2021 Colorado Code
Title 42 - Vehicles and Traffic
Article 2 - Drivers' Licenses
Part 1 - Drivers' Licenses
§ 42-2-127. Authority to Suspend License - to Deny License - Type of Conviction - Points

1. 1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (8) of this section, the department has the authority to suspend the license of any driver who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points or more within any twelve consecutive months or eighteen points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or, in the case of a minor driver eighteen years of age or older, who has accumulated nine points or more within any twelve consecutive months, or twelve points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or fourteen points or more for violations occurring after reaching the age of eighteen years, or, in the case of a minor driver under the age of eighteen years, who has accumulated more than five points within any twelve consecutive months or more than six points for violations occurring prior to reaching the age of eighteen years; except that the accumulation of points causing the subjection to suspension of the license of a chauffeur who, in the course of employment, has as a principal duty the operation of a motor vehicle shall be sixteen points in one year, twenty-four points in two years, or twenty-eight points in four years, if all the points are accumulated while said chauffeur is in the course of employment. Any provision of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, the license of a chauffeur who is convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, UDD, or leaving the scene of an accident shall be suspended in the same manner as if the offense occurred outside the course of employment. Whenever a minor driver under the age of eighteen years receives a summons for a traffic violation, the minor's parent or legal guardian or, if the minor is without parents or guardian, the person who signed the minor driver's application for a license shall immediately be notified by the court from which the summons was issued. (1) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (8) of this section, the department has the authority to suspend the license of any driver who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points or more within any twelve consecutive months or eighteen points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or, in the case of a minor driver eighteen years of age or older, who has accumulated nine points or more within any twelve consecutive months, or twelve points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or fourteen points or more for violations occurring after reaching the age of eighteen years, or, in the case of a minor driver under the age of eighteen years, who has accumulated more than five points within any twelve consecutive months or more than six points for violations occurring prior to reaching the age of eighteen years; except that the accumulation of points causing the subjection to suspension of the license of a chauffeur who, in the course of employment, has as a principal duty the operation of a motor vehicle shall be sixteen points in one year, twenty-four points in two years, or twenty-eight points in four years, if all the points are accumulated while said chauffeur is in the course of employment. Any provision of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, the license of a chauffeur who is convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, UDD, or leaving the scene of an accident shall be suspended in the same manner as if the offense occurred outside the course of employment. Whenever a minor driver under the age of eighteen years receives a summons for a traffic violation, the minor's parent or legal guardian or, if the minor is without parents or guardian, the person who signed the minor driver's application for a license shall immediately be notified by the court from which the summons was issued.
   2. If any applicant for a license to operate a motor vehicle has illegally operated a motor vehicle in this state prior to the issuance of a valid driver's or minor driver's license or instruction permit or in violation of the terms of any instruction permit within thirty-six months prior to said application, the department has the authority to deny the issuance of said license for not more than twelve months.
   3. For the purpose of this section, any points accumulated by a minor under an instruction permit shall apply to the minor driver's license subsequently issued to or applied for by such minor.
   4. No suspension or denial shall be made until a hearing has been held or the driver has failed to appear for a hearing scheduled in accordance with this section. This section shall not be construed to prevent the issuance of a restricted license pursuant to section 42-2-116.

2. 1. The time periods provided in subsection (1) of this section for the accumulation of points shall be based on the date of violation, but points shall not be assessed until after conviction for any such traffic violation. (2) (a) The time periods provided in subsection (1) of this section for the accumulation of points shall be based on the date of violation, but points shall not be assessed until after conviction for any such traffic violation.
   2. The accumulation of points within the time periods provided in subsection (1) of this section shall not be affected by the issuance or renewal of any driver's or minor driver's license issued under the provisions of this article or the anniversary date thereof.

