823 S.E.2d 283 (2019).

- Even though the crimes of conspiracy and possession of tools for the commission of a crime do not merge as a matter of law, because the form of the indictment required proof of the possession of tools in order to prove the conspiracy, the offenses merged as a matter of fact. Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 377, 523 S.E.2d 581 (1999).

- Conspiracy is merged into greater crime where evidence shows without dispute that crime charged was actually committed, or that all essential acts constituting crime were committed. Dutton v. State, 228 Ga. 850, 188 S.E.2d 794 (1972); Crosby v. State, 232 Ga. 599, 207 S.E.2d 515 (1974).

- Because attempted burglary and conspiracy to commit armed robbery each required different statutory elements and, thus, required proof of a fact the other did not, the offenses did not merge. Owens v. State, 353 Ga. App. 616, 838 S.E.2d 909 (2020).

- When conspiracy contemplates commission of more than one substantive offense, and there are separate conspiracy statutes separately punishing a conspiracy to commit each offense, a separate conviction under each conspiracy statute may be authorized. Price v. State, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981).

- When multiple overt acts are committed pursuant to what is albeit a single conspiracy, and each overt act constitutes a separate substantive offense, there may be multiple convictions for multiple substantive offenses. Price v. State, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981).

Charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and trafficking in marijuana could be joined for trial, over objection, where the charges arose from the same conduct. Bridges v. State, 195 Ga. App. 851, 395 S.E.2d 30 (1990).

- Trial court did not err by refusing to vacate the conviction for conspiracy to commit murder on the basis that the verdict was inconsistent or irreconcilable with the acquittal of a co-conspirator. Thornton v. State, 331 Ga. App. 191, 770 S.E.2d 279 (2015), aff'd, 298 Ga. 709, 784 S.E.2d 417 (2016).

- Improper conviction of multiple counts of conspiracy indictment is harmless error where defendant's sentence is within legal limits for conviction of a single conspiracy. Price v. State, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981).

When defendants are indicted under former Code 1933, § 26-3201, the maximum punishment provisions apply. Jones v. State, 135 Ga. App. 893, 219 S.E.2d 585 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8).

- Juvenile defendant was sentenced as an adult to 10 years' imprisonment after being convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery in a criminal episode in which a person was killed. As the 10-year sentence was within the limits set by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-8-41(b), and there was no showing that the sentence was overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense, the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga. App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0426, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. 2009).

- Even if it was error to sentence the defendant on two conspiracy counts, the error was harmless because the sentence was within the legal limits for conviction of a single conspiracy. Dorsey v. State, 331 Ga. App. 486, 771 S.E.2d 167 (2015).

- Sentencing provisions in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33, not the general provisions in O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8, are applicable to the offense of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana. Raftis v. State, 175 Ga. App. 893, 334 S.E.2d 857 (1985).

- When the indictment charged "Conspiracy to Possess and Sell Marijuana" a violation of provisions of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 16) is properly charged and maximum punishment provisions of it apply. Jones v. State, 135 Ga. App. 893, 219 S.E.2d 585 (1975).

Because conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine was a crime penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code did not apply; thus, under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30 and16-13-33, which were mutually exclusive, the defendant was properly sentenced to 30 years, which was the maximum sentence allowed. McWhorter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 624, 621 S.E.2d 571 (2005).

- When the clear language of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33 precludes the imposition of a fine in conjunction with a prison sentence for conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., the preclusion applies equally to attempt and conspiracy; therefore, § 16-13-33 supplanted the general punishment provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8 for attempt or conspiracy to possess controlled substances. Watson v. State, 276 Ga. 212, 576 S.E.2d 897 (2003).

Since under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33, a conviction for criminal attempt to violate the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., does not authorize the imposition of a fine; therefore, Watson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 789 (2002) is reversed to the extent that it holds to the contrary. Watson v. State, 276 Ga. 212, 576 S.E.2d 897 (2003).

- If in carrying out design of conspirators, overt acts are done, causing legal damage, the person so damaged has a right of action. Patterson-Pope Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 66 Ga. App. 41, 16 S.E.2d 877 (1941).

Conspiracy alone, without overt act, will not support a civil cause of action. Patterson-Pope Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 66 Ga. App. 41, 16 S.E.2d 877 (1941).

