2011 Connecticut Code
Title 14 Motor Vehicles. Use of the Highway By Vehicles. Gasoline
Chapter 248 Vehicle Highway Use
Sec. 14-219. Speeding.

      Sec. 14-219. Speeding. (a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle (1) upon any highway, road or any parking area for ten cars or more, at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any occupant of such motor vehicle, but not the life of any other person than such an occupant; (2) at a rate of speed greater than fifty-five miles per hour upon any highway other than a highway specified in subsection (b) of section 14-218a for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of said subsection; (3) at a rate of speed greater than sixty-five miles per hour upon any highway specified in subsection (b) of section 14-218a for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of said subsection; or (4) if such person is under eighteen years of age, upon any highway or road for which a speed limit of less than sixty-five miles per hour has been established in accordance with subsection (a) of section 14-218a, at a rate of speed more than twenty miles per hour above such speed limit.

      (b) Any person who operates a motor vehicle (1) on a multiple lane, limited access highway other than a highway specified in subsection (b) of section 14-218a for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of said subsection at a rate of speed greater than fifty-five miles per hour but not greater than seventy miles per hour, (2) on a multiple lane, limited access highway specified in subsection (b) of section 14-218a for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of said subsection at a rate of speed greater than sixty-five miles per hour but not greater than seventy miles per hour, (3) on any other highway at a rate of speed greater than fifty-five miles per hour but not greater than sixty miles per hour, or (4) if such person is under eighteen years of age, upon any highway or road for which a speed limit of less than sixty-five miles per hour has been established in accordance with subsection (a) of section 14-218a, at a rate of speed more than twenty miles per hour above such speed limit, shall commit an infraction, provided any such person operating a truck, as defined in section 14-260n, shall have committed a violation and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hundred fifty dollars.

      (c) Any person who violates any provision of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section or who operates a motor vehicle (1) on a multiple lane, limited access highway at a rate of speed greater than seventy miles per hour but not greater than eighty-five miles per hour, or (2) on any other highway at a rate of speed greater than sixty miles per hour but not greater than eighty-five miles per hour, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hundred fifty dollars, provided any such person operating a motor vehicle described in subsection (a) of section 14-163c shall be fined not less than one hundred fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars.

      (d) No person shall be subject to prosecution for a violation of both subsection (a) of this section and subsection (a) of section 14-222 because of the same offense.

      (e) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes to the contrary, any person who violates subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (b) of this section while operating a truck, as defined in section 14-260n, or subdivision (1) of subsection (c) of this section while operating a motor vehicle or a truck, as defined in section 14-260n, shall follow the procedures set forth in section 51-164n.

      (1949 Rev., S. 2407; 1961, P.A. 379, S. 2; 517, S. 15; 1963, P.A. 289; 595; February, 1965, P.A. 92; 1969, P.A. 450, S. 1, 2; 670, S. 1, 2; P.A. 73-253, S. 1; P.A. 75-577, S. 6, 126; P.A. 79-609, S. 1; P.A. 80-276, S. 1, 6; P.A. 84-372, S. 5, 9; P.A. 90-213, S. 7; P.A. 98-181, S. 2; P.A. 08-32, S. 13; P.A. 09-187, S. 14; P.A. 10-110, S. 18.)

