2013 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 53a - Penal Code
Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses
Section 53a-62 - Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.

(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

(b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “threatening” with “threatening in the second degree” where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289. Cited. 8 CA 190; Id., 496. Cited. 9 CA 161. Cited. 14 CA 6; Id., 526. Cited. 25 CA 149; Id., 334. Cited. 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494. Cited. 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 708. Cited. 31 CA 497. Cited. 33 CA 103. Cited. 40 CA 805. Cited. 41 CA 47. Words of defendant’s threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of “imminent” serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.

Cited. 37 CS 664. Cited. 42 CS 574. Cited. 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Cited. 226 C. 601. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, reversed. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153; 228 C. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403.

Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80; 13 CA 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 CA 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 CA 515; 41 CA 584. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Statute’s application to defendant’s conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id. Subdiv. (3): A reasonable speaker would foresee that the statements, “more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you” and “I’m going to be there to watch it happen”, when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, would cause the listener to believe that he would be subject to physical violence, and therefore the statements constituted a true threat and were not constitutionally protected speech. 130 CA 470.