2021 Colorado Code
Title 19 - Children's Code
Article 3 - Dependency and Neglect
Part 5 - Petition, Adjudication, Disposition
§ 19-3-505. Adjudicatory Hearing - Findings - Adjudication

1. At the adjudicatory hearing, the court shall consider whether the allegations of the petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence; except that jurisdictional matters of the age and residence of the child shall be deemed admitted by or on behalf of the child unless specifically denied prior to the adjudicatory hearing.
2. Evidence tending to establish the necessity of separating the child from the parents or guardian may be admitted but shall not be required for the making of an order of adjudication.
3. Adjudicatory hearings shall be held at the earliest possible time, but in no instance shall such hearing be held later than ninety days after service of the petition, or, in a county designated pursuant to section 19-1-123, if the child is under six years of age at the time a petition is filed in accordance with section 19-3-501 (2), in no instance shall such hearing be held later than sixty days after service of the petition unless the court finds that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a delay. If the court determines that a delay is necessary, it shall set forth the specific reason why such delay is necessary and shall schedule the adjudicatory hearing at the earliest possible time following the delay.
4. 1. When it appears that the evidence presented at the hearing discloses facts not alleged in the petition, the court may proceed immediately to consider the additional or different matters raised by the evidence if the parties consent.
   2. In such event, the court, on the motion of any interested party or on its own motion, shall order the petition to be amended to conform to the evidence.
   3. If the amendment results in a substantial departure from the original allegations in the petition, the court shall continue the hearing on the motion of any interested party, or the court may grant a continuance on its own motion if it finds it to be in the best interests of the child or any other party to the proceeding.
   4. If it appears from the evidence that the child may have a mental health disorder or an intellectual and developmental disability as these terms are defined in article 10.5 of title 27, subsections (4)(a) to (4)(c) of this section do not apply, and the court shall proceed pursuant to section 19-3-506.

5. After making a finding as provided by paragraph
   1. of subsection (7) of this section but before making an adjudication, the court may continue the hearing from time to time, allowing the child to remain in his own home or in the temporary custody of another person or agency subject to such conditions of conduct and of visitation or supervision by a juvenile probation officer as the court may prescribe, if:
   2. Such continuation shall extend no longer than six months without review by the court. Upon review, the court may continue the case for an additional period not to exceed six months, after which the petition shall either be dismissed or sustained.

6. When the court finds that the allegations of the petition are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall order the petition dismissed and the child discharged from any detention or restriction previously ordered. His or her parents, guardian, or legal custodian shall also be discharged from any restriction or other previous temporary order. The court shall inform the respondent that, pursuant to section 19-3-313.5 (3)(f), the department shall expunge the records and reports for purposes related to employment or background checks.
7. 1. When the court finds that the allegations of the petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, except when the case is continued as provided in the introductory portion to subsection (5) of this section, the court shall sustain the petition and shall make an order of adjudication setting forth whether the child is neglected or dependent. Evidence that child abuse or nonaccidental injury has occurred shall constitute prima facie evidence that such child is neglected or dependent, and such evidence shall be sufficient to support an adjudication under this section.
   2. The court shall then hold the dispositional hearing, but such hearing may be continued on the motion of any interested party or on the motion of the court. Such continuance shall not exceed thirty days unless good cause exists. In a county designated pursuant to section 19-1-123, if the child is under six years of age at the time a petition is filed in accordance with section 19-3-501 (2), the dispositional hearing shall be held within thirty days after the adjudicatory hearing unless good cause is shown and unless the court finds that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a delay. It is the intent of the general assembly that the dispositional hearing be held on the same day as the adjudicatory hearing, whenever possible.

(a) Consent is given by the parties, including the child and his parent, guardian, or other legal custodian after being fully informed by the court of their rights in the proceeding, including their right to have an adjudication made either dismissing or sustaining the petition;

History. Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 781, § 1, effective October 1. L. 94: (3) and (7) amended, p. 2053, § 6, effective July 1. L. 96: (6) amended, p. 1290, § 3, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: (6) amended, p. 1723, § 5, effective June 1. L. 2003: (6) amended, p. 1407, § 12, effective January 1, 2004. L. 2006: (4)(d) amended, p. 1402, § 58, effective August 7. L. 2017: (4)(d) amended,(SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1315, § 163, effective May 25.