      History: 1961 acts amended Subsec. (a) to add parking areas for ten cars or more and deleted exception for Merritt Parkway from first sentence of Subsec. (b); 1963 acts established maximum speed limits in Subsec. (a)(2) and added roads of specially chartered municipal associations; 1965 act added district roads to Subsec. (a); 1969 acts amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to add provisions re private roads and to establish speed limits applicable to commercial vehicles; P.A. 73-253 prohibited operation of vehicle at greater than reasonable speed on school property; P.A. 75-577 deleted provisions of Subsec. (a) re operation at greater than reasonable speed, deleted Subsec. (b) re determination of speed limits and relettered former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b); P.A. 79-609 reduced speed limit from 70 to 55 miles per hour with limit being generally applicable, special limit provisions were deleted; P.A. 80-276 inserted new Subsec. (b) re offenses deemed infractions and expanded Subsec. (c) re speeding offenses and replaced $100 maximum fine with $100 minimum fine and $150 maximum fine; P.A. 84-372 established higher penalties for person operating a truck; P.A. 90-213 amended Subsec. (c)(1) and (2) to establish a maximum speed of 85 miles per hour and added Subsec. (e) to require a person who violates Subsec. (a)(1), Subsec. (b)(1) while operating a truck, or Subsec. (c)(1) while operating a motor vehicle or truck to follow the procedures set forth in Sec. 51-164n; P.A. 98-181 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to exclude a highway for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with Sec. 14-218a(b) and to add Subdiv. (3) prohibiting operation at a rate of speed greater than 65 miles per hour on a highway for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with Sec. 14-218a(b), amended Subsec. (b)(1) to exclude a highway for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with Sec. 14-218a(b) and to add Subdiv. (2) prohibiting operation on a multiple lane, limited access highway for which a speed limit has been established in accordance with Sec. 14-218a(b) at a rate of speed greater than 65 miles per hour but not greater than 70 miles per hour, renumbering former Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (3), and amended Subsec. (e) to include a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (b) while operating a truck; P.A. 08-32 added Subsec. (a)(4) and Subsec. (b)(4) re person under 18 years of age who operates motor vehicle upon certain highways or roads at rate of speed 20 miles per hour or more above established speed limit and made technical changes, effective August 1, 2008; P.A. 09-187 amended Subsecs. (a)(4) and (b)(4) to replace "twenty miles per hour or more" with "more than twenty miles per hour" and made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective July 8, 2009; P.A. 10-110 amended Subsec. (c)(2) to substitute "motor vehicle described in subsection (a) of section 14-163c" for "truck, as defined in section 14-260n".

      See Sec. 14-107 re liability of owner, operator or lessee of vehicle.

      See Sec. 14-111g re operator's retraining program.

      See Sec. 14-219c re use of radar to support conviction.

      See Sec. 14-222 re penalty for operation at rate of speed greater than eighty-five miles per hour.

      The effect of exceeding former statutory speed limits. 81 C. 500; 90 C. 707; 98 C. 490; 99 C. 727; 106 C. 386. Former statute applied. 102 C. 44. Excessive speed and failure to look ahead. 105 C. 693. Duty of driver to keep reasonable lookout. 108 C. 508, 546, 560. Permissible rate of speed depends on existing conditions. Id., 706. Endangering life of occupant of vehicle being driven should be distinguished from endangering life of another, which is a violation of section 14-222. 124 C. 270. Cited. 125 C. 448. Where jury was cautioned that plaintiff was limited to negligence specified in complaint, it was not prejudicial to read inapplicable portion of statute. Id., 512. Cited. 139 C. 719. Cited. 140 C. 274. Trier to decide whether the speed was actually unreasonable under all the circumstances. 146 C. 470. If plaintiff's speed was unreasonable, it cannot be said that as a matter of law, under the circumstances of the case, the excess speed was a proximate cause of the collision. Id. Violation constitutes negligence per se. 147 C. 644. Cited. 148 C. 456. Prima facie evidence discussed. Id., 481. Cited. 149 C. 385. Court may take judicial notice that radar is an accurate speed-measuring principle. 153 C. 365. Cited. 154 C. 100. Cited. 170 C. 495. Cited. 202 C. 629. Cited. 208 C. 94. Cited. 209 C. 98.

      Cited. 27 CA 346. Cited. 29 CA 791.

