2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 11 - Offenses Against Public Order and Safety
Article 4 - Dangerous Instrumentalities and Practices
Part 3 - Carrying and Possession of Firearms
§ 16-11-126. Having or Carrying Handguns, Long Guns, or Other Weapons; License Requirement; Exceptions for Homes, Motor Vehicles, Private Property, and Other Locations and Conditions

1. Any person who is not prohibited by law from possessing a handgun or long gun may have or carry on his or her person a weapon or long gun on his or her property or inside his or her home, motor vehicle, or place of business without a valid weapons carry license.
2. Any person who is not prohibited by law from possessing a handgun or long gun may have or carry on his or her person a long gun without a valid weapons carry license, provided that if the long gun is loaded, it shall only be carried in an open and fully exposed manner.
3. Any person who is not prohibited by law from possessing a handgun or long gun may have or carry any handgun provided that it is enclosed in a case and unloaded.
4. Any person who is not prohibited by law from possessing a handgun or long gun who is eligible for a weapons carry license may transport a handgun or long gun in any private passenger motor vehicle; provided, however, that private property owners or persons in legal control of private property through a lease, rental agreement, licensing agreement, contract, or any other agreement to control access to such private property shall have the right to exclude or eject a person who is in possession of a weapon or long gun on their private property in accordance with paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Code Section 16-7-21, except as provided in Code Section 16-11-135.
5. 1. 1. Any person licensed to carry a weapon in any other state whose laws recognize and give effect to a license issued pursuant to this part shall be authorized to carry a weapon in this state, but only while the licensee is not a resident of this state; provided, however, that:
         1. Such licensee licensed to carry a weapon in any other state shall carry the weapon in compliance with the laws of this state; and
         2. No other state shall be required to recognize and give effect to a license issued pursuant to this part that is held by a person who is younger than 21 years of age.
      2. The Attorney General shall create and maintain on the Department of Law's website a list of states whose laws recognize and give effect to a license issued pursuant to this part.
   2. Any person who is not a weapons carry license holder in this state and who is licensed to carry a weapon in any other state whose laws recognize and give effect to a license issued pursuant to this part shall be authorized to carry a weapon in this state for 90 days after he or she becomes a resident of this state; provided, however, that such person shall carry the weapon in compliance with the laws of this state, shall as soon as practicable submit a weapons carry license application as provided for under Code Section 16-11-129, and shall remain licensed in such other state for the duration of time that he or she is a resident of this state but not a weapons carry license holder in this state.
6. 1. Any person with a valid hunting or fishing license on his or her person, or any person not required by law to have a hunting or fishing license, who is engaged in legal hunting, fishing, or sport shooting when the person has the permission of the owner of the land on which the activities are being conducted may have or carry on his or her person a weapon or long gun without a valid weapons carry license while hunting, fishing, or engaging in sport shooting.
   2. Any person with a valid hunting or fishing license on his or her person, or any person not required by law to have a hunting or fishing license, who is otherwise engaged in legal hunting, fishing, or sport shooting on recreational or wildlife management areas owned by this state may have or carry on his or her person a knife without a valid weapons carry license while engaging in such hunting, fishing, or sport shooting.
7. Notwithstanding Code Sections 12-3-10, 27-3-1.1, 27-3-6, and 16-12-122 through 16-12-127, any person with a valid weapons carry license may carry a weapon in all parks, historic sites, or recreational areas, as such term is defined in Code Section 12-3-10, including all publicly owned buildings located in such parks, historic sites, and recreational areas, in wildlife management areas, and on public transportation; provided, however, that a person shall not carry a handgun into a place where it is prohibited by federal law.
8. 1. No person shall carry a weapon without a valid weapons carry license unless he or she meets one of the exceptions to having such license as provided in subsections (a) through (g) of this Code section.
   2. A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon without a license when he or she violates the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
9. Upon conviction of the offense of carrying a weapon without a valid weapons carry license, a person shall be punished as follows:
   1. For the first offense, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and
   2. For the second offense within five years, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which convictions were obtained to the date of the current arrest for which a conviction is obtained, and for any subsequent offense, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than two years and not more than five years.
10. Nothing in this Code section shall in any way operate or be construed to affect, repeal, or limit the exemptions provided for under Code Section 16-11-130.