- Conspiracy to commit arson, without more does not naturally, necessarily, and probably result in the murder of one coconspirator by another; thus, defendant was improperly convicted of murder because although defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, the subsequent murder of one coconspirator by another to keep the murdered coconspirator quiet was not reasonably foreseen as a necessary, probable consequence of the arson conspiracy. Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457, 588 S.E.2d 691 (2003).

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of false statements under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 and conspiracy to commit theft by shoplifting under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8 as the coconspirator testified as to the defendant's request for specific items to be stolen, the special agent testified about the defendant's false statements, and the defendant gave a statement admitting to the conduct; the testimony of the coconspirator and of the special agent established the elements of the offenses, and the jury, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), had the right to disbelieve the defendant's testimony to the contrary. Acey v. State, 281 Ga. App. 197, 635 S.E.2d 814 (2006).

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the codefendants' convictions for theft by receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving stolen property since the testimony was sufficient to show that items of value, owned by someone other than the codefendants, were recovered from a warehouse over which the codefendants had control. A witness's misstatements concerning the specific address of the warehouse did not render the evidence insufficient as to the location from where the stolen property was recovered. Robinson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (2011).

- State proved that the defendant possessed the intent required to commit the predicate aggravated assault and conspiracy felonies for the felony murder conviction because evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to conclude that the defendant, with a coparty and coconspirator, intended to rob the victim using a deadly weapon, that the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury as a result of their intentional acts, and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011).

Cited in Cross v. State, 124 Ga. App. 152, 183 S.E.2d 93 (1971); Patterson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 753, 191 S.E.2d 584 (1972); Sak v. State, 129 Ga. App. 301, 199 S.E.2d 628 (1973); Porterfield v. State, 137 Ga. App. 449, 224 S.E.2d 94 (1976); Barner v. State, 139 Ga. App. 50, 227 S.E.2d 874 (1976); Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977); Mace v. State, 144 Ga. App. 496, 241 S.E.2d 615 (1978); Hammock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 339, 246 S.E.2d 392 (1978); Booker v. State, 242 Ga. 773, 251 S.E.2d 518 (1979); Dasher v. State, 149 Ga. App. 740, 256 S.E.2d 106 (1979); Evans v. State, 161 Ga. App. 468, 288 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Hamilton v. State, 162 Ga. App. 620, 292 S.E.2d 473 (1982); State v. Lewis, 249 Ga. 565, 292 S.E.2d 667 (1982); Robinson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 652, 297 S.E.2d 751 (1982); Staton v. State, 165 Ga. App. 572, 302 S.E.2d 126 (1983); Minton v. State, 167 Ga. App. 114, 305 S.E.2d 812 (1983); Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395 (11th Cir. 1984); Simmons v. State, 174 Ga. App. 171, 329 S.E.2d 312 (1985); Robinson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 769, 334 S.E.2d 358 (1985); Duren v. State, 177 Ga. App. 421, 339 S.E.2d 394 (1986); Chase v. State, 179 Ga. App. 71, 345 S.E.2d 149 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 179 Ga. App. 434, 346 S.E.2d 881 (1986); Rowe v. State, 181 Ga. App. 492, 352 S.E.2d 813 (1987); Skinner v. State, 182 Ga. App. 370, 355 S.E.2d 726 (1987); Kelleher v. State, 185 Ga. App. 774, 365 S.E.2d 889 (1988); Hargrove v. State, 188 Ga. App. 336, 373 S.E.2d 44 (1988); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 401 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Lyons v. State, 214 Ga. App. 709, 448 S.E.2d 777 (1994); Burnette v. State, 241 Ga. App. 682, 527 S.E.2d 276 (1999); Pinkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 737, 534 S.E.2d 192 (2000); Granados v. State, 244 Ga. App. 153, 34 S.E.2d 886 (2000); Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003); Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 630 S.E.2d 783 (2006); Walker v. State, 289 Ga. App. 879, 658 S.E.2d 375 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 780 S.E.2d 376 (2015); Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584 (2013); Sanchez-Villa v. State, 341 Ga. App. 264, 799 S.E.2d 364 (2017).

Evidence supported conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute where: (1) the defendant was found in a shed with 70 pieces of crack cocaine, scales, razors, and baggies; (2) the defendant's pockets contained a large amount of cash; (3) the codefendant, the shed's occupant, fled from the police and was found with additional crack cocaine; and (4) the defendant's car contained a case for holding scales and additional baggies. King v. State, 275 Ga. App. 450, 620 S.E.2d 570 (2005).

Essence of conspiracy under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8 is an agreement, and that agreement (unlike its meaning in contract law) may be a mere tacit understanding. Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995).

