2013 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 53a - Penal Code
Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability
Section 53a-8 - Criminal liability for acts of another.

(a) A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

(b) A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3, to another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or under circumstances in which he should know that such other person intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2.)

History: 1971 act specified that person who requests, commands, aids, etc. another in the commission of an offense “may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2 added Subsec. (b) re criminal liability for the conduct of another person with a firearm.

Cited. 4 CA 676; 7 CA 503; Id., 701; 9 CA 161; Id., 228; 11 CA 575; Id., 621; Id., 699; Id., 805; 12 CA 1. Being an accessory to breach of the peace is a cognizable crime. Id., 74. Cited. Id., 343; 13 CA 76; Id., 554; 14 CA 1; Id., 205; Id., 445; Id., 472; Id., 493; 15 CA 122; Id., 416; 16 CA 89; Id., 333; Id., 455; 17 CA 50; 18 CA 175; Id., 184; Id., 730; 19 CA 179; 20 CA 410; Id., 665; 22 CA 216; Id., 329; Id., 340; 23 CA 123; 25 CA 318; Id., 565; Id., 646; 26 CA 33; Id., 641; Id., 779; 27 CA 1; Id., 558; 28 CA 126; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 575; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 304; Id., 499; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; 31 CA 47; Id., 614; 32 CA 224; Id., 831; 33 CA 143; Id., 288; 34 CA 223; Id., 717, see 37 CA 509; 35 CA 138; Id., 360; Id., 527; Id., 781; 36 CA 190; Id., 454; Id., 473; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 35; Id., 40; Id., 276; Id., 509; Id., 574; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; Id., 579; 40 CA 47; Id., 470; Id., 526; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 565; 42 CA 555; 44 CA 499; Id., 790; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 269; Id., 640; Id., 778. Statute does not provide for a separate, substantive offense but provides alternate means by which the underlying substantive crime may be committed. 49 CA 121. Fact that defendant not formally charged as accessory does not preclude a conviction as such. Id., 183. State must prove that accused shared both the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with principal perpetrator of the crime. 63 CA 466. Court’s charge re accessorial liability properly tracks language of section and correctly explained that acting as accessory merely is an alternative means of committing the substantive offense. 81 CA 152. When defendant is charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory, state must prove that defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury and to aid the principal in doing so, but does not have to also prove that defendant intended the use, carrying or threatened use of the firearm. 95 CA 362. There is no meaningful distinction between principal and accessory liability and defendant may be convicted as accessory even if charged as a principal. 105 CA 862. Evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish intent and defendant’s identity with respect to charges stemming from drug transaction. 110 CA 70.

Defendant who operated boat while brother stole lobsters was criminally liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the offense. 37 CS 809. Cited. 38 CS 301; 40 CS 38.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 242 C. 485. Jury did not have to find that defendant actually wielded knife during robbery; it had to find that defendant was a participant in the robbery. 275 C. 534. Trial court properly rejected defendant’s claim that a defense of duress, if credited, would negate the required mental state governing accessorial liability, specific intent and duress can coexist. 282 C. 281.

Cited. 37 CA 464; 39 CA 333. To be guilty as accessory, one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with perpetrator of the crime and must knowingly and willfully assist perpetrator in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it. 77 CA 80. Although the evidence did not reveal whether it was defendant or a coparticipant who had fired the fatal shot, the jury reasonably could have determined that there was sufficient concert of action between defendant and the coparticipant to support the accessory allegation. 136 CA 197.