2020 Georgia Code
Title 15 - Courts
Chapter 19 - Attorneys
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 15-19-14. Liens for Services Rendered; Priority; Modes of Enforcement; Other Rights

1. Attorneys at law shall have a lien on all papers and money of their clients in their possession for services rendered to them. They may retain the papers until the claims are satisfied and may apply the money to the satisfaction of the claims.
2. Upon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied. Attorneys at law shall have the same right and power over the actions, judgments, and decrees to enforce their liens as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them.
3. Upon all actions for the recovery of real or personal property and upon all judgments or decrees for the recovery of the same, attorneys at law shall have a lien for their fees on the property recovered superior to all liens except liens for taxes, which may be enforced by mortgage and foreclosure by the attorneys at law or their lawful representatives as liens on personal property and real estate are enforced. The property recovered shall remain subject to the liens unless transferred to bona fide purchasers without notice.
4. If an attorney at law files his assertion claiming a lien on property recovered in an action instituted by him, within 30 days after a recovery of the same, his lien shall bind all persons.
5. The same liens and modes of enforcement thereof which are allowed to attorneys at law who are employed to bring an action for any property, upon the property recovered, shall be equally allowed to attorneys at law employed and serving in defense against such actions in case the defense is successful.
6. This Code section shall not affect the rights of attorneys under Code Section 15-19-13 and decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals thereon.

(Ga. L. 1873, p. 42, § 16; Code 1873, § 1989; Ga. L. 1880-81, p. 63, § 3; Code 1882, § 1989; Civil Code 1895, § 2814; Civil Code 1910, § 3364; Code 1933, § 9-613.)

- Validity and enforcement of obligations to pay attorney's fees upon notes or other evidences of indebtedness, § 13-1-11.

Liens generally, § 44-14-320 et seq.

- For article, "The Rights of Attorneys and Their Clients in Fee Disputes," see 16 Ga. St. B.J. 150 (1980). For article, "Trust Account Rules for Georgia Lawyers," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 22 (1987). For annual survey of commercial law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 119 (1991). For article, "Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney," see 41 Emory L.J. 367 (1992). For annual survey article discussing legal ethics, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 353 (1999). For annual survey article discussing trial practice and procedure, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 487 (1999). For annual survey of legal ethics decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 273 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (2006). For annual survey on legal ethics, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 189 (2012). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 257 (2015).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Time When Lien Attaches
• Extinguishment of Lien
• Recovery by Attorney
• Practice and Procedure

General Consideration

Applicability.

- This section is inapplicable if attorney's contingent fee contract is only entered into after judgment is taken. Wall v. Benningfield, 237 Ga. 173, 227 S.E.2d 13 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 does not apply to actions in which neither money nor property may be gained for the plaintiffs or saved for the defendants. Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga. App. 769, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).

Trial court erroneously granted part of the relief requested by a county in the county's suit seeking an order requiring the county's former county attorney to turn over all of the files generated during the attorney's term of employment as county attorney. The court erroneously applied the foreseeable prejudice standard given that there was no evidence that the attorney was attempting to assert a lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a) for unpaid legal fees. Putnam County v. Adams, 282 Ga. App. 226, 638 S.E.2d 404 (2006).

- Unless petition sets forth facts which bring the case within the terms of this section, the petition must fail as an action to foreclose a lien; this section is in derogation of the common law, and is to be strictly construed. Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 138 S.E. 852 (1927).

Lien laws are to be strictly construed, and one who claims a lien must bring oneself clearly within the law. White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943); May v. May, 180 Ga. App. 581, 349 S.E.2d 766 (1986).

This section is in derogation of the common law, and is to be strictly construed; accordingly, this section will not be construed so as to apply to any factual situation not strictly within the statute's wording. Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 167 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889, 90 S. Ct. 175, 24 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1969).

- State law requires the filing of a claim of lien in the county where the property subject to the lien is located for the perfection of an attorney's lien. Anderson v. Burnham, 12 Bankr. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

- Subsection (a) of this section recognizes the attorney's common-law general or retaining lien on all papers and money belonging to the client which come into the attorney's hands until the attorney's claims for professional services rendered are satisfied; however, money delivered to the attorney by the client for a special purpose cannot be made the subject matter of a retaining lien in favor of the attorney. King v. Tyler, 148 Ga. App. 272, 250 S.E.2d 784 (1978).

- Subsection (b) of this section provides that so long as the relationship exists, the attorneys, for the purpose of enforcing the attorneys' liens, not only have the same right and power over judgments and decrees as the attorneys' clients, but have control over the actions as well; the subsection means nothing more. White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943).

Language of subsection (b) of this section will not be held to mean to deny to the client the right to discharge the client's attorney. White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943).

- Property upon which an attorney seeks to impress a lien is not "property recovered" by the attorney within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section if there has been no action or settlement of a disputed claim between adverse parties as the result of the attorney's efforts. Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 167 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889, 90 S. Ct. 175, 24 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1969).

Attorney's successful notice of lis pendens was not a recovery of real property within the meaning of subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14. Decorating Direct, Inc. v. Crawford, 200 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).

Subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 applies only to liens arising under subsection (c); it does not concern liens arising in actions for money. Moore v. Diamond Mfg. Co., 123 Bankr. 125 (S.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 959 F.2d 972 (11th Cir. 1992).

- Attorney's retaining or "holding" lien, codified in this section, existed at common law and was founded and depended on possession of something to which the lien could attach. Davidson v. Collier, 104 Ga. App. 546, 122 S.E.2d 465 (1961).

- There must be legal work performed by an attorney on behalf of a client for which a lien can attach under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b). Recoba v. State, 167 Ga. App. 447, 306 S.E.2d 713 (1983).