3. Nothing in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall affect or prevent any proceedings to suspend any license under the provisions of law existing prior to July 1, 1974.
4. Statutory provisions for cancellation and mandatory revocation of drivers' licenses shall take precedence over this section.
5. Point system schedule:
   1. Leaving scene of accident 12 (b) (I) DUI or DUI per se 12
      1. One to four miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or one to four miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 0 (II) Five to nine miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or five to nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 1 (III) Ten to nineteen miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or ten to nineteen miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 4 (IV) Twenty to thirty-nine miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or twenty to thirty-nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 6 (IV.5) Forty or more miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or forty or more miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 12 (V) Failure to reduce speed below an otherwise lawful speed when a special hazard exists 3 (VI) One to four miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter 0 (VII) Five to nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter 2 (VIII) Greater than nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter 4 (g) Failure to stop for school signals 6 (h) Driving on wrong side of road or driving on wrong side of divided or controlled-access highway in violation of section 42-4-1010 4 (i) Improper passing 4 (j) Failure to stop for school bus 6 (k) Following too closely 4 (l) Failure to observe traffic sign or signal, except as provided in paragraph (ff) of this subsection (5) 4 (m) Failure to yield to emergency vehicle 4 (n) Failure to yield right-of-way, except as provided in subsections (5)(y) to (5)(bb.5) of this section 3 (o) Improper turn 3 (p) Driving in wrong lane or direction on one-way street 3 (q) Driving through safety zone 3 (r) Conviction of violations not listed in this subsection (5) while driving a moving vehicle, which are violations of a state law or municipal ordinance other than violations classified as class B traffic infractions under section 42-4-1701 or having an equivalent classification under any municipal ordinance 3 (s) Failure to signal or improper signal 2 (t) Improper backing 2 (u) Failure to dim or turn on lights 2 (v) (I) Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (v), operating an unsafe vehicle 2 (II) Operating a vehicle with defective head lamps 1 (w) Eluding or attempting to elude a police officer 12 (x) Alteration of suspension system 3 (y) Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian 4 (z) Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian at walk signal 4 (aa) Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian upon emerging from alley, driveway, or building in a commercial or residential area 4 (bb) Failure to yield right-of-way to person with a disability pursuant to section 42-4-808 6 (bb.5) Failure to yield right-of-way to a bicyclist or other authorized user in a bicycle lane that is the proximate cause of a bodily injury . 4 (cc) Failure to exercise due care for pedestrian pursuant to section 42-4-807 4 (dd) A second or subsequent violation of section 42-2-101 (1) and (4) 6 (ee) Failure to maintain or show proof of insurance pursuant to section 42-4-1409 4 (ff) Failure to observe high occupancy vehicle lane restrictions pursuant to section 42-4-1012 0

   2. (Deleted by amendment,L. 2005, p. 334, § 2, effective July 1, 2005.)
   3. Driving a motor vehicle while not wearing a seat belt in violation of section 42-2-105.5 (3) 2 (ii) Driving with more passengers than seat belts in violation of section 42-2-105.5 (4) 2 (jj) A violation of section 42-4-239 (2) 1 (jj.5) A violation of section 42-4-239 (3) 4 (kk) Driving with a passenger who is under twenty-one years of age or driving between 12 midnight and 5 a.m. in violation of section 42-4-116 2 (ll) (I) Except as provided in subsection (5)(ll)(II) or (5)(ll)(III) of this section, failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle pursuant to section 42-4-705 (2) 3 (II) Failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle resulting in bodily injury 6 (III) Failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle resulting in death 8 (mm) Driving under restraint in violation of section 42-2-138 (1.5) 3 (5.5) If a person receives a penalty assessment notice for a violation under section 42-4-1701 (5) and such person pays the fine and surcharge for the violation on or before the date the payment is due, the points assessed for the violation are reduced as follows:
      1. For a violation having an assessment of three or more points under subsection (5) of this section, the points are reduced by two points;
      2. For a violation having an assessment of two points under subsection (5) of this section, the points are reduced by one point.
         1. (5.6) (a) Any municipality may elect to have the provisions of subsection (5.5) of this section apply to penalty assessment notices issued by the municipality pursuant to counterpart municipal ordinances. Whenever a municipality reduces a traffic offense, the reduced offense and the points assessed for such reduced offense shall conform to the point assessment schedule under subsection (5) of this section.
         2. Any county may elect to have the provisions of subsection (5.5) of this section apply to penalty assessment notices issued by the county pursuant to counterpart county ordinances. Whenever a county reduces a traffic offense, the reduced offense and the points assessed for such reduced offense shall conform to the point assessment schedule under subsection (5) of this section.

            (5.7) Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes to the contrary, if a penalty assessment for a traffic infraction is not personally served on the defendant or the defendant has not accepted the jurisdiction of the court for such penalty assessment, then the traffic infraction is a class B traffic infraction and the department has no authority to assess any points under this section upon entry of judgment for such traffic infraction.

            (5.8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department may not assess any points for a violation if such assessment of points is prohibited under section 42-4-110.5 (3) .

6. 1. “Convicted” and “conviction”, as used in this section, include conviction in any court of record or municipal court, or by the Southern Ute Indian tribal court, or by any military authority for offenses substantially the same as those set forth in subsection (5) of this section which occur on a military installation in this state and also include the acceptance and payment of a penalty assessment under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or under the similar provisions of any town or city ordinance and the entry of a judgment or default judgment for a traffic infraction under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or 42-4-1710 or under the similar provisions of any municipal ordinance. (6) (a) “Convicted” and “conviction”, as used in this section, include conviction in any court of record or municipal court, or by the Southern Ute Indian tribal court, or by any military authority for offenses substantially the same as those set forth in subsection (5) of this section which occur on a military installation in this state and also include the acceptance and payment of a penalty assessment under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or under the similar provisions of any town or city ordinance and the entry of a judgment or default judgment for a traffic infraction under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or 42-4-1710 or under the similar provisions of any municipal ordinance.
   2. For the purposes of this article, a plea of no contest accepted by the court or the forfeiture of any bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court or the failure to appear in court by a defendant charged with DUI, DUI per se, or UDD who has been issued a summons and notice to appear pursuant to section 42-4-1707 as evidenced by records forwarded to the department in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-124 shall be considered as a conviction.
   3. The provisions of paragraph (r) of subsection (5) of this section shall not be applicable to violations of sections 42-2-115, 42-3-121, and 42-4-314.