(Laws 1837, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 848, 849; Ga. L. 1851-52, p. 269, §§ 1-3; Code 1863, § 4413; Ga. L. 1865-66, p. 233, §§ 1, 2; Code 1868, § 4454; Code 1873, § 4527; Ga. L. 1882-83, p. 48, § 1; Code 1882, § 4527; Ga. L. 1898, p. 60, § 1; Penal Code 1895, § 341; Penal Code 1910, § 347; Code 1933, § 26-5101; Code 1933, § 26-2901, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1430, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 16; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 16; Ga. L. 1996, p. 108, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1153, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1630, § 3; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 16/SB 103; Ga. L. 2008, p. 533, § 3/SB 366; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1199, § 3/HB 89; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 16/SB 46; Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 1-2/SB 308; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-4/HB 60; Ga. L. 2015, p. 805, § 2/HB 492; Ga. L. 2017, p. 8, § 1/HB 406; Ga. L. 2017, p. 555, § 4/HB 292.)

The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective April 5, 2017, rewrote subsection (e); and added subsection (e.1). The second 2017 amendment, effective May 8, 2017, rewrote subsection (e); designated the existing provisions of subsection (f) as paragraph (f)(1); substituted "weapon" for "handgun" near the end of paragraph (f)(1) and added paragraph (f)(2).

- Exemption from section for private detectives and private security agents who hold firearms permits issued by Georgia Board of Private Detective and Security Agencies, § 43-38-10.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2010, "a" was inserted preceding "weapon" in the introductory language of subsection (i).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2017, the addition of subsection (e.1) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2017, p. 8, § 1/HB 406, was treated as impliedly repealed and superseded by Ga. L. 2017, p. 555, § 4/HB 292, due to irreconcilable conflict.

- Ga. L. 2008, p. 1199, § 1/HB 89, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Business Security and Employee Privacy Act.' "

Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 3-1/SB 308, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment of this Code section shall apply to all offenses committed on and after June 4, 2010, and shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before June 4, 2010, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecution.

Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"

Ga. L. 2017, p. 555, § 1/HB 292, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds that:

"(1) The ownership of firearms is a clear and explicit right protected by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of this state;

"(2) Access to financial services provides for the functioning of a firearms industry and, thus, the constitutionally protected right of firearm ownership; and

"(3) The provisions of this Act are intended to implement the constitutional protections provided for under the law."

Ga. L. 2017, p. 8, § 1/HB 406, which amended this Code section, purported to amend subsection (e), but also added subsection (e.1).

- For article on recidivism and convictions based on nolo contendere pleas, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979). For article, "No Second Chances: Immigration Consequences of Criminal Charges," see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 26 (2007). For article, "Crimes and Offenses," see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 131 (2011). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 47 (2014). For review of 1996 offenses against public order and safety legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 123 (1996).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Prima Facie Case

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 26-2903 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Wording of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126, particularly defining as a concealed weapon "any . . . knife designed for the purpose of offense and defense," is not facially unconstitutional, and, since there was no evidence in the record of what kind of knife defendant had in defendant's possession, the statute would not be declared void for vagueness. Simmons v. State, 262 Ga. 674, 424 S.E.2d 274 (1993).

Defendant's failure to point to a specific provision of the Constitution that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(d) allegedly violated was not fatal to defendant's claim that § 16-11-126(d) was unconstitutional due to vagueness, and the trial court erred by finding that defendant had not properly raised the issue of whether § 16-11-126(d) was constitutional. Lindsey v. State, 259 Ga. App. 389, 577 S.E.2d 78 (2003).