- Lien attaches to fruits of labor and skill of the attorney, whether realized by judgment or decree, or by virtue of an award, or in any other way, as long as the fruits are the result of the attorney's exertions. Wooten v. Denmark, 85 Ga. 578, 11 S.E. 861 (1890); Barge v. Ownby, 170 Ga. 440, 153 S.E. 49 (1930); Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931); Thomas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 404, 185 S.E. 922 (1936); Brotherton v. Stone, 197 Ga. 74, 28 S.E.2d 467 (1943); John J. Woodside Co. v. Irwin, 79 Ga. App. 252, 53 S.E.2d 246 (1949).

- Subject matter against which an attorney's lien was attached needed to have been the fruit of the labor of the attorney so when the settlement in a breach of contract and negligent construction case resulted in the construction company's repurchase of the house and a monetary amount above the purchase price, the purchase price plus additional moneys were the "fruit" of the lawyer's labor, not the house; dismissal of the attorney's lien against the house was not error. Gutter-Parker v. Pridgen, 268 Ga. App. 205, 601 S.E.2d 707 (2004).

- Trial court erred in awarding 25 percent of the fees to the former firm for its origination of the case because origination or procurement of a case, in other words, rainmaking, is not a service by an attorney that confers value upon a client or that is rendered to or for the benefit of the client. Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 772 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

- Client's discharge of an attorney does not defeat the attorney's right to be paid; the right to receive compensation comes, not under the contract of employment, but under quantum meruit which is protected by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14. Yetman v. Greer, Klosik & Daugherty, 225 Ga. App. 397, 483 S.E.2d 878 (1997), aff'd, 269 Ga. 271, 496 S.E.2d 693 (1998), aff'd, Greer, Klosik & Daugherty v. Yetman, 269 Ga. 271, 496 S.E.2d 693 (1998).

When a law firm entered into a contingent fee agreement with the firm's clients in a medical malpractice matter, and the clients discharged the firm before the clients received a recovery, the contract was not enforceable, because the contingency it called for, namely the clients' receipt of a recovery, upon which the firm's right to recover a fee under the contract was based, did not occur prior to the firm's discharge, but the firm could recover the reasonable value of the firm's services under quantum meruit. Ellerin & Assocs. v. Brawley, 263 Ga. App. 860, 589 S.E.2d 626 (2003).

Because a former attorney's O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) lien was fixed as soon as the suit was filed and the award was based upon the former attorney's hourly fee and sufficient proof of the former attorney's work, the lien could not be divested by any subsequent settlement or contract. Howe & Assocs., P.C. v. Daniels, 274 Ga. App. 312, 618 S.E.2d 42 (2005), aff'd, 280 Ga. 803, 631 S.E.2d 356 (2006).

Attorney's lien is not only a lien against recovery but is a lien against action itself. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bagwell, 116 Ga. App. 675, 158 S.E.2d 267 (1967).

- Attorneys at law, employed and serving in defense against actions, have the same liens and means of foreclosure which are allowed to attorneys at law who are employed to sue for any property, if the defense is successful. Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 138 S.E. 852 (1927).

- Workers' Compensation Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34) does not provide for any lien in favor of an attorney for services under the chapter, but the attorney's lien attaches to the award. Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 71 Ga. App. 184, 30 S.E.2d 420 (1944).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b), predecessor counsel who performed legal work for a client in developing a lawsuit is authorized to place a lien on the suit when the suit is filed for the client by successor counsel. Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 772 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

- Lawyer having control over a trust account has no more right to make a unilateral disbursal of the funds to the lawyer than the lawyer would to a stranger. Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14, in such a circumstance, must be understood to authorize the application of client funds held by an attorney to the satisfaction of liquidated sums owing to the attorney. In re Kunin, 252 Ga. 310, 313 S.E.2d 697 (1984).

An otherwise liquidated account for legal services cannot be rendered unliquidated by challenging the amount billed after the attorney has enforced the attorney's lien by disbursing sums from the trust account to the attorney's general operating account. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 878 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

- Attorney cannot prevent dismissal by plaintiff of action for divorce and alimony. Keefer v. Keefer, 140 Ga. 18, 78 S.E. 462, 46 L.R.A. (n.s.) 527 (1913).

This section has no application to matters of alimony and counsel fees. Hagstrom v. Hagstrom, 235 Ga. 853, 221 S.E.2d 602 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Southerland v. Southerland, 247 Ga. 585, 277 S.E.2d 684 (1981).

- Attorney's charging lien should not be allowed to nullify an award determined to be necessary to assure the support of a child and is not enforceable against child support payments. Law Office of Tony Center v. Baker, 185 Ga. App. 809, 366 S.E.2d 167 (1988).

Attorney's retention of a client's computer tapes prejudiced the client, and, in turn, the client's estate in bankruptcy by jeopardizing the sale of the bankrupt client's property or reducing the amount to be realized from such sale since the value of the attorney's lien claim was adequately protected by virtue of the lien attaching to any proceeds of the sale. Dabney v. Information Exch., Inc., 98 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).

- While an attorney has a legal right to perfect a lien against all papers and money of the attorney's clients in the attorney's possession for services rendered to the clients under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a), such right generally must yield to an attorney's ethical obligation not to prejudice a former client's ongoing suit by withholding the client's file in order to collect unpaid fees. Mary A. Stearns, P.C. v. Williams-Murphy, 263 Ga. App. 239, 587 S.E.2d 247 (2003).

- Court of Appeals, not Supreme Court, has appellate jurisdiction in action to foreclose attorney's statutory lien on land, which raises no question to be determined by a court of equity, or as to title to land, or any other question of which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Constitution of this state. Edwards v. Bynum, 177 Ga. 504, 170 S.E. 367 (1933).

- There is no statutory or constitutional basis for the award of attorney fees in a criminal action; in fact, sovereign immunity barred a criminal defendant's claim for attorney fees when the charge against the attorney was dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Bennett v. State, 210 Ga. App. 337, 436 S.E.2d 40 (1993).

