2021 Colorado Code
Title 31 - Government - Municipal
Article 15 - Exercise of Municipal Powers
Part 1 - Vesting of Corporate Powers
§ 31-15-103. Making of Ordinances

Municipalities shall have power to make and publish ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of this state, from time to time, for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this title which are necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of such municipality and the inhabitants thereof not inconsistent with the laws of this state.

History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1105, § 1, effective July 1.

This section is similar to former § 31-12-301 as it existed prior to 1975.

Law reviews. For article, ”Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado“, see 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267 (1958). For article, ”One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure“, see 36 Dicta 34 (1959).

Annotator's note. Since § 31-15-103 is similar to former § 31-12-301 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Ordinance of statutory city that is in conflict with state law of general application is invalid. Lakewood Pawnbrokers, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 183 Colo. 370 , 517 P.2d 834 (1973).

A municipal ordinance of a home-rule city that is in clear opposition to the provisions of a general state law is invalid. Hamilton v. City & County of Denver, 176 Colo. 6 , 490 P.2d 1289 (1971).

Public necessity a state and municipal legislative determination. Whether the recital in a municipal ordinance, what it is ”necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety“, is true or not is a legislative and not a judicial question, and respecting this matter, there is no distinction between state and municipal legislation. Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27 , 218 P. 913 (1923).

Standard measuring exercise of police power. If a restriction upon the use of property is to be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power it must bear ”a fair relation to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare“, and have ”a definite tendency to promote or protect the same“. In determining the validity of restraints upon freedom imposed by statute or ordinance, the determination to be made is whether the ordinance has a real and substantial relation to the accomplishment of those objectives which form the basis of police regulation. City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 161 Colo. 281 , 422 P.2d 384 (1966).

Due process, as it applies to cases involving municipal trash ordinances, requires only that a municipal ordinance enacted under the police power shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that it bear a rational relation to a proper legislative object sought to be attained. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

A municipal regulation having a fair relation to the protection of human life and the protection of public convenience and welfare constitutes a reasonable application of the police power. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

The standard for determining whether there is a rational basis to uphold the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance is whether the ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal. City of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328 , 600 P.2d 62 (1979).

The test of constitutionality for a municipal ordinance is whether there is a rational basis to uphold the classification created by the ordinance. City of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328 , 600 P.2d 62 (1979).

An ordinance comports with due process when it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Municipal ordinances for road improvement project that eliminated parking on the municipality's right-of-way near a condominium were a reasonable exercise of the municipality's police powers. The ordinances were within the municipality's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety, and welfare. The measures were a reasonable exercise of that power because they were reasonably related to the municipality's objectives of improving traffic safety, improving water drainage, and remedying a missing portion of a recreational bike path. In examining the reasonableness of the relationship, a court does not compare or otherwise examine alternative methods for addressing the government objective. Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condo. Assn., 2014 CO 37, 325 P.3d 1032.

U.S. supreme court's contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence makes clear that the relevant inquiries for due process and takings claims are distinct. Because the property owner did not (and could not) assert a takings claim, the lower courts' focus on the magnitude and character of the burden imposed on the property owner by the ordinance was misplaced. Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condo. Assn., 2014 CO 37, 325 P.3d 1032.

Cannot stifle fundamental personal liberties. Even though the governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20 , 501 P.2d 744 (1972).

Differing treatment of people allowable where differentiation rational. The fact that an ordinance affects different people in different degrees does not invalidate the provision so long as the distinctions have a rational basis. City of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328 , 600 P.2d 62 (1979).

Ordinance must resemble national standards when regulating industry. Local ordinances should have some reasonable resemblance to recognized national standards established by qualified organizations, or otherwise the regulated industry would be at the mercy of every whim and caprice of the many different communities. City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 161 Colo. 281 , 422 P.2d 384 (1966).

A presumption of reasonableness attaches to ordinances promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977); City of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328 , 600 P.2d 62 (1979).

Determination binding on supreme court. Unless a city council acts arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting an ordinance and in finding it necessary for the preservation of health and safety, such a determination is binding on the state supreme court. United States Disposal Sys. v. City of Northglenn, 193 Colo. 277 , 567 P.2d 365 (1977).

Finding city standard unreasonable. It is not for the supreme court to substitute its notions as to what is fair and reasonable, but to ascertain under all existing circumstances whether the standard established by the city is in fact reasonable and bears a reasonable relation to the public health, welfare, and safety of the city and its inhabitants. And while it might be desirable to classify service stations as to the capacity of the truck which may make delivery there, or to promulgate some other reasonable regulations applying to retail services stations based on their specific location in certain fire zones, the supreme court held that an ordinance which requires the tank vehicles to pass through the city to a bulk plant, unload at the bulk plant, and then reload vehicles and a capacity of less than 2,200 gallons for redelivery to retail filling stations throughout the city, necessarily involves a greater exposure to hazard and accident, and therefore a greater danger to the public health, welfare, and safety of the city and its populace. City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 161 Colo. 281 , 422 P.2d 384 (1966).

Liquor licensing ordinance required. The matter of issuing licenses by a municipality for the sale of liquor, in view of this section, should be governed by ordinance duly passed and published, and not left to the discretion of the city council. Maurer v. Boggs, 103 Colo. 72 , 82 P.2d 1099 (1938).

And valid. Where an ordinance enumerating many places where men usually assemble or pass, provided that no person ”shall drink“ certain designated intoxicating liquors, while in any of these places ”unless the person occupying the building be duly licensed by the city to sell, etc.“, it was held that the manifest purpose of the ordinance is to prevent the drinking of intoxicating liquors in public view, and particularly of children and youth, and thus improve the public morals; that including all of the places of the classes designated it is therefore authorized by this section. City of Delta v. Charlesworth, 64 Colo. 216 , 170 P. 965 (1918).

Set-back ordinances valid. Ordinances which require structures to be set back from the property line are a valid exercise of police power. City of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328 , 600 P.2d 62 (1979).

Regulation of signs permitted. The powers granted to a statutory city by this section and § 31-23-301 (1) are commodious enough to enable it to promote its safety and aesthetic interests by regulating the number and type of signs permitted in different zoning districts. City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1981).

City scavenger ordinance valid. Ordinance creating the office of city scavenger and defining his duties and prohibiting others from doing scavenger work without a license is not invalid because it fails to provide the special manner in which the scavenger work must be done. City of Ouray v. Corson, 14 Colo. App. 345, 59 P. 876 (1900).

The issuance of town bonds to fund a floating debt should conform with the provisions of this section as to procedure by ordinance. Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Town of Granada, 54 F. 100 (8th Cir. 1893).

City ordinance on possession of deadly weapons held unconstitutionally overbroad. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20 , 501 P.2d 744 (1972).

Applied in City of Denver v. Webber, 15 Colo. App. 511, 63 P. 804 (1900).