2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 11 - Offenses Against Public Order and Safety
Article 3 - Invasions of Privacy
Part 1 - Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, Surveillance, and Related Offenses
§ 16-11-64. Interception of Wire or Oral Transmissions by Law Enforcement Officers

1. Application of part to law enforcement officers. Except only as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, nothing in this part shall apply to a duly constituted law enforcement officer in the performance of his official duties in ferreting out offenders or suspected offenders of the law or in secretly watching a person suspected of violating the laws of the United States or of this state, or any subdivision thereof, for the purpose of apprehending such suspected violator.
2. When in the course of his or her official duties, a law enforcement officer desiring to make use of any device, but only as such term is defined in Code Section 16-11-60, and such use would otherwise constitute a violation of Code Section 16-11-62, the law enforcement official shall act in compliance with the provisions provided for in this part.
3. Upon written application, under oath, of the district attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime under investigation or the Attorney General made before a judge of superior court having jurisdiction over the crime under investigation, such court may issue an investigation warrant permitting the use of a device for the surveillance of a person or place to the extent the same is consistent with and subject to the terms, conditions, and procedures provided for by 18 U.S.C. Chapter 119. Such warrant shall have state-wide application and interception of communications shall be permitted in any location in this state.
4. Evidence obtained in conformity with this part shall be admissible only in the courts of this state having felony and misdemeanor jurisdiction.
5. Defenses. A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this part or under any other law.

(Ga. L. 1967, p. 844, § 1; Code 1933, § 26-3004, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 615, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 952, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 824, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 326, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1385, § 7; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2319, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 13; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 16; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 16; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 16; Ga. L. 2000, p. 491, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1432, § 3; Ga. L. 2013, p. 4, § 1/HB 55.)

- Searches and seizures generally, T. 17, C. 5.

- Ga. L. 2002, p. 1432, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as 'Georgia's Support of the War on Terrorism Act of 2002'."

- For survey of 1986 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1141 (1987). For article on the 2013 amendment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 109 (2013). For note discussing organized crime in Georgia with respect to the application of state gambling laws, and suggesting proposals for combatting organized crime, see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 124 (1970). For comment advocating certain revisions to former eavesdropping statute, in light of constitutional requirements as articulated in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967), see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 595 (1968).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Constitutionality
• Relationship Between State and Federal Law
• Application

General Consideration

Legislative intent.

- General Assembly's intent is to foster cooperation between law enforcement agencies as necessary to the prosecution of organized crime. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984).

- Former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) provided permission for third-party interception by law enforcement officers under specified circumstances and procedures. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, on remand, 142 Ga. App. 802, 237 S.E.2d 243 (1977).

Former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) permitted enforcement agents to use electronic eavesdropping devices under appropriate circumstances and control. Birge v. State, 142 Ga. App. 735, 236 S.E.2d 906 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 240 Ga. 501, 241 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945, 98 S. Ct. 2847, 56 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1978).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) merely provides authority to Georgia superior court judges to issue wiretap warrants upon proper application by the prosecuting attorney, and the statute contains no prohibition against evidence gathered as part of a federal investigation in compliance with the federal warrant process. State v. Harrell, 323 Ga. App. 56, 744 S.E.2d 867 (2013).

- Appellate court erred in affirming a trial court's denial of the appellants' motion to suppress because the warrants were invalid since the Gwinnett County Superior Court lacked the authority to issue the wiretap warrants for the interceptions in the case which took place exclusively in Fulton County. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Georgia concludes that Georgia superior courts do not currently possess the authority to issue wiretap warrants for interceptions conducted outside the boundaries of their respective judicial circuits. Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 736 S.E.2d 397 (2013).

- Trial court erred by granting the defendant's motion to suppress because the fact that the warrant was not initially issued by a Georgia superior court judge did not violate the requirements for obtaining a warrant codified in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) and that fact did not require suppression of evidence gathered pursuant to the warrant. State v. Harrell, 323 Ga. App. 56, 744 S.E.2d 867 (2013).

- Police officer in performance of the officer's official duties in ferreting out offenders of the law was authorized by former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) to go upon premises of another or any private place and eavesdrop upon conversations of others. Rautenstrauch v. State, 129 Ga. App. 381, 199 S.E.2d 613 (1973).

Nothing in former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) allowed private individuals to monitor intercepted communications. Bilbo v. State, 142 Ga. App. 716, 236 S.E.2d 847 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 240 Ga. 601, 242 S.E.2d 21 (1978).

Exception stated in former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) was not limited to law enforcement officers as they were dealt with and excepted in former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64). Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974).