- While ordinarily the question of whether or not a conspiracy was entered into is a question of fact exclusively for consideration of jury, this question, like other questions of fact, is subject to the scintilla rule and unless there is some evidence to show a conspiracy, a conviction or a finding of fact which has as its basis a conspiracy ought not to be allowed to stand. Brewer v. State, 129 Ga. App. 118, 199 S.E.2d 109 (1973), overruled on other grounds, State v. Folk, 238 Ga. App. 206, 521 S.E.2d 194 (1999).

Existence of conspiracy may appear from direct proof or by inference as a deduction from conduct which discloses a common design on part of persons charged to act together for accomplishment of unlawful purpose. McGinty v. State, 134 Ga. App. 399, 214 S.E.2d 678 (1975); Jerdine v. State, 137 Ga. App. 811, 224 S.E.2d 803 (1976); Tookes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 423, 283 S.E.2d 642 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1982).

Conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, such as conduct evidencing common design of participants. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and on occasion without actually placing one of the parties as present at scene of crime. Byrd v. State, 156 Ga. App. 522, 275 S.E.2d 108 (1980).

Conspiracy consists in corrupt agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. Tookes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 423, 283 S.E.2d 642 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1982).

To have a conspiracy, there must be an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983).

It is not necessary to show a preliminary antecedent agreement. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

It is not necessary to prove an express compact or agreement among parties. It need not appear that parties have ever met together, either formally or informally, and entered into any explicit formal agreement; it is not necessary that it appear either by words or writing that defendants formulated their unlawful objects. It is sufficient that two or more persons in any manner, either positively or tacitly, come to a mutual understanding that they will accomplish the unlawful design. Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972).

While essential element of charge is the common design or purpose between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, it need not appear that parties met together either formally or informally or that they entered into a formal agreement. Neither is it essential that conspirators formulated their unlawful objective either by words or writings. It is sufficient that two or more persons in any manner either expressly or tacitly came to a mutual understanding that they would accomplish the unlawful design. Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to purchase marijuana because the defendant had previously gone to the seller's home to purchase marijuana, the defendant accompanied the codefendant to the seller's home when the latter went to purchase marijuana, the defendant entered the neighbor's porch with the codefendant where the seller was selling marijuana, drugs and money were visible on the porch, the defendant remained with the seller and the codefendant as they discussed the sale of marijuana for $20 and $10, and the defendant blocked the seller's friend's exit as the friend was leaving the residence. Hunter v. State, 355 Ga. App. 520, 844 S.E.2d 858 (2020).

- Type of agreement necessary to form a conspiracy is not the "meeting of the minds" necessary to form a contract and may be a mere tacit understanding between two or more people that the people will pursue a particular criminal objective. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983).

- Agreement relating to the sale or delivery of amounts of less than 28 grams cannot support a conviction of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, even if the amounts sold over time amount to 28 grams or more, as the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) requires a transaction involving 28 grams or more; additionally, the coconspirators must act "together with" one another to commit the crime of trafficking. Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga. App. 44, 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003).

- If evidence shows that defendants acted with a common intent and purpose, and that things which were proved to have happened were within scope of this common intent and purpose, this amounts to a conspiracy. Garmon v. State, 122 Ga. App. 61, 176 S.E.2d 218 (1970).

- Jury is authorized to conclude that a conspiracy existed by proof of acts and conduct of parties, and from nature of acts done, relation of parties and interests of alleged conspirator. Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972).

Presence, companionship and conduct before and after commission of alleged offense may be considered by jury and are circumstances which may give rise to inference of existence of conspiracy. Stroud v. State, 154 Ga. App. 852, 270 S.E.2d 69 (1980); Price v. State, 155 Ga. App. 206, 270 S.E.2d 203 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981).

Proof that crime has been committed does not necessarily prove end of conspiracy so as to render acts and declarations of coconspirators after that time inadmissible against other coconspirators, as a conspiracy may be kept open for various purposes. Hawkins v. State, 80 Ga. App. 496, 56 S.E.2d 315 (1949) (decided under prior law).

Conspiracy may extend beyond actual commission of criminal offense charged. It may expressly or impliedly include such matters as concealing the crime, concealing or suppressing evidence, taking means to prevent or defeat prosecution, possession and disposition of the spoils - depending on nature and extent of agreement as expressly or impliedly entered into by alleged conspirators. Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 11 S.E.2d 350 (1940); Kent v. State, 105 Ga. App. 565, 125 S.E.2d 96 (1962) (decided under prior law).