7. Upon the accumulation by a licensee of half as many points as are required for suspension, the department may send such licensee a warning letter in accordance with section 42-2-119 (2) or order a preliminary hearing, but the failure of the department to send such warning letter or hold such preliminary hearing shall not be grounds for invalidating the licensee's subsequent suspension as a result of accumulating additional points as long as the suspension is carried out under the provisions of this section. Should a preliminary hearing be ordered by the department and should the licensee fail to attend or show good cause for failure to attend, the department may suspend such license in the same way as if the licensee had accumulated sufficient points for suspension and had failed to attend such suspension hearing.
8. 1. Whenever the department's records show that a licensee has accumulated a sufficient number of points to be subject to license suspension, the department shall notify the licensee that a hearing will be held not less than twenty days after the date of the notice to determine whether the licensee's driver's license should be suspended. The notification shall be given to the licensee in writing by regular mail, addressed to the address of the licensee as shown by the records of the department. (8) (a) Whenever the department's records show that a licensee has accumulated a sufficient number of points to be subject to license suspension, the department shall notify the licensee that a hearing will be held not less than twenty days after the date of the notice to determine whether the licensee's driver's license should be suspended. The notification shall be given to the licensee in writing by regular mail, addressed to the address of the licensee as shown by the records of the department.
   2. 1. If the department's records indicate that a driver has accumulated a sufficient number of points to cause a suspension under subsection (1) of this section and the driver is subject to a current or previous license restraint with a determined reinstatement date for the same offense or conviction that caused the driver to accumulate sufficient points to warrant suspension, the department may not order a point suspension of the license of the driver unless the license or driving privilege of the driver was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-126 (3)(c). (b) (I) If the department's records indicate that a driver has accumulated a sufficient number of points to cause a suspension under subsection (1) of this section and the driver is subject to a current or previous license restraint with a determined reinstatement date for the same offense or conviction that caused the driver to accumulate sufficient points to warrant suspension, the department may not order a point suspension of the license of the driver unless the license or driving privilege of the driver was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-126 (3)(c).
      2. If the department does not order a point suspension against the license of a driver because of the existence of a current or previous license restraint with a determined reinstatement date under the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), the department shall utilize the points that were assessed against the driver in determining whether to impose any future license suspension if the driver accumulates any more points against the driver's license.
      3. A probationary license issued pursuant to this subsection (14) shall contain any other restrictions as the department deems reasonable and necessary, shall be subject to cancellation for violation of any such restrictions, including but not limited to absences from alcohol and drug education or treatment sessions or failure to complete alcohol and drug education or treatment programs, and shall be issued for the entire period of suspension.

9. Repealed.
10. Suspension hearings when ordered by the department shall be held at the district office of the department closest to the residence of the licensee; except that all or part of the hearing may, at the discretion of the department, be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5. A hearing delay shall be granted by the department only if the licensee presents the department with good cause for such delay. Good cause shall include absence from the state or county of residence, personal illness, or any other circumstance which, in the department's discretion, constitutes sufficient reason for delay. In the event that a suspension hearing is delayed, the department shall set a new date for such hearing no later than sixty days after the date of the original hearing.
11. Upon such hearing, the department or its authorized agent may administer oaths, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers, apply to the district court for the enforcement thereof by contempt proceedings, and require a reexamination of the licensee.
12. If at the hearing held pursuant to subsection (8) of this section it appears that the record of the driver sustains suspension as provided in this section, the department shall immediately suspend such driver's license, and such license shall then be surrendered to the department. If at such hearing it appears that the record of the driver does not sustain suspension, the department shall not suspend such license and shall adjust the accumulated-point total accordingly. In the event that the driver's license is suspended, the department may issue a probationary license for a period not to exceed the period of suspension, which license may contain such restrictions as the department deems reasonable and necessary and which may thereafter be subject to cancellation as a result of any violation of the restrictions imposed therein. The department may also order any driver whose license is suspended to take a complete driving reexamination. After such hearing, the licensee may appeal the decision to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135.
13. If the driver fails to appear at such hearing after proper notification as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section and a delay or continuance has not been requested and granted as provided in subsection (10) of this section, the department shall immediately suspend the license of the driver. A driver who failed to appear may request a subsequent hearing, but the request shall not postpone the effectiveness of the restraint.
14. (a) (I) If there is no other statutory reason for denial of a probationary license, any individual who has had a license suspended by the department because of, at least in part, a conviction of an offense specified in subsection (5)(b) of this section may be entitled to a probationary license pursuant to subsection (12) of this section for the purpose of driving for reasons of employment, education, health, or alcohol and drug education or treatment, but:
    1. If ordered by the court that convicted the individual, the individual shall enroll in a program of driving education or alcohol and drug education and treatment certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services; and
    2. If the individual is an interlock-restricted driver or is a persistent drunk driver, as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5), any probationary license shall require the use of an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 42-2-132.5 (9)(a), and the time that the individual holds a probationary license under this section shall be credited against the time that the individual may be required to hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to section 42-2-132.5.

