2020 Georgia Code
Title 15 - Courts
Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code
Article 6 - Delinquency
Part 9 - Transfers
§ 15-11-561. Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Transfer to Superior Court

1. After a petition alleging delinquency has been filed but before the adjudication hearing, on its own motion or on a motion by a prosecuting attorney, the court may convene a hearing to determine whether to transfer the offense to the appropriate superior court for criminal trial if the court determines that:
   1. There is probable cause to believe that a child committed the alleged offense;
   2. Such child is not committable to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill; and
   3. The petition alleges that such child:
      1. Was at least 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense and committed an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult; or
      2. Was 13 or 14 years of age and either committed an act for which the punishment is loss of life or confinement for life in a penal institution or committed aggravated battery resulting in serious bodily injury to an alleged victim who is not a public safety officer as such term is defined in Code Section 16-5-19.
2. At least three days prior to the scheduled transfer hearing, written notice shall be given to a child and his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian. The notice shall contain a statement that the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether such child is to be tried in the juvenile court or transferred for trial as an adult in superior court. A child may request and the court shall grant a continuance to prepare for the transfer hearing.
3. After consideration of a probation report, risk assessment, and any other evidence the court deems relevant, including any evidence offered by a child, the court may determine that because of the seriousness of the offense or such child's prior record, the welfare of the community requires that criminal proceedings against such child be instituted. The court shall also consider the criteria listed in subsection (a) of Code Section 15-11-562.
4. No child, either before or after reaching 17 years of age, shall be prosecuted in superior court for an offense committed before the child turned 17, unless the case has been transferred as provided in this part. In addition, no child shall be subject to criminal prosecution at any time for an offense arising out of a criminal transaction for which the juvenile court retained jurisdiction in its transfer order.

(Code 1981, §15-11-561, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 540, § 1-13/HB 361; Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 2-3/SB 160.)

- Duties of the clerk of the Juvenile Court, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 2.2(a).

- Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"

- For article suggesting upward adjustment to age 15 of the age of criminal responsibility and creation of a rebuttable presumption of adult accountability for youths aged 15 to 18, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972). For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article, "The Prosecuting Attorney in Georgia's Juvenile Courts," see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 27 (2008). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 89 (2017). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For comment on J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Transfer Hearings
• Procedure
• Amenability to Treatment
• Concurrent Jurisdiction

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations taken from cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution are included in the annotations for this Code section. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-39, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-30.2, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

- Former statute was reasonable and did not violate substantive due process under U.S. Const., amend. 14. In re J.J.S., 246 Ga. 617, 272 S.E.2d 294 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Attempt to transfer a juvenile to superior court after an adjudicatory hearing violated subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) and placed the juvenile in jeopardy twice in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In re T.E.D., 169 Ga. App. 401, 312 S.E.2d 864 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, and the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as the legislature sees fit as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved. Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501); In re J.J.S., 246 Ga. 617, 272 S.E.2d 294 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Former statute indicated that assumption of jurisdiction by a juvenile court was linked to an authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Subsection (c) of former statute (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-566) did not enlarge scope of former statute beyond that specified in former subsection (a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561). Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Absent compliance with former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561), there can be no such transfer of a juvenile to another court for treatment as an adult criminal defendant. In re D.B., 187 Ga. App. 3, 369 S.E.2d 498 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Order granting the state's request for a continuance in a juvenile proceeding was vacated because the juvenile court did not consider whether the state's proffered reason of needing more time to determine whether to file a removal petition constituted good cause given the juvenile's objection to the continuance and the expressed desire to admit to the charged crimes. In the Interest of A. H., 332 Ga. App. 590, 774 S.E.2d 163 (2015).

- Disregarding the question of whether collateral estoppel actually applied in the context of a case, the transfer of an involuntary manslaughter case, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-567), against a juvenile to the juvenile court did not collaterally estop a later transfer of the case back to the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) because the first transfer was based on the jurisdictional restrictions in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) and at the time of that transfer, the superior court did not consider or rule on the multiple factors in former § 15-11-30.2 on which the second transfer was based. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Juvenile court did not err in finding that the defendant juvenile was not committable to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill based on a doctor's evaluation which found that the defendant did not meet the criteria for intellectual disability or mental illness after having conducted an evaluation of the defendant. In the Interest of K. S., 348 Ga. App. 440, 823 S.E.2d 536 (2019).