Knowledge of existence or acquiescence in conspiracy does not render one part of it; there must exist some element of affirmative cooperation or at least an agreement to cooperate. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979).

- Whether object of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case the agreement that constitutes the conspiracy, and if there is only one agreement there can be only one conspiracy. Price v. State, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981).

- In a "wheel" conspiracy, there is usually a "hub," or common source of the conspiracy, who deals individually with different persons, "spokes," who do not know each other. It is more difficult to infer an agreement among these spokes than among the links of a "chain" conspiracy because they are less likely to have a community of interest or reason to know of each others' existence, since one spoke's success is usually not dependent on the other spokes' success but instead on the spokes' dealings with the hub. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983).

Conspiracy is deemed to progress until its ultimate purpose is accomplished and may include acts performed and declarations made after commission of crime, and conspiratorial efforts to conceal facts of crime and identity of perpetrators are a continuance of a conspiracy. Timberlake v. State, 158 Ga. App. 125, 279 S.E.2d 283 (1981).

- Possessing tools for the commission of a crime, itself a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-20(a), is an overt act upon which an armed robbery conspiracy conviction may be based. Fuller v. State, 165 Ga. App. 55, 299 S.E.2d 397 (1983).

- Evidence that the defendant confessed to entering the apartment to burglarize it, the apartment was occupied, and the defendant and the accomplices took items from the apartment was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery because evidence was presented that the defendant and a co-defendant entered a restaurant to rob the restaurant and shot two employees of the restaurant. In a statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the defendant entered the restaurant with a handgun to rob the restaurant, but the defendant claimed that the defendant heard gunshots and left the restaurant, while the co-defendant gave a similar statement to the police. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant's claim that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-4-9, the defendant renounced and abandoned the conspiracy and that a co-conspirator fatally shot the victims was contradicted by the physical evidence at trial; shell casings from two guns were found at the murder scene and in positions indicating that there were two weapons fired by different individuals. Bailey v. State, 291 Ga. 144, 728 S.E.2d 214 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery because the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer that the defendant entered into an agreement with the other codefendants to carry out a plot to recover drugs and money from the victim's home. In the week prior to the incident, a codefendant repeatedly met the defendant to discuss "retrieving" drugs and cash from the victim's home, on the night of the home invasion defendant left the hotel with the other co-defendants in a white truck, which was identified as being at the scene of the incident, and the defendant was present with the other co-defendants in the hotel room after the incident. Stokes v. State, 355 Ga. App. 565, 845 S.E.2d 305 (2020).

Given that the defendant was accompanied by two other people, one masked, who had guns and who stood outside the door's line of sight, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant intended to commit armed robbery and that the defendant had conspired with the other people to do so. Owens v. State, 353 Ga. App. 616, 838 S.E.2d 909 (2020).

Writing and signing a contract are overt acts to effect the object of a conspiracy to commit murder. McCright v. State, 176 Ga. App. 486, 336 S.E.2d 361 (1985).

Coconspirator's letters, written during existence of conspiracy, tending to show acts pursuant to conspiracy, are admissible. Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935).

- Acts, conduct, and sayings of one conspirator during pendency of wrongful act, not alone in its actual perpetration but also in its subsequent concealment, were admissible against another conspirator. Bragg v. State, 52 Ga. App. 69, 182 S.E. 403 (1935).

- When intent is material, other acts of same character, at about same time, tending to show common purpose and design to defraud, although such acts were committed by coconspirator, are admissible. Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935).

- Former Code 1933, § 26-3201 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8) and substantive offense of murder, former Code 1933, § 26-1101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1), create crime of conspiracy to commit murder. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction on a charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by showing that defendant conspired with defendant's nephew and another man to knowingly possess 28 grams or more of cocaine; defendant performed an overt act by picking up the cocaine from the nephew; by instructing the other man to drive slower to avoid arrest because they had cocaine in the car; and by trying to conceal the cocaine in the car after the driver was stopped for speeding. Smith v. State, 253 Ga. App. 131, 558 S.E.2d 455 (2001).

