2022 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 53a - Penal Code
Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses
Section 53a-92. - Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony.

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)

History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara. indicators and made other technical changes.

Cited. 173 C. 165; 197 C. 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 225 C. 347; 227 C. 677; 235 C. 711; 236 C. 112. Court's failure to instruct jury in accordance with 287 C. 509 was harmless because restraint of victim was not incidental to additional offenses. 293 C. 435.

Cited. 8 CA 177; 24 CA 13; 39 CA 632; 46 CA 691; Id., 741.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165. Cited. 185 C. 339; 189 C. 346; 194 C. 114; Id., 692; 198 C. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 1; Id., 240; Id., 714; 205 C. 132; Id., 673; 206 C. 40; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 210 C. 110; Id., 199; Id., 315; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 388; Id., 422; 214 C. 38; Id., 89; 215 C. 173; Id., 716; 216 C. 647; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 93; Id., 160; Id., 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 270; Id., 345; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 1; Id., 153; 228 C. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 C. 195; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284. Cited. Id., 694; 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235; 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 740. Legislature intended to exclude from scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608. Holding in 287 C. 509 that to commit a kidnapping, defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime, applies retroactively to petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenges his kidnapping conviction. 299 C. 740. Where defendant was also charged with robbery and there was no evidence that victim was bound or moved physically, and victim was restrained for five minutes and released immediately after robbery was complete, the restraint alone cannot support kidnapping charge. 301 C. 77. Subdiv. (2)(A): Subpara. not unconstitutionally vague since defendant had fair warning when he committed sexual assault in 1988 that his movement of victim could support an independent kidnapping conviction. 306 C. 718. Retroactive relief is available, as long as the evidence warrants such relief, for all collateral attacks on judgments rendered final prior to the holding in 287 C. 509, irrespective of whether the kidnapping instruction was challenged in the criminal proceeding, and such challenges are not subject to the procedural default rule; omission of a Salamon instruction not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 321 C. 56. Subdiv. (2)(B): Clarifying “merely incidental to and necessary for” language used in holding in State v. Salamon, 287 C. 509, and cited in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 C. 56. 339 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 428; 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457; 34 CA 276; 36 CA 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718; Id., 774; 37 CA 360; Id., 464; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155. Kidnapping conviction reversed and matter remanded so jury could be instructed re holdings in 287 C. 509 and 288 C. 418 that it could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping unless he intended to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the underlying crime. 115 CA 166. Subdiv. (2)(A): When assessing whether a kidnapping charge is merely incidental to and necessary for another crime, trial court must make a specific factual finding whether defendant intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than what was necessary to commit the other crime; where defendant is charged with kidnapping pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(A), and no evidence is presented at trial re defendant's intention to inflict physical injury subsequent to related sexual assault, court's analysis of the kidnapping charge is limited to defendant's conduct up to the completion of the sexual assault. 118 CA 140. Subdiv. (2)(A) is a lesser offense included within the kidnapping charge of Subdiv. (2)(B) and thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted double jeopardy. Id., 831. Subdiv. (2): 287 C. 509 does not control burglary and larceny case because restraint of victim was not necessary to accomplish those crimes and restraint occurred after defendant took jewelry. 127 CA 181. Subdivs. (2)(A) and (2)(B) are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 180 CA 371; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54. Subdiv. (2)(B): In order to prevail on habeas claim that the absence of a Salamon instruction did not constitute harmless error, petitioner is not required to establish that there was insufficient evidence to convict him or that a properly instructed jury likely would find him guilty; commissioner bears burden of demonstrating that the omission of a Salamon instruction on incidental restraint did not contribute to the verdict; test to be applied by appellate court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would reach a different result. 184 CA 101; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 1.

Cited. 43 CS 46.