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-3-106 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsection (6), see section 1 of chapter 196, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

Analysis

• I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
• II. EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
• III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

Law reviews. For article, “One Year Review of Domestic Relations”, see 34 Dicta 108 (1957). For article, “One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 36 Dicta 34 (1959). For article, “Representing the Mentally Retarded or Disabled Parent in a Colorado Dependent or Neglected Child Action”, see 11 Colo. Law. 693 (1982).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The adjudication procedure allows parents with limited financial ability to obtain proper treatment for their developmentally disabled children, and thereby furthers the legislative purpose of securing for such children the care that will best serve their welfare and the interests of society. The best interests of the child, rather than the parents' finances, determine what care the child receives. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1991).

Adjudication of dependency and neglect was proper where father had been bound over for trial on charge of murder of mother and held without bond because child could be found dependent and neglected under the ground that she lacked parental care or was not domiciled with her parent. People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied, 754 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1988).

Was also proper where the jury verdict was based on allegations in the petition in dependency and neglect; the only argument presented to support the finding of dependency was the allegation in the petition of the act of sexual molestation initially told to a pediatrician by the child and subsequently investigated by the department of social services; the father did not contend that the jury's determination rested on some unknown other incident and not the sole allegation concerning him; and the verdict was intended to be a determination of the status of the child, and not a specific finding of the acts creating that status. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993).

Admission by one respondent not necessarily dispositive of allegations disputed by any other respondents. One party's admissions, while binding upon that party, are legally insufficient to establish the allegations in a dependency and neglect petition in the face of the other party's denial. People ex rel. U.S., 121 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2005).

“Fault” admissions made by father involving mother, which she denied and which were not proved at an adjudicatory hearing, cannot form the basis for requiring mother to comply with a treatment plan in the absence of an adjudication. People ex rel. U.S., 121 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2005).

Admission by a mother with whom children did not reside that child had been assaulted and lacked proper parental care is not sufficient to sustain an adjudication of dependency and neglect against a father who disputed such allegations and demanded a jury trial. People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1989).

Purpose of hearing. The purpose of the adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether the facts show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child is in fact neglected and dependent. People in Interest of K.S., 33 Colo. App. 72, 515 P.2d 130 (1973).

The primary purpose of a dependency adjudication is to furnish the jurisdictional bases for state intervention to assist the parents and child in establishing a relationship and home environment that will preserve the family unit. People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982).

An adjudicatory hearing on dependency or neglect is designed to determine whether the child, for whatever reason, lacks the benefit of parental guidance, concern, protection or support to which he is entitled. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981).

Focus. While the acts or omissions of the parents singly and together are relevant in determining the status of the child, the primary focus of the adjudicatory hearing is to determine the condition and circumstances of the child at the time of the hearing. People in Interest of K.S., 33 Colo. App. 72, 515 P.2d 130 (1973).

Adjudications of neglect or dependency are not made “as to” the parents, but rather relate only to the status of the child. People in Interest of P.D.S., 669 P.2d 627 (Colo. App. 1983); People in Interest of C.T., 746 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 1987).

Constitutional rights guaranteed. The interest of the state in a hearing to determine if a child is dependent or neglected must be exercised without denial of fundamental fairness as required by due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. People in Interest of Zollinger, 173 Colo. 113 , 476 P.2d 262 (1970).

Due process rights of parent. Due process requires that a parent be given adequate notice of the possibility of termination of parental rights and afforded an opportunity to be heard on that issue. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981).

Father had no constitutional right to confront witness in civil dependency and neglect proceeding. Furthermore, the trial was fundamentally fair where child testified from another room via closed-circuit television and father had real-time communication with his attorney during child's testimony. People ex rel. S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124 (Colo. App. 2011).