State did not have to prove that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine to obtain a conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine, and the state supreme court rejected defendant's argument that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine had to be reversed because the state did not offer evidence to prove the quantity or purity of the cocaine allegedly involved. Hendricks v. State, 277 Ga. 61, 586 S.E.2d 317 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of a conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, based on the defendant's understanding with the defendant's spouse regarding the spouse's drug sales, and testimony of drug enforcement agents and co-indictees as well as drugs, money, and drug paraphernalia obtained during a search of the residence defendant shared with the spouse, who had engaged in three sales of this contraband. Williamson v. State, 300 Ga. App. 538, 685 S.E.2d 784 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0387, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 191 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine over 400 grams in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-31(e)(3) because an accomplice testified that the defendant supplied the accomplice with several pounds of methamphetamine, and that testimony was amply corroborated by other evidence in the record; the defendant's translator testified that the translator retrieved $15,000 from the accomplice as payment for fronted methamphetamine, police officers recovered $15,000 in cash from the translator upon leaving the accomplice's residence, and there were recorded conversations between the accomplice, the defendant, and the translator in which they discussed methamphetamine transactions. Melesa v. State, 314 Ga. App. 306, 724 S.E.2d 30 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant possessed marijuana with intent to distribute under a conspiracy theory because the defendant admitted to agreeing to drive a passenger to pick up the marijuana in exchange for the crack cocaine, which demonstrated an agreement between the defendant and the passenger; both the defendant and the passenger committed acts in furtherance of the agreement because the defendant drove the passenger to pick up the marijuana, and the passenger acquired the marijuana. Stokes v. State, 317 Ga. App. 435, 731 S.E.2d 118 (2012).

Because the state failed to prove the essential element of an agreement between the defendant and the occupants of a stash house in a drug conspiracy trial, since the only evidence was that a purchase of drugs was to take place, the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-31(a)(1) was reversed. Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773 (2013).

- Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of bringing stolen property to Georgia, eluding an officer, and possessing marijuana as a party, if not as a conspirator since: (1) the defendant discussed with the defendant's love interest what would happen if they were apprehended by the police; (2) the love interest gave the defendant a handgun after the love interest stole a new gun and the defendant packed two guns with the defendant's personal items and the ski masks; (3) the defendant suspected that the truck was stolen, refused to ask about its origin, saw the stolen gun on the seat of the truck, observed two gas drive-offs, ate stolen food, smoked shared marijuana repeatedly, and sat next to the glove compartment where the marijuana lay; and (4) the defendant was silent during the police pursuits, saw the defendant's love interest retrieve a stolen handgun just prior to an assault of a police officer, did not hinder the love interest or warn the police, lied to the police to cover up the matter, and referred to the entire affair as having "fun for a minute." Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308 (2017).

- Trial court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury on possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana because the offense of possession of marijuana was not a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana as the facts necessary to prove each offense were different. Hunter v. State, 355 Ga. App. 520, 844 S.E.2d 858 (2020).

- Conviction for conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine was not supported by the evidence. The testimony of the defendant's friend showed only that as an admitted methamphetamine user, the friend was familiar with methamphetamine labs, not that the friend and the defendant reached any agreement to manufacture the drug at the place and time in question; furthermore, the fact that the friend was convicted for manufacturing the drug in a related proceeding arising from the same facts could not be taken as evidence of that fact for purposes of the present case. Honeycutt v. State, 293 Ga. App. 614, 668 S.E.2d 19 (2008).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because methamphetamine was found in a trailer on the defendant's property, which the defendant occupied and controlled, a known drug dealer was found on the defendant's premises, who had been "fronting" the defendant and the defendant's spouse methamphetamine on a weekly basis, and the defendant's spouse kept a book regarding their sales from the drugs supplied by the dealer. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga. App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853 (2010).

- Defendant's motion for a new trial on the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the aggravated assault charges was properly denied as the defendant's actions before, during, and after a friend's aggravated assault and firearm possession crimes at a home showed not only that the defendant was a party to those crimes, but that the defendant was a fellow conspirator in the assault against the woman as the defendant: (1) forced the woman at gunpoint to drive to the home; (2) stayed in the nearby living room while the friend shot a gun and threatened the woman (and defendant looked into the bedroom after the gun was fired); (3) accompanied the friend and the handcuffed woman in the vehicle following the incident while the friend searched for the boyfriend's residence; (4) encouraged the friend to kill the woman; and (5) did not protest any of the friend's actions throughout the evening. Sapp v. State, 280 Ga. App. 592, 634 S.E.2d 523 (2006).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on a police officer because the state failed to show a mutual understanding between the defendant and anyone else to pursue the common criminal objective of shooting the officer. There was no evidence presented about how the defendant obtained the weapon from a co-indictee, and even though the defendant told the others to run after the defendant announced that the defendant was going to shoot the officer and the others ran, that evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on the officer. Frazier v. State, 349 Ga. App. 507, 826 S.E.2d 361 (2019).

