2021 Colorado Code
Title 31 - Government - Municipal
Article 15 - Exercise of Municipal Powers
Part 4 - Police Regulations
§ 31-15-401. General Police Powers

1. In relation to the general police power, the governing bodies of municipalities have the following powers:
   1. To regulate the police of the municipality, including employing certified peace officers to enforce all laws of the state of Colorado notwithstanding section 16-2.5-201, and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances;
   2. To do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease;
   3. To declare what is a nuisance and abate the same and to impose fines upon parties who may create or continue nuisances or suffer nuisances to exist; except that a municipal ordinance may impose liability on the owner of real property for a nuisance committed on the property by a tenant in lawful possession of the property only if the municipality notifies the property owner and tenant of the nuisance before a fine or other liability is imposed;
   4. 1. To provide for and compel the removal of weeds, brush, and rubbish of all kinds from lots and tracts of land within such municipalities and from the alleys behind and from the sidewalk areas in front of such property at such time, upon such notice, and in such manner as such municipalities prescribe by ordinance, and to assess the whole cost thereof, including five percent for inspection and other incidental costs in connection therewith, upon the lots and tracts of land from which the weeds, brush, and rubbish are removed. The assessment shall be a lien against each lot or tract of land until paid and shall have priority over all other liens except general taxes and prior special assessments. (d) (I) To provide for and compel the removal of weeds, brush, and rubbish of all kinds from lots and tracts of land within such municipalities and from the alleys behind and from the sidewalk areas in front of such property at such time, upon such notice, and in such manner as such municipalities prescribe by ordinance, and to assess the whole cost thereof, including five percent for inspection and other incidental costs in connection therewith, upon the lots and tracts of land from which the weeds, brush, and rubbish are removed. The assessment shall be a lien against each lot or tract of land until paid and shall have priority over all other liens except general taxes and prior special assessments.
      2. In case such assessment is not paid within a reasonable time specified by ordinance, it may be certified by the clerk to the county treasurer who shall collect the assessment, together with a ten percent penalty for cost of collection, in the same manner as other taxes are collected. The laws of this state for assessment and collection of general taxes, including the laws for the sale and redemption of property for taxes, shall apply to the collection of such assessments.

   5. To prevent and suppress riots, routs, affrays, noises, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies in any public or private place;
   6. To prevent fighting, quarreling, dog fights, cock fights, and all disorderly conduct;
   7. To suppress bawdy and disorderly houses and houses of ill fame or assignation within the limits of the municipality or within three miles beyond, except where the boundaries of two municipalities adjoin the outer boundaries of the municipality; to suppress gaming and gambling houses, lotteries, and fraudulent devices and practices for the purpose of gaining or obtaining money or property; and to regulate the promotion or wholesale promotion of obscene material and obscene performances, as defined in part 1 of article 7 of title 18, C.R.S.;
   8. To restrain and punish loiterers, mendicants, and prostitutes;
   9. To prohibit and punish for cruelty to animals;
   10. To establish and erect jails, correction centers, and reform schools for the reformation and confinement of loiterers and disorderly persons and persons convicted of violating any municipal ordinance, to make rules and regulations for the government of the same, and to appoint necessary officers and assistants therefor;
   11. To use the county jail for the confinement or punishment of offenders, subject to such conditions as are imposed by law, and with the consent of the board of county commissioners;
   12. To authorize the acceptance of a bail bond when any person has been arrested for the violation of any ordinance and a continuance or postponement of trial is granted. When such bond is accepted, it shall have the same validity and effect as bail bonds provided for under the criminal statutes of this state.
   13. 1. To regulate and to prohibit the running at large and keeping of animals, including fowl, within the municipality and to otherwise provide for the regulation and control of such animals including, but not limited to, licensing, impoundment, and disposition of impounded animals. (m) (I) To regulate and to prohibit the running at large and keeping of animals, including fowl, within the municipality and to otherwise provide for the regulation and control of such animals including, but not limited to, licensing, impoundment, and disposition of impounded animals.
       2. In case any municipality neglects or refuses to pass an ordinance in conformity with this paragraph (m), anyone impounding an animal running at large within the limits of said municipality shall notify the state board of stock inspection commissioners, and said animal shall be disposed of by said board as provided in article 44 of title 35, C.R.S.