15. Repealed.

Type of conviction Points

(f) Speeding:

(b) The department may refuse to issue a probationary license if the department finds that the driving record of the individual is such that the individual has sufficient points, in addition to those resulting from the conviction referred to in this subsection (14), to require the suspension or revocation of a license to drive on the highways of this state, or if the department finds from the record after a hearing conducted in accordance with subsection (12) of this section that aggravating circumstances exist to indicate the individual is unsafe for driving for any purpose. In refusing to issue a probationary license, the department shall make specific findings of fact to support such refusal.

(c) No district attorney shall enter into, nor shall any judge approve, a plea bargaining agreement entered into solely for the purpose of permitting the defendant to qualify for a probationary license under this subsection (14).

History. Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2144, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1)(a), (8), and (9)(a) amended, p. 1307, § 4, effective July 1. L. 96: (5)(f)(I) amended, p. 637, § 2, effective May 1; (5)(f)(I), (5)(f)(II), (5)(f)(III), and (5)(f)(IV) amended, p. 577, § 1, effective May 25; (5)(h) and (5)(l) amended and (5)(ff) added, p. 1357, § 4, effective July 1; (14)(a) amended, p. 1204, § 4, effective July 1. L. 97: (5.8) added, p. 1670, § 4, effective June 5; (5)(b)(IV) added and (9)(a) amended, p. 1465, § § 6, 7, effective July 1; (5)(v) amended and (5.5) to (5.7) added, p. 1385, § 4, effective July 1 L. 98 : (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 174, § 4, effective April 6. L. 99: (5)(gg), (5)(hh), and (5)(ii) added, p. 1381, § 5, effective July 1; (5.6) amended, p. 368, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2000: (5)(f)(I), (5)(f)(II), (5)(f)(III), and (5)(f)(IV) amended and (5)(f)(IV.5) added, p. 683, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (2)(b) amended, p. 1355, § 27, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (9)(c) and (10) amended, p. 554, § 5, effective May 23; (14)(a) amended, p. 787, § 5, effective June 1. L. 2002: (15) added, p. 1131, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(gg) amended and (5)(kk) added, p. 334, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(jj) added, p. 268, § 2, effective August 8; (6)(c) amended, p. 1173, § 8, effective August 8. L. 2006: (5)(c) amended, p. 173, § 6, effective July 1; (14)(a) amended, p. 1367, § 3, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2008: (1)(a), (5)(b), (6)(b), (8)(b)(I), and (9)(a) amended, p. 246, § 9, effective July 1; (9) repealed, p. 834, § 4, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (1)(d) and (13) amended, (HB 09-1234), ch. 91, p. 352, § 1, effective August 5; (5)(f)(VI), (5)(f)(VII), and (5)(f)(VIII) added, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1266, § 25, effective October 1. L. 2010: (5)(e.5) added, (SB 10-204), ch. 243, p. 1080, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2011: (1)(d), (8)(a), and (14)(a)(I)(A) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1180, § 103, effective August 10. L. 2012: (14)(a)(I)(B) amended, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1483, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(a) and (6)(b) amended and (5)(b)(II) repealed, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1881, § 8, effective May 28; (15) repealed, (HB 13-1160), ch. 373, p. 2201, § 12, effective June 5. L. 2017: IP(14)(a)(I) and (14)(a)(I)(A) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1258, § 22, effective May 25; (5)(jj) amended and (5)(jj.5) added, (SB 17-027), ch. 279, p. 1524, § 2, effective June 1; (5)(mm) added, (HB 17-1162), ch. 208, p. 811, § 2, effective August 9; (5)(ll) added, (SB 17-229), ch. 278, p. 1521, § 3, effective September 1. L. 2019: (5)(e.7) added, (SB 19-175), ch. 331, p. 3070, § 1, effective May 29. L. 2020: (5)(n) amended and (5)(bb.5) added, (SB 20-061), ch. 30, p. 102, § 3, effective July 1.