- Failure of an attorney to deliver papers to the plaintiff did not constitute a violation of former Rule 4-102, Standard 22 of the Standards of Conduct of the State Bar because, under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14, the attorney was lawfully entitled to retain the papers until the fee was paid. Frame v. Booth, Wade & Campbell, 238 Ga. App. 428, 519 S.E.2d 237 (1999).

Cited in Odom v. Attaway, 173 Ga. 883, 162 S.E.2d 279 (1931); Dyal v. Watson, 174 Ga. 330, 162 S.E. 682 (1932); Arnold v. Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank, 47 Ga. App. 254, 170 S.E. 316 (1933); Fanning v. Poe, 76 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1935); Felker v. Johnson, 189 Ga. 797, 7 S.E.2d 668 (1940); Thomas v. Holt, 209 Ga. 133, 70 S.E.2d 595 (1952); Brooks v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, 137 Ga. App. 176, 223 S.E.2d 225 (1976); Crews v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 145 Ga. App. 339, 243 S.E.2d 722 (1978); In re Beef N' Burgundy, Inc., 21 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); Steele v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 171 Ga. App. 499, 320 S.E.2d 203 (1984); Pope v. State, 179 Ga. App. 739, 347 S.E.2d 703 (1986); In re Presto, 263 Ga. 576, 435 S.E.2d 200 (1993); D. Robert Autrey, Jr., P.C. v. Baker, 244 Ga. App. 532, 536 S.E.2d 204 (2000); Gilbert v. Montlick & Assocs., P.C., 248 Ga. App. 535, 546 S.E.2d 895 (2001); Yurevich v. Williams, 302 Ga. App. 162, 690 S.E.2d 476 (2010).

Time When Lien Attaches

Attachment arises upon employment.

- Lien given to an attorney arises upon the attorney's employment and is perfected by ultimate recovery of the judgment for the attorney's client. Molloy v. Hubbard, 48 Ga. App. 820, 173 S.E. 877 (1934).

- Lien on property is not perfect until after recovery; but there is a lien on the action which is perfect at once, and the lien on the property is inchoate. Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279 (1876); Lovett v. Moore, 98 Ga. 158, 26 S.E. 498 (1896); Burgin & Sons Glass Co. v. McIntire, 7 Ga. App. 755, 68 S.E. 490 (1910).

- Upon the filing of an action by an attorney, a lien attaches in the attorney's favor in such action, which the plaintiff and defendant are not at liberty to settle so as to defeat the attorney's claim for fees. Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 138 S.E. 852 (1927).

- In action for property, if the fee of plaintiff 's attorney is payable by special contract out of the proceeds of the action, the attorney has an inchoate lien upon the property for the attorney's fee as soon as the action is commenced, and the client has no right to defeat such lien by dismissing the action before trial over the attorney's objection without first paying the fee. Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279 (1876).

- Mere engagement by prospective suitor of attorney at law upon contingent fee does not give rise to a lien for fees in favor of the latter upon the cause of action for which the attorney is employed. Brown v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry., 101 Ga. 80, 28 S.E. 634 (1897).

- Georgia attorney's liens under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 arise upon the attorney's employment and are perfected by the ultimate recovery of the judgment and if the lien does not arise and is not perfected until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the lien does not relate back to a pre-petition date; accordingly, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) prevents counsel from obtaining a post-petition lien for post-petition services. In re Chewning & Frey Sec., 328 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).

- Because the interest in a fee award held by appellee, a law firm's former attorney, existed prior to the law firm's later assignment of its interest to appellant assignee, and the attorney's interest could not have been assigned by the firm as it belonged to the attorney personally, the attorney had an enforceable contractual interest in the attorney's percentage and the attorney was protected by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14's attorney lien; the attorney had left the firm before the class action was filed, and after the action was filed, the attorney associated the law firm in the class action, and it was not until thereafter that the firm assigned the firm's interest in the fees to the assignee. R.D. Legal Funding Partners, LP v. Robinson, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2012)(Unpublished).

Extinguishment of Lien

Duration of lien.

- Legislature did not intend for attorney liens on real property created under the statute to be governed by the time restrictions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 44. Jones v. Wellon, 237 Ga. App. 62, 514 S.E.2d 880 (1999).

Imposition of an attorney lien on real property, as a separate and distinct remedy governed by O.C.G.A. Ch. 19, T. 15, should not be subject to extinction for failure of the attorney to bring suit to enforce the lien within a specific period of time. Jones v. Wellon, 237 Ga. App. 62, 514 S.E.2d 880 (1999).

Attorney fees, which were protected by a lien against real property, were based on an open account and, therefore, the lien was barred since the attorney did not bring suit against the attorney's former client within the four-year statute of limitation for open accounts. Jones v. Wellon, 237 Ga. App. 62, 514 S.E.2d 880 (1999).

- Since the attorney's lien is only on the action or judgment and not on the cause of action, if there is a settlement before action is brought, there is no lien, and the attorney cannot prosecute the action for the attorney's fees. Winslow Bros. Co. v. Murphy, 139 Ga. 231, 77 S.E. 25 (1913); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Crosby, 12 Ga. App. 750, 78 S.E. 612 (1913).

- Attorneys' lien was not extinguished since: (1) the attorneys represented a church in connection with a dispute with the seller of property to the church; (2) the attorneys filed an action for specific performance, and the seller filed a counterclaim for ejectment; (3) the dispute was settled and the action was dismissed; and (4) the attorneys then sought to recover additional fees from the church by seeking to foreclose a lien on the property recovered in the settlement of the earlier action. Smith v. Word of God Ministries, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 263, 506 S.E.2d 427 (1998).

Attorney's lien on real property recovered by means of a settlement agreement successfully procured through the attorney's labor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(c) was not extinguished by the dismissal of the action brought to recover that real property. Carragher v. Potts, 300 Ga. App. 735, 686 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

- Attorney for defendant has a lien upon the defendant's interest in a pending action which cannot be defeated by any settlement, made without defendant's consent, after the action is brought. Payton v. Wheeler, 13 Ga. App. 326, 79 S.E. 81 (1913).