      Right of Merritt Parkway Commission to fix speed limits under former statute discussed. 7 CS 165. Cited. 16 CS 398. Prima facie presumption that driving at rate of speed exceeding posted speed limit is not reasonable. Proof of favorable conditions is effective neither to rebut, as a matter of law, state's prima facie case nor to constitute, as a matter of law, a defense to a prosecution under this section. 22 CS 464. Cited. 23 CS 303, 342. Passing at speed in excess of posted speed limit and returning to right-hand lane are among circumstances for trier to consider in determining reasonableness of speed. Id., 437. Court may take judicial notice of regulations of state traffic commission. Id. Radar can show speed, and it is for the trier to believe or disbelieve testimony with regard to the accuracy of the radar. 24 CS 13. Cited. Id., 91, 124, 160, 167, 345. Plea of guilty and absence of affidavit of explanation can result in inference that speeding was proximate cause of accident. 25 CS 380. Cited. 26 CS 513. Officer's testimony that speedometer had recently been tested satisfies requirement in speeding prosecutions of some showing of instrument's accuracy prior to admissibility. 37 CS 601. Cited. 39 CS 313.

      Speed recorded on radar unit admissible in evidence if accuracy of unit is established and car identified. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68. Defendant has right, prior to trial, to inspect radar equipment. Id., 369. Not abuse of discretion to refuse postponement of trial when request made during trial. Id. Speeding violation may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id., 439. Where facts conflict with witnesses' estimates of speed, the facts control. Id. It is for the trier to decide under all the circumstances, some of which may be favorable to the driver, whether the speed was greater than was reasonable at the time. Id., 644. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 461 (fn). Testimony of state trooper as to speed of defendant's vehicle during "clocking" period is admissible although no foundation has been laid to establish accuracy of device by which trooper reached his conclusion. Id., 566, 568. Speedometer reading is only prima facie evidence. Trier of facts shall determine its credibility. Id. Operation of police radar requires no technical knowledge of radar science. Id., 575, 577. Individual graphic record containing alleged speed of defendant is admissible without producing graphic record covering entire period of operation. Id. Prima facie evidence of defendant's speed of seventy miles an hour as unreasonable is rebuttable but casts on defendant burden of going forward with the evidence his speed was reasonable under the conditions. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 93. It is not double jeopardy to prosecute offender for two successive speeding offenses in different towns in same hour of one day. Id., 102. Court will judicially notice that radar instrument measures speed accurately. Id., 109. Expressed intent of legislature was to distinguish between the types of highways described in statute. Id., 374. Cited. Id., 499 (fn). This statute does not go much beyond the common law rule and the jury must decide whether defendant's speed was negligent under the circumstances. Id., 671. Failure of officer issuing summons to defendant to correctly identify him in court or trial did not affect the establishment of the identity of the driver where defendant had entered a general appearance and appeared for trial. Id., 697. Where there was no evidence of the testing of the speedometer of the state trooper within a reasonable time before the clocking of the defendant's car, evidence of the clocked speed was inadmissible. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 190. Cited. Id., 333. Defense of entrapment must establish the criminal design arose solely in the mind of the police. Id., 379. In a trial for violation of this section, the court may not direct the jury to find a verdict of guilty even where there was a stipulation of all facts. Id., 223. Cited. Id., 618. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 161, 162. No clocked measurements are necessary to establish prima facie evidence of speed in excess of the maximum limits. Id., 334. Cited. Id., 560, 599.

      Subsec. (a):

      Each of the two sentences in this subsection states a separate interdict. 144 C. 399. Violation of this subsection would be negligence per se. 165 C. 635. Subdiv. (1) cited. 176 C. 451.

      Cited. 34 CA 201.

      Subdiv. (2) cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 580; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516. In crime of speeding which is malum prohibitum the intent to do the prohibited act is only intent necessary for conviction and motive of defendant is of no consequence. Id., 573.

      Subsec. (b):

      Degree of excess speed over posted limit is factor to be considered by trier in determining whether, under all circumstances, a motor vehicle has been operated at greater than reasonable speed. 144 C. 399. Violation of posted speed limit not negligence per se. 165 C. 635.

      History discussed; state traffic commission has authority to post speed limits on Merritt Parkway and it is proper to admit evidence of posted speed. 23 CS 468.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 14 CA 816. Cited. 17 CA 416. Cited. 19 CA 432.

      Cited. 34 CA 201. Cited. 46 CA 633.

      Cited. 41 CS 356.