§ 1. - See Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911); Strickland v. State, 9 Ga. App. 855, 72 S.E. 436 (1911); Nero v. State, 10 Ga. App. 23, 72 S.E. 510 (1911); James v. State, 10 Ga. App. 13, 72 S.E. 600, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 115, 1913B Ann. Cas. 323 (1911); Armond v. State, 18 Ga. App. 140, 88 S.E. 990 (1916) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Purpose of Ga. L. 1910, p. 134 was to prevent evil of carrying pistols on person while going from place to place outside of house or place of business. Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140, 78 S.E. 866 (1913) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Ga. L. 1910, p. 134 should receive a reasonable construction in accord with purpose of its enactment. Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. App. 427, 77 S.E. 371 (1913); Cosper v. State, 13 Ga. App. 301, 79 S.E. 94 (1913); Rogers v. State, 19 Ga. App. 751, 92 S.E. 230 (1917); Whitehead v. State, 46 Ga. App. 42, 166 S.E. 448 (1932) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-126(b)(2) and16-11-128(b)(2) (now repealed) are recidivist statutes. In order to trigger their aggravation of punishment provisions it is necessary to show prior convictions. It is not sufficient merely to show the commission of previous offenses, the existence of previous charges, or the occurrence of previous events. Favors v. State, 182 Ga. App. 179, 355 S.E.2d 109 (1987).

- An offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 does not merge with an offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1 because neither crime is fully inclusive of the other. Sinkfield v. State, 266 Ga. 726, 470 S.E.2d 649 (1996).

- Defendant charged with carrying a concealed weapon has the burden of proving that defendant had a valid permit authorizing the defendant to carry a handgun in a motor vehicle. London v. State, 235 Ga. App. 30, 508 S.E.2d 247 (1998).

Carrying a pistol without a license and carrying a concealed weapon are separate offenses, although growing out of same transaction. Asberry v. State, 142 Ga. App. 51, 234 S.E.2d 847 (1977); Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's pre-trial motion for immunity because, in 2011, immunity was not available if in the use of deadly force, the defendant utilized a weapon the carrying or possession of which was unlawful by the defendant under Part 2 or 3 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of Title 16 of the Georgia Code; while the gun used to kill the victim was lawfully registered to the defendant, the defendant had never obtained a weapons carry license, and carrying a weapon was prohibited outside the defendant's own property, motor vehicle, or place of business without a valid license. Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 783 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

When "carrying" occurs when in custody of officer after arrest, former Penal Code 1910, § 347 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126) was applicable. James v. State, 153 Ga. 556, 112 S.E. 899 (1922).

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert a challenge to the weapons carry license statute insofar as it was applied to deprive the defendant of the defendant's statutory right to immunity because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Georgia Supreme Court had yet determined that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home for self-defense was an impermissible infringement on a citizen's Second Amendment rights; and, to the extent the defendant asserted that Second Amendment jurisprudence was headed in that direction, there was no requirement for trial counsel to prognosticate on future law in order to render effective representation. Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 783 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

Carrying weapon without license is not included within crime of aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Thomas v. State, 128 Ga. App. 538, 197 S.E.2d 452 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Violation of Ga. L. 1910, p. 134 and of section prohibiting carrying of concealed weapons, former Penal Code 1910, § 347 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126), may be charged in same indictment. Butler v. State, 18 Ga. App. 201, 89 S.E. 178 (1916) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and gang-related crimes, the trial court did not commit plain error with regard to the court's jury instructions because the trial court correctly stated the law by using the statutory language in the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a), in the court's charge to the jury, so the charge did not omit a nexus between the violence, and it was not possible for the jury to convict the defendant without finding that nexus. Skinner v. State, 318 Ga. App. 217, 733 S.E.2d 506 (2012).

Charge on felony involuntary manslaughter in a prosecution for voluntary manslaughter was not justified by defendant's carrying of a concealed weapon; the concealment, while unlawful, did not cause the death, defendant's firing of the gun did so. Carlton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 315, 480 S.E.2d 336 (1997).