Jury instructions concerning dependency and neglect adjudication were not misleading where instructions were stated in the past tense rather than the present tense. People ex rel. S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124 (Colo. App. 2011).

When adjudication becomes final judgment. The adjudication of a child as dependent or neglected, with the dispositional hearing continued to a future date, does not become a final judgment until a decree of disposition is entered. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981).

Only final orders of juvenile court may be appealed. People in Interest of B.W., 43 Colo. App. 235, 601 P.2d 1086 (1979).

Interest and welfare of child control. Even the parental right to its custody and control must yield to the interests and welfare of the child. Fulton v. Martensen, 129 Colo. 125 , 267 P.2d 658 (1954).

The presumption that parents are fit and proper persons to have care and custody of their children is subject to the qualification that in custody proceedings the welfare and best interests of the children is the paramount consideration. Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417 , 339 P.2d 1008 (1959).

The interest of the state in a child is based upon the statutory grounds of dependency, neglect, or abandonment, and in order for a child to be snatched from a blood relation who is giving him love and care, there certainly must be some showing as to the necessity therefor. Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238 , 323 P.2d 628 (1958).

Neglect or dependency proceeding is preventive as well as remedial. People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981).

Jurisdiction, duties, etc., of court and welfare department. It is the court which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction, and the duty, to adjudicate whether a child is dependent and neglected, to determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the legal relationship with the child's parents, and to make such further disposition as deemed necessary. If so requested by the court, it is the function of the welfare department to aid the court in the court's pursuit of its obligations. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

Issue to be resolved in dependency proceeding. In a dependency proceeding the question to be resolved is not the comparative rights of different claimants of custody, but solely that of whether or not the existing custody and surroundings of the child are such that it is the duty of the state, as parens patriae, to take over its custody and make it a ward of the state. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511 , 265 P.2d 233 (1953); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

In a dependency proceeding, the only matter at issue before the court in the first place is that of dependency. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235 , 179 P.2d 662 (1947); In re People in Interest of Murley, 124 Colo. 581 , 239 P.2d 706 (1951).

In a petition in dependency nothing can be determined except that a child or children involved are dependent and neglected children. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217 , 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

Under former subsection (3)(b) now subsection (5)(b), after the juvenile court finds that the allegations in the petition to adjudicate a child dependent and neglected are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court can hold hearings on the petition for a maximum of two six-month periods after which it can take no other action than either to dismiss or sustain the petition. People in Interest of K.M.J., 698 P.2d 1380 (Colo. App. 1984).

Parental care is not sole issue. Whether or not a child is receiving parental care is not the sole issue in a dependency proceeding. Care of a child by other sources is relevant. Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238 , 323 P.2d 628 (1958).

If child found not dependent, action should be dismissed. If the child is found not dependent, then there is nothing further to be considered and the action should be dismissed. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235 , 179 P.2d 662 (1947); In re People in Interest of Murley, 124 Colo. 581 , 239 P.2d 706 (1951).

No judgment of dependency was entered by the trial court which is a prerequisite to establish responsibility against petitioner to contribute to the child's support. Rios v. People in Interest of Martinez, 154 Colo. 88 , 388 P.2d 402 (1964).

Once jury found child not dependent and neglected, the dependency and neglect court was without jurisdiction to enter further orders despite mother's no-fault admission. The court must dismiss the case and discharge the father and child from any detention or restriction previously ordered. Mother's no-fault admission was sufficient only to support court's continuing jurisdiction pending a determination by the jury as to whether the child was dependent and neglected. The court did not have jurisdiction to entertain subsequent motion by paternal grandfather for custody of the child. People ex rel. A.H., 271 P.3d 1116 (Colo. App. 2011).

Despite mother's admission, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders beyond dismissing the petition once court found that the allegations of the petition regarding father were not proven. The dismissal order from father's adjudicatory hearing resulted in the child being discharged from any detention or restriction previously ordered and the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over the child to hold a fitness hearing or enter an allocation of parental responsibilities order in favor of the grandparents. People in Interest of S.T., 2015 COA 147 , 361 P.3d 1154.