Transfer Hearings

Juvenile court divests itself of jurisdiction.

- Requirements of former statute constitute the only means by which the former juvenile court can divest itself of jurisdiction under the former Juvenile Code. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975); C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976); K.G.W. v. State, 140 Ga. App. 571, 231 S.E.2d 421 (1976), cert. dismissed, 238 Ga. 599, 234 S.E.2d 535 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Former Code section was designed to require a hearing on the issue of transfer if the juvenile court was considering relinquishing jurisdiction. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Former Code section was designed to define procedures and requirements governing transfer hearings. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Juvenile's due process rights were not violated when the court dismissed, without a hearing, a delinquency petition which alleged that the juvenile committed aggravated sodomy as former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(f) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) expressly provided that the transfer hearing provisions did not apply to any proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of a superior court, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560), which included aggravated sodomy. In the Interest of N.C., 293 Ga. App. 374, 667 S.E.2d 181 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Juvenile court was vested with broad discretion in determining whether reasonable grounds exist for transferring a delinquency petition to the appropriate court for prosecution of a crime or public offense. In re K.L.L., 204 Ga. App. 320, 419 S.E.2d 312, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 419 S.E.2d 312 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Juvenile appellant challenged the juvenile court's transfer order contending that the evidence was insufficient to show: (a) that the juvenile committed the offenses alleged against the juvenile as the evidence was based on hearsay testimony from an investigator; (b) that the juvenile was not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, and (c) that the juvenile was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. However, the hearsay evidence was admissible at the instant transfer hearing and the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding that the appellant was not committable upon the mental health report of its psychologist. In the Interest of D.W.B., 259 Ga. App. 662, 577 S.E.2d 819 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile court did not abuse the juvenile court's discretion in transferring a former juvenile's case to the superior court because, as a 28-year-old adult, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter, and the court could not be assured that the former juvenile would receive the appropriate treatment for the necessary length of time in the juvenile system; furthermore, the transfer under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) did not violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Interest of R.T., 278 Ga. App. 225, 628 S.E.2d 662 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Decision by a juvenile court to surrender the court's jurisdiction is a critical determination affecting the tenor of the juvenile's subsequent treatment in the courts and therefore must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Transfer hearings are critically important proceedings affecting important rights of the juvenile. While the hearing need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Statements of the defendant, a juvenile, were admissible and were properly considered in deciding to transfer the defendant's case to the superior court for prosecution even though the statements were made prior to the defendant receiving Miranda warnings since the defendant voluntarily spoke to the police and was not in custody or otherwise detained at the time the statements were made; even if the statements were inadmissible, other evidence, including statements by others which incriminated the defendant, was admissible and supported the transfer determination. In the Interest of B.Y., 257 Ga. App. 253, 570 S.E.2d 689 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Transfer hearings are not to be treated as similar to a committal court nor as an arraignment under the criminal procedure provisions. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- If no petition alleging delinquency was filed in juvenile court, no transfer hearing in that court was required. Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501); Longshore v. State, 239 Ga. 437, 238 S.E.2d 22 (1977);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- In an action against a juvenile charging the juvenile with the delinquent act of murder, when nonexpert witnesses did not provide any basis for their opinion that the juvenile was not mentally ill, the juvenile court abused the court's discretion in transferring the case to the superior court without sufficient evaluation of the juvenile's mental health. In re R.A.J., 214 Ga. App. 162, 447 S.E.2d 158 (1994), overruled on other grounds, In re R.B., 264 Ga. 602, 448 S.E.2d 690 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