It is immaterial that weapon is broken or useless. Williams v. State, 61 Ga. 417, 34 Am. R. 102 (1878); Crawford v. State, 94 Ga. 772, 21 S.E. 992 (1894).

- If carried about the person for any purpose, it must be fully exposed to view. Edwards v. State, 126 Ga. 89, 54 S.E. 809 (1906).

- That weapon is being carried to a shop for repairs does not negate requirement of carrying in full view. Crawford v. State, 94 Ga. 772, 21 S.E. 992 (1894).

When being delivered after having been repaired, weapon must be in full view. Goldsmith v. State, 99 Ga. 253, 25 S.E. 624 (1896).

- Carrying a pistol in pocket of defendant's pants, handle of pistol being visible to some witnesses through split in defendant's shirt but not seen by others, does not meet requirement that weapon be carried "in an open manner and fully exposed to view." Marshall v. State, 129 Ga. App. 733, 200 S.E.2d 902 (1973).

When no portion of the weapon is directly visible, it cannot be said that the weapon is being carried in an open manner and fully exposed to view, and this is true even though the arresting officer recognizes the bulge as a weapon. Gainer v. State, 175 Ga. App. 759, 334 S.E.2d 385 (1985).

- It was not reversible error to fail to charge the remaining "open manner and fully exposed to view" language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 where neither the circumstance admitted by the defendant at trial, that normally approximately an inch of the gun handle might have been visible below defendant's jacket line, nor the fact that the officer was able to initially view the weapon through an opening in defendant's jacket, met the "open" and "exposed" requirements of the statute. Anderson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 118, 416 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 309 (1992).

While O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(d) permits transporting a loaded firearm in any private passenger motor vehicle in an open manner and fully exposed to view or in the glove compartment, console, or similar compartment of the vehicle, a gun half-hidden in the seat is not "fully exposed" and therefore constitutes an illegal concealed weapon. Ross v. State, 255 Ga. App. 462, 566 S.E.2d 47 (2002).

- When one suddenly, upon an emergency, acquires manual possession of a pistol for purpose of defending oneself, one's family, or one's property, one is not guilty of carrying a pistol without a license in violation of this section. Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315, 85 S.E. 813 (1914); Caldwell v. State, 58 Ga. App. 408, 198 S.E. 793 (1938); Pickett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 1, 179 S.E.2d 303 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

One cannot carry a pistol about one's person for meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which one unlawfully intends to create by one's own act, without first procuring a license, and if such carrying is done outside of one's home or place of business, one is guilty of a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-5103 (now repealed). Caldwell v. State, 58 Ga. App. 408, 198 S.E. 793 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Minor under 18 years cannot carry pistol either with or without license. Glenn v. State, 10 Ga. App. 128, 72 S.E. 927 (1911) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- When license was purchased in one county while accused was in that county and pistol was carried openly in another county, there is no violation of Ga. L. 1910, p. 134. Rogers v. State, 19 Ga. App. 751, 92 S.E. 230 (1917) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Defendant's carrying of a concealed weapon into another's residence was unlawful. Snell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 651, 703 S.E.2d 93 (2010).

When no part of body touches pistol, it is not "about" one's person. Hayes v. State, 28 Ga. App. 67, 110 S.E. 320 (1922) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Ownership of pistol is immaterial except to illustrate guilt or innocence of accused. Gates v. State, 12 Ga. App. 706, 78 S.E. 270 (1913) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Parking area adjacent to rental property owned by defendant was not defendant's "place of business" for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126. Ely v. State, 222 Ga. App. 651, 475 S.E.2d 647 (1996).

- Conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 was warranted after the defendant was carrying a .22 caliber pistol in the defendant's back pocket without a permit, despite the fact that the defendant was driving a taxi which constituted defendant's place of business. Poole v. State, 159 Ga. App. 792, 285 S.E.2d 205 (1981).