Cause of action can be settled by the parties before action is brought, but after the action has been brought, the action and cause of action become one in substance, and neither the action nor the cause of action thereafter can be settled so as to defeat the lien of the attorney. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Crosby, 12 Ga. App. 750, 78 S.E. 612 (1913); Pharr v. McDonald, 180 Ga. 777, 180 S.E. 844 (1935); Bennett v. Cannon, 114 Ga. App. 479, 151 S.E.2d 828 (1966).

- If, pending the action, the plaintiff and defendant compromise and settle their differences, and upon the trial the action is dismissed, the action thus commenced is thereby ended and the attorney's lien is extinguished. Brown v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry., 101 Ga. 80, 28 S.E. 634 (1897).

If for any reason the action is finally disposed of by operation of law, or by a ruling of the court thereon, the lien of the attorney is necessarily discharged. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Crosby, 12 Ga. App. 750, 78 S.E. 612 (1913).

Recovery by Attorney

Recovery on behalf of attorney dependent on valid cause of action.

- There can be no recovery on behalf of the attorney, unless the evidence is of such a character as would have authorized a recovery by the client if the action were still proceeding for the client's benefit. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co. v. Owens, 119 Ga. 833, 47 S.E. 213 (1904).

- Attorney is not obliged to insist upon the attorney's lien or the attorney's right to collect the judgment or execution; the attorney may waive the lien or submit to a discharge. Roland v. Roland, 139 Ga. 825, 78 S.E. 249 (1913).

- Attorney who successfully resists a mechanic's lien is entitled to a lien under this section. Fry v. Calder, 74 Ga. 7 (1884).

Attorney at law who successfully defends an action for the recovery of property, real or personal, recovers the property. Lovett v. Moore, 98 Ga. 158, 26 S.E. 498 (1896).

Lien of attorney attaches to real or personal property for the rendition of services in successfully defending the client's title thereto as against an adverse claim. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Byrd, 188 Ga. 527, 4 S.E.2d 175 (1939).

- Settlement made directly with plaintiff will leave defendant liable to recovery for benefit of attorney to the extent of the attorney's fees. Little v. Sexton, 89 Ga. 411, 15 S.E. 490 (1892); Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931).

If an action is brought by an attorney at law for the attorney's clients as payees, against the maker of a promissory note, for principal, interest, attorney's fees, and certain equitable relief, and before the trial of the case the parties settle the case among themselves, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs' attorney, who is not paid the attorney's fees, the attorney may prosecute the original action for the purpose of recovering the attorney's fees. Glennville Inv. Co. v. Jordan & Rogers, 144 Ga. 14, 85 S.E. 1049 (1915).

Attorney is given express statutory right to prosecute action in the event of settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bagwell, 116 Ga. App. 675, 158 S.E.2d 267 (1967).

- In a claim for attorney's fees, the contingency set forth in the retainer agreement, a final recovery, had not occurred when the attorney was terminated by the client; however, as the client prevented the contingency from happening, the attorney might be entitled to a fee under quantum meruit principles. Lewis v. Smith, 274 Ga. App. 528, 618 S.E.2d 32 (2005).

- Lien provided in this section does not arise, as against the defendant, until there has been either service of process or actual notice of the filing of the petition; it follows, therefore, that if a settlement is had between plaintiff and defendant, and the latter is ignorant that the petition has been filed at the time of the settlement, such settlement would be a bar to a recovery by plaintiff of fees due by plaintiff under a contract with plaintiff's attorneys. Florida C. & P.R.R. v. Ragan, 104 Ga. 353, 30 S.E. 745 (1898); Lumpkin v. Louisville & N.R.R., 136 Ga. 135, 70 S.E. 1101 (1911).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a law firm's motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2) to intervene in a former client's case because the firm was discharged from the case and filed the firm's lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) before the settlement, and the firm knew when the client had reached a settlement agreement but did not move to intervene as a party until over a month later; the firm was allowed to prosecute the firm's fee lien to the jury as a party, making opening statements, calling witnesses, introducing evidence, and arguing in closing. Jones, Martin, Parriz & Tessener Law Offices, PLLC v. Westrex Corp., 310 Ga. App. 192, 712 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

- Trial court order awarding a discharged firm 5% of the fees for the firm's pre-suit legal work was affirmed because after being retained to investigate and pursue a medical malpractice case, the firm procured the relevant medical records, researched the medical issue, consulted with three potential experts, developed a theory of the case, and drafted a complaint, which work the taking attorney relied upon when the case was litigated to a successful settlement with another firm. Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 772 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

- Attorney who has a lien upon a cause of action being asserted for payment of compensation contracted to be paid for such services has an interest in the litigation and may intervene in the pending action. Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 1647, 64 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1980).

Although a former attorney lacked standing to file a contempt motion after the attorney formally withdrew from representing a client, the filings of the attorney to enforce a settlement were construed as papers filed to protect a colorable notice of attorneys' lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 for fees and costs owed based on a written fee contract. Young v. JCB Mfg., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2008).

- If attorney directs that judgment be entered in favor of garnishor of the attorney's client in action against a debtor, the attorney is estopped from asserting a lien against the debtor who has paid the judgment. Watters v. Wells, 7 Ga. App. 778, 68 S.E. 450 (1910).

Former spouse's action to remove an attorney's lien against marital property under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 was barred by collateral estoppel under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. The issue of the lien had been fully litigated and decided in a divorce action on the merits between the same parties or their privies, and for purposes of recovering on the lien, the attorney was the other spouse's privy. Ruth v. Herrmann, 291 Ga. App. 399, 662 S.E.2d 726 (2008).

Because an attorney only represented a client in a custody dispute, and because the client ultimately surrendered the client's half interest in the property at issue in settlement of that dispute, the attorney was not entitled to a lien on the property under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(c). Outlaw v. Rye, 312 Ga. App. 579, 718 S.E.2d 905 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 312 (Ga. 2012).