To the extent that consideration of the need for future psychiatric treatment might have influenced the determination of whether a transfer to the superior court would be in the juvenile's best interest, the relevant consideration was whether the juvenile required treatment now or in the future and whether such treatment was available through the superior court or exclusively through the juvenile court, not whether the juvenile was suffering from a delusional compulsion at the time of the prior act. In re E.J.P., 236 Ga. App. 221, 511 S.E.2d 290 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Jeopardy did not attach so as to preclude further proceedings against a juvenile for crimes the juvenile admitted at a transfer hearing since the juvenile court accepted the admission for the limited purpose of determining whether the case should be transferred to superior court. In re M.E.J., 260 Ga. 805, 401 S.E.2d 254 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Transfer decision is determinative as to the juvenile aspect of the case and thus may be final and reviewable. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs. v. Perkins, 244 Ga. 237, 259 S.E.2d 427 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Transfer to superior court was proper since the transfer was based in part on the severity of murder and robbery offenses and in part on the involvement in the crimes at issue of adult offenders, along with the defendant's role as the apparent instigator of the offenses. Waller v. State, 261 Ga. 830, 412 S.E.2d 531 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Transfer from the juvenile court to the superior court was proper since evidence was presented as to each transfer requirement and the juvenile court ruled that such evidence justified transfer. In re E.J.P., 236 Ga. App. 221, 511 S.E.2d 290 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Since there were reasonable grounds to determine that the juvenile was a party to the crime of armed robbery and was not likely to be amenable to treatment in the juvenile system, the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in transferring the case to the superior court. In re J.L.B., 240 Ga. App. 655, 523 S.E.2d 645 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Since both the state's and the juvenile's expert witnesses testified that the juvenile did not require involuntary commitment, there was ample evidence supporting the juvenile court's determination that the juvenile did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment; therefore, the transfer from juvenile court to superior court for criminal prosecution was proper. In the Interest of A.B.S., 242 Ga. App. 277, 529 S.E.2d 415 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in transferring the cases of two juvenile defendants to the superior court for prosecution on charges of aggravated assault and attempted armed robbery. The record supported a finding that the transfer criteria of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) and (a)(4) were met since the juvenile court found that the interests of the defendants and the community mandated transfer in light of the seriousness of the conduct, which included one victim being hit repeatedly with a baseball bat, since there was evidence that the defendants committed the alleged delinquent acts when both were older than 15, and since neither of the defendants were committable to an institution for the mentally infirm. In the Interest of B.Y., 257 Ga. App. 253, 570 S.E.2d 689 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile court did not abuse the juvenile court's discretion in transferring the prosecution of two juveniles to the superior court, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2, based on the nature and severity of the crimes alleged, the community interest, the age of both juveniles charged, and the fact that insufficient time existed to provide both with adequate treatment in the juvenile system. In the Interest of S.K.K., 280 Ga. App. 877, 635 S.E.2d 263 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

In a case in which: (1) an inmate was charged in juvenile court with aggravated assault and aggravated battery pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-10); (2) after the victim died, the inmate was indicted in a county superior court for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery without a transfer hearing being held in the juvenile court as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561); (3) the superior court was exercising the superior court's jurisdiction pursuant to former § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560); and (4) the juvenile court judge ordered the juvenile complaint against the inmate to be dismissed, the inmate's motion for reconsideration of the denial of the inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied; any due process error had no effect on the outcome of the inmate's case since the felony murder charge was properly before the superior court and would have been proved by the same evidence. Moreover, the inmate's right against excessive punishment was not violated. Miller v. Martin, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile defendant's long history of offenses, the failure of attempts at rehabilitation through the juvenile system, and the fact that, as the defendant was 17, alternative rehabilitation programs in the juvenile system would be difficult, if not impossible, to find, supported the juvenile court's determination that the interests of the defendant and the community would be better served by transferring the case to superior court. In the Interest of T. F., 295 Ga. App. 417, 671 S.E.2d 887 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Because a juvenile had an extensive history of delinquency offenses, because past rehabilitative attempts had proven fruitless, and because several of the pending charges against the juvenile involved seriously violent behavior, transfer of the juvenile's case to a superior court pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) was proper. In re R.W., 299 Ga. App. 505, 683 S.E.2d 80 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