Overt act is required for conviction of conspiracy under former Code 1933, § 79A-812. - For one to be guilty of conspiracy under former Code 1933, § 79A-812, one or more of the conspirators must commit an overt act, as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8. Price v. State, 247 Ga. 58, 273 S.E.2d 854 (1981) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33).

Phrase, "any person who conspires," in former Code 1933, § 79A-812 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33), means anyone committing conspiracy as defined by former Code 1933, § 26-3201 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8). Hammock v. Zant, 244 Ga. 863, 262 S.E.2d 82 (1979).

Separate indictment of parties does not affect admissibility of acts of coconspirator against defendant. Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935) (decided under prior law).

- While rule is well established that conspiracy itself cannot be shown from acts and declarations of one coconspirator in absence of the others, such acts and declarations made in carrying out the conspiracy are relevant. Bragg v. State, 52 Ga. App. 69, 182 S.E. 403 (1935) (decided under prior law).

- Unless a conspiracy is shown prima facie, evidence of acts and declarations of one alleged conspirator can only operate against person whose acts and declarations are proved, if one is on trial; or, if one is not on trial, they are not admissible against defendants being on trial, and should be rejected. Jones v. State, 62 Ga. App. 734, 9 S.E.2d 707 (1940) (decided under prior law).

- Trial court properly imposed recidivist punishment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 based on the defendant's prior federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314, because the conviction's elements matched felony conspiracy to commit a crime under Georgia law as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8. It did not match Georgia's receiving stolen goods crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019).

- If sufficient prima facie evidence of conspiracy is introduced to authorize admitting of evidence of acts and declarations of one of the alleged conspirators, ultimately it is for jury to determine whether from all evidence, a conspiracy has been shown; and, if they find that none has been established, it is then their duty not to consider acts and declarations of supposed coconspirator which have been admitted, except so far as they may affect the coconspirator, if the coconspirator is on trial. Nelson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E. 16 (1935) (decided under prior law).

Indictment

Object of conspiracy need not be charged.

- State is not precluded from electing to indict and proceed on a conspiracy charge where the object of the conspiracy is completed but not charged. Moser v. State, 178 Ga. App. 526, 343 S.E.2d 703 (1986).

It is unnecessary that another person be indicted with defendant for conspiracy to justify a charge on the subject. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

Indictment need not specify which appellants committed each overt act. Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980).

Offense of conspiracy was not included in an indictment when no reference was made therein to one or more persons conspiring or agreeing to commit an offense, and when the indictment did not refer to any overt act to effect the object of a conspiracy, but, on the contrary, alleged only that a substantive crime had been committed, namely, possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowe v. State, 166 Ga. App. 836, 305 S.E.2d 624 (1983).

- In a trial for armed robbery and kidnapping, the trial court does not err in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy although conspiracy is not charged in the indictment, where the conspiracy instruction is properly adjusted to the evidence. Spencer v. State, 180 Ga. App. 498, 349 S.E.2d 513 (1986).

Conspiracy may be proven and a jury charge given on conspiracy, even though defendant is not indicted under that theory. Williams v. State, 267 Ga. 308, 477 S.E.2d 570 (1996); Wiley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 334, 519 S.E.2d 10 (1999).

Victim was raped and robbed at gunpoint by two accomplices, and then murdered. The jury was properly charged on conspiracy, although it was not alleged in the indictment, since the evidence tended to show a conspiracy. Davis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (2008).

- When the evidence established clearly that the offense of possession with intent to distribute more than one ounce of marijuana had been committed, considering the fact that conspiracy was not included in the indictment and a person cannot be convicted of a crime not charged, together with the fact that conspiracy is a separate crime only when the crime conspired to be committed has not been committed, it was error to find appellant guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, and defendant's conviction must be set aside. Rowe v. State, 166 Ga. App. 836, 305 S.E.2d 624 (1983).

- Denial of habeas relief was reversed where conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was based on indictment alleging "a conspiracy to commit the crime of possessing a sufficient amount of a substance containing cocaine"; this indictment was invalid as a matter of law. Gonzalez v. Abbott, 986 F.2d 461 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 894, 114 S. Ct. 257, 126 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1993).

