2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 11 - Offenses Against Public Order and Safety
Article 4 - Dangerous Instrumentalities and Practices
Part 3 - Carrying and Possession of Firearms
§ 16-11-131. Possession of Firearms by Convicted Felons and First Offender Probationers

Universal Citation: GA Code § 16-11-131 (2020)
  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Felony" means any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more and includes conviction by a court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for an offense which would constitute a felony under the laws of the United States.
    2. "Firearm" includes any handgun, rifle, shotgun, or other weapon which will or can be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or electrical charge.
  2. Any person who is on probation as a felony first offender pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, who is on probation and was sentenced for a felony under subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2, or who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and dominions; or by a court of any foreign nation and who receives, possesses, or transports any firearm commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than ten years; provided, however, that upon a second or subsequent conviction, such person shall be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than ten years; provided, further, that if the felony for which the person is on probation or has been previously convicted is a forcible felony, then upon conviction of receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm, such person shall be imprisoned for a period of five years.
  3. This Code section shall not apply to any person who has been pardoned for the felony by the President of the United States, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or the person or agency empowered to grant pardons under the constitutions or laws of the several states or of a foreign nation and, by the terms of the pardon, has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm.
  4. A person who has been convicted of a felony, but who has been granted relief from the disabilities imposed by the laws of the United States with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 925, shall, upon presenting to the Board of Public Safety proof that the relief has been granted and it being established from proof submitted by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Board of Public Safety that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant's record and reputation are such that the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest, be granted relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section. A person who has been convicted under federal or state law of a felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade shall, upon presenting to the Board of Public Safety proof, and it being established from said proof, submitted by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Board of Public Safety that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant's record and reputation are such that the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest, be granted relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section. A record that the relief has been granted by the board shall be entered upon the criminal history of the person maintained by the Georgia Crime Information Center and the board shall maintain a list of the names of such persons which shall be open for public inspection.
  5. As used in this Code section, the term "forcible felony" means any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person and further includes, without limitation, murder; murder in the second degree; burglary in any degree; robbery; armed robbery; home invasion in any degree; kidnapping; hijacking of an aircraft or hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree; aggravated stalking; rape; aggravated child molestation; aggravated sexual battery; arson in the first degree; the manufacturing, transporting, distribution, or possession of explosives with intent to kill, injure, or intimidate individuals or destroy a public building; terroristic threats; or acts of treason or insurrection.
  6. Any person sentenced as a first offender pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42 or sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2 and subsequently discharged without court adjudication of guilt as a matter of law pursuant to Code Section 42-8-60 or 16-13-2, as applicable, shall, upon such discharge, be relieved from the disabilities imposed by this Code section.

(b.1)Any person who is prohibited by this Code section from possessing a firearm because of conviction of a forcible felony or because of being on probation as a first offender or under conditional discharge for a forcible felony and who attempts to purchase or obtain transfer of a firearm shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years; provided, however, that upon a second or subsequent conviction, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than ten years.

(Code 1933, § 26-2914, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1509, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1171, § 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 945, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 476, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 16; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1630, § 5; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 8-5/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2014, p. 426, § 4/HB 770; Ga. L. 2014, p. 444, § 2-5/HB 271; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 6C-2/SB 367; Ga. L. 2017, p. 417, § 3-1/SB 104; Ga. L. 2018, p. 550, § 4-4/SB 407.)

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted "as a matter of law pursuant to Code Section 42-8-60" for "pursuant to Code Section 42-8-62" near the middle of subsection (f).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in the middle of subsection (e), inserted "hijacking a" and inserted "in the first degree".

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in subsection (b), inserted ", who is on probation and was sentenced for a felony under subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2," near the middle, inserted "year", and substituted "ten years" for "five years" in the middle, in the proviso, inserted "upon a second or subsequent conviction, such person shall be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than ten years; provided, further, that", and substituted "for" for "as to" in the middle of the proviso; in paragraph (b.1), inserted "or under conditional discharge", deleted "pursuant to this Code section" following "forcible felony" near the middle, inserted "upon conviction", inserted "year" in the middle, and added the proviso; and, in subsection (f), substituted "sentenced" for "placed on probation" near the beginning, and, in the middle, inserted "or sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2" and inserted "or 16-13-2, as applicable,".

Cross references.

- Unauthorized possession of weapon by person confined in penal institution, § 42-5-63.

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "of" was deleted following "Chapter " in subsection (e) (now (f)).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, "18 U.S.C. Section 925" was substituted for "18 U.S.C. 925" in the first sentence of subsection (d).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act."

Administrative Rules and Regulations.

- Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Crime Information Center Council, § 140-2-.17.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2016). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 61 (2017). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For article on the 2018 amendment of this Code section, see 35 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 45 (2018). For annual survey on criminal law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Double Jeopardy

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(a), defining a felony for purposes of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, creates an ambiguity in that a person of ordinary intelligence could fail to appreciate that the definition was meant to look past the treatment given a criminal offense by an out-of-state jurisdiction and encompass within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 any offense with a maximum sentence exceeding 12 months, even those denominated "misdemeanor" by the rendering jurisdiction; section was held partly unconstitutional in that it failed to give sufficient notice as to what out-of-state convictions could be used in support of the charge. State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 is a reasonable regulation authorized by the police power and thus is not violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VIII). Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 299 S.E.2d 707 (1983).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 is not an ex post facto law because it creates a new offense and imposes punishment for that offense only. Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 299 S.E.2d 707 (1983).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 is not an ex post facto law. The applicable date is the date of the offense of possession, not the date of the previous felony conviction. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).

Construction with § 16-3-24.2. - In a case in which the evidence showed that defendant, a convicted felon, used a firearm to shoot the deceased, a trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the indictment under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. Since defendant possessed the firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, defendant was not entitled to the immunity offered by § 16-3-24.2 State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781, 684 S.E.2d 269 (2009).

Construction with O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21(a) and 16-11-138. - O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21(a) and16-11-138 in combination effectively provide this rule of law: A person is justified in threatening or using force against another, or in possessing a weapon in circumstances otherwise prohibited under the Code, when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force or conduct otherwise prohibited is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141, 839 S.E.2d 521 (2020).

Construction of O.C.G.A.

§ 16-11-131(b). - Georgia Supreme Court held that the phrase any firearm, as used in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), indicated that the quantity of firearms was inconsequential and that the gravamen of the offense was the general receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms by convicted felons, rather than the specific quantity of firearms received, possessed, or transported and, therefore, the statute unambiguously permitted only one conviction for simultaneous possession of any number of firearms. Edvalson v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020).