State met the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) for transferring a criminal case against a juvenile to the superior court based on the nature and severity of the offenses, the involvement of adult offenders, and the juvenile's role as an instigator in a gang shooting that injured five innocent bystanders. In re D.C., 303 Ga. App. 395, 693 S.E.2d 596 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Juvenile court erred in granting the state's motion to transfer the defendant juvenile's case back to the superior court pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 because the superior court had properly transferred the case to the juvenile court since the defendant was not indicted within 180 days of detention as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1; the time limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 are plainly stated and mandatory and clearly express the legislative intent that when a juvenile is detained and the superior court is exercising jurisdiction under either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561), the state must obtain an indictment within the specified time or the superior court loses the jurisdiction conferred by those provisions. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Hearsay testimony from an investigator as evidence of the "reasonable grounds to believe" that the juvenile had committed murder was admissible at a transfer hearing. In re R.B., 264 Ga. 602, 448 S.E.2d 690 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Consideration of an affirmative defense goes to the merits of a case and is not an issue during the juvenile court's consideration of whether to transfer a case. In re E.J.P., 236 Ga. App. 221, 511 S.E.2d 290 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in transferring a murder case since the juvenile court found that because of the heinous nature of the offense the community's interest in treating the appellant as an adult outweighed the appellant's interest in being treated as a juvenile. In re C.R., 264 Ga. 215, 442 S.E.2d 737 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947, 115 S. Ct. 357, 130 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Juvenile court may, but is not required to, consider the severity of the crimes committed when determining the weight to be given the community's interest in trying a juvenile in superior court. In re J.N.B., 263 Ga. 600, 436 S.E.2d 202 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Burden of meeting stated requirements of former statute was upon state. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

State is required to carry the burden of showing that the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation. In re E.W., 256 Ga. 681, 353 S.E.2d 175 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In re S.P., 189 Ga. App. 829, 377 S.E.2d 911 (1989);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

State has the burden of showing that the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation in order to make a finding that the interests of the child and the community require placing the child under legal restraint and making the transfer to another court. In re K.S.J., 258 Ga. 52, 365 S.E.2d 820 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Determination that a child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill must be supported by competent evidence, and the burden of presenting such evidence lies with the state. In re K.S.J., 258 Ga. 52, 365 S.E.2d 820 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In re S.P., 189 Ga. App. 829, 377 S.E.2d 911 (1989);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- As to offenses charged, all that is required is to show court had reasonable grounds to believe child committed delinquent acts and is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through available facilities. D.L.M. v. State, 160 Ga. App. 424, 287 S.E.2d 355 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Nature of crime alone was not sufficient to satisfy requirements of former section. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- If a petition alleging delinquency has been filed in the juvenile court, the same requirements must be met in order for the juvenile court to transfer a case involving a capital offense to the superior court as a case involving a noncapital offense. J.G.B. v. State, 136 Ga. App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 79 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Same 180-day time limitation applies to both former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28(b) and15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-560 and15-11-561), and that 180 days begins to run on the day the juvenile is detained whenever the superior court is exercising jurisdiction under either section; it necessarily follows that anytime the superior court loses jurisdiction which was conferred by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) because the state failed to obtain an indictment within 180 days of the date the juvenile was detained, the time will also have expired within which the state could procure an indictment if the superior court were proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) and, thus, a transfer back to the superior court under those circumstances is pointless since an indictment returned by the grand jury would be void. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Although O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 allows the state to request one automatic 90-day extension, this extension cannot be granted after the expiration of the 180 days; the legislature intended to set time limitations for the state to act in those situations in which the juvenile is detained and the superior court is exercising jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561). In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- Lower appellate court erred when the court affirmed the transfer of the defendant from the superior court to the juvenile court because the court misunderstood O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 when the court concluded that the statute did not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention as the defendant filed an express waiver. State v. Baxter, 300 Ga. 268, 794 S.E.2d 49 (2016).