Premises rented to tenant are not "place of business" of landlord. Reagon v. State, 16 Ga. App. 369, 85 S.E. 353 (1915) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Mere showing that upon different occasions defendant was seen with pistol in defendant's hand (these being occasions when defendant was in act of robbing another) does not authorize finding that defendant carried concealed weapon. McHenry v. State, 58 Ga. App. 410, 198 S.E. 818 (1938).

Farm laborer is exempt while carrying pistol upon farm where employed. Miller v. State, 12 Ga. App. 479, 77 S.E. 653 (1913) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

One may carry a pistol home from place of purchase without first obtaining a license; so also as to pistol found in road which finder carries home for safekeeping until called for by owner. Cosper v. State, 13 Ga. App. 301, 79 S.E. 94 (1913) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Former Ga. L. 1910, p. 134, § 1 did not apply when person, while examining weapon with view toward purchasing the weapon, was called away about 20 feet for a conversation. Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. App. 427, 77 S.E. 371 (1913) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Carrying pistol to return it to owner who left it at defendant's home requires license. Cheney v. State, 10 Ga. App. 451, 73 S.E. 617 (1912) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Carrying pistol to store, without license, for purpose of pawning the pistol violated Ga. L. 1910, p. 134, § 1. Usry v. State, 17 Ga. App. 268, 86 S.E. 417 (1915) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Fact that the defendant was carrying the pistol in a motor vehicle which was not defendant's own did not negate the need for a license. Hubbard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 141, 435 S.E.2d 709 (1993) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

Carrying pistol on road violates Ga. L. 1910, p. 134 (now repealed) even though the defendant owns land on both sides of the road. Foy v. State, 33 Ga. App. 676, 127 S.E. 619 (1925) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

- Given a gun license applicant's criminal history and the fact that the applicant retained the right to possess a handgun in the applicant's own home, vehicle, or business under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126, intermediate scrutiny was applied to the applicant's claim that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, regulating public carrying, was unconstitutional as applied to the applicant. Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 751 S.E.2d 90 (2013).

Weapon found in bag next to defendant is sufficient evidence of carrying a concealed weapon on or about defendant's person to justify conviction. Anderson v. State, 221 Ga. App. 176, 470 S.E.2d 778 (1996).

- Knife in a defendant's sock while the defendant was in a holding cell was sufficient to support carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(a). McCarty v. State, 269 Ga. App. 299, 603 S.E.2d 666 (2004).

- Whether a "scalpel" met the definition of a concealed weapon was a question for the finder of fact. Dorsey v. State, 212 Ga. App. 830, 442 S.E.2d 922 (1994).

- Whether a sharp and knife-like letter opener met the definition of a weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 was a jury question. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

- Gun protruding from under the driver's seat of a vehicle was not "fully exposed" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for conviction of a violation of that section. Parrish v. State, 228 Ga. App. 177, 491 S.E.2d 433 (1997).

- Gun ownership, and carrying such a weapon, do not by themselves impute bad character. Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 512 S.E.2d 640 (1999); Henderson v. State, 272 Ga. 621, 532 S.E.2d 398 (2000).

- Defendant's counsel's performance was defective for failing to file a motion to suppress a handgun found by police in the defendant's rear waistband because the defendant was in handcuffs, face down on the floor, and could have reasonably believed that the defendant was under arrest. The arrest was made without a warrant or probable cause. Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (2010).

It is for jury to determine whether knife exhibited meets definition laid down in former Code 1933, § 26-5101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126). Oliver v. State, 106 Ga. App. 493, 127 S.E.2d 325 (1962).

§ 16-11-126(c) not erroneous. - See Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984); Forehand v. State, 188 Ga. App. 527, 373 S.E.2d 382 (1988).

- Trial court erred in admitting into evidence over objection a fingerprint card taken following a felony arrest of defendant for violation of, inter alia, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126, since the violation of that section was an other crime not shown to be connected with the one on trial, served no useful or relevant purpose, placed defendant's character in evidence, and was prejudicial to defendant. Strawder v. State, 207 Ga. App. 365, 427 S.E.2d 792 (1993).

