2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Administration
Article 1 - Abuse of Governmental Office
§ 16-10-2. Bribery

1. A person commits the offense of bribery when:
   1. He or she gives or offers to give to any person acting for or on behalf of the state or any political subdivision thereof, or of any agency of either, any benefit, reward, or consideration to which he or she is not entitled with the purpose of influencing him or her in the performance of any act related to the functions of his or her office or employment; or
   2. A public official, elected or appointed, or an employee of this state or any agency, authority, or entity of the state, or any county or municipality or any agency, authority, or entity thereof, directly or indirectly solicits, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive a thing of value by inducing the reasonable belief that the giving of the thing will influence his or her performance or failure to perform any official action.A thing of value shall not include:
      1. Food or beverage consumed at a single meal or event;
      2. Legitimate salary, benefits, fees, commissions, or expenses associated with a recipient's nonpublic business, employment, trade, or profession;
      3. An award, plaque, certificate, memento, or similar item given in recognition of the recipient's civic, charitable, political, professional, or public service;
      4. Food, beverages, and registration at group events to which all members of an agency, as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Code Section 21-5-30.2, are invited.An agency shall include the Georgia House of Representatives, the Georgia Senate, committees and subcommittees of such bodies, and the governing body of each political subdivision of this state;
      5. Actual and reasonable expenses for food, beverages, travel, lodging, and registration for a meeting which are provided to permit participation or speaking at the meeting;
      6. A commercially reasonable loan made in the ordinary course of business;
      7. Any gift with a value less than $100.00;
      8. Promotional items generally distributed to the general public or to public officers;
      9. A gift from a member of the public officer's immediate family; or
      10. Food, beverage, or expenses afforded public officers, members of their immediate families, or others that are associated with normal and customary business or social functions or activities;

          provided, however, that receiving, accepting, or agreeing to receive anything not enumerated in subparagraphs (A) through (J) of this paragraph shall not create the presumption that the offense of bribery has been committed.

2. A person convicted of the offense of bribery shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years, or both.

(Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 805; Code 1863, §§ 4364, 4365; Ga. L. 1865-66, p. 233, § 1; Code 1868, §§ 4402, 4403; Code 1873, §§ 4469, 4470; Code 1882, §§ 4469, 4470; Penal Code 1895, §§ 267, 268; Penal Code 1910, §§ 270, 271; Code 1933, §§ 26-4101, 26-4102; Ga. L. 1949, p. 274, § 1; Ga. L. 1959, p. 34, § 18; Code 1933, § 26-2301, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1749, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075, § 17.)

- Prohibition against contributions by corporations for purpose of influencing vote, judgment, or action of officer of state, § 14-5-6.

Lobbying, T. 28, C. 7 and T. 21, C. 5, Art. 4.

- For article discussing statute preceding present criminal Code section restricting municipal purchasing from city officials, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 309 (1969). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 40 (1992). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 247 (1992).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application
• Constitutional Issues

Ethics in Government Act, O.C.G.A. § 21-5-1 et seq., has in no manner altered the bribery statutes; the act simply defines a campaign contribution and, having defined, requires disclosure; specifically, nothing in the act permits a public officeholder to request or receive anything of value to which the officeholder is not entitled with the purpose of influencing the officeholder in the performance of any act related to the functions of the office or employment; nor is the term "entitled," as contained in the bribery statute, modified in any way by the Ethics in Government Act. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- Ethics in Government Act, O.C.G.A. § 21-5-1 et seq., carried forward the substance of the definition of contribution from the Financial Disclosure Act, but removed the words that restricted the term "influence" to "influencing the introduction of enriching legislation"; the change was not an attempt to restrict the definition of a bribe, but as a manner of enlarging the definition of a contribution so as to ensure the reporting of almost all transfers to the candidate or office holder. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Essential elements of offense are offer or gift, purpose to corruptly influence, and official status of offeree. Ingram v. State, 97 Ga. App. 468, 103 S.E.2d 666 (1958); Slaughter v. State, 99 Ga. App. 239, 108 S.E.2d 161 (1959).

Offense of bribery is complete when offer of reward is made to influence vote or action of an official. York v. State, 42 Ga. App. 453, 156 S.E. 733 (1931).

Act need not be lawful to render officer liable, but need only be official in form and done under color of office. York v. State, 42 Ga. App. 453, 156 S.E. 733 (1931).