- When investigator listening in on the defendant's telephone conversations had not previously made written application under oath to the district attorney or Attorney General, showing probable cause, and then obtained an investigation warrant from a judge of superior court, the investigator was clearly within the prohibition of former Code 1933, § 26-3001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62). State v. Toomey, 134 Ga. App. 343, 214 S.E.2d 421 (1975).

- An investigation warrant must be obtained before recording a telephone conversation between the alleged child victim and the defendant, even though the District Attorney obtained the consent of the child's father. Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 415 S.E.2d 168 (1992).

- Superior court judge, in granting application for telephonic surveillance, is not presiding as judge for particular county of the judicial circuit in which the judge is physically present when application is presented to the judge, but is acting as judge of superior court of circuit authorized to grant such applications. The application, therefore, may be granted in any county of the judge's judicial circuit. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Disclosure under former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(7) was not required when consent of one party was received under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66. Luck v. State, 163 Ga. App. 657, 295 S.E.2d 584 (1982).

Former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(8) was intended to strictly limit publication and use of evidence obtained through electronic surveillance. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).

Former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(8) did not prohibit the use of information obtained to broaden the scope of the pending investigation and give probable cause to seek additional wiretaps and to intercept the conversations of additional parties. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1987).

Trial court's suppression of wiretap evidence was proper where the state made no evidentiary showing that the disclosure of intercepted telephone conversations to an IRS agent was necessary and essential for purposes of prosecuting defendant for commercial gambling; moreover, there was no basis for finding that disclosure to the agent was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 as a matter of law. Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 475 S.E.2d 629 (1996)reversing State v. Anderson, 218 Ga. App. 643, 463 S.E.2d 34 (1995).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b) does not prohibit making duplicate recordings. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1987).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 permits use of evidence derived from interception of wire or oral communications relating to offense, but limits use of evidence of offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization to offense for which investigative warrant may issue. Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981).

- Assuming the information obtained during electronic surveillance by police officers was shared with other law enforcement agencies, such disclosure does not cause the information and evidence to be inadmissible at trial. Uhler v. State, 180 Ga. App. 767, 350 S.E.2d 281 (1986), cert. dismissed, 257 Ga. 324, 359 S.E.2d 14 (1987).

- Former Code 1933, §§ 26-3001 and 26-3004(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-62 and16-11-64(c)) were not intended to apply to a sovereign absent an appropriate naming of the sovereign, but, rather, were intended merely to state rules relating to admissibility of evidence in courts in this state and not to prohibit admissibility in courts of other jurisdictions, particularly not in courts of the United States. United States v. Hayes, 445 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Ga. 1977).

- Legislature contemplated bringing of civil actions for wiretapping tort. Awbrey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

When the record showed that the discs of the wiretap recordings were created June 24, 2015, the issuing judge signed an order sealing the discs on July 2, 2015, and the authorizing order expired around July 6, 2015, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 and 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a), the state did not need to provide an explanation of the delay between the sealing and the date the authorizing order expired as the evidence showed that the recordings were sealed before the expiration of the authorizing order; thus, the defendants' motion to suppress was properly denied. Booth v. State, 344 Ga. App. 661, 812 S.E.2d 21 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 521; cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 526; cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 523; cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 497; cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 513 (Ga. 2018).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-67 applies to violations of the administrative requirements of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 since, to protect against tampering, alteration, or destruction of evidence, and against allegations thereof, "obtained" necessarily includes both the gathering and safeguarding of evidence. Williams v. State, 265 Ga. 471, 457 S.E.2d 665 (1995).

Noncompliance with the administrative requirements of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 did not call for suppression of evidence developed from information gathered with a pen register where there was no showing of any prejudice to defendant's privacy interest resulting from such noncompliance. Williams v. State, 265 Ga. 471, 457 S.E.2d 665 (1995).

- In the defendant's motion to suppress the contents of intercepted telephone calls in which the defendant allegedly set up a drug deal with the target of wiretapping warrants, the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant could not rely on the state's evidence to establish standing; the defendant should have been permitted to rely on a sergeant's testimony that the defendant was the speaker on the call in an attempt to establish standing. Bourassa v. State, 306 Ga. 329, 830 S.E.2d 189 (2019).

- Alleged noncompliance with procedural safeguards in connection with a wiretap on the telephone of defendant's mother did not provide a basis for suppressing intercepted communications from defendant's telephone; defendant had no standing to complain of the noncompliance. Williams v. State, 211 Ga. App. 8, 438 S.E.2d 126 (1993).

- Although the defendants had general standing to attack the illegality of a wiretap on their telephone, the defendants lacked the standing to assert that the illegality was due to the fact that the defendants' telephone toll records were illegally obtained because telephone toll and billing records are not owned or possessed by the telephone customer but are business records belonging to the telephone company. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1987).

