2021 Colorado Code
Title 19 - Children's Code
Article 4 - Uniform Parentage Act
§ 19-4-116. Judgment or Order - Birth-Related Costs - Evidence

1. The judgment or order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes.
2. If the judgment or order of the court is at variance with the child's birth certificate or if the court enters a judgment or order determining the existence of a parent and child relationship during the course of a proceeding held pursuant to article 3 of this title, the court shall order that a new birth certificate be issued under section 19-4-124.
3. 1. The judgment or order may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding concerning the duty of support, the recovery of child support debt pursuant to section 14-14-104, C.R.S., the allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to the child and guardianship of the child, parenting time privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the judgment, or any other matter in the best interest of the child. The judgment or order may direct the father to pay for genetic testing and to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement.
   2. Repealed.
   3. Bills for pregnancy, childbirth expenses, and genetic testing are admissible as evidence without the necessity of third-party foundation testimony and shall constitute prima facie evidence of the amounts incurred for such services or for expenses incurred on behalf of the child.

4. Support judgments or orders ordinarily shall be for periodic payments which may vary in amount. In the best interest of the child, a lump-sum payment or the purchase of an annuity may be ordered in lieu of periodic payments of support. The court or delegate child support enforcement unit may enter an order directing the father to pay for support of the child, in an amount as may be determined by the court or delegate child support enforcement unit to be reasonable under the circumstances, for a time period which occurred prior to the entry of the order establishing paternity. The court may limit the father's liability for past support of the child to the proportion of the expenses already incurred that the court deems just.
5. The judgment or order may include a provision requiring that the respondent initiate inclusion of the child under a medical insurance policy currently in effect for the benefit of the respondent, purchase medical insurance for the child, or in some other manner provide for the current or future medical needs of the child. At the same time, the court may make a determination of whose responsibility it shall be to pay required medical insurance deductibles and copayments. If the judgment or order does not contain a provision regarding medical support, such as insurance coverage, payment for medical insurance deductibles and copayments, or unreimbursed medical expenses, that fact may be grounds for a modification of the order under section 14-10-122, C.R.S.
6. In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, a court enforcing the obligation of support shall consider all relevant facts, including:
   1. The needs of the child;
   2. The standard of living and circumstances of the parents;
   3. The relative financial means of the parents;
   4. The earning ability of the parents;
   5. The need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;
   6. The age of the child;
   7. The financial resources and the earning ability of the child;
   8. The responsibility of the parents for the support of others;
   9. The value of services contributed by the parent with whom the child resides the majority of the time;
   10. The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the parents been married; and
   11. The child support guidelines, as set forth in section 14-10-115, C.R.S.

7. Any order of support made pursuant to subsections (4) to (6) of this section shall continue until the child is nineteen years of age, unless the support order is terminated sooner by court order.
8. The court may order support to be continued after the child is nineteen years of age if the child is unable to care for himself or herself by reason of mental or physical disability or other reason justifiable in the opinion of the court.
9. All child support orders entered pursuant to this article shall include the names and dates of birth of the parties and of the children who are the subject of the order and the parties' residential and mailing addresses. The social security numbers of the parties and children shall be collected pursuant to sections 14-14-113 and 26-13-127, C.R.S.

History. Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 798, § 1, effective October 1; (6)(i) and (6)(j) amended and (6)(k) added, p. 1587, § 60, effective October 1. L. 89: (3), (5), and (7) amended, p. 794, § 21, effective July 1. L. 93: (3) amended, p. 582, § 21, effective July 1; (8) amended, p. 1638, § 25, effective July 1. L. 94: (4), (7), and (8) amended, p. 1542, § 15, effective May 31. L. 95: (3) amended, p. 1397, § 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (3)(a) amended and (3)(c) and (9) added, p. 1276, §§ 15, 16, effective July 1. L. 98: (3)(a) and (6)(i) amended, p. 1409, § 71, effective February 1, 1999. L. 99: (2) and (9) amended, p. 1086, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2008: (9) amended, p. 1348, § 4 effective July 1.

1. This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-6-116 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
2. Subsection (3)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(b), effective June 30, 1999. (SeeL. 95, p. 1397.)

For the legislative declaration contained in the 1993 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 165, Session Laws of Colorado 1993. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1997 act amending subsection (3)(a) and adding subsections (3)(c) and (9), see section 1 of chapter 236, Session Laws of Colorado 1997.

Law reviews. For comment, “The Unwed Father's Parental Rights and Obligations After S.P.B.: A Retreat in Constitutional Protection” see 60 Den. L.J. 659 (1983).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Constitutionality. This section does not violate due process in creating an irrebuttable presumption that a father should share in the duty of child support. People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982).

There is no violation of equal protection in the statutory obligation of both parents to pay child support or in the denial to an unwed father of the right to demand the termination of a pregnancy. People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982).

Former section constitutional. Former section compelling a father to support unborn child and its mother was constitutional. Cederquist v. Archuleta, 127 Colo. 41 , 253 P.2d 431 (1953).

Former statute which provided for assessment of damages held unconstitutional and would not support a judgment of damages. This did not relieve the father of an illegitimate child of his obligation to support the child since the finding of the jury as to the father of the child involved stood. Loveland v. Lewis, 169 Colo. 149 , 454 P.2d 84 (1969).