Probable cause for arrest.

- Police search of a defendant's bag and person, which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. Green v. State, 302 Ga. App. 388, 691 S.E.2d 283 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from a rental car because the officer had reasonable grounds for detaining the defendant since the officer found the defendant and a friend in the parking lot of a closed business late at night, knew that several burglaries and thefts had occurred in the area recently, and observed that the defendant and the friend appeared to be nervous when the officer spoke with them; in the course of securing a firearm the officer saw a firearm in the center console of the rental car, the officer saw in plain view a digital scale with white residue, affording the officer probable cause to effect a custodial arrest of the defendant. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115, 717 S.E.2d 698 (2011).

Proof required.

- To support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the state need only prove that the accused is a convicted felon and in possession of a firearm as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(a)(2). Malone v. State, 337 Ga. App. 178, 786 S.E.2d 558 (2016).

No speedy trial violation.

- Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with the intent to rob, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were proper because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 20-month delay between the date the indictment was issued to the date of the defendant's actual trial as the delay was due to a higher priority of statutory speedy trial demands, so it was not a deliberate delay on the part of the state, and as the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the delay. Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).

Constructive possession is sufficient to prove a violation. Simpson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 143, 444 S.E.2d 115 (1994).

Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was proper because the act of any one of the conspirators involved was the act of all, and because the defendant's co-conspirator possessed a weapon, it followed that the defendant was in constructive possession of the weapon. Murray v. State, 309 Ga. App. 828, 711 S.E.2d 387 (2011).

Possession of firearms by convicted felons.

- It is the public policy of Georgia that possession of firearms by convicted felons generally presents a threat to the safety of the citizens of the state. Edmunds v. Cowan, 192 Ga. App. 616, 386 S.E.2d 39, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 901, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989).

Nonforcible felon who has been free of restraint or supervision for five years is not eligible to apply for a license to carry firearms unless the felon obtains a pardon within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(c). Absent a pardon, such an applicant commits a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) if the felon carries a firearm. Fain v. State, 259 Ga. 708, 386 S.E.2d 144 (1989).

Evidence that defendant kept guns in storage in safes immediately after defendant was released from prison on parole after defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and firing a gun at another was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. Quinn v. State, 255 Ga. App. 744, 566 S.E.2d 450 (2002), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005).

Any error in the admission of a witness's statements under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt for assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, including the exact match of defendant's blood sample to the blood found at the scene, the location and timing of defendant's capture, and the fact that defendant had a recent gunshot wound. Porter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 513, 621 S.E.2d 523 (2005).

Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 merged with the defendant's conviction of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failure to request a bifurcated trial on felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; because the possession count was a predicate offense for the felony murder count, the prior conviction that was admitted into evidence was relevant to the felony murder count, and it was not necessary to sever the possession count. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing or attempting to elude based on the defendant's involvement in a police chase that included speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a residential area and the defendant's attempt to flee on foot; a backpack that the defendant was carrying while running from the police and which was recovered from the roof of the house around which the defendant had disappeared had drugs and a pistol in the backpack. Hinton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant constructively possessed three firearms as a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) because the defendant's bedroom contained two firearms and ammunition for a third gun that was found in a spare bedroom, and a shed the defendant used also contained ammunition for the guns. Layne v. State, 313 Ga. App. 608, 722 S.E.2d 351 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the gun being found in close physical proximity to the defendant and that the defendant had in a pocket the exact number of the proper caliber bullets to completely reload the gun; although others had access to the car before the defendant took possession of the car, the evidence authorized the conclusion that the car had been visually inspected at a point close in time to when the defendant had sole access. Malone v. State, 337 Ga. App. 178, 786 S.E.2d 558 (2016).

Possession of black powder guns sufficient.

- Evidence that the defendant was found in possession of two black powder guns was sufficient to support the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and by a convicted felon. Hall v. State, 322 Ga. App. 313, 744 S.E.2d 833 (2013).

Disassembled rifle was firearm.

- Jury was authorized to find that the disassembled rifle was a firearm within the statutory definition. Mantooth v. State, 335 Ga. App. 734, 783 S.E.2d 133 (2016).

Firearms includes handguns.

- Juvenile court erred by modifying the juvenile's disposition after determining that the disposition was void on the ground that the juvenile's conduct did not qualify as a Class-B felony because carrying a weapon in a school zone qualified as a Class-B designated felony under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 and "firearm" included "handguns" under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131. In the Interest of D. B., 341 Ga. App. 559, 802 S.E.2d 19 (2017).

Relevancy of possession evidence.

- Evidence that the defendant was in possession of a handgun "around the time of the shooting" was relevant and material to a charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007).

Possession of firearm by felon in self-defense.

- Evidence supported the defendant's contention that the defendant shot the victim in self-defense; therefore, if the defendant's possession of a firearm at the shooting was justified under the rule created under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21 and16-11-138, then it could not be said that the defendant was committing a felony when the defendant shot the victim, and the preclusive bar of § 16-3-21(b)(2) would not apply. However, the trial court needed to consider whether possession of the firearm before or after the shooting could be prosecuted. State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020).

Failure to sever firearms charge not ineffective assistance.

- In a case where the defendant shot and killed the victim during a robbery, trial counsel's performance was not deficient simply because counsel did not move to sever the firearm possession charge from the other counts of the indictment, since that charge was material to the more serious charges, including malice murder, and, thus, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to bifurcate the trial. Lee v. State, 280 Ga. 521, 630 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

No requirement to sever charges.

- Defendant was not entitled to a new jury on a trial of a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge as, generally, all charges arising out of the same conduct had to be tried in a single prosecution; although there were limited exceptions to the rule allowing, under proper circumstances, the bifurcation of a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge, the defendant was not entitled to a separate trial before a new jury on that charge. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Construed with O.C.G.A.

§ 16-11-129(b)(3). - Clear impact of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) and (c) is to implicitly repeal O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(3). Fain v. State, 259 Ga. 708, 386 S.E.2d 144 (1989).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. - Because defendant's three prior felony convictions, and a subsequent conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of one or more of those felonies, remained separate felonies that could be used to impose a recidivist punishment for the commission of yet another felony, and defendant did not seek to collaterally attack any of those convictions, the recidivists sentences imposed under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 were valid. Campbell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 331, 631 S.E.2d 388 (2006).