- If contract between an attorney and client contemplates a settlement, the attorney impliedly consents to the settlement and cannot enforce the attorney's lien against the opposing party. Gower v. Roberts, 32 Ga. App. 164, 122 S.E. 796, cert. denied, 32 Ga. App. 807 (1924).

- Contingent fee contract was fully performed when judgment was entered and the amount of attorney fees due was correctly based on the amount of the judgment; thus, an attorney had no right under the contract or O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 to have the attorney's fee calculated on a post-judgment settlement negotiated by a successor attorney. Peoples v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 265, 486 S.E.2d 604 (1997).

- If the client failed to establish that the client's attorney had constructive possession of funds at the time of the client's demand that the attorney withdraw the attorney's lien, the trial court erred in holding the attorney to the ten-day limit on foreclosure under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-550(1). Autrey v. Baker, 228 Ga. App. 396, 492 S.E.2d 261 (1997).

Even though an attorney withdrew from representation prior to the final settlement in a divorce action, liens for attorney fees asserted against property recovered by the client pursuant to the judgment were not unlawful. Lipton v. Warner, Mayoue & Bates, 228 Ga. App. 516, 492 S.E.2d 281 (1997).

- Attorneys who represented an asphalt company in a lawsuit the company filed before the company was forced into bankruptcy did not have a charging lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) on the proceeds of a settlement the attorneys negotiated after the attorneys were appointed as special counsel for the company's bankruptcy estate because the attorneys represented the estate, not the company, and the attorneys were not entitled to receive 35 percent of the settlement proceeds because the Chapter 7 trustee had rejected the attorneys' proposal for a contingency fee contract, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. Because the court had not determined a method for paying the attorneys for work the attorneys performed as special counsel, the court held that the amount of fees would be determined under 11 U.S.C. § 330 and the award would be given administrative priority under 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 and 507. Cardwell v. Bankruptcy Estate of Joel Spivey (In re Douglas Asphalt Co.), 483 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).

- When plaintiff law firms engaged in a number of legal matters for a debtor, one of which resulted in the creation of a settlement fund, the law firms' charging lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) was limited to the expenses and fees that generated the fund, and did not extend to the plaintiffs' expenses and fees generated in other lawsuits; the statute did not provide guidance on the issue, and the enactment of the statute did not render Georgia's prior case law on the subject irrelevant. Savage, Turner, Pinson, & Karsman v. Fid. & Deposit Co. (In re Douglas Asphalt Co.), F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2013).

- Plain language of a fee agreement which an attorney concluded with clients did not show that the clients agreed to give the attorney part of land the clients owned as compensation for services the attorney rendered in defending the clients' title, and the trial court erred by awarding the attorney title to part of the clients' land. Hornsby v. Hunter, 262 Ga. App. 598, 585 S.E.2d 900 (2003).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in excluding evidence of how much a former client or the client's experts thought the client's claim against a city was worth or the amount of the client's settlement with the city because the trial court concluded that neither the size of the claim nor the outcome of the case were relevant to the law firm's attorney lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) because the reasonable fee for the contract work the firm performed did not vary with the value of the case; the contingency fee contract specified that the firm was entitled to reasonable fees for work performed up to the date of discharge, and the trial court admitted only evidence of the results the firm obtained before the client discharged the firm. Jones, Martin, Parriz & Tessener Law Offices, PLLC v. Westrex Corp., 310 Ga. App. 192, 712 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

- Trial court did not err in granting an attorney's motion to vacate the dismissal of a client's medical malpractice suit and to foreclose the attorney's lien for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) because the attorney's motion to enforce the lien was timely under the four-year statute of limitations applicable to open accounts, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, since the motion was filed within the same year the attorney's right of action accrued; the statute of limitation did not begin to run until the client settled the client's lawsuit on February 6, 2008, the attorney filed the attorney's notice of attorney's lien the day after the client executed the settlement release, and when the client filed a dismissal of the lawsuit without satisfying the lien the attorney filed the attorney's motion to vacate the dismissal and to enforce the attorney's lien on September 10, 2008, and thus was timely. Woods v. Jones, 305 Ga. App. 349, 699 S.E.2d 567 (2010).

- Under the right-for-any-reason rule, the trial court did not err by dismissing a law firm's case against an insurer under the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1, and O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) to enforce the firm's attorney's lien in a case the firm filed on behalf of an owner against the insurer because declaratory judgment was not available; the issues the firm raised were the same as those raised in an owner's case against the insurer for failure to provide a defense, and the rights of the parties in the owner's case had already accrued. McRae, Stegall, Peek, Harman, Smith & Manning, LLP v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 526, 729 S.E.2d 649 (2012).

Practice and Procedure

Determination of amount of fee.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to calculate the amount of attorney fees pursuant to a contingent fee contract since the court found that the payment of insurance proceeds was not entirely the result of the attorney's exertions on behalf of the client or the fruit of the attorney's labor and skill in prosecuting the cause of action. Holland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 244 Ga. App. 583, 536 S.E.2d 270 (2000).

- Filing is not essential to the validity of the lien as between the attorney and the client, or as between the attorney and other existing creditors of the latter. Coleman v. Austin, 99 Ga. 629, 27 S.E. 763 (1896); Burgin & Sons Glass Co. v. McIntire, 7 Ga. App. 755, 68 S.E. 490 (1910).

Between the attorney and other existing creditors of the client, it is not essential to the validity of the lien that the lien should be filed, or recorded, or enforced by foreclosure. Molloy v. Hubbard, 48 Ga. App. 820, 173 S.E. 877 (1934).

- Attorney is given the privilege of protecting the attorney's lien by recording the attorney's claim thereto, and the attorney's failure to avail oneself of such privilege brings upon the attorney the same disaster that befalls other lienholders who neglect to record the lien as authorized by law. Johnson v. Giraud, 191 Ga. 577, 13 S.E.2d 365 (1941).

