2021 Colorado Code
Title 44 - Revenue - Regulation of Activities
Article 3 - Alcohol Beverages
Part 8 - Judicial Review and Civil Liability
§ 44-3-801. Civil Liability - Legislative Declaration - Definitions

1. The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that this section shall be interpreted so that any common law cause of action against a vendor of alcohol beverages is abolished and that in certain cases the consumption of alcohol beverages rather than the sale, service, or provision thereof is the proximate cause of injuries or damages inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person, except as otherwise provided in this section.
2. As used in this section, “licensee” means a person licensed under the provisions of this article 3 or article 4 or 5 of this title 44 and the agents or servants of the person.
3. 1. No licensee is civilly liable to any injured individual or his or her estate for any injury to the individual or damage to any property suffered because of the intoxication of any person due to the sale or service of any alcohol beverage to the person, except when:
      1. It is proven that the licensee willfully and knowingly sold or served any alcohol beverage to the person who was under the age of twenty-one years or who was visibly intoxicated; and
      2. The civil action is commenced within one year after the sale or service.

   2. No civil action may be brought pursuant to this subsection (3) by the person to whom the alcohol beverage was sold or served or by his or her estate, legal guardian, or dependent.
   3. In any civil action brought pursuant to this subsection (3), the total liability in any such action shall not exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars.

4. 1. No social host who furnishes any alcohol beverage is civilly liable to any injured individual or his or her estate for any injury to the individual or damage to any property suffered, including any action for wrongful death, because of the intoxication of any person due to the consumption of such alcohol beverages, except when:
      1. It is proven that the social host knowingly served any alcohol beverage to the person who was under the age of twenty-one years or knowingly provided the person under the age of twenty-one a place to consume an alcoholic beverage; and
      2. The civil action is commenced within one year after the service.

   2. No civil action may be brought pursuant to this subsection (4) by the person to whom the alcohol beverage was served or by his or her estate, legal guardian, or dependent.
   3. The total liability in any such action shall not exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars.

5. An instructor or entity that complies with section 18-13-122 (5)(c) shall not be liable for civil damages resulting from the intoxication of a minor due to the minor's unauthorized consumption of alcohol beverages during instruction in culinary arts, food service, or restaurant management pursuant to section 18-13-122 (5)(c).
6. 1. The limitations on damages set forth in subsections (3)(c) and (4)(c) of this section must be adjusted for inflation as of January 1, 1998, January 1, 2008, January 1, 2020, and each January 1 every two years thereafter. The adjustments made on January 1, 1998, January 1, 2008, January 1, 2020, and each January 1 every two years thereafter must be based on the cumulative annual adjustment for inflation for each year since the effective date of the damages limitations in subsections (3)(c) and (4)(c) of this section. The adjustments made pursuant to this subsection (6)(a) must be rounded upward or downward to the nearest ten-dollar increment.
   2. As used in this subsection (6), “inflation” means the annual percentage change in the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-Boulder, all items, all urban consumers, or its successor index.
   3. The secretary of state shall certify the adjusted limitation on damages within fourteen days after the appropriate information is available, and:
      1. The adjusted limitation on damages as of January 1, 1998, is applicable to all claims for relief that accrue on or after January 1, 1998, and before January 1, 2008;
      2. The adjusted limitation on damages as of January 1, 2008, is applicable to all claims for relief that accrue on and after January 1, 2008, and before January 1, 2020; and
      3. The adjusted limitation on damages as of January 1, 2020, and each January 1 every two years thereafter is applicable to all claims for relief that accrue on and after the specified January 1 and before the January 1 two years thereafter.

History. Source: L. 2018: Entire article added with relocations,(HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1047, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2019: (6)(a) and (6)(c) amended,(SB 19-109), ch. 83, p. 295, § 1, effective August 2.

This section is similar to former § 12-47-801 as it existed prior to 2018.

Law reviews. For article, “What's in the Package: Food, Beverage, and Dietary Supplement Law and Litigation Part I”, see 43 Colo. Law. 77 (July 2014). For article, “Negligent Entrustment of Guns and Other Dangerous Instrumentalities”, see 47 Colo. Law. 46 (June 2018).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The plain language of subsection (4)(a)(I) requires that a social host must knowingly provide the person under the age of twenty-one a place to consume alcohol. This section does not impose liability on a social host who provides a venue but does not have knowledge that specific underage persons are drinking at the venue. Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177 , __ P.3d __, aff'd, 2018 CO 69, 428 P.3d 512.

Employer that made alcohol beverages available to an employee on its premises after work hours was acting as a social host and not liable for injuries sustained by third parties as a result of the employee's operation of a motor vehicle after consuming the alcohol beverages. Rojas v. Engineered Plastic Designs, Inc., 68 P.3d 591 (Colo. App. 2003).

Employer is a “social host” within the meaning of this act and is protected from liability for injuries caused by its guest even though it did not furnish alcohol to anyone at a party on its premises. Shielding a party host who directly supplies alcohol from liability while not protecting the seemingly less-culpable host who does not, even if both do not prevent drinking, would be contrary not only to logic and common sense, but to the stated purpose of the act, which is to shift the responsibility for drinking alcohol from the vendor or provider to the consumer of alcohol beverages. McCray v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 437 F. Supp. 3d 907 (D. Colo. 2020 ).

A victim need not show his or her injuries were a reasonable foreseeable consequence of licensed alcohol vendor serving a visibly intoxicated person. It suffices that the vendor's improper service of alcohol caused the patron's intoxication and patron's intoxication caused the victim's injuries. Strauch v. Build It, 226 P.3d 1235 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd, 253 P.3d 302 (Colo. 2011).