Defendant waived defendant's objection to the trial court's consideration of a particular conviction in aggravation of sentencing under the recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, when the state had already used that conviction in support of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant failed to object at sentencing to the exhibit containing the conviction. Thomas v. State, 305 Ga. App. 801, 701 S.E.2d 202 (2010).

Pistol as "firearm."

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131's definition of a firearm does not include toys or nonfunctional replicas, and whether a pistol is a firearm is a matter to be determined by the jury. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005).

When there was no evidence that a pistol was not a firearm, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the pistol was such beyond a reasonable doubt. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005).

Jury was authorized to find that guns found in defendant's automobile were actual working firearms since there was no evidence introduced to refute a police officer's testimony that the guns were pistols. Jolly v. State, 183 Ga. App. 370, 358 S.E.2d 912 (1987).

Antique shotgun.

- Possession of an antique shotgun while a convicted felon was sufficient to sustain a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 as the state was not required to prove that the gun was operational at the time the defendant possessed the gun. Senior v. State, 277 Ga. App. 197, 626 S.E.2d 169 (2006).

Evidence of bullets properly admitted.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, failure to obey a traffic control device, fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, reckless driving, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions as the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain bullets found in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest based on the state allegedly not providing a proper chain of custody; the bullets, unlike fungible articles, were distinct and recognizable physical objects that were identifiable by observation, eliminating the necessity of a chain-of-custody showing. Green v. State, 287 Ga. App. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007).

Tender of weapons into evidence unnecessary.

- Defendant's contention that the evidence was not sufficient to convict defendant of possessing firearms while a convicted felon because the weapons were not tendered into evidence is without merit. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 359 S.E.2d 416 (1987).

Firearms properly admitted into evidence.

- Firearms found in the defendant's girlfriend's room, occupied by the defendant and defendant's girlfriend at the time of arrest, were properly admitted as being relevant to prove the necessary elements of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131. Thompson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 734, 310 S.E.2d 725 (1983).

Motion to suppress evidence of the seized firearm found in plain view was properly denied.

- Defendant voluntarily consented to police officers searching the defendant's bedroom; moreover, the officers did not threaten defendant into giving defendant's consent merely by telling defendant that they could obtain a warrant based on their earlier seizure of marijuana in another part of the house. Butler v. State, 272 Ga. App. 557, 612 S.E.2d 865 (2005).

Fingerprint card improperly admitted.

- Trial court erred in admitting into evidence over objection a fingerprint card taken following a felony arrest of defendant for violation of, inter alia, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, since the violation of that statute was an other crime not shown to be connected with the one on trial, served no useful or relevant purpose, placed the defendant's character in evidence, and was prejudicial to the defendant. Strawder v. State, 207 Ga. App. 365, 427 S.E.2d 792 (1993).

Prior criminal record.

- In a prosecution of defendant for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, introduction of evidence showing defendant had a prior criminal record was necessary to prove the charge. Belt v. State, 225 Ga. App. 813, 485 S.E.2d 39 (1997).

Out-of-state convictions.

- Defendant's charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, on which a charge of felony murder was predicated, was based on defendant's Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which carried a maximum five-year sentence. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, criminalizing a felon's firearm possession, gave insufficient notice to defendant that the Pennsylvania misdemeanor could be a predicate felony for a charge under the statute. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(a)'s definition of a felony created an ambiguity, in that a person of ordinary intelligence could fail to appreciate that the statute intended to encompass any offense with a maximum penalty over 12 months, even if it was called a misdemeanor. Had sufficient notice been given, the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, would not prohibit according defendant's misdemeanor conviction felony status. State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that a conviction by an out-of-state court of a crime, which authorized punishment of up to three years in prison, is a felony conviction for purposes of the statute. Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0978, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 508 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction on two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict based on the defendant's contention that a prior out-of-state conviction was not a felony conviction; given that the defendant was convicted of an offense that carried a maximum punishment of three years in prison, the trier of fact properly concluded that the defendant had been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, because in determining whether a sentence is a felony, the established consideration is what sentence can be imposed under the law, not what was imposed. Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0978, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 508 (Ga. 2008).

After the plaintiff appealed a district court's dismissal with prejudice of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the plaintiff's prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the plaintiff lacked standing because even if § 922(g)(1) was declared unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Georgia law independently barred the plaintiff from possessing a firearm because of the plaintiff's Michigan convictions. Daogaru v. Brandon, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017)(Unpublished).

Proof of previous felony conviction is necessary element of state's proof under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and introduction of evidence of previous conviction during trial of issue of guilt was not error. Prather v. State, 247 Ga. 789, 279 S.E.2d 697 (1981); Favors v. State, 182 Ga. App. 179, 355 S.E.2d 109 (1987).

Defendant's prior felony conviction for armed robbery is properly admitted where it is the basis for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 896, 418 S.E.2d 155 (1992).

Because conviction of a prior felony is a necessary element of the crime of firearm possession as proscribed by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, insufficiency in the proof of this element demands entry of a judgment of acquittal as to that offense; thus, since the Court of Appeals determined that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was a convicted felon, it was error for that court to remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of whether the defendant had in fact pled guilty to any prior charges. Brantley v. State, 272 Ga. 892, 536 S.E.2d 509 (2000).

Certified copies of a defendant's out-of-state judgment of conviction, associated complaint, and plea hearing transcript were properly admitted into evidence to show that the defendant was a convicted felon for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, which prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0978, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 508 (Ga. 2008).

In the defendant's murder trial, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to specially demur to the counts in the defendant's indictment charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder predicated on that crime because neither count specified the felony of which the defendant was previously convicted; although it was required that the state prove a felony, it was not required that the felony be listed in the indictment. Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 832 S.E.2d 792 (2019).

Sufficient proof of prior felony conviction.

- Since the state offered as proof of defendant's previous felony conviction a certified copy of the 1974 burglary conviction of one Henry Levi Glass and defendant presented no evidence contradicting that defendant was the person named in the 1974 documents, it was held that concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity and that in the absence of any denial by defendant and no proof to the contrary, this concordance of name was sufficient to show that defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person. Glass v. State, 181 Ga. App. 448, 352 S.E.2d 642 (1987).