Purpose of the recording statutes is to protect both the lienholder and innocent persons acting in good faith but without means of discovering the lien of another. An attorney is given the privilege of protecting the attorney's lien by recording the attorney's claim thereto, and the attorney's failure to avail oneself of such privilege brings upon the attorney the same disaster that befalls other lienholders who neglect to record the lien as authorized by law. Anderson v. Burnham, 12 Bankr. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

- Only notice necessary to a defendant in a pending action of the lien of the plaintiff 's attorney on the action and the action's proceeds for the attorney's fees in that case is knowledge of the fact that the action has been instituted and is pending. Little v. Sexton, 89 Ga. 411, 15 S.E. 490 (1892); Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931).

- Notice to the opposing party before action is brought will not make the opposing party liable for the attorney's fees. Winslow Bros. Co. v. Murphy, 139 Ga. 231, 77 S.E. 25 (1913).

- After attorneys file a bill to enforce the attorneys' lien on realty, one who purchases the land does so with notice. Wilson v. Wright, 72 Ga. 848 (1884).

After recovery of land sued for, plaintiff 's attorneys may foreclose their liens and it is not necessary that a vendee pendente lite should have been given notice of such liens, the pendency of the action in ejectment constituting such notice. Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597, 35 S.E. 142 (1900).

If at the time a purchaser purchased property, an attorney's lien was properly filed and recorded, the property transferred was subject to the attorney's lien and the purchaser was not a "bona fide purchaser without notice". Hester v. Chalker, 222 Ga. App. 783, 476 S.E.2d 79 (1996).

- Petition by attorney states a cause of action if the petition alleges that the attorney's co-counsel and the attorney's clients conspired with the intent to deprive petitioner of compensation and the petitioner's right to exercise the petitioner's holding lien. Davidson v. Collier, 104 Ga. App. 546, 122 S.E.2d 465 (1961).

- When petition for foreclosure of attorney's lien and lien itself, made part of petition, fully set forth nature of cause and of litigation in which legal services were rendered on implied contract or quantum meruit, it is unnecessary to state specific charge for each item of services. York v. Edwards, 52 Ga. App. 388, 183 S.E. 339 (1936).

- Lien of attorney is kept alive if original open account is within four years converted into a note under seal, and the lien may be foreclosed at any time before action on the note has become barred by the statute of limitations. Johnson v. Giraud, 191 Ga. 577, 13 S.E.2d 365 (1941).

- Attorney's refusal to release file material to a former client prior to settlement of a fee dispute cannot constitute duress sufficient to permit the former client to avoid the obligations pursuant to a promissory note, the execution of which is made a prerequisite for the return of the file material, since the attorney has a statutory right to retain the former client's file materials in the attorney's possession until the attorney's fee claim is satisfied or the attorney is otherwise directed by court order. Crockett v. Shafer, 166 Ga. App. 453, 304 S.E.2d 405 (1983).

- Action for damages by one counsel will lie against one's co-counsel for failure to protect one's retaining or holding lien on funds in the hands of the defendant after notice of the lien claim has been given; when the defendant co-counsel releases the funds to the client to plaintiff 's detriment, it follows that plaintiff is entitled to such damages as will make plaintiff whole. Davidson v. Collier, 104 Ga. App. 546, 122 S.E.2d 465 (1961).

- When attorney is employed to bring action for accounting for the attorney's client (there being no agreement fixing the amount of fees), does so, and obtains a decree requiring defendant to account, when such defendant fails to do so, the filing of another petition in the same case to bring about an accounting, based on the original decree, is not a new action, and the attorney has a right to proceed with the whole case, despite the fact that the client made an effort to dismiss the attorney before the second petition for accounting was filed, especially since the dismissal is for the sole reason that the client does not wish to incur further expense. Aiken v. White, 69 Ga. App. 717, 26 S.E.2d 471, rev'd on other grounds, 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943).

- Plaintiff in error cannot withdraw a writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, when it appears that the litigation is such that it would, if successful, result in a recovery of property on which counsel would have a lien for fees earned in the case. Walker v. Equitable Mtg. Co., 114 Ga. 862, 40 S.E. 1010 (1902).

- Fund impounded for distribution may be subjected to lien of attorney who recovered the fund. Stewart v. McDonald, 147 Ga. 158, 93 S.E. 86 (1917).

If a fund recovered by an attorney on behalf of a client is in the hands of a court of equity, the court may, on motion of the defendant's attorney and with defendant's consent, impress a lien of defendant's attorney on the funds to which defendant is entitled. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Byrd, 188 Ga. 527, 4 S.E.2d 175 (1939).

- Surety's interest in contract proceeds which had been assigned to the surety by the contractor took priority over a subsequently filed attorney's lien asserted by the contractor's attorney. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Sutton Constr. Co., 907 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1990).

- If a fund held in escrow was the result of fruits of labor and skill of an attorney at law, the attorney's lien as an attorney attached thereto and was superior to the liens of two other lienholders, who held bills of sale to the insured property destroyed by fire from which the insurance fund in escrow was derived. John J. Woodside Co. v. Irwin, 79 Ga. App. 252, 53 S.E.2d 246 (1949).

- Attorney's lien may, as against the liens of other creditors, be enforced against a portion of the property covered thereby and satisfied out of its proceeds, although attorney has permitted other portions of such property to be sold. Coleman v. Austin, 99 Ga. 629, 27 S.E. 763 (1896).

- If attorney at law, under employment, obtained judgment of foreclosure and caused execution to be issued and levied on land, which was sold, the attorney's client becoming the purchaser and taking the title, no money being paid but the price of the land being entered as a credit upon the execution, the lien of the attorney for the attorney's fee attached to the land and could be foreclosed thereon. Wooten v. Denmark, 85 Ga. 578, 11 S.E. 861 (1890).