- Giving the accused juvenile notice of an intention to transfer the case out of the juvenile court's jurisdiction was instituted in order to satisfy the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Reed v. State, 125 Ga. App. 568, 188 S.E.2d 392 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Former statute specifically required that in cases in which the juvenile court decided to yield to concurrent jurisdiction over the juvenile to another court that the accused child and the child's parents must be notified that the hearing was for this specific "purpose." Reed v. State, 125 Ga. App. 568, 188 S.E.2d 392 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- When former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2501 and 24A-2002 are read together, a juvenile faced with the possible transfer of the juvenile's case from juvenile court to "the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense" has the right to an evidentiary hearing at which the juvenile must be given the opportunity to introduce evidence and otherwise be heard in the juvenile's own behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- There was no harmful error in the failure of the notice to state the purpose of the hearing since, even if the initial knowledge of the purpose of the hearing was insufficient to establish proper notice to the juvenile, the mother, and the attorney, a five-day postponement of the portion of the hearing dealing with whether to process the juvenile as an adult provided adequate notice. In re B.A.H., 198 Ga. App. 713, 402 S.E.2d 791 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Since a juvenile admitted receipt of the state's written motion for transfer and interposed no objection, but proceeded on the merits of the motion, any valid objection to the sufficiency of the motion was waived. In re L.R., 219 Ga. App. 755, 466 S.E.2d 653 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); Rivers v. State, 229 Ga. App. 12, 493 S.E.2d 2 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Juvenile court has discretion to determine whether there are "reasonable grounds" and to order the transfer only after conducting an evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court may not simply waive juvenile jurisdiction and deny an appellant the right to an evidentiary hearing on the "reasonable grounds" for the transfer. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933 § 24A-2501).

Standard under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) required only that the court find that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the child committed the act alleged, not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was is required for a conviction. Moreover, the court's determination, if based on evidence, will not be controlled by the appellate court. In re K.S.J., 258 Ga. 52, 365 S.E.2d 820 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In re R.J., 191 Ga. App. 712, 382 S.E.2d 671 (1989); In the Interest of J.B.H., 241 Ga. App. 736, 527 S.E.2d 18 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- While former Code 1933, §§ 24A-3501 and 24A-3502 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-704 and15-11-708) both require the consent of the court to inspect a juvenile's records and files, a juvenile's right to effective assistance of counsel limits the court's discretion to withhold such consent from counsel representing the juvenile in a "critically important" transfer proceeding. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Since the court granted defense counsel's motion pursuant to former Code 1933, §§ 24A-3501 and 24A-3502 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-704 and15-11-708) but limited access to only those files and records of appellant which would be "used against" the juvenile concerned at the transfer hearing, to the extent that the appellant's counsel was not granted access to files and records of the appellant which were considered by the juvenile court in transferring jurisdiction, the ruling was erroneous. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Not only are a juvenile and the juvenile's counsel entitled to know what information in the juvenile's records and files the court relied upon in the juvenile court's adverse decision to transfer jurisdiction, but the juvenile and counsel are also entitled to view those records and files considered but not relied upon by the juvenile judge. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- If a decision on waiver is "critically important" it is equally of "critical importance" that the material submitted to the judge be subjected to examination, criticism, and refutation within reasonable limits having regard to the theory of the former Juvenile Code. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- While allowing counsel access to materials which will be "used against" a juvenile serves the defensive purpose of ensuring that any adverse material considered by the court will be subject to attack and refutation, it denies counsel the opportunity to examine, for the purpose of discovering and ensuring that proper and due consideration is given thereto, any material to be considered by the court which might serve as a "reasonable ground" for retaining, rather than transferring, jurisdiction. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Child's mental condition may be established by the testimony of a nonexpert witness, such as a court services worker, provided the witness gives sufficient facts and circumstances to establish the basis for the witness's opinion. L.K.F. v. State, 173 Ga. App. 770, 328 S.E.2d 394 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Discretion conferred by paragraph (a)(3) of the former statute cannot be based on undisclosed personal information known to the trial jurist and in disregard of the evidence in the record. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Juvenile court did not abuse the juvenile court's discretion in ordering a transfer merely because the court relied on layperson rather than expert testimony as to the juvenile's mental condition and amenability to treatment. D.T.R. v. State, 174 Ga. App. 695, 331 S.E.2d 70 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Juvenile court's finding that, because of the heinous nature of the offenses (aggravated assaults leaving one victim with permanent brain damage), the community's interest in treating the juvenile as an adult outweighed the juvenile's interest in remaining in the juvenile system and was sufficient to warrant transfer. State v. M.M., 259 Ga. 637, 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Juvenile court did not err in the juvenile court's reliance upon the heinous nature of the charged offense in determining that the community's interest in treating a juvenile defendant as an adult outweighed the defendant's interest in being treated in the juvenile system. In re J.H., 260 Ga. 447, 396 S.E.2d 885 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Since the juvenile court judge refused to conduct a hearing at which evidence bearing upon the "transfer criteria" listed in the former section could be introduced, the judgment of the juvenile court transferring jurisdiction must be reversed and the case remanded for an appropriate evidentiary hearing. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Given that the right of confrontation is a trial right, there is no reason to apply that right to a transfer hearing involving a juvenile. Therefore, hearsay evidence is admissible at such hearings. In the Interest of T. F., 295 Ga. App. 417, 671 S.E.2d 887 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- If the juvenile had a full hearing and the child and the child's parents were present and participated in the hearing, normally such conduct, including the acknowledgment of service by the attorney of the initial petition under the former Juvenile Code, might constitute a waiver of the three-day notice requirement of paragraph (a)(2) of the former section, but if a juvenile was involved then such conduct will not operate as an estoppel or legal waiver of statutory requirements. Reed v. State, 125 Ga. App. 568, 188 S.E.2d 392 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Former Code 1933, § 24A-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-420) was not unconstitutional on the ground that the statute violated due process of law by permitting the juvenile court to allow the case to be transferred to the superior court by merely disallowing the filing of a petition such as would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court, without the benefit of any transfer hearing. Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Amenability to Treatment