Disposition issue follows finding of dependency. If the child shall first have been found dependent upon proper evidence, then, and only then, should the court in orderly procedure receive evidence concerning, and determine, the disposition of the child. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235 , 179 P.2d 662 (1947); In re People in Interest of Murley, 124 Colo. 581 , 239 P.2d 706 (1951).

Adjudicatory and dispositional hearings may be combined or separate. The clear meaning and import of the hearing provisions provide in proper cases that the adjudicatory hearing and the dispositional hearing may be separate hearings, but that also, in a proper case, providing prior notice thereof is given, the dispositional hearing may be had coextensively with the adjudicatory hearing. When the latter alternative is followed, it is necessary that there be presented at the hearing, evidence relating to factors which the court must consider before it can make a proper disposition. Johnson v. People in Interest of W__ J__, 170 Colo. 137 , 459 P.2d 579 (1969).

The Colorado Children's Code provides for either a combined or bifurcated adjudicatory-dispositional procedure. People in Interest of M.B., 188 Colo. 370 , 535 P.2d 192 (1975).

Court's grant of extension of time for adjudicatory hearing, upon request of child's guardian ad litem, satisfied statutory requirements and court's refusal to dismiss case was not erroneous. People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied, 754 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1988).

Subsection (5)(b)'s 12-month time limit for holding a hearing is not a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, the court's failure to follow the statutory requirement was an erroneous decision not affecting jurisdiction. Since the mother joined in the motion that continued the matter beyond the 12-month period she is not entitled to relief. People ex rel. A.W., 74 P.3d 497 (Colo. App. 2003).

Court's failure to enter adjudicatory order did not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. Mother admitted the child was dependent and neglected and the court accepted the admission and deferred adjudication pursuant to subsection (5). Subsequently, mother voluntarily participated in termination proceedings and did not deny that the child was dependent and neglected nor object to court's erroneous finding that the child had been adjudicated dependent and neglected. People ex rel. N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410 (Colo. App. 2009); People in Interest of J.W., 2017 CO 105, 406 P.3d 853.

Party wishing to file a motion for summary judgment cannot comply with both this section and C.R.C.P. 56(c). Under C.R.C.P. 81, the timing of subsection (3) of this section controls. People ex rel. A.C., 170 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2007).

Court correct in allowing the guardian ad litem to present his evidence before ruling on mother's motion for a directed verdict since primary focus of hearing concerned the child's best interests, and since the guardian ad litem had advised the court of his intent to align the child's case with that of the people. People in Interest of M.M.T., 676 P.2d 1238 (Colo. App. 1983).

Order based on conflicting evidence is conclusive. The power of a juvenile court in matters involving the custody of minor children is great, and while it should be exerted with the utmost circumspection, an order based upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on review. Hudson v. Mattingley, 69 Colo. 528 , 195 P. 113 (1921).

Where trial court resolves conflicting evidence, its findings will not be disturbed on review, even though it would be possible for reasonable men to arrive at different conclusions based on the same facts. In re People in Interest of R.L., 32 Colo. App. 29, 505 P.2d 968 (1973).

Attorney fees. The attorney retained by a petitioner therein must secure his compensation, if any is to be had, from the petitioner. Cederquist v. Archuleta, 127 Colo. 41 , 253 P.2d 431 (1953); Geisler v. People, 135 Colo. 121 , 308 P.2d 1000 (1957).

Applied in People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 592 P.2d 415 (1976); People in Interest of T.H., 197 Colo. 247 , 593 P.2d 346 (1979); People in Interest of V.A.E.Y.H.D., 199 Colo. 148 , 605 P.2d 916 (1980); People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197 , 606 P.2d 450 (1980); People in Interest of C.A.K., 628 P.2d 136 (Colo. App. 1980).

A determination of dependency and neglect must be based on a consideration of existing circumstances and not on speculation concerning future possibilities. People in Interest of C.T., 746 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 1987).