Admission of a certified copy of defendant's five-year sentence for a prior conviction of armed robbery showing both that defendant had pled guilty to armed robbery and that defendant had been represented by counsel satisfied the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131. Ingram v. State, 240 Ga. App. 172, 523 S.E.2d 31 (1999).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon even though the only evidence presented during the separate guilt/innocence phase on that charge was the certified copy of the defendant's indictment, guilty plea, and sentence for the felony offense of theft by taking; the jury was properly instructed that the jury was authorized to consider the evidence presented in the first guilt/innocence phase of the trial, as well as the evidence presented in the second guilt/innocence phase, in reaching the jury's verdict regarding the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The evidence at trial on the malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime charges was sufficient and was incorporated by reference into the trial on the firearm count. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

After verdicts were entered on the other counts charged against the defendant, evidence submitted by the state consisting of a certified copy of the defendant's prior conviction showing the defendant's probationary status as a first time offender for felony theft by taking at the time of the crimes was sufficient to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

After the defendant was found guilty of rape and aggravated assault, a separate guilt/innocence trial was held on the firearm possession charge, wherein the state introduced into evidence, without objection, a certified copy of the defendant's guilty plea and sentence for the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which testimony and documentary evidence from the combined proceedings sufficiently established that the defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Harris v. State, 283 Ga. App. 374, 641 S.E.2d 619 (2007).

Evidence establishing that the defendant was a convicted felon included not only the defendant's guilty plea to a charge of first-degree forgery, a felony, but also the defendant's admissions in closing argument that the defendant had been convicted on just that charge; thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. McKie v. State, 345 Ga. App. 84, 812 S.E.2d 353 (2018), aff'd, 306 Ga. 111, 829 S.E.2d 376 (2019).

Insufficient proof of prior felony conviction.

- Because the only evidence before the jury regarding the defendant's status as a convicted felon was the entry of a guilty plea to a crime that could have been either a felony or a misdemeanor, the evidence failed to provide the jury with a sufficient basis for finding that element beyond a reasonable doubt; consequently, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon had to be reversed. Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (2007).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 does not limit the number of prior felony convictions that may be considered to establish the offense. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005).

Sufficiency of indictment.

- In a recitation of felonies in an indictment for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, the failure to correctly list a conviction as forgery in the first degree, instead of forgery, did not result in a variance between the indictment and proof offered at the trial so as to affect defendant's substantial rights. Hutchison v. State, 218 Ga. App. 601, 462 S.E.2d 648 (1995).

Although the trial court might not have been presented with evidence that the defendant was in physical possession of a firearm during the hijacking of the victim's car, because the evidence that was presented authorized a finding that the defendant was a party to that crime, and that all those involved were joint conspirators, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that the indictment charging possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was at fatal variance with the proof presented at trial. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 786, 653 S.E.2d 104 (2007).

Collateral attack prohibited.

- One charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was prohibited from collaterally attacking a prior felony conviction that served as the predicate offense since O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) clearly prohibited all convicted felons from possessing a firearm until the felons were pardoned from the felons' felony convictions or otherwise relieved of the disability, and no exception was made for an invalid outstanding felony conviction. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. 778, 642 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Introduction of evidence of previous conviction not error.

- Proof of previous felony conviction is necessary element of state's proof under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and introduction of evidence of such previous conviction during trial of issue of guilt is not error. Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 521, 295 S.E.2d 219 (1982).

Joint trial and use of evidence concerning offense of having been convicted of a felony and thereafter being in possession of a firearm during the trial and deliberation as to counts for armed robbery and possession of the sawed-off shotgun did not prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial by denial of due process and equal protection of the law. Adkins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 273, 297 S.E.2d 47 (1982).

After the appellant was found guilty of criminal damage to property, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, evidence of the appellant's prior felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter was clearly admissible since the state's evidence proving the appellant's prior conviction contained references not only to voluntary manslaughter, as alleged in the indictment, but also to charges of murder and aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 192 Ga. App. 246, 384 S.E.2d 451 (1989).

In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, trial of the charges together was not required since defendant made no motion to sever and, in view of the limiting instructions given and the weight of the testimony of the victim and a corroborating witness, proof of a prior conviction did not place defendant's character in issue to such an extent as to affect the verdict on the armed robbery and firearm charges. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

Despite the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting the defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior conviction for aggravated child molestation, that error was harmless as it was undisputed that the defendant was a convicted felon, admitted to possessing the firearm, and failed to give any justification for possession or offer any evidence of a legal reason to do so. Whitt v. State, 281 Ga. App. 3, 635 S.E.2d 270 (2006).

Any error in the admission of a certified copy of a defendant's burglary conviction without redacting an attachment that set forth the evidence supporting the conviction was waived by the defendant as the defendant failed to object to the admission of the document at trial; however, the defendant was not unduly prejudiced by the admission of the document as the defendant did not offer to stipulate to the conviction and neither the conviction nor the facts surrounding the conviction were of a nature likely to inflame the passions of the jury. Tanksley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 61, 635 S.E.2d 353 (2006).

Because a defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a), a killing resulting from an unlawful act other than a felony. Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009).

When the record shows two prior convictions and the records of the two convictions are so inextricably intertwined that one could not effectively be masked or otherwise removed from the jury's view, both convictions should be listed by the prosecutor. Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. 163, 290 S.E.2d 159 (1982).

Merely having once been sentenced to a term of probation as a first offender is not an element of the crime defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b); the crime is committed when one who is currently on probation as a first offender possesses a firearm. Williams v. State, 238 Ga. App. 310, 520 S.E.2d 466 (1999).

Sentence for each separate firearm conviction.

- Unit of prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) is possession of a single firearm, and the defendant could be separately punished for possession of each of the firearms seized from the defendant's house; thus, the trial court committed no error in declining to merge the defendant's four firearm-related convictions for purposes of sentencing.

Consecutive sentences not an abuse of discretion.

- To the extent that the appellant argued that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, the argument was without merit because the trial court had broad discretion to impose either a concurrent or consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the record did not show that the court made that decision under a misapprehension about the scope of the court's discretion. Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. 637, 832 S.E.2d 453 (2019).

Expert testimony.

- Testimony by a ballistics expert proving the operability of the firearm is not required for conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131. Bryant v. State, 169 Ga. App. 764, 315 S.E.2d 257 (1984).

License to carry pistol is no defense.

- Trial court's charge that "the fact that a convicted felon obtains a license to carry a pistol is no defense to a charge of being a Convicted Felon in Possession of a Firearm" was correct. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986).

No assumption that homeowner owns firearms found in home.