Testimony regarding rehabilitation possibilities or absence needed.

- Since the former section required the state to show "reasonable grounds," there must be testimony as to the rehabilitation possibilities or absence thereof in the record to meet the due process requirements granted juveniles by the Georgia Supreme Court. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501); In re T.J.M., 142 Ga. App. 415, 236 S.E.2d 152 (1977);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Transfer order must realistically reflect why a child is not amenable to treatment as a juvenile. Such a decision must be based on evidence and the basis for the decision must be clearly reflected in the transfer order itself. C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Transfer order which did not reflect why the child was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile was too general to sustain and was remanded for specific findings and conclusions balancing the amenability factor against the interests of the community in processing the child as an adult. In re H.W.A., 182 Ga. App. 188, 354 S.E.2d 884 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In re M.M., 190 Ga. App. 795, 380 S.E.2d 75 (1989);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Number and severity of offenses, standing alone, cannot establish absence of amenability to rehabilitation. J.G.B. v. State, 136 Ga. App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 79 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501); C.L.A. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 511, 224 S.E.2d 491 (1976);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Child's amenability or nonamenability to treatment is but one factor to consider in determining the child's and the community's interests. Both the state and the juvenile are free to put forth any evidence they desire relating to the child's and the community's interest. State v. M.M., 259 Ga. 637, 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Juvenile court finding that it would be in the best interest of a juvenile defendant and of the public for the defendant to be dealt with as an adult based on the severity of the offense does not abuse the juvenile court's discretion in ordering the transfer of that case to superior court based on these findings. In re A.G., 265 Ga. 481, 458 S.E.2d 343 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Whether a juvenile is amenable to treatment in the juvenile system is but one factor for the juvenile court to consider when making this determination. In re J.B., 234 Ga. App. 775, 507 S.E.2d 874 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Juvenile court may transfer to the superior court a juvenile who is amenable to treatment if the juvenile court finds that the amenability factor is outweighed by the interests of the community in treating the child as an adult. In re K.S.J., 258 Ga. 52, 365 S.E.2d 820 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Order of the juvenile court transferring a juvenile's case to superior court so that the juvenile could be treated as an adult offender was required to be remanded because, even though the record contained facts on which the court's conclusion could be based, the record failed to show the required balancing of the interests of the juvenile and the community. In the Interest of B.J.W., 247 Ga. App. 437, 543 S.E.2d 811 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

It is not necessary to prove the juvenile's amenability to treatment in the juvenile system if the interest of the community mandates a transfer. In re S.B.B., 234 Ga. App. 778, 507 S.E.2d 879 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Former statute subsumed a juvenile's amenability to treatment within the concept, "the interest of the child," and authorized a juvenile court to transfer to the superior court a juvenile who was amenable to treatment if the juvenile court found that the amenability factor was outweighed by the interest of the community in processing the child as an adult. In re J.J.S., 246 Ga. 617, 272 S.E.2d 294 (1980) (decided under Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