Law liberally interpreted. Where the paternity of the child is established beyond question, the law should be liberally construed to insure the necessary help to the child and its mother, consonant with the father's ability to pay. Davis v. People, 103 Colo. 437 , 86 P.2d 975 (1939).

The primary issue for determination in a paternity case is whether the alleged father is, in fact, the father. A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439 , 507 P.2d 468 (1973).

Determination of status of child is conclusive. A proceeding to determine the parentage of a child is in the direct interest of the child and the status of the child as to its parentage determined in such a proceeding is just as conclusive and binding upon the child as it would be upon a parent brought into court under the provisions of the statute. In re Morrow's Estate, 100 Colo. 424 , 68 P.2d 36 (1937).

A person who is determined to be a non-parent under the Uniform Parentage Act but who fits the criteria in § 14-10-123 (1) may qualify as an “appropriate party” within the meaning of this section. In re Ohr, 97 P.3d 354 (Colo. App. 2004).

Payment of reasonable expenses of mother's pregnancy and confinement is authorized and jurisdiction rests exclusively under the Uniform Parentage Act and not under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). In re Custody of Garcia, 695 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1984).

Question of child support involved. In a paternity proceeding the question of support of the child, both past and future, is involved. People in Interest of A.A.T., 191 Colo. 494 , 554 P.2d 302 (1976).

A father may be required to pay child support retroactive to the birth of the child pursuant to subsection (4). In re Smith, 7 P.3d 1012 (Colo. App. 1999).

Subsection (4) permits an award of child support retroactive to the date of the child's birth and does not violate equal protection by treating unmarried parents differently from married parents. People ex rel. B.W., 17 P.3d 199 (Colo. App. 2000).

Jurisdiction to award back child support. The use of the word “may” in the first sentence of subsection (3) indicates that the general assembly intended to allow the trial court broad discretion in determining support issues, including that of child support arrearages. People in Interest of L.W., 756 P.2d 392 (Colo. App. 1988) (decided under former § 19-6-116 as it existed prior to the 1987 repeal and reenactment of this title).

Juvenile court properly considered the father's earning ability and the parties' agreement to sell jointly owned house in determining whether an increase in child support was warranted for child born out of wedlock and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering increased child support upon the sale of said house. M.H.W. by M.E.S. v. D.J.W., 757 P.2d 1129 (Colo. App. 1988).

Unless an order specifically states that it is not subject to modification a trial court may modify a lump-sum child support order. M.F. v. L.M., 780 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1989).

Deferred compensation in father's nonqualified retirement plan is not income for child support purposes under this act. Applying the definition of income in § 14-10-115 , the court determined that it was not income because father did not have the ability to use it to pay his expenses, including child support. Father was not vested in the plan, there was no account in his name, the plan would pay only upon retirement if certain conditions were met, and father would forfeit the plan if he was fired, quit, or retired before age sixty-five, and once retired, it would pay out over 10 years. In re N.J.C., 2019 COA 153 M, 467 P.3d 1209.

Request to hear change of minor's name within broad grant of authority to trial court pursuant to subsection (3). Whether change of name is in the best interests of a minor child is a factual determination for the trial court. D.K.W. v. J.L.B., 807 P.2d 1222 (Colo. App. 1990); S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

Trial court may deviate from presumed amount of support in § 14-10-115 according to the criteria in subsection (6) of this section so long as it enters findings that allow an appellate court and the parties to discern the reasons for the deviation. In Interest of D.R.V., 885 P.2d 351 (Colo. App. 1994).

Power of court to issue temporary orders. The juvenile court may, in its discretion in a proper case, issue temporary orders providing for protection, support, or medical and surgical treatment as it deems in the best interest of the child prior to adjudication or disposition of the petition to determine paternity. People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

Evidence as to the putative father's ability to pay must not only be adduced but the ability of the man charged to pay must bear some relationship to the sum awarded. Noffsinger v. Sipes, 161 Colo. 413 , 422 P.2d 639 (1967).

Continuing jurisdiction of the trial court under this section allows appointment of a guardian ad litem even after the entry of permanent orders when deemed necessary by the court. Such appointment may be made on motion of a party or on the court's own motion; however, appointment of a guardian ad litem after the entry of permanent orders should not be done as a matter of course. In Interest of A.R.W., 903 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1994); S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

In paternity proceedings, juvenile court must make and modify permanent orders regarding parenting time in accordance with the UDMA. People in Interest of S.E.G., 934 P.2d 920 (Colo. App. 1997).

Parenting time is primarily a right of the child and only secondarily a right of the parent. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

Relevant factors that the court appropriately considered under subsection (3)(a) included the facts that the mother was rigid and inflexible, the father harbored anger and hostility, and visitation occurred in an atmosphere of tension and distrust. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

A specific order, containing limitations on father's parenting time, was appropriate where the evidence showed a lack of cooperation between the parties. Under such circumstances, a general order does not meet the purposes for which parenting time is intended. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

Not all medical expenses allocated. To harmonize this section and § 19-4-129 , only uninsured medical expenses exceeding $100 for enumerated health problems may be apportioned between the parties in a paternity action filed on or after July 1, 1988. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

Cost of a nanny may be included in the calculation of child support. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

Mother not precluded from bringing a paternity action under this section after conclusion of an action under the UDMA. Although the issue of paternity had been established in the UDMA action, the issue of whether the mother was entitled to birth-related costs was unresolved and could not have been resolved in prior action. In re G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2011).