- It could not be presumed that defendant, as owner and head of a household, owned or possessed the firearms found therein during a search for drugs, where there was no other evidence to show that defendant owned or possessed the firearms; the evidence was not sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Smith v. State, 180 Ga. App. 657, 350 S.E.2d 302 (1986).

Putting character in issue.

- It was proper under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-7 and former24-9-20 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506) to try a firearms possession charge, which required evidence of a prior felony conviction, together with a marijuana and a burglary charge. State v. Santerfeit, 163 Ga. App. 627, 295 S.E.2d 756 (1982).

Conducting a trial on a possession of a firearm charge prior to the sentencing phase and before the same jury that imposed a death sentence on a defendant did not unnecessarily prejudice the jury by impermissibly placing the defendant's character in issue in the sentencing phase since the state could have introduced evidence of the defendant's prior convictions during the sentencing phase. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Bifurcation.

- Trial court had no obligation to bifurcate a trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from other unrelated charges in the same indictment where defendant made no motion to bifurcate. Belt v. State, 225 Ga. App. 813, 485 S.E.2d 39 (1997).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to bifurcate and separately try the count for being a felon in possession of a firearm because bifurcation was not authorized when the charge of being a felon in possession served as the underlying felony for felony murder. Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

Jury instruction on justification.

- When a defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant was entitled to a charge as to justification, the only defense defendant claimed; the refusal to so charge and to charge merely the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 was tantamount to a directed verdict, requiring reversal. Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 130, 392 S.E.2d 896 (1990).

Instructions on "possession."

- In a prosecution for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the definitions of constructive and joint possession to enable the jury to consider whether defendant "possessed" the weapon within the meaning of that section. Waugh v. State, 218 Ga. App. 301, 460 S.E.2d 871 (1995).

No error found in court's charging the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 or in refusing to charge sudden emergency, specific intent, or O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(c), which concerns carrying a concealed weapon. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).

Evidence sufficient to dismiss charges.

- Because the defendant had completed a three-year first-offender probationary sentence and had been discharged without court adjudication of guilt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-62 at the time the defendant allegedly violated O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, the trial court properly dismissed the charge. State v. Mills, 268 Ga. 873, 495 S.E.2d 1 (1998).

Spatial proximity to weapon insufficient to warrant conviction.

- See Wofford v. State, 262 Ga. App. 291, 585 S.E.2d 207 (2003).

Ineffective counsel established as to aggravated assault but not as to gun possession charge.

- Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).

Counsel ineffective for failing to move to suppress a weapon found after a warrantless arrest.

- Defendant's counsel's performance was defective for failing to file a motion to suppress a handgun found by police in the defendant's rear waistband because the defendant was in handcuffs, face down on the floor, and could have reasonably believed that the defendant was under arrest. The arrest was made without a warrant or probable cause. Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (2010).

Ineffective assistance of counsel shown.

- Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was reversed because the defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to the witness's testimony that improperly bolstered the investigator's testimony and credibility. Jones v. State, 350 Ga. App. 618, 829 S.E.2d 820 (2019).

Counsel not ineffective.

- Defendant's trial counsel could not be ineffective in failing to specifically demur to the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the felony murder based on the same, as it was not necessary for the charge to state what felony formed the basis of the prior conviction. Miller v. State, 283 Ga. 412, 658 S.E.2d 765 (2008).

Plea to misdemeanor not element of offense.

- Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek to redact the portion of a defendant's first offender plea that related to carrying a concealed weapon. The plea to carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor, was not an element of the current charge of the possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b). Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

Identification of defendant sufficient.

- Victim's testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon since the victim knew the defendant from a previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant's face during the incident because the area was illuminated by a streetlight. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 153, 630 S.E.2d 661 (2006).

Suppression motion erroneously denied.

- Because no exigency existed to justify a search after the defendant was handcuffed and placed under the watchful eye of a police officer, and even assuming that the defendant was under arrest while being detained in the kitchen, a search of the defendant's bedroom, which yielded a shotgun found under the bed in the bedroom, a box of unspent shotgun shells, and some loose unspent shotgun shells, was not one incident to an arrest; thus, the defendant's possession of a firearm while a convicted felon conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial in which the illegally-obtained evidence could not be introduced. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007).

Recidivist sentencing.

- Conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon could not stand because the same prior conviction could not support both recidivist sentencing and a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and also a nolo contendere plea could not serve as proof of a prior conviction for a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the prior conviction remained available to support enhanced sentencing as a recidivist, however. Wyche v. State, 291 Ga. App. 165, 661 S.E.2d 226 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1413, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 914 (Ga. 2008).

Consent of probationer to search.

- When officers went to a defendant's residence to conduct a probation search based on a tip that the defendant was involved with drugs, as the defendant willingly led the officers to a concealed gun, and voluntarily furnished a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, the defendant gave valid consent to the search, which eliminated the need for either probable cause or a search warrant under U.S. Const., amend. IV. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction.

- See Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 493, 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986); Booker v. State, 257 Ga. 37, 354 S.E.2d 425 (1987); Jackson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 847, 368 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Spivey v. State, 193 Ga. App. 127, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989), cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 911, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989); Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 410 S.E.2d 740 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S. Ct. 118, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1992); Holcomb v. State, 231 Ga. App. 15, 443 S.E.2d 662 (1994); Willis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 479, 448 S.E.2d 223 (1994); Boone v. State, 229 Ga. App. 379, 494 S.E.2d 100 (1997); Crawford v. State, 233 Ga. App. 323, 504 S.E.2d 19 (1998); Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 42, 520 S.E.2d 746 (1999); Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 215, 522 S.E.2d 506 (1999); Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Scott v. State, 276 Ga. 195, 576 S.E.2d 860 (2003); Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003).

Convicted felon's conviction for possession of a shotgun was authorized, even though the shotgun was not in the felon's immediate possession, where the evidence supported a finding that the felon was a party to the crime of burglary and the felon and codefendant were co-conspirators. Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 where a victim testified to seeing the weapon emerge from the window of defendant's truck, and then saw the muzzle flash. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003).

Evidence that the defendant, a convicted felon, accompanied the victim to a store with the codefendant; shot the victim in the head with a handgun that the defendant had in defendant's possession; thereby, causing a wound in which the victim lost one eye; and along with the codefendant took all the victim's money was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003).