Indictment need not allege that weapon was manufactured and sold for purpose of offense and defense. Nixon v. State, 121 Ga. 144, 48 S.E. 966 (1904).

Sentence based on defendant's plea of nolo contendere constituted a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-51, requiring forfeiture of a weapon used in the commission of a crime. State v. Pitts, 199 Ga. App. 493, 405 S.E.2d 115 (1991).

- When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, theft by taking, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly imposed a 111-year sentence of imprisonment, which was within the statutory limits and which was the maximum possible. The presumption of vindictiveness was absent when a trial court imposed a greater penalty after trial than the court would have after a guilty plea; furthermore, the trial court explained that the court imposed the sentence because the defendant's actions were life-threatening, because the jury convicted the defendant of entering the dwelling with intent to commit murder, because the defendant's actions against one victim, the defendant's parent, had escalated from the defendant's previous misdemeanor crimes against the parent, and because the defendant displayed no remorse. Townes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 185, 679 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

- See Jackson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 847, 368 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); In re A.B., 193 Ga. App. 651, 388 S.E.2d 750 (1989).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for carrying a concealed weapon because the trial court, in a bench trial, credited an officer's testimony that the gun concealed in defendant's vehicle was loaded. Wright v. State, 272 Ga. App. 423, 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime, and carrying a concealed weapon were supported by sufficient evidence including guns, money, and a knife stolen from a robbery victim found in a car in which the defendant was a passenger, the fact that the defendant, when arrested, was wearing a sweatshirt identified by the victims as the sweatshirt worn by one of the perpetrators, and the testimony of another of the perpetrators, who stated that the defendant was one of the participants in the robbery. Callahan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 323, 634 S.E.2d 102 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Because sufficient evidence was presented consisting of the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a burglary, who threatened the victim with a sharp, knife-like letter opener, forcing the victim into a closet, and stealing the victim's camera upon fleeing, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's burglary, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping convictions; further, when the letter opener was found in a search incident to the defendant's arrest, and the defendant signed a false name on a waiver of Miranda rights form, sufficient evidence supported convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and forgery. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

Adjudication of delinquency for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18 was proper when juvenile defendant who was driving a relative's vehicle had free run of the relative's property while the relative was deployed overseas; also, defendant was in the vehicle the morning of and night before a traffic stop, defendant directed the other juvenile where to drive, neither gun was registered to the relative, defendant seemed to know about the guns' existence, and defendant gave a deputy false information about the defendant's identity. In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga. App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony that the defendant pulled a knife out of the defendant's pocket with the defendant's right hand and lunged at the victim was sufficient in itself to support convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-126. Testimony that the defendant had arthritis in the right hand at most created a conflict in the evidence as there was also testimony that the defendant, a carpenter, used both hands in the defendant's trade. Carder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 265, 661 S.E.2d 632 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug offense, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the items seized from the defendant's vehicle and the defendant's person after a traffic stop as the defendant's failure to wear a seatbelt and to have insurance on the vehicle justified the traffic stop. Thereafter, after being released from the traffic stop and being asked to come back, the defendant consented to the search of the vehicle and of the defendant's person, which led to the seizure of the contraband. Hughes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 404, 667 S.E.2d 163 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon because when the defendant was searched upon the defendant's arrest the defendant was found to be carrying a knife. Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 318, 690 S.E.2d 683 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for kidnapping, hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a weapon on school property were authorized because pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony alone established the essential elements of the offenses. Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (2011).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(b), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

- After the motion to suppress hearing was converted to an adjudicatory hearing, the state retained the burden of proof to present evidence to support each element of the weapons possession offenses of possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18, and possession and carrying of a handgun or a long gun by persons prohibited by law from such possession, but the state failed to carry the state's burden of proof to establish the elements of the weapons possession offenses by failing to show that the weapon met the definition of a handgun or long gun; furthermore, the state's failure to raise an objection to the procedure and the state's acquiesce to it did not constitute induced error or relieve the state of the state's burden of proof. In the Interest of A. A., 334 Ga. App. 37, 778 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