- Proceeding to foreclose attorney's lien upon real property is to be brought in the same manner as a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage upon land; the process is a rule nisi issued by the court, and not a process issued by the clerk as in ordinary cases. York v. Edwards, 52 Ga. App. 388, 183 S.E. 339 (1936).

- Lien of the patient's attorney on the settlement proceeds of personal injury action had priority over the hospital's claims for medical expenses incurred in treating the patient as a result of the accident. Ramsey v. Sumner, 211 Ga. App. 202, 438 S.E.2d 676 (1993).

- As an attorney's lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 for services rendered to a decedent's child with respect to securing the child's share of the estate was valid and there was no dispute as to the amount due to the attorney, the child was not entitled to direct distribution of the child's share of the estate until the attorney's lien or claim for fees was fully satisfied. In re Estate of Estes, 317 Ga. App. 241, 731 S.E.2d 73 (2012).

- Lawyer followed the proper procedure to enforce the lawyer's attorney's lien under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) by moving to vacate the dismissal of the underlying suit and reinstate the original action to prosecute the lien; the trial court acted within the court's authority in vacating the dismissal of the underlying action to allow the lawyer to prosecute the lien. Howe & Assocs., P.C. v. Daniels, 280 Ga. 803, 631 S.E.2d 356 (2006).

Lien of the mortgagee is superior to the lien of the mortgagor's attorney. Leiden v. GMAC, 136 Ga. App. 268, 220 S.E.2d 716 (1975).

- Attorney is not entitled to lien upon land for obtaining restraining order to prevent sale thereof when such order was subsequently dissolved, though the delay enabled the client to arrange to prevent the sale. Hodnett v. Bonner, 107 Ga. 452, 33 S.E. 416 (1899).

- When note is reduced to judgment in the amount of principal and interest and the attorney's fees, and the judgment is declared a special lien upon certain land which is security for the payment of the note, and although an attorney may have a lien upon certain land as security for the attorney's fee even after the land has been sold under the execution and has been brought in at the sale by the payee of the note as plaintiff for an amount less than the principal represented in the judgment, the attorney's lien upon the land is only to the extent of 10 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the land. Stegall v. Edwards, 51 Ga. App. 738, 181 S.E. 502 (1935).

- Attorney prosecuting an application to set apart a homestead of realty has no lien on the property if the application is withdrawn or dismissed, nor can the attorney prosecute it further. Haygood v. Dannenberg Co., 102 Ga. 24, 29 S.E. 293 (1897).

- Debt due by attorney cannot be collected by process of garnishment served upon debtor of one of the attorney's clients, although the attorney may, as a result of the attorney's services, have a contingent interest in the debt to the client. Modlin v. Smith, 13 Ga. App. 259, 79 S.E. 82 (1913).

- Attorney, having foreclosed chattel mortgage and lodged the fieri facias with the sheriff, and having brought a petition for a rule against the sheriff for the mortgagee, asking to have the funds derived from the sale of the mortgaged property turned over to the client, the mortgagee, prior to the institution of the garnishment proceedings by the creditor of the mortgagee, who held a common-law fieri facias against the mortgagee, was entitled to have the attorney's lien for services performed in the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, satisfied prior to turning the proceeds of the sale over to the garnishing creditor. Molloy v. Hubbard, 48 Ga. App. 820, 173 S.E. 877 (1934).

- Attorney employed to bring action for accounting has lien on action and inchoate lien on the sums recovered, if any, for whatever fee the attorney is eventually entitled to; there is no rule of law in this state confining such right on the part of an attorney to cases involving contingent fees. Aiken v. White, 69 Ga. App. 717, 26 S.E.2d 471, rev'd on other grounds, 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943).

Attorneys have lien on awards of State Board of Workers' Compensation; such lien need not be recorded, and the only notice necessary is that the employer and the insurance carrier have notice of the attorney's relation to the proceeding. Dunagan v. Marell Farms, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 857, 99 S.E.2d 236 (1957).

State Board of Workers' Compensation is without authority to enforce an attorney's lien, and an award directing the employer, as the result of the employer having settled with the claimant without consulting an attorney, to pay attorney's fees directly to the claimant's attorney is contrary to law and unenforceable. Dunagan v. Marell Farms, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 857, 99 S.E.2d 236 (1957).

- Lien of attorney at law representing claimant attaches to a proceeding in an industrial commission brought for the purpose of obtaining an award of compensation, and, when an award of compensation is entered in favor of the claimant, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier, having notice of the attorney's relation to the proceeding, are not at liberty to satisfy the award until the lien or claim of the attorney for the attorney's fee is fully satisfied, and, if they do so, they are liable in the action to a recovery for the benefit of the attorney to the extent of the attorney's fees, and the attorney may prosecute the proceeding in the manner pointed out by seeking, in the superior court, a judgment upon the award entered in favor of the client, to the extent of the attorney's fees. Dunagan v. Marell Farms, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 857, 99 S.E.2d 236 (1957).

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1, requiring the filing of an action to enforce a materialman's lien within 12 months, did not apply to the enforcement of an attorney's lien. Hester v. Chalker, 222 Ga. App. 783, 476 S.E.2d 79 (1996).

- In an action for breach of promise to marry, after marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant, counsel for the plaintiff cannot prosecute the action for fees. Harris v. Tisom, 63 Ga. 629, 36 Am. R. 126 (1879).

- Judgment creditor cannot defend against a levy to enforce an attorney's lien on the ground that the judgment creditor had agreed, for value, to give indulgence. Tarver v. Tarver, 53 Ga. 43 (1874).

- Trial court's entry of judgment in favor of an attorney in the amount claimed under the attorney's lien for attorney fees did not deny a client the right to a jury trial as to the amount of the attorney fees due because O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 did not provide the statutory right to a jury trial in actions to enforce an attorney's lien, and the award was a matter for the trial court to decide. Woods v. Jones, 305 Ga. App. 349, 699 S.E.2d 567 (2010).