   14. To regulate and license pawnbrokers as provided in section 29-11.9-102;
   15. To enact and enforce ordinances prohibiting gambling and the use of any gambling device, as the terms are defined in section 18-10-102, in a park, on a public way, or on a street; except that in enacting and enforcing the ordinances, a municipality, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, may also prohibit social gambling in or on parks, public ways, or streets. Nothing in this subsection (1)(o) shall be construed as prohibiting pari-mutuel betting or wagering under article 32 of title 44.
   16. 1. To adopt reasonable regulations for the operation of establishments open to the public in which persons appear in a state of nudity for the purpose of entertaining the patrons of such establishment; except that such regulations shall not be tantamount to a complete prohibition of such operation. Such regulations may include the following: (p) (I) To adopt reasonable regulations for the operation of establishments open to the public in which persons appear in a state of nudity for the purpose of entertaining the patrons of such establishment; except that such regulations shall not be tantamount to a complete prohibition of such operation. Such regulations may include the following:
          1. Minimum age requirements for admittance to such establishments;
          2. Limitations on the hours during which such establishments may be open for business; and
          3. Restrictions on the location of such establishments with regard to schools, churches, and residential areas.

       2. The governing body of the municipality may enact ordinances which provide that any establishment which engages in repeated or continuing violations of regulations adopted by the governing body shall constitute a public nuisance. In addition to the power provided for in paragraph (c) of this subsection (1) the governing body of the municipality may bring an action for an injunction against the operation of such establishment in a manner which violates such regulations.
       3. Nothing in the regulations adopted by the governing body of the municipality pursuant to this paragraph (p) shall be construed to apply to the presentation, showing, or performance of any play, drama, ballet, or motion picture in any theater, concert hall, museum of fine arts, school, institution of higher education, or other similar establishment as a form of expression of opinion or communication of ideas or information, as differentiated from the promotion or exploitation of nudity for the purpose of advancing the economic welfare of a commercial or business enterprise.

   17. 1. To control and limit fires, including but not limited to the prohibition, banning, restriction, or other regulation of fires and the designation of places where fires are permitted, restricted, or prohibited. (q) (I) To control and limit fires, including but not limited to the prohibition, banning, restriction, or other regulation of fires and the designation of places where fires are permitted, restricted, or prohibited.
       2. Nothing in this paragraph (q) shall be construed to preempt or supercede state, tribal, or federal law concerning the control, limitation, or other regulation of fires described in this paragraph (q).

History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1108, § 1, effective July 1. L. 76: (1)(g) amended, p. 559, § 3, effective July 1. L. 77: (1)(g) amended, p. 985, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (1)(g) amended, p. 627, § 34, effective April 2. L. 84: (1)(o) added, p. 838, § 1, effective April 2; (1)(n) added, p. 443, § 3, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(p) added, p. 1060, § 2, effective May 10. L. 86: (1)(g) amended, p. 784, § 7, effective April 21. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (1)(q) added, p. 38, § 4, effective July 17. L. 2005: (1)(c) amended, p. 550, § 1, effective January 1, 2006. L. 2017: (1)(a) amended,(SB 17-066), ch. 105, p. 386, § 3, effective April 4; (1)(n) amended,(SB 17-228), ch. 246, p. 1042, § 8, effective August 9. L. 2018: (1)(o) amended,(HB 18-1024), ch. 26, p. 324, § 19, effective October 1.

The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1975. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.

For requirement that a municipality be made a party in any proceeding involving the validity of an ordinance or franchise and that the attorney general be served with a copy in any proceeding involving the constitutionality of an ordinance or franchise, see § 13-51-115 and C.R.C.P. 57(j); for the authority of counties to adopt regulations pursuant to their police powers, see § 30-15-401 ; for the penalty for livestock grazing on roads and in municipalities, see § 35-46-105 .

Analysis

• I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
• II. REGULATING MUNICIPAL POLICE.
• III. PUBLIC HEALTH.
• IV. DECLARING AND ABATING NUISANCES.
  • A. In General.
  • B. What Constitutes a Nuisance.
  • C. Abatement.

• V. ESTRAYS AND IMPOUNDING.

Law reviews. For note, ”Colorado Municipal Government Authority to Regulate Obscene Materials“, see 51 Den. L.J. 75 (1974). For article, ”Civil Enforcement of Building and Zoning Codes in Municipal Court“, see 19 Colo. Law. 469 (1990).