1. This section is similar to former § 42-2-123 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-127 was relocated to § 42-2-135.
2. Section 5 of chapter 30 (SB 20-061), Session Laws of Colorado 2020, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2020.

1. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act enacting subsections (5)(gg), (5)(hh), and (5)(ii), see section 1 of chapter 334, Session Laws of Colorado 1999. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (14)(a), see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act repealing subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
2. For the short title (“Move Over for Cody Act”) in SB 17-229, see section 1 of chapter 278, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

Law reviews. For note, “The Effect of Land Use Legislation on the Common Law of Nuisance in Urban Areas”, see 36 Dicta 414 . For article, “The New Colorado Per Se DUI Law”, see 12 Colo. Law. 1451 (1983). For article, “There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License”, see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-127 is similar to 42-2-123 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to repealed § 13-4-23 , C.R.S. 1963, and to § 13-3-24 , CRS 53, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Portion of section authorizing suspension of license held constitutional. Portion of this section which grants the motor vehicle division authority to suspend the driver's license of any operator who has accumulated “twelve points within any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months” is not overbroad, vague, or indefinite. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

Portion of section severable. The portion of this section dealing with suspension of licenses is complete in itself and independent of the portion of the statute dealing with probationary licenses; the two provisions are severable. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

Classification of 18- to 21-year-olds not violative of equal protection. Where licensees assert that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment because Colorado allows drivers in the age group of 18 to 21 years to accumulate only eight points prior to suspension, while drivers over 21 years are allowed 12 points before their licenses are suspended, and further assert that there is no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare of Colorado in the different treatment, statistical analyses of all accidents in Colorado in 1973, analyzed by age, fully justifies the different treatment mandated by the general assembly, and these figures clearly support the determination by the general assembly that drivers in the lower age groups demand closer supervision, to protect the public health and safety. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Nonresident licensees assert that it is unreasonable for Colorado to treat them differently from their states of residence where they are allowed the same driving privileges as older drivers, but, as repeatedly pointed out, the use of Colorado highways is a privilege strictly governed by statute, and it has not been demonstrated that the general assembly was in any way unreasonable or arbitrary in its classification. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Subsection (1)(a) of this section is constitutional. Keegan v. State, 194 Colo. 325 , 571 P.2d 1110 (1977).

Higher point allocation for chauffeurs not unconstitutional. The legislative decision to accord chauffeurs as a class a higher point allocation than that given to the “regular driver” cannot be viewed as so lacking a reasonable basis in fact as to render the statutory classification constitutionally flawed. Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1982).

Statutes enacted by the general assembly in the exercise of its police power must be strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication; accordingly, an operator's license, once issued, is not to be revoked arbitrarily but only in the manner provided by law. Cave v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 31 Colo. App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972).

Revocation proceeding is civil. The administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license of a habitual offender is a civil proceeding. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

This section does not constitute an unreasonable exercise of the police power, since an individual's right to use the highways of the state is an adjunct of the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and protect property. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

This section does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. Since the overall statutory scheme, of which the probationary license provision is a part, provides sufficient general standards to guide its application and contains adequate safeguards against administrative abuse, this section is not on its face an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

The words of this section are plain and unambiguous. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

This section is not unconstitutionally vague. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The obvious purpose of this section is to protect the safety of the public. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The primary purpose of this section and sections §§ 42-2-121 and 42-2-122 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).

This section is designed to protect the welfare and safety of the public and must be construed to further that legislative purpose. Livengood v. Dept. of Rev., 44 Colo. App. 431, 614 P.2d 908 (1980).

Legislative intent. Legislative history clearly demonstrates that it was the intent of the general assembly to authorize the motor vehicle division to consider that period of time ending with the date of the last violation involved. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973); Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The general assembly did not intend by this section to empower the motor vehicle division to delve back into the driving history of any operator for the purpose of suspending his license. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

The legislative intent was to authorize two suspensions in an instance where during the first year the driver accumulated 12 points and in the second year the driver accumulated 6 more points. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

Suspension of license authorized upon accumulation of 12 points in one year. Subsection (1) authorizes the department of revenue to suspend the license of any operator who has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in accumulation of 12 points in one year. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961); Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

The word “year” must be interpreted as a year tied to the expiration date of the license, this being referred to as an “anniversary license year”. Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

Suspension of license authorized. This section establishes a basic rule that any operator or chauffeur is subject to license suspension if he is convicted of traffic violations which result in the accumulation of 12 points within any 12 consecutive months. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Section contains a limited exception for chauffeurs which allows them to accumulate a maximum of 16 points in one year subject, however, to the proviso that “all such points are accumulated while said chauffeur is in the course of his employment”. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Where all of the violations and the resulting points did not occur within the course of chauffeur's employment, the 16-point exception is not applicable. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Thus, suspension of license not subject to abuse of discretion. Where evidence is clear and demonstrates that chauffeur has more than enough points to justify suspension of license, suspension of license is ministerial act, discharge of which is not subject to abuse of discretion. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973); Mitchell v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 719 (Colo. App. 1982).