- Trial court did not err in denying a law firm's motion for new trial after the court awarded the firm fees under a contingency fee contract because the jury found that the reasonable fee for the work the firm performed for a former client before the firm was discharged was $20,750; the city called as witnesses the attorney who represented the city in the client's lawsuit against the city, the firm's managing partner, and the firm's remaining partner, and the client called no witnesses and introduced no evidence but argued that the firm's own evidence presented at the trial showed the firm had performed 90 to 180 hours of work on the case, and suggested that a fee of 100 hours times $200 per hour was a reasonable fee under the contract. Jones, Martin, Parriz & Tessener Law Offices, PLLC v. Westrex Corp., 310 Ga. App. 192, 712 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR

Withholding of client's papers or properties.

- Attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14. An attorney, therefore, may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. Adv. Op. No. 87-5 (Sept. 27, 1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 310 et seq.

Reasonableness of Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Actions, 30 POF2d 197.

- 7A C.J.S., Attorney and Client, §§ 207, 221, 230 et seq., 357 et seq.

- Lien of attorney on public fund or property, 2 A.L.R. 274; 24 A.L.R. 933.

Agreement for contingent fee as assignment of interest in judgment, 2 A.L.R. 454; 19 A.L.R. 399.

Attorney's lien on property purchased by client on sale under a judgment procured by attorney, 2 A.L.R. 483.

Attorney's lien on papers or securities that come into his possession otherwise than in his professional capacity, 2 A.L.R. 1488.

Substitution by court of security for attorneys' lien, 33 A.L.R. 1296.

Attorneys' lien as subject to set-off against judgment, 34 A.L.R. 323; 51 A.L.R. 1268.

Attorney's lien on decedent's estate, 50 A.L.R. 657.

Right of attorney to have case continued to protect his compensation, 67 A.L.R. 442.

Validity of statutory provision for attorneys' fees, 90 A.L.R. 530.

Attorney's lien on property recovered for his client, 93 A.L.R. 667.

Affirmative duty of defendant to protect lien of plaintiff's attorney, 94 A.L.R. 695.

Right of attorney rendering service to personal representative or testamentary trustee to equitable substitution or subrogation to the latter's right against the estate in respect of such services, 100 A.L.R. 72.

Allowance of attorney's fee against property or fund increased or protected by attorney's services, 107 A.L.R. 749.

Means of enforcing or making effective attorney's retaining lien, 111 A.L.R. 487.

Payment into court or to clerk of court as affecting rights, liability, and procedure in respect of lien of judgment creditor's attorney, 117 A.L.R. 983.

Statute relating to attorney's lien as affecting common-law or equitable lien, 120 A.L.R. 1243.

Attorneys' fees or other expenses incident to proceeding for judicial determination of restoration of sanity or capacity of one previously adjudged to be insane or incompetent as a charge against his estate, 121 A.L.R. 1501.

Constitutionality of statute which by express terms or construction declares that attorneys' liens shall not be affected by settlement or compromise between the parties, 122 A.L.R. 974.

Attorney's contract for contingent fee as amounting to an equitable assignment of interest in cause of action, or proceeds of settlement thereof, 124 A.L.R. 1508.

Priority of lien of sales or consumers' tax, 136 A.L.R. 1015.

Terms of attorney's contingent-fee contract as creating an equitable lien in his favor, 143 A.L.R. 204.

Merits of client's cause of action or counterclaim as affecting attorney's lien or claim for his compensation against adverse party, in case of compromise without attorney's consent, 146 A.L.R. 67.

Right of attorney to set off claim for unrelated services against client's claim for money collected, 173 A.L.R. 429.

Attorney's right to lien or equitable assignment in respect of client's share or interest in decedent's estate, or in trust, 175 A.L.R. 1132.

Rights and remedies of client as regards papers and documents on which attorney has retaining lien, 3 A.L.R.2d 148.

Conflict of laws as to attorneys' liens, 59 A.L.R.2d 564.

What constitutes acceptance or ratification of, or acquiescence in, services rendered by attorney so as to raise implied promise to pay reasonable value thereof, 78 A.L.R.2d 318.

Sufficiency of notice to opposing party (or of serving or filing thereof) required to establish attorney's lien upon client's claim or cause of action, 85 A.L.R.2d 859.

Attorney's charging lien upon continuing payments to which client becomes entitled as result of litigation, 99 A.L.R.2d 451.

Right of attorney for holder of property insurance to fee out of insurer's share of recovery from tortfeasor, 2 A.L.R.3d 1441.

Funds in hands of his attorney as subject of attachment or garnishment by client's creditor, 35 A.L.R.3d 1094.

Amount of attorneys' compensation in absence of contract or statute fixing amount, 57 A.L.R.3d 475.

Amount of attorneys' compensation in matters involving guardianship and trusts, 57 A.L.R.3d 550.

Amount of attorneys' fees in tort actions, 57 A.L.R.3d 584; 86 A.L.R. Fed. 866.

Attorneys at law: fee collection practices as ground for disciplinary action, 91 A.L.R.3d 583.

Attorney's failure to report promptly receipt of money or property belonging to client as ground for disciplinary action, 91 A.L.R.3d 975.

Limitation to quantum meruit recovery, where attorney employed under contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, 92 A.L.R.3d 690.

Attorney's charging lien as including services rendered or disbursements made in other than instant action or proceeding, 23 A.L.R.4th 336.

Attorney's retaining lien as affected by action to collect legal fees, 45 A.L.R.4th 198.

Attorney's assertion of retaining lien as violation of ethical code or rules governing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974.

What items of client's property or funds are not subject to lien, 70 A.L.R.4th 827.

Priority between attorney's charging lien against judgment and opposing party's right of setoff against same judgment, 27 A.L.R.5th 764.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 A.L.R.5th 595.

Circumstances under which attorney retains right to compensation notwithstanding voluntary withdrawal from case, 53 A.L.R.5th 287.