One cannot be bribed to do something entirely outside of one's official duties. Taylor v. State, 42 Ga. App. 443, 156 S.E. 623, later appeal, 44 Ga. App. 387, 161 S.E. 793 (1931).

Both giving and receiving of bribe are not necessary elements of offense; giving renders offerer guilty, and receiving, with criminal intent, renders receiver guilty. Slaughter v. State, 99 Ga. App. 239, 108 S.E.2d 161 (1959).

- Other than those emoluments of public office that are expressly authorized and established by law, no holder of public office is entitled to request or receive - from any source, directly or indirectly - anything of value in exchange for the performance of any act related to the functions of that office. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Citizens of Georgia have every right to try to influence their public officers - through petition and protest, promises of political support and threats of political reprisal; they do not have, nor have they ever had, the "right" to buy the official act of a public officer. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- Only offense expressly designated as bribery under Georgia law is this section. Ansley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 670, 185 S.E.2d 562 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S. Ct. 2503, 33 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1972).

Bribery is a well-known word, used widely and understood generally. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

- Ordinary signification of "bribery" may mean an act of influencing action of another by corrupt inducement. As a legal word of art, "bribery" is somewhat broader, including offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of anything of value to influence action as an official or in discharge of a legal or public duty. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

That an officer may not be "entitled" under the terms of the officer's public employment to receive money for private work does not demonstrate that soliciting and receiving such compensation is bribery. If, on the other hand, an officer is not prohibited by the terms of the officer's public employment from engaging in private work, by soliciting and receiving money for such work, the officer is likewise not seeking a "bribe." A bribe must be for the purpose of influencing an officer in the performance of any act related to the officer's public office or employment. Upton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 541, 305 S.E.2d 1 (1983).

Acceptance of a bribe is an egregious conflict of interest, and will vitiate official acts that otherwise appear to be lawful. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- Public officers are not prohibited from receiving legitimate financial aid in support of nomination or election to public office; they do not have, nor have they ever had, the "right" to sell the powers of their offices. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Campaign contribution, whether made to a candidate in the heat of a campaign or to encourage or influence the official after the candidate is elected, is not something which a candidate or elected official is qualified or privileged to request or receive and thus is not something to which the candidate is "entitled" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- Transfer that is a bribe as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2 also may come within the definition of "contribution" as contained in the third sentence of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-3(6); the fact that such a transfer must be reported does not change the transfer's character as a bribe. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(2)) must be read in pari materia with the rest of the section. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

Meaning of offense set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of former Code 1933, §§ 26-4101 and 26-4102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was dependent upon language of paragraph (a)(1) of that section with respect to purpose for which person "solicits or receives" and was thus restricted to "influencing him in performance of any act related to functions of his office or employment" whereas former Code 1933, § 26-2304 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-4(b)) included solicitation for sale of influence by perpetrating officer or employee, who might or might not be a member of the legislative body, or others, members of the legislative body, to assure passage or defeat of legislation. Ansley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 670, 185 S.E.2d 562 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S. Ct. 2503, 33 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1972).

- Although at same place and time under same circumstances, appellant extended offer of bribe to two officers, appellant's conduct constituted a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-2301 as to each, and the two counts of bribery did not have to be consolidated for trial. Hall v. State, 155 Ga. App. 724, 272 S.E.2d 578 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2).

§ 16-10-4(b). - Former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was restricted to bribes to influence an official in the official's performance of any act related to functions of office or employment, whereas former Code 1933, § 26-2304 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-4(b)) included the sale of an official's influence on others who were members of a legislative body. Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1973).

Acquittal under this section not necessarily inconsistent with conviction under § 16-10-4. - From standpoint of conviction and acquittal, acquittal on a count under former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was not, as a matter of law, inconsistent and repugnant to a simultaneous conviction on a count under former Code 1933, § 26-2304 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-4). Ansley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 670, 185 S.E.2d 562 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S. Ct. 2503, 33 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1972).

- Offense of violation of oath by a public officer is a lesser included offense of bribery. Nave v. State, 171 Ga. App. 165, 318 S.E.2d 753 (1984).

Proof of the alleged bribery of an assistant district attorney as a factual matter would include the facts necessary to establish a violation of oath, and thus the latter is embraced within the charge of bribery and constitutes a lesser included offense of that crime. Nave v. Helms, 845 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1988).