The suspension of drivers' licenses, being based on a point system, involves no discretion on the part of an administrator and therefore is not subject to abuse of discretion. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

Suspension of license based upon the point system is not subject to abuse of discretion. Ryan v. Charnes, 738 P.2d 1175 (Colo. 1987).

The department is authorized to suspend the driver's license of any person who has been “convicted” of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of excessive points, but points cannot be assessed until after “conviction” for such traffic violations. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

Department is vested with discretionary authority to determine length of period of suspension and whether to grant a probationary license. Elkins v. Charnes, 682 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1984).

No violation of due process. Section 42-4-1510 and this section give a licensee notice of the ramifications of his failure to appear, and the forfeiture of his bond for traffic violation charge and due process requirements are satisfied. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Violation of § 42-4-1406 included in term “leaving scene of accident”. The general assembly intended that a violation of § 42-4-1406 be included within the meaning of the term “leaving scene of accident” as used in this section. Gammon v. State Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 437, 513 P.2d 748 (1973).

Notification of nonresident offenders constitutional. The methods used to notify purported nonresident traffic offenders are not so unconstitutionally deficient as to violate equal protection or due process rights. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

Minimum standard mandated for use of penalty assessment as conviction. Through the provisions of § 42-2-121 (3) , the general assembly has mandated a minimum standard of due process which must be followed before payment of a penalty assessment may be used as a conviction for purposes of suspension or revocation of a driver's license pursuant to subsection (1)(a). Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Points not assessable. If a traffic violation does not appear on the summons, and the offender is not advised by the arresting officer in reference to the points chargeable for the traffic violation, points cannot be assessed against him for that offense. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Summons need not reflect assessable points. Where a conviction is the result of a court appearance, not of a penalty assessment, the summons need not reflect the number of points to be assessed for the offense charged; the statutory provision which requires that a summons reflect the number of points relates only to penalty assessments under § 42-4-1501(4)(a) . Purcell v. Tomasi, 43 Colo. App. 540, 608 P.2d 844 (1980).

Due process requirements. Due process requires that the department of revenue promulgate rules or regulations to guide hearing officers in their decisions regarding requests for probationary licenses. These rules and regulations must be sufficiently specific to inform the public what factors will be considered relevant by department hearing officers, and they must require that hearing officers specifically state, in each case where a probationary license is denied, the reason for the denial. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

This section does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law, even though a person whose driver's license was suspended administratively through § 42-2-122.1 could not receive a probationary license and a person whose license was suspended as a result of a criminal conviction in accordance with this section could receive a probationary license, because the court, after making a determination of whether persons allegedly subject to disparate treatment by these sections were in fact similarly situated, found that no classification of persons similarly situated exists since § 42-2-122.1 involved an administrative suspension as opposed to a suspension resulting from a criminal conviction. Hancock v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1988); Bath v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1988).

The date of conviction is the decisive date from which the accumulated points are to be counted. Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

The language of subsection (8) is mandatory. People v. Yount, 174 Colo. 462 , 484 P.2d 1203 (1971).

Notice to nonresident offenders. The state is not required to ascertain an out-of-state traffic offender's permanent address prior to sending him notification under subsection (8). Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

One-year delay not bar to proceedings. A one-year delay in commencing these administrative proceedings pursuant to this section does not ipso facto constitute a bar to the hearing. Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).

The right to jury trial and the right to confront witnesses are inapplicable in an administrative hearing to determine whether a driver's license should be revoked for accumulated traffic violations. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Hearing officer is not required to make findings as to validity of each conviction since these are matter of record. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

Findings of fact necessary are that sufficient points have accumulated to warrant revocation of permit, that evidence offered in mitigation of permit is not deemed sufficient to justify exception, and that petitioner is not fit person to operate motor vehicle. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

This provision is mandatory, and function of hearing examiner in such situation is purely ministerial. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

The function of the hearing examiner in suspension proceeding is purely ministerial, and the strict rules of evidence followed in civil and criminal actions are not applicable. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

A suspension order under this section is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 42-2-127 . Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Sole issue at revocation hearing is whether requisite number of convictions are sustained. The only issue to be determined at the license revocation hearing is whether the licensee has sustained the requisite number of convictions for specified traffic offenses within the prescribed period of time, all as established by statute. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

The issues to be determined at the suspension hearing pursuant to subsection (11) are whether the defendant has accumulated the requisite number of convictions within the time period established in the statute to require suspension and whether he would be granted a probationary license. Thurber v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1983).