- Because an indictment clearly charged that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendant arranged for the distribution of both amphetamine and methamphetamine, and no authority required the indictment to set forth the particulars of the overt act, but required a reference to the overt act alleged by the State, the indictment at issue sufficiently apprised the defendant of the crimes charged. Bradford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 75, 640 S.E.2d 630 (2006).

Conspiracy count as alleged in the indictment was sufficient to withstand both a general and special demurrer, and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file either demurrer, because in the relevant clause alleging that the defendant did forcibly enter the residence and take methamphetamine and United States currency; the word "forcibly" modified both the verbs "enter" and "take"; meaning that the indictment plainly alleged that the defendants conspired to take the drugs and cash by force. As such, the defendant could not admit to all of the facts in this count of the indictment and still be innocent of conspiracy to commit robbery. Stokes v. State, 355 Ga. App. 565, 845 S.E.2d 305 (2020).

Venue

Some act pursuant to conspiracy must occur in county where indictment returned.

- If conspiracy is formed in one county and act done in another, or if some acts are in county of venue and others not, proof must affirmatively show one or more of these events as occurring in county of venue and jury must be instructed, if more than one is alleged and evidence of venue is in conflict, that the jury must acquit unless the evidence shows one of the forbidden acts to have occurred in the county where indictment was returned. Caldwell v. State, 142 Ga. App. 831, 237 S.E.2d 452 (1977).

- When overt acts are alleged to have been committed in more than one jurisdiction, it is essential in a conspiracy prosecution that jury be properly instructed as to venue. In Georgia, both corrupt agreement and overt act must be proved; venue may be laid in county of either, or, if there are several overt acts, in a county where any of them was committed. Caldwell v. State, 142 Ga. App. 831, 237 S.E.2d 452 (1977).

Conspiracy is question for jury. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

- Conspiracy may be proved, though not alleged in indictment or accusation. Sweat v. State, 119 Ga. App. 646, 168 S.E.2d 654 (1969).

When evidence shows a conspiracy, a charge on the subject is proper even though not alleged in indictment. Alexander v. State, 150 Ga. App. 41, 256 S.E.2d 649 (1979); Keen v. State, 164 Ga. App. 81, 296 S.E.2d 91 (1982); Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979); Anderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 401, 265 S.E.2d 299 (1980); Greene v. State, 155 Ga. App. 222, 270 S.E.2d 386 (1980); Evans v. State, 161 Ga. App. 468, 288 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Keen v. State, 164 Ga. App. 81, 296 S.E.2d 91 (1982). But see Rowe v. State, 166 Ga. App. 836, 305 S.E.2d 624 (1983).

When the evidence tends to show jointly indicted defendants had acted in concert, conspiracy may be proved though not alleged in the indictment, and there is no error in charging the jury upon the issue of conspiracy. Alexander v. State, 186 Ga. App. 787, 368 S.E.2d 550 (1988).

When evidence tends to show a conspiracy, a charge upon the subject is not error even if not alleged in indictment. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979); Anderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 401, 265 S.E.2d 299 (1980); Greene v. State, 155 Ga. App. 222, 270 S.E.2d 386 (1980).

Conspiracy may be proven and a jury charge may be given on conspiracy and parties to a crime even though a defendant is not indicted under those theories. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).

Because the evidence established more than the defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crimes, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and simple assault; although the defendant was not indicted for conspiracy, the evidence also supported a conspiracy charge. Belsar v. State, 276 Ga. 261, 577 S.E.2d 569 (2003).

Jury was properly instructed on conspiracy and parties, even though the defendant's indictment alleged that the defendant directly committed the offenses and did not specify that the defendant was only a party to or coconspirator in the criminal acts. Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308 (2017).

- When a defendant was charged with malice murder, the fact that a jury did not convict the defendant of conspiracy did not indicate that the jury did not believe the defendant to have been involved in the killings at issue; the jury had not been instructed that the jury could find the offense of conspiracy, and even if the jury had rejected a conspiracy offense, Georgia has rejected the inconsistent verdict rule. Conway v. State, 281 Ga. 685, 642 S.E.2d 673 (2007).

- When evidence in a criminal case shows that two or more persons were concerned in the commission of an alleged crime, it is not harmful error for the trial court to charge the jury on law of conspiracy. Anderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 401, 265 S.E.2d 299 (1980).

When the state proceeded against the defendant as a party to the crime of murder with a co-indictee, any possible error by the trial court in charging conspiracy was harmless since there was sufficient evidence to support a charge on parties to a crime, and the state did not attempt to use statements of the co-indictee against defendant under the conspiracy hearsay exception. Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995).