After a juvenile stole two pounds of cocaine from a sheriff 's property room, and had a history of delinquency adjudications, there was no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's transfer of the defendant to superior court for prosecution of this offense. In re T.M., 195 Ga. App. 342, 393 S.E.2d 448 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Even though the juvenile defendant was amenable to treatment, considering the severity of the crimes involved and the involvement of an adult offender, the juvenile court had sufficient basis for finding that the community's interest mandated the defendant's adjudication to the adult system. In re C.B.D., 215 Ga. App. 655, 449 S.E.2d 1 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

State is not required to show, nor is the transfer order required to explain, why the child is not amenable to treatment when that factor is not relied on as the basis for the transfer. In re J.D., 264 Ga. 836, 452 S.E.2d 105 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

State did not err in failing to determine whether the juvenile was amenable to treatment since the court found it would be in the best interest of the public for the juvenile to be dealt with as an adult based on the severity of the offense and the community's interest in public prosecution. In re J.D., 264 Ga. 836, 452 S.E.2d 105 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Because the record showed that the juvenile had a five-year history of treatment in the juvenile system resulting from criminal offenses escalating in severity, including carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a pistol without a license, the juvenile court correctly balanced the juvenile's interest in treatment in the juvenile court system against the community's interest in treating the juvenile as an adult. In re A.P.W., 265 Ga. 8, 453 S.E.2d 457 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In the Interest of D.W.B., 259 Ga. App. 662, 577 S.E.2d 819 (2003) ;(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- If the state seeks a transfer based at least in part on the child's nonamenability to treatment in the juvenile system, the state has the burden of proving the child is not amenable to treatment. But if the state argues that, even though a juvenile is amenable to treatment, the community's interest in transferring the juvenile to the adult system outweighs the juvenile's interest in treatment in the juvenile system, the state does not have to prove the child's nonamenability to treatment. State v. M.M., 259 Ga. 637, 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

If the juvenile court relies in part on the child's nonamenability to treatment in ordering the transfer, the transfer order, in performing the balancing test required by subparagraph (a)(3)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561), must reflect why the child is not amenable to treatment, but if the state argues that, even though a juvenile is amenable to treatment, the community's interest in transferring the juvenile to the adult system outweighs the juvenile's interest in treatment in the juvenile system, and the court orders a transfer, the order does not have to reflect why the juvenile is not amenable to treatment. Instead, the order must balance the child's interest in treatment in the juvenile system, including but not limited to the child's amenability to treatment, against the community's interest in treating the child as an adult. State v. M.M., 259 Ga. 637, 386 S.E.2d 35 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39); In re J.B., 234 Ga. App. 775, 507 S.E.2d 874 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

State did not meet the state's burden to prove the defendant's nonamenability to juvenile treatment since the defendant had no prior record and had no previous experience in the juvenile system and, although the state and the court's order relied on nonamenability, no proof of such was offered. In re E.M., 198 Ga. App. 729, 402 S.E.2d 751, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 402 S.E.2d 751 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Since there were reasonable grounds for the court to conclude that the juvenile could not receive appropriate treatment in a secure facility for the necessary length of time in the juvenile system, the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in ordering a transfer. In re J.N.B., 263 Ga. 600, 436 S.E.2d 202 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Evidence that a juvenile had a history of using marijuana and other drugs, had used marijuana before the juvenile lost control of a car the juvenile was driving while racing another car on a public street, causing a multi-car collision in which two people died, had challenged other people to automobile races on several occasions, violated the conditions of the juvenile's driver's license by driving with a non-family member, and used drugs after the accident was sufficient to support the juvenile court's judgment that the juvenile was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile court system and that the interests of the juvenile and the community would be better served if the case was transferred to the superior court. In the Interest of W.N.J., 268 Ga. App. 637, 602 S.E.2d 173 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile court's order transferring the defendant, a juvenile, for trial as an adult pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) was proper because the juvenile court properly found that based on the testimony of the defendant's probation officer, the defendant was not amenable to treatment in that court; the juvenile court also properly found that the community's interest in transfer outweighed the defendant's interest in remaining in juvenile court based on the escalating nature of the defendant's alleged criminal conduct, all while on probation. Evidence that the defendant was intelligent and performed well in school did not demand a finding or necessarily demonstrate that the defendant was amenable to the treatment solutions offered in the juvenile court. In re D.M., 299 Ga. App. 586, 683 S.E.2d 130 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in determining that the community's interest in having the defendant prosecuted as an adult, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2), outweighed the defendant's interest in having the case stay in juvenile court because the factors favoring the community's interest outweighed the defendant's amenability to treatment in the juvenile court, particularly, the seriousness of the offenses in that the defendant killed a child and caused another to be a quadriplegic, the fact that the defendant was the instigator, the limited options for detention and supervision available to the juvenile court in dealing with the defendant, and the community's need for a full and public trial. In the Interest of J. R. L., 319 Ga. App. 666, 738 S.E.2d 144 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Court first taking jurisdiction retains jurisdiction unless transfer.