- Receiver of bribe might be convicted although person who paid money might have been in fact ignorant that receiver, in order to do what was requested of the receiver, would have to act in such official capacity as to commit crime of bribery. Slaughter v. State, 99 Ga. App. 239, 108 S.E.2d 161 (1959).

Municipal officer fell within scope of former Code 1933, §§ 26-4101 and 26-4102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2). Wellborn v. State, 78 Ga. App. 520, 51 S.E.2d 588 (1949).

Bribery statute is applicable to members of municipal council. Turner v. State, 43 Ga. App. 799, 160 S.E. 509 (1931).

Former Code 1910, §§ 270, 271 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was applicable to an attempt to offer money to a member of the Atlanta City Council for purposes of trying to influence the council member's official action. Taylor v. State, 44 Ga. App. 64, 160 S.E. 667 (1931), cert. dismissed, 175 Ga. 642, 165 S.E. 733 (1932), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tyson, 544 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2001).

Offices of police officer and deputy sheriff of county were included in the coverage provided by former Code 1933, §§ 26-4101 and 26-4102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2). Usry v. State, 90 Ga. App. 644, 83 S.E.2d 843 (1954).

- Because the existence, execution, and timing of an agreement that allegedly violated the bribery statute were unknown to the state before February 2010, the statute of limitation for the bribery charge was tolled until it was discovered; and the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's plea in bar based on the expiration of the statute of limitation. Kenerly v. State, 325 Ga. App. 412, 750 S.E.2d 822 (2013).

Cited in Ken Stanton Music, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 227 Ga. 393, 181 S.E.2d 67 (1971); Partain v. State, 129 Ga. App. 213, 199 S.E.2d 549 (1973); Hickox v. State, 138 Ga. App. 882, 227 S.E.2d 829 (1976); Patterson v. State, 247 Ga. 736, 280 S.E.2d 836 (1981); United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 289 S.E.2d 270 (1982); United States v. Ward, 808 F. Supp. 803 (S.D. Ga. 1992); Five Star Partners v. Vincent Netherlands Properties, 169 Bankr. 994 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994); In the Matter of Farmer, 307 Ga. 307, 835 S.E.2d 629 (2019).

Application

Receipt of bribe by assistant district attorney proved.

- Under the evidence, the state met its burden of proving that an assistant district attorney received something of value to influence the attorney's action in the discharge of a legal or public duty, and the payments could be found by a jury to have influenced the attorney's decision as to whether to reopen the case and prosecute an accused. Nave v. State, 166 Ga. App. 466, 304 S.E.2d 491 (1983).

- Motion for general demurrer by defendant, a county jailer, was properly denied on defendant's indictment on a charge of bribery for receiving marijuana as payment for delivering a pack of cigarettes to an inmate because where the indictment alleged the giving of a thing of value in exchange for a service rendered, the thing could not be considered a gift, notwithstanding the $10 value of the alleged bribe. Murkerson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 701, 592 S.E.2d 184 (2003).

Evidence that a corrections officer threatened an inmate that if the inmate did not give the officer $2,000, the officer would have the inmate charged with marijuana possession, was insufficient for a jury to find that the officer attempted to improperly influence official action by another officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-5, although it might have supported a conviction for bribery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2. Beard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 146, 684 S.E.2d 306 (2009).

- Within the context of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(2), it is only "gifts" which are excepted from the purview thereof and not "bribes," no matter how small the amount involved; accordingly, where a trial court construed § 16-10-2 and held that small amounts of cash that added up to less than $100, which were accepted by defendant, a detention officer, from inmates, were specifically excepted from the offense of bribery, it did not construe the statute using the ordinary meaning of the words pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b), which was error. State v. Fortner, 264 Ga. App. 783, 592 S.E.2d 454 (2003).

- Verdict awarding general damages in a libel suit filed by an attorney against a former client, which showed that the client published facts intimating that the attorney bribed judges, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2, was upheld as: (1) the jury could reasonably conclude that the attorney was a limited public figure, and was properly charged; (2) the client failed to seek any remedy regarding the verdict entered; (3) the trial court did not err in prohibiting the client from offering testimony about corrupt individuals who were exposed as a result of the publication about the attorney; and (4) based on the evidence of said publication on the client's web site, neither a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the client's favor was authorized. Milum v. Banks, 283 Ga. App. 864, 642 S.E.2d 892 (2007).