State has burden of proof. Where a mother files a petition asking the state to seek a determination of dependency and neglect, in order to gain the relief requested, the state has the burden of establishing the assertion thereon that the children are “neglected or dependent”. In re People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Dependency requires preponderance of proof. It is only necessary to prove the allegations of the petition alleging children to be dependent and neglected in a custody hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. Robinson v. People in Interest of Zollinger, 173 Colo. 113 , 476 P.2d 262 (1970).

In an action to declare children dependent or neglected, petitioner must prove the elements by a preponderance of the evidence. In re People in Interest of R.K., 31 Colo. App. 459, 505 P.2d 37 (1972).

Preponderance of evidence standard does not violate due process. Subsection (1), which permits a dependency adjudication under the preponderance of evidence standard, does not violate due process of law. People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982).

Where petitioner was deprived of significant parental rights that did not amount to a permanent termination of the parent-child relationship, her constitutional due process rights were not violated by the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard. While the court's order granted custody of the petitioner's children to the department, appointed the foster parents as permanent legal guardians, and ordered that the petitioner was to have no contact with her children until they were over 18, the trial court did retain jurisdiction over the case until the children were 21 and the petitioner retained the right to consent or withhold consent to adoption, the right to reasonable parenting time except as restricted by the court, and the right to determine the children's religious affiliation. L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271 (Colo. 2000).

This section does not lessen or shift the burden of proof. It allows the trial court to submit a case to the jury once the petitioner has presented a prima facie case, i.e., evidence that nonaccidental injury has occurred, and if the jury finds the children are neglected or dependent, that prima facie evidence shall be sufficient to uphold the jury's determination. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976); People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 592 P.2d 415 (1976).

This section does not direct that an adjudication of neglect or dependency shall be made on evidence merely showing nonaccidental injury, nor does it indicate that a respondent has the burden to rebut the evidence presented. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

Nor direct adjudication of neglect or place burden on respondent to rebut. This section does not direct that an adjudication of neglect and dependency shall be made on evidence merely showing nonaccidental injury, nor does it indicate that a respondent has the burden to rebut the evidence presented. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 592 P.2d 415 (1976).

Evidence must be clear and convincing and not based on hearsay to support finding that child was neglected and dependent. Daugaard v. People in Interest of Daugaard, 176 Colo. 38 , 488 P.2d 1101 (1971).

A parent, if a fit and suitable person, has the prior right of custody of his children over a grandparent or any other person or the state. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

And a parent is presumed to be a fit and suitable person to have the custody of his children. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417 , 339 P.2d 1008 (1959); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

The legal presumption is that natural parents are entitled to the custody of their children unless otherwise clearly established. Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421 , 283 P.2d 162 (1955).

The presumption is that the parents are fit and suitable persons to be entrusted with the care of their minor children, and that the interests and welfare of such children are best subserved when under such care and control. Allen v. Huffman, 135 Colo. 1 , 307 P.2d 802 (1957).

Such presumption can be overcome only by convincing evidence to the contrary. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

Such presumption is like the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, ever present, throughout the controversy, until overcome by the most solid and substantial reasons established by plain and certain proofs. Allen v. Huffman, 135 Colo. 1 , 307 P.2d 802 (1957).

Such presumption is ever present and can be overcome only by plain and certain proofs. Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417 , 339 P.2d 1008 (1959).

The statute of limitations for determining paternity does not apply to a proceeding to determine liability for support of a dependent, illegitimate child. Ortega v. Portales, 134 Colo. 537 , 307 P.2d 193 (1957).

Question for trier of fact. Where, in a neglect or dependency proceeding, it is shown that a child has sustained a nonaccidental injury resulting from an instance of parent-administered corporal punishment, the reasonableness of that punishment is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

Treatment of other children as consideration. Although physical injury to a child was not shown, it was proper for the trial court to consider a treatment accorded the other children in reaching a conclusion regarding the nonabused daughter. People in Interest of C.R., 38 Colo. App. 252, 557 P.2d 1225 (1976).