Hearing officer must ensure record indicates existence of requisite convictions. While a hearing officer need not determine the validity of a respondent's convictions, he must nevertheless, pursuant to his statutory authority under subsection (1)(a), ensure that the record on its face indicates the existence of the requisite convictions. Gurule v. State Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 295, 558 P.2d 587 (1976).

Driver's history record is prima facie evidence of conviction. The driver's history record maintained by the department constitutes prima facie evidence of conviction for the offenses therein noted. Anadale v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 674 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1984).

In determining length of suspension and whether to grant a probationary license, it was not an error for hearing officer to follow regulation which required hearing officer to base his determination solely on driver's driving record and on the presence or absence of factors specified in the regulation. Elkins v. Charnes, 682 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1984).

This initial presumption may be overcome by evidence indicating that the official records are insufficient to establish guilt. Anadale v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 674 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1984).

Licensee may challenge mistakes in records but not relitigate guilt. At the administrative hearing, it is the licensee's responsibility to challenge alleged mistakes in the records of the department as to his driving history, but he may not relitigate the issue of guilt as to the offenses shown on his record. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

The defendant may not relitigate factual issues of his guilt or the validity of his traffic convictions. Thurber v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1983).

Hearing officer may not ignore challenged conviction. Even if a licensee has a meritorious claim that an underlying conviction is not valid, the department hearing officer cannot ignore the conviction until it has been ruled invalid and set aside by a court. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

Where driving record clearly shows convictions in a court of law, licensee has had his day in court, and in no case may he relitigate the issue of guilt in the suspension hearing. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

Separate suspensions may be imposed for violations committed during the same period where, at the time the first suspension was imposed, other charges were still being litigated and had not resulted in convictions, since points may be assessed and suspensions imposed only following convictions. Howell v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 631 P.2d 1198 (Colo. App. 1981).

Proof of payment of money did not prove conviction. Where plaintiff's driving privileges were suspended because she had allegedly accumulated 12 points against her driving record within a 12-month period, but of these points, four were based on an alleged conviction of a charge of driving 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone in the city of Golden, a four-point offense, and with respect to this charge, the record indicated only that $15 was paid on September 26, 1974, to the Golden municipal court clerk, proof of payment of $15, even if it were assumed that it had been to pay a fine, did not prove that there was a conviction of the offense for which plaintiff was ticketed. Troutman v. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 417, 571 P.2d 726 (1976).

Mere acceptance of penalty assessment is not “conviction” within the meaning of subsection (6)(a). Gillespie v. Dir. of Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 561, 592 P.2d 418 (1978).

The general assembly decriminalized various state law traffic violations in 1982, and, in doing so, subsection (6)(a) was amended to include as a “conviction” the entry of a judgment or default judgment for a traffic infraction under the provisions of § 42-4-1501 or 42-4-1505.7 . Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

A default judgment entered by a municipal court for a civil traffic infraction under municipal law does not constitute a “conviction” for purposes of assessing points and authorizing a license suspension. The clause “or under the similar provisions of any town or city ordinance,” which follows the provisions regarding penalty assessments under state law in subsection (6)(a), does not follow the provisions added in 1982 regarding judgments for civil traffic infractions under state law. It cannot be presumed that this omission was unintentional or without significance. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 amendment).

Proof of knowledge of revocation order. The prosecution is required to prove the element of knowledge of the revocation order in a driving after judgment prohibited case, as mailing notice of the order is only prima facie proof of its receipt under subsection (12), and is not conclusive. People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1983).

The 60-day time limit under subsection (12) is, on its face, directory and does not create a mandatory requirement which, if not met, will deprive the Department of all jurisdiction to act. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

Construing the pertinent time limitation to be mandatory would divest the Department of jurisdiction to suspend or revoke any license if that limitation were violated, even if no prejudice was occasioned by such violation and, absent explicit language revealing such, we decline to assume that the general assembly intended that an agency's procedural mistake should defeat the prime objective of the statute. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

Unlike the time limit for hearings under § 42-2-122.1 (7)(e) , the 60-day time limit in § 42-2-123 (12) is not mandatory and, consequently, if no claim of actual prejudice resulting from the delay is established, the department does not lose jurisdiction over the habitual offender revocation proceedings or the points suspension proceedings simply because the requested hearing is scheduled beyond the 60-day period. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993) (decided under law in effect prior to 1994 amendment).

Probationary license must be issued unless department makes finding of unfitness. Where the department makes no finding that the applicant for a probationary license is “unsafe for driving for any purpose”, and the basis for the suspension is, at least in part, an alcohol-related offense, subsection (13) requires the department to grant the probationary license. In re Quay, 647 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1982).

Applicability of subsection (13). Subsection (13) applies only to traffic offenses committed on or after October 1, 1979, and not to acts of the department in revoking or suspending a license. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

Subsection (13) inapplicable to plea-bargained non-alcohol-related offense. A driver may not plea-bargain an alcohol-related offense to a non-alcohol-related offense, and thereafter successfully assert the inconsistent position that he is entitled to the protection of subsection (13)(a), when seeking a probationary license. Schmidt v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982).