- When the court of appeals found the trial court's definition of the term "entitled" misleading because the term failed to inform the jury that a public official is entitled to receive campaign contributions, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding because the more appropriate meaning of "entitled" was more restrictive than the definition given by the trial court, any error was helpful to the accused, and was therefore harmless error. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of bribery to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt in regard to defendant; there was ample evidence at trial that defendant gave payments to county commissioners for the specific purpose of influencing their votes on his application for a building height variance. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), , 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that defendant made payments to county commissioners in an effort to induce a vote in favor of defendant's application for a zoning variance. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Sufficient evidence supported a bribery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2 when: the defendant, a jail officer, agreed to sell an inmate a handcuff key; the defendant gave the inmate the key in exchange for $100; the inmate told a shift supervisor that the inmate had the key and told investigators about how the inmate got the key; and a second inmate overheard the discussion between the defendant and the inmate. Felder v. State, 286 Ga. App. 271, 648 S.E.2d 753 (2007).

- When the defendant was not charged with bribery and did not assert that bribery constituted a lesser included offense of any of the charges for which the defendant was on trial, the trial court was under no obligation to charge the jury on this offense. Gober v. State, 203 Ga. App. 5, 416 S.E.2d 292, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 292 (1992).

- Rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant's intent in offering to allow a police officer to participate in the defendant's drug distribution activities where the officer could make $6,000.00 a week or more was specifically to influence the officer in the performance of official duties. Lee v. State, 204 Ga. App. 283, 418 S.E.2d 809 (1992).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial because there was no violation of the bribery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(1), when the record contained no evidence that the state made payments or promised benefits in exchange for testimony at the defendant's trial with the purpose of influencing informants in the performance of such testimony, and it was up to the jury to weigh the evidence of the state's arrangements with the informants in assessing their credibility; the informants were offered leniency, and one of the informants was paid cash, in exchange for their assistance in drug investigations by the police, only a portion of which involved the controlled buys with the defendant, and although the parties could have contemplated that the informants would testify upon the completion of the investigation, there was no evidence that the informants were paid in exchange for their testimony. Moreland v. State, 304 Ga. App. 468, 696 S.E.2d 448 (2010).

- When in support of the defendants' pre-trial motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, defendants claimed the defendants could not be prosecuted for paying money to county commissioners for the purpose of influencing their vote on a pending land use application because the district attorney had not prosecuted others who had made similar payments, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in denying the defendants an evidentiary hearing on their selective prosecution defense; the proffer included details of money transfers that were similar to those for which the defendants were prosecuted, sources of reliable and available evidence, i.e., permanent public records, and names of witnesses who were disinterested in the prosecution. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- In a case where defendants allegedly bribed county commissioners, the court did not determine the propriety of the admission into evidence of currency obtained through the cashing of checks and the district attorney's display of that currency; the error, if any, was not so harmful as to require reversal. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

- Debtor's claim that bribery, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2, had been committed by a bank and the bank's director and was therefore a predicate act for purposes of the debtor's civil racketeering claims was without merit; the debtor contended that the bank bribed the debtor's ex-spouse to file for divorce and to write a check from the debtor's account, but there was no evidence that the ex-spouse was a state official or representative. Tucker v. Morris State Bank, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 14, 2005)(Unpublished).

Former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was not unconstitutionally vague. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980); Whitfield v. State, 247 Ga. 367, 276 S.E.2d 841 (1981); State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

Former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) was not vague, ambiguous, or violative of U.S. Const., amends. 5 and 14. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981).

- Bribery statute is not an impermissible restraint upon free speech under the U.S. Const., amend. 1; the bribery statute, which places no limitation upon amounts of contributions or expenditures, restricts the purposes for which any benefit, reward or consideration may be offered or given to, or solicited, or accepted by a public officer. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).

O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2 does not violate the First Amendment on the statute's face since the statute includes corrupt intent as an element. Therefore, the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's offer of campaign contributions to influence the decision of county commissioners' regarding the defendant's zoning variance request. Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1023, 118 S. Ct. 1305, 140 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1998).