- When an instruction is free of confusion or other error, it follows that there is no "possibility" or "real probability" that the instruction would induce the jury to convict the defendant of conspiracy (maximum sentence: five years) rather than attempted bribery (a ten-year maximum). Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 79, 310 S.E.2d 912 (1984).

- When evidence showed crime to have been complete, refusal to charge on conspiracy as a lesser offense is not error. Terrell v. State, 138 Ga. App. 74, 225 S.E.2d 470 (1976).

When the evidence shows without dispute that the crime charged was actually committed, omission to charge on conspiracy is not error. Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341 (1979); Byram v. State, 189 Ga. App. 627, 376 S.E.2d 909 (1988).

Even if the trial judge committed legal error in failing to instruct that an overt act is a necessary element of a conspiracy, the error was harmless where the jury necessarily found that the crimes themselves had been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. High v. Turpin, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd sub nom. High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2000).

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested charge on withdrawal from conspiracy because the charge was not authorized by the evidence in the case when the conspiracy to rob the victims could not have been effected without the defendant's performance of overt acts; prior to the defendant's alleged withdrawal from the conspiracy, the defendant acted to lead the defendant's co-indictees to the home where the victims were present, told the co-indictees, who were seeking victims to rob, about dice game money the defendant observed on the floor of the home, accompanied an armed co-indictee to the home and knocked on the door, and gave the defendant's name so as to enable the defendant's armed co-indictee to gain entry when the door was opened in response to the defendant's words. Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286, overruled on other grounds, Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial since no error occurred by the trial court giving the jury an instruction on conspiracy as evidence that the defendant and the codefendant were paid, jointly picked up a package containing drugs from a shipping company, and both refused to tell who hired the pair was sufficient to support that a conspiracy existed. Aguilera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378 (2008).

- Reversal of a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., through a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1), was required because the trial court failed to provide any limiting instruction informing jurors that the purchaser and the buyer in a drug transaction could not conspire together. Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110 (2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy, § 1 et seq.

Handling the Defense in a Conspiracy Prosecution, 20 Am. Jur. Trials 351.

- Substitution or attempted substitution of another for one under sentence as a criminal offense, 28 A.L.R. 1381.

Merger of conspiracy in completed offense, 37 A.L.R. 778; 75 A.L.R. 1411.

When does statute of limitations begin to run against civil action or criminal prosecution for conspiracy, 97 A.L.R. 137; 62 A.L.R.2d 1369.

Conspiracy to commit adultery or other offense which can only be committed by the concerted action of the parties to it, 104 A.L.R. 1430.

Criminal responsibility of one who furnishes instrumentality of a kind ordinarily used for legitimate purposes, with knowledge that it is to be used by another for criminal purposes, 108 A.L.R. 331.

Identity, as regards former jeopardy, of offenses charged in different indictments or information for conspiracy, 112 A.L.R. 983.

Conviction or acquittal of attempt to commit particular crime as bar to prosecution for conspiracy to commit same crime, or vice versa, 53 A.L.R.2d 622.

Criminal conspiracies as to gambling, 91 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Jurisdiction to prosecute conspirator who was not in state at time of substantive criminal act, for offense committed pursuant to conspiracy, 5 A.L.R.3d 887.

Insured's co-operation with claimant in establishing valid claim against insurer as breach of co-operation clause, 8 A.L.R.3d 1345.

Actionability of conspiracy to give or to procure false testimony or other evidence, 31 A.L.R.3d 1423.

Criminal liability of corporation for bribery or conspiracy to bribe public official, 52 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Criminal conspiracy between spouses, 74 A.L.R.3d 838.

When statute of limitation begins to run on charge of obstructing justice or of conspiracy to do so, 77 A.L.R.3d 725.

Right of defendants in prosecution for criminal conspiracy to separate trials, 82 A.L.R.3d 366.

Right of creditor to recover damages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11 A.L.R.4th 345.

Prosecution or conviction of one conspirator as affected by disposition of case against coconspirators, 19 A.L.R.4th 192.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant - Marijuana cases, 1 A.L.R.6th 549.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant - Cocaine cases, 2 A.L.R.6th 551.

When is conspiracy continuing offense for purposes of statute of limitations under 18 USCS § 3282, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 616.

State criminal prosecution against medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under Medicaid, Medicare, or similar welfare program for providing medical services, 79 A.L.R.6th 125.