This section does not protect defendant from liability for negligence because defendant did not sell, serve, or otherwise provide alcohol to plaintiff or her companions. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, 347 P.3d 606.

Cases Decided Under Former § 12-46-112.5 .

Law reviews. For comment, “Crespin v. Largo Corporation and the Legislative Response: The Turbulent State of Dram Shop Liability in Colorado”, see 57 U. Colo., L. Rev. 419 (1986). For article, “1986 Colorado Tort Reform Legislation”, see 15 Colo. Law. 1363 (1986). For article, “1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation -- Part II”, see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988). For article, “Recovery of Interest: Part I -- Personal Injury”, see 18 Colo. Law. 1063 (1989).

This section is not intended to apply retrospectively and does not apply to claims which accrued prior to its effective date. Jenkins v. Wine & Dine, Inc., 784 P.2d 854 (Colo. App. 1989).

One-year statute of limitation period within which to file a claim under this section is not unreasonably limited in duration. Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar, 832 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1992).

One-year limitation period established by this section is constitutional. Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar, 832 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1992).

“Willfully and knowingly served” as used in subsection (3)(a)(I) occurs only when a social host has control over or takes an active part in supplying a minor with alcohol. Providing a home at which alcohol is consumed by minors, without more, does not create social host liability. Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

The fact that the host collected money for the purchase of beer was not enough to permit a finding of social host liability, absent evidence that he also bought or exercised control over the beer. Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Social host liability for injuries to third party under this section not established where parent provided home where minors could consume alcoholic beverages and helped collect money to purchase alcoholic beverages unless it could be shown that parent willfully and knowingly served alcoholic beverages to minors. Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Cases Decided Under Former § 12-47-128.5 .

Law reviews. For comment, “Crespin v. Largo Corporation and the Legislative Response: The Turbulent State of Dram Shop Liability in Colorado”, see 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 419 (1986). For article, “1986 Colorado Tort Reform Legislation”, see 15 Colo. Law. 1363 (1986). For article, “Recovery of Interest: Part I -- Personal Injury”, see 18 Colo. Law. 1063 (1989).

This statute found constitutional in that it does not violate due process by being unconstitutionally vague, does not violate equal protection rights of heirs of intoxicated person because the statute is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of preventing negligence by consumers of alcohol, does not unconstitutionally limit access to courts, and is not constitutionally-prohibited special legislation. Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. P'ship I, 817 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1991).

Subsection (4) does not deny equal protection. The classification is based on a previously established distinction between minors and adults with respect to alcohol consumption and the state has a legitimate interest in deterring alcohol-related injuries caused by minors. Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1991).

Under the plain language of this section, a licensee may be held civilly liable only if the licensee knows that he or she is serving alcohol to a person under twenty-one years of age and willfully does so. Dickman v. Jackalope, Inc., 870 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1994).

The terms “willfully and knowingly” in this section apply both to the words “sold or served” and to the phrase “to such person who was under the age of twenty-one years”, and a different interpretation would render the “willful and knowing” language meaningless since it is difficult to imagine any sales or service of alcohol by a licensee which are not deliberate. Dickman v. Jackalope, Inc., 870 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1994).

Whether a licensee “willfully and knowingly” sold or served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person is generally a question of fact which may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Christoph v. Colo. Comm. Corp., 946 P.2d 519 (Colo. App. 1997).

The addition of the words “willfully and knowingly” to this section relating to imposition of civil liability, together with the fact that the civil liability section does not include the good-faith defense contained in § 12-47-128 (5)(a)(I) , buttresses the conclusion that the general assembly did not intend that this be a strict liability provision, but rather one requiring a plaintiff to prove knowledge and intention on the part of the vendor. Dickman v. Jackalope, Inc., 870 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1994).

Heirs of fatally injured intoxicated person may not maintain wrongful death action against vendor of alcoholic beverages because this statute abolishes such actions by the consumers of alcohol and the wrongful death statute permits heirs to maintain such actions only if the deceased could have done so had the deceased's injuries not been fatal. Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. P'ship I, 817 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1991).

One-year statute of limitation period within which to file a claim under this section is not unreasonably limited in duration. Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar, 832 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1992).

Social host liability for injuries to third party under this section not established where parent provided home where minors could consume alcoholic beverages and helped collect money to purchase alcoholic beverages unless it could be shown that parent willfully and knowingly served alcoholic beverages to minors. Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Section imposes no duty on employer who is neither an innkeeper nor a social host to prevent an employee from becoming intoxicated at work where employer did not know employee had consumed, on the day in question or at any other time, wine employer kept for business purposes nor was employer aware if employee had a history of alcohol-related problems. Biel v. Alcott, 876 P.2d 60 (Colo. App. 1993).

Trial court did not err in determining that two plaintiffs' combined recovery against two separate establishments was limited to $150,000. This section describes the civil action as one in which a single licensee is civilly liable to an injured individual. If the statute required plaintiffs to maintain separate actions against each licensee, each plaintiff would have been required to file separate actions against both licensees, a waste of judicial resources not intended by the general assembly. Brown v. Hollywood Bar and Cafe, 942 P.2d 1363 (Colo. App. 1997).

Plaintiff entitled to interest and costs insofar as those amounts exceed the statutory cap. This section makes clear that the total liability is specified for any injury to an individual, thus only damages for the injury are covered by the statutory cap. Brown v. Hollywood Bar and Cafe, 942 P.2d 1363 (Colo. App. 1997).