When the defendant shot a victim in the head after an argument and also shot at another victim but failed to hit the second victim, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Hightower v. State, 278 Ga. 39, 597 S.E.2d 362 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where defendant did not dispute that defendant was a convicted felon, and an officer observed defendant with a firearm. Taylor v. State, 267 Ga. App. 588, 600 S.E.2d 675 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, based upon defendant's and an accomplice's robbing a store at gunpoint, was affirmed because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as latent fingerprints, which belonged to defendant, that were found in the car used in the armed robbery sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice who identified defendant as the driver of the car before the accomplice recanted the accomplice's custodial statement at trial. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as the conviction was supported by more evidence than just defendant's mere spatial proximity to the gun because: (1) the jury could have inferred that defendant actually lived in the apartment rented by defendant's sister and that the items found in the apartment belonged to defendant; and (2) the gun was found in plain view on the television, which defendant claimed as defendant's own, next to defendant's keys to the apartment. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004).

Testimony provided by two accomplices, together with inside information wherein defendant learned about the location of the robbery, the security camera on the premises, the people that worked there, how many people worked there, who was in the back area, and about the safe, when coupled with the fact that the gunman was not captured on the security camera, provided some evidence, though slight, that the robber had such inside information; under the circumstances, the accomplices' testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and the jury was authorized to find defendant guilty of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Ziegler v. State, 270 Ga. App. 787, 608 S.E.2d 230 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1019, 126 S. Ct. 656, 163 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2005).

When a victim paid defendant money the victim owed, and, after the victim paid the money, defendant told the victim that the victim was going to die anyway and shot the victim as the victim sat in a vehicle with two other people, the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony. Stephens v. State, 279 Ga. 43, 609 S.E.2d 344 (2005).

Defendant was not convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) merely based on circumstantial evidence that failed, in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt; the defendant made several admissions to officers that constituted direct evidence including that the defendant had a gun in the defendant's bedroom and that the defendant used the gun to hunt. Parramore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 372, 626 S.E.2d 567 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions since the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim's positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim's subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant's hands as a sergeant regularly ordered gunshot residue tests on suspects. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony where, upon pulling into an apartment complex to turn around and ask for directions, the victims were approached by defendant and another man, defendant pulled out a gun and told the victims to "give it up," when one of the victims hesitated, defendant shot the victim, defendant then stole that victim's money and jewelry, and later, the gunshot victim died; the second victim described defendant, who was wearing a specific jersey at the time of the crimes, and two witnesses who knew defendant testified that defendant robbed and shot the victim while wearing that jersey. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006).

Because the evidence showed that the probationer had continuous access to the firearms in the house on the day of a fatal shooting, and that the probationer intended to, and did in fact exercise control over the sons' access to one of the guns in the minutes leading up to the shooting, the trial court properly found that the probationer had constructive possession of the firearm. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. App. 299, 630 S.E.2d 774 (2006).

Convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that, during an argument involving the defendant and the two victims, the defendant told one of the victims to go get the victim's guns, adding that the defendant had guns, the victim went to the victim's vehicle and retrieved two handguns, approached with arms crossed and a gun in each hand, and the defendant took a gun out of the waistband of the defendant's pants and started shooting, wounding one victim and killing the other victim. McKee v. State, 280 Ga. 755, 632 S.E.2d 636 (2006).

Convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that while the victim was in the process of buying drugs from a third party, the defendant approached the driver's side of the victim's car, demanded the victim's money, and shot the victim several times, killing the victim and injuring a passenger in the car; the seller of the drugs testified that the seller had observed the defendant carrying a gun, and both the codefendant and another witness identified the defendant as the shooter. Major v. State, 280 Ga. 746, 632 S.E.2d 661 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as defendant's possession of the victim's handgun and shotgun on the night of the crimes was shown by the victim's direct testimony, rather than by circumstantial evidence, since: (1) the victim testified that two men forced their way into the victim's house, hit the victim in the head with a blunt object, recovered a .380 caliber handgun and a 20-gauge single-barrel shotgun, forced the victim to give them thousands of dollars the victim had hidden in the attic, and then fled; (2) during a consensual search, the police found a .380 caliber handgun hidden in the defendant's bedroom that was identified as the victim's by the victim and that bore the same serial number as the victim's gun; and (3) the victim identified defendant in a photo array and at trial; thus, the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant was in actual possession of the handgun and that defendant continued to be in at least constructive possession of the handgun when the handgun was found in defendant's bedroom. Tanksley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 61, 635 S.E.2d 353 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; the victims of both armed robberies, who testified as to the defendant's conduct of holding the victims up with a gun and taking cash, identified the defendant as the perpetrator, and when the officers apprehended the defendant, the defendant had a gun. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by the evidence as: (1) the defendant told the defendant's girlfriend that the defendant knew who had taken the defendant's drugs from a motel room and that the defendant was going to get them; (2) the defendant and an accomplice forced a woman with something "glossy" on the woman's forehead; (3) the defendant told the driver to stop at a secluded area so that the defendant could put the woman "somewhere safe"; (4) the defendant threw a gun from a bridge on the return; (5) the defendant instructed the driver to clean blood from the car's backseat; and (6) the defendant told the defendant's girlfriend that the defendant had killed the person who had the defendant's drugs and told a cell mate that the defendant had shot a person. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Despite the defendant's contrary contentions, evidence seized via the execution of a valid search warrant, specifically a substantial amount of methamphetamine, a set of scales in a case marked "dope kit inside," a .38 revolver, common tools of the drug trade, written instructions for making pure ephedrine, a loose bag of vitamin B-12 commonly used to dilute methamphetamine, over $2,000 in cash, and evidence that the defendant installed a video surveillance system to monitor the front door and driveway, both a trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon conviction were supported by sufficient evidence. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 178, 645 S.E.2d 658 (2007).

When the state's evidence showed that the defendant pulled into a parking lot while the victim was robbing a friend of the defendant's, waited in the defendant's car until the victim came around a corner, and then shot the victim three times without the victim ever having aimed the victim's gun at the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of felony murder based on the defendant's killing the victim while being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; although the defendant claimed that the defendant acted in self-defense, the jury was free to reject the defendant's claim. Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; a witness who sold drugs for the defendant got into a dispute with a third person over drugs before the shooting, the defendant upon seeing the victim asked the witness if the victim was the third person in question and then shot the victim, and witnesses placed the defendant at the scene of the crime and testified that the witnesses saw the defendant carrying a gun. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235, 647 S.E.2d 48 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant and the victim lived in the same rooming house where the defendant often intimidated the victim and demanded money from the victim, on the night of the crime the defendant sent the victim to buy crack cocaine and became angry when the victim returned empty-handed, the defendant argued with the victim and shot the victim in the eye, and at the hospital the victim repeatedly declined to say who shot the victim, except to say that a person with a first name other than the defendant's shot the victim accidentally. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007).