- State failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the firearm that fell from the juvenile's pocket met the requirements of the firearm offenses of possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18, and possession and carrying of a handgun or a long gun by persons prohibited by law from such possession because the state never introduced into evidence either photographs of the firearm recovered during the July 18 incident or the firearm itself; and the officer referred to it only as a firearm, weapon, or gun, and never identified the recovered weapon as a handgun or described the length of its barrel; thus, the appellate court reversed the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency as to those offenses. In the Interest of A. A., 334 Ga. App. 37, 778 S.E.2d 28 (2015).

Cited in Paulhill v. State, 229 Ga. 415, 191 S.E.2d 842 (1972); Ezzard v. State, 229 Ga. 465, 192 S.E.2d 374 (1972); Johnson v. State, 230 Ga. 196, 196 S.E.2d 385 (1973); Reeves v. State, 128 Ga. App. 750, 197 S.E.2d 843 (1973); Jackson v. State, 230 Ga. 640, 198 S.E.2d 666 (1973); Mayo v. State, 132 Ga. App. 217, 207 S.E.2d 697 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Freeman v. State, 233 Ga. 678, 212 S.E.2d 847 (1975); Carter v. State, 136 Ga. App. 197, 220 S.E.2d 749 (1975); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 225 S.E.2d 711 (1976); Lowe v. State, 239 Ga. 783, 239 S.E.2d 1 (1977); Holtzendorf v. State, 146 Ga. App. 823, 247 S.E.2d 599 (1978); J.E.T. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Simmons v. State, 246 Ga. 390, 271 S.E.2d 468 (1980); McCroy v. State, 155 Ga. App. 777, 272 S.E.2d 747 (1980); Robertson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 715, 288 S.E.2d 362 (1982); Edwards v. State, 165 Ga. App. 527, 301 S.E.2d 693 (1983); Daniel v. State, 170 Ga. App. 795, 318 S.E.2d 218 (1984); Dimick v. State, 178 Ga. App. 60, 341 S.E.2d 914 (1986); State v. Fricks, 188 Ga. App. 869, 374 S.E.2d 749 (1988); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. App. 676, 545 S.E.2d 89 (2001); Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Cranford, 285 Ga. App. 666, 647 S.E.2d 295 (2007); Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (2007); McBee v. State, 296 Ga. App. 42, 673 S.E.2d 569 (2009); Souder v. State, 301 Ga. App. 348, 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009); El-Fatin v. State, 332 Ga. App. 252, 771 S.E.2d 902 (2015); Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26, 785 S.E.2d 874 (2016); Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141, 839 S.E.2d 521 (2020).

Prima Facie Case

Prima facie case of violation of section.

- State makes a prima facie case by proving that accused carried or manually possessed pistol out of home or place of business. The burden of proving license or exemption is upon accused, and the state does not have to affirmatively negative license. Blocker v. State, 12 Ga. App. 81, 76 S.E. 784 (1912); Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 76 S.E. 785 (1912); Sims v. State, 12 Ga. App. 363, 77 S.E. 188 (1913); Russell v. State, 12 Ga. App. 557, 77 S.E. 829 (1913); Harris v. State, 14 Ga. App. 521, 81 S.E. 587 (1914); Harden v. State, 17 Ga. App. 322, 86 S.E. 736 (1915); Hardison v. State, 18 Ga. App. 692, 90 S.E. 374 (1916); Green v. State, 23 Ga. App. 519, 98 S.E. 553 (1919).