- When and how to raise objections to evidence at trial is generally a matter of trial strategy, thus, neither the fact that the appellant's counsel could have pursued a different strategy to suppress the wiretap evidence nor the fact that the chosen strategy was partially unsuccessful necessarily renders the counsel's performance constitutionally deficient. Kilpatrick v. State, 308 Ga. 194, 839 S.E.2d 551 (2020).

Cited in Pruitt v. State, 227 Ga. 188, 179 S.E.2d 339 (1971); Satterfield v. State, 127 Ga. App. 528, 194 S.E.2d 295 (1972); Cauley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 278, 203 S.E.2d 239 (1973); Orkin v. State, 239 Ga. 334, 236 S.E.2d 576 (1977); State v. Birge, 240 Ga. 501, 241 S.E.2d 213 (1978); State v. Bilbo, 240 Ga. 601, 242 S.E.2d 21 (1978); Dismuke v. State, 152 Ga. App. 188, 262 S.E.2d 490 (1979); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798, 267 S.E.2d 237 (1980); Caudill v. State, 157 Ga. App. 415, 277 S.E.2d 773 (1981); Ford v. State, 160 Ga. App. 707, 288 S.E.2d 39 (1981); Bilbo v. United States, 633 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1981); Gilstrap v. State, 162 Ga. App. 841, 292 S.E.2d 495 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020); Romano v. State, 162 Ga. App. 816, 292 S.E.2d 533 (1982); Gonzalez v. State, 175 Ga. App. 217, 333 S.E.2d 132 (1985); Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987); Quintrell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 268, 499 S.E.2d 117 (1998); Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Ga. 1999); Santibanez v. State, 301 Ga. App. 121, 686 S.E.2d 884 (2009).

Former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) was not violative of U.S. Const., amends. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 14. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(8), limiting publication, does not automatically override the Sixth Amendment's openness principle or the First Amendment and turn criminal proceedings into closed events. Ayers v. State, 181 Ga. App. 244, 351 S.E.2d 692 (1986).

- Electronic surveillance of suspect not in custody does not violate right under U.S. Const., amend. 5 not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Rights to remain silent and to counsel inapplicable to electronic surveillance of suspect not in custody. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Fact that 28 U.S.C. § 2518(6) is not included in former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) did not render the state statute unconstitutional or in conflict with federal provision. Lawson v. State, 236 Ga. 770, 225 S.E.2d 258, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857, 97 S. Ct. 156, 50 L. Ed. 2d 134, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859, 97 S. Ct. 159, 50 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1976).

Relationship Between State and Federal Law

Both state and federal law must be complied with.

- Wiretapping and surveillance are subjects of federal and state law and both must be complied with where applicable. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979); Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S. Ct. 106, 83 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1984).

Although an investigation warrant could be obtained under provisions of former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64), it was settled that a wiretap must also be measured against standards set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, which are part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Bilbo v. State, 142 Ga. App. 716, 236 S.E.2d 847 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 240 Ga. 601, 242 S.E.2d 21 (1978).

Evidence must be excluded if obtained in manner inconsistent with either federal or state law. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

- Eighteen U.S.C. § 2516(2) does not require that state wiretap statutes be carbon copies of federal enactment; they must merely be in conformity with federal law. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

Former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) was supplementary of the federal statute. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Applicable federal standards set minimum requirements for surveillance in analysis of state-authorized wiretap; if these minimum requirements are not met, analysis need proceed no further and wiretap must be held to be unlawful. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

When federal standards are met, analysis must proceed under applicable state law to determine if state standards, which may be more stringent, are met. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

Applicable standard under both federal statute and former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) was probable cause for issuance of order to tap. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

"Good cause shown" under former paragraph (b)(3) of former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) was equivalent of "probable cause" under federal statute. Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).

Evidence obtained without violating federal law, although violating state law, is admissible in federal criminal trial. United States v. Hayes, 445 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Ga. 1977).

Application

Pen registers.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-60, the definition of the term "device" expressly excluded pen registers; thus, defendant's contention that a pen register order violated former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)'s 20-day time limitation for investigative warrants failed. Barnett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 465, 576 S.E.2d 923 (2003).

Standard of probable cause required for invasion of citizen's privacy by authority of wiretap warrant is same as standard for regular search warrant. Tookes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 423, 283 S.E.2d 642 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1982).

Investigation warrants authorizing tapping of telephone lines must state: (1) that interception will terminate when described communication is first obtained; (2) that authorization to intercept will be executed as soon as practicable; (3) that interceptions will be conducted so as to minimize interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception; and (4) that interception will terminate upon attainment of authorized objective. Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. 805, 177 S.E.2d 699 (1970).