Because sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence showed that the defendant, a prior felon wielding a weapon, engaged in a fight with the two victims, fatally wounding one and shooting the other in the arm, and thereafter fled from police, the defendant's convictions for involuntary manslaughter, reckless conduct, fleeing and eluding, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were upheld on appeal. Alvin v. State, 287 Ga. App. 350, 651 S.E.2d 489 (2007).

Because Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule, and despite the fact that the jury found that the defendant did not commit armed robbery, this did not preclude the trial judge from finding the defendant guilty of possessing a firearm while a convicted felon given evidence that: (1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon was not contested; and (2) the defendant was in constructive possession of the firearm used by another to commit the crimes charged and conspired to possess the firearm as a party to the crime. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; in addition to testimony by a codefendant and eyewitness testimony by the victim's spouse, the victim's blood was on the defendant's clothes, the defendant had the victim's keys, and the knife used to kill the victim and a pistol were discovered near the site of the defendant's arrest in some woods near the scene of the crime. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011).

Defendant was properly convicted on two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of the police finding a silver .32 caliber handgun in the closet of the defendant's master bedroom, which also contained the defendant's clothes and other possessions, and to which the defendant admitted ownership; in turn, the victim testified that the defendant shot the victim with a gun, and the police found .380 caliber shell casings at the crime scene. The evidence authorized the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant used one firearm to shoot the victim and possessed another firearm in the defendant's bedroom. Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0978, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 508 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The four victims were found dead in two hotel rooms from gunshot wounds to the back of their heads; identification documents belonging to the four victims were found in the defendant's car; there was expert testimony that the defendant's gun had been used to kill the victims; the defendant's baseball cap contained one victim's deoxyribonucleic acid; there was evidence that the defendant and two friends used three victims' tickets to attend a football game after the victims were murdered; the defendant was identified as being in an elevator with one victim; the defendant was seen leaving the hotel with one victim's cooler; and a duffle bag belonging to one victim was in the defendant's car when the defendant was arrested on weapons charges. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, possessing a firearm during the commission of that murder, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. A drug dealer told police that the drug dealer saw the defendant shoot the victim, although the drug dealer said at trial that the drug dealer did not see the shooting; the drug dealer's spouse testified as to a statement by the drug dealer that was inconsistent with the drug dealer's trial testimony; and another prosecution witness testified that before the shooting, the defendant said that the defendant was "going to get" the victim and that afterward, the defendant said, "I told you I was going to do" the victim. Broner v. State, 284 Ga. 402, 667 S.E.2d 613 (2008).

Evidence that handguns belonging to a passenger in a defendant's car, that the handguns were within an arm's reach of the defendant during the commission of felony drug offenses, that the defendant knew that the passenger carried guns for protection while in the drug trade in which the defendant actively participated, and that the defendant was a first offender probationer was sufficient to show that the defendant jointly and constructively possessed the handguns in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b). Driscoll v. State, 295 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's burglary conviction as it was within the province of the jury to believe the testimony of the owner of the burglarized home, who was a police officer, and the testimony of a detective, regardless if the owner's trial testimony contradicted a prior written statement. Further, because the evidence showed that the defendant committed the burglary in which certain guns were stolen, it followed that the defendant took possession of the guns during the burglary, thus, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the verdict of guilty on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge with regard to the guns found in the bedroom of defendant's parent. Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 673 S.E.2d 537 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0986, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 341 (Ga. 2009).

Evidence supported the defendants' convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The first defendant told a driver to stop a car while the second defendant and the victim got out of another car; the second defendant held the victim at gunpoint with an AK-47; the first defendant jumped out of the car and approached the second car with a .45 caliber handgun; both defendants fired their weapons at the victim as the victim was running; after the victim fell, the second defendant stood over the victim with the rifle and fired several more times; the victim suffered five back-to-front bullet wounds; and shell casings from a .45 caliber handgun as well as an AK-47 were found at the scene. Anderson v. State, 285 Ga. 496, 678 S.E.2d 84 (2009).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(b), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant, who threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot the victim, wrapped the body with a large boulder, placed the victim in a retention pond, and, for days, misled the victim's mother and authorities about the victim's whereabouts was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm. Platt v. State, 291 Ga. 631, 732 S.E.2d 75 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by evidence that the defendant was present in the apartment above the defendant's mother's garage, had access to the garage at any time, and was present in the apartment almost every time probation officers visited, allowing the jury to find the defendant had access, power, and intention to exercise dominion or control over the firearm found in the apartment. Mantooth v. State, 335 Ga. App. 734, 783 S.E.2d 133 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's constructive possession of a gun because the defendant had access to the gun and had exercised control over the gun and there was evidence to corroborate the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had purchased a gun since the defendant knew where the gun was hidden and the defendant gave police permission to enter the room, indicating the intent to exert control over the room and contents. Jones v. State, 350 Ga. App. 618, 829 S.E.2d 820 (2019).

Evidence insufficient to support conviction.

- Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant's name did not appear on the lease for the apartment and there was no evidence that the defendant had any clothing or personal items at the apartment; the only evidence linking the defendant to the gun, other than the defendant's proximity to it, was the discovery of paperwork bearing the defendant's name in a closet of the apartment; and that circumstantial evidence did not provide a link between the defendant and the gun, nor did it exclude the possibility that the gun belonged to others present in the apartment - such as the other individual detained in the bedroom or those individuals found in the living room. Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 7, 806 S.E.2d 302 (2017).

Since the defendant's first-offender probation expired prior to the date on which the defendant was alleged to have possessed a firearm and the state presented no evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm during the term of probation and prior to the defendant's discharge, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer had to be reversed. Chavez v. State, 307 Ga. 804, 837 S.E.2d 766 (2020).

No evidence of constructive possession.

- Conviction was reversed in part because while the defendant knew the location of the shotgun, there was no evidence presented that the defendant had actual possession of the shotgun outside of possibly handing the shotgun to officers at the officers' request, nor was there evidence that the defendant was in constructive possession of the shotgun in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b). Peppers v. State, 315 Ga. App. 770, 728 S.E.2d 286 (2012).

