2021 Colorado Code
Title 44 - Revenue - Regulation of Activities
Article 3 - Alcohol Beverages
Part 3 - State and Local Licensing
§ 44-3-305. Denial of Application

1. The state licensing authority shall refuse a state license if the premises on which the applicant proposes to conduct its business do not meet the requirements of this article 3, or if the character of the applicant or its officers or directors is such that violations of this article 3 or article 4 or 5 of this title 44 would be likely to result if a license were granted, or if in its opinion licenses already granted for the particular locality are adequate for the reasonable needs of the community.
2. The state licensing authority shall not refuse a state license after a local license has been granted, except upon hearing after fifteen days' notice to the applicant and to the local licensing authority. The notice shall be in writing and shall state grounds upon which the application may be refused. If the applicant does not respond to the notice within fifteen days after the date of the notice, the application for a license shall be denied. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, and judicial review of the state licensing authority's decision shall be pursuant to section 24-4-106.

History. Source: L. 2018: Entire article added with relocations,(HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 978, § 2, effective October 1.

This section is similar to former § 12-47-305 as it existed prior to 2018.

Law reviews. For article, “Antitrust”, see 55 Den. L.J. 415 (1978).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Three grounds for refusal. By the express provisions of this section, the state licensing authority is authorized and directed to refuse to grant a license for the failure of an applicant to meet statutory requirements in three particulars only, viz: (1) that the premises for which the license is sought do not meet the requirements of the law; (2) that the character of applicant or its officers is such that violation of the liquor law would likely result; and (3) that existing outlets are adequate for the reasonable needs of the community. MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452 , 230 P.2d 589 (1951); Stanley v. Anderson, 158 Colo. 576 , 408 P.2d 984 (1965).

This section contains no requirement of formal findings. MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452 , 230 P.2d 589 (1951).

Where there was substantial evidence to support the action of the licensing authority, and no jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional determination or finding was required, and no specific findings were requested and refused, the decision of the licensing authority to refuse a license could not be challenged on the ground that he failed to make any findings or state any reason for his refusal. MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452 , 230 P.2d 589 (1951).

Witnesses not required. The power of an agency to do justice informally and promptly is not limited to cases where witnesses have been heard, and without any witnesses at all it may act of its own knowledge, for it is made up of men with special qualifications of training and experience. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).

When an agency acts on its own knowledge, it must set forth in its return the facts known to its members, but not otherwise disclosed. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).

Facts as to hardship required. To characterize a situation as a hardship without more does not tend in any substantial degree to enlighten a reviewing court, and therefore there must be disclosure of the facts from which a hardship is inferred. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).

Notice of hearing responsibility of local authority. The question of whether there has been compliance with the requirement that notice of hearing be given upon the application for a county license is a matter which has been specifically and exclusively entrusted to the local licensing authority. Stanley v. Anderson, 158 Colo. 576 , 408 P.2d 984 (1965).

Finding of adequacy of notice binding. The determination of the commissioners on the issue of whether posting of notice of hearing before the commissioners has been adequate is binding upon the state licensing authority. Stanley v. Anderson, 158 Colo. 576 , 408 P.2d 984 (1965).

The state licensing authority does not have statutory authority to inquire into the adequacy of posting, once the local licensing authority has made its determination of such question. Stanley v. Anderson, 158 Colo. 576 , 408 P.2d 984 (1965).

To favor one applicant over another is discriminatory and suggests the exercise of an unwarranted and uncontrolled discretion on the part of the licensing authority. Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo. 536 , 313 P.2d 980 (1957).

Basis for finding denial arbitrary and capricious. Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administrative board can arise by exercising its discretion in such manner after a consideration of evidence before it as clearly to indicate that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach contrary conclusions. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).

Denial not arbitrary and capricious. Where the record of a hearing on an application for a liquor license discloses a situation with reference to which reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, the action of the board of county commissioners in denying such application cannot be adjudged arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable as a matter of law. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bonicelli, 151 Colo. 308 , 377 P.2d 124 (1962).

Evidence sufficient to deny license. Where a plat put in evidence disclosed the existence of 93 liquor outlets within a radius of six blocks of the premises for which the license was sought, and of these, more than half were hotel and restaurant licenses, the evidence was sufficient to support the denial of a hotel and restaurant liquor license. MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452 , 230 P.2d 589 (1951).

Issuance of a license to another person in an area, shortly after the rejection of applicant's application on the ground that the needs of the neighborhood were satisfied, would be arbitrary and discriminatory. Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo. 536 , 313 P.2d 980 (1957).