Prima facie case is made when it is proved defendant had pistol in hand though another grabbed the pistol when the pistol was discharged, no proof being had as to who brought pistol to place where defendant's statement as to examining pistol for purpose of purchase was rebutted. Alexander v. State, 25 Ga. App. 388, 103 S.E. 684 (1920) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

State makes out a prima facie case when it proves that accused carried a pistol on the accused's person, or had manual possession of a pistol, not at the accused's home or place of business, and burden is upon accused to show, in answer to this evidence, that the accused's had a license. Miller v. State, 50 Ga. App. 30, 177 S.E. 82 (1934); McHenry v. State, 58 Ga. App. 410, 198 S.E. 818 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

When upon trial, the state makes out a prima facie case of guilt on proof that the accused had in the accused's manual possession a pistol outside of the accused's home or place of business, it is then incumbent on the accused to establish a lawful possession. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842, 25 S.E.2d 692 (1943).

Prima facie case is established by proof that defendant carried pistol in public place, and burden of showing that defendant had a license is upon defendant. Days v. State, 134 Ga. App. 585, 215 S.E.2d 520 (1975); Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2903).

There is no restriction against carrying an unloaded shotgun in a vehicle through this state. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-30.

- Conviction obtained prior to July 1, 1976 for carrying of a concealed weapon may be used for a subsequent violation occurring after July 1, 1976, so as to treat that violation as a felony under (b)(2). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-29.

- Proposed ordinance regulating the manner and location in which a firearm may be lawfully placed in a home, building, trailer, or boat was in conflict with general laws of the state and, accordingly, the city council was without power to enact it because it would be ultra vires. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U98-6.

Off-duty police officers may carry a concealed weapon only if the officers are authorized to do so by state or federal law, regulation, or order. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U87-28.

Special deputy sheriff is not authorized, by virtue of that office, to carry a firearm. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-204.

Constables do not possess general police powers, and may carry pistols only if licensed. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-30.

- It is a violation of the statute if the vehicle is not the person's own automobile and if the person does not have a weapons license. On the other hand it is not a violation of the statute if the vehicle is the person's own automobile, whether the person has a license or not. It does not matter in either case whether the pistol is concealed or not; the offense is failure to have a license. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-66.

- Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Texas grant recognition to Georgia residents with firearms permits; thus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(e), residents of those states are entitled to recognition of their state's firearms license or permit and may carry handguns in Georgia. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-27.

Former Code 1933, § 26-2901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126) was violated when a pistol was concealed in automobile so as to be fully accessible with little or no movement; this prohibition was applicable regardless of who owned the automobile and regardless of whether the person had a license to carry the pistol; this prohibition was not limited to pistols and revolvers but was directed at any weapon as defined by that section. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-66.

- Investigators employed by the solicitor's office of the juvenile court may not be authorized by the solicitor to carry weapons and may not exercise the powers of a peace officer unless they are certified as peace officers pursuant to O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-22.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Weapons and Firearms, § 12 et seq.

- 94 C.J.S., Weapons, § 24 et seq.

- Instruction applying rule of reasonable doubt specifically to particular matter or defense as curing instruction placing burden of proof upon defendant in that regard, 120 A.L.R. 591.

Burden of averment and proof as to exception in criminal statute on which the prosecution is based, 153 A.L.R. 1218.

Offense of carrying concealed weapon as affected by manner of carrying or place of concealment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492.

What felonies are inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life for purposes of felony-murder doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3d 397.

Who is entitled to carry concealed weapons, 51 A.L.R.3d 504.

Scope and effect of exception, in statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to persons on his own premises or at his place of business, 57 A.L.R.3d 938.

Statutory presumption of possession of weapon by occupants of place or vehicle where it was found, 87 A.L.R.3d 949.

Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.

What constitutes "dangerous weapon" under statutes prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons in motor vehicle, 2 A.L.R.4th 1342.

What constitutes a "bludgeon," "blackjack," or "billy" within meaning of criminal possession statute, 11 A.L.R.4th 1272.

Validity of state statute proscribing possession or carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 745.

Constitutionality of state statutes and local ordinances regulating concealed weapons, 33 A.L.R.6th 407.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861, 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

Judicial review of state or local administrative order approving, denying, or revoking permit or license to carry, possess, or own firearm, 91 A.L.R.6th 435.