Annotator's note. Since § 31-15-401 is similar to provisions of former §§ 31-12-101 and 31-12-701 through 31-12-706 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

No local regulation in areas preempted by state. No limitation is implied upon the traditional but statutory rights of municipalities to prevent disturbances of the peace and to maintain law and order by appropriate police action, but it is only when the city's acts or regulations attempt to interfere with or cover a field preempted by the state or which is of statewide concern that they must fail, and it makes no difference whether the attempted exercise of power by a city is reasonable, or is wholly prohibitory. City of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472 , 348 P.2d 951 (1960).

No authority to pass ordinance regulating labor dispute. Express delegations of power to municipalities to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances, to regulate streets, or to prevent and suppress riots, routs, affrays, noises, disturbances, disorderly assemblies in any public or private place are not express delegations to cities and town to adopt an ordinance regulating the conduct of parties to a labor dispute which on its face covers matters of statewide concern already treated by state statute, the labor peace act. City of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472 , 348 P.2d 951 (1960).

Applied in City of Colo. Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo. 554 , 36 P. 540 (1894).

Due process requirements. Due process, as it applies to cases involving municipal trash ordinances, requires only that a municipal ordinance enacted under the police power shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that it bear a rational relation to a proper legislative object sought to be attained. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

A municipal regulation having a fair relation to the protection of human life and the protection of public convenience and welfare constitutes a reasonable application of the police power. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

A presumption of reasonableness attaches to ordinances promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

Authority for scavenger ordinance. Subsection (1)(b) gives to cities and towns ample power to pass an ordinance creating the office of city or town scavenger and providing that no other person shall do scavenger work for the citizens of the city or town without the payment of a license fee, fixed by the ordinance, and procuring a license, and fixing a penalty for the violation of the ordinance. Ouray v. Corson, 14 Colo. App. 345, 59 P. 876 (1900).

Authority to prevent sewer disconnections for nonpayment. Under subsection (1)(b) and §§ 31-15-702 (1)(a) and 31-15-709 (1)(a) , where there is no other sewer to connect with, the necessity for the protection of the public health certainly gives to the city the right, temporarily at least, to prevent the digging up of its streets and alleys to disconnect private users who refuse to pay during the pendency of the quo warranto suit, regardless of who is right in that action. City of Leadville v. Leadville Sewer Co., 47 Colo. 118 , 107 P. 801 (1909).

Basis for judicial interference limited. A court of equity should not interfere with the officials of a city in efforts directed to the preservation of the public health under this section, unless the right of the applicant is free from doubt, and then only in an extreme and exceptional case. City of Leadville v. Leadville Sewer Co., 47 Colo. 118 , 107 P. 801 (1909).

Determination binding on supreme court. Unless a city council acts arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting an ordinance and in finding it necessary for the preservation of health and safety, such a determination is binding on the state supreme court. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

Constitutionality of conferring discretionary power of enforcement. The conferring of discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade or business which is the proper subject of regulation within the police power of the state is not violative of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, and where the marshal was the agent of the city government when he issued the citation and impounded the steers, the ordinance is valid, and the execution thereof is strict compliance with its abatement provision is not within the ambit of the civil rights act. Martin v. King, 417 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1969).

Subsection (1)(c) is not self-executing. See Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1912).

Ordinance pursuant to delegated police power. Where the title indicated that the ordinance defined nuisances and provided for the abatement, removal, or suppression of the same, and paragraph (c) authorizes municipalities under the police power section to declare what shall be a nuisance and to abate the same, accordingly, legislative authority existed for enacting the ordinance under the police power delegated by the state legislative body to the municipality. Martin v. King, 417 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1969).

Subsection (1)(c) requires an ordinance to make it effective. Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 P. 263 (1913).

But not outside boundaries. Assuming, under subsection (1)(c), a town has power to declare it a nuisance for one to sell or keep for sale intoxicating liquor inside the corporate limits, and, by ordinance regulating the procedure, to abate the nuisance, this does not confer power to declare what shall constitute a nuisance within a mile beyond the outer boundaries, and abate it. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).

Denoting nuisance insufficient unless city had power to punish conduct. The fact that a municipal ordinance which prohibits the solicitation of orders for merchandise from residents without invitation denominates such practice a nuisance, which it may not be in fact, is immaterial in a consideration of the validity of the ordinance, the real question being whether the city had power to punish the prescribed conduct, not whether it had the right to name it. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493 , 99 P.2d 969 (1939).

