2022 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 53a - Penal Code
Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses
Section 53a-167a. - Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.

(a) A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's or firefighter's duties.

(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor, except that, if such violation causes the death or serious physical injury of another person, such person shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 50; P.A. 76-225; P.A. 01-84, S. 11, 26; P.A. 05-180, S. 4; P.A. 08-150, S. 52; P.A. 10-36, S. 22; 10-110, S. 51; P.A. 13-300, S. 1; P.A. 19-108, S. 6; P.A. 22-117, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 76-225 reworded Subsec. (a) to eliminate redundant reference to interference with peace officer or fireman and made interference with an officer a Class A misdemeanor rather than a Class D felony; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “fireman” with “firefighter” and make other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (a) to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of subsection; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (a) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated”, add “motor vehicle inspector's” re performance of duties and make a technical change, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 10-110 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 13-300 amended Subsec. (b) to establish class D felony penalty if violation causes death or serious physical injury of another; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec.(a) to delete references to motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 22-117 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022.

Cited. 182 C. 242; 189 C. 1; 191 C. 433; 194 C. 347; 195 C. 668; 198 C. 43; 205 C. 456; 211 C. 389; 220 C. 38; 230 C. 400; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 214. Refusal to comply with police command to provide identification following a “Terry” stop may constitute a violation of section even if such refusal is unaccompanied by any physical force or other affirmative act; statute broadly proscribes conduct that hinders, obstructs or impedes a police officer in performance of duties, irrespective of whether offending conduct is active or passive. 280 C. 824. Re 2003 revision, Appellate Court's determination that evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction and that defendant lacked requisite intent was improper in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene, and potential applicability of Sec. 14-217 to present case does not preclude conviction under this section which was drafted expansively to encompass wide range of conduct. 285 C. 447. Evidence was not sufficient to convict defendant under section due to state's failure to pursue a theory of guilt predicated on threatening language and where the trial court did not instruct the jury on the true threat doctrine. 321 C. 729.

Cited. 1 CA 540; Id., 709; 5 CA 616. Statute meets requirement of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407. Cited. 7 CA 257; 8 CA 153; 10 CA 486; Id., 532; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 15 CA 58; Id., 161; 18 CA 104; 21 CA 326; 22 CA 10; Id., 683; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 479; 24 CA 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; Id., 598; 27 CA 49; Id., 103; 28 CA 369; 30 CA 45; 31 CA 178; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78; 37 CA 276; 38 CA 56; 40 CA 601; 42 CA 507; 43 CA 76; 45 CA 369; 46 CA 118. Broad intent is to prohibit conduct that hampers activities of police in performance of their duties, including physical resistance as well as defendant's conduct in this case, in which, after officer saw defendant in window and ordered him at gunpoint to get down and show his hands, defendant reentered building and fled through another window. 66 CA 357. Legislature did not intend failure to identify oneself instantly and voicing of declaratory statements, such as “this isn't Russia”, to constitute interference or obstruction under section. 86 CA 363. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. Id., 607. Conviction reversed in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene to bring brother to hospital because section requires physical struggle, attempt to escape or to destroy evidence and there was not sufficient evidence to support conviction under section. 93 CA 349; judgment reversed, see 285 C. 447. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for interfering with an officer. 96 CA 341. Defendant who placed arresting officer in head lock was in violation of section regardless of whether officer had probable cause for making the arrest. 98 CA 350. Under facts presented, conviction of assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(5) and interfering with officer under this section does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Text message to witness telling him not to write statement to police and to “keep [his] mouth shut” could not be construed to be fighting words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. 152 CA 590. Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under this section and assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Cited. 33 CS 4. Construed. Id., 515. Intention to interfere is necessary element of offense; charge to jury also required knowledge of officer's duty; unlawful entry by officer would not be “in the performance of his duties”, so proof of lawfulness is essential element of state's case and Sec. 53a-23 is applicable. 34 CS 531. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. Id., 549. Cited. 36 CS 89; 37 CS 767; 38 CS 364; Id., 400; Id., 665; 39 CS 347; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 221 C. 788. In order to sustain a conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Defendant acted with the intent to interfere with the performance of the officers' duties; defendant's act does not have to be successful. 1 CA 669. Cited. 5 CA 496; 9 CA 255; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 104; 21 CA 260; 23 CA 123; 24 CA 195; Id., 489; 25 CA 3, 5; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 509; 41 CA 584; 46 CA 791. There was sufficient evidence to support conviction of interfering with an officer where defendant provided police with a false name when asked for his name at crime scene and again while being booked for drug offenses at police headquarters. 110 CA 778. Conviction of both interfering with officer under Subsec. and assault of peace officer under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) constitutes double jeopardy. 119 CA 556.