The trial court could reasonably infer that a nonabused child lacked proper parental care from the evidence establishing mistreatment of the others. People in Interest of C.R., 38 Colo. App. 252, 557 P.2d 1225 (1976).

The trial court may properly consider the treatment accorded the parents' other children in determining whether the child before it is neglected and dependent. People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981).

While a parent's treatment of one child may be considered in determining whether another child is dependent or neglected, consideration of the individual needs, strengths, and weaknesses of each child and each parent is also probative. People ex rel. T.T., 128 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005).

Evidence of a child's physical care, surroundings, and well-being is competent and material evidence to the issues in a dependency action. Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238 , 323 P.2d 628 (1958).

The consent to adoption signed by the parents had no legal effect other than as evidence of an intent to abandon the child. In re People in Interest of R.L., 32 Colo. App. 29, 505 P.2d 968 (1973).

Cause of illness must be proven. To justify finding of dependency and termination of parental rights, evidence must be shown that illness or disease in specific case was caused or resulted from lack of parental care. Daugaard v. People in Interest of Daugaard, 176 Colo. 38 , 488 P.2d 1101 (1971).

Evidence of care from other than parental sources admissible. If, through arrangements made by a parent, a child is being properly cared for by those who have a genuine interest in its welfare, the fact that the mother has obtained such help and has sought out and procured proper care for the child is evidence that the parent is not neglecting the child. It is also evidence of proper concern for the child's welfare and tends to establish that she was not abandoned or left homeless. Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238 , 323 P.2d 628 (1958); Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92 , 349 P.2d 704 (1960).

Evidence that child has been mistreated or abused in the past was sufficient to support adjudication of dependency and neglect of child. People in Interest of T.R.W., 759 P.2d 768 (Colo. App. 1988).

Admission by a mother with whom children did not reside that child had been assaulted and lacked proper parental care is not sufficient to sustain an adjudication of dependency and neglect against a father who disputed such allegations and demanded a jury trial. People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1989).

Summary judgment in favor of defendant and against mother of 9-year-old child was inappropriate under § 19-3-102 (1)(b) to (1)(d) where other than child's claim of abuse, there was no evidence of abuse under subsection (7)(a) which might have occurred while the child, who also spent time with noncustodial father, was in the mother's custody. People in Interest of C.C.G., 873 P.2d 41 (Colo. App. 1994).

Further, even if court were to characterize the enlarged vaginal opening as evidence of abuse pursuant to subsection (7)(a), it would establish only prima facie, not conclusive, evidence that child was neglected or dependent under this section. People in Interest of C.C.G., 873 P.2d 41 (Colo. App. 1994).

Application of exclusionary rule in a dependency and neglect case requires the court to balance the deterrent benefits of applying the rule against the societal cost of excluding relevant evidence. People ex rel. A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App. 2008).

Here, applying the rule would have a high societal cost in terms of protecting child welfare interests. Therefore, the court did not err in denying mother's motion to suppress evidence. People ex rel. A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App. 2008).

Presumption afforded parent under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), that parent is acting and will act in the best interests of the child is overcome by adjudicatory order finding a child dependent or neglected. The mere judicial authorization to file a petition alleging dependency or neglect does not overcome the Troxel presumption. People ex rel. N.G., 2012 COA 131 , 303 P.3d 1207.

The Troxel presumption will ordinarily survive a deferred adjudication because a deferred adjudication is not final as to the merits of the allegations set forth in the dependency and neglect petition, especially where the determination is based only on the parent's no-fault admission. People ex rel. N.G., 2012 COA 131 , 303 P.3d 1207.

The statutory criteria for adjudicating a child as dependent or neglected satisfies Troxel and does not require that the court find that both parents are unavailable, unable, or unwilling to provide reasonable parental care prior to adjudication. Adjudicatory proceedings are distinct from termination proceedings, and each has different goals and requirements. By requiring the state to prove that neither parent was available, able, and willing to provide reasonable parental care, the trial court erred in unnecessarily conflating the statutory dependency and neglect criteria with the termination criteria. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, 370 P.3d 1151.