- Superior courts and the juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles charged with capital offenses, and whichever court first takes jurisdiction over the matter may retain jurisdiction, subject to the right of the juvenile court to transfer the case to the superior court. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

After a delinquency petition was filed, alleging that a 16-year-old committed the criminal offense of armed robbery, and the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine whether the offense should be transferred for prosecution in the superior court, the juvenile court did not err when the juvenile court determined that the commission of the serious offense of armed robbery by a 16-year-old acting in concert with adult co-perpetrators warrants the conclusion that the child is not amenable to treatment as a juvenile. In re J.D., 195 Ga. App. 801, 395 S.E.2d 280 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

- Under the statutory scheme, exclusive original jurisdiction of noncapital juvenile cases is placed in the juvenile courts with the concurrent jurisdiction of the superior courts becoming effective when activated by a proper transfer from the juvenile courts. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), for comment, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

While under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) an involuntary manslaughter charge could not be initiated in a superior court, which properly transferred the matter to a juvenile court, assuming the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) were met, the juvenile court did not err in granting a motion to transfer the case back to the superior court as the authority to do so was specifically given in former § 15-11-30.2. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- When either the juvenile court or the superior court properly could have exercised jurisdiction, no petition alleging delinquency was ever filed in the juvenile court, and the superior court first took jurisdiction through indictment, jurisdiction properly vested in the superior court and no transfer hearing pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) was required. Taylor v. State, 194 Ga. App. 871, 392 S.E.2d 57 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).

Because the defendant was charged with participating in a "pattern of criminal street gang activity" that included armed robbery and murder, the trial court's jurisdiction necessarily extended to the related lesser crimes even though the defendant was a juvenile at the time and the case had not been transferred pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561). Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

- If the superior court first exercised jurisdiction over a minor charged with murder by conducting a committal hearing, subsequent proceedings in juvenile court which charged the appellant with aggravated assault and ordered transferral to superior court were null and void. J.T.M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635, 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- If a juvenile defendant is charged with a crime for which the juvenile could be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in a penitentiary, and the superior court first took jurisdiction over such juvenile, the trial court may deny a motion which seeks to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for a hearing to determine the defendant's amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 353, 219 S.E.2d 419 (1975) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

Juvenile court's judgment to try the defendant as a juvenile is res judicata as the determination of guilt was made in that court. Lincoln v. State, 138 Ga. App. 234, 225 S.E.2d 708 (1976) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976) (decided prior to adoption of 1983 Constitution and under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).

- Juvenile court erred in finding that a juvenile case involving armed robbery with a firearm was subject to the transfer provisions delineated in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) because, under former subsection (f) of that section, the transfer provisions did not apply in cases involving armed robbery with a firearm, which were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(vii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560). However, because the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction to enter the judgment due to the state's filing a petition in the juvenile court, the state had no right to appeal from the judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(5). In re D. L., 302 Ga. App. 234, 690 S.E.2d 522 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 10 et seq.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 141 et seq.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 34.

- Jurisdiction of another court over child as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court, 11 A.L.R. 147; 78 A.L.R. 317; 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Power of juvenile court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, 76 A.L.R. 657.

Possibility of rehabilitation as affecting whether juvenile offender should be tried as adult, 22 A.L.R.4th 1162.

Juvenile's guilty or no contest plea in adult court as waiver of defects in transfer or certification proceedings, 74 A.L.R.5th 453.