In determining whether motorist's license should be suspended, the length of that suspension, and whether a probationary license should be granted, the department of revenue did not err in considering both the municipal court conviction and the traffic points resulting therefrom. Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979).

Enforcement of violations of municipal traffic laws is separate and distinct from enforcement of violations of state traffic laws, although a municipal ordinance may be patterned after comparable state law provisions. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applicant's need for probationary license is one factor. The need of an applicant for a probationary license during a period of suspension is only one factor to be considered by the hearing officer, and it was not error for hearing officer to deny a probationary license based on applicant's repeated driving convictions. Fisher v. Jorgensen, 674 P.2d 1003 (Colo. App. 1983).

The benefits of amendatory legislation do not apply to driver's license revocation proceedings because revocation of a driver's license is a civil, not criminal, matter. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

The general rule in civil proceedings regarding amendatory legislation is that civil liability already incurred may not be changed by statute unless specifically so provided by the general assembly. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

Basis for suspensions. Where, in the 24-month period preceding April 16, 1972, the date on which appellant committed traffic violations for which he was subsequently convicted, the only points accumulated by him were during the four months ending with April 16, 1972, the only possible basis for his first suspension was the acquisition of 12 points during the 12-month period ending with April 16, 1972, and where, during the year immediately succeeding April 16, 1972, he was awarded 7 more points, he was subject to a second suspension of his license for 18 or more points resulting from violations occurring in a 24-month period. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev.,191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The language of subsection (13)(a) is unambiguous and the denial by the department of revenue of plaintiff's application for a second probationary license was proper because issuance of a second probationary license within a five-year period is prohibited regardless of whether alcohol-related offenses were involved. Howard v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 680 P.2d 1336 (Colo. App. 1984).

Section permits no “grace period” within which a person whose license has previously been suspended may operate a motor vehicle without concern for the effect such earlier violations may have on his right to continue to drive. Livengood v. Dept. of Rev., 44 Colo. App. 431, 614 P.2d 908 (1980).

Only in original suspension hearing may department grant probationary license, and such discretion may not be exercised under proceedings concerned with the renewal or extension of a period of suspension under § 42-2-130 (3) . Ewing v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 353 (Colo. App. 1980).

Suspensions ending seven years prior in time not considered in probationary license hearing. For the purpose of examining one's driving history in appraising an application for a probationary license, the department may not consider any suspension in which the ordered period has ended prior to seven years before the hearing. Edwards v. State, Dept. of Rev., 42 Colo. App. 52, 592 P.2d 1345 (1978).

Department may allow review of seven-year record when processing probationary license. The department has not exceeded its authority by allowing the hearing officer to consider the licensee's record for a period of seven years when processing a probationary license request even though this section sets 24 months as the maximum period for which point accumulations are to be examined in determining whether a license should be suspended. Peshel v. Motor Vehicle Div., 43 Colo. App. 58, 602 P.2d 875 (1979).

Validity of probationary license. A probationary license, issued during a period of suspension, is valid until the licensee pays the restoration fee to get back his driver's license because the period of suspension continues until the restoration fee is paid, unless the expiration date of the probationary license is noted on that license. Seigneur v. Motor Vehicle Div., 674 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1983).

Review of denial of probationary license limited. Where there is competent evidence to support the hearing officer's findings of aggravating circumstances and lack of mitigating circumstances and, therefore, to sustain the denial of a probationary license, further review of the soundness of that denial is precluded. Sonoda v. State, 664 P.2d 259 (Colo. App. 1983).

Failure to make findings of fact relating to denial of application for probationary license for work-related driving is improper. Isberg v. State, Dept. of Rev., 670 P.2d 29 (Colo. App. 1983).

“Employment”, as used in subsection (13), means a compensated position is applied in Braddock v. State, 679 P.2d 120 (Colo. App. 1984).

Where the evidence before the motor vehicle division did not support its findings, it abused its discretion. Gurule v. State Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 295, 558 P.2d 587 (1976).

When decision reversed. Where the hearing officer made his decision without the guidance of any articulated standards in the form of rules or regulations, there is no basis upon which a reviewing court can determine whether or not the officer abused his discretion, and decision must be reversed. Friedman v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 228 , 571 P.2d 1086 (1977).

Applied in Duenas-Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm'n, 199 Colo. 95 , 606 P.2d 437 (1980); People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486 , 617 P.2d 1178 (1980); People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980); Briner v. Charnes, 10 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981 ); Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 632 P.2d 1044 (Colo. App. 1981); Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 (Colo. 1982); City of Greenwood Vill. v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1982); Downey v. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1982); Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 (Colo. 1983); DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).