Cited in Robinson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 296, 283 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775, 296 S.E.2d 110 (1982); Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983); Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233, 303 S.E.2d 773 (1983); Mayweather v. State, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 597 (1985); Hamilton v. State, 179 Ga. App. 434, 346 S.E.2d 881 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 210, 348 S.E.2d 736 (1986); Dickerson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 852, 350 S.E.2d 835 (1986); Marshall v. State, 193 Ga. App. 314, 387 S.E.2d 602 (1989); 123 A.L.R. 88; Gray v. State, 254 Ga. App. 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (2002); Reece v. State, 257 Ga. App. 137, 570 S.E.2d 424 (2002); Herring v. State, 277 Ga. 317, 588 S.E.2d 711 (2003); Thornton v. State, 288 Ga. App. 60, 653 S.E.2d 361 (2007); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666, 740 S.E.2d 598 (2013); Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013); Banks v. State, 329 Ga. App. 174, 764 S.E.2d 187 (2014); Patterson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 105, 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018); Barber v. State, 350 Ga. App. 309, 827 S.E.2d 733 (2019); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Marshall v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020).

Double Jeopardy

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 punishes a discrete crime and subjects a defendant to neither double jeopardy nor multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).

When a convicted felon is in possession of a sawed-off shotgun, two separate and distinct crimes are being committed, because a prohibited person is in possession of a prohibited weapon. One crime is not "included" in the other and they do not merge. Bivins v. State, 166 Ga. App. 580, 305 S.E.2d 29 (1983); Brown v. State, 168 Ga. App. 537, 309 S.E.2d 683 (1983).

Convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge, where one crime was not "included" in the other, and each involved proof of distinct essential elements. Scott v. State, 190 Ga. App. 492, 379 S.E.2d 199, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 899, 379 S.E.2d 199 (1989); Clark v. State, 206 Ga. App. 10, 424 S.E.2d 310 (1992).

Conviction not precluded by collateral estoppel.

- Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was not precluded by collateral estoppel where defendant was acquitted of two other charges (aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime against a person) arising out of the same incident; the jury could have concluded that defendant had the gun but did not assault or attempt to rob the victim with it. Clark v. State, 194 Ga. App. 280, 390 S.E.2d 425 (1990).

Conviction for malice murder and possession.

- Because defendant was found guilty of malice murder, defendant was properly convicted also of a possession count, it being unrelated to malice murder. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993).

Count of possession of firearm by convicted felon does not merge with related armed robbery charge. Smallwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. 247, 304 S.E.2d 95 (1983); McGee v. State, 173 Ga. App. 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985).

Merger with shooting of firearm.

- Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not merge with act of shooting the firearm; therefore, a jury may find a convicted felon guilty of felony murder by treating the felon's possession of a firearm in committing the murder as the underlying felony. Scott v. State, 250 Ga. 195, 297 S.E.2d 18 (1982).

Failure to merge offense.

- Trial court erred in failing to merge, for purposes of sentencing, the defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with use of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony, because the same act was used to establish each of the offenses and each crime did not require proof of a fact not required by the other. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 105, 733 S.E.2d 407 (2012).

Defendant's possession of a handgun when the defendant shot the victim on July 29, 2012, was not simultaneous with the defendant's possession of the long guns on August 2, 2012, when the defendant carried them from the house and hid them in the overgrown area of the backyard; thus, those convictions did not merge. However, because the defendant possessed all six of the long guns simultaneously, those six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon involving the long guns merged for purposes of sentencing. Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 538, 832 S.E.2d 402 (2019).

State may convict and punish for burglary and for unlawful possession of firearm by a previously convicted felon, when the firearm was taken in the burglary. The offenses charged were separate and distinct and there was no merger; evidence used to establish the burglary was not again used to establish the later crime of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 340 S.E.2d 256 (1986).

Conviction may not be used in repeat offender prosecution.

- Prior felony conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 cannot also be used to punish a defendant as a repeat offender under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a). King v. State, 169 Ga. App. 444, 313 S.E.2d 144 (1984).

Only one prosecution permitted regardless of number of firearms.

- Because the gravamen of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is the general receive, possession, or transportation of firearms by convicted felons, rather than the specific quantity of firearms received, possessed, or transported, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) was found ambiguous and permitted only one prosecution and conviction for the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms. Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 818 S.E.2d 622 (2018).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Former Code 1933, § 26-2914 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131) was only an additional qualification to requirements presently provided in former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(3)). 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-32.

Restoration, pursuant to pardon, of right to receive, possess or transport firearm.

- State Board of Pardons and Paroles has authority to restore, in a pardon to a Georgian convicted of a felony, the right to receive, possess or transport in commerce a firearm, so long as the pardon expressly uses wording which appears in 18 U.S.C. appx. § 1203(2). 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-122.

An order of restoration of civil rights granted by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles which expressly authorizes an individual to receive, possess, or transport a firearm satisfies the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(c) mandating the granting of a pardon. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Propriety of using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence, 37 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Sufficiency of evidence as to nature of firearm in prosecution under state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms, 37 A.L.R.4th 1179.

Fact that weapon was acquired for self-defense or to prevent its use against defendant as defense in prosecution for violation of state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 967.

Sufficiency of prior conviction to support prosecution under state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 983.

Sufficiency of evidence of possession in prosecution under state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 43 A.L.R.4th 788.

What amounts to "control" under state statute making it illegal for felon to have possession or control of firearm or other dangerous weapon, 66 A.L.R.4th 1240.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 745.

What constitutes "constructive possession" of unregistered or otherwise prohibited weapon under state law, 88 A.L.R.5th 121.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861, 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

Validity of state gun control legislation under state constitutional provisions securing right to bear arms - convicted felons, 85 A.L.R.6th 641.

Construction and application of state statutes and local ordinances regulating licenses or permits to carry concealed weapons, 12 A.L.R.7th 4.

Removal of Trustee in Bankruptcy Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 324(a), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1.

Waiver or Loss of Protection of Federal Attorney 'Work Product' Protection for Expert Witnesses Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2.

Proscription of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(3) that Persons Who Are Unlawful Users of or Addicted to Any Controlled Substance Cannot Possess Any Firearm or Ammunition in or Affecting Commerce, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3.

Balloon Payments in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4.

Adoption, Rejection, and Use of "Receipt of Benefits" Test Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5.

Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, As Amended (22 U.S.C.A. §§ 611 et seq.), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6.

Application of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Antisegmentation Principle to Dredge or Fill Projects, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1.

Extradition Treaties Between United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - United States and United Kingdom Cases, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6.

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