- O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2 was intended to discourage the making of affirmatively false statements. Watkins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 87, 381 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 381 S.E.2d 45 (1989).

- Defendant, by stating to a state trooper that defendant's brother-in-law had been driving a truck involved in a fatal accident when, in fact, defendant had been the driver, made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department of state government. Watkins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 87, 381 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 381 S.E.2d 45 (1989).

- Words, "benefit, reward or consideration" in this section all relate to thing of value and need not be specifically defined to meet constitutional standards. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

- When trial court, in bribery case, ordered confiscation of bribe money and ruled that money might be used toward payment of fine assessed in case, and when bribe money did not exceed maximum fine under former Code 1933, § 26-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2), confiscation was not tantamount to forfeiture prohibited under former Code 1933, § 85-1109 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-5-210) and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XX). Hall v. State, 155 Ga. App. 724, 272 S.E.2d 578 (1980).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Applicability to public officials.

- Elements of the crime proscribed by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(2) are: (1) a public official or employee; (2) directly or indirectly solicits, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive; (3) a thing of value; (4) by inducing the reasonable belief that the giving of the thing will influence his or her performance or failure to perform any official action. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U91-10.

Public officials in many instances have influence over a wide array of interests of potential contributors. Nonetheless, the bribery statute should not become a factor unless the potential donor's interest is narrowed to a matter which is then pending or reasonably likely to be pending before the public official or the body in which the official serves and upon which the official may be called upon to act. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U91-10.

Bribery statute cannot be said to unequivocally exclude specific situations facing public officials such as meals, receptions, trips and so forth. In any event, the applicability of the statute to any such situation will depend on all the relevant facts. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U91-10.

- Members of the General Assembly may continue to receive their legitimate regular salary and benefits from their employer during a legislative session without violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a) or being subject to the limitations and disclosure requirements of O.C.G.A. T. 21, Ch. 5, as long as the giving of the salary and benefits is not for the purpose of influencing the legislator's performance of his or her duties or the legislator's nomination or election to public office. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-27.

ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR

Committing offense results in Rules of Professional Conduct violation.

- If an attorney were to indicate to an officer that as a result of the attorney's position as a member of the city council a favorable recommendation as to one of the attorney's clients would result in benefits flowing to the officer, or that an unfavorable recommendation would result in harm, the attorney would have committed the offense of bribery, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(1), or extortion, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16(a)(4). The attorney would also have violated Rule 3.5(a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Adv. Op. No. 05-12 (July 25, 2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bribery, § 1 et seq.

Handling the Defense in a Bribery Prosecution, 37 Am. Jur. Trials 273.

- 11 C.J.S., Bribery, § 2 et seq.

- Bribe giver as accomplice of bribe taker and vice versa within rule requiring corroboration of testimony of accomplice, 73 A.L.R. 389.

Statement by candidate regarding salary or fees of office as violation of Corrupt Practice Acts or bribery, 106 A.L.R. 493.

Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of legal qualification of person assuming or alleged to be an officer, 115 A.L.R. 1263.

Bribery as affected by nonexistence of duty upon part of official to do, or refrain from doing, the act in respect of which it was sought to influence him, 158 A.L.R. 323.

Admissibility, in prosecution for bribery or accepting bribes, of evidence tending to show the commission of other bribery or acceptance of bribe, 20 A.L.R.2d 1012.

Solicitation or receipt of funds by public officer or employee for political campaign expenses or similar purposes as bribery, 55 A.L.R.2d 1137.

Recovery of money paid, or property transferred, as a bribe, 60 A.L.R.2d 1273.

Criminal liability of corporation for bribery or conspiracy to bribe public official, 52 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Furnishing public official with meals, lodging, or travel, or receipt of such benefits, as bribery, 67 A.L.R.3d 1231.

Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of authority of state public officer or employee, 73 A.L.R.3d 374.

Antagonistic defenses as ground for separate trials of codefendants in criminal case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

What constitutes such discriminatory prosecution or enforcement of laws as to provide valid defense in state criminal proceedings, 95 A.L.R.3d 280.

Who is a public official within meaning of federal statute punishing bribery of a public official (18 USCA § 201), 161 A.L.R. Fed. 491.

Effect of McDonnell v. U.S. Definition of "Official Act" upon Bribery Prosecution Involving Public Official Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 201, 32 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 6.