City had authority to abate nuisance and to recoup its remediation expenses through liens if so provided in the nuisance ordinance. Gold Vein LLC v. Cripple Creek, 973 P.2d 1286 (Colo. App. 1999).

Municipality may not impose a priority lien for abatement expenses except as specifically authorized in subsection (1)(d) for weed, brush, and rubbish removal. Gold Vein LLC v. Cripple Creek, 973 P.2d 1286 (Colo. App. 1999).

Licensing ordinance repugnantly discriminatory. The attempt of a city council, by ordinance, to prevent the prosecution of lawful business avocations, not declared by any ordinance to be nuisances, within the city limits without a permit or license from the city council is not authorized by subsection (1)(c), and such an ordinance is repugnant to fundamental rights in that it is susceptible of being used to unjustly discriminate between individuals equally worthy and respectable by permitting certain individuals to pursue the avocations mentioned while denying the privilege to other persons of the same class, or by making acts done by one person penal and imposing no penalty for the same act when done under like circumstances by another. May v. People, 1 Colo. App. 152, 27 P. 1010 (1891).

Applied in Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223 , 15 P. 399 (1887).

Animals. Under subsection (1)(c), the city council of a city or the board of trustees of a town may declare horses, cattle, sheep, swine, goats, or other like animals running at large within the corporate limits, a nuisance, and impose a fine on any person permitting it. Haldeman v. Colo. City, 52 Colo. 233 , 120 P. 1041 (1911).

An ordinance was a valid nuisance abatement ordinance which lawfully declared maintenance of cattle within the town limits a nuisance and provided for abatement thereof unless a permit allowing such maintenance had been granted. Martin v. King, 417 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1969).

Liquor. The mere sale of, or keeping for sale, intoxicating liquors is not a nuisance per se, but the town council may by ordinance declare it a nuisance. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).

An ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within the limits of the city, and declaring that ”a place kept for such sale, and the business, and the liquor kept“ is a nuisance ”to be abated as any other nuisance“ is conclusive in its effect, and the provision that the nuisance shall be abated ”as any other nuisance“ can be held to mean only as any other nuisance may lawfully be abated. Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 P. 263 (1913).

Privies. Cities may have the power to declare a privy in an established sewer district a nuisance per se, and to abate it, and fine the party suffering it to exist, but the proceeding would have to be under an ordinance based upon the power conferred by the statutes, and the ordinance must provide the manner of abatement. Gault v. City of Ft. Collins, 57 Colo. 324 , 142 P. 171 (1914).

Nuisance per accidents. Even though zoning regulations permit an act to be done, and the act is being done with reasonable care and skill, the courts may grant relief where it is found that the acts complained of constitute a nuisance per accidents; to hold otherwise would be to state that the legislative body may license a nuisance. Hobbs v. Smith, 177 Colo. 299 , 493 P.2d 1352 (1972).

The abatement procedure should be regulated by an ordinance, and the manner of abatement not left to the discretion of the officer executing the order. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).

Enjoining nuisance. Regardless of compliance with zoning ordinances or regulations, both business and residential uses may be enjoined if they constitute a nuisance to an adjoining property owner or resident. Hobbs v. Smith, 177 Colo. 299 , 493 P.2d 1352 (1972).

Manner of arrest and destruction unwarranted. The arrest with unnecessary force of one found in possession of a stock of intoxicating liquors, the destruction of the liquors with other legitimate merchandise, all in a disorderly and tumultuous manner, in disturbance of the peace of the Sabbath day, was not justified by ordinance prohibiting the sale or keeping for sale of such liquors, and declaring that the sale or keeping for sale of such liquors was a nuisance; nor by a vote or resolution of the city council directing the city marshal to seize and bring before the police magistrate all such liquors, with the persons of those found upon the premises. Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 P. 263 (1913).

As to nuisances which may at common law be summarily abated, e.g., the obstruction of the public highway, it may be that the municipal authorities may proceed without the aid or adjudication of any court, otherwise, in the absence of statute, as to other nuisances, or where the existence of the nuisance depends upon proof that the law has been violated. Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 P. 263 (1913).

Constitutional basis for power. A city organized under art. XX, Colo. Const., has the power to impound animals running at large, within its bounds, and to charge owner a reasonable amount for discharging this duty, and such an imposition is a matter of local concern. City of Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447 , 182 P. 884 (1919).

Denver municipal ordinance prohibiting pit bulls held constitutional. Colo. Dog Fanciers v. Denver, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991).

Applied in Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223 , 15 P. 399 (1887).