Time necessary to accomplish objective of wiretap is within discretion of judge issuing warrant, thus, "execution" of a wiretap is not rendered illegal for reason that surveillance was not terminated immediately upon realization of objectives sought in petition for investigation warrant which initially authorized wiretap. Dowdy v. State, 148 Ga. App. 498, 251 S.E.2d 571 (1978).

Length of time to continue a wiretap addresses sound discretion of trial court and absent abuse of that discretion an appellate court will not interfere. Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 395, 249 S.E.2d 110 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917, 99 S. Ct. 1235, 59 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1979).

Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent's failure to follow the mandated procedure for obtaining a warrant for installation of a pen register negated the legal effect of the authorization order the agent obtained from a judge and caused the pen register to be illegal. Duncan v. State, 259 Ga. 278, 379 S.E.2d 507 (1989).

- There is no requirement that court exercise personal supervision over execution of wiretap. Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 395, 249 S.E.2d 110 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917, 99 S. Ct. 1235, 59 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1979).

Neither personal judicial supervision nor progress reports, absent judicial request, are required by either state or federal law. Dowdy v. State, 148 Ga. App. 498, 251 S.E.2d 571 (1978).

- Failure of trial judge to expressly make written findings under former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64) would not be cause for invalidating warrant where it appeared from record that affidavit or other evidence submitted to issuing judge by applicant would clearly have authorized such findings. Under these circumstances it will be presumed that judge issuing warrant made necessary findings before issuing it. Cross v. State, 225 Ga. 760, 171 S.E.2d 507 (1969).

- Conspiracy to commit murder, although subsequently enacted, is a felony involving bodily harm within meaning of former (b)(1) for which an investigation warrant may issue. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).

Former Code 1933, § 26-2304 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-10-4(b)) was an offense within scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) and former paragraph (b)(1) of former Code 1933, § 26-3004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64). Ansley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 670, 185 S.E.2d 562 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S. Ct. 2503, 33 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1972).

Police officer placing ear next to door does not convert otherwise permissible surveillance into illegal search. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981).

An inductor coil which is placed in the junction box servicing each phone to be tapped is not a device used to overhear, record, or intercept defendant's conversation within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-60 and16-11-64. Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S. Ct. 106, 83 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1984).

- Construction to be given to former (b)(8) was what was reasonably necessary and essential to preparation of and actual prosecution for a crime; what is reasonable will depend upon facts of a given case and must necessarily rest with controlled discretion of district attorney, subject to review by trial court. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

- At hearing on a motion to suppress, burden of proof is upon state to show what facts constituting probable cause existed and were presented to magistrate before warrant was issued. Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 263 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

- Playing tape recordings of telephone conversations between conspirators to intended victim for purposes of voice identification, does not taint evidence, nor does allowing victim's counsel to hear tapes. Orkin v. State, 140 Ga. App. 651, 231 S.E.2d 481 (1976).

- See Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 280, 447 S.E.2d 676 (1994), aff'd, 265 Ga. 471, 457 S.E.2d 665 (1995).

- When an ambulance was called to the scene of a child's injury, and a police officer recorded the defendant acting out the events on the officer's cell phone, allegedly contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2), any error in admitting the video was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and the recording was cumulative of other evidence. Sims v. State, 297 Ga. 401, 774 S.E.2d 620 (2015).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Use of two-way communication system, known to prisoners.

- Use of two-way communication system for monitoring all activity in jail, operation of such system being known to each prisoner, would not necessarily deprive a prisoner of constitutional rights, provided there is no interception of conversations between attorney and client. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-84.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 620. 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Search and Seizure, §§ 176 et seq., 338.

- 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, §§ 30, 31, 144 et seq. 86 C.J.S., Telecommunications, § 177.

- Admissibility of evidence obtained by government or other public officer by intercepting letter or telegraph or telephone message, 66 A.L.R. 397; 134 A.L.R. 614.

Admissibility of telephone conversations in evidence, 71 A.L.R. 5; 105 A.L.R. 326.

Mode of establishing that information obtained by illegal wiretapping has or has not led to evidence introduced by prosecution, 28 A.L.R.2d 1055.

What constitutes an "interception" of a telephone or similar communication forbidden by the Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 605) or similar state statutes, 9 A.L.R.3d 423.

Right or duty to refuse telephone, telegraph, or other wire service in aid of illegal gambling operations, 30 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Uninvited entry into another's living quarters as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 434.

Omission or inaudibility of portions of sound recording as affecting its admissibility in evidence, 57 A.L.R.3d 746.

Sufficiency of identification of participants as prerequisite to admissibility of telephone conversation in evidence, 79 A.L.R.3d 79.

State or municipal liability for invasion of privacy, 87 A.L.R.3d 145.

Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on communications between accused and his attorney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841.