2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 14 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
§ 16-14-8. Period of Limitations as to Criminal Proceedings or Civil Actions Under This Chapter

Notwithstanding any other provision of law setting forth a statute of limitations, a criminal proceeding or civil action brought pursuant to Code Section 16-14-6 shall be commenced up until five years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this chapter terminates. If a criminal proceeding or civil forfeiture proceeding is brought by the state pursuant to this chapter, then the running of this period of limitations, with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (b) or (c) of Code Section 16-14-6 which is based upon any matter complained of in such criminal proceeding or civil forfeiture proceeding by the state, shall be suspended during the pendency of the criminal proceeding or civil forfeiture proceeding by the state and for two years thereafter.

(Code 1933, § 26-3407, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 405, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 2-25/HB 233.)

- Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure."

- For article, "A Comprehensive Analysis of Georgia RICO," see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 537 (1993). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Limitations start for state racketeering suit.

- In a state civil RICO suit, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the cause of action accrues, and not from the time that the racketeering activity terminates. Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 676, 426 S.E.2d 165 (1992).

Civil RICO cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that plaintiff has been injured and that plaintiff's injury is part of a pattern. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516 (1995).

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2(2), the statute of limitation for criminal prosecution of RICO violations was tolled up to the time the victim and the state first learned of the predicate offenses. Adams v. State, 231 Ga. App. 279, 499 S.E.2d 105 (1998).

Trial court erred by applying O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.2 to the RICO and theft charges against defendants because it was necessary for the state to show that the victim was over 65 years of age, was the principal stockholder of the corporation, was the owner of the property allegedly stolen, not the corporation, to determine the date the crime became known to the victim. Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584 (2013).

Court did not err in dismissing the tax advisor's claims as time-barred because the advisor filed the complaint long after the limitations periods governing the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and Georgia RICO claims expired, and the advisor had not plausibly alleged that the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the causes of action and thus could not have invoked tolling because the advisor received direct information that conflicted with the bank entities' representation that the tax shelter transactions at issue had economic substance, the advisor did not explain how the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in light of that notice, and the advisor did not explain why the advisor could not have sued earlier. Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014)(Unpublished).

- Claim by a partnership against the partnership's former managing partner was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 since the partnership should have known about the alleged racketeering by 1993 at the latest, when several partners began to question the former partner about partnership checks that the former partner had written to the former partner; the "separate accrual rule" did not apply because there was no new and independent injury. Cochran Mill Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 648 S.E.2d 764 (2007).

Trial court did not err by dismissing an indictment charging the defendants with racketeering violations and conspiracy as the state failed to prove that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred less than five years from the date of the indictment. State v. Conzo, 293 Ga. App. 72, 666 S.E.2d 404 (2008).

Trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's civil RICO claims based on the statute of limitation as the statute contained no language imperatively requiring retroactive application of the revised limitation period, and nothing in the act as a whole demanded a conclusion that the legislature intended such. Glock, Inc. v. Harper, 340 Ga. App. 65, 796 S.E.2d 304 (2017).

- Defendant's action was not time-barred as checks were written to the defendant from a co-conspirator less than five years before the action was filed. Whaley v. State, 343 Ga. App. 701, 808 S.E.2d 88 (2017).

- Defendant's convictions for theft by conversion and a RICO violation were reversed because the state failed to carry the state's burden to prove that the defendant was indicted on the counts within the applicable statutes of limitation as the evidence showed that the victims, and therefore the state, had actual knowledge of the offenses more than five years prior to the June 12, 2009 indictment, and the state produced no evidence or argument to the contrary. Jannuzzo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 760, 746 S.E.2d 238 (2013).

Cited in Radcliffe v. Founders Title Co., 720 F. Supp. 170 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316, 785 S.E.2d 8 (2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Commencement of limitation period for criminal prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), (18 USCS §§ 1961-1968), 89 A.L.R. Fed. 887.