Evidence of mother's acts in prior dependency and neglect cases for other children was relevant to jury's determination as to whether day-old child who had never been in mother's care would be exposed to an injurious environment. People in Interest of A.W., 2015 COA 144 M, 363 P.3d 784.

Court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence relating to psychosexual evaluation and polygraph examination during adjudication hearing. Father's participation in testing pre-adjudication was voluntary and father was under no obligation to participate in county department of human service's evaluation process. People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183 , 409 P.3d 645.

Lacking transcript, evidence, order reversed. Where an order was entered declaring a child neglected and dependent, severing parental rights, and holding the child's grandfather in contempt of court for failure to deliver the child, but the court reporter certified that there had been no transcript made of any of the hearings prior to the one on the contempt violation, and since there was no evidence or showing that the home environment which the grandfather might provide for the child would be unsatisfactory, the judgment and orders of the trial court were reversed. C.B. v. People in Interest of J.T.B., 30 Colo. App. 269, 493 P.2d 691 (1971).

Prima facie dependency established. Campbell v. Gilliam, 127 Colo. 471 , 257 P.2d 965 (1953).

Proper parental care established. A child placed with relatives or friends does have proper parental care when the parent or parents have sent gifts of clothing, money, food, household items, toys, and medical supplies to the child, and have frequently visited and communicated with the child. Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92 , 349 P.2d 704 (1960).

The single fact that a father has ceased making support payments to the mother for those children on whose behalf the state is invoking the doctrine of parens patriae does not establish that the children are “neglected or dependent”. This is particularly true where the father is acting under what he considers to be a controlling order of court which placed custody of the children with him. Under these circumstances, there is no showing that the father is failing or refusing to perform his obligations toward the children. In re People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Lack of parental care established. Most of the evidence presented in support of the petition was undisputed and the totality of all the evidence clearly supports the finding and order of the juvenile court that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the infant child lacked proper parental care because of his mother's apparent limitations and because of her actions and omissions. Johnson v. People in Interest of W__ J__, 170 Colo. 137 , 459 P.2d 579 (1969).

Where the mother has disappeared after refusing to support the child, where the alleged father is in the penitentiary, and where the child has been abandoned in the care of strangers who are in no way related to the natural parents or said child, who are under no legal obligation to care for and support the child, it is error for the trial court to find that the child was receiving proper parental care. Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92 , 349 P.2d 704 (1960).

Effect of parent's conviction of crime. The fact alone that a father had been convicted of a violation of the prohibition laws of the state did not justify a court order depriving him of the custody and control of his minor children. Ziemer v. Wheeler, 89 Colo. 242 , 1 P.2d 579 (1931).

Finding of abandonment justified. Where the evidence disclosed that the father of children, serving in the United States Navy, had notice of a dependency proceeding by mail, but upon returning failed to make any such arrangements or provision for the care of the children, a finding that he had abandoned such children was justified. Olsen v. Davidson, 142 Colo. 205 , 350 P.2d 338 (1960).

Where the evidence discloses that a child had been abandoned by its natural parents, a holding that such child was not dependent because it was in the custody of parties who were giving it proper care was erroneous. Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92 , 349 P.2d 704 (1960).

Evidence of abandonment insufficient. Where a young mother deserted by her husband is forced to make a living for herself and, if possible, for her child as well, who, faced with this emergency, and by agreement with her sister, has the sister take care of the child, and the child is well cared for in the sister's household, it cannot be said that such child is a dependent child within the meaning of this section nor can it be said that the mother had abandoned the child under the circumstances. Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511 , 265 P.2d 233 (1953).

Habeas corpus proceeding is not adjudication of abandonment. An adjudication in a habeas corpus proceeding involving custody of a minor child is not an adjudication of abandonment as defined in the adoption statute, nor as used in the dependent and neglected child statute, a district court having no jurisdiction in abandonment proceeding. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

Applied in Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536 